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Monetary and Financial Structures: The Impact of Political Unrests and Wars Université Paris 10 Nanterre 19-20 Juin – June 19th-20th The French Stock Market in War David Le Bris1 Abstract : It is interesting to identify the extreme cases of changes in the stock exchange caused by wars. Stock return depends on how the war is financed. The Franco-Prussian war was financed only by regular debt thus stocks reflected only situations of real activity. WWI was partially financed by short term debt; however, since capital markets kept their freedom, stock prices can be adjusted. WWII and the beginning of German occupation was also financed by short term debt from the Banque but in a closed market: stocks prices increased. War affects not only return but structural characteristics of the market too. The Franco-Prussian war caused a durable all high interest rate, WWI changed the amplitude of stock movements and WWII affected the components of markets. After WWI and WWII, the importance of stock markets in the economy decreased. WWI is the major event affecting markets during the twentieth century; a contrefactual hypothesis of a quick German victory can help to understand the real price of victory. 1 David Le Bris is a PhD candidate in economic history. Dissertation under Prof. Dominique Barjot (Paris IV) : 150 ans de Cac 40 ou les actions françaises sur le long terme. David Le Bris is a graduate of DEA Economie Appliquée (Sciences-Po Paris), DESS Banques et Finances (Toulouse I), Maîtrise en droit international (Toulouse I), and Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Toulouse. Many thanks to Kim Phan. War, followed by defeat, is probably the worst event which can impact the stock market. Current conflict raises several issues of interest. Fernandez (2008) looks at the volatility change due to war in Irak. Rigobon and Sack (2005) find an important war risk premium in US assets just before the beginning of the war. There have been a number of studies with particular focus on the developments around World War II. Frey and Kucher (2000) analyse war situations using foreign government bond prices at the Zurich stock exchange. Oosterlinck (2003) compares prices of Vichy bonds with pre-war French bonds to measure the legitimacy of Vichy France. Brown and Burdekin (2002) study German bonds traded in London. Occhino, Oosterlinck and White (2007) show how occupied France financed its own exploitation. Marseille (2000) finds that several industries, like construction firms, have a better performance than the market. Most of these studies use market prices to understand war. This paper focuses on wars to understand stock returns. Confident stock market data exists since 1871 for the United States thanks to the precursor work of Alfred Cowles (1939), recently completed by Siegel or Goetzmann, Ibbostson and Peng (2000) for 1815-1871 period. The very specific economic history of the United States, a winner one, leads to an investigation into other countries. Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) compile a large panel of stock indices but without the quality of US data. They found that in Europe too, despite wars, stocks performed well in the 20th century. France is a good point of comparison with the US data due to three wars, not only victorious, but on national territory and also because of the major role of the Paris stock market before 1914. This study uses a new homogeneous stock index for the French stock market from 1854 to 1998.2 Basically, the “Cac 40” is a monthly index of the 40 most prominent shares among French firms, ranked (each year) by market capitalisation, thus avoiding survivor’s bias. The index is weighted by these capitalisations. 40 firms are few compared to the number of quoted stocks but these 40 represent a major part of the total market capitalisation. Today, the Euronext’s Cac 40 represents about 70 % of the French market capitalisation. It was the same or even better during war periods. In reality, the distribution of the firm’s size is not linear. Focusing on the forty first firms, the first one has a weighting of 12,73 % on average 2 See, Le Bris D. and Hautcoeur P-C., “A challenge to triumphant optimists? A new index for the Paris stock exchange (1854-2007)”, Working Paper, Paris School of Economics, n. 2008-21, 2008 to have a presentation of this index. http://www.pse.ens.fr/document/wp200821.pdf 2 from 1854 to 2007. The top ten represent more than 60 % whereas the final ten, less than 8 %. It has remained very stable over time; today3, the first French capitalisation (Total) has a weighting of 12,48 % while the last one (Air France) only 0,54 % but it has probably not remained stable internationally. To achieve the same 70 % of the total market capitalisation, more than 40 firms in United States or Japan are probably needed but fewer in Belgium, Switzerland or Finland. Thus, for France, with these 40 firms, a correct measure of the stock exchange is obtained. 18% Average weight by rank (1854 to 2007) 16% Average weignt + one standard deviation Average weight - one standard deviation 14% AVERAGE WEIGHT BY RANK from 1854 to 2007 RNK Weight Cumulate RNK Weight Cumulate RNK Weight Cumulate RNK Weight Cumulate 12% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Weight 10% 8% 6% 12,73% 9,20% 7,73% 6,75% 5,58% 4,71% 4,15% 3,67% 3,29% 3,05% 12,73% 21,93% 29,67% 36,41% 41,99% 46,70% 50,85% 54,52% 57,80% 60,86% 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2,77% 2,46% 2,27% 2,08% 1,94% 1,81% 1,69% 1,59% 1,51% 1,42% 63,63% 66,08% 68,35% 70,43% 72,37% 74,18% 75,87% 77,45% 78,97% 80,39% 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1,35% 1,30% 1,24% 1,20% 1,15% 1,12% 1,07% 1,04% 1,01% 0,97% 81,74% 83,04% 84,28% 85,48% 86,63% 87,75% 88,82% 89,87% 90,87% 91,85% 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 0,94% 92,78% 0,91% 93,69% 0,88% 94,57% 0,85% 95,42% 0,82% 96,25% 0,81% 97,05% 0,78% 97,83% 0,76% 98,59% 0,72% 99,31% 0,69% 100,00% 4% 2% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 Rank Figure 1, Firm’s index weight by rank (average 1854-2007) (Source : author) Using this database, index and components of the index, we are focusing on the stock market during war. This paper seeks to measure the impact of war on stock prices and to understand this impact looking at the way the war is financed. We observe that war affects not only stocks prices but the regime of the stock market: a high interest rate after 1871, the end of monetary stability with WWI and the partial nationalisation of the market after WWII. Consequently, the role of the stock market in the economy decreased after the two World Wars. We are going to try to measure the real financial cost of WWI using a hypothetical model of a French defeat in September 1914. 3 05/02/2008 3 THE PERFORMANCE OF STOCKS DEPENDS ON HOW THE WAR IS FINANCED Three wars, three different reactions France suffers three wars on its own national territory: one clear defeat (1870), one very difficult victory (WWI) and one defeat with a pseudo-victory (WWII). Stock market prices present similar movements prior to war declaration. Prices are stable, the market seems to not expect serious negative consequences from the war. Starting from a year before the declaration of war, prices decrease about 10 % before WWI and WWII and keep perfectly stable during the same one year period before the Franco-Prussian war. Once the war starts, variations differ strongly. After the defeat, stock prices fall 20 % in 1871. At the beginning of WWI, stock prices fall about 15 %. It is a very different scenario for WWII. Two months after the declaration of war, during the “drôle de guerre” and after the armistice, stock prices rise very quickly, with a weak impact from the military defeat. This rise in nominal prices during WWII is very homogeneous until January 1943. Since the declaration of war, prices are multiplied by 4. After that date, the trend is reversed but the coefficient is always 2,5 at the end of the war. 5,0 Franco-prussian (january 1869-december1876) 4,5 January 1943 WWI (january 1913-december 1920) 4,0 June 1944 Paris Liberation WWII (january 1938-december 1945) Stock price 3,5 3,0 WAR 2,5 "Drôle de guerre" End of WWII French defeat 2,0 1,5 End of WWI 1,0 75 72 69 66 63 60 57 54 51 48 45 42 39 36 33 30 27 24 21 15 9 12 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -1 8 -1 5 -1 2 18 End of franco-prussian war 0,5 Month Figure 2, Price reaction of the Cac 40 during wars (Source : author) 4 Nominal and real prices Nominal and real prices are definitively different. These stocks prices are those quoted in the stock market: they are nominal. With the value of the French franc falling, the real performance is not the same. It is reasonable to assume that investors are more concerned with real performances than with nominal ones. Only the capital value is measured, the total return of a stock holder is different since a dividend exists. Dividends or coupons are not used since yield impact is very weak when price variations are so large. It is difficult to measure inflation, even more so during a war with the generalisation of the black market. In order to measure all the “war effect”, it is necessary to look at the resulting situation a few years after the war. The years immediately following the end of the war must be included in the analysis of its effects. To understand stock performances, State bond and gold prices are also presented here. Three wars, two near total losses. The Franco-Prussian war causes a 40 % loss for both stocks and bonds. Nominal and real performances are similar since inflation does not really exist. One year after, the loss in the value of stocks is only 20 % but 30 % for bonds. At the end of WWI, the decrease in value is about 65 % for stocks and more than 70 % for bonds. Two years after, it is worse: 75 % for stocks and 80 % for bonds. WWII is different with a nominal increase but a terrible real performance. On the top of stock prices, the real performance is + 75 % but at the end of the war, the real variation is – 40 % and – 70 % for bonds. A few years after, in January 1949, the loss is more or less complete with – 88 % for stocks and – 95 % for bonds since in 1946, 1947 and 1948, the inflation rate is above 50 % each year. During these two last wars, gold achieves very attractive performances. Two years after the end of WWI, gold holders have the same real value as prior the war. The highest value of stocks in January 1943 of + 75 % pales in comparison to the + 500 % achieved by gold! At the end of WWII, gold keeps a 400 % increase and 20 % in January 1949. 5 January 1870 January 1871 January 1872 january 1914 january 1915 january 1916 january 1917 january 1918 january 1919 january 1920 january 1921 january 1939 january 1940 january 1941 january 1942 january 1943 january 1944 january 1945 january 1946 january 1947 january 1948 january 1949 PRICES IN WAR Stocks Rente 3 % Nominal Real Nominal Real Franco-Prussian war 100 100 100 100 74,11 63,68 69,84 60,02 88,53 81,56 75,79 70,29 WWI 100 100 100 100 85,61 71,94 84,62 71,11 74,83 55,84 74,82 55,84 83,55 52,22 72,77 45,48 84,62 40,88 68,66 33,17 90,23 34,84 72,24 27,89 94,18 26,38 69,72 19,53 84,36 27,04 68,31 21,89 WWII 100 100 100 100 111,46 93,91 90,44 76,20 160,17 115,07 102,35 73,53 241,36 144,33 113,08 67,62 367,00 176,72 114,96 55,35 299,47 117,98 113,61 44,76 262,32 69,66 117,89 31,31 208,72 36,33 116,07 20,20 263,91 30,79 105,34 12,29 212,39 15,62 78,01 5,74 186,06 12,09 73,31 4,76 Gold Nominal Real 100 100 100 100 85,93 92,74 100 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 105,00 225,00 304,00 100 84,03 74,63 62,50 48,31 40,54 63,03 97,44 100 112,08 575,10 1 082,45 1 237,14 1 514,69 1 676,73 2 193,88 1 371,43 1 906,12 1 857,14 100 94,43 413,17 647,30 595,72 596,72 445,27 381,89 160,02 140,14 120,65 Figure 3, Nominal and real prices during and after wars (Source : INSEE, author) Three different ways to finance wars, three different impacts on stocks prices These different price reactions during these wars can be explained by the method used to finance each war. The main cost of the Franco-Prussian war is an indemnity financed by standard debt (Emprunt Thiers). 5 billion francs of new debt between 1871 and 1872 is just equal to the market capitalisation of the Cac 40 in January 1871. The comparison with the stock market capitalisation is used to represent the size of these amounts. Thus, the “financial cost” of the war is only about 100 % of the market capitalisation. This new debt causes a fall in bonds prices but financial stability is maintained. For WWI, it is very different: it is the birth of inflation. Before 1914, the new public debt is non-existent. The beginning of the war is financed by short term debt (1/3 from the 6 Banque de France) but from 1916, long term bonds issues are massive. Between 1915 and 1924, new “Rente” is about 45 billion franc-or. It is nearly double of all issues during the preceding century. Between 1798 and 1914, total new “Rente” is only 26,3 billion francs (nominal capital).4 The next figure shows, for each year, the growth of debt (short and long term)5 divided by market capitalisation of the Cac 40 at the beginning of the year. 350% New short term debt / stock market capitalization New long term debt / stock market capitalization 300% 250% 200% 150% 100% 50% 0% 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 -50% Figure 4, New public debt on stock market capitalisation at the beginning of the year during WWI (Source: INSEE, author) War causes different impacts on securities. The impact on bonds is direct because of the increase in interest rate. Massive issues of long-term public debt should have a negative impact on stock prices since it is an alternative choice for savers and a higer cost of debt for firms. The main effect comes from monetary creations (advances from the Banque de France and “Bons de la Défense Nationale” during WWI too6) which causes a non-anticipated inflation whose impact is very strong. Perhaps this kind of inflation is never anticipated since for savers, it is a period of heavy losses each time. Conventional wisdom suggests that nominal stock returns should be relatively high when inflation is high and vice-versa, since stocks represent claims on real assets that should increase value with inflation. From 1926 to 1996, in the United States, with a weak inflation compared to France, there is no discernable 4 Vaslin J-M., « Le siècle d’or de la Rente perpétuelle française », in Gallais-Hamonno G., Le marché financier français au XIXème siècle, vol. II, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007, p. 185 5 INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1951 6 Eichengreen shows a strong correlation between inflation and monetary growth (M1 which includes “Bons de la Défense nationale issued in the early 20’s were sufficiently liquid to serve as close substitute for money”) among 12 countries over the period 1921-1927. Eichengreen B., Elusive stability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990 p. 27 7 relationship between stock performances and inflation rate7. “Accordingly, stocks are not good hedges against inflation rate”.8 It is worse in France with high war inflation. Stock prices never follow inflation. WWI and WWII differ in the level of capital freedom. During WWI, the majority of the rules of the market keep safe. Exportation of capital is free and foreign securities can be bought. The French government only rent or buy foreign securities9 to pay for importations in dollars. Stock prices adjust without any constraint, real values decrease quickly. It is not the same during the Second World War. During WWII, all assets are controlled: frontiers are closed to export money. Money can only buy national assets. It is the famous “circuit”. Consequently, there is a boom for stock prices due to a lot of new money created in the country. War needs money. With the “mobilisation générale”, 25 billion from the Banque de France is made available for the government.10 Another convention11 sees 20 billion more being offered by the Banque. This amount is nearly the value of all stocks listed (in January 1939, market capitalisation of the Cac 40 is only 42 billion). In February 1940, 20 billion is spent by the government; on May 9th, only 21,6 billion is spent but after the defeat (10th June), this figure rises to 36 billion. This advance rises to 57,7 billion on the 1st August after a new convention between the government and the Banque de France. German occupation causes an unbelievable creation of new money. The armistice convention of the 22nd June 1940 sets an occupation indemnity of 400 million francs a day, to be paid by the French government. In May 194112, this amount decreases to 300 million a day but rises to 500 million in winter 194213 when the south of France becomes occupied too. As a result, together with some additional various expenditure (Italian indemnity, maintenance of 7 Correlation coefficient between stock returns and inflation rate is -0,01. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 1997 Yearbook, Chicago, Ibbotson Associates, 1997. Various studies find the same absence of relation in the shortterm at least. 8 Sharpe W., Alexander G., Bailey J., Investments, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1999, p. 331 9 Pennsylvania 3 % and Chicago Milwaukee 4 % are bought at issue price by French government in June 1915. After, it is Central Pacific 4 % and New-York New-Haven 4 % . After 5th May 1916, securities are rented by the State, compensated by a dividend/coupon majoration of 25 %. A certificate of rent can be exchanged on the market but few transactions are listed. 10 convention of 29th September, 1938 11 29th February 1940 12 May, 11, 1941 13 November, 11, 1942 8 military bases), the French government transfers 80 billion in 1940, 130 billion in 1941, 124 billion in 1942, 220 billion in 1943 et 142 billion in 1944.14 The total amount is about 700 billion.15 A new kind of advance from the Banque de France is used to pay German troops: “frais d’entretien des troupes d’occupation”. The total of this new money is about 426 billion francs compared to 40 billion which is the market capitalisation of the Cac 40 in January 1939. With only the 1940 transfer amount, Germany can buy all the stocks in the Cac 40 two times over, and 17 times over (700/40) with all the francs transferred during the war. Avances pour "frais d'entretien des troupes d'occupation" par la Banque de France (en milliards) Convention Approuvé Publié au relevant le plafond date par loi du J.O le plafond de porté à 25 août 1940 25 août 1940 13 septembre 1940 50 50 29 octobre 1940 29 octobre 1940 1 novembre 1940 15 65 12 décembre 1940 16 décembre 1940 17 décembre 1940 8 73 30 décembre 1940 31 décembre 1940 20 janvier 1941 12 85 20 février 1941 22 février 1941 22 mars 1941 15 100 30 avril 1941 3 mai 1941 6 juillet 1941 4 104 10 mai 1941 30 mai 1941 6 juin 1941 4 108 11 juin 1941 11 juin 1941 24 juin 1941 10 118 11 septembre 1941 21 septembre 1941 23 septembre 1941 12 130 27 novembre 1941 9 décembre 1941 12 décembre 1941 12 142 26 décembre 1941 31 décembre 1941 8 février 1942 8 150 5 mars 1942 26 mars 1942 5 avril 1942 10 160 30 avril 1942 4 mai 1942 5 mai 1942 9 169 11 juin 1942 12 juin 1942 13 juin 1942 12 181 17 septembre 1942 28 septembre 1942 1 octobre 1942 15 196 19 novembre 1942 4 décembre 1942 6 décembre 1942 15 211 21 janvier 1943 12 février 1943 17 février 1943 20 231 31 mars 1943 8 avril 1943 10 avril 1943 30 261 8 juillet 1943 10 juillet 1943 8 août 1943 30 291 30 septembre 1943 30 septembre 1943 14 octobre 1943 30 321 16 décembre 1943 20 décembre 1943 5 janvier 1944 30 351 23 mars 1944 30 mars 1944 6 avril 1944 30 381 17 mai 1944 8 juin 1944 16 juin 1944 30 411 20 juillet 1944 non publiée 15 426 Figure 5, Advances from Banque de France to finance German occupation (Source: Sédillot, 1945) This new money, without any new wealth being generated in the French economy, causes price adjustment (inflation) but most of the prices are controlled thus it is a flight for real assets and a boom for stocks. All free prices rise quickly, carpets or stamps, gold (black market) or stocks. Stocks with real value (real estate or retail stores with many real estate properties, like Au Printemps) have the best performances. In January 1943, stocks prices are 4 times more than in 1939. Stock prices start to fall in 1943 when the end of this exceptional 14 Sédillot R., Le franc enchaîné, histoire de la monnaie française pendant la guerre et l’Occupation, Paris, Sirey, 1945, p. 139 15 Pollard A.A., War, Economy and Society 1939-1945, London, 1977 p. 132 said 600 billion. 9 situation seems to be on the horizon. In January, the first big German defeat in Stalingrad takes place, and also the fusion between the Giraud and Leclerc armies in Tunisia. We notice that stock increase is very weak compare to gold prices. It is probably a liquidity premium (gold can be used to pay anything anytime, unlike stocks) and a security premium (stocks and firms can support political restriction, not gold). War cause spectacular price variations but changes the nature of the market too. STRUCTURAL CHANGES AFTER WAR Franco-Prussian war increases interest rates for years In order to pay the indemnity to the Prussians, two big issues (2 and 3 billion) of debt take place. This 5 billion franc of debt is about 20 % of the French GDP. After this major transaction, the interest rate decreases more slowly than after previous interest rate peaks in 1840, 1848 or 1852. A new progressive wave of saving can probably explain this gradual decrease in interest rate. The first "Emprunt Thiers", 2 billion of “Rente 5 %” the 21st June 1871 is sold with an attractive prime: the actuarial rate is 6,5 % when the bond market indicates 5,8 %. The second one of three billion is the most significant of the whole century, it is sold with a 6,32 % rate.16 Only ten years after, this rate is under 3,5 %. It is the only one that experiences a slow decrease during this century. This slow decrease is accompanied by a symmetric increase for stock prices. This increase is very regular. While a financial crisis affects international markets in 1873, the French one is not affected. A decrease in interest rate causes a mechanic growth in stock price since bonds investment is less attractive, the discount rate decreases and an indirect effect with the fall in the cost of debt for firms. So a relationship exists probably between this progressive decrease in interest rate and the growth of stock prices. 16 Vaslin J-M., « Le siècle d’or de la rente perpétuelle française », in Gallais-Hamonno G., Le marché financier français au XIXème siècle, vol. II, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007, p. 182 10 250 6,50% June 1871 & July 1872 "Emprunt Thiers" for prussian tribute Top of interest rate 230 6,00% CAC 40 210 Long terme interest rate (Rente 3 %) 5,50% 5,00% 170 + 138 % + 5,35 %/year 1873 "International crisis" 150 4,50% Interest rate Stock price 190 130 4,00% 110 3,50% 90 1871 1885 3,00% 18 71 18 71 18 71 18 72 18 72 18 73 18 73 18 73 18 74 18 74 18 75 18 75 18 76 18 76 18 76 18 77 18 77 18 78 18 78 18 78 18 79 18 79 18 80 18 80 18 81 18 81 18 81 18 82 18 82 18 83 18 83 18 83 18 84 18 84 70 Figure 6, Stock price and interest rate (Rente 3 %) (1871-1885) (Source: author) WWI affects the distribution of stocks variations From WWI, the amplitude of price movements increases. Mean and standard deviation are 0,10 %/month and 2,20 %/month before 1914 but 0,32 % and 5,74 % after WWI. Of course the real economic situation is more volatile after 1914 but this probably cannot explain all this variation in price movement. The end of the franc-or provides a new source of risk: monetary value. This regime change is clear on the next graph. All monthly price variations of 2007 2003 1999 1995 1992 1988 1984 1980 1976 1972 1969 1965 1961 1957 1953 1949 1946 1942 1938 1934 1930 1926 1923 1919 1915 1911 1907 1903 1900 1896 1892 1888 1884 1880 1877 1873 1869 1865 1861 1857 1854 the Cac 40 since 1854 are shown. 30% Monthly price variation of the Cac 40 1 écart-type 1914 20% Monthly price variation 10% 0% -10% -20% -30% 1 8 5 4 -1 9 1 3 M ean S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n K u rt o s is S kew ness R ange M in im u m M a x im u m C ount C o n fid e n c e L e v e l(9 5 ,0 % ) J a rq u e - B e rra 0 ,1 0 % 2 ,2 0 % 1 0 ,2 6 - 0 ,5 8 2 5 ,6 9 % -1 4 ,4 0 % 1 1 ,3 0 % 719 0 ,0 0 1 6 1619 1 9 1 4 -1 9 7 3 M ean S ta n d a rd D e v ia tio n K u rto s is Skew ness R ange M in im u m M a x im u m C ount C o n f id e n c e L e v e l(9 5 ,0 % ) J a rq u e -B e rra 0 ,3 2 % 5 ,7 4 % 4 ,6 3 0 ,4 4 4 6 ,6 4 % -2 1 ,4 0 % 2 5 ,2 4 % 720 0 ,0 0 4 2 103 -40% Date Figure 7, Monthly price variation of the Cac 40 (1854-2007) (Source: author) 11 One may imagine it is only the magnitude of price variation which increases. Actually the distribution rules change too. It is not a Gaussian one before or after 1914 since the “Jarque-Berra” is too strong. A Khi² test makes a comparison possible between the nature of price variation distribution before and after 1914. Price variations are ranked by a quarter of standard deviation before and after 1914. This bin range makes a comparison possible between the distribution rule before and after the war. An identical distribution can be rejected by this khi² test. Thus the distribution is not Gaussian and is different before and after 1914. The distribution rule is probably never stable during any long period. Monthly pricevariation 1854-1913 1914-1973 Mean 0,10% 0,32% Standard-deviation 2,20% 5,74% Maximal Bin -10,13% 34,64% Minimal Bin -16,35% -33,96% 133 khi 2 >5% 43,8 WWII affects the components of the French stock market WWII has an impact on the component of the stock market. Nationalisations of the Libération can be considered as a result of the war. This policy was in the program of the Conseil National de la Résistance. At the very least, the war accelerates this movement. Different industries are nationalised: banking (4 big companies only), energy (electricity, coal, gas), insurance (not present in the Cac 40 since this industry is not concentrated). From the 1939 Cac 40, 28 % is nationalised. It is the first time that a big part of the market artificially disappears; the nationalisation of the railways in 1936 represents only 5,88 % of the 1936 Cac 40. 12 RANK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 CAC 40 IN 1939 WITH FIRMS NATIONIONALIZED (in bold) Firm Weight RANK Firm 21 Mines de Lens SC Canal maritime de Suez 18,65% Brasseries Argentine Quilmès 5,78% 22 Electro-Chimie d'Ugine Crédit Foncier de France 5,61% 23 Compteurs à gaz 24 Union d'électricité Rhône Poulenc 4,05% Air Liquide 3,65% 25 Française des Pétroles Banque de France 3,65% 26 Hts fourneauxde Pont à Mousson Crédit Lyonnais 3,23% 27 Charbonnages du Tonkin Le Nickel 2,89% 28 Terres Rouges 29 Mines de Courrières Saint Gobain 2,86% Sté Lyonnaise des Eaux et d'Eclairage* 2,64% 30 Orléans Banque de l'Indo-Chine 2,48% 31 Forges et Aciéries du Nord et de l'Est Société Générale 2,46% 32 Mines de Marles Cie Parisienne de distibution d'électricité 3,09% 33 Nord 34 Force motrice La Truyère Produits chimiques d'Alais et Camargue 2,23% Etb Kuhlmann 2,02% 35 Cie de Béthune Kali Ste Thérèse 2,00% 36 Energie electrique du littoral medit Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 1,87% 37 Cie Gale d'Electricité 38 Houilles de Blanzy Raffinerie Say 1,78% Paris Lyon Méditérannée 1,72% 39 Sarre et Moselle Comptoir Nationale d'Escompte 1,69% 40 Port du Rosario * water part is not nationalized TOTAL NATIONALIZED Weight 1,65% 1,61% 1,59% 1,58% 1,45% 1,37% 1,35% 1,33% 1,30% 1,19% 1,17% 1,16% 1,15% 1,15% 1,14% 1,13% 1,12% 1,09% 1,08% 1,05% 28,05% Figure 8, Cac 40 in 1939 with firms nationalised after WWII (Source: author) WWII changes the nature of the stock market. The diversification of the index decreases since specific industries disappear. For example, the banking industry which had played a major role in the stock market since 1854 became a minor player. Before WWII, the weighting of the banking industry (without the Banque de France) in the index is always above 15 % but after nationalisation it is only about 5 %. A new leading role is played after WWII by oil firms. After a few decades a new quoted bank industry appears but privatisations during the 1980s are necessary to restore its place in the market. 50% 45% Total weight of bank (and insurance since 1980s) in the Cac 40 (without Banque de France) 40% 35% 30% WWII 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 20 04 19 99 19 94 19 89 19 84 19 79 19 74 19 69 19 64 19 59 19 54 19 49 19 44 19 39 19 34 19 29 19 24 19 19 19 14 19 09 19 04 18 99 18 94 18 89 18 84 18 79 18 74 18 69 18 64 18 59 18 54 0% Figure 9, Weight of bank industry in the Cac 40 (1854-1990) (Source: author) 13 LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR The role of the French stock market decreases after the World Wars The World Wars cause a fall in the role of the stock exchange in the economy. WWI changes the importance of the stock market in the economic system. The ratio of the capitalisation of the 40 biggest stocks to French GDP was 21 % in January 1914. This ratio is only 7,71 % in January 1919. The 1914 level was only reached in 1995. Market Capitalisation on GDP falls again after the WWII from 8,16 % to less than 2 %. For each war, the changes are the consequences of political choices: nationalisation after WWII and fixed selling prices with high taxation after WWI. 40% Market Capitalization of the Cac 40 on GDP 35% 1914 21,57 % 30% %of GDP 25% 20% 15% 1919 7,72 % 10% 1939 8,16 % 5% 1951 1,82 % 18 53 18 56 18 59 18 62 18 65 18 68 18 71 18 74 18 77 18 80 18 83 18 86 18 89 18 92 18 95 18 98 19 01 19 04 19 07 19 10 19 13 19 16 19 19 19 22 19 25 19 28 19 31 19 34 19 37 19 40 19 43 19 46 19 49 0% Figure 10, Market capitalisation of the Cac 40 on french GDP (1854-1951) (Sources: INSEE, author) The market capitalisation is the value of firms. The value of one firm is the present value of all future profits of the firm, the value of market capitalisation is the present value of all future profits of all quoted firms. It is always difficult to appreciate the discounted rate but dividends are known. 14 500 000 000 WWI 450 000 000 WWI 400 000 000 350 000 000 300 000 000 250 000 000 200 000 000 150 000 000 100 000 000 50 000 000 Dividends payed by Cac 40 firms in francs 1914 18 55 18 58 18 61 18 64 18 67 18 70 18 73 18 76 18 79 18 82 18 85 18 88 18 91 18 94 18 97 19 00 19 03 19 06 19 09 19 12 19 15 19 18 19 21 19 24 19 27 19 30 19 33 19 36 19 39 19 42 19 45 19 48 19 51 - Figure 12, Dividends payed by Cac 40 firms (1855-1951) (Source: author) After WWII, it is normal to have fewer dividends because a part of the stock market is nationalised, so there is a decrease in the market capitalisation on GDP ratio. It is different after WWI because all firms are present before and after the war. The production level of 1924 is about 115% of the 1913 one17 but dividends are only 44 % of those during 1913. Why is this market capitalisation on GDP ratio divided by three after WWI? Some of the damage for a few firms is due to WWI but real activity of most of them does not change. This difference between production and dividends can be explained (partially) by inflation. Stocks are not only a real asset. A well-known explanation is the high taxation level after war whose impact is multiplied by inflation since the tax rate is applied on nominal profits.18 Another explanation for the fall in dividends is the weighting of firms with fixed sale prices. In 1914, 37 % of the market capitalisation have activities with fixed income. All concession firms (electricity, water, railways) have contracts with political authorities. Inflation increases costs for these firms but sale prices are fixed by contracts. These firms cannot perform in the same manner. Ten years after, less than 15 % of the market capitalisation is firms with "fixed sale prices". 17 18 Sauvy A., Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, Paris, Economica, 1984, Tome 1, p. 39 See Hautcoeur (2001) 15 RANK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 CAC 40 IN 1914 WITH FIXED SALE PRICES (in bold) Firm Weight RANK Firm Canal maritime de Suez 9,22% 21 Banque de l'Indo-Chine Paris Lyon Méditérannée 8,50% 22 Crédit Industriel et Commercial Nord 7,46% 23 Mines de Vicoigne et Noeux SC 24 Cie Parisienne de distibution d'électricité Banque de France 7,05% Crédit Lyonnais 6,96% 25 Banque de l'Union Parisienne Société Générale 6,79% 26 Penarroya Orléans 6,60% 27 Mines de Béthune SC Est 4,43% 28 Banque hypothécaire franco-argentine Mines de Lens SC 3,75% 29 Forges et Aciéries de la marined'Homécourt Comptoir Nationale d'Escompte 3,50% 30 Nouvelles Galeries Crédit Foncier de France 2,93% 31 sté Centrale des banques de Province N Mines de Courrières 2,45% 32 Mokta-el-hadid Midi 2,34% 33 Boléo Ouest 2,24% 34 Procédé Thomson-Houston Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 2,05% 35 Mines de Dourges SC Schneider et cie 1,69% 36 Sté d'Electricité de Paris Metropolitain Paris 1,46% 37 Cie Gale des Omnibus de Paris Cie Gale des Eaux 1,40% 38 Sté Marseillaise de Crédit Industriel Phosphates de Gafsa 1,38% 39 Crédit Mobilier Banque de l'Algérie 1,26% 40 Paris-France TOTAL FIXED SALE PRICES RANK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 36,70% CAC 40 IN 1924 WITH FIXED SALE PRICES (in bold) Firm Weight RANK Firm Canal maritime de Suez 9,74% 21 Raffinerie Say Banque de France 6,10% 22 Mines d'Aniche Saint Gobain 4,56% 23 Mines de Marles Mines de Lens SC 4,08% 24 Banque Nationale de Crédit Paris Lyon Méditérannée 3,89% 25 Soie artificielle d'Izieux Crédit Foncier de France 3,81% 26 Procédés Thomson-Houston Crédit Lyonnais 3,60% 27 Penarroya Brasseries Argentine Quilmès 3,58% 28 Phosphates de Gafsa Mines de Courrières 3,23% 29 Comptoir Lyon-Allemand Société Générale 3,20% 30 Au Bon Marché Ouenza 3,04% 31 Cie Parisienne de distibution d'électricité Nord 3,03% 32 Produits chimiques d'Alais et Camargue Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas 2,88% 33 Etb Kuhlmann Orléans 2,63% 34 Union d'électricité Banque de l'Indo-Chine 2,44% 35 Banque de l'Union Parisienne Charbonnages du Tonkin 2,43% 36 Banque hypothécaire franco-argentine Mines d'Anzin 2,25% 37 Compagnie Algérienne Est 2,25% 38 Forges et Aciéries de Huta-Bankowa Comptoir Nationale d'Escompte 2,16% 39 Banque de l'Algérie Mines de Vicoigne et Noeux SC 1,82% 40 Houilles de Blanzy TOTAL FIXED SALE PRICES Weight 1,24% 1,18% 1,12% 1,02% 1,00% 0,92% 0,88% 0,82% 0,81% 0,81% 0,75% 0,74% 0,73% 0,71% 0,70% 0,63% 0,63% 0,62% 0,62% 0,62% Weight 1,79% 1,78% 1,77% 1,73% 1,67% 1,64% 1,58% 1,55% 1,53% 1,52% 1,47% 1,40% 1,31% 1,30% 1,26% 1,21% 1,21% 1,20% 1,19% 1,15% 14,56% Figure 13, Cac 40 in 1914 and 1924 with fixed sale prices firms (Source: author) The price of victory or what happened if the Germans had won the Marne battle ? The counterfactual hypothesis is a useful method to understand the impact of the WWI on financial markets. It has already been shown how this war represents a period of change on the stock markets. This complete upheaval that occurred in WWI can be underestimated by the appearance of graphs or returns in the long run that seem to tone down 16 the consequences of this single event. Bordo and Hautcoeur (2007) show why a stabilisation of the Franc was impossible just after WWI thanks to the public debt amounts but possible in 1924. Alfred Sauvy (1984) estimates losses, caused by post-war inflation, for state bondholders, of 1 000 billion franc-1929 (172 billion franc-or), close to 333 % of GDP.19 In the same vein as this estimate, a counterfactual hypothesis allows a greater understanding of the impact of the war, looking at what would have happened if the conflict had not taken place or, to put it more precisely, if the Germans had achieved a quick victory. The First World War could have turned out very differently to how it did. Indeed, at the battle of the Marne (6th/9th 1914), the Germans very nearly claimed victory due to the Schlieffen manoeuvre. This battle marks a turning point in the German advance; British troops were ready to go back to the ports of the English Channel. It required the emergency dispatch of 10 000 soldiers from the military base of Paris, 6 000 of which were transported by the famous Marne’s Taxis, as well as a little luck to save the capital from the Germans. What would have happened if the taxis had not existed or more precisely if the Marne battle had been lost or perhaps more generally if the WWI had ended on the 10th September 1914, after only one month of combat, with the victorious arrival of the Germans in Paris and a humiliating armistice for France? Undoubtedly, the course of history would have been different on many fronts. This study only seeks to measure the financial cost of the actual longer war by looking at the financial market values if the Germans had been quickly victorious. The model used here is the simpliest possible. It consists of comparing what became of invested savings in stocks and bonds between 1914 and 1928 with what they would have become if the 19th century returns had been maintained. The difference represents the “financial cost” of the war for French savers. 1928 is used here since this year constitutes the legal end of the Germinal franc and it is frequently assumed that the WWI was financially settled during this year. The Franc has recovered a kind of stability at this point; however, the time period starting from 1929 is another story. This model is based upon three hypotheses which are to be discussed. 19 Sauvy A., Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres, Paris, Economica, 1984, Tome 1, p. 290 17 Hypotheses discussion: - H1, hypothetical financial returns between January 1914 and December 1928 are identical to that recorded between January 1854 and December 1913 This is the most important hypothesis of this study. It is impossible to consider any other situation because the best estimate of what would have been is what has already happened in the past. In addition, the 59 years between 1854 and 1913 were not particularly successful. They were affected by significant financial crashes (1857 and 1882), by a major military defeat (1871) and also by a major economic depression at the end of the century. The 1928 value of stock market capitalisation in 1914 depends on the rate of revenue reinvestment. This rate is impossible to calculate and difficult to explain in a theoretical manner. On one hand, the rate of revenue is the only way to estimate the opportunity cost of choosing to spend rather than to save revenue. On the other hand, a complete reinvestment appears not to be very realistic. Siegel20 points out that using the rate obtained by a permanent reinvestment of dividends in US stocks between 1802 and 1992, a rich man at the beginning of the 19th century who invested one million dollars (equivalent to 12 millions dollars in 1992) would have found himself with 3 000 billion dollars in 1992. This sum of money would have allowed him to buy the entire stock market capitalisation of North America! The reality however is somewhat different with investors sometimes spending their own savings. A factor α, is therefore included, the rate of revenue reinvested with 0<α<1. The two extreme cases are to be considered : α=0 et α=1. - H2, the currency system remains the franc-or, there is no inflation, Without a pressing need to finance military spending, there is no reason to believe that a currency system who had already survived five changes of government, two military defeats and three revolutions, could not have withstood another military defeat. - H3, The French market capitalisations are held by the country’s savers This is a simplified hypothesis because it is impossible to know precisely the proportion of French assets that were being held by foreigners in 1913. This does not affect the nature of this study but maybe its scale. The loss caused by WWI can easily be reduced by the 20 Siegel J., Stocks for the long run, Irvin, New-York, 1994, p. 7 18 percentage corresponding to the loss suffered by foreign savers in possession of French stocks and bonds in 1913. However, taking into account that France was an exporter of capital, it can equally be claimed that French savers had more capital at their disposal abroad than foreign savers in France, and that these foreign investments could be subject to the same reasoning. Would Russian debt have been paid back if the Germans had achieved a quick victory? Losses to assets abroad caused by the war probably compensated largely the proportion of the loss in French assets affecting foreign owners. The model : World War One cost for Stocks = (Hypothetical value in 1928 of 1914 stock market capitalisation) - (Observed value in 1928 of 1914 stock market capitalisation) stocks Cost = MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) s s (15 ) [ − MC s 1914 * (1 + Robs ) (15) s φ ] s (1 + Robs ) (15) s (15 ) = MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) − φ s R with MC s hyp s 1914 = ∆p s hyp + α rdt hyp s : Market capitalisation for stocks in 1914 obs : for observed, and hyp : for hypothetical (approximate by observed from 1854 to 1913) ∆p s hyp rdt : Geometric mean of price variations, for stocks (hypothetical) s hyp : Yield (dividends/price), for stocks (hypothetical) φ : number to switch 1928 francs into 1914 francs 1 franc 1928 = 0,1829267 francs 1914 (INSEE), thus φ = 5,4666703 19 Results for stocks : Stock market capitalisation of the Cac 40 in January 1914 was 12 000 103 600 francs, and total capitalisation of the most liquid French stocks was 17 882 613 250 francs. This figure is that of French savings invested in stocks in 1914. What really happened between 1914 and 1928: In January 1914, the Cac 40 was at 189 points and it rose to 453 in December 1928. Stock holders benefit, over this 15 years period, from an annual geometric mean of 6,16 %. 1914 stock market capitalisation, about 18 billions, has a value of 43 billion in December 1928. Yet if expressed in the franc of 1914, it is no more than 8 billion. Therefore, the loss is about half the 1914 value. The complete stock market capitalisation observed at the end of 1928 is 61 billion of 1928 francs. Thus, 33 % ((61-43)/61) of this capitalisation comes from new investment. In other words, a new wave of savings which has occurred since the war allows a gradual reconstitution of the stock market capitalisation. What could have happened if 19th century returns were maintained: From 1854 to 1913, the Cac 40 increases by 0,82 % each year (geometric mean). The 18 billion of stock capitalisation in 1914 which hypothetically could have increased at this rate during the 15 years between 1914 and 1928 would have been therefore 20 billion in francs of 1914 while only being 8 billion in reality. The loss is thus about 12 billion franc-or. These figures obviously increase when assuming the hypothesis of a partial dividend reinvestment (α>0). Assuming a complete dividend reinvestment (α=1), the loss is about 27 billion franc-or. To help understand the scale of these figures, these amounts are compared to the French GDP in 1914 (54 billion). Therefore, the cost of war for French stock holders, in shortfall, is between 23 and 51 % of 1914 GDP. Value in 1928 of the 1914 market capitalization for stocks in francs 1914 α=0 Hypothetical (I) Observed (II) Cost WWI (I-II) α=1 20 691 656 884 41 403 000 882 8 019 414 351 13 794 281 925 12 672 242 533 27 608 718 957 20 Generalisation for all French savings : A major part of French wealth was not however invested in stocks. An identical argument can also be made with the investments in public and private bonds in order to find the total loss. In 1914, the market capitalisation of public bonds is 25,52 billion francs21. According to Michalet22, the value of the investment in French private bonds is 30 billion. Thus, the model becomes: Cost total = Cost stocks + Cost bonds + Cost statebonds Cost total s bo (1 + Robs ) (15) (1 + Robs ) (15) bo s bo (15 ) (15 ) + MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) − = MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) − φ φ s rbo (1 + Robs ) (15) rbo (15 ) + MC1914 * (1 + Rhyp) − φ rbo with s : for stocks bo : for private bonds rbo : for public bonds (Rente bonds) Returns of stocks and public bonds are known (Le Bris & Hautcoeur, 2008). Nevertheless, the financial returns of privates bonds are not available. An average performance between that in stocks and that in public bonds is used as an estimate for private bonds. The performance of private bonds (observed and hypothetical) are calculating using : R bo = ∆p + α rdt bo bo s rbo + ∆ p ∆ p bo and with ∆p = 2 (rdt + rdt ) = s rdt bo rbo 2 All these returns used are on this table 21 22 INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1951 p. 296 Michalet C-A, Les placements des épargnants français de 1815 à nos jours, Paris, PUF, 1968 p. 158 21 Hypothetical performances (proxy observed performances january 1854 - december 1913) Cac 40 Rdt ?p Dividende Annual Yield AVERAGE GEOMETRIC MEAN 4,52% STANDARD DEVIATION 0,95% State Bonds Rdt ?p Total Coupon Annual Yield Private Bonds Inflation Rdt ?p Total Coupon Annual Total Yield Price Nominal rate Price Nominal Price Nominal Variation Return Variation Return Variation Return if α=0 if α=1 if α=0 if α=1 if α=0 if α=1 1,24% 0,98% 5,76% 5,50% 3,78% 7,25% 7,37% 0,72% 0,96% 0,77% 4,75% 4,55% 6,12% 6,23% INSEE 0,22% 4,15% 0,87% 5,03% 3,78% Observed Performances january 1914 - december 1928 Cac 40 State Bonds ?p Rdt Dividende Annual Total Rdt Coupon Yield Yield AVERAGE GEOMETRIC MEAN 3,90% STANDARD DEVIATION 0,52% Private Bonds ?p Annual Total Rdt Coupon Yield Inflation ?p rate Annual Total Price Nominal Price Nominal Price Nominal Variation Return Variation Return Variation Return if α=0 if α=1 if α=0 if α=1 if α=0 if α=1 7,53% 6,16% 11,43% 10,07% 5,04% 17,20% 17,47% 0,79% -0,82% -1,32% 4,33% 3,82% 10,20% 10,61% INSEE 9,07% 4,47% 2,42% 6,94% 11,81% Figure 14, Hypothetical and real performances of Cac 40, State Bonds and private bonds (Sources: INSEE, author) Therefore, using the same method as for stocks, the observed and hypothetical values of private and public bonds are mentioned below: Value in 1928 of the 1914 market capitalization for private bonds in francs 1914 α=0 Hypothetical (I) Observed (II) Cost WWI (I-II) α=1 34 177 538 275 62 613 044 789 7 858 134 463 15 021 118 782 26 319 403 812 47 591 926 007 Value in 1928 of the 1914 market capitalization for state bonds in francs 1914 α=0 Hypothetical (I) Observed (II) Cost WWI (I-II) α=1 28 621 002 448 49 763 643 121 3 826 612 495 8 187 268 474 24 794 389 953 41 576 374 647 After calculating the total sum of losses for stock holders and private and public bond holders, war appears very expensive since the minimum cost (revenues consumed, thus α=0) is about 64 billion of francs 1914, or 118 % of 1914 GDP. If the contradictory hypothesis is 22 assumed, that is to say a complete and permanent reinvestment (α=1), the loss is more than 117 billion of franc-or. In order to comprehend the significance of this amount note that in January 1929, the first industrial stock capitalisation is Saint Gobain (third after the Canal de Suez and the Banque de France) valued at 3,35 billion of francs 1929, or 613 million of francs 1914. Therefore, the total cost of war (with α=1) is equal to 190 Saint Gobain. This money, if it had been made available for the French and the French economy from 1914 would have probably facilitated higher gains in productivity thanks to the extra investments made possible. 1928 OBSERVED AND HYPOTHETICAL VALUE OF 1914 MARKET CAPITALISATION (billion Franc 1914) 1914 VALUE 1928 VALUE COST OF WWI OBSERVED HYPOTHETICAL HYPOTHETICAL - OBSERVED Stocks Bonds 18 30 α=0 8 8 α=1 14 15 α=0 21 34 α=1 41 63 α=0 13 α=1 28 26 48 State Bonds 26 4 8 29 50 25 42 TOTAL 73 20 37 83 154 % GDP 1914 64 117 118% 216% What about an indemnity to Germany? This counterfactual study suffers from one weakness: assuming a German victory, an indemnity would probably have been imposed upon the French government. Thus two more hypothesis are used: - H4, the end of the war needs an indemnity equal to 30 % of GDP The military defeat during the preceding century finished with an indemnity payed by the defeated party. In the case of a German victory, their interest would have held in imposing the maximum amount of compensation. A high financial compensation would have been the most probable, accompanied by the transfer of authority of overseas territories.23 In 1815-1819, 1,65 to 1,95 billion francs were paid to the Allies, that is, 18 to 21 % of the GDP and the 5 billion paid in 1871 represent 25 % of the GDP (Occhino, Oosterlinck, White, 2007). Therefore, the figure of 30 % of the GDP (16,25 billion francs) can be retained. 23 According to Jacques Marseille, Empire colonial et capitalisme français : histoire d’un divorce, this transfer would probably have been more a saving than a cost. 23 - H5, the indemnity payment reduces the public bonds capitalisation This hypothesis implies that it would have been the “Rente” holders who paid the indemnity. Assuming a French defeat and a large issue of state bonds like in 1871, the interest rate demanded by the money lenders would have increased. This increase would have reduced the value of the existing bonds. Finally, total market capitalisation of state bonds would have increased but this rise would have come from additional savings (possibly foreign). In March 1870, when French state debt was 12,45 billion francs24, the price of the “Rente 3 %” which serves as reference was 72,29 (or an actuarial rate of 4,19 %)25. One year later, in March 1871, after the specification of a 5 billion indemnity financed by new Rente (Emprunts Thiers), the same “Rente 3 %” quoted 51,05 (or a rate of 6,01 %). This was a fall of 29,89 %. Bonds owners lost close to 30 % of their savings. This 30 % represents a market capitalisation of 4,32 billion which is very close to the famous “5 milliards”. Model with indemnity to Germany : Cost total s bo (1 + Robs ) (15) (1 + Robs ) (15) bo s bo (15 ) (15 ) + MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) − = MC1914 * (1 + R hyp) − φ φ s [ + ( MC1914 − Ind ) * (1 + R ) rbo rbo (15 ) hyp ] rbo (1 + Robs ) (15) rbo − MC1914 * φ with Ind : for indemnity The cost of WWI for stocks and private bonds holders does not change. Nevertheless, the loss on public bonds is reduced since the 1928 value of these investments is weaker thanks to the deduction of the indemnity from the 1914 market capitalisation. Therefore, the total loss is weaker. An average between α=0 and α=1 indicates a lost opportunity of having 65 billion of francs 1914, or « 107 Saint-Gobain ». 24 INSEE, Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1951 p. 296 Vaslin J-M, « Le siècle d’or de la rente française » in Gallais-Hamono G. (dir), Le marché financier français au XIXème siècle, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2006 25 24 1928 OBSERVED AND HYPOTHETICAL VALUE OF 1914 MARKET CAPITALISATION AFTER AN INDEMNITY (billion Franc 1914) 1914 VALUE 1928 VALUE COST OF WWI OBSERVED HYPOTHETICAL α=0 α=1 α=0 α=1 HYPOTHETICAL - OBSERVED α=0 α=1 Stocks 18 8 14 21 41 13 28 Bonds 30 8 15 34 63 26 48 State Bonds 26 4 8 10 18 7 10 TOTAL 73 20 37 65 122 % GDP 1914 46 85 84% 157% Maximum acceptable amount of the hypothetical indemnity: Indemnity fixed at 30 % of the GDP is arbitrary. The model allows this constraint to be minimised and even permits the calculation of what would have been the maximum preferable amount to pay Germany in order to avoid the real returns of 1914-1928. This estimation is obviously weak since the hypothesis of stability of state bonds returns is not credible: a massive issue of Rente would have probably raised the interest rate to a higher level. In this model an indemnity higher than the market capitalisation of the existing public bonds implies a negative valorisation of (CB rbo 1913 ) − Ind . This means that 1914 French savers, instead of having savings invested in bonds, are collectively in debt following the issue of new public bonds. The value of this hypothetical debt is obtained using the same method than the value of a saving. In this particular case, the hypothesis of a complete reinvestment of revenue α=1, implies the issue of new bonds just to pay interest on the initial amount of debt. This extreme figure is not totally impossible in the real world. In the case of debt too, a value of α between 0 and 1 rather than either of two extremities is the more realistic scenario. The 1928 value of this debt rises as the part of the indemnity to borrow increases. The 1928 value of this debt reduces the advantage of maintained 19th century returns on stocks and private bonds. An indemnity is preferable until the total loss equal zero. The maximum preferable indemnity is given by the equation below which comes from a rearrangement of that from the model with indemnity: 0 = Cost stocks + Cost privatebonds + Cost publicbonds 0 = Cost stocks + Cost privatebonds + (MC rbo 1914 ) (1 + Robs ) (15) rbo − Ind * (1 + R ) rbo (15 ) hyp − MC1914 * rbo φ 25 Therefore: Cost stocks + Coût Ind = privatebonds rbo (1 + Robs ) (15) rbo (15 ) + MC1914 * (1 + Rhyp ) − φ rbo (1 + Rhyp ) (15) rbo Up to an indemnity of 56 billion francs 1914, it was financially preferable for French savers to lose the war quickly. Amounts obtained with or without reinvestment of revenues are close. 56 billion represents near to 100 % of GDP of 1914 and more than all securities quoted in France in 1914 (73,4 billion). With the obvious small probability of such an indemnity, this model shows therefore that it would have been distinctly preferable that Germany won the war. 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