Download Balanced harvesting in fisheries: economic

ICES Journal of
Marine Science
ICES Journal of Marine Science (2016), 73(6), 1679– 1689. doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsv161
Contribution to the Themed Section: ‘Balanced harvest and the ecosystem approach to
fisheries’
Original Article
Balanced harvesting in fisheries: economic considerations
A. Charles1*, S. M. Garcia2, and J. Rice 3
1
School of Business and School of the Environment, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Canada
Fisheries Expert Group, IUCN Commission on Ecosystem Management, Gland, Switzerland
3
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Ottawa, Canada
2
*Corresponding author: tel: +1 902 420 5732; fax: +1 902 496 8101; e-mail: [email protected].
Charles, A., Garcia, S. M., and Rice, J. Balanced harvesting in fisheries: economic considerations. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 73: 1679– 1689.
Received 29 April 2015; revised 13 August 2015; accepted 19 August 2015.
This paper explores economic aspects of a recent proposal to shift fisheries to a “Balanced Harvesting” (BH) strategy, as a means to achieve the goal,
set by the Convention on Biological Diversity and related to the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries, of “conservation of ecosystem structure and
functioning” within fishery ecosystems. Studies indicate that a BH strategy—broadening the range of species and sizes caught in the aquatic ecosystem, and lowering exploitation rates for some conventionally targeted species—may provide improved ecological performance relative to conventional harvesting strategies. However, the potential economic implications have received little attention to date. This paper provides a
preliminary economic assessment of BH, focusing on six main themes: (i) assessing benefits and costs, (ii) factors affecting the economics of BH,
(iii) economic issues in implementing the ingredients of BH, (iv) effects of incremental and/or partial implementation of BH, (v) transition
options within the harvesting sector of the fishery, and (vi) distributional impacts arising across fisheries, fleet sectors, and fishing gears, and
between the present and the future.
Keywords: benefits and costs, conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning, convention on biological diversity, distributional impacts,
ecosystem approach to fisheries, harvesting strategies, incentives, subsidies, transition options.
Introduction
Recent years have seen widespread adoption of an Ecosystem
Approach to Fisheries (FAO, 2003; Garcia et al., 2003), within a
broader context of marine ecosystem-based management
(Charles, 2014). A well-accepted implication of this is the need to
expand from relatively narrow single-species fisheries management
objectives to incorporate goals relating to the aquatic ecosystem and
its wellbeing—as well as goals relating to human wellbeing and good
governance (Charles, 2012). This expansion is seen on the international stage within FAO arenas and through agreements in the
Convention on Biological Diversity (e.g. CBD, 2000).
In particular, the CBD’s 12 Malawi Principles for the Ecosystem
Approach (UNEP, 1998) lay out clear directions for an ecosystem approach, and highlight that “Conservation of ecosystem structure
and functioning, in order to maintain ecosystem services, should
be a priority target of the ecosystem approach”. While none of the
Malawi Principles are firm “norms” internationally (i.e. requirements of ocean governance), most have been subject to broad
# 2015
agreement over corresponding implementation measures—which
largely relate to aspects of good governance. The exception among
the 12 principles is the above-noted conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning, since the manner by which it could be implemented remains under debate, as do the consequences of that
implementation. In particular, there is a need to translate this goal
into practical terms within a fishery context, including its links to
management goals and decision-making criteria (e.g. limits and
targets). Here there are parallels with related aspects of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) that also relate
to maintaining biodiversity productive capacity under ecological
constraints.
One strategy recently proposed to incorporate the goal of conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning within fisheries is by
shifting to a harvesting strategy referred to as “Balanced
Harvesting” (BH; Zhou, 2008; Garcia et al., 2011; 2012). This approach “broadens the selectivity perspective from the narrow
scales of single fisheries operations and stocks to the integrated
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scale of ecosystem productivity and impacts” (Garcia et al., 2011,
2012). If fully implemented, BH would involve distributing
fishing mortality across the widest possible range of species,
stocks, and sizes in an ecosystem, in proportion to their natural
productivity. This implies a reversal of the practice in many fisheries,
in which only a narrow range of the species available in an ecosystem
is actually targeted by the fishery, and often only a limited range of
size classes for each species.
The specific actions this implies, relative to current fishery practices, are (i) to broaden the range of species caught in the ecosystem,
and (ii) to broaden the range of sizes caught of each currently
impacted species in the ecosystem. In addition, research to date indicates that, at least in heavily exploited ecosystems, these need to be
accompanied by a further requirement, namely (iii) lower exploitation rates, particularly for some conventionally targeted species,
to ensure that the overall exploitation level in the ecosystem is not
excessive.
Modelling results suggest that full implementation of these
changes to BH may lead to better ecological performance, at an ecosystemic scale, compared with conventional harvesting strategies
(Bundy et al., 2005; Kolding and Van Zwieten, 2011; Garcia et al.,
2012; Law et al., 2012, 2015; Jacobsen et al., 2014). This result was
based inter alia on comparing BH with alternative strategies
across a range of harvesting intensities (measured by “annual percentage removal” from the ecosystem), using three aggregate performance measures considered to reflect aspects of ecosystem
structure and functioning: long-term available biomass, low incidence of extirpations (species extinction), and total yield from the
ecosystem (cf. Figure 1 in Garcia et al., 2012).
While these indicators point to the potential for ecologically
oriented benefits of BH, there has been little systematic research
into social and economic implications. This paper seeks to
address this gap, focusing on economic implications of shifting to
BH in fisheries. The article particularly addresses six main themes:
(i) assessing benefits and costs, (ii) factors affecting the economics
of BH, (iii) economic issues in implementing the ingredients of
BH, (iv) effects of incremental and/or partial implementation of
BH, (v) transition options within the harvesting sector of the
fishery, and (vi) distributional impacts arising across fisheries,
fleet sectors and fishing gears, and between the present and the
future. The article closes with a synthesis of key points arising
from the analysis, and a discussion of how moves towards balanced
harvesting within the fishery system interact with the range of
human uses of aquatic systems beyond the fishery.
Benefits and costs
To assess the economic implications of BH as a harvesting strategy, it
is necessary to explore its various benefits and costs relative to other
harvesting strategies. Since BH is considered to directly support the
CBD goal of “conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning”,
the performance measures used to date to assess its potential—(i)
system biomass, (ii) species extirpations, and (iii) total yield—are
very much ecologically oriented. However, these also have economic
implications, which are discussed first in this section. Subsequently,
this section explores other benefits and costs to be considered in relation to the many fishery objectives—economic, social, cultural,
and biological—that already have a long history within fisheries.
Available system biomass
Studies to date indicate that, for fully developed fisheries, the aggregate biomass in the ecosystem would be greater under BH compared
Charles et al.
with conventional strategies. While from a conventional economic
perspective, this would not be considered an economic benefit per
se, there could be positive impacts on economic value in two principal ways.
First, there may be direct biodiversity use benefits, i.e. a higher
system biomass may generate market value (i) in terms of higher
catch-rates and hence profitability for the fishery, or (ii) in terms
of other ecosystem services and related societal benefits, such as in
the tourism sector, through greater wildlife for viewing. Second, a
higher system biomass may be valuable in providing broader biodiversity protection benefits. These could arise in a direct manner,
as cost savings given a lower probability of requiring costly protection and recovery programmes (e.g. if rare species are maintained at
higher levels than would be the case otherwise), or indirectly, as
“option value”—with a higher biomass keeping ocean use options
open for the future. These various benefits could accrue to fisheries
(improving stock resilience or maintaining potential opportunities
in the future) as well as to other sectors, including conservation.
The primary costs involved in achieving a higher system biomass
are likely to result, for some fisheries, from short-term harvest losses
(comparable to the typical result of stock rebuilding plans—cf.
Costello et al., 2012). There may also be long-term (even permanent) reductions in harvests of currently exploited (and perhaps
bycatch) species, resulting from the BH requirement of lowering
overall exploitation rates, if systems are currently being too intensively exploited. However, depending on the change in exploitation
rates needed, the resulting rebuilding could possibly produce higher
future harvests. Given this uncertainty, the economic outcomes
(e.g. the total present value of net revenues) cannot be predicted
at this stage.
Incidence of extirpations
Avoiding the loss of species from the ecosystem is considered an important aspect of conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning.
Modelling of extirpations (and extinctions)—with extirpations
defined as groupings that fall below 10% of their unfished levels
(Garcia et al., 2012, online supplement)—indicate that BH achieves
this benefit to a greater extent than other fishery strategies. The
economic benefits of a lower rate of extirpations may arise in at
least five ways: (i) a continuing capability to produce net revenues
from harvesting of species that avoid extirpation, (ii) “existence
value” of those same species that avoid extirpation, each of which
may be valued by humans, usually in non-market ways, (iii)
option value of those species, reflecting the potential to provide
future economic value, based on possible uses not currently
known, e.g. as a cure for disease, (iv) avoiding expensive rebuilding
plans that are often obligatory for populations nearing extirpation,
and costly adjustments by fishers to avoid such species, and (v)
avoidance of negative consumer reactions to the loss of species in
the aquatic system, together with possible monetary benefits as a
result of eco-labelling potential.
To the extent that avoidance of extirpations can be achieved
simply through a choice of fishing methods or management measures that, for example, better conserve the ocean habitat, the
costs may be minimal. However, such actions are not among the
ingredients of BH, but instead lowering of the extirpation rate is particularly connected to the lowering of the overall exploitation rate.
This has costs in terms of foregone harvest, in the same manner as
described above in relation to measures that increase total system
biomass.
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Economics of balanced harvesting
Total yield from the ecosystem
Modelling analyses indicate that a BH approach (by drawing from a
wider range of aquatic species, and sizes, though at a more moderate
rate of total exploitation, relative to a conventional fishery management strategy) will produce a higher total productivity of the ecosystem, as measured by total potential yield from the fishery ecosystem.
This is seen to have ecological benefits.
Further, it may provide benefits related to food security (Kolding
and van Zwieten, 2011), which is relevant in its own right, and in relation to economic development and poverty reduction. The actual
food security benefits achieved depend on the manner by which the
fish yield is consumed. For example, such benefits may be substantial if the production is used for direct consumption by those
needing food. On the other hand, if less-selective fishing produces
species and sizes undesired for human consumption, while reducing
production of more-desired species, then consumption may be
diverted to use as animal feed (if this is considered ethically suitable). In the extreme, this could possibly even reduce food security
(HLPE, 2014). Overall, however, BH would be expected to at least
produce the opportunity for increased food availability.
The above scenarios also reflect the reality that the total yield
from the ecosystem is not directly meaningful in a “conventional”
market-focused economic sense, since it includes not only species
with a market price but also those with no market value. Knowing
the total (aggregate) yield tells nothing about the fishery’s market
benefits—that would require multiplying the yield of each species
caught (perhaps by size, as well) by its market price, and summing.
Herein lies a basic distinction between market goals of a fishery and
other goals, including food security and the CBD goal. From a market
economics perspective, comparing harvesting strategies is not a matter
of knowing which produces a larger total yield but rather comparing
market value, using information on the species and size composition
of the harvest, the human utilization of that harvest, and either the
market prices or the “shadow value” of species (the latter reflecting
their implicit economic value). This contrasts with an assessment of
other goals, in that food security and conservation of ecosystem structure
and functioning, as well as other ecological goals, may be optimized
through a higher total yield, even if that were accompanied by the economic cost of a lower total market value.
composition of fish harvests from a focus on larger, valuable fish
to much more lower-valued catch, including some sizes and
species not currently harvested. While total yield may rise, it is not
clear whether overall aggregate revenues would rise or fall. It is
also unclear what the impact would be on harvesting costs, while a
shift from larger fish to smaller ones may have significant impacts
on processing costs. In terms of management, BH potentially calls
for a very high degree of micro-management to achieve perfect
“tuning” of harvests for all species in the ecosystem. The costs
involved in carrying this out could be prohibitive. It is as yet
unclear whether co-management approaches could be used in this
context.
In comparing BH with conventional harvesting approaches, it
is essential to maintain a high-level, ecosystemic perspective—so
the comparison is not for a certain species or individual fishery,
nor for a specific fishing operation or fishing fleet, but rather for
the aggregate of all fisheries in a given ecosystem. This means that
an assessment of benefits and costs depends on how the harvesting
strategies are implemented—which does not necessarily involve
changes to every component of the fishery system. Instead, given
the diversity and complexity of aquatic ecosystems, any overall
(integrated) harvesting strategy will likely have within it different
approaches for different segments of the fishery sector. It thus
becomes challenging to properly compare across strategies. Nevertheless, to develop a framework for doing so, the following section
provides a discussion of some of the economic issues arising in considering implementation of a BH harvesting strategy.
Factors affecting the economics of balanced
harvesting
The economic implications of implementing a BH strategy in fishery
systems will depend on a range of factors, including the fishery scale
(small, large), area (inland, coastal, offshore, high seas), ecological
domain (pelagic, demersal), and fishery culture, as well as the starting point of the fishery system (ecological, economic, social conditions), and the current mix of fishery management and policy tools.
Considerations relating to the latter two of these factors are discussed here.
State of the ecosystem and the fishery
Other economic dimensions
The above discussion explored the economic benefits and costs of
alternative harvesting strategies in terms of the three ecologically
focused performance measures used in evaluations of BH to date.
A full analysis would need to also assess other economic costs and
benefits throughout the fishery value chain—from the ecosystem
services provided by the resources component of the aquatic ecosystems and their habitats, through the fishing enterprises, to the
corresponding post-harvest and market components. Further, in
assessing the economic outcomes of each harvesting strategy, it is
also important to examine the relative benefits and costs of the
corresponding fishery management system itself (Charles, 2001:
Chapter 5)—for example, costs related to the complexity of required
management measures. In particular, a BH strategy implies a need
for “perfectly-tuned” harvesting across sizes and species, involving
precision in “tuning” a portfolio of catches by specialized fleets,
and implying significant cost implications for fishing and for management (e.g. Garcia et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2016).
As noted by a reviewer, BH can be expected to face several major
economic barriers. First, it fundamentally involves changing the
Some ecosystems may be closer to or further from BH than other
ecosystems, and this will affect the costs of a transition to BH.
Notably, if past fishery (and other) practices produced a degraded
ecosystem, e.g. with few predatory fish species, few large fish or
older spawners, and degraded fish habitat, this may well underlie a
currently narrow range of species and sizes being caught. If it is
considered a priority to rectify this situation, significant change
may be required, e.g. in the fishing mortality and habitat protection
measures. There is an extensive literature of measures intended
to recover individual populations that have been overharvested
within a larger fish community, and much experience with recovery
of size structure of single populations through reduction in fishing
mortality (e.g. Murawski, 2010). However, simultaneously restoring
not only a few overharvested species but also the size composition of
a full community may pose significant challenges to the operation of
a set of fleets.
This implies a need to examine the range of ecological options
for implementing BH in a given context, e.g. on choices relating
to the species/size range. Assessment of the situation may be
easier in temperate areas with fewer and individually larger stocks,
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with already-existing studies and data, and with more established
management. In data-poor tropical areas with low capacity in research and management and many smaller stocks, the effort
needed for an initial assessment and implementation of a new strategy could be more costly. On the other hand, in these traditionally
more data-limited areas, the culture of managing for aggregate outcomes may be somewhat better established (cf. Mahon, 1997), requiring less of a change in assessment practices to provide the
necessary support for BH.
There are also likely to be economic implications of the “distance
from BH” in fishery systems. It may be that tropical ecosystems, with
their many species caught in multispecies, multi-gear fisheries, are
closer to a BH scenario and thus less expensive to shift (cf. Kolding
and van Zwieten, 2014). It is interesting to speculate on whether ecosystems containing so-called “well-managed fisheries” may also be
closer to a BH arrangement, or if these have developed a high
degree of selectivity in fishing activity, which may be contrary to BH.
Management and policy tools
The specific measures involved in BH, i.e. broadening the species
and size ranges in the catch, and lowering the overall exploitation
rate, will likely interact with existing management and policy
tools, within fisheries and for oceans more broadly, thereby generating a range of economic implications.
Interactions can be definitely expected with fishing rights
approaches. BH may pose a particular challenge for use rights
systems that are largely single-species oriented. This is the case, for
example, with most current catch rights systems, such as individual
transferable quota (ITQ) schemes, in which rights are assigned on a
species-by-species basis to individual fishers or fishing companies.
The basic nature of such species-specific schemes is likely to conflict
with the ecosystemic nature of a BH strategy.
Indeed, under BH—and more generally, under EAF—any
fishing rights system would need to be relevant for use at an ecosystem level. There have been some efforts to develop multispecies
catch rights systems to improve on single-species approaches, although implementing these may necessitate considerable change
in management practices, and consequent higher adjustment
costs. Perhaps most important to recognize, in considering EAF
and BH, is that there are other forms of longstanding use rights
systems (Charles, 2009), such as those focused on fishing effort
(e.g. gear) or space (e.g. territorial use rights in fishing, TURFs),
that may well already allow for a broad range of species and sizes
being caught.
Other management tools that will interact with BH include (i)
marine protected areas, which, like BH, can serve both fishery and
ecosystemic goals; (ii) gear and/or season regulations, which
clearly affect species and size mix in a harvest; (iii) incentive arrangements, such as those for adopting new technologies or changing
species targeting; (iv) and eco-labelling, perhaps covering species
that would have been omitted from consideration in the past.
Interactions would also be expected with bycatch policies and
discard bans, as each of these may affect the broadening of species
and size ranges under BH (Hall and Mainprize, 2005). Economic
impacts, positive or negative, may arise as well in the interaction
of BH with broad policy directions such as management decentralization, stewardship initiatives, and good governance.
Assessing the costs and benefits of BH requires not only assessing
the above operational aspects, at species, fishery and ecosystem
levels, but also policy aspects within a strategic, sectoral, EEZ,
ecoregional, or ecosystem framework. This includes assessing
Charles et al.
interactions with current policies (e.g. species protection; discard
policies) and whether new policy requirements are feasible. The economic analysis will need to take into account management at
both tactical and strategic levels, and the effects of both long-term
(often ecosystem-based) regulations and short-term (often singlespecies) regulations. Furthermore, to achieve a well-rounded analysis of economic costs and benefits of BH, it will be important to
utilize both conventional market analysis and non-market evaluation. This combination of metrics is particularly important in considering ecological and social factors, such as the economic value of
ecosystem services (e.g. Lange and Jiddawi, 2009; Barbier et al.,
2011), and economic implications for food security and poverty alleviation, respectively. For example, those in society most in need are
often also income-deficit people, and thus may be ill-served in a
purely market perspective.
Implementing the ingredients of BH
The following explores the economic implications of implementing
the major ingredients of BH, namely broadening the range of sizes
and species harvested, and lowering the overall exploitation rate in
the ecosystem.
Broadening the range of species and sizes harvested
In considering the economic, and social, costs of broadening the
species and size mix in a fishery system, it is essential to examine
the key question: Why are currently unexploited or underexploited
species, or sizes within a species, not being more intensively harvested? Four major reasons are discussed here: markets, regulations,
technology, and societal preferences.
Markets
There is a great deal of experience globally indicating that fishery
resources invariably become exploited, and marketed, when net
economic benefits are expected to accrue from them. Therefore,
in a market context, the most obvious reasons to have unexploited
species or size ranges in commercial fisheries are (i) a low market
price for the species, or size, that “should” be caught under BH, relative to the harvesting cost, thus making fishing unprofitable, or (ii) a
lack of markets for those species or sizes. The question, in both cases,
is whether benefits outweigh costs in undertaking investments,
incentives, and subsidies that would be needed to induce change
in these situations.
For the first of these situations, is it worthwhile to subsidize the
harvesting of a species, to broaden the range of species being caught?
Similarly, while some shifts in size range may have ecological
benefits—e.g. by improving stock resilience or protecting old spawners, such as the “Big Old Fat Fecund Females”, as discussed for BH
in Garcia et al. (2011, 2012)—such changes may or may not be
worthwhile economically, in producing positive net economic benefits. This will depend on how the price (per unit or per kilogramme)
paid for the particular species in the marketplace varies with size. If
market demand is heavily weighted to a specific size (e.g. “market”
lobsters or “plate-sized” fish), and if the fishery is fully exploited at
that size, then an enforced broadening of the size range would reduce
what is available sustainably at the desired size, making the fishery
less profitable (or even unprofitable).
The latter scenario is related as well to the second situation
described above, in which there is a lack of markets for some of
the species and/or sizes required to be harvested under BH. This
is presumably either because consumers do not want this fish, or
that insufficient attention has been paid to market development.
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Economics of balanced harvesting
In either case, changing this situation by developing a value chain
for the broader range of species, in a shift to BH, would require
potentially expensive measures such as: new marketing channels,
new seafood technologies, training and capacity-building programmes, shifting consumer preferences through marketing campaigns, searches for new markets, or even direct subsidization
of certain consumer products. Specifically, Garcia et al. (2012)
suggest that “markets and the processing sector will need incentives
to accommodate a wider range of catch components, including
many not currently utilized in Western countries but commonly
used in multispecies, multi-gear fisheries in the developing world”.
Such incentives (notably subsidies) would be needed to overcome
barriers to creating the new markets that may be needed, to cover
the potentially high costs of marketing campaigns where these
species are not yet consumed, or to pay high transportation costs
to areas where markets (if any) already exist.
These challenges have been faced, and in some cases overcome, in
past efforts to initiate fisheries on previously unexploited species,
and such experiences can provide an indication of what the costs
may be in undertaking market development. However, costs may
be much higher under BH. While past cases of marketing new
species (or sizes) were presumably based on at least some evidence
of market potential for those species, the “push” to utilize new
species under BH is solely ecological, not economic. Some of the
previously unexploited species that would need to be fished under
full BH may have market potential, but many others will not.
Hence, the effort, time, and cost to develop markets for those
truly unwanted species may be very large, if not prohibitive.
Concerns must also be addressed over the reaction of consumers
to broadening the species and size range of fish in the catch, given a
large-scale shift to BH. While this is hard to predict, it may be relevant to examine the experiences of eco-certification schemes (such
as the Marine Stewardship Council) where there has been some
success in inducing consumers to pay a premium for certified fish,
and Consumer Supported Fisheries, which receive consumer
support despite providing little choice in the seafood available at
any given time (e.g. Brinson et al., 2011; Olson et al., 2014). It is
also of interest to speculate on how an increase in the availability
of forage fish (as species ranges are widened) will be seen in the
market. While in theory, a properly implemented BH strategy will
balance prey abundance with predator needs in the long term, so
concerns about forage fish should not be relevant, in practice
there may be resistance to enlarging such markets.
While there are major issues over the potentially high costs of
change, two counteracting considerations arise. First, some costs
of market development may be mitigated to some extent through
measures that have proven useful in the past, such as customer education, collaboration of leading restaurants, and eco-labelling.
Second, the above assessment of costs is largely from an economic
or financial perspective, and there is a need to add non-market factors to the assessment. The costs of creating markets may be offset, at
least to some extent, by indirect benefits of those markets, for
example, if a widening of the species and size ranges being caught
and landed thereby reduces dumping at sea, or if ecosystem services
are increased under BH, or if food security benefits arise through
greater availability of less expensive food for those in need.
Regulations
If a broadening of the species and size ranges being caught, as called
for in BH, is limited by fishery regulations, it is crucial to ask why
those regulations are present, i.e. whether there are ecological,
social, or economic reasons for regulations preventing certain
species or size ranges from being harvested. Some ecological possibilities could be regulations aiming to conserve specific endangered
species (or classes of species, such as forage fish), or to avoid harvesting juvenile fish, while social and economic reasons could include
culturally based restrictions on catching certain species, or economically focused regulations on catching fish at profit-maximizing sizes
(as for lobster, noted above).
Consider, for example, regulations that prohibit the landing of
small fish, e.g. below a minimum size (e.g. Condie et al., 2015).
These rules are popular in removing incentives for targeting small
fish, but lead to fish being caught that cannot legally be landed and
are largely dumped wastefully at sea (though this can be reduced somewhat through technical measures such as gear or spatio-temporal
restrictions). This practice of dumping is likely considered unacceptable in terms of the inherent wastefulness, harm to food security
goals, and resulting problems in assessing resources and hence being
able to certify that the system is “balanced”. An alternative scenario is
that some fish may be unlawfully landed and consumed, which
decreases waste but can create anti-conservationist incentives in
some situations.
In any case, the key questions that arise relate to (i) the balance of
costs and benefits for any regulation aiming to maintain ecosystem
structure and function, (ii) whether a change in regulations would
have negative impacts on one or more societal objectives, and (iii)
whether transition costs would arise if the regulations were to be
changed. For example, where landing obligations (discard bans)
need to be institutionalized, they are likely to raise operational
and management costs, as well as potentially creating new costs
for disposal of non-commercial landings.
Technology
If there are no market, profitability or regulatory constraints on
fishing, historical experience has shown that any technological innovations needed for that fishing activity will typically occur in a timely
manner. A rapid increase in the variety of target species and the development of new markets over time indicates that the industry has
experience and competence in this matter. Therefore, if there is to be
a broadening in species and size ranges under BH, and there are no
financial, market, or regulatory barriers, we can predict that catching and processing technology better suited to a broader range of
species and sizes will develop eventually. There may, however, be
transition issues in terms of excessive short-term costs for technological development, or a lack of financial capability if implementation of BH is sought in a short time frame. In any of these scenarios,
there is a need to consider the benefits and costs of incentives such as
subsidies if more rapid adjustment is sought (cf. Charles, 2007).
Societal preferences
A full implementation of BH would imply a massive broadening of
the range of sizes and of species being caught in fisheries. Some
aspects of this may be generally acceptable, such as measures to recuperate lost productivity, improve reproductive success, stop and
reverse genetic degradation, and become more resilient to climate
change. For example, this could be by shifting harvesting to
younger ages while better protecting older spawners and restoring
the relative abundance of older fish in a specific stock.
On the other hand, if there are species or sizes that a particular
society has no interest in utilizing, or does not consider appropriate
to kill—i.e. the killing of which is contrary to societal values, with
too high a social or moral cost (Yeates, 2014)—then the costs of a
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complete implementation of a BH strategy, including those species
or sizes, would be considered excessive. Of course, this assessment is
specific to a given society, with expected variations across countries
and cultures, including differing meanings of “sustainable use”, in
CBD terms. In any case, if a given society has a set of species (or
sizes) it designates as not to be harvested, this does not rule out
pursuit of BH, since it is the aggregate results across the ecosystem
that are important in assessing any shift in harvesting strategies,
not necessarily implying harvesting of each individual fish stock.
In particular, if certain harvesting would be contrary to societal preferences, and thus highly uneconomical, it may be preferable to
focus on adjusting the harvesting of other fisheries, or other
species within a given fishery.
Lowering exploitation rates for target and non-target
species
Modelling of BH options indicates that broadening the range of
species and sizes harvested in the ecosystem should be accompanied
by a reduction in harvest rates for some existing fisheries, notably on
(i) target species which are currently highly exploited as well as (ii)
certain non-target species for which the present catch, including
bycatch, or fishing level is higher than that corresponding to the
adopted BH targets. There are several implications of this reduction
in harvest rates:
(i) For currently overexploited target and non-target species,
this may facilitate rebuilding of stocks, which—like any
rebuilding strategy—can be predicted to have certain economic consequences (Costello et al., 2012). These include eventually increased annual profits (if the market is not saturated)
but short-term losses in catches of currently-desired target
species, and losses in the profits generated from those
catches, over some uncertain period (with potential impacts
on fishery viability). As is often the case in such situations,
the longer term benefits, if they appear, may or may not be
sufficient to overcome the negative short-term costs of BH
implementation.
(ii) For species currently harvested at a level producing maximum
sustainable yield (MSY), a lowering of exploitation rates to a
level corresponding approximately to maximum economic
yield could actually increase net revenues (rents) in the harvesting component of the fishery. However, this may mean
less fish to process and/or market, so there could be net economic losses to the post-harvest sector, and negative impacts
on food security (Charles, 2001: Chapter 5).
(iii) Depending on how the lower exploitation rate is put into place,
there may be less catch taken even from species not highly
exploited (e.g. with imperfect implementation); this may
imply a negative impact economically (and in terms of production of desired food).
(iv) A lower overall exploitation rate, from implementing BH,
could also produce other benefits (such as greater stability of
catch, if stocks have a less truncated age structure and there
is a more diversified set of targets) as well as other costs,
such as a need for financial and other compensations, e.g.
through buy-back schemes, subsidized alternative technologies, or greater use of social safety nets.
Charles et al.
Incremental and partial implementation
Inherent uncertainties, implementation costs, and capacity constraints tend to limit transitions to ecosystem-based management
frameworks, such as EBM or EAF, to following strategies that are
incremental and adaptive in nature (e.g. FAO, 2003; Fogarty and
McCarthy, 2014). In addition, the multi-objective nature of fisheries, discussed earlier, leads to a logical conclusion that any single
goal—and specifically that of “conservation of ecosystem structure
and functioning”—is bound to be subject to trade-offs that depend
on many conditions. In other words, as decision makers seek a
dynamic balance among the desirable objectives (both interim
and ultimate), any single objective will be typically only partially realized. The trade-offs (substitutability) among goals depend on many
conditions, but there is nonetheless usually some room for choices
to be made in how and to what extent the ideal goals can be achieved.
These perspectives imply that, whatever the merits of theoretical
analyses suggesting the desirability (ecologically) of full BH implementation, the reality is that the dramatic changes this would
imply in fishery systems raise doubts as to the practicality or feasibility of this endpoint. Therefore, adapting the implementation strategy to the cost realities and the capacity available (and keeping
within ecosystem constraints) may require (i) phased-in (incremental) implementation, leading ultimately to (ii) some degree of partial
implementation.
Incremental implementation refers to the pace at which a new
initiative is put in place; the need for incrementalism arises as a consequence of the tension between necessity and capacity. The implication is that interim objectives are needed in moving in phases or
stages towards BH goals across the different segments of the sector
and/or the ecosystem. To ensure that interim measures move the
system in the right direction requires good monitoring and recurrent performance assessments, as well as progress in understanding.
Risk and cost/benefit analyses are important instruments to optimize and limit the adverse consequences of the choices made.
Partial implementation, on the other hand, refers to a less-thancomplete extent to which BH is implemented. Compared with incremental implementation, this matter has not been addressed to
the same extent, and indeed, it is more sensitive, in that it refers
not to the pace of change but to the ultimate destination, i.e.
whether or not the goal (full BH) is actually achieved or not. Here
we consider three approaches to partial implementation. First, it
may occur through reducing the degree of precision required, i.e.
in how precisely the various fisheries, fleets, and métiers are required
to achieve the “balance”. Second, partial implementation might
be pursued as a way to achieve interim objectives, on the way to
full implementation of BH (if determined to be a desired and practical goal). In such a situation, an adaptive implementation strategy
might be needed, to deal with transitional realities, costs of implementation, and uncertainties inherent in policy change, revised
“on the fly” as implementation progresses and partial outcomes
(benefits and costs) are obtained, better defining the realm of the
“possible”.
The third, and perhaps most important, scenario for partial implementation of BH is one in which full implementation is technically infeasible and/or accompanied by unacceptable costs to society
(e.g. management costs, undesired exploitation of certain fish
species). In such cases, trade-offs would be expected between the
CBD goal of full conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning
(together with other goals of BH, such as improved food security
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Economics of balanced harvesting
through predicted increases in overall harvests) and the many other
biological, economic, and social goals being pursued in the fishery
system. This would lead to BH implementation that is less than complete, e.g. only partially broadening the range of species or of sizes
caught, and/or moving to BH in some fisheries but not others.
Decisions about partial implementation must consider the
typical economic assessment of marginal costs and benefits resulting
from different implementation levels, i.e. related to the rate at which
ecological, economic, and social benefits accrue as implementation
proceeds. Such an assessment will help to determine the acceptability of any chosen extent and approach to BH. Inherent in this is the
law of diminishing returns: as the extent of BH implementation
increases, the marginal (or incremental) benefit decreases while
the marginal (or incremental) cost of implementation increases.
Therefore, the “optimal” level of implementation will almost certainly be ,100%—which may be acceptable even under the sustainability paradigm underpinning the LOSC, if it does not lead to
serious irreversible impacts on ecosystem structure and function.
Indeed, this may be seen as somewhat analogous to current implementation of MSY; no State manages all species strictly at MSY
and indeed, this is not required by the LOSC. The reference to following MSY, in the LOSC, is not absolute, but rather is “as qualified
by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns,
the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether sub-regional, regional or
global” (LOSC Art. 61.3). The same approach could be applied to
the CBD goal of maintaining ecosystem structure and function.
That said, it would be important to avoid the equivalent, under
BH, of what are generally considered unacceptable outcomes of
poor implementation of the MSY norm, both from an ecological
and economic angle (e.g. Shelton and Morgan, 2014). Poor implementation of BH would be reflected in a lack of achievement of
the goals being pursued, whether those of the CBD or other ecological, economic, and social goals. Particularly negative would be
outcomes that actually worsen conservation of ecosystem structure
and functioning, food security, or other goals.
These are important issues, since analyses of BH to date, which
have been largely theoretical and model-based, are based on assuming full implementation (with fishing mortalities perfectly in
proportion to natural productivity simultaneously by size and
species, across the aquatic ecosystem). While under that assumption, full implementation of BH is predicted to provide several ecologically oriented benefits, there is no consensus to date whether
partial implementation of BH would at least partially achieve
those ecological objectives.
This leads to a series of research questions. To what extent are
benefits and costs (ecological, economic, and social) incurred if
certain dimensions of BH are put in place independently and individually? For example, what if the “in proportion to productivity”
requirement of BH is applied just to species (broadening the
range of species) or just to sizes (broadening the range of sizes)?
What if partial implementation took place, involving just one of
(i) a partial broadening of species harvested in an ecosystem, (ii) a
partial broadening of sizes caught, for all species, or (iii) a full broadening of sizes but for only one or a few species in the ecosystem? How
would each of these actions affect the various goals being pursued
(including protecting ecosystem structure and function)? Finally,
given that assessments of BH (e.g. Garcia et al., 2012, 2015) agree
that the intensity of fishing must be tackled together with
broadening the sizes and species caught, how should the corresponding changes in harvest rates be dealt with in the context of
partial implementation of BH? Addressing the economic implications of BH will require some robust answers to these questions.
Analytically, these questions relate to some key functional relationships. Ecologically, do benefits accrue monotonically across
all dimensions of BH, such that any type of partial implementation
(e.g. shifting just one fishery to be less selective) will be beneficial
from the perspective of the CBD objective? Economically, how
strongly curvilinear are the rates at which costs and benefits increase
with progressively more complete (but still partial) implementation
of BH? Specifically, the results will depend on whether the cost and
benefit functions are both concave, both convex, or opposite (in
which case, a key issue would be which initially rises more rapidly
with BH implementation) as well as whether it is species or sizes
that are considered in a partial manner. Furthermore, given high
levels of uncertainty, it is essential to assess whether departures
from “balance” are real (statistically significant given high levels of
uncertainty) and consequential (in terms of probability to meet
the objectives).
A complicating factor in assessing the “marginal” or incremental
net benefit of possible partial shifts towards BH is the need to look
across all societal objectives. In fact, the net benefit is not a single
measure but rather multidimensional: a shift to BH may have net
benefits in certain dimensions (e.g. improved ecological and food
provision benefits), but net negative impacts in other dimensions
(e.g. fishery profits). Therefore, in evaluating BH scenarios, it is
crucial to understand the range of costs and benefits, including
those relating to resource use and those focused on conservation
(Garcia et al., 2014), the rates at which the costs and benefits scale
with implementation, and how these costs and benefits interact
across multiple objectives. Indeed, the idea of “balance” for an ecosystem may be as multifaceted and therefore at least as illusive a target
as MSY for populations.
Transition options
If BH as a harvesting strategy is concluded to be desirable, there
remains a key issue of the choice of transition path if it is to be introduced over time, in a manner that is “viable” in environmental,
social, and economic terms, and that deals appropriately with distributional concerns. The path must be considered at an ecosystem
scale, but the ingredients of BH (broaden the range of species and
of sizes harvested in the ecosystem, and lower overall exploitation
rates) ultimately would need to be implemented in specific fisheries
and indeed particular fleets and métiers, either existing or to be
created. What are the best ways to do this? In this section, we
examine the economic implications of transition options within
the harvesting sector of the fishery.
Support for existing fishery sector components
Some fisheries have been documented to already exhibit the equivalent of a BH strategy on their own—in certain cases, through a
process of self-adaptation, as seems to be the case with some
small-scale fisheries (Kolding and van Zwieten, 2011). In such
cases, traditional practices involve harvesting widely across the ecosystem (e.g. on African lakes and perhaps in traditional fishing on
coral reefs). Although a comprehensive analysis of these cases has
not been undertaken, it seems that these BH-like practices may be
more widespread where the pressure to meet food security needs,
and to access a wide range of available sources of food, is already
high, thereby outweighing balance-distorting market forces.
1686
Supporting such fishery systems may be a particularly efficient
means to pursue the CBD goal, as well as obtaining food security
and livelihood benefits. Such policy and practical support might
include securing corresponding community-based use rights,
with suitable social structures and processes underlying them, and
ensuring sustainability by keeping overall fishing pressure sufficiently low, in the face of increasing livelihood needs and export
market incentives.
Changes to existing fishery sector components
All, or some, existing fisheries, fleets, or métiers (fleet components)
may be required to adjust to a BH strategy. For example, while each
component may keep harvesting the species belonging to its usual
habitat/species assemblage, their fishing practices may change,
through self-initiated or regulatory approaches. Some options
could include (i) requirements to land all their catches (no discards),
(ii) broadening their range of species and sizes caught, through
benign changes in gears and practices, (iii) shifting away from
the conventional concentration of fishing on large individuals,
through measures requiring proportional harvest of smaller sizes,
and de facto protecting old spawners, and (iv) potentially lowering
their overall exploitation rate (as discussed above).
A major question here is which fishery components are obliged
to change and to what extent. For example, components that are
already harvesting a broad range of species and sizes at sustainable
rates (i.e. ones not far from the effectively BH situation discussed
above) may be able to reach BH more easily, and more inexpensively,
than others. Making the costs of adjustment commensurate with the
distance each component’s existing practices lie from the BH target
may be considered “fair” if those far from a BH arrangement (and
thus requiring the greatest change) are fisheries that have been historically overexploiting and “high-grading”, but unfair if they are
ones that previously shifted to a high degree of fishing selectivity,
in response to regulatory requirements. Alternatively, if fishing pressure must be lowered on specific ecosystem components (which may
be necessary whether BH is adopted or not), it may be considered
equitable for the impact to be distributed in a manner approximately proportional to existing excess fishing activity on those ecosystem
components.
The broader the requirement for change is across the fishery
system, the more spread out are the costs of a shift to BH.
However, this imposes the cost of change on everyone regardless
of their capability to adapt, or the cost of doing so, which may be
both economically inefficient and inequitable. (See later in this
article for a detailed discussion of distributional issues.).
Changing fishers’ behaviour is a key factor in the success of
both governance change and technological change, each of which
are likely essential in as major a shift as that involved in BH.
The costs of such behavioural change are not easily estimated
(unlike a purely mechanical change such as modifying gear to
broaden the size range caught). In cases where fishing is driven by
market value (notably in commercial fisheries), fishers can be
expected to target species (and sizes) of high value and, unless the
fishery is in trouble (e.g. for overfishing or unacceptable impact
on protected species), inducing a change in behaviour needed to
shift towards BH would require the “stick” of regulations (that
may be potentially expensive to enforce) and/or the also-expensive
“carrot” of compensatory subsidies to those making the changes. In
either case, a further cost is likely to arise in monitoring of fishing
behaviour—the more complete the BH implementation desired,
the more monitoring (e.g. video or observers) may be needed to
Charles et al.
ensure catches across the fisheries match what is required under
BH. (This need for a high level of monitoring is analogous to that
accompanying some fishery regulatory schemes; for example, it
has been seen that rigorous monitoring must accompany individual
quota schemes, which bring an inherent anti-conservationist incentive to exceed one’s quota—see Copes and Charles, 2004.)
Development of new fishery components
Rather than relying on existing fishery components to adapt sufficiently to be able to achieve a BH strategy, another option is to
elicit groups of entrepreneurial fishers to develop new fisheries,
or fishery components, designed specifically to “re-balance” the
harvest. These fishery players may target new markets and (where
necessary) develop new harvesting approaches to “crop” components of the ecosystem not being utilized by existing operations.
This approach may minimize the change required in existing
fishery components, thereby reducing dislocation of those fisheries—although regulatory change may induce adaptation of those
existing components, at least to some extent. However, unless the
new fishery components happen to be profitable on their own,
with suitable markets for the targeted resources (raising the question
discussed earlier of why they are not operating already), there will
likely be a need for subsidies to make the new fisheries feasible. In
such cases, the ecological benefits of BH would have to be assessed
against the financial costs (and other impacts) of subsidies
(OECD, 2006) in determining whether and to what extent BH is desirable. Furthermore, avoidance of perverse subsidies (especially
ones that actually produce negative ecological impacts) would be
essential (OECD, 2006).
It may be considered fair for those fishery components continuing their conventional operations to fund any needed subsidies to
new components, e.g. through specific taxes. In other words, the
“quid pro quo” for existing fleets being able to continue catching
only currently “high-end” or otherwise more profitable species
would be to help subsidize the new initiatives that are needed to
achieve the desired overall harvesting mix within a BH strategy. If
the tax were made proportional to the degree to which a fishery deviates from BH, as a result of profit-seeking choices (rather than being
the result of regulation), this would provide an incentive for adaptation of the conventional components as well.
Combinations
It must be highlighted that the above three transition options—(i)
support for existing fishery sector components, (ii) changes to existing fishery sector components, and (iii) development of new fishery
components—are certainly not mutually exclusive, and indeed are
potentially quite complementary. If there are fisheries, fleets, or
métiers that are already “models” of what is needed under BH,
these might provide examples for others. If existing fishery components, while continuing with their current species and size mix, and
the basic nature of their existing practices, see opportunities to make
changes in their fishing practices, this could reduce the extent to
which they must subsidize new fleets. Correspondingly, governments may also see value in enforcing modest changes on existing
fishers to reduce the potential need for subsidizing new fleets.
Other possible synergies can be explored, although overall, this
may be more a matter of sharing the costs of change, than one of actually reducing total costs.
1687
Economics of balanced harvesting
Distributional impacts of BH
Like any major change, a shift to BH in fisheries would have implications in terms of equity, fairness, and potential distributional
impacts, both (i) among current actors in the fishery—notably in
terms of perceived fairness, and subsequent responses to the
change (Charles, 2001; Symes and Phillipson, 2009)—and (ii)
between current and future actors.
The previous section discussed, for the harvesting sector of
the fishery system, the economic implications of moving to BH
through widespread changes to existing fishery sector components,
or by developing new fishery components. In both cases, it was
noted that equity, fairness, and distributional issues arise.
Notably, there may be differential (positive or negative) impacts
on the different fisheries, fleets, or métiers of the sector, and specifically who faces the additional ecological “burden” of the difference
between current harvest patterns and what would be required under
a BH strategy. If there is a desire for equitable treatment across
fishery components and over time (Cochrane, 2000), this has implications for how any required changes in catch composition should
be allocated.
For example, consider the situation of specific fisheries (or fleet
sectors within a given fishery) that have made investments (still to be
amortized) to meet the requirements of conventional selectivity regulations. It seems reasonable that those fishery players who invested
most in transitioning to selective fishing not be unduly penalized if
new regulations are put in place to promote a shift in the opposite
direction, to broader harvesting across sizes and species. Thus,
there may be reason to provide specific support for such players to
adapt and possibly to develop new capabilities. Similarly, within
any given fleet, it will be important that regulations are applied
fairly, to avoid a situation in which one set of fishers complies
with changes in fishing operations, while others, as “free-riders”,
avoid fulfilling their obligations. Suitable enforcement, taxes,
and/or subsidies may be needed in some settings.
It is also important to examine the distribution of BH impacts
across the value chain, specifically in terms of the post-harvest
components of the fishery system and the ultimate consumers.
For example, will relatively wealthy consumers of “high grade”
seafood be willing to shift towards “consuming less-utilized fish
species”, or will such species be marketed as a product for those in
poverty? If there were to be a shift to BH, and increased consumption
in wealthy areas, will accessibility of desired species to poor communities be reduced?
The implementation of BH may also lead to distributional
impacts over time, notably in terms of costs and benefits incurred
in the present and in the future. To this end, it is helpful to consider
that the underlying CBD goal of conserving ecosystem structure and
functioning may be viewed as both an investment in natural
capital (i.e. in terms of long-term ecosystem productivity and wellbeing, and the capability of ecosystems to adapt to future shocks—
e.g. Jansson et al., 1994) and a form of insurance (against the risk of
severe negative impacts in the aquatic ecosystem, in a similar
manner to marine protected areas—cf. Lauck et al., 1998). The
latter insurance function reflects the high uncertainty concerning
possible future ecosystem destruction or adverse changes of the ecosystem (such as through climate change), and highlights that the
benefits of actions (such as BH) taken to achieve the CBD goal are
not guaranteed but instead depend on the nature of the measures
taken (comparable to the use of large and stringently regulated
MPAs—cf. Rice and Houston, 2011).
Both of these relate to the practice of discounting (e.g. Sumaila
and Domı́nguez-Torreiro, 2010), reflecting the preferences that
people (as well as businesses, institutions, etc.) are assumed to
have for immediate or short-term benefits (e.g. revenues) as
opposed to longer term benefits arriving in the future. As with
any investment, the benefits of investing in natural capital (in this
case, through BH) would be produced much later than the costs,
and with much greater uncertainty than are the short-term costs.
The latter will depend, for example, on how predator–prey relationships actually respond to changes in harvest of the various species
and sizes of fish and how climate vagaries will affect that response.
Fishery economists have mechanisms to choose what discount
rate to use in a given fishery, often based on alternative uses of
capital in other parts of the economy, or other investment
options. However, the situation is not clear-cut for BH, and other
approaches for which resource exploitation and biodiversity conservation are both inherently involved. The meaningful time horizon
and discount rate are not explicit, and likely differ significantly
between those focused on conservation and those in the fishing industry (Garcia et al., 2014), leading to conflicts and the need to find a
suitable balance.
Discussion
This paper has provided a preliminary assessment of economic considerations relating to the proposal for a BH approach to fisheries
management. BH is seen as a means to meet the CBD goal of maintaining ecosystem structure and functioning, which requires that
rates of use match natural productivity. We have seen, however,
that this goal must be considered simultaneously with a range of
other ecological, social, and economic objectives—which will determine the importance placed on the CBD goal. Understanding economic aspects will lead to more informed approaches in balancing
society’s multiple objectives.
If the CBD goal is considered sufficiently important, a key operational question is whether the chosen means to achieve it should be
by matching fishing rates across size, species, or trophic levels—as
proposed under BH—or through other approaches. If BH is the
desired route, then the next set of questions address “how much”
BH is desirable, and how to transition to that level of BH. This
paper has explored transition issues in relation to how short-term
costs compare with long-term benefits, and the trade-offs involved
(including the marginal short- and long-term impacts of incremental moves towards the goal of conserving ecosystem structure and
functioning).
If it is infeasible or undesirable to fully implement BH, we have
noted that a partial implementation might be considered—for
example, broadening only across sizes, or species, or to a limited
extent for both. However, the efficacy of this requires assessing
and contrasting, for each implementation scenario: (i) the resulting
ecological benefits (relevant to the CBD goals) in the initial, interim,
and final stages of implementation, and (ii) the corresponding economic effects, and in particular how economic benefits and costs
vary with the degree and type of implementation and the transition
options. Both of these will depend on, among other factors, whether
the benefits and costs accrue monotonically with time or with implementation effort (and indeed, whether there are non-linearities
in the responses).
From a perspective of distributional impacts, we have seen that
if BH is to be pursued, its implementation would involve choices
such as whether change should take place widely across fishery
1688
components, or whether the change is concentrated on certain
players who are supported (perhaps through subsidies) to start
new fisheries. Again, the question of the policy and management
steps needed to accomplish this is crucial, as is the nature of
equity in the distribution of costs and benefits, and in the transition
pathways.
Since the potential ecological benefits of BH have been discussed
elsewhere, this paper may serve to particularly highlight the potential economic costs involved. These remain highly uncertain, but
could include both short-term transition costs (e.g. dislocation of
fleets, or costs of developing new markets) and longer term costs
(e.g. permanent loss of high-value catches due to lowering of exploitation rates, or ongoing subsidies to induce the harvesting of
non-marketable production). In totality, these costs could be prohibitive. On the other hand, this paper also identifies situations in
which a shift to BH can produce economic benefits.
In considering the possibility of a shift to BH, the overall balance
of benefits and costs will depend on the transition path chosen, including the rate and ultimate extent of implementation, the set of
suitable incentives (e.g. subsidies, or regulatory initiatives), as well
as aspects of innovation, technological development, and policy
change. All these have their costs. The financial capacity of the
sector, the level of incentives that is worthwhile for society, and
the risks of economic distortions through subsidies all must be considered. Future analyses will need to focus on specific scenarios in
which BH is being considered, to carry out a detailed, quantitative
economic analysis. Also important will be a corresponding analysis
of the social implications of BH.
As noted by an anonymous reviewer, related to this is the reality
that the choice is not simply between BH and the status quo. There is
a need to explore whether other options for reshaping fisheries
might better achieve the portfolio of objectives being pursued in
fishery systems. Put another way, if BH is a vehicle to achieve the
CBD goal of maintaining ecosystem structure and functioning, as
well as the human aim of improving food security, could there be alternative ways to accomplish this, at less cost in terms of other goals?
This could be an important question if, for example, BH were so
costly, and requiring such high subsidies, as to be a net drain economically. Then it will be important to explore, in future analyses,
whether the funds saved by not shifting to BH might be better
used in other ways to meet CBD and food security goals.
Further compounding the considerations around implementing
BH in fishery systems is the complexity of human uses of aquatic
systems (Charles, 2012). Typically, in any given location, the
fishery sector is not alone in using the aquatic ecosystem—other activities such as shipping, tourism, and aquaculture all have impacts.
Therefore, when considering implementation of BH, we must assess
the accompanying benefits and costs in relation to how other human
uses impact on conservation of ecosystem structure and functioning,
and how a change to BH would impact the opportunities to
pursue these other uses. Just as there is uncertainty about the efficacy
of shifting a single fishery (or a single gear type or métier) in an ecosystem towards BH, due to the complexities of fisheries and ecosystem interactions, so too is it uncertain whether a move of the entire
fishery system to BH will necessarily have the desired beneficial
effects (or be sustainable), if other uses of the aquatic ecosystem
do not change.
As with implementation of the Ecosystem Approach, the existence of these complexities does not provide an excuse for “doing
nothing”, but it does highlight the need for integrated ecosystembased management of inter-related marine activities (Charles,
Charles et al.
2014). To this end, further analysis of the implications of BH
within fisheries will need to be accompanied by broader analyses
of implications across the entire range of human uses of aquatic
ecosystems.
Acknowledgements
We would like to express our gratitude to many colleagues who have
provided helpful comments in the course of developing this paper,
and to anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions, all of
which has significantly improved this article. As usual, remaining
errors, if any, are the responsibility of the authors. Funding support
to AC is acknowledged from the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (Grant 895-2011-1017).
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