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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR Please Sir, May I Have Some More (Theory)? by Charles S. Oliviero Reference: Letting Clausewitz Go: The Lesson the Canadian Army Must Learn from Afghanistan, by Andrew Godefroy, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 2010 R ecently, there was a complaint against studying a classical military theorist, a so-called “dead Prussian.” I beg to differ. Military leaders need more study of military theory. Only thus can the profession of arms fulfill its obligations. What is military theory? A theory is a system of ideas explaining something. Consciously or not, everyone uses theories every day. They provide intellectual structure. They are invaluable aids to clear thinking and assist in developing rules. Understanding the world around us would not be possible without theories. For instance, a rudimentary understanding of physics is fundamental in the building of a bridge. Some knowledge of the nature of wood is required for carpentry. To paraphrase Professor Williamson Murray, as written in a US Marine Corps Gazette essay, the purpose of theory is to educate: it allows us to catalogue our thoughts and to extend our understanding of the complex, ambiguous, interactive phenomena that make up the real world. Theories about war provide some direction to thinking. Theory helps to explain life. In the same way that unknown technology appears to be magic, the absence of theory makes all events either unpredictable or unexplainable. Without theory, all human action could be perceived and explained as mere happenstance. The human mind requires order to clarify what it observes. Theories help us make sense of what we perceive. However, the majority of officers have but the most rudimentary contact with military theory. To these people, military actions occur because that is the way they have always occurred. Soldiers march in step because it is ‘well known’ that they have always done so. To these men and women, so highly focused upon actions and results, worrying about obscure theories seems somehow redundant. But theories are not redundant. They are fundamental to understanding. Being derived from fundamental philosophies, theories form the framework upon which strategies and plans are formulated. Whether progressing from formal education to practical skills or vice versa, the need for military professionals to study war and military theory should be self-evident. Ironically, this need is greater in small forces than in large forces. The smaller the force, the greater is the need for the professional development of its leaders; and this professionalism is reflected in more than mere skills. It is also reflected in the quest for creativity in seeking unorthodox solutions to complex problems. Such creativity can only be enhanced by the study of theory. There are many stumbling blocks to educating leaders in military theory, the greatest being the lack of an agreed upon universal model. In part, the difficulty lies in the fact that unlike the ‘hard’ sciences, military theory lies within a national or cultural domain. In the same way that early scientific theories tended to be either parochial or nationally proprietary, so also are military theories today. There is hope, however. With the growth of globalization and the increasing number of coalitions and alliances, the potential exists for all armed forces to come together to create a uniform, international model of military theory. But among military officers, and particularly among combat officers, theory is given little credit, credence, or study. Disregard for theory is commonplace, and it is arresting to think that ignorance of military theory holds true for the great majority of the world’s soldiers. I make this statement primarily as a quantitative observation. A broad reading of military history easily supports the premise that those officers who read widely and who studied their profession were generally more successful than those who did not. Even the military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte did not spring from his mind untutored; he read military theory voraciously. Until such a model is created, the disturbing tendency to mix and match ideas from different theories remains prevalent, sometimes resulting in a choice of ideas that are in opposition to each other. The result is the creation of doctrine that is fraught with internal inconsistencies, as is often seen in the multi-cultural armed forces of Canada and the United States. Education will certainly help but a long-term solution remains doubtful. Thus, in spite of the many barriers, the study of military theory is not just worthwhile, it is necessary – particularly so to smaller militaries such as that of Canada. If military theory is to be ‘taken back’ by military professionals from sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists, expanded study by uniformed personnel is critical. Only through continuous study can progress be made toward a universal understanding of the nature of war. Armed forces have, for generations, maintained a focus upon teaching skills instead of ideas. This practice is important for soldiers, but their leaders need more. Accepting these shortcomings in the field of military theory, it is reasonable to ask: Why study it? Will it assist military leaders in the performance of their daily duties? Will Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal 5 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR this study make war less likely? Will it make the world a better place? The answer is yes to all of the above. It is a truism that soldiers who have experienced war are the least likely to recommend it as a tool for conflict resolution. The more society understands war, the less likely it is to occur. The ultimate utility of studying war is that it will make life better. Part of this increased study must include a greater study of military theory in all of its guises – including (especially) the writings of dead Prussians. Letter by Isabel Campbell Reference: Review of The Naval Service of Canada 1010-2010: The Centennial Story, Richard Gimblett (ed.), reviewed by Jurgen Duewel, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 2010. I n his review of The Centennial Story, LieutenantCommander Duewel characterizes my interpretation of the 1949 incidents as mere “tempests in the teapot.” Despite his use of quotations, that phrase does not appear in my text. [Editor’s Note: The editor is the one who placed Lieutenant-Commander Duewel’s idiomatic words in single quotes to identify the phrase as being idiomatic, as is the stylistic custom at the Canadian Military Journal.] Rather, after careful examination of every single RCN report of proceedings from mid-1945 to 1949, I concluded, “…the postwar Canadian navy was not a happy institution. Desertions, absence without leave, and a host of other personnel problems plagued the navy from 1945 to 1949.” Duewel also states that Colonel Charles S. Oliviero, CD, PhD, is a Royal Military College (RMC) graduate, former armoured officer (8th Canadian Hussars), educator, and trainer. He has taught at RMC and the Canadian Forces College, and his area of expertise is military theory. He currently teaches post-graduate studies in military history and military theory at Norwich University. He is also a special advisor to the Chief of Land Staff, and in his civilian life, he is the coordinator responsible for the contractor support to the Canadian Army’s six simulation centres. “…the navy’s divisional system was born at this time.” These were his words, crediting the Mainguy Report for the divisional system. In fact, the divisional system existed long before the 1949 Mainguy Report, but constant personnel changes aboard warships had rendered it less effective during these years. I thank Lieutenant-Commander Duewel for bringing readers’ attention to this important point. Interpretation of the Mainguy Report remains a controversial issue far too complex to resolve properly in a mere three paragraphs of my chapter in this work. The forthcoming Volume Three of the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy represents collaborative research among top naval historians, and devotes an entire chapter to this subject. I hope it will assist in clarifying some of the historical myths that still surround the Mainguy Report. Isabel Campbell Naval Historian Directorate of History and Heritage Operation Apollo by John Horton. 6 Canadian Military Journal • Vol.11, No. 1, Winter 2010