Download LETTErS TO ThE EDITOr

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Please Sir, May I Have Some More (Theory)?
by Charles S. Oliviero
Reference: Letting Clausewitz Go: The Lesson the
Canadian Army Must Learn from Afghanistan, by Andrew
Godefroy, Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3,
Summer 2010
R
ecently, there was a complaint against studying
a classical military theorist, a so-called “dead
Prussian.” I beg to differ. Military leaders need
more study of military theory. Only thus can the
profession of arms fulfill its obligations.
What is military theory? A theory is a system of ideas
explaining something. Consciously or not, everyone uses
theories every day. They provide intellectual structure. They are invaluable aids to
clear thinking and assist in developing
rules. Understanding the world around us
would not be possible without theories.
For instance, a rudimentary understanding
of physics is fundamental in the building
of a bridge. Some knowledge of the nature
of wood is required for carpentry.
To paraphrase Professor Williamson
Murray, as written in a US Marine Corps
Gazette essay, the purpose of theory is to
educate: it allows us to catalogue our
thoughts and to extend our understanding
of the complex, ambiguous, interactive
phenomena that make up the real world.
Theories about war provide some direction
to thinking.
Theory helps to explain life. In the same way that
unknown technology appears to be magic, the absence of theory makes all events either unpredictable or unexplainable.
Without theory, all human action could be perceived and
explained as mere happenstance. The human mind requires
order to clarify what it observes. Theories help us make sense
of what we perceive.
However, the majority of officers have but the most rudimentary contact with military theory. To these people,
military actions occur because that is the way they have
always occurred. Soldiers march in step because it is ‘well
known’ that they have always done so. To these men and
women, so highly focused upon actions and results, worrying about obscure theories seems somehow redundant. But
theories are not redundant. They are fundamental to understanding. Being derived from fundamental philosophies,
theories form the framework upon which strategies and
plans are formulated.
Whether progressing from formal education to practical skills or vice versa, the need for military professionals
to study war and military theory should be self-evident.
Ironically, this need is greater in small forces than in large
forces. The smaller the force, the greater is the need for the
professional development of its leaders;
and this professionalism is reflected in
more than mere skills. It is also reflected
in the quest for creativity in seeking
unorthodox solutions to complex problems. Such creativity can only be
enhanced by the study of theory.
There are many stumbling blocks to
educating leaders in military theory, the
greatest being the lack of an agreed
upon universal model. In part, the difficulty lies in the fact that unlike the
‘hard’ sciences, military theory lies
within a national or cultural domain. In
the same way that early scientific theories tended to be either parochial or
nationally proprietary, so also are military theories today. There is hope, however. With the
growth of globalization and the increasing number of coalitions and alliances, the potential exists for all armed forces
to come together to create a uniform, international model
of military theory.
But among military officers, and particularly among
combat officers, theory is given little credit, credence, or
study. Disregard for theory is commonplace, and it is arresting to think that ignorance of military theory holds true for
the great majority of the world’s soldiers. I make this statement primarily as a quantitative observation. A broad reading
of military history easily supports the premise that those officers who read widely and who studied their profession were
generally more successful than those who did not. Even the
military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte did not spring from
his mind untutored; he read military theory voraciously.
Until such a model is created, the disturbing tendency to
mix and match ideas from different theories remains prevalent,
sometimes resulting in a choice of ideas that are in opposition
to each other. The result is the creation of doctrine that is
fraught with internal inconsistencies, as is often seen in the
multi-cultural armed forces of Canada and the United States.
Education will certainly help but a long-term solution remains
doubtful. Thus, in spite of the many barriers, the study of
military theory is not just worthwhile, it is necessary – particularly so to smaller militaries such as that of Canada. If
military theory is to be ‘taken back’ by military professionals
from sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists,
expanded study by uniformed personnel is critical. Only
through continuous study can progress be made toward a universal understanding of the nature of war.
Armed forces have, for generations, maintained a
focus upon teaching skills instead of ideas. This practice is
important for soldiers, but their leaders need more.
Accepting these shortcomings in the field of military
theory, it is reasonable to ask: Why study it? Will it assist
military leaders in the performance of their daily duties? Will
Vol. 11, No. 1, Winter 2010 • Canadian Military Journal
5
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
this study make war less likely? Will it make the world a better place? The answer is yes to all of the above.
It is a truism that soldiers who have experienced war
are the least likely to recommend it as a tool for conflict
resolution. The more society understands war, the less likely
it is to occur. The ultimate utility of studying war is that it
will make life better. Part of this increased study must
include a greater study of military theory in all of its guises
– including (especially) the writings of dead Prussians.
Letter
by Isabel Campbell
Reference: Review of The Naval Service of Canada
1010-2010: The Centennial Story, Richard Gimblett (ed.),
reviewed by Jurgen Duewel, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 2010.
I
n his review of The Centennial Story, LieutenantCommander Duewel characterizes my interpretation of
the 1949 incidents as mere “tempests in the teapot.”
Despite his use of quotations, that phrase does not
appear in my text. [Editor’s Note: The editor is the one
who placed Lieutenant-Commander Duewel’s idiomatic words
in single quotes to identify the phrase as being idiomatic, as is
the stylistic custom at the Canadian Military Journal.] Rather,
after careful examination of every single RCN report of proceedings from mid-1945 to 1949, I concluded, “…the postwar Canadian navy was not a happy institution. Desertions,
absence without leave, and a host of other personnel problems
plagued the navy from 1945 to 1949.” Duewel also states that
Colonel Charles S. Oliviero, CD, PhD, is a Royal Military College
(RMC) graduate, former armoured officer (8th Canadian Hussars),
educator, and trainer. He has taught at RMC and the Canadian
Forces College, and his area of expertise is military theory. He currently teaches post-graduate studies in military history and military
theory at Norwich University. He is also a special advisor to the
Chief of Land Staff, and in his civilian life, he is the coordinator
responsible for the contractor support to the Canadian Army’s six
simulation centres.
“…the navy’s divisional system was born at this time.” These
were his words, crediting the Mainguy Report for the divisional system. In fact, the divisional system existed long
before the 1949 Mainguy Report, but constant personnel
changes aboard warships had rendered it less effective during
these years.
I thank Lieutenant-Commander Duewel for bringing
readers’ attention to this important point. Interpretation of
the Mainguy Report remains a controversial issue far too
complex to resolve properly in a mere three paragraphs of
my chapter in this work. The forthcoming Volume Three of
the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy represents
collaborative research among top naval historians, and
devotes an entire chapter to this subject. I hope it will assist
in clarifying some of the historical myths that still surround
the Mainguy Report.
Isabel Campbell
Naval Historian
Directorate of History and Heritage
Operation Apollo by John Horton.
6
Canadian Military Journal • Vol.11, No. 1, Winter 2010