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A "Feudal Mutation"? Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns in World History Author(s): Stephen Morillo Source: Journal of World History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 531-550 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079242 . Accessed: 29/04/2013 11:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of World History. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions A "Feudal Mutation77? Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History STEPHEN MORILLO Wabash College as W in world history, a common there a "feudal mutation" pro cess that affected much of the Eurasian "ethnosphere" between 900 and 1200? R. J. Barendse says there was, and argues approximately in addition is a useful term for world historical that "feudalism" analy sis. I argue, first, that "feudalism" is not a useful term and concept in analyzing Barendse any aspect of world history, we call describes, whatever and, second, that the mutation it, did not actually happen. "Feudalism" Barendse s Claims Barendse makes three sets of broad claims about what he variously or "feudalism as a process": claims about calls the "feudal mutation" warriors about and horses, and about the results peasant production, structures. First, the feudal mutation was an internal for sociopolitical transformation caused by an upsurge in agricultural col productivity, a "warhorse rev and trade between onization, 900 and 1200. Second, a new olution" brought class of rural warrior aristocrats, bound together by oaths, to power across Eurasia at the expense of both peasant free doms and central authority. The result? He claims that "The feudal as a specific world historic process can be perceived juncture in which peasant societies were subjugated by an aristocracy of mounted Journal ofWorld History, Vol. 14, No. 4 ? 2003 by University of Hawai'i Press 531 This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions war 532 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 that became more powerful institution than any central and over the peasants, the jurisdiction and thus increasingly appropriated the land revenue." Thus, "the feudal mutation" consisted of changes in peasant production and in warhorses and warrior roles, the combi nation producing societies economic that had "certain common [and riors characteristic that makes them different by inference sociopolitical] from capitalist from hunter-gatherer societies, bands, or, indeed, from or in late antiquity, the societies such as the Roman, Sassanid, Harsha, the Gupta empires."1 Two questions in stand out from this summary. First, did changes create the "horse revolution" and the peasant resulting production of warriors over peasant dominance society? If so, how? This question is particularly the central role of steppe pressing when one considers in of the areas Barendse discusses. How did changes motives actions of affect the and these nonagrar peasant production ian societies? Second, what exactly was the result, and can we describe it as "feudal societies," the linguistic implicand of the "feudal muta tion" as a process? nomads in many "Feudalism" inMedieval Historiography is especially since the term is in rapid This last question pressing in medieval decline among European history, specialists especially is a term that is paradoxically because "feudalism" military historians,2 both too vague and too precise. Though based on the medieval word Latin the for "fief," the word "feudalism" was coined "feudum" by 1 R. "The Feudal Mutation: and Economic of Transformations J. Barendse, Military to Thirteenth in the Tenth the Ethnosphere this vol Centuries," Journal ofWorld History, ume, (pp. 511, 518). 2 Elizabeth A. R. "The Tyranny of a Construct: and Historians of Feudalism Brown, first raised the problems with this term; 79 (1974): 1063-1088, Europe," AHR is still vital. Constance her critique Bouchard, Strong of Body, Brave and Noble: Chivalry and summarizes France (Ithaca: Cornell Press, 1998), pp. 35-38, University Society inMedieval of significant the historiography of the term nicely and re-urges its abandonment. Examples works of medieval that manage the term include Frank Bar history perfectly well without "feudal monarch," William low's biography of an erstwhile Rufus (London: Methuen, 1983), Medieval The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and theCrusader Kingdom and Bernard Hamilton's Press, 2000). John France's survey of west University (Cambridge: Cambridge of Jerusalem some form of the term only three 1000 and 1300 mentions ern European warfare between times. Two of these imply the term's growing obsolescence: "This military-tenurial system, the best soldiers of the age" and "the bonds that tied which we often call 'feudal,' provided third discusses "feudal these mouvances together were what we call feudal oaths." The adjustments," rior aristocrats. N.Y.: Cornell in minor ways the landholdings and ties of war that affected is, warfare in theAge of theCrusades, 1000-1300 (Ithaca, John France, Western Warfare Press, 1999), pp. 7, 47, 56. University that This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 533 the sys reformers in the eighteenth century to describe (unfavorably) tem of rights and privileges the French espe aristocracy, enjoyed by tenants. This and their peasant regard to landholding cially with was taken up and extended broad socioeconomic meaning by Marxist the for whom the "feudal mode of succeeded historians, production" classical mode and preceded the capitalist mode.3 For military histori for if a privileged ans, this has always been far too broad a definition, constitutes then class and a subject peasantry feudalism, landholding most civilizations before the industrial revolution were feudal and the term loses any real analytic usefulness. taken a more historians have usually restricted view of Military a lord feudalism. For them, it is the system of raising troops in which a a a vassal (Latin vassus) in grants piece of land?to fief?typically return for a defined term of military service.4 But these conceptions of as they always contained a specious tended to be misleading, In the period 900-1100, precision. "feudum" and "vassus" were vague to the four and mutable terms, while military systems from the ninth teenth centuries were far more varied, flexible, and rational than con "feudalism" has long have allowed.5 Since ventional interpretations since became shorthand for these conventional the interpretations, sense is as misleading as in its broad term in its restricted military feudalism Marxist sense. we then define feudalism more generally as a landed sup are several problems service? There port system for unpaid military with this. First, in western Europe individuals and groups also served economic it pos for pay from an early date, wherever conditions made service. service sible and even when owed "feudal" Paid became they common in the period after 1050. Second, in a global increasingly context there have been many forms of "soldiers' lands" in different Should 3 See the references notes 1-8. A good example cited by Barendse, of this use of "feu to Capitalism is Robert in Early Modern S. Duplessis, Transitions Europe (Cambridge: "feudal" describes the rights to income exaction Press, 1997), where Cambridge University over tenants: that landlords exercised "most [lordly estates] had feudal (seignorial) rights as well" attached (p. 15). 4 This is the "military-tenurial system" referred to by John France; see note 2. Barendse in order to show that it doesn't work. My this definition (Barendse, p. 506) appropriates point exactly, and one reason the term is now out of favor. 5 See Susan Reynolds, Evidence Reinterpreted especially Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval of this Press, (Oxford: Oxford University 1994). For a case study and further discussion see Stephen Morillo, Warfare under theAnglo-Norman (Wood problem, Kings, 1066-1135 In that study I used the term "feudalism" in a restricted and care bridge: Boydell, 1994). dal" fully defined caused more way, but have since decided confusion than it was worth that even this carefully in terms of convenience. circumscribed This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions usage has 534 OF WORLD JOURNAL HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 in combination times and places, with paid service and not. To call all feudal is to arrive at a uselessly broad definition again. To try and as some feudal has involved the of distinguish inevitably privileging the European model, for no reason than that it was studied first. Many medieval historians have therefore decided that the term is military to best be functional of the avoided, probably replaced by descriptions these world's (and Europe's) varied military tia service, and the social hierarchies systems of landed support, mili that accompanied them.6 Given this historiography, will Barendse's definition clear up the that every other definition confusion has simply added to? Such defi nitions include Marc Bloch's, Barendse upon which depends most, even though he never explains why this definition is among many correct. But even his reliance on Bloch is qualified, for he is it significantly. The sec forced in the course of his analysis to modify is "wide features" of European feudalism ond of Bloch's "fundamental use a salary, tenement service of the the instead of (i.e., fief) spread which was out of the question."7 Yet Barendse must claim that "The act of entrusting oneself was thus critical to feudalism rather than the on funda enfeoffment of land per se,"8 indicating that agreement most mental features of anything called "feudalism" is well nigh impossible. 6 of Europe have of course come to a different In the more conclusion. Legal historians of the twelfth century and later, the informal arrangements settled European conditions o? an earlier age tended to crystallize terms of ser into formal legal arrangements with defined vice and defined inheritance the emer rights on the part of the vassal. This process marked in the narrow meaning of "fief holding" gence of feudalism (Bouchard, Strong of Body, p. cru tie of landholding became 36) as a fundamental legal system. Indeed, the lord-vassal it resembled) aris cial as one of two key bonds which (with marriage, among the European the basis of most later Eng tocracy. The twelfth century English system o? fief law became lish estate law and thence of modern American law. See S.EC. Milsom, The Legal property Framework Press, 1976) and the of English Feudalism University (Cambridge: Cambridge review by Robert C. Palmer, "The Feudal Framework of English Law," Michigan Law Review in England," "The Origins also Palmer's of Property Law and His 79 (1981): 1130-1155; on the developments 1-50; and more recently tory Review 3 (1985): (with greater emphasis in the Anglo-Norman in Anglo-Norman Land, Law, and Lordship John Hudson, period), law has a defi "feudal" property Press, (Oxford: Oxford University 1994). Thus, England is to read this very European nite history. The mistake legal history back into the military the rest of the world. sphere of Europe or, even more, 7 Marc of Chicago Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon Bloch, University (Chicago: II, p. 446. Bouchard, Press, 1961), Strong of Body (p. 39), points out that "it is now clear 'first [feudal] age,' was not in any defin that the period before the eleventh century, Bloch's able sense 'feudal.'" 8 Barendse, p. 515. Cf. France, Western Warfare, p. 56: "But the oath in itself did lit was who had real power in a relationship." And cf. Hamilton, mattered tle?what Leper on bundles of rights, that many of the King, p. 46, who notes, pace Barendse's emphasis tenures under Baldwin conferred no juris holders of military fiefs, which "only held money diction." This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 535 construction itself suf Dr. Barendse's of the concept Furthermore, flaws. First, it leads us right back theoretical fers from two significant to nineteenth with Europe as the model for century historiography, started with analyzing the rest of the world. The very problem Barendse in Europe is "a case of mistaken what feudalism identity" concerning was.9 In other words, getting European feudalism right allows us to see more broadly. The result is shoehorning: the "feudal mutation" fitting into a preexisting of other societies model derived from the evidence argument, we should first European history. To paraphrase Barendse's in Europe. Then, we should see if it happened look at what happened are broad enough and our comparisons in India. And if our definitions are loose enough, so as to take account of the variations that will as an a we to in exist "real" "ideal" find that type, inevitably opposed in India, too. This, I would the same "feudal mutation" happened are about.10 forms of Eurocentrism argue, is what the most damaging The second is that, despite his attempt to distance himself from the con of the Marxist of feudalism, Barendse's teleology historiography notion Marxist of "feudalization" of the of cept partakes heavily not just over "feu "modes of production," which promotes confusion it leads itsMarxist dalism" but over explaining sequel. In other words, to the question "If there was no feudalism, how do we explain the rise of capitalism?"11 is twofold. First, The problem with the formulation of this question not capitalism it asks for an explanation it is of the wrong for thing, across in in various has societies existed forms different (which many both the traditional the modern but indus and, obviously, worlds12) trialization has that needs this Second?and (which not) explaining. in the term "feudalism"?it in is the problem embedded asks, effect, or industrialism) arose how an economic system (whether capitalism a center is from a political if for there of around which system, gravity 9 Barendse, 10 I outline p. 503. an alternative method and explore the historiographical with problems in S. Morillo, further "Guns and Government: A Comparative terminology Study 6 (1995): of Europe and Japan," Journal ofWorld History 75-106. 11 This was to me forcefully when Barendse our papers and I delivered brought home in a session of the World in Boston in June 2000. One conference of History Association the first questions I received was this very question. 12 For in Janet Abu-Lughod, the evidence the traditional world see, for example, Before The World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, European Hegemony. System A.D. 1250-1350 in the context overview of world-systems 1989). For a general theory, see Christopher feudal and Thomas Chase-Dunn Westview Press, 1997). D. Hall, Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions (Boulder: JOURNAL 536 OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 the non-Marxist of medieval feudalism conceptions European it is that feudalism was a set of political and military arrange that tied together the warrior aristocracy and their dependants. It was, in other words, a political system separate from the economic all orbit, ments that supported systems (usually but certainly not always manorialism) it.13 Clearly, the political, and social spheres are linked in economic, even if linked. in all societies, but they are distinct important ways term it contains the if elements of the "feudalism," Using especially "modes of production" idea complex, clear analysis.14 elides the distinctions in ways that hinder "Feudalism": Conclusion is a useful term of whether "feudalism" Thus, regarding the question in analyzing world history, I remain inclined to reject it on and concept and theoretical linguistic, historiographical, grounds alone. Neither the term nor the concept help Barendse's analysis, because he has to so own time much his definition of it afloat in the his spend keeping it as a "real" rather whitewater (including defending toriographical than an "ideal" type) he wants to describe. Horses, Warriors, that he can't and focus fully on the historical process Peasants a transformation What about that process? In order to assess whether we as must took such Barendse describes actually place, analyze three of warrior elites the relationship warhorse revolution, major topics?a to their states and societies, and peasant the production?across states centuries. and nomadic several powers through major sedentary an article of this length can only sketch the outlines of Obviously, such a survey. Still, to be untenable. a survey even at this level shows Barendse's claims 13 economic that supported the for example the nonmanorial Note, arrangements warrior elite of the Crusader of Jerusalem: Hamilton, Leper King, p. 51-54. Kingdom 14 is that there are many ways to explain the the answer to this question Ultimately, to Capitalism, rise of industry or industrial capitalism Transitions and, for an (see Duplessis, world-historical The Great Divergence: Pomeranz, comparative analysis, Kenneth [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton of the Modern World Economy Europe, and theMaking nor are Press, 2000]), but that isn't the project of this article (nor of Barendse's), University the topics even closely connected. excellent China, This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual A Warhorse Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 537 Revolution? in the period is no real evidence revolution for a warhorse or of horses themselves either in terms of the capabilities 900-1200, in terms of tactics. did not produce Selective bigger horses across Eurasia. breeding have been bred in part for size, Northwestern destriers may European Fine Spanish horses were but even there size varied considerably.15 There of the Crusades cousins, and the evidence also remained and faster than Cru lighter in the Palestinian cli sader steeds that furthermore did not prosper mate.16 Above of nomads remained smaller than the horses all, steppe as references to Mongol those of sedentary warriors, "ponies" in the show.17 thirteenth century Nor did medieval horses have genetically better combat capabili or modern ties than ancient horses: only training and conditioning as Barendse over the first few years of a horse's life (not "decades," lighter than their northern is that near-eastern horses to claim, as the useful span of a warhorse's life is less than a to can inure horses the and sounds of the battlefield, decade) sights on a to impale themselves and medieval horses were just as unwilling seems solid line of spears as any other horses ever were.18 To claim that they were misunderstands tactics. The heavy of medieval the dynamics was a to intimidate that had the weapon cavalry charge psychological 15 R.H.C. of the Normans," "The Warhorses Studies 10 (1987): Davis, Anglo-Norman selective could affect the quality of war 80, who also points out that minimal breeding of selection were not necessary. horses very rapidly (pp. 71-73)?centuries See also Ann to theCrusades Penn.: Com The Medieval Warhorse (Conshokoken, Hyland, from Byzantium bined Books, destriers were of a and, for example, p. 146: "early medieval 1994), passim, size." very moderate 16 R. C. Smail, Crusading Warfare 1097-1193 Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 1956), p. 77? 17 David Morgan, The Mongols pp. 125-139; Hyland, Medieval Warhorse, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1990). 18 and the Somme (Lon John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo to understanding is fundamental don: Penguin, the dynamics o? 1976), pp. 154-160, in Napoleonic warfare study shows that horses infantry versus cavalry combat. Keegan's I were of withstanding noise and in World War and terror as medieval just as capable must have been more noisy ones. battlefields than medieval horses?indeed, gunpowder See also Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern Europe, (London: Rout 1495-1715 to early modern war outlined the principles ledge, 1992), pp. 30-31, by Keegan extending fare. And the history of Alexander the Great's that the basic capa cavalry tactics proves since classical times: Robin bilities of heavy Lane Fox, Alexander the cavalry had existed in Barendse's claim (p. 514), Carroll Gillmor, 1974), pp. 72-80. Regarding at the International at Kalamazoo in Medieval paper delivered Congress was about 3 to 10 or out that the usual age range o? active warhorses pointed Great (London, an unpublished May 12. 2002, This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 538 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 in other ranks to succeed.19 Success, opposing infantry into breaking on the quality of the opposing words, depended infantry and cavalry as horses in the latter case), as a steady mass of (men as crucially to hold off shock cavalry, and continued been able had infantry always to be able to do so in this period.20 As a result, almost all medieval armies outside purely steppe forces contained significant infantry com rare for unsupported and it was in fact extremely ponents, heavy cav to to be able defeat alry infantry. European-style heavy cavalry were, both a tactical anomaly21 and far less numerous than furthermore, most for forces from the elsewhere,22 forces, cavalry cavalry especially more contained horse archers than shock tradition, steppe cavalry. on the size of horses for its effec Horse archery was neither dependent tiveness nor was it newly effective after 900; it had been and contin to be effective in the right circum armies against sedentary ued stances.23 Thus, Steppe there was no pattern of rising cavalry dominance militarily. for a millenium had been formidable already. Their nomads around cyclical pattern of activity may have waxed not had fundamental Elsewhere, capabilities changed. 1000, good but their infantry 19 For an extended see Morillo, of this problem under the Anglo analysis Warfare in tenth-century the tactics described Byzantine Kings, pp. 150?162; military man uals support this analysis, and not breaking ranks for the infantry and a stressing steadiness slow, controlled against enemy heavy approach infantry, during which by the kataphraktoi the cavalry "must not be afraid": Eric McGeer, Sewing theDragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare Norman in the Tenth Century D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 103, and (Washington, 1995), pp. 104-105, a battle of wills between passim; a cavalry charge was in essence cavalry and infantry that genetic horse quality had little effect on, though training of horses and men did matter. 20 See on the effec under theAnglo-Norman Morillo, Warfare Kings, pp. 156, 169-174, in tiveness of Anglo-Norman the frequent of knights infantry, including dismounting in battles. Examples of successful medieval infantry stands, as at Legnano Anglo-Norman assume 1176, could be multiplied Byzantine military manuals endlessly; while tenth-century a central role for infantry that can resist cavalry charges and explain (McGeer, Sewing the in both Byzantine and Arab See Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. practice. Dragon's Teeth) on the crucial role of infantry in Crusader armies against horse archers. 202-203, 21 Their to Byzantines and Muslims alike: Anna Com charges caused astonishment trans. E.R.A. Sewter nena, Alexiad, (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 416, says famously "A mounted is irresistible; Kelt numerous ways she also details which had where), 22 The western to succeed he would bore his way through the walls of Babylon." But such charges and else of stopping 415-416, (pp. 164-165, at first go or not at all. climate could support only limited numbers and geography European to the steppes of Asia: Davis, The "Warhorses," p. 75; Mark Whittow, compared of California Press, 1996), pp. 19-25. 600-1025 (Berkeley: University of Byzantium, Making 23 horsemen the battle of Carrhae Note, just as an example, (53 b.c.) where Parthian an army of Roman and annihilated surrounded legions: R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, of horses The Enclyclopedia and Row, Harper of Military 1986), p. History 117. from 3500 B.C. to the Present, 2nd edition This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions (New York: Morillo: and Historical Tools Conceptual Patterns inWorld to be able to hold its own against good continued of combat and the capabilities damental mechanics what they had been and would continue essentially more. There was no "horse revolution" between History 539 cavalry, as the fun of horses remained to be for centuries and 900 1200. to a newly prominent warrior aris from a horse revolution Arguing the distinct military and social roles of conflates tocracy, furthermore, act as cavalry, for did not necessarily horsemen: knights European was dominance and their socially based, not vice military example, between social and mili versa.24 And only by eliding the distinction as can the equivalent be treated nomadic roles conquerors tary steppe a "horse to who ride horses. of a home-grown Thus, aristocracy happen a slides toward revolution" determinist argument simple technological with horses as the technol social phenomenon, of a complex an of "feudalism" has been tried before in Euro Such ogy. explanation a narrower on the stirrup, and with focus medieval pean history, on a global scale. failed.25 It is even more problematic account Warriors, States, and Societies a nonexistent also explains argument technological phenome was no across Eurasia rise warrior aristocracies of for there non, general between 900 and 1200, as a survey of warrior roles and whether they changed during this period will show. For the purposes of this survey, can be thought of as elites acting I will distinguish the "state," which institutions formal of includes power, from "society," which through elites as social groups acting outside of formal institu the confines across tions.26 The relationship of state to society varied significantly The "warriors" from "soldiers." Eurasia in this period. Iwill also distinguish The former are fighting men who are part of a social elite, whose pro to their social prestige. fession of arms either creates or contributes 24 See note 20. 25 and Social Change Medieval (Oxford: Oxford Technology Lynn White, University a theory of the origins of feudalism based on the intro 1, popularized Press, 1962), chapter duction of the stirrup; see Kelly DeVries, Medieval N.Y.: (Lewiston Military Technology Broadview of the "stirrup thesis," Press, 1992) for a good summary of the historiography See also Morillo, toward its dismissal. under the Anglo-Norman tending Kings, pp. Warfare in DeVries noted that the stirrup was widely 150-162. The general consensus long adopted to a vaguer "horse revolution" before 900 forces recourse for a technological determinist of feudalism. explanation 26 I caveats fully accept Barendse's states anywhere were not modern states. tion of some of them; such states. indeed, itmakes the definition regarding But this does not make a clear, more problematic of the "feudal" "state": medieval a useful descrip functional description This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions of 540 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2003 are fighting men who are not socially elite and do not prestige from bearing arms, such as conscript infantry.27 in 900. As By global standards, western Europe was underorganized a result, social structures tended to determine arrangements. political warrior A elite already dominated the this society; tiny mounted a aristoc of of the castle this reorganization private spread prompted in local castles and estates.28 racy toward patrilineal lineages based The latter derive of kinship and lordship held this class together relationships state structures blocks of the rudimentary formed the building as to build after the leaders 1000, economy began regional expanded came to occupy invasions ended. Warriors therefore and external more of the power structure, at the expense of the Church, partly by a in investi the exclusive self-definition embodied of process mutually came ture controversy. to values and dominate this prestige Military on as on their showed themselves conquerors coinage society: kings Informal and and the Church horseback, justified its claims to power with a "two that in a sense they'd already swords" theory of legitimacy, indicating Note also that the high points of Church lost the symbolic struggle. a from of derived the Cru venture, prestige military papal leadership even more became the aristocracy, sades. Underneath society widely than it had before 900. Urban militarized troops, drawn from largely formed the third part, with cas and communes, self-organized militias an of tles and knights, system that proved emerging sociomilitary and contentious, expansive, subject only with externally internally to In central control.29 the transformation short, large-scale difficulty 1100 was in social character and and of western Europe between 950 saw a significant rise in warrior prestige and dominance. 27 The in which I survey various the fact that western order societies?especially no particular is not the model for other Europe significance. Europe comes first?carries areas. 28 Robert and Cultural Change Colonization Bartlett, The Making of Europe. Conquest, Press, 1993), p. 66; C. Warren Hollister, (Princeton, 950-1300 N.J.: Princeton University in Chinese and Fall of the Middle "The Decline History" Ages: Reperiodizing European Lun Lecture Series, ed. Amy K. Y. Leung Bulletin Supplement, Wei (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Duby, The Chivalrous 1996), p. 34. See also Georges of California Postan Press, 1979), pp. 59-80, (Berkeley: University 134-157; Bouchard, Strong of Body, p. 39. 29 Cf. sometimes does not suffi who, however, Bartlett, Making of Europe, pp. 60-84, as cavalry. On as a social and military elite and knights between ciently distinguish knights and Samurai: Military this terminological "Milites, Knights point, cf. Morillo, Terminology, at War: Essays in in The Normans of Translation," and the Problem History, Comparative The Chinese University Society, trans. Cynthia Honor dell, ofC. Warren Hollister, 2001), pp. 167-184. eds. Richard Abels and Bernard Bachrach (Woodbridge: This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Boy Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 541 institu In Byzantium, the stronger survival of Roman by contrast, state shaped soci that a centrally organized tional frameworks meant and pres ety rather than the other way around: Court appointments a of of focused the circulation with tige, along cycle gold coinage, of all of and ambitions types, including loyalties Byzantine provincials into the Byzantine the soldiers recruited army, on the state.30 Two this structure, the civil aristocracy of the capital and groups dominated the military of the provinces; their interests were held aristocracy invasions of Arab until 900. But the the external pressure together by ten end of that threat and subsequent Byzantine introduced expansion sions that were only resolved in the civil wars at the beginning of Basil IPs independent rule in the 990s. Despite his martial Basil reputation, in favor of the civil aristocracy. The mili actually settled this tension both the tary families lost power and influence thereafter. Meanwhile, demands of offensive warfare after 900 and the dynamics of internal units the aristocracy that the indigenous Byzantine led politics meant were increasingly replaced after 900 by foreign mercenaries?partly heavy cavalry but even more heavy infantry such as Basil IPsVarangian more politically were (theoretically) Guard?who loyal to the emper ors who hired them.31 Military values were therefore steadily parti tioned off from society, and society itself was widely demilitarized.32 The transformation of Byzantium between 900 and 1050, therefore, was a political one that reduced both the role and prestige of warriors. a military led the revival of Byzantium Though family, the Komnenoi, after the disasters of 1071-1081, their rule remained state-centered, their military from and separate largely foreign society.33 There was no revival of the role or prestige of a native warrior aristocracy after 1081. state and society appears in the Yet a third relationship between Islamic world: radical separation. Born of sudden conquest, the Umay its armies in enclaves. conqueror yad caliphate garrisoned Though consciously separated from the old elites of the areas they conquered, to the lower strata of the the Arab tribes gradually became connected societies that often led to conversion of conquered through patronage the clients. The unity, cultural identity, and even religious doctrine of this scattered ruling army of tribal, nomadic Arabs emerged from a 30 Whittow, pp. 104-134. Making of Byzantium, 31 Whittow, pp. 310-390. Making of Byzantium, 32 Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current John Haldon, "Military Service, Military Problems and Interpretations," Dumbarton Oaks Papers 47 (1992): 66. 33 Paul 1Komnenos, The Empire of Manuel Cam 1143-1180 Magdalino, (Cambridge: Press, 1993). bridge University This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 542 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 that is, in effect, a dialogue with process of definition by distinction; their surroundings whose "we are not starting point was the assertion or are "we and wanderers from the Persian)" (or Jewish, Byzantine in the emergent desert." This attitude became enshrined religion the influence of the ulema, the urban-based through scholar-priests who increasingly acted as the arbiters of Muslim history and doctrine. of imperial states that The result was a deep distrust of the mechanisms down the Umayyad The new Abbasid caliphate. to seize control of Islam from the ulema, but lost. caliphate attempted on meant Persian based the loss that the models, government Having a Abbasid suffered from critical lack of within the caliphate legitimacy most it ruled. The swift and immediate and the very society result, key eventually brought transformation of Islam after 900: the appearance of slave soldiers at As the heart of the Abbasid both slaves and (almost always) for polity. armies were doubly Turkish servile steppe nomads), eigners (especially outside the structures of mainstream Islamic society. Slave armies gave to the Abbasid the appearance and function of a conquest caliphate as state: an occupier native well be (who though sepa foreign) might rate from the society use of slave soldiers, it ruled. The taint of illegitimacy, the consequent nature of Islamic state-society and the conquest to be central features of the various pieces of the relations continued and of almost every Islamic polity Abbasid caliphate after it fragmented in the traditional world.34 Military values and prestige lost out to the vision of Islam; warriors, either slaves or tribal ghazis, uiema-created were marginalized; and society was almost completely demilitarized. in that a powerful state dominated China and resembled Byzantium The Tang dynasty, under the leadership of shaped social arrangements. a strong, an and elite strong emperors aristocracy, military operated state staffed by a trained Confucian But the centralized bureaucracy. wars in civil the that the self-destructed aristocracy brought military an to in them Nomadic the end around 900. conquerors Tang replaced new in rulers civilian the south, the north; Song adopted aggressively to curb any resurgence of independent lead military policies designed ers. The result was a total eclipse of warrior prestige as Song emperors designed tiveness. forces built armed Confucian-inspired 34 Patricia for political reliability more than for effec antimilitarist?values civilian?indeed, Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cam in Kurt Raaflaub "The Early Islamic World," and 1980); Crone, and Medieval Worlds, eds., War and Society in theAncient pp. 309-332, of state and society and the nonfeudal for separation ("lord and vas pp. 326-327 especially sal") nature of the settlement. Crone, bridge University Nathan Rosenstein, Press, This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 543 on horseback, Chi if European rulers showed themselves triumphed: nese emperors heeded the old saying that you can conquer a kingdom on horseback, them but you can't rule it from there, and so presented as at in warrior the the decline selves scholars. Reinforcing prestige to a recruitment of the under shift from conscription top, long Tang term professionals drawn from the dregs of society under the Song further into disrepute even if society was pushed the military profession not demilitarized.35 completely a close congruence of Indian had produced Long development a a in states. class and had Warriors society and relatively high place caste system that was becoming But warfare elaborated. increasingly was characterized than conquest, and for prestige more by contests or combi conquests large-scale political shifting alliances made many the impact of war on society and rest of society.36 Muslim raids, a new ele after 900, introduced one.37 Mil socially revolutionary shift from Arab lancers to nomadic horse archers did itarily, the Muslim is this shift that some scholars make the raiders far more effective?it it depended in Indian military history38?but call a "horse revolution" on new tactics, not new horses, and most crucially had little effect on nations limited both unstable, which to the the spread of warrior values in scale and effectiveness increasing ment into this world, but it was not a come under for Hindu arrangements. kingdoms might sociomilitary nor in prestige or warriors neither but Hindu lost rule, eign gained as a general result of Muslim war social position raids, while Muslim remained outside the Indian social raiders or conquerors, riors, whether It is possible, however, that the failure of the system in this period. to an native warrior class to deal effectively with the raids contributed so from of Indian values and religious increasing distancing politics from warrior activity. 35 The Arthur Wright Cambridge History of China, vol. 3 :Sui and T'ang China 589-906, is a good gen and Denis Twitchett, eds. (Cambridge: Press, 1979), University Cambridge on Chinese eral survey of these two dynasties with a great deal of specific information mil see also E. G. Pulleyblank, to the Rebel and their evolution; The Background itary institutions lion of An Lu-shan Press, 1955); John Haeger, (London: Oxford University ed., Crisis and in Sung China of Arizona Press, 1975). (Tucson: University Prosperity 36 A New History of India, 5th edition (Oxford, Stanley Wolpert, 1997). The divergent are Indian and medieval of state formation processes European paths taken by precolonial in the papers of the first section of Martin Doornbos and Sudipta Kaviraj, eds., explored (London: Sage Press, 1998). Dymanics Europe and India Compared of State Formation: 37 Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History (Cambridge, 1999). 38 in India c. 1000-1850" in Jeremy Black, ed., "Warhorse and Warfare Jos Gommans, War in the Early Modern World 1450-1815 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions pp. 109-112. 544 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 To borrow a Buddhist phrase, state and society evolved in Japan in a state of dependent each affecting the other. After co-origination, 1150, warriors asserted an increasing role in society, state, and culture. it is this late date that leads to Barendse's odd avoidance of Perhaps the rich comparative literature on Japanese feudalism, for it was only in Japanese civilization the end of his period that the elements to develop. I have have called feudal began analyzed in detail elsewhere; my basic conclusion comparisons Japan-Europe is that it has been a damaging in Japanese history about "feudalism" construct of shoehorning.39 because Briefly for this survey, warriors from that others and military val gained in authority at the expense of civil aristocrats, ues became to central this civilization, increasingly though legitimacy to derive from the nonmilitary continued figure of the emperor. At a wide gulf separated warriors and the least until after 1477, however, was the near exclusive rest of society. Warfare preserve of a particular "warrior class" and though class: bushi means the they rode horses, tactics of the bushi were even more flexible than those of European soldiers, meant not knights. Similarly, ashigaru, the word for non-bushi not but "lower-class Thus tactics, marked class, "infantry" fighter." a as reminder elsewhere that serving Japanese military terminology, "horse revolutions" (even if they existed) and warrior social roles need not be linked.40 this survey shows is that there is no discernable What pattern that a "feudal mutation." is no general characterize There could possibly rise in warrior prestige?indeed, of warriors and their the separation do not values from society seems to be a more general trend. Warriors a or states in in societies role 1050 (or 1200) greater consistently play than they did in 900. Nor or societies no pattern in response is there any consistent to warrior roles or restructuring actions?certainly of states there is of decentralization.41 39 is when A good example of shoehorning "Guns and Government." Morillo, J. R. more more feudalism had to be more structured, Strayer wrote, impersonal, "Japanese from the mid than European feudalism. At least it had to have these qualities bureaucratic of huge armies and large numbers of dle of the sixteenth century, when we have evidence retainers under a single lord." J. R. Strayer, "The Tokugawa Period and Japanese Feudal and Marius ism," in John W Hall Jensen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History of Early in "Guns Modern Press, 1968), p. 6. As I noted N.J.: Princeton Japan (Princeton, University is hardly worth the conceptual "bureaucratic feudalism" and Government," effort, and to the bankruptcy in Japan? "Feudalism of the term. See also John Whitney Hall, points Studies in Society and History A Reassessment," 5 (1962). Comparative 40 and Samurai." Morillo, "Mi?ites, Knights 41 There were of course broad similarities in the social and political of organizations to all extends this is an important these societies. But?and similarity qualification?this This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 545 of horse and negative, There is, perhaps, greater impact, positive in this period, but in almost every case, warriors on a range of societies mercenaries and allies to Islamic slave and Chinese from Byzantine are involved the warriors soldiers and raiders of Hindu kingdoms, no or to connection the social little nomads with steppe they peoples in Barendse's argument between confusion impacted. The fundamental an in the evolution factor of these soci external nomadic horsemen, to warrior who ride classes and eties, horses, an sedentary happened is the fact that the internal factor, only two by vividly highlighted in which warrior prestige rose in this period (and the only two societies as "feudal"), western drawn attention that have consistently Europe were two least affected by nomadic contact.42 the and Japan, Warriors, Peasants, and Economics are an even larger topic than warrior roles, transformations even less space to consider them here. But as with warrior and there is even a any picture of a consistent survey undermines roles, telegraphic "mutation" between Eurasian socioeconomic 900 and 1200. Economic I doubt whether of the organi To begin with, any transformation zation or productivity of agricultural could have effected a production as significant as Barendse portrays, a point illustrated by the mutation over time on a log in which 1, Figure plots human population graph scale so as to equalize scales of change.43 arithmic As every society in this period lies along the relatively flat section increases of the agricultural and of the graph between the dramatic I take that to mean in "modes of that variations industrial revolutions, see Patricia Crone, societies: Pre-Industrial Societies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). preindustrial in this period, is the problem with Barendse's This emphasis on oaths among horse warriors as well as with notions do not distinguish of honor and so forth: these characteristics the from any earlier or later period. They are well-nigh universal among war period 900-1200 rior societies. Achilles into fighting would oaths binding men groups; recognize certainly is nothing in Dr. Barendse's of the he lived and died by notions of honor. There description in ear societies of the "feudal mutation" that would distinguish them from similar societies in terms of the role and status of warriors. lier or later periods, especially 42 On see Thomas the roles and impact of nomads D. Hall, "Civilizational generally, Review 24 (1991): 34-57; Thomas The Role of Nomads," Civilizations Comparative Change: The Making Barfield, The Perilous Frontier (Oxford: Blackwell, of 1992); Mark Whittow, The Mongols. pp. 19-25; Morgan, Byzantium, 43 Modified from Edward S. Deevey Jr., "The Human Population," Scientific American 262 (Sept. i960): and Richard 194-204, using Colin McEvedy Jones, Atlas ofWorld Popu at website lation History (New York: Penguin, 1978) and the World Population <http://metalab.unc.edu/lunarbin/worldpop>. This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOURNAL 546 I i Cu TOOLS and FIRE 1.8M years ago o OF WORLD MESOLITHIC CULTURAL REVOLUTION 90K-70K years ago HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1900 CU AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION -8000 to -3000 si *. / p >. Homo ? Sapiens i 2M / .- / IM Homo Erectus, Neanderthals 100K YEARS AGO Figure i. were fairly insignificant.44 between those two revolutions production" of "mode any Furthermore, argument must ignore the production" ones over economic in of political the pre in dominance arrangements dustrial world.45 Even taken on its own terms, however, the evidence its connection economic for Barendse's transformation, especially is highly inconsistent. with warrior activity, It got con Western Europe began this period poor and disorganized. over the next three centuries, in siderably richer and more organized warrior Because their wealth and social because of the part aristocracy. on intensive estate management of person rested ultimately position as in acted held land, they agri private entrepreneurs encouraging ally cultural and commercial expansion.46 The end of a period of invasions eco and Saracens, around 950, further facilitated by Vikings, Magyars, nomic of landed estates (some of which possession growth. Warrior over was thus were fiefs) that carried farmers peasant jurisdiction 44 The that there have been three basic "modes graph is the basis for my contention in human history: hunter-gatherer, and industrial, with nomadic of production" agricultural, as a dependent pastoralism subtype of agricultural. 45 Pre-Industrial Societies, pp. 13-35. Crone, 46 trans. Howard B. Clarke of the European Economy, Duby, The Early Growth Georges 1, 2, and Press, 1974); Bartlett, Making (Ithaca: Cornell University of Europe, esp. chapters 5-7 This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 547 central to a system of warrior economic socially (though not militarily) was social first and governmental support that only second. But it should be noted that as Europe got richer and its economy more mon as classically understood etized, "feudal" forms of military organization actually declined: paid service increasingly replaced unpaid service in contracts for land, and formal financial (or at least exchange replaced runs ties of vassalage.47 of course, This, customary supplemented) counter to Barendse's basic causal argument. It before 900 was also poor but was centrally organized. Byzantium too got somewhat richer after 900, largely as a result of a shift in the and Islam. Byzan tide of success in the border wars between Byzantium tine strategy had previously for security.48 The sacrificed prosperity to go on of the caliphate the chance gave Byzantium fragmentation to the benefit of Anatolian In the offensive, agricultural production. a circumstances in other words, external military role major played as was western in economic but the response fostering growth, Europe, as opposed to the free enterprise nature of western in the Byzantine is This reflected system of mil expansion. European on economic which remained centered support, government itary salaries. There was growth in "soldiers lands," but such lands were cen centrally directed did not provide jurisdiction over cultivators, and thus trally controlled, cannot be equated toWestern Later eleventhand twelfth practices.49 were more influenced Western fiefs, but as century grants ofpronoia by to the grants carried little legal jurisdiction and were made primarily foreign mercenaries, they reflect the increasing separation of Byzantine 47 A classic Mass.: Harvard (Cambridge, study is B. D. Lyon, From Fief to Indenture under the Anglo-Norman Press, University Warfare 1957); see also, for example, Morillo, and twelfth centuries Kings, chapter 3, on the role of paid service as early as the eleventh in rich England. Iwon't even get into the vast and now somewhat dated literature on "bas tard feudalism." It is also not at all clear that economic led to a leveling of peasant growth across many claims studies show the opposite cultures: status, as Barendse (p. 523). Many economics into peasant societies that the penetration of market leads to greater stratifica tion of village to take advantage families show differing abilities society, as different peasant of market See for example and Mar Peasants, Merchants opportunities. James Masschaele, kets: Inland Trade inMedieval 1150-1350 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), esp. England, c. 1295-1344 A Medieval pp. 33-55; Judith M. Bennett, Life: Cecilia Penifader ofBrigstock, Transi (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 7 and 8; in early modern 1999), chapters Europe, Duplessis, tions toCapitalism, passim.; and inMuromachi Japan, Nagahara Keiji with Kozo Yamamura, in John W. Hall and Daimyo and Toyoda Takeshi, Power," eds., "Village Communities of California Press, 1977), pp. 107-124. Japan in theMuromachi Age (Berkeley, University 48 Whittow, pp. 310-357. Making of Byzantium, 49Warren A History State and Society Calif.: (Stanford, Treadgold, of the Byzantine Stanford University denies any Byzantine "feudalism." Press, 1997), p. 680, who specifically See also Haldon, "Military Service." This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JOURNAL 548 OF WORLD HISTORY, DECEMBER 2OO3 so sharply with the organic connection army and society that contrasts in western Europe.50 of military force and social organization Islam, by contrast with the Christian world, was already rich and had even spread the wealth, prosperous before 900. Islamic expansion as diffusion to what has been of agricultural contributed techniques But this was offset to some extent by called a "Green Revolution."51 the dynamics of Islamization of the peasantry, which tended to draw from the countryside dominated elites to the peasants by pre-Islamic cities where Arab garrisons were stationed.52 And the story after 900 one of decline to the increased activity is increasingly related directly both as invaders and as slave soldiers within horsemen, areas reverted from cultivation to pasture, Islamic polities. Significant as reflected in grants of iqta to warriors that contained pasture rights, not agricultural estates. The division between pastoralist warriors and an agricultural peasantry the gap between Islamic state simply widened of nomadic of agri and society noted above, and acted to the long-term detriment in the Islamic world. cultural production before 900, but unlike Islam too, was rich and prosperous China, to gain in productivity. In fact, the agricultural continued improve ments strain of introduced under the Song, including a faster-ripening a two plantings rice that virtually doubled cereal harvests by allowing trade, made year, not to mention thriving Song industry and overseas in Eurasia in terms of peasant production.53 China the biggest winner on Barendse's Here above all one should expect a "feudal mutation" is undoubtedly the least feudal area on the continent. terms, yet China nor was anything Warriors expansion, played no role in the economic to even remotely estates warrior used support military resembling forces, which were instead raised, paid, and supported out of centrally tax revenues. in prosperity, this period and seems to have also began save for the damage done by Islamic so with little change remained raiders.54 It is, in other words, hard to see much impact of warriors or on economic of developments the Hindu base, warriors) (especially in the economic base upon warriors. Warriors may have held lands that controlled India 50Mark Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (Philadelphia: of Pennsylvania Press, 1992). University 51 Andrew in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion Innovation Watson, of Agricultural Press, 1983). 700-1100 Crops and Farming Techniques, University Cambridge (Cambridge: 52 Slaves on Horses. Crone, 53 in Sung China. Haeger, Crisis and Prosperity 54 Such raids foreshadow disaster that was the Delhi the economic sultanate, starting just after 1200: Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, pp. 238-255. This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Morillo: Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns inWorld History 549 but it is not clear that gave them "bundles of rights" over cultivators, in such arrangements there was any significant change dating to the period in question. Finally, Japan, like western Europe, was relatively poor in 900.55 It gained slowly in productivity through this period, though not as dra as Europe did, in part because land for expansion was much matically more limited. But the highly indirect relationship between the agri cultural base of this society and the warrior class that came to rule it in either direction. any influence Shoen, the estates granted mitigated to warriors and civil aristocrats alike by the central authority, illustrate a superficial resemblance toWestern this. Despite fiefs, what Japanese come from a warriors that might got were grants of shoen income estates warriors of whose also other and civil output variety supported was officials. Neither "bundles of rights" nor estate management involved.56 as those con results of this survey are as easily summarized no warrior is roles: there conditions varied Initial pattern. cerning across con the direction of also and the Eurasia, varied, widely change to warriors and their horses and social roles varied even more. nection it is hard to see what direct causal connection could have Indeed, in existed between and the peasant agricultural changes production The activities of pastoral nomads who formed the bulk of cavalry warriors across Eurasia in this period. That "population in pressure and changes were in within rural the agrarian production society inducing changes in any consistent way that can be superstructure"57 military/fiscal in to called "feudal" is not only unproven but, my opinion, impossible prove. Conclusion should be obvious from the results of these sur My overall conclusions as no pattern I have veys. If, shown, there was no warhorse revolution, no of increasing warrior dominance and of pattern socially, changing across Eurasia between peasant production 900 and 1200, never mind 55 Contra in 900 was less developed, io), Japan though perhaps more organized, in every way he mentions: than Europe etc." "trade, agricultural urbanization, productivity, 56 "Guns and Government," and Morillo, pp. 86-87; Hall, Government John Whitney to 1700 (Princeton: in Japan, 500 Local Power Princeton Press, University 1966), pp. (because 99-128. 57 smaller Barendse, Barendse and more (note unified) p. 521. This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 55o any JOURNAL consistent connection among OF WORLD these HISTORY, elements, then DECEMBER there was 2OO3 no or process that can be called "feudal," or mutation, transformation, and so no such thing else for that matter, that can be called anything as "feudalism" in world history between 900 and 1200. Such a conclu reasons sion simply reinforces and historiographical the philosophical as a tool for the the term "feudalism" adduced earlier for rejecting analysis of world history. is of course emotionally A negative less satisfying than conclusion a positive one. The reader may be tempted to ask, if there wasn't feu is a legitimate and my then what was there? This dalism, question, as a case not in should be taken this conclusion negative precluding The way forward for world for larger patterns and connections. in the recycling of an out other directions than lies history, however, no one can agree on. whose dated Eurocentric concept meaning search This content downloaded from 148.206.40.98 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:57:30 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions