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From the SelectedWorks of Timothy Shanahan
September, 1989
"Kant, Naturphilosophie, and Oersted's Discovery
of Electromagnetism: A Reassessment"
Timothy Shanahan, Loyola Marymount University
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/timothy_shanahan/6/
TIMOTHY
DISCOVERY
SHANAHAN*
AND OERSTED’S
OF ELECTROMAGNETISM:
A
REASSESSMENT
DANISH chemist
and physicist Hans Christian
Oersted (1777-I 851) is
recognized by historians of science primarily as the discoverer of electromagnetism. His experiments
in 1820 demonstrated
a definite lawlike relationship
between electrical and magnetic phenomena.
The quite general question of
whether there is in science such a thing as a “logic of discovery” can in this
case be given a more precise formulation.
Why was Oersted, rather than
another of the many scientists interested in electricity and magnetism
in the
nineteenth century, the fortunate one to have made the discovery, and thus to
have his name immortalized
in the history of science? What events, ideas, or
methods were responsible for the discovery?
A number of possibilities might occur to the historian. Perhaps it was merely
a matter of time. Sooner or later someone had to discover electromagnetism.
If
it had not been Oersted, then it would have been someone else. The fact that it
was Oersted, and not someone else, may simply reflect nothing more than his
THE
good luck. In fact, the dominant
view of Oersted’s discovery for most of this
century held that it was simply a matter of chance that Oersted stumbled upon
the phenomenon.
For example, an issue of the Open Court for 1913 carried an
article by Philip E. B. Jourdain entitled “An Accident that Led to a Notable
Discovery”. Jourdain remarked that, “In Ernst Mach’s well-known lecture ‘On
the Part Played by Accident in Invention
and Discovery’, there is no mention
of the remarkable
accident that led to Oersted’s momentous
discovery of the
action of an electric curent on a magnetic needle.“’ Jourdain then proceeds to
quote a long excerpt from a letter of Christopher
Hansteen,
an associate of
Oersted’s,
to Faraday,
dated 30 December
1857. In the letter Hansteen
describes Oersted as “a man of genius”,
but also as “a very unhappy
experimenter”
who could not manipulate
instruments.
After a lecture, he says,
Oersted happened to place a wire connected to a battery parallel to a magnetic
needle, and was “quite struck with perplexity” to see that the movement of the
needle corresponded
to the direction of the current in the wire. The letter,
*Department
of Philosophy,
Loyola Marymount
University, Los Angeles, CA 90045. U.S.A.
Received 19 Much 1986; in revisedform 30 July 1988.
‘P. E. B. Jourdain, ‘An Accident that Led to a Notable Discovery’, Open Court 27 (1913), 3940.
Ernst Mach, ‘On the Part Played by Accident in Invention and Discovery’,
Popular Scientific
Lectures, 3rd edn (Chicago, 1898). pp. 259-281.
Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci., Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 287-305,
Printed in Great Britain
287
1989.
$3.00 + 0.00
0039-3681/89
Q 1989. Pergamon Press pk.
Studies in Histwy
288
which purports to recount the “accident”
leading
with the remark that, “Thus the great discovery
und Philosophy
of Science
to the discovery, culminates
was made; and it has been
said, not without reason, that ‘he tumbled over it by accident’.“’
The idea that Oersted’s discovery in 1820 of electromagnetism
was simply an
accident seems to have been the “received view”, even among historians,
for
about a century after the announcement
of the discovery. It was then that
scholars such as Meyer’ and Stauffer4 demonstrated
that Oersted’s discovery
was anything but accidental, because he had by that time been working on the
very problem of the relationship
between electricity and magnetism
for many
years. (Meyer has shown, ironically given Hansteen’s claims, that Oersted was
in fact a gifted experimenter,
and that it was Hansteen who was rather clumsy
in the laboratory.)
As a result of such historical studies, the popularity
of the
“accident”
account has diminished.
Now, however, the pendulum
seems to
have swung in the other direction. Far from it being merely a “chance” event
or an accident. Oersted’s discovery is now seen as having a very specific, but
initially somewhat surprising,
causal source. It is currently popular to claim
that Oersted’s discovery was the direct result of his allegiance to ~uturp;nhilosonot
phie. So, for example, Stauffer declares that, “It was Natu~philosol~hit,
chance, that led to the discovery of electromagnetism”.5
L. Pearce Williams,
after describing Oersted’s discovery, expresses much the same view:
Thus it was that nature philosophy led Oersted to a discovery which has immortalized his name in the history of science. It should be insisted upon that it was nature
philosophy that was responsible for the discovery.
There can be no doubt of the
importance
of Oersted’s discovery, nor of its relation to nature philosophy
as a
whole. Certainly the assumptions
of this school of thought seemed, finally. to have
been justified by the new discovery.h
According
to this view,
Nuturphilosophie,
despite all its philosophical
excesses,
ought to be credited with leading to Oersted’s discovery of electromagnetism.
This is an interesting
claim, both historically
and philosophically,
because if
true, then far from being the scientifically barren philosophical
movement it is
:H. Bcnce Jones, 7he Ll/> a&Lrrrers
afFaradaq>(London, 1870), Vol. II, pp. 3955397. Jourdain
(op. cir., note I, p. 40) substitutes the word ‘discovery’ where the original has ‘detection‘.
‘K. Meyer, ‘The scientitic life and works of H. C. Oersted’, in: Oersted’s Natrrrvidensh-crhelj~~
Skr$tcr
S&nt[fic Papers, K. Meyer (ed.). 3 Vols (Copenhagen,
1920). Vol. I, pp. xviii-clxvi,
and ‘Faraday and Oersted’, Nature 128 (193 I), 337-339.
“R. C. Stauffer, ‘Persistent Errors Regarding Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism’,
Isis 44
(1953). 3077310, and Speculation
and Experiment
in the Background
of Oersted’s Discovery of
Electromagnetism’,
Isis 48 (1957), 33350.
‘Stauffer (1953). p. 310: cf. his (1957). pp. 33, 35, 48, 50, for similar claims.
‘L. Pearce Williams. The Origins o/‘Firld Thror~ (Clinton, Mass: Random House, 1966). pp. 59~
60. Williams places the greatest stress on the clajm that Oersted’s discovery of electromagnetism
should be attributed
to his devotion to Natu~/~/ti/uso/,hir, even identifying
Oersted hrmself as a
Natwphilowph (p. 52). Similar claims are made in his ‘Kant, Naturphilosupllie, and scientific
method’. in: Foumlrrtirm of‘ Sc~imtiji<~Method: Ihc Nitwtwttth Cwmq,
R. N. Giere and R. S.
Westfall (eds) (Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press. 1973). p. X.
Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism
often portrayed
the advancement
as, Naturphilosophie
of natural
treat Naturphilosophie
science.
as a somewhat
289
has actually
Standard
curious
been an important
histories
force for
of philosophy
(if not embarrassing)
which
episode
in
nineteenth-century
German philosophy,
which enjoyed popularity
for a time
before passing into oblivion and leaving no enduring contributions
to knowledge, will have to be rewritten. Naturphilosophie
will have to be given its due,
and accorded the respect it deserves as the cradle of one of the most important
discoveries in the history of science.
The tendency to react, and perhaps overreact, to the view that Oersted’s
discovery
was accidental,
by fixing on Naturphilosophie
as the cause, is
understandable.
Indeed, any account of his discovery which omits to mention
the role of Naturphilosophie
will provide at best an incomplete picture of this
episode in science. Nonetheless,
it is misleading to attribute to this source the
preeminence Stauffer and Williams do in the above quotations.
The time is ripe
for a reassessment
of the roots of Oersted’s discovery. Whereas others have
argued that it was Oersted’s devotion to Naturphilosophie
that resulted in his
discovery, I shall argue that it was his deeply rooted acceptance
of certain
Kantian docrines, and his explicit rejection of central doctrines of Naturphilosophie, that made his discovery possible. Thus, direct and indirect evidence
suggests that Naturphilosophie played a far different, and less important,
role in
Oersted’s discovery than is now commonly
supposed. If there is a philosophical stimulus behind this event then it must be identified as Kant. In the sections
which follow I distinguish between Kant’s doctrines and those characteristic
of
Naturphilosophie,
and show how Oersted’s early interest in Kant continued
to
inform his experimental
work and his theoretical
explanations
of physical
phenomena,
culminating
in his discovery of electromagnetism.
If this paper
stimulates
historians
and philosophers
of science to think again about the
cogency of the present “received view” of Oersted’s discovery, and to pursue
the suggestions in the present paper in greater detail than I am able to do here,
it will have served its purpose.
1. The Seminal Influence of Kant
Oersted’s
early devotion
to Kantian
ideas can be said, without
exaggeration.
to have influenced the entire subsequent course of his scientific and philosophical interests. Kant’s philosophy
was an established
part of the curriculum
in
natural philosophy
at the University
of Copenhagen
where Oersted studied
between 1793 and 1799 (taking a doctorate in pharmaceutical
science). In 1798
he served as a member of the editorial board of Philosophisk repertorium for
faedrelandets
nyeste litteratur, a new journal
established
as a platform
for
expounding
the Critical Philosophy.
In 1799 he published
a work entitled
Grundtraekkene
af Naturmetaphgsiken
rildeels efter en n)le Plar; (Fundamental
290
Studies in History and Philosophy of’ Science
Features of Metaphysics,
partly on a New Plan).’ His interest in Kant found
further expression
in his doctoral
dissertation
of the same year entitled
“Dissertatio
works drew
de forma metaphysices
elementaris
heavily on Kant’s Kritik der reinen
Reason) and Metaphysische
cal Foundations ?f Natural
naturae
Vernmft
externae”.’
These
(Critique sf Pure
Arzfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft
(MetaphysiScience).’ Because Kant’s thought in these works
played such an important
role in the formation
of Oersted’s philosophica
orientation,
the relevant doctrines will be discussed at some length. This will
provide the background
for claims to be made later concerning
the factors
contributing
to Oersted’s discovery of electromagnetism.
In an appendix to the Transcendental
Dialectic in the Kritik, Kant included
a section entitled “The Regulative
Employment
of the Ideas of Pure Reason”.” One of the main points Kant emphasizes
here is that concepts have
valid application
only within the realm of possible experience.
When one
attempts to employ concepts beyond the field of possible experience, one is
inevitably led into all kinds of deception and error. Transcendental
ideas, Kant
says, never allow of any constitutive
employment.
But they do serve a
legitimate,
and indeed indispensable,
regulative function,
namely, “that of
directing the understanding
towards a certain goal upon which the routes
marked out by all its rules converge, as upon their point of intersection”.”
He
goes on to say that a distinctive
feature of reason is that it strives for
systematization,
i.e. to exhibit the connection
between items of knowledge with
respect to a single principle. This idea of the whole as a system connected by
necessary laws is always presupposed
in the knowledge of each item. “These
concepts of reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we interrogate
nature in accordance with these ideas, and consider our knowledge as defective
so long as it is not adequate to them”.” He adds that, “This unity aids us in
discovering
a principle for the understanding
in its manifold (manni&altigen)
and special modes of employment,
directing its attention to cases which are not
given. and thus rendering it more coherent (zusammenhiingend).”
Kant illustrates these ideas with respect to ‘power’ or ‘force’ (Kraft). Earlier
‘Reprinted in Oersted’s Naturvidenskabelige
Skrifer, Vol. I, pp. 33-78.
‘Skrifier I, pp. 79-105. Published in German translation
as Ideen zu einer neuen Architektonik
der Naturmetaphysik
(Berlin, 1802).
‘For this paper 1 have used Norman Kemp Smith (trans.), Immanuel Kant’s Critique qf Pure
Reason (New York: 1929), and James Ellington (trans.), Metaphysical
Foundations of Natural
Science (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill,
1970). All references
to the Anfungsgriinde
are to this
translation.
This has recently been reissued as Emmanuel Kant: Philosophy of Materiul Nature
(Indianapolis:
Hackett,
1985).
“‘Critique A 643/B671pA669/B697;
“A” and “B” refer to the first and second editions of the
Critique, respectively.
“Critique A6441B672.
“Critique A646/B6?4.
“Critique A647iB675.
291
Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism
in the Kritik he argued
concept
of substance
against
is nothing
an atomistic
view of nature,
other than our concept
proposing
that our
offorce.
We are acquainted with substance in space only through forces which are active in
this and that space, either bringing other objects to it (attraction),
or preventing
them penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability).
We are not acquainted with
any other properties
constituting
the concept of the substance which appears in
space and which we call matter.14
Kant’s
point
here
is an epistemological
one.
It concerns
what
we can
and
know or conceive of with respect to material substance. This view had
important
implications
for natural science. It is worth quoting Kant at length.
cannot
The various appearances of one and the same substance show at first sight so great a
diversity, that at the start we have to assume just as many powers as there are
different effects.
Now there is a logical maxim which requires that we should
reduce, so far as may be possible, this seeming diversity, by comparing these with
one another and detecting their hidden identity.
Though logic is not capable of
deciding whether afundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the
problem involved in a systematic representation
of the multiplicity of powers. The
logical principle of reason calls upon us to bring about such unity as completely as
possible; and the more the appearances
of this and that power are found to be
identical with one another, the more probable it becomes that they are simply
manifestations
of one and the same power, which may be entitled, relatively to the
more specific powers, the fundamental power.
He adds that, “The relatively fundamental
powers must in turn be compared
with one another, with a view to discovering
their harmony,
and so to bring
them nearer to a single radica!, that is, absolutely
fundamental,
power.15
Finally, “We must endeavour, whenever possible, to bring in this way systematic unity into our knowledge”.”
In short, Kant argues that the regulative use of
the idea of a unity of fundamental
forces provides the foundation
for a
systematic inliestigation
the practice of natural
griinde.
of nature. This view had important
consequences
for
science, which Kant develops further in the Anfangs-
The Metaphysische
Anfangsgriinde
der Naturwissenschqft
(1786) was published between the first (178 1) and second (1787) editions of the Kritik, and as
one would expect, the two works are complementary
in important
respects. In
the Kritik Kant focuses on the general conditions
for the possibility
of
knowledge, wherever knowledge claims are at issue. In the Anfungsgriinde he is
more narrrowly concerned with the conditions
for the possibility of knowledge
in natural
science, especially in physics. In particular,
this work adds the
empirical assumption
of matter, i.e. real moving stuff. To Kant this required
‘“CririqueA256/B321.
“Critique A649/B617.
“Critique
A650/B678
Studies in History and Philosophy of‘ Science
292
an explication of the general a priori principles of the systematic understanding
of (the empirical
notions
of) matter and motion.
Again, this requires
metaphysics
According
with respect to the explication of physical phenomena.
The mechanical
explicates all the varieties of matter by the combination
philosophy
absolutely
a
of corporeal nature in terms of attractive and repulsive forces.
to Kant, there are only two ways of proceeding in natural science
full with the absolutely
empty,
i.e. atoms
natural
of the
and the void.”
Its essentials consist in the assumption
of the absolute impenetrability
of the
primitive matter, in the absolute homogeniety
of the primitive matter, differences
only being allowed in the shape, and in the absolute unconquerability
of the
cohesion of the matter in these fundamental particles themselves.lx
Natural phenomena
are explained as arising from the shape of these primary
parts as machines set moving by some externally impressed force. The mechanical mode of explication assumes “empty intermediate
spaces and fundamental particles of determinate
shapes, neither of which can be discovered and
determined
by an experiment”.”
Kant’s primary objection to the mechanical
mode of explication
is that it
leaves far too much liberty to the investigator
to construct
explications
of
natural phenomena
in an adhoc manner.
Everything that relieves us of the necessity of having recourse to empty spaces is an
actual gain for natural science. For these give far too much freedom to the
imagination to supply by fiction the lack of intrinsic knowledge of nature. Absolute
emptiness and absolute density are in the doctrine of nature approximately
what
blind chance and blind fate are in metaphysical
science, namely, a barrier for the
investigating reason or else reason is lulled to sleep on the pillow of occult qualities.‘O
Besides the mechanical
physical phenomena
tion and repulsion.
way there is the dynamical
through
the combination
way, which explicates
of the original
all
forces of attrac-
[T]hat mode of explication
which derives the specific variety of matter not from
matters as machines, i.e., as mere tools of external moving forces, but from the
proper moving forces of attraction
and repulsion originally belonging to those
matters may be called the dynamical natural philosophy.2’
On this view “matter
does
not (as the merely
fill its space by absolute
mechanical
impenetrability,
but by repulsive
its degree, which can be different in different matters”.22
‘7Anfangsgriinde, p. 9 1.
‘“At-$angsgriinde. p. 9 1.
“Anfangsgriinde, p. 92.
‘“Anfang.vgriinde, p. 90.
2’Anfangsgrlnde. p. 9 1.
*‘Anfangsgriinde, p. 92. Note the preparation
section in the Critique c$Pure Reason.
investigators
assume)
force; this force has
of this idea in the “Anticipations
of Perception”
293
Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism
Matter
and the motions
the fundamental
apriori.
different
forces
it undergoes
of attraction
are, according
and
repulsion.
to Kant,
This
a product
much
of
is certain
But we do not know apriori the specific form such forces take in
circumstances.
This is why empirical physics is necessary. In order to
account for the specific behavior of matter in motion,
to appeal to the particular forces known only through
out, quite correctly, that mere perception of bodies in
constitute
physics as a science. Perceptions
without
there is no recourse but
experience. Kant points
motion is insufficient to
systematization
remain
merely a collection of facts, lacking coherence. For physics to become a science
it must reduce the multiplicity
of forces provided by empirical observation
to a
rational unity. 23What is needed is a formal schematism of matter’s constitutive
forces, as experience reveals them to us, which will serve as a preliminary
to
physics by reordering the empirical search for forces in their concrete realization. This formal schematism
will point out in an apriori manner how the
formal conditions
of cognition serve as a directive for the discovery of all the
empirical forces that physics searches for.24
This schematism is sketched out by Kant in the Anfangsgriinde, especially in
the second chapter entitled, “Metaphysical
Foundations
of Dynamics”.
Dynamics is described as the science of matter in motion. “The universal principle of
the dynamics of material nature is this: all that is real in the objects of our
experience and is not merely a determination
of space (place, extension, and
figure) must be regarded as moving force”.25 In this way, Kant says, absolute
impenetrability
(as imagined by atomists) is banished from natural science as
an empty concept, and is replaced by repulsive force. Attractive
force is also
posited as “a fundamental
force necessary even to the possibility of the concept
of matter”.26 If we thought of bodies as possessing only a repulsive force, then
all bodies would be infinitely distant from one another. If we thought of bodies
as possessing only an attractive force, then the whole universe would collapse
13For further discussion, see Ellington’s essay, “The Unity of Kant’s Thought in His Philosophy
of Corporeal Nature”, directly following his translation
of Kant’s Anf~ngsgriinde (op. cit., note 9).
especially p. 216. Kant’s philosophy
of science has been the subject of considerable
interest in
recent years. Especially useful discussions (in English) may be found in G. Buchdahl, Meraphysics
and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969). G. G. Brittan, Jr., Kantk Theory qf
Science (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton
University
Press, 1978), R. E. Butts, Kunt and the Double
Government Methodology. Supersensibility and Method in Kant% Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1984), R. E. Butts (ed.), Kunf’s Philosophy of Physical Science (Dordrecht:
D. Reidel,
1986). For the purposes of this paper I have foregone a more detailed exposition of Kant’s views
which takes into account all the technical issues presently the subject of debate, in favor of a
formulation
of his views which reflects the form of his doctrines Oersted would have been familiar
with. Readers interested in a deeper understanding
of Kant’s views should consult the abovementioned works. (Similar remarks pertain to my treatment of Schelling’s doctrine in this paper.)
24For a good discussion
of Kant’s later assessment
of his success in this endeavor,
see G.
DiGiovanni,
‘Kant’s Metaphysics
of Nature and Schelling’s Ideas fbr a Philosophy of Nature’,
Journal qfrhe Hist0r.v of Philosophy 17 (1979), 197-215.
2SAnfangsgriinde, p. 77.
‘bAnfangsgriinde, p. 77.
294
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
into a mathematical
point of infinite density. A body on this view can be
understood
as consisting
of an equilibrium between the opposing
forces of
attraction
and repulsion.
tal to our understanding
ways in sense perception.
These two basic forces (GrundkrLifte) are fundamenof matter as it manifests itself in “infinitely diverse”
The task for physics is to explain other forces and
physical phenomena
in terms of these fundamental
forces. “[A]11 natural
philosophy
consists in the reduction
of given forces apparently
diverse to a
smaller number
of forces and powers sufficient for the explication
of the
former”.” This approach promises to “enlarge the field of the investigator
of
nature” by removing the limitations
previously imposed on natural science by
a conception
of nature as consisting of atoms and empty space. This conception is thus “more favorable to experimental
philosophy
inasmuch as it leads
directly to the discovery of the moving forces proper to matter and the laws of
such forces”.28
Despite its great potential for experimental
research, there are also dangers
in this approach that Kant is careful to warn against. “But one must guard
against going beyond what makes the universal concept of matter in general
possible and wanting to explain apriori the particular or even specific determination and variety of nature”.2y This is because, “no law whatever of attractive
or of repulsive force may be risked on apriori conjectures; but everything, even
universal attraction
as the cause of gravity, must, together with the laws of
such attraction,
be concluded from the data of experience”.3” If this is true of
physics, it is a fortiori true of chemistry,
which was still the subject of
considerable
controversy.
“Still less will such conclusions in regard to chemical
affinities be permitted to be tried otherwise than by means of experiment.
For
to comprehend
original forces apriori according to their possibility lies generally beyond the horizon of our reason”.3’ Kant concludes that, “the investigation of metaphysics
behind what lies at the basis of the empirical concept of
matter is useful only for the purpose of leading natural philosophy
as far as
possible in the investigation
of the dynamical grounds of explication,
because
these alone admit the hope of determinate
laws, and consequently
of a true
rational coherence of explications”.”
Kant’s cautions about the proper limits
of metaphysical
theorizing with regard to natural science were often ignored by
those who read him. This was true of the philosophers
associated
with
Naturphilosophie.
2’Anfangsgriinde,
2”Anfangsgriinde,
2qAnfangsgriinde,
“‘A~fangsgriinde,
“Anfangsgrtinde,
‘2Anfangsgriinde,
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
93.
92.
78.
93.
93.
93.
Oersted and Naturphilosophie
Nuturphilosophie
can be looked
at, not so much
as a “school”
with well-
defined doctrines, but rather as a loosely connected
set of ideas and beliefs
which found their fullest expression in the early writings of Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph von Schelling (I 775-I 854). Schelling’s philosophy
has recently been
given careful and detailed treatment
by Esposito. He writes that common to
most thinkers
who would describe themselves
as Naturphilosophen
was a
commitment
“to seek interrelations
among natural phenomena
and to eventually bring about a unity of nature and culture”.”
Nuturphilosophie
sprung
from seeds planted by Kant’s Kritik and Anfangsgriinde.
“These two works,
together with Jacobi’s Spinoza work, present the key ideas that would serve as
the point of departure for Schelling’s own approach to the concept of matter,
so that there can be no doubt of Schelling’s indebtedness
to Kant here, as with
later arguments as we11”.j4
The Kantian foundation
for Schelling’s philosophy is clearly discerned in his
writings on the metaphysics
of nature. In his Ideen zu einer Philosophie der
Natur (1797) he tried to show that nature is animated
by opposing forces,
fundamental
dualities, and polarities. This thesis recurs in many of his early
writings3’ His interest in the physical polarity of dual forces of nature is, of
course, a development
of Kant’s doctrine of the Grundkrbpe, the basic forces
of attraction
and repulsion. Instead of physical phenomena
being constituted
of opposing forces in stable equilibrium
with one another, such phenomena
are
seen as the manifestation
of one or another aspect of force, all of which aspects
are present in each phenomenon
to some degree. Nature is thus seen as an
integrated and interconnected
organic whole - as a system. If this is so, he
reasoned, then it should be possible to connect diverse physical phenomena
within a unified theoretical physics. Such unification would be achieved on the
basis of a metaphysics
of nature, developed along broadly Kantian lines.
Although
Schelling was strongly
influenced
by Kant, he came to the
conclusion
that Kant was fundamentally
mistaken in some crucial respects.
First, he criticized Kant for presenting a reductionistic
view of nature which
“J. L. Esposito,
ScheNing’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature (Cranbury,
N.J.: Associated
University Press, 1977), p. 137.
34Esposito, op. cif., note 33, p. 49. Another important
source for Nulurphilosophie, which I will
not discuss in this paper, is Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790).
“See especially the following works [volume and page references refer to Schelling’s Siimmtliche
Werke, K. F. A. Schelling (ed.) (Stuttgart and Augsburg,
185&1861)]: ‘Ideen zu einer Philosophie
der Natur’ (1797; 2: l-343), ‘Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der hiiheren Physik zur Erkliirung
des allgemeinen Organismus’
(1798; 2: 345-584), ‘Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphi!?sophie’ (1799; 3: l-268), ‘Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie,
oder Uber
den Begriff der speculative Physik und die innere Organisation
eines Systemes dieser Wissenschaft’
(1799; 3: 269-326), ‘Allgemeine Deduktion
des dynamischen
Processes, oder der Kategorien
der
Physik’ (1800; 4: l-78), ‘Darstellung
meines Systems der Philosophic’
(1801; 4: 105-212).
296
Studies in History and Philosophy
fails to recognize
zu dem Entwurf
the higher
principles
eines Systems
of natural
phenomena.
der Naturphilosophie
qf Science
In the Einleitung
(1799), he wrote:
[T]he notions of dynamical physics hitherto diffused, are very different from, and
partially at variance with, those which the author lays down..
I speak of the
modes of representations
which have been put into philosophic heads by Kant, and
which may be mainly reduced to this: that we see in matter nothing but the
occupation
of space in definite degrees, in all of matter, therefore,
only mere
difference of occupation of space (i.e. density), in all dynamic (qualitative) changes,
only mere changes in the relation of the repelling and attracting forces.
The problem
the “higher”
with such a view, according to Schelling, is that it utterly
principles standing behind natural phenomena.
ignores
Now, according to this mode of representation,
all the phenomena
of Nature are
looked at only on their lowest plane, and the dynamical physics of these philosophers begin precisely at the point where they ought properly to leave off.
Even magnetic and electric phenomena,
he says, when viewed from this standpoint, will be seen as a product of the fundamental
forces. Schelling’s opposition to this approach is unequivocal.
“lw]e are convinced that this so-called
dynamical
principle is too superficial and defective a basis of explanation
for
all Nature’s phenomena,
to reach the real depth and manifoldness
of natural
phenomena”.‘6
According to Esposito, “In Schelling’s view Kant had not gone far enough
in drawing out the implications
of the dynamic conception
of matter”. In his
Abhandlungen zur Erliiuterung des Idealismus der Wisssenschaftslehre,”
Schelling, like Kant, had characterized
matter as an equilibrium
of opposing forces.
“Where he departs from Kant, however, is over the interpretation
of what the
analysis of matter actually reveals to US”.~* Because Schelling believed that
Kant had already shown that “matter is matter only insofar as it is an object of
intention or action”, he concluded that nothing actually remained of the object
apart from spiritual activity. According
to Schelling, what we call matter is
really “spirit intuiting its activities in equilibrium”.39 The attractive and repulsive forces of which Kant spoke are for Schelling really dimensions of spiritual
reality itself. Such forces are, on Schelling’s view, inconceivable
as existing
outside the realm of spirit.40
Schelling departed from Kant in a second way. Unlike Kant, Schelling held
that
the laws of nature
could
be infallibly
inferred
from
reason.
Because
jb‘On the Possibility of Speculative Physics’, in his: ‘Introduction to the Outline of a System of
Natural Philosophy’, Tom Davidson (trans.), Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1 (1867), 198; see
also 205.
“Siimmtliche Werke, op. cit., note 35, 1: 343-452.
‘*Esposito, op. cit., note 33, p. 54.
‘9Siimmtliche Werke, op. cit., note 35, 1: 380; quoted in Esposito op. cit., note 33, p. 55.
%ee Esposito, op. cit., note 33, p. 55.
Oersted’s Discovery qf Electromagnetism
Denken
govern
291
and Sein are equivalent,
the same laws that govern
the physical world as well. If nature truly constitutes
can expect a deduction
from abstract
possible.
quotation
The following
principles
to concrete
the spiritual world
a system, then we
phenomena
gives a good sense of Schelling’s
to be
view.
The assertion is, that all phenomena
are correlated in one absolute and necessary
law, from which they can all be deduced; in short, that in natural science all that we
know, we know absolutely apriori. Now, that experiment
never leads to such a
knowing, is plainly manifest, from the fact that it can never get beyond the forces of
Nature, of which it itself makes use as means. . . By this deduction of all natural
phenomena
from an absolute hypothesis,
our knowing is changed into a construction of Nature itself, that is, into a science of Nature apriori. If, therefore, such
deduction itself is possible, a thing which can be proved only by the fact, then also a
doctrine of Nature is possible as a science of Nature; a system of purely speculative
physics is possible, which was the point to be proved.41
The contrast between Schelling’s and Kant’s views is striking. ScheIling would
refer physical phenomena
to the higher principles
of mind (or spirit), and
would construct a purely speculative physics on the basis of apriori conceptions. One of the distinctive features of Kant’s approach, on the other hand, is
his conviction
of the limitation
of pure reason as applied to nature. The
metaphysics
of corporeal nature deals only with the application
of transcendental concepts to matter in general, these metaphysical
principles constitute a
complete system when the empirically given concept of matter is determined by
the categories. Such a metaphysics
does not, however, constitute a substitute
for empirical research. Concrete facts must still be given to us by experience.
What such a metaphysics can do, however, is to reveal, in a necessary way, the
general aspects of every possible object of physics. Besides securing physics as
a science (as above defined), the knowledge of such metaphysical
foundations
provides a heuristic guiding the formulation
of questions to put to nature, and
for which the appropriate
experiments
must be devised. Schelling may have
begun with Kant, but his published writings reflect a very different conception
of the aims and methods of natural science.
Our interest, however, is not in Schelling’s ideas for their own sake, but in
their influence on Oersted. In 1799, at the same time he was defending Kant in
his doctoral dissertation,
he also came across some of Schelling’s works which
had
been
published
just a year or two before. At the conclusion
of his
after praising Kant’s Anjbtgsgriinde,
he comments on Schelling’s Ideen zu einer Philosophie
der Natur (1797), and his Von der Weltseele,
Grundtraekkene,
eine Hypothese
(1798).
der hiiheren
He writes that,
4’Op. cit., note 36, p. 49
Physik
zur Erkllirung
des allgemeinen
Organismus
298
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
no doubt deserve attention for the beautiful and great ideas we find
in them, but on account of the not very rigorous method by which the author
intermingles
empirical propositions
without sufficiently distinguishing
them from
apriori propositions
the book is robbed of much of its value, especially as the
empirical propositions
Oersted
adduced are often utterly false.“’
came into intimate
contact
with ideas of Schelling
Nuturphilosophen
in the period 1801-1803 while he was
on a fellowship. He attended lectures by Fichte at Berlin
acquaintance
as well. At Jena he became friends with
heard August
Schlegel’s lectures.
In a letter to a
impressions
of Naturphilosophen
in general
and of
again
travelling
and made
Friedrich
friend he
Schelling’s
via several
in Germany
his personal
Schlegel and
records his
theories
in
particular.
He [i.e. Schelling] wants to give us a complete philosophical
system of physics, but
without any knowledge of nature except from text-books and without possessing the
same rigorousness
of philosophical
construction
as Kant.
These people all bring
to market halting comparisons
and lopsided physical theories, and then they
grumble when others will not accept them. I always pester these people with Steffens
who has seen nature with his own eyes and thought about her with his own brain.47
As Oersted’s remarks at various points make clear, he opposed Naturphilosophie for its claim to provide knowledge of nature, but appreciated
it for its
aesthetic qualities. During his Wunderjurhre he came into contact with the
writings of Franz von Baader,
whose writings on Nature Philosophy are so beautiful that one would wish to make
the acquaintance of the author, and often so obscure that one needs it to get the
explanation..
He persistently urges that moral and physical nature are most
closely connected, and that without such a connection
value. In this he accords very closely with [myself].”
As this quote
on aesthetic,
suggests,
rather
Oersted’s
than
physical
science has no real
of Naturphilosophie
was based
considerations.
His remarks about
appreciation
on scientific,
Nuturphilosophie
fall into either of two categories.
He either praises such
writings for their “great beauty”, or else criticizes them for paying insufficient
attention
to observation
and experimentation
in the construction
of physical
science. While it is true that Naturphilosophie
had an effect on Oersted, it is
important
to carefully determine what this influence amounted to. As Esposito
writes, “Oersted . . . would not have called himself a Nuturphilosoph
reason that he found sympathy only with its attitude toward nature,
with its speculative approach to research”.45
for the
and not
42SkriJter
vol. I, p. 71.
43Brmef,u og iii Hans Christian Orr.~kd, 2 Vols, Mathilde Oersted (ed.) (Copenhagen,
vol. I, pp. 81-82.
“Ibid., p. 83.
4SEsposito op. cit., note 33, p. 137.
1870),
Oersted’s Discovery oJ‘ Electromagnetism
That Oersted
teaching
understood
at the University
him around
299
the dangers
of unchecked
of Copenhagen.
A student
speculation
reported
is clear in his
Oersted
telling
1810 that,
It is also my firm conviction,
and my lectures bear witness thereof, that a great
fundamental
unity pervades the whole of nature; but just when one has become
convinced of this, it becomes doubly necessary to direct one’s whole attention to the
world of the manifold, wherein this truth above all finds its confirmation. If one does
not do this, unity itself remains an unfruitful and empty idea which leads to no true
insight.‘”
This emphasis on the close coupling of theory and experiment is also evident
in Oersted’s electrochemical
investigations
in the following years.
3. Oersted’s Electrochemical
Investigations
Oersted was among the many scientists in 1800 to be stimulated by Volta’s
invention of the galvanic battery. Like others, he was interested in the practical
uses this battery might be put to, but his interest also extended to articulating
a
theoretical account of the physics of electrochemical
phenomena
along Kantian lines. An early expression of this account is presented in an 1806 article in
the Journal de Physique on the chemical nature of electrical force.47 More
detailed expositions
appear in his Ansicht der chemischen Naturgesetze durch
die neuren Entdecken gewonnen, published in Berlin in 18 12, and in the revised
version of this work published in French translation
in Paris the next year
under the title Recherches sur I’identitt des forces chimiques et tlectriques.48
The major aim of this work, as the title of the French edition suggests, was
to show that chemical and electrical forces are at bottom identical. In the
Introduction
to the Recherches Oersted compares the state of chemical science
to that of mechanics before Galileo, Descartes, Huygens and Newton. Before
the age of these men a great number of important
facts were known, but the
great principle of unity to which the modern science of mechanics owes its
completeness
was lacking. Chemistry
of facts had been collected, a series
these affinities had been discovered.
to reduce all chemical effects to the
that chemical science could be based
was in a similar condition.
A large body
of affinities found, but no first cause of
An attempt should be made, he thought,
primitive forces which produce them, so
on a theory of force whence, by the aid of
49lohannes Carsten Hauch, H. C. Ousted’s Leben. Zwei Denkschrifen
van Hauch und Forchammer, H. Sebald (trans.) (Spandau, 1853), p. 13; quoted in Stauffer (1957), op. cit., note 4, p. 39.
470ersted, ‘Sur la propagation de l’klectricitk’, Journal de physique, de chimie, d’histoire naturelle
et des arts. 62 (1806). 369-375.
480ersted, Ansich; der chemischen Naturgesetze,
durch die neueren Entdeckungen
gewonnen
(Berlin, 1812). Reprinted in Naturvidenskabelige
Skrifer,
Vol. II, pp. 35-169. Recherches sur
I’identite des,forces chimiques et Plectriques, Marcel de Serres (trans.) (Paris, 1813).
300
Studies
in fiistory
and
Philosophy of’ Science
mathematics,
the chemical phenomena
could be deduced. The Ansicht and
Recherches were intended as a first step toward this ultimate goal.“9
In order to unify the phenomena
associated with chemical combination,
heat, light, electricity and magnetism, Oersted related them to two basic forces
extended in space. While retaining the Kantian dynamism,
Oersted developed
his own version of the Kantian
Grundkr~fte.
Like Kant, he saw matter as
composed of two fundamental
forces, but he modified the Kantian forces of
attraction and repulsion into the chemical forces of combustion
and combustibility. just as the simultaneous
existence of attractive and repulsive forces in
dynamical
equilibrium
satisfied the necessary conditions
for the existence of
matter, so too, Oersted argued, the two forces of combustion
and combustibility account for all chemical phenomena,
and all mechanical action including
heat.50 He then employed these two basic chemical forces, the Brennktxft,
in
combustible
substances and alkalies, and the Ziindkrqft, in oxygen as well as in
acids, to explain oxidation, acidification,
and neutralization
in chemistry.5’ The
two basic forces extend, he says, throughout
the entire world: all actions in
nature represent in various modes of behavior both basic forces.52
Oersted then uses these ideas to explain the physical processes at work in
Volta’s battery, suggesting
how one manifestation
of force is changed into
another. He begins by explaining how electrical force is propagated.
Electricity
does not flow like a fluid, but is rather propagated
by a kind of continual decomposition
and rccomposition,
or rather by an action
which disturbs
the equilibrium
at every moment,
and re-establishes
it in the
following instant. One could express this succession of opposed forces which exists
in the transmission
of electricity by saying that electricity is always propagated
in an
undulatory
nlanncr.5’
A similar process operates with respect to chemical forces. Chemical elements,
such as those present in a battery, are themselves a combination
of the two
basic forces. The stability of a chemical element is, however, a delicate matter,
dependent on an equilibrium
between its constituent
forces. When this equilibrium is disturbed,
for example by an electrical force. the disturbance
travels
through the battery in wave-like fashion, briefly decomposing
the elements
along the way, which then return to their equilibrium
state. The electrical and
chemical forces are thus interconvertible.
Which one is manifested depends on
whether or not equilibrium
is maintained.
The conversion
of one kind of
49For further discussion, see K. Meyer’s Introduction
to Oersted’s Skrlfter, Vol. I, p. xlvii.
S0For discussion, see T. H. Levere, Ajfiniry and Matter: Elements qf Chemical Philosophy. 18001865 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1971). p. 134.
“See Skrifter, II. p. 73.
“Skr[fter, II, p, 149.
“joersted, Racherches p. 130. For more on this undulatory
theory, and the relationship
between
the ideas of Oersted and Ampere, see the excellent discussion
in K. L. Caneva ‘Amp&e, the
Ethereans, and the Oersted Connection’.
British Journa/ for the History of Science 13 (1980).
Oersted’s
Discovery of Electromagnetism
physical
phenomenon
explained,
Oersted
into
believed,
another
301
apparently
by postulating
forces.
Oersted’s Ansicht and Recherches,
further discussions
of the metaphysics
quite
different
an underlying
one
duality
is thus
of basic
it should be evident, were not merely
of dynamism
as a general foundation
for physics. He was already long convinced
that Kant had articulated
the
correct metaphysical
foundations
of natural science. His chief concern in these
books was chemistry, and in particular
the formulation
of a chemical theory
which would provide an answer to Kant’s accusation
that “chemistry
should
be called systematic art rather than science”.54 When Kant insisted that natural
science have a formal structure,
and not be merely an accumulation
of
empirical observations,
he had chemistry in mind in particular as an example
of an area of investigation
that had not yet reached the level of a science. The
laws of chemistry were merely ‘laws of experience’ (Ecfuhrungsgesetze),
that is,
they were simply empirical generalizations
with no genuine lawlike character.
The chemist fills his notebooks
with observations,
but his knowledge
of
physical events remained on the sensory level and never contained
the apriori
laws that governed the processes of chemical interaction.
Natural science was
Nuturwissenschaft,
and Wissenschaft could only mean an ordered system of
principles. Knowledge derivative of these principles was to be upodictic. The
Ansicht and Recherches represent the results of Oersted’s sustained attempt to
derive and describe the fundamental
apriori principles which he, like Kant,
believed were necessary if chemistry was to become a science.s5 Describing the
Ansicht,
The
Snelders
book
writes,
distinctly
shows
the
influence
of
Kanatian
philosophy,
systematic construction,
but still more in the dynamical concept
Oersted defends.
the aim of chemistry is to trace all phenomena
forces; chemical phenomena
are to be deduced mathematically.5h
In doing so, Oersted
takes exactly the method
defending,
reducing
namely,
phenomena
that Schelling
partly
in its
of matter which
back to primitive
criticized
Kant for
to their lowest level and then con-
structing a mathematical
theory for making predictions.
As Oersted described
his hope in the Ansicht, “Chemistry
will then become a science of forces;
mathematics
will reach into its inmost recesses, to determine the quantitative
relations.
directions
and
effective
forms
of
these
forces”.”
In
this
way
54Anfangsgriinde,p.4. For further discussion of Kant’s view of chemistry, see K. Okruhlik,
‘Kant on Realism and Methodology’,
in: R. E. Butts (ed.), Kant’v Philosoph,: of Phy.~kul Science
(Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 1986), pp. 307-329: see especially pp. 3 I I-313.
Yjee Esposito, op. cit., note 33, p. 49-50; also, B. Gower, ‘Speculation
in Physics: The History
and Practice of Naturphilosophie’,Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 3 (1973). 341-342.
56H. A. M. Snelders. ‘Romanticism
and Naturphilosophie
and the Inorganic Sciences’, Studie.v
in
Romanticism
9 (1970), p. 205.
570ersted, Ansicht, p. 5; quoted in Levere, op. cit.. note 50, p. 133.
302
chemistry
achieved
Studies in History and Philosophy
would attain
in mechanical
the same unity and completeness
of Science
that had already
been
science.
Although the Ansicht and Recherches
were primarily about the identity of
electrical and chemical forces, Oersted conjectured
that other kinds of physical
phenomena
might be interrelated
as well. In particular, “It will be necessary to
see if electricity in its most latent state does not have some action on a magnet
as such. The experiment
will not be without difficulty because the electrical
action will always tend to mix in with it and make observation
very complicated”.5x The experiment turned out to be the essence of simplicity, although it
was to take eight years for the decisive experiment to be performed.
4. Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism
Oersted noted that “if it were possible to produce any magnetical effect by
electricity, this could not be in the direction of the current, since this had so
often been tried in vain, but that it must be produced by a lateral action”.59
That is, others had assumed that if there was to be any magnetic effect of an
electric current, the positive and negative ends of the wire would correspond to
the north and south poles of a magnet, or vice versa. All investigations
had
failed to detect any such simple, intuitive relationship.
Oersted reasoned that if
there was to be any magnetic effect, it would have to be found alongside the
current-carrying
wire. He goes on to explain why this idea occurred to him.
Writing in the third person, he says,
This was strictly connected
with his other ideas; for he did not consider the
transmission
of electricity through a conductor
as a uniform stream, but as a
succession of interruptions
and reestablishments
of equilibrium, in such a manner,
that the electrical powers in the current were not in quiet equilibrium, but in a state
of continual conflict. As the luminous and heating effect of the electrical current,
goes out in all directions from a conductor,
which transmits a great quantity of
electricity;
so he thought
it possible that the magnetical
effect could likewise
eradiate.hO
In the spring
magnetism
of 1820 a feasible
occurred
to Oersted,
form of the experiment
and
it was around
relating
April
electricity
1820 that
and
it was
carried out, during his advanced class in electricity, galvanism and magnetism
at the University of Copenhagen.
It was discovered that if a magnetic needle is
brought into the field surrounding
the wire, it will set itself tangent to the
circular field, continuing
its tangential
position when it is carried around the
wire, pointing in one direction beneath the wire and in the opposite direction
above it. Three months after this initial experiment,
during July 1820, he
5”Recherches,
p. 238; this part is not included in Oersted’s
500ersted, ‘Thermo-Electricity’, in Skrifier II, p. 357.
“Skriftcr
II, p. 357.
Skr(J/er
303
Oersted’s Discovery of Electromagnetism
extended
his experiments.
in the conductor,
former position.
He found
the direction
The interposition
that if the direction
of the needle
of various
of current
is similarly
substances
is reversed
reversed
between
from
its
the wire and
the needle had no effect on the position of the latter. On the basis of these
observations
Oersted inferred that the undulatory
electric powers in the wire
produced a circular motion in the space surrounding
the wire, that electric and
magnetic forces acted in circles, and that they were spatially distributed.
He
noted in particular that, “It is sufficiently evident from the preceding facts that
the electric conflict is not confined to the conductor,
but dispersed pretty
widely in the circumjacent
space”.6’ On 21 July 1820 he published a condensed
four-page Latin account of his investigations,
bearing the title Experimenta
circa eflectum conjlictus electrici in scum magneticam.
As he characterized
his
discovery later, in this short tract he announced
“the fundamental
law of
electromagnetism,
viz., that the magnetical efiect of the electrical current has a
circular motion round it”.63
How should we understand
why Oersted was led to perform this experiment,
and thus arrive at the discovery of electromagnetism?
I wish to suggest that
this discovery was due more to Oersted’s reading and understanding
of Kant
than it was to ideas dominant
among the Naturphilosophen.
The difference
resides to a great extent on diferent views of the roles of reason and experiment
in the advancement
of natural science, as well as on substantive
views about
the nature of physical reality.
First, we know that Oersted embraced
Kantian
views very early in his
studies, and continued
to hold Kant in high esteem throughout
his life. In
particular,
he adopted Kant’s vision of a dynamical physics conceptualized
in
term of forces rather than atoms. This basic metaphysical
option informs all of
his scientific theorizing.
In addition, and equally important,
Oersted internalized Kant’s injunction
to employ the regulative idea of a fundamental
unity of
forces in his scientific investigations.
It was this idea that played a crucial role
in his early electrochemical
research and
electromagnetism.
This was connected
with
took to heart, to transform chemistry from
into a science. It was Oersted’s attempt to
subsequently
in his discovery of
Kant’s challenge, which Oersted
a mere collection of observations
systematize chemistry in terms of
fundamental
forces of combustion
that led to his conjectures
about the
interrelatedness
of electricity and magnetism, and thence to his electromagnetic
experimentation.
Second, Kant held that pure reason alone is unable to produce a science of
nature, and that therefore careful empirical investigations
are necessary. In this
“‘Skrzjier I, p. xciii.
62Skr$er II, pp. 214218.
6’.Skrzfler II, p. 358.
This is given in English
translation
in Skrifter
I, pp. lxxxix-xciii
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science
304
last respect Kant differed sharply from certain other “dealers in the upriorThJ
who assumed that empirical research was unnecessary,
because pure reason
was capable of arriving at a complete knowledge of nature -- &helling,
in
particular,
seemed to suppose this. Oersted’s attitude was much closer to
Kant’s than to Schelling’s. Like Kant, Oersted was both more knowledgeable
about and more respectful of the actual achievements
of physical scientists
than were the majority of the Naturphilosophen,
&helling included. Both Kant
and Oersted agreed that to set natural science on firm metaphysical
foundations was a useful, and indeed an essential, task, but that it was certainly no
substitute for empirical investigations
into nature. The Naturphilosophen
were
mainly impressed with how much physical knowledge can be arrived at by the
use of pure reason. Kant, and Oersted, tended to focus on how little could be
achieved by pure reason alone, and thus regarded experimental
investigations
more highly. This is not to assert, however, that either Kant or Oersted were
unconcerned
with the formal character of science. As we saw earlier, Oersted
follows Kant in holding that a science must meet certain stringent conditions.
In short, without putting nature to the test (in virtue of realizing the insufficiency of pure reason), and without the high scientific standards he adopted
from Kant, Oersted never would have made the empirical discovery he did. If
we are to look for inspirational
forces behind Oersted’s discovery, Kant must
be considered as more important
than Schelling and Naturphilosophie.
5. Summary/Conclusion
As Oersted wrote about himself: “Throughout
his literary career, he adhered
to the opinion, that the magnetical effects are produced by the same powers as
the electrical. He was not so much led to this by the reasons commonly alleged
for this opinion,
as by the philosophical
principle, that all phenomena
are
alleged”
produced by the same original power”.h5 By “the reasons commonly
he was referring to the allegation that his discovery was merely accidental. But
if the above analysis is substantially
correct, then his remark might just as well
apply to the claim, which has enjoyed popularity
more recently, that he was
“led” to his discovery by Naturphilosophie.
It is true, as Stauffer remarks, that
“This belief in the unity of the powers of nature was characteristic
of the
German Romantic school of Naturphilosophie”.@ But I would not want to go
on to endorse his claim that: “It was Naturphilosophie
that led to the
Rather, as Williams at one point admits,
discovery of electron~agnetism”.h7
Oersted “developed his philosophical
insights by comparing his own metaphyMThe phrase
is from Ellington,
op. cit.. note 9, p, xix
6SSkriferII,p. 356.
4,
4.
305
Oersted’s Discovery of’ Electromugnetisrn
sits with those of the Nuturphilosophen. Since both Oersted and the Narurphiloand basic ideas from Kant, it is not [surprising]
that Oersted’s later philosophy
closely resembled
Naturphilosophie”.@
But
sophen drew their inspiration
resemblance
is not identity, and the d@erences between
those of Nuturphilosophen are in this case more important
Oersted’s views and
than their superficial
similarities. Aesthetically
Oersted may have found Naturphilosophie appealing,
but it was his devotion to a Kantian philosophy
of natural science that was
instrumental
in his discovery of electromagnetism.
Acknowl~~dgrments ~~ I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Gerd Buchdahl,
Karl Ameriks, Michael Crowe, and anonymous
referees of this journal for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
‘“L Pearce Williams, ‘Oersted’, in: C. C. Gillispie (ed.), Dictionnry of Scientz~c Biography,
Vols iNew York.
197&1980).
Vol. IX, pp. 182-183.
16