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Markus J. Prutsch
European University Institute, Florence
The Revision of the French
Charte constitutionnelle in the Crisis of 1830
Constitutional Change and Political Transformation between
Evolution and Revolution
Abstract
This paper aims to highlight the nature of political transformation in France, in particular the
change of political system from the Restoration to the July Monarchy, by analysing the revision
of the Charte constitutionnelle in 1830. This constitutional revision has remained in the shade of the
“big” upheavals of 1789 and 1848 respectively and has often been considered to be only of secondary interest in historiography. Such an understanding, however, following a closer examination of 1830 turns out to be one-sided and underestimates the importance of events in 1830.
Hence, the aim of this paper is threefold: Firstly, to show the constitutional and political basis for
the regime change during the July Revolution; secondly, to describe the concrete revision of the
constitution and to explain the changes which were made, especially regarding the definition and
restriction of monarchical power; finally, to assess the political transformation of 1830 in broader
contexts.
Thus, the reformulation of the Charte constitutionnelle will be critically examined in this work,
with special reference to the role of the king and the parliament as two crucial protagonists in this
process. In this context, the widespread theses of the Restoration regime as a monarchie impossible
and the view that the Revolution of 1830 was an inevitable event in French political history will
be challenged. This may finally provide some further insights into the character of political transformation and change on a more general level.
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1. Introduction
The French July Revolution of 1830 remains in the shadow of the two “great” revolutions of
1789 and 1848 respectively, both in public awareness and historiography. Indeed, the constitutional dimension of the July Revolution in general and the revision of the Charte constitutionnelle of
1814 in particular have not been given significant attention by historians, whose general view
appears to be that these are events of minor importance.
Thus, the ambition of this paper is to analyse the constitutional changes of 1830 and to scrutinize whether the predominant judgement of only marginal alterations in the constitutional system
of France in 1830 remains valid. One could approach this subject by focusing upon the concrete
course and the results of constitutional revision and the question of the extent to which the
Charte constitutionnelle as the constitutional basis for the restoration regime had represented a solid
basis for the political development of the country since 1814. 1 It can be asked if the prelude of
the revolution may be interpreted as a constitutional conflict between crown and chambers. Fur1
In fact, only a few monographs make the Charte of 1814 and its’ revised version of 1830 an explicit subject of research, above all two aged juridical dissertations of Pierre Simon and Erich Guttentag and a later book of Pierre
Rosanvallon. See Simon, Pierre. L’élaboration de la Charte constitutionnelle de 1814 (1er avril – 4 juin 1814). Paris
1906, Guttentag, Erich. Entstehung und Aufbau der Charte constitutionnelle von 1814. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
des konstitutionellen Prinzips. Jur. Diss., Univ. Freiburg/Breisgau 1921, Rosanvallon, Pierre. La monarchie impossible : les Chartes de 1814 et de 1830. Paris 1994. Simon’s work was, in fact, for a long time the only study on the
origin of the Charte based on archival sources and the main point of reference for later authors, Guttentag and
Rosanvallon included. Yet, Simon has to be corrected in many ways, not least because he did not take into consideration several sources of great importance, among them a hand written fragment of Louis XVIII, commenting
the “senatorial constitution” of 6 April 1814, which became crucial for the later Charte and allows insights both in
the special role of the king and the very character of the restoration (Archives du Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères, Mémoires et Documents France 646 – Fonds Bourbons), or the diary of Félix Faulcon, Vice-President
of the Corps législatif and member of the constitutional commission in 1814 (Archives Départementales de la Vienne, Poitiers, SAO 659). Furthermore, in view of Simon’s obvious juridical and institutional-historical interest the
political dimension of the events and their interpretation do not receive the necessary attention. The same counts –
though not to the same amount – for Guttentag’s later dissertation. Pierre Rosanvallon certainly overcomes the
narrow approach of Simon and Guttentag insofar as “politics” and “explanation” become more important, but is
still founding its argumentation upon the sources Simon presented in 1906. Apart from that, the main weakness of
Rosanvallon’s book has to be seen in its normative and to a certain degree prejudiced interpretation of the whole
restoration system as a monarchie impossible. Cf. also chapter 4.2.
Considering these deficiencies, perhaps the best researched and balanced interpretation of the constitutional system
of the Charte and its genesis is offered by Volker Sellin in his work on the downfall of Napoleon and the restoration in Europe, published 2001, in which the author not only traces the emergence of the French constitution of
1814 by consulting new archival material, but also works out the political and theoretical implications of the Charte
constitutionnelle for the restoration in France and Europe. See Sellin, Volker. Die geraubte Revolution. Der Sturz Napoleons und die Restauration in Europa. Göttingen 2001. Based on the findings and impulses of this monograph,
which indeed represents a crucial starting point for all research on the restoration era, my own work has aimed at
highlighting the specific role of the Charte for the political life of the restoration and portrayed the constitution’s
development and revision between 1814 and 1830. The findings of this research with further references to relevant
literature may be found in my recently published book. See Prutsch, Markus J. Die Charte constitutionnelle Ludwigs
XVIII. in der Krise von 1830. Verfassungsentwicklung und Verfassungsrevision in Frankreich 1814 bis 1830.
Marburg 2006.
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thermore it has to be asked, whether this conflict was founded on real defects of the existing
constitution or rather diverging (mis)interpretations by the political actors. Or, to put it another
way: whether the constitution of 1814 was not able to demonstrate its value as such or whether
the Charte formed no appropriate medium for the accomplishment of the protagonists’ powerpolitical interests. As for the latter it can be argued that the conflict between king and chamber
was sparked off by the question on the monarch’s right to appoint ministers without taking into
account parliamentarian majorities, i.e. the character of ministerial responsibility. The chambers
drew their criticism of the king upon a specific interpretation of the Charte, whereas the release of
the July Ordinances, published 26 July 1830, rested on ostensible emergency powers of the executive, which Charles X derived from article 14 of the constitution. Hence it can be expected
that the victorious liberals 2 tried to reformulate the Charte at least insofar that the sense of contentious passages were changed. Moreover one might also expect further modifications: Since
1814 16 years had passed, in which the society and the political system had considerably developed. Therefore one may surmise with good reason that also other objectives and interests, e.g.
those regarding the pouvoir constituant, were reflected in the revision of 1830.
Based on this general outline, three concrete questions can be formulated:
1)
What were the roots of the constitutional conflict between king and parliament, which
finally culminated in the July Revolution of 1830?
2)
What were the concrete changes to the Charte constitutionnelle like, and how can these
changes be explained?
3)
How can the revision of the French constitution in 1830 be evaluated in more general
terms?
Thus, the structure of the paper is as follows:
In the first part the broader framework for the constitutional revision of 1830 is analysed, by
focusing both on the Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 as the object of the later revision and the practice of “monarchical constitutionalism” 3 during the rule of Louis XVIII. In a second step the
constitutional revision will be examined, starting with an exposition of the break in the constitutional reality under Charles X, marked by growing differences between crown and parliament and
finally culminating in the enactment of the July Ordinances and the start of the July Revolution in
Paris. Drawing from this section, the revision of the constitution as such will be presented and
2
Though aware of the difficulties of the term, “liberal” in this paper may be used to characterize the main political
group of the regime change in 1830.
3 In general terms, “monarchical constitutionalism” can be defined as a constitutional system with a dominant monarch, in which, however, the executive power is effectively restricted by a written constitution.
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the concrete changes as well as the reasons for them will be outlined. In the third part, the focus
will be on the interpretation of the political change, which markedly changed the power relations
between crown and parliament. On the one hand the character of the political and constitutional
transformation, and on the other the widespread argument of a “necessary political correction”,
which implies the inevitability of the revolution too, will be highlighted. This approach allows us
to answer the three main questions in the concluding part of the paper.
To begin with, however, constitutional text and constitutional reality in the Restoration era
may be taken into consideration.
2. Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality in the
Restoration Era
2.1. The Charte constitutionnelle of 1814
When the Bourbons returned to power in 1814 and sought to establish a new constitutional system, the situation in France was unique: The foundations for the later set up of the Charte constitutionnelle were only laid by the political collapse of the Napoleonic Empire. 4 Napoleon himself had
brought his regime into total discredit by refusing all the earlier attempts of the Allies to make
peace and by placing intolerable burdens on the country, though the military and economic
breakdown became already foreseeable in early 1814. The self-delegitimation of his regime finally
culminated in the deposition of the emperor by the French Senate at the beginning of April. This
coup, which was initiated by Talleyrand and the Russian Tsar Alexander, paved the way for a
basic reorganization of the political order. However, at that time it was not clear at all that a constitutional system along the lines of the later Charte would be installed, not even, that the Bourbon monarchy would be restored. 5 The deciding factor for choosing the “Bourbon alternative”
was in the end a very opportunistic one, namely the belief that the former dynasty was relative to
the alternatives the most legitimate, and would find stronger acceptance in the people than others. Hence, the position of the Count of Provence and later king Louis XVIII was very exposed,
even more so given the pretender’s lack of practical instruments of power. The Senate again,
For details on the history of the Charte see Sellin 2001 Die geraubte Revolution, pp. 41-273. See also Prutsch 2006
Die Charte constitutionnelle Ludwigs XVIII, pp. 13-55.
5 Among others Napoleon’s former marshal, Jean-Baptiste Jules Bernadotte, Swedish crown prince and later King
Charles XIV John, was being talked about as new French king.
4
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trusting in his own strength, did not think of re-establishing the traditional power structures, but
had the ambition to found a new legal system, which should form the basis for the Bourbon Restoration but preserve the “revolutionary heritage” by corresponding constitutional guaranties.
Mainly the principle of national sovereignty, based on the theory of the Abbé Sieyès 6 and for the
first time institutionalised in the French constitution of 1791, was to be safeguarded and seen as a
“conditio sine qua non” for the accession of the Bourbons to the throne. To this end the Senate
presented a liberal constitutional draft 6 April 1814, in which the acceptance of this constitution
was defined as a prerequisite for the appointment of Louis as king. 7
Nonetheless, even thought the starting position of the Bourbons was not promising and the
ties between the former dynasty and French society were of a fragile nature given the experiences
of the Revolution and the Empire as well as the long time span since the fall of Louis XVI, in the
weeks that followed Louis succeeded in defending his claim for preserving the monarchical principle and in pushing through a constitutional system based on the concept of “divine rights”.
Favoured by the common wish for peace after the devastating Napoleonic wars as well as inept
and objectionable conduct on the part of the Senate 8 and by the concession of liberal rights,
Louis finally achieved to push through the Charte constitutionnelle as a constitution octroyée, which differed from the senatorial draft just in its crucial component: the emphasis of the sovereignty of
the people. Rather than that, the Charte – and above all its preamble – granted solely the king the
pouvoir constituant, that in accordance with the political program of the Restoration, and aimed at
keeping monarchical legitimacy. This characteristic feature, however, which made the Charte the
prototype of “monarchical constitutionalism”, 9 can not obscure the fact that the constitution as
such was an expression of existing power relations. Louis refrained from encroaching on these
See Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? Paris 1988 [1789].
Regarding the “senatorial constitution” as a possible constitutional alternative to the Charte see Soto, Jean de. La
constitution sénatoriale du 6 avril 1814. In: Revue internationale d’histoire politique et constitutionnelle, nouvelle
série (1953) 3, pp. 268-304 and Corciulo, Maria Sofia. La Constitution sénatoriale française du 6 avril 1814. In: Parliaments, Estates & Representation (1997) 17, pp. 139-150. In the centre of Soto’s acute analysis is the conception
of a “treaty” between nation and ruler, which had been broken by Napoleon and was planned to be renewed with
the Count of Provence and latter king Louis XVIII. In honouring the Senate’s plan, Soto works out not least that
in 1830 the Chambre des Députés fell back on the procedure anticipated already in 1814. As for the text of the “Senatorial Constitution” see Constitution française (6 April 1814). In: Bulletin des lois du Royaume de France (in what follows shortly BL), Tome premier, N.° 13, pp. 14-18. Concerning the role of the Napoleonic Senate in 1814 and its
end see Bury, John Patrick Tuer. The End of the Napoleonic Senate. In: Cambridge Historical Journal (1948) 9, pp.
165-189.
8 Mainly the codification of special rights for the existing members of the Senate in the constitutional draft caused
offence to the broader public and brought the chamber into massive disrepute, whereas Louis managed to win
public opinion by presenting himself as a person of integrity and the paternal saviour of his country and people. Cf.
Prutsch 2006 Die Charte constitutionnelle Ludwigs XVIII., p. 29f.
9
Concerning the political-theoretical concept of the Charte see also Rials, Stéphane. Essai sur le concept de monarchie limitée (autour de la charte de 1814). In: Rials, Stéphane. Révolution et contre-révolution au XIXe siècle. Paris
1987, pp. 88-125
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relations, but rather tried to position the monarchy in a tradition of “royal adaptability” and
“modernity”, which gave the whole Restoration project the character of a dynamic and innovative adjustment concept. 10 Though neither the Senate nor the – less influential – second chamber
of the former Napoleonic parliament (Corps législatif) was directly involved in the elaboration of
the Charte, which was drawn up by a small royal commission under direct personal involvement
of Louis 11 over the period of only some weeks, it established the concrete settings of the constitutional text including the explicit will to find an arrangement with the French political class and
its fundamental demands. 12 Altogether the ambivalence of the Charte and its character as a compromise can not be denied: The constitution, though fundamental for the Restoration project,
was of a “revolutionary” nature, both with regard to the Bourbons’ aim to reconquer the constituent power and the perpetuation of “revolutionary innovations” and was neither to be qualified as purely “conservative” nor “liberal”, but provided an pragmatic basis for reconciling the
fragmented political landscape of post-Napoleonic France.
Diagram 1: The Political System of the Charte constitutionnelle (1814)
Roi de
France et de Navarre
Right of Initiative
Appointment and dismissal
Appointment
Dissolution
Ministers
Impeachment
Chamber of Deputies
Chambre des députés
Chamber of Peers
Chambre des pairs
Electorate (census)
Rather than a static “epoch notion”, “restoration” can be seen as a complementary term to “revolution”. Such an
understanding was already outlined by Jacob Burckhardt, who interpreteted revolution as “Geist der ewigen Revision” in his lectures on the “Revolutionszeitalter”. “Restoration” was seen by him as an answer to the revolutionary challenge, characterized by the effort of those governing to fulfil “Revisionsgelüste” to an extent which allows
to keep control and to safeguard the legitimacy of rule. See Burckhardt, Jacob. Historische Fragmente [ed. by Emil
Dürr]. Stuttgart [etc.] 1942, p. 205. Volker Sellin worked out this understanding of “restoration” in his work on Die
geraubte Revolution, interpreting restoration “als eine unaufhörliche Suche nach immer neuen Möglichkeiten des Auffangens und Abfederns, des Anerkennens und Zurückweisens“ and as a mentality: “Als Mentalität wären weder
Revolution noch Restauration an eine bestimmte Staatsform gebunden […] Revolution und Restauration sind nach
dieser Lesart Formalbegriffe, die auf Gesellschaft, Politik und Kultur in gleicher Weise anwendbar erscheinen.“ Sellin 2001 Die geraubte Revolution, pp. 321-325. Quotations p. 323.
11 Cf. AMAE, MD France 646 – Fonds Bourbons, fol. 41r-42r.
12 Already shortly after the presentation of the senatorial constitution, Louis had promised to keep essential achievements of the revolutionary and Napoleonic era in his “Declaration of Saint-Ouen”, though he made clear that he
was not willing to accept the constitution in the present form. Déclaration du Roi (2 May 1814). In: BL, Tome premier, N.° 89, p. 75f.
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2.2. Louis XVIII and the Development of the Constitutional System
Even though the constitution of 1814 was not to be interpreted as a concession to democracy
but rather as a specific variation of monarchical rule, the monarchical principle was nevertheless
far from being doomed to fail. 13 The future of the constitutional state was rather dependent on
the ability of the parliamentarian regime to guarantee durable legitimacy for the monarchical constitutional system. The king himself grasped this necessity and he was well aware that his crown
was not unshakable at all. Consequently he tried to position himself in the role of a ruler who
does not take part in day-to-day politics, that is one who acts in accordance with the crucial principle of a parliamentarian monarchy, “Le Roi règne et ne gouverne pas“. Hence the parliamentarian system was able to take first roots, and Louis XVIII did not see the chambers as opponents
of his royal prerogatives, but as a useful mediator and an indispensable outlet for liberal societal
aspirations.
Though the moderate views of the king were somewhat dampened by Napoleon’s return from
Elba and the interlude of the Hundred Days, manifest in Louis’ declared refusal of any form of
“constitutional democratisation” after the battle of Waterloo, 14 he was still willing to interpret the
settings of the Charte in a temperate way. Louis appointed ministers in accordance with the parliamentarian majorities and avoided to make use of his right to rule by decrees and edicts as
vested in article 14 of the constitution. So a crucial prerequisite for the development of a parliamentarian regime was met, which had taken place in an atmosphere of several possible conflicts,
namely between aristocracy and middle classes, monarchy and liberal bourgeoisie, as well as royal
and parliamentarian rights. 15
The assassination of the Duke of Berry in February 1820 certainly led to a considerable
change in Louis’ politics, in the course of which censorship was reintroduced and the electoral
law was modified insofar as the wealthiest part of the electorate was vested with special voting
rights (loi de double vote). Moreover, Joseph Count Villèle, one of the leading figures of the ultraroyalists, was appointed head of government. Still, however, the ongoing process of the formation of a parliamentarian monarchy was rather well under way, not least because since 1814 decisive elements of parliamentarian government had gained acceptance in France, mainly by means
See Sellin, Volker. ’Heute ist die Revolution monarchisch’. Legitimität und Legitimierungspolitik im Zeitalter des
Wiener Kongresses“. In: QFIAB 1996 76, pp. 335-361; here p. 358f.
14
Such a “democratisation” had been prepared by the Acte additionell aux constitutions de l’Empire, which Napoleon
hadordered to work out during his short rule and was confirmed by a plebiscite. As for the text see Bulletin des
lois 6e série, Tome unique, N.° 112, pp. 131-140.
15 See Ponteil, Félix. Les institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870. Paris 1966, p. 25f.
13
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of common law: The cabinet system, a “dialogue system” between legislative and executive
power as apparent in parliamentarian control rights and the growing awareness of the need of
political responsibility of the government towards the parliament, not least the practice of dissolving the parliament, which was not abused by the king as a tool for absolutist reaction, but
devoted to the smooth interplay of the constitutional institutions. 16
The ongoing evolution of parliamentarism suffered a severe setback only in September 1824,
when Louis XVIII died. The accession to the throne of Louis’ younger brother Charles X,
around whom “all of those who gazed backwards were assembled”, 17 opened the way for a radical reactionary policy change.
3. Constitutional Conflict and Constitutional Revision
3.1. Constitutional Conflict – the Prelude to the Revolution
Already his ritual coronation in Reims underlined Charles’ strictly conservative understanding of
power and rule, which did not leave much space for constitutional principles. As former leader of
the ultra-royalists, who were able to gain a solid majority in the elections of 1824, it was quite
clear right from the beginning, that the king was neither able nor willing to take up his constitutional role as a pouvoir neutre. 18
Shortly after Charles’ succession to the throne a number of reactionary measures were taken,
among them the passage of the so called “emigrants billion”, meant as compensation for those
aristocrats who had been expropriated during the Revolution. Moreover the Catholic Church was
granted an influential position again, e.g. with regard to the educational system. The attempt of
the government, however, to tighten up press law again met with determined opposition which
included not only liberals but also many rightists who were afraid of loosing influence. The prime
16
See Gangl, Hans. 1966. Die Verfassungsentwicklung in Frankreich 1814-1830. In: Historische Zeitschrift 1966 202,
pp. 265-308, here pp. 296-306. Concerning the dissolution of the parliament during the Restoration see Tort, Olivier. La dissolution de la Chambre des députés sous la Restauration : le difficile apprivoisement d'une pratique institutionnelle ambiguë. In: Revue Historique 2000 302 (2), pp. 339-365.
17
Cf. Hillebrand, Karl. Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis Philipps bis zum Falle Napoleons III.
Erste Abtheilung: Geschichte des Julikönigthums (1830-1848). Erster Theil: Die Sturm- und Drangperiode des Julikönigthums (1830-1837). Gotha 1881, p. XX.
18
The mindset of Charles X is well characterized by Bagge, Dominique (Ed.). Les idées politiques en France sous la
restauration. Paris 1952, p. 184: “Charles X. aimait à répéter qu’il eût préféré scier du bois que de gouverner à
l’anglaise. Son vœu, son exigence était de rétablir le lien mystique unissant le monarque à son peuple. Il entendait
être souverain absolu ou n’être pas. ”
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minister succeeded in winning a majority in the second chamber, but the bill finally failed in the
Chambre des Pairs, which considered the government’s resolution to be directed against both spirit
and text of the Charte. In reaction to the parliament’s unforeseen resistance 76 new pairs were
appointed by the king. 19 In addition, 6 November 1827 the Chambre des Députés was dissolved by
Charles X, who was hoping to find confirmation for the government policy in new elections as
Louis XVIII in 1823. Though, the dissolution of the second chamber had a contradictory effect,
and the opposition, which for the first time was bound together in an alliance called Aide-toi et le
ciel t’aidera headed by Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot, was only strengthened by the elections.
At first it seemed that the king was willing to accept the new majorities, not least given the fact
that Jean Baptiste Count Martignac, a centre right politician, was appointed successor of Villèle.
Still, Martignac’s moderate course between liberals and crown was interpreted as weakness by
Charles right from the beginning. Hence Martignac was confronted with a steady opposition on
the part of the monarch.
20
The failure of a bill concerning the local and department administra-
tion in spring 1829 was in the end the pretext for his replacement by a conservative cabinet,
which was expected to put Charles’ idea of monarchical government into action: “C’est-à-dire la
Charte selon la monarchie et non la monarchie selon la Charte. Il faut un ministère qui résisterait
non point à sa volonté mais à l’opposition des Chambres.” 21
The head of the new government was Prince Jules de Polignac, a representative of the extreme
right, who had a very bad reputation among the people, not least given his active involvement in
the terreur blanche after 1815. Mainly, however, the appointment of a reactionary was an open affront to the liberal majority in the second chamber, by which Charles X gave to understand that
he was willing to put aside the principles of a parliamentarian system and to seek the confrontation with the parliament. The opening of the parliamentary session in 1830 emphasized the king’s
new political line, when Charles X expatiated allusively on “sinister manoeuvres”, which were to
19
Like in the English constitutional system the appointment of a number of new pairs (in German, this practice is
characterized by the noun Pairsschub) was an effective way to change majorities in the upper house. A certain restriction of the monarch’s influence both in England and France was the existence of hereditary peerages. In this
connection, the royal prerogative to appoint new peers has a practical limit too insofar as the will to change existing majorities in the upper house, especially at short intervals, requires a steadily growing number of appointments
given increasing size of the chamber. This problem became evident for French king Charles X in the second half
of the 1820s, who continually raised the number of Pairs de France for gaining political support, but was confronted
ever and anon with opposition because of his controversial policies.
20
Typically enough was Martignac –contrary to his predecessors – not granted the title Président du Conseil. See Gangl
1966 Verfassungsentwicklung, p. 299.
21
Garnier, Jean-Paul. Charles X. Le Roi. Le Proscrit. Paris 1967, p. 114.
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be combated, what was only to be interpreted as an indirect threat by the deputies. 22 Consequently the Chambre des Députés made reference to the rules of the parliamentarian regime in its
formal address, that was adopted with 221 against 181 votes and in which the chamber called to
mind the fact that the Charte provided the interplay and cooperation of parliament and government – requirements, which were not met any more. 23
In reaction to such undisguised criticism Charles X decided to adjourn and on 16 May 1830
also to dissolve the rebellious chamber. However the only result was another election victory of
the opposition. In this situation the king and his government took the far-reaching decision to
dissolve the just elected and not yet convened chamber again, “with little planning, military or
otherwise”. 24 Furthermore, two other ordinances were released that 25 July 1830 with reference
to article 14 of the constitution, which was interpreted in a highly arbitrary way. Whereas the first
ordinance suspended the freedom of the press, the second altered the electoral census for the
benefit of the conservative clientele. 25 The simmering conflict between king and parliament had
thus culminated not only in a political crisis but a coup d’état of the executive power, which was
to bring forth elementary changes for the French political system.
3.2. The July Revolution of 1830 – Towards a New Constitution
King Charles X had cherished the hope that the July Ordinances would strengthen his authority
and lead to a new era of monarchical rule in France, in which the parliament was only of subordinate importance. 26 The effect of Charles’ coup d’état, however, was just opposite, and the king
lost the support even of those, who had until then been loyal to crown and monarch. 27 That is
Charles’ speech in Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860 (in what follows shortly AP) 1862ff. Vol. 61, p. 543f.;
Among other things the king argued: “Si de coupables manœuvres suscitaient à mon gouvernement des obstacles
que je ne veux pas prévoir, je trouverais la force de les surmonter […]”
23 Text ibid., p. 618f.
24 Pilbeam, Pamela M. The ‘Liberal’ Revolution of 1830. In: Historical Research. The Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 1990 63, pp. 162-177, citation p. 163.
25 As for the content of those three July Ordinances, which were supplemented by a fourth one on the date of the
convening of the electorate committees, see AP 1862ff. vol. 61, pp. 639-641.
26 The application of article 14 of the constitution had in fact been interpreted as a necessary mean to “consolidate
the political institutions” by the government, as it appears in a report to the king, dated July 25 1830: “L’article 14 a
investi Votre Majesté d’un pouvoir suffisant, non sans doute pour chanter nos institutions, mais pur les consolider
et les rendre plus immuables.” In: Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard (Ed.). Sozialökonomische und politische Voraussetzungen der Julirevolution 1830. Göttingen 1971, p. 38.
27 The support for king and government was already at a very low level before the release of the July Ordinances, as
the elections of 1830 had proved: “On peut en déduire que des 80000 électeurs qui formaient le pays légal, pas plus
d’un quart n’accorda […] son soutien à la politique du roi et de ses ministres.“ Higonnet, Patrick-Bernard. La composition de la Chambre des Députés de 1827 à 1831. In: Revue Historique 1968 92, number 239, pp. 351-378 , here p. 359.
22
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why the evolving popular revolt in Paris, helped by the poor economic situation, including crop
failures and rising prices, was able to spread out and turn into a revolution. Starting with the formal protest notes of liberal lawyers and journalists, which stressed the illegality of the ordinances
and denounced the turn from legal rule into tyranny, 28 the control of the capital moved over
from the government to the revolutionaries in only three days, known as Trois Glorieuses. When
the debacle of the royal troops became obvious on 29 July, on his advisors’ urging Charles X
sought to set people’s minds at rest by withdrawing the ordinances and by announcing the formation of a new cabinet under the Duke of Mortemart. This however occurred too late to change
the course of events.
Meanwhile the most influential political groups in the country already had started to campaign
for their concepts of the political and constitutional future of the country, after the powerlessness
of the crown had become so evident within a few days: The Bonapartists, most of them former
soldiers of Napoleon and a rather numerous group, aimed at restoring the empire and abolishing
all the privileges of the old nobility. The even more influential Republicans again, who did not
conceal their deep aversion towards the Bourbon dynasty, argued for an all-out “government of
the people” with their slogans of “Liberty” and “common property”.
In this situation, when the proclamation of a republic was within reach, the Orléanists as the
third important political fraction of the time was determined to take the political initiative. Composed primarily of members of the liberal bourgeoisie, this fraction considered the Duke of Orléans as a member of a Bourbon collateral line to be the best guarantee for the necessary political
change, which at the same time had to be of a moderate nature and prevented the country from a
“republican experiment”. Arguing that “la République nous exposerait à d’affreuses divisions; elle
nous brouillerait avec l’Europe”, Louis-Philippe was presented as the best and only political alternative, as a “roi citoyen”, 29 who had never opposed the people and had spoken up for the Tricolour. For this reason he was seen as a guarantor of the constitutional state and a functioning
government.
Already on 30 July a group around the financier Jacques Laffitte, cooperating with the newly
established National Guard under its distinguished leader Lafayette, thus in possession of a decisive instrument of power, decided to offer the throne to the Duke of Orléans. By following the
These protest notes (text in AP 1862ff. vol. 61, p. 641f.) were published 27 July in a number of newspapers who
had disobeyd the ban on publication. Among other things it is put forward: “La Charte (art. 8) dit que les français
en matière de presse sont tenus de se conformer aux lois; elle ne dit pas aux ordonnances. La Charte (art. 35) dit
que l’organisation des collèges électoraux sera rédigée par les lois; elle ne dit pas par les ordonnances.“
29 Proclamation in Le National, 31 July 1830.
28
11
English example of 1688, the bourgeoisie hoped to liberalize the political system but safeguard
the monarchy at the same time with a dynastic change. And indeed, the same evening LouisPhilippe complied with a request of the liberals, formulated by Benjamin Constant, which invited
the Duke of Orléans to come to Paris and take the office of Regent (lieutenant général du royaume).
In a proclamation to the people Louis-Philippe justified his decision with the need to prevent
anarchical conditions in France and guaranteed at the same time an immediate summoning of the
parliamentary chambers as well as the strict observance of the constitution: “La Charte sera
désormais une vériteé.” 30
This statement was welcomed with open arms by those parliamentarians who stayed in Paris
during these turbulent days. In its official response the second chamber announced the appointment of Louis-Philippe as Regent and praised his role as a guarantor of the constitution. Moreover a number of promises were made: The permanent renewal of the National Guard with
elected officers, the participation of the citizens in the formation of the local and department
administration, the responsibility of the ministers, as well as new elections for those deputies who
had been appointed civil servants. 31 When Louis-Philippe’s public speech in the late afternoon of
the 31 July, in which he renewed his confession to the nation together with Lafayette, met with
general assent, the victory of the Orléanist fraction was not to be doubted any more. Now the
liberal elite – above all the influential circle around Laffitte – was able to get down to the elaboration of the future constitution and the normalisation of political life. To this end, the Duke of
Orléans appointed a provisional government on 1 August and convened both the Chambre des
Pairs and the Chambre des Députés for the 3 August. 32
In his address during the inauguration of the two chambers Louis-Philippe introduced his political program. 33 Above all he emphasized the need for a restitution of the rule of law and the
guarantee of liberty for all. Accordingly, “tous les droits doivent être solidement garantis; toutes
les institutions nécessaires à leur plein et libre exercice doivent recevoir les développements dont
elles ont besoin.” The principles of a free and liberal government were to be unanimously accepted, hence Louis-Philippe made an appeal to the parliament to cooperate on the organisation
of the National Guard, the formation of jury courts, the reorganisation of the local and department administration, and above all on the revision of article 14, “qu’on a si odieusement inter-
Text of the proclamation in AP 1862ff. vol. 61, p. 644f., citation ibid. p. 645.
Text ibid., p. 645.
32 Text ibid., p. 648; Besides another edict, proclaming the Tricolore the new national flag, These were the first official acts of Louis-Philippe.
33 Text of the address in ibid. vol. 63, p. 28.
30
31
12
prété”. The Duke of Orléans finished this part of his speech with the auspicious remark, that “Le
respect de tous les droits, le soin de tous les intérêts, la bonne foi dans le gouvernement, sont les
meilleurs moyens de désarmer les partis et de ramener dans les esprits cette confiance dans les
institutions, cette stabilité, seuls gages assurés du bonheur des peuples et de la force des Etats.”
Finally he informed the deputies of the resignation of both King Charles X and the Dauphin (2
August 1830), without mentioning however, that they had only renounced the throne in favour
of Charles’ grandson Henri, Duke of Bordeaux. 34
Louis-Philippe’s speech corresponded entirely with the ambitions of the bourgeois fraction,
which was willing to preserve the monarchical system, but aimed at gaining liberal concessions
and a “constitutional guarantee” for the existing political system. Therefore the necessity to reformulate the controversial article 14 of the Charte had been explicitly mentioned by LouisPhilippe. At the same time a broader revision of the constitution was prepared. In the following
discussions two diverging concepts on the future political system developed within the bourgeois
fraction: One group, headed by Jacques Laffitte and Benjamin Constant, pursued a more liberal
program, e.g. the extension of individual rights, a drastic lowering of property qualifications for
elections, and a far-reaching restriction of the monarchical power. Astonishingly enough LouisPhilippe was personally inclined to the ideas of this group, but he found it also necessary to make
concessions to the right wing of the bourgeois fraction under the direction of the Duke of
Broglie and Françis Guizot, the designated minister of the interior. 35 As leading figures of the
Doctrinaires, Broglie and Guizot warned of the dangers of a drastic liberalization, especially with
regard to freedom of expression, and spoke in favour of preserving certain privileges and the
takeover of the main institutions of the Restoration era. Thus, a compromise on the future constitution of the country had to be found, something Guizot was entrusted with.
Guizot’s leading idea was the formation of a new regime that was nevertheless founded on the
organization of the old system. Since the royal family was just about to leave the country, the
appointment of Louis-Philippe as king was not to be questioned any more. Given that the new
king was to be appointed, the new monarchy was based on the principles of choice and contract,
and the prerequisite for the election of Louis-Philippe was the approval of the constitution with
all the indented changes. Thus, Guizot’s concept, which was introduced to the Chambre des Députés
on 6 August, concluded: “„[…] S.A.R. Louis-Philippe d’Orléans. Lieutenant général du royaume,
34
35
The abdication decree of King Charles X and the Dauphin in ibid. vol. 61, p. 649.
As for Constant’s and Guizot’s different concepts of sovereignty see Craiutu, Aurelian. ”The Battle for Legitimacy:
Guizot and Constant on Sovereignty”. In: Historical Reflections 2002 28 (3), pp. 471-491.
13
sera invité à accepter et à jurer les clauses et engagements ci-dessus énoncés, l’observation de la
Charte constitutionnelle et les modifications indiquées; et, après l’avoir fait, à prendre le titre de
roi des Français.” 36 Nonetheless, Guizot had tried to interpret the new monarchy in a traditional
way, not least because appearances of legitimacy had to be kept up. That is why Louis-Philippe
was elected on account of his dynastic relations with the old Bourbon branch and why the idea of
a permanent elective monarchy was abandoned in favour of the traditional form of a hereditary
monarchy.
The only thing that was left to do was to pass the constitutional draft through parliament,
which occurred on 7 August. In the end the text was accepted with 219 against 33 votes in the
second chamber and 99 against 14 votes in the first chamber, where the radical right abstained
from voting. Louis-Philippe’s oath and his proclamation as “King of the French” on 9 August
brought an end to the revision of the constitution, which was put into force 14 August 1830. 37
3.3. The New Charte constitutionnelle
“Speed, not style, epitomised the occasion.” 38 These are the words with which Pamela Pilbeam characterized the proclamation of Louis-Philippe, a description indeed, which is also true
for the political transformation of 1830 as such. The parliamentary discussions on the necessary
constitutional changes confined to two single days, namely the 6 and 7 August. That can be interpreted as a result of the unclear political situation in France and the wish of the main political
protagonists to consolidate the political system as fast as possible, but also as proof for an existing consensus on which parts of the Charte constitutionnelle had to be changed.
The main ambition of the Chamber of Deputies was to reject the concept of monarchical sovereignty durably, which was considered as the crucial innovation of the Charte and made the
French constitution of 1814 a prototype for European monarchical constitutionalism. At the
same time the aim was to qualify the alternative principle of “sovereignty of the people” as much
as possible. 39 Rather than establish this principle, the favoured political-theoretical construction
was based on the idea of “sovereignty of the parliament” and the emphasis was on the chamber
Guizot’s draft, which was presented by M. Bérard, in AP 1862ff. vol. 63, pp. 51-53; Based on this draft, a constitutional commission was entrusted with the task of elaborating the necessary constitutional changes.
37 The parliamentarian protocols of 7 and 9 August 1830 in ibid., pp. 61-89.
38 Pilbeam, Pamela M. The Constitutional Monarchy in France, 1814-1848. Harlow [etc.] 2000, p. 41.
39 What gives evidence for the reservations of the political class against the principle of sovereignty of the people is
that the parliament refrained from a plebiscite on the new Charte constitutionnelle.
36
14
as the “institutional place of sovereignty”, by which it was possible to justify the usurpation of
the pouvoir constituant. 40
Subject to these objectives the introductory declaration of the Chamber of Deputies to the new
constitution, which included the idea of the common right to resist against tyranny and was to be
read as new “preamble” of the Charte, which declared the vacancy of the French throne on account of the violation of the existing constitution by King Charles X and his personal behaviour:
“La chambre des députés, prenant en considération l’impérieuse nécessité qui résulte des événements des 26, 27 [et] 29 juillet dernier et jours suivants, et de la situation générale où la
France s’est trouvée placée à la suite de violation de la Charte constitutionnelle; Considérant
en outre que par suite de cette violation et de la résistance héroïque des citoyens de Paris, S.M.
Charles X, S.A.R. Louis-Antoine, dauphin, et tous les membres de la branche aînée de la maison royale, sortent en ce moment du territoire français. Déclare que le trône est vacant en fait
et en droit, et qu’il est indispensable d’y pourvoir.” 41
In this situation it was the will and common interest of the French people to reform the existing constitution:
“La Chambre des députés déclare secondement que, selon le vœu et dans l’intérêt du peuple
français, le préambule de la Charte constitutionnelle est supprimé comme blessant la dignité
nationale, en paraissant octroyer aux Français des droits qui leur appartiennent essentiellement, et que les articles suivants de la même Charte doivent être supprimés ou modifiés […]” 42
Accordingly, above all the preamble of 1814, which by then already had a highly archaic touch
by defining “que l’autorité toute entière résidât en France dans la personne du Roi”, 43 was abrogated. Thus, the central formula for the monarchical principle was smashed. The revision of the
constitution however was not limited to the preamble, but was accompanied by a number of
other changes, aiming at creating a liberal parliamentarian regime.
See Beyme, Klaus von. Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa. München 1973, p. 109.
AP 1862ff. vol. 63, p. 89f. This declaration was given directly before the announcement of the constitutional
changes and was also made by the Chambre des Pairs in the royal session on 9 August,
42 Ibid. p. 90
43
Charte constitutionnelle (4 June 1814). In: BL, Tome premier, N.° 133, pp. 197-207, citation p. 197.
40
41
15
The first of these changes concerned article 6 of the 1814-Charte, codifying the catholic religion as religion of the state, which was cut out without replacement. In its place the reformulated
article 7 defined the Roman Catholic confession only as “confession of the majority of the
French”, but granted all the Christian confessions the same rights otherwise: “Art. 7. Les ministres de la religion catholique, apostolique et romaine, professée par la majorité des Français, et
ceux des autres cultes chrétiens, reçoivent des traitements du Trésor public.”44 It can be taken as
read that this equal treatment of all Christian confessions accrued not only from the preferential
treatment of the Catholic Church during the rule of Charles X, but also corresponded with direct
interests of (Protestant) parts of the bourgeoisie, which had until then been excluded from public
and high military service.
The reformulated article 8 perpetuated the guarantee of freedom of expression and speech
within the borders of law, but was completed with an irrevocable ban of censorship: “Art. 8. […]
La censure ne pourra jamais être rétablie.” 45 Thus, every new attempt of the state to restrict the
freedom of expression was going to be prevented for the future.
Whereas the revision of the Droit public des Français was limited to these changes, the reformulation of the following section of the constitution on Formes du Gouvernement du Roi was more substantial and represented the core of the political transformation process. Special attention was
attached to the revision of article 14, which had been interpreted and applied in a highly obscure
way by king and government and was the actual basis for the July-events. The new Charte did not
infringe upon the right of the crown to issue decrees necessary for the enforcement of laws, but
denied every form of direct royal intervention in existing laws: “Art. 14. Le roi […] fait les règlements et ordonnances nécessaires pour l’exécution des lois, sans pouvoir jamais ni suspendre les
lois elles-mêmes, ni dispenser de leur exécution.” 46 What was to be prevented with this regulation
was the possibility of king or government to rule with royal ordinances by declaring a state of
emergency and hence inactivating the legislative power.
Besides this restricting measures, the chambers also granted themselves the initiative in the
legislative process, which had until then been a royal prerogative only: “Art. 16 et 17. La proposition des lois appartient au roi, à la Chambre des pairs et à la Chambre des députés.” Moreover,
AP 1862ff. vol. 63, p. 90
Ibid.
46 Ibid.; It was also added that “Toutefois aucune troupe étrangère ne pourra être admise au service de l’Etat qu’en
vertu d’une loi”. This formula to prevent the formation of military forces without legal control of the parliament
was obviously not only inspired by the immediate experiences of the July Revolution, but the course of French history since 1789 as such, in which the military forces had often played a decisive role in domestic policy.
44
45
16
concerning tax affairs the second chamber claimed a privilege right, manifest in the regulation
“Néanmoins toute loi d’impôt doit être d’abord votée par la Chambre des députés.” 47
By qualifying the monarchical dominance in the legislation also the articles 19 and 20 of the
old Charte became superfluous, which had regulated the right of the parliament to make legislative
petitions to the king, and article 21 was levelled: “Si une proposition de loi a été rejetée par l’un
des trois pouvoirs, elle ne pourra être représentée dans la même session.” Now every legal project
required the cooperation of all three legislative powers, thus following the idea of a consensual
political system realizing the system of checks and balances.
The demands of the liberals were not only directed towards the royal prerogatives, but also
that of the nobility and its institutional basis, the Chambre des Pairs. Though far reaching propositions to abolish life peerage did not find a majority, the chamber was reformed in several respects. Above all, the right to take the function of a legislative organ even out of the regular parliamentary sessions was abolished: “Art. 26. Toute assemblée de la Chambre des pairs qui serait
tenue hors du temps de la session de la Chambre des députés est illicite et nulle de plein droit,
sauf le seul cas où elle est réunie comme cour de justice, et alors elle ne peut exercer que des
fonctions judicaires.” 48 Furthermore, the sittings of the upper house became public like that of
the second chamber – “Art. 32. Les séances de la Chambre des pairs sont publiques comme celles de la Chambre des députés” – and the articles concerning the rights of the Princes of the
Blood were revised (articles 30 and 31). 49 Perhaps the most momentous regulation concerning
the first chamber was that in the “Particular Regulations” of the new constitution, declaring that
“Toutes les nominations et créations nouvelles de pairs, faites sous le règne du roi Charles X.,
sont déclarées nulles et non-avenues”, what in effect meant a direct intervention in the composition of the upper house. Besides, the right of the king to nominate new peers was provided for
examination, however, not explicit decisions were taken for the time being.
But not only were the changes concerning the upper House remarkable, those of the Chamber
of Deputies were also far from being irrelevant. The period in office became five years again,
after it hade been prolonged to seven years in May 1824 (article 37). 50 The voting age was lowered from 30 to 25 years (article 40), whereas the age for eligibility became 30 instead of 40 (article 38). These measures were to be interpreted as concessions to the broad demands for a liber-
Ibid.
Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Contrary to the Charte of 1814, there was no longer a regulation prescribing annual elections for 20% of the members of the parliament.
47
48
17
alization of the electoral law. A definitive regulation or even an abolition of property qualifications however did not take place but was postponed to later legal regulations. 51
The ambition of the Chamber of Deputies to become emancipated from the king was also
manifest in the revision of articles 41 and 43. Hereby the former royal prerogative to elect the
presidents of the electoral committees was transferred to the electorate – “Art. 41. Les présidents
des collèges électoraux sont nommés par les électeurs” –, whereas the the right to elect the president of the second chamber fell to the chamber itself: “Art. 43. Le président de la Chambre des
députés est élu par elle à l’ouverture de chaque session.” 52 Besides, in view of the new regulations
for legal initiatives, the former articles 46 and 47 were abolished without replacement.
Appointment and especially responsibility of the government had turned out to be one of the
main conflicts between crown and parliament, given that the latter only had the right to bring a
charge against ministers in the case of high treason and embezzlement. Therefore it is no wonder
that article 56 of the old Charte was abolished, which had restricted the possibilities of the chambers to control the royal cabinet to such an extent, and that there was at least a slight approach to
the principle of political responsibility of the government.
Concerning the organisation of the judiciary there was no crucial need for reform on the part
of the parliament. Only the ban on special courts, which had already been part of the Charte in
1814, was confirmed in article 63 – “Il ne pourra en conséquence être créé de commissions et de
tribunaux extraordinaires, à quelque titre et sous quelque dénomination que ce puisse être.” –, 53
whereas the slight reformulation of article 73 was meant to underline the special legal status of
the colonies.
The modification of article 74 finally marked the essence of the whole revision procedure and
gave evidence for the self-awareness of the new political elite: The traditional formula of the selfcommitment of the king and his successors to obey the constitution was replaced by the definitive rule that “Art. 74. Le roi et ses successeurs jureront, à leur avènement, en présence des
Chambres réunies, d’observer fidèlement la Charte constitutionnelle.” The new constitution
closed with two symbolically relevant points, the emphasis of the common touch of the constitu-
A new electoral law was finally passed on 19 April 1831 (text in Berlia, Georges (Ed.). Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789. Paris 1952, pp. 200-211), but did not meet the high expectations in
the society for a radical liberalization. Parliament sticked to census, which was only reduced from 300 to 200
Francs regarding the right to vote and from 1000 to 500 for the right to be elected. Nevertheless, the number of
voters at least doubled from 100.000 to around 200.000. See. Hartmann, Peter Claus. Französische Verfassungsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1450-1980). Ein Überblick. Darmstadt 1985, p. 87.
52 AP 1862ff. vol. 63, p. 90
53 Ibid.
51
18
tion (article 75, article 66 of the new Charte) and the definition of the Tricolour as national flag
(article 76, article 67 of the new Charte), and the appended “Particular Regulations”. 54
Diagram 2: The Political System of the Charte constitutionnelle (1830)
Roi
König
des Français
Dissolution
Appointment and dismissal
Appointment
Ministers
Responsibility
Chamber of Deputies
Chambre des députés
Impeachment
Chamber of Peers
Chambre des pairs
Electorate (census)
4. Towards an Evaluation of the Constitutional Revision
4.1. The Character of the Political Transformation
Having focused upon the formal changes of the Charte constitutionnelle in the course of the July
Revolution, the obvious question remains that of assessing the general character of the political
transformation. It can be stressed with good reason that the regime change of 1830 was not of a
fundamental character, especially if the standards of comparison are other examples of French
constitutional history since 1789, such as the transition from constitutional monarchy to republicanism in 1792 or the collapse of the Napoleonic empire in 1814. Consequently the majority of
historians have argued that 1830 resulted in only marginal changes, as emphasized, for example,
by Maurice Duverger: “les différences [to the Charte of 1814 ; MJP] ne portent guère que sur des
détails. Il s’agit d’un changement de dynastie plutôt que d’un changement de régime.” 55
The articles 75 and 76 of the old Charte had become obsolete since they were only provisional regulations in 1814.
The new Dispositions particulières provided for the reorganisation of certain areas, e.g. the upper house.
55 Duverger, Maurice. Les constitutions de la France. Paris 1971, p. 64; Even more sober is Richard, Guy. Les institutions politiques de la France de Louis XV à Giscard d’Estaing. Paris 1979, p. 198: “un change de dynastie, pas de
régime.”
54
19
It has to be asked however whether one can unreservedly agree with this judgement. There is
no doubt that the monarchy as such was preserved and that the personnel changes at the head of
the state were far from being radical. Nevertheless, the reform of the constitutional order was of
a revolutionary nature. This is especially relevant in the relation between king and constitution.
Whereas the constitution of 1814 had been imposed by the king, who then claimed to be the only
holder of sovereignty and the pouvoir constituant, the revised Charte of 1830 downgraded the king to
nothing more than an – even though important – element and “object” of the constitution.
Whereas the constitutional oath of Louis XVIII in 1814 was to be interpreted as a voluntary act
of the monarch, Louis-Philippe had to solemnly swear to preserve, protect and defend the constitution as a prerequisite for his appointment as king in 1830. Thus, indeed a revolution of the
monarchical principle had taken place, which transformed the former Roi de France et de Navarre to
Roi des Français 56 and was at the bottom of Félix Ponteil’s pathetic sentence that “L’acte d’autorité
de 1814 est transformé en une œuvre de liberté.” 57
Walking hand in hand with the change of the relation between monarch and Charte constitutionnelle were the power-shifts which had occurred in the country, namely shifting the centre of
power from the king to the parliament as the hub of bourgeois and liberal ideas. The primary
ambition of the driving forces though was not to help to get the principle of popular sovereignty
accepted and to widen the possibilities for the common people to participate in the political process, but to strengthen their own influence and power. The dangers of the revolution had become
too apparent during the Trois Glorieuses, embodying almost everything that was averse to the upper middle classes: Societal egalitarianism, unsteadiness, and rule of the lower classes. Contrary to
that, the Charte in its revised version guaranteed the monarchy and so continuity and stability.
Furthermore, the proclamation of a “national monarchy” together with the guarantee of political
rights calmed down public feeling, while the political class had carefully reformed the parliamentarian system for its own benefit. In this context one can see striking resemblances with the Senatorial constitution in April 1814. 58
To ensure that the chambers were able to coexist with the crown as an independent political
power, the authority of the parliament had been strengthened in several respects: 59 Firstly, the
right of the chambers to impeach ministers was no longer restricted to individual cases, out of
which the principle of political responsibility was to be deduced. Secondly, the embodiment of a
56
This title had already been used in the first French constitution of 1791 (chapter II, article 2).
Ponteil 1966 Institutions, p. 150.
58
Cf. chapter 2.1.
59 Cf. also Beyme 1973 Regierungssysteme, p. 110f.
57
20
“double initiative” in the legislation laid the foundations for a successful parliamentarian government. Thirdly, the reformulation of article 43 brought more autonomy for the (second) chamber insofar as from now onwards the appointment of the president was a prerogative of the parliament itself. The parliamentary session of 1831, during which several of the legislative acts provided in the Dispositions particulières were put into action, only underlined the new influential position of the lower house. In this context it is particularly important to mention among other things
the abolition of hereditary peers on 29 December 1831. 60
To prevent the king from leaving the constitutional path, the legal basis both for emergency
and special legislation had been qualified. The idea of the bourgeois elite about what the king’s
role in the new political system of France should be like was rather clear: One among other political institutions, a pouvoir constitué, enthroned by the parliament as the pouvoir constituant.
If one takes these points for granted, the constitutional revision of 1830 can be qualified as
ambivalent: On the one hand characterized by a decisive reinterpretation of monarchical rule, on
the other hand following closely the traditional institutions and practices and preserving the system of a constitutional monarchy. In this respect, the Charte of 1830 followed up the first French
constitution of 1791, though the latter had been even more “radical” in certain respects. 61 The
historical model for the regime change in 1830 was obviously the English Glorious Revolution,
either intentional or unintentional. Like in England 1688/89, also in France the vacancy of the
throne and the forfeit of former monarchical rights was justified with the continual abuse of his
prerogatives by the monarch. In both cases the parliament took advantage of the specific historical situation, namely a moment of weakness on the part of the crown, to consolidate its own position and to achieve a durable guarantee of its rights. And finally, both in England and France
the parliamentarians were anxious to disguise the dynastical rupture as far as possible and to keep
up appearances of a continued legitimacy. Perhaps the main difference was that in the French
case the parliamentarian forces felt rather more compelled to supplement the constitutional
changes with concessions to national identity than their English counterparts. Thus, the Charte
constitutionnelle of 1830 is also the attempt to cope with the legacies of the revolution and to steer a
course between constitutional monarchy on the one hand, republicanism on the other hand, although the first element was certainly predominant.
The text of this law, becoming article 23 of the new constitution (the former article 27 of the Charte of 1814), in
Berlia 1952 Constitutions, p. 211f.
61
The 1791-constitution, to give one example, had only contained a suspensive royal veto.
60
21
4.2. The Constitutional and Political Change of 1830 – Inevitable?
But what about the interpretation of the regime change in 1830? Can the revision of the Charte
constitutionnelle be interpreted as inevitable, and if so, is perhaps the whole “l’entreprise bourbonienne” in the Restoration era to be characterized as “impossible”? 62 Certainly not, unless one
wishes to follow dogmatic and teleological interpretations of history. Rather it can be seen that
the development towards a revolutionary constitutional change in 1830 was not an irrevocable
must, but that it was up to the political protagonists to guarantee an evolutionary constitutional
development in Restoration-France.
In 1814 Louis XVIII had managed to set up a certainly fragile, but highly innovative constitutional system, which was a political compromise and had the potential to serve as an integrative
moment for future development in the country. The reconciliation of seemingly contradictory
elements in the Charte – the monarchical principle and the aim of the king to preserve a legitimacy of his own on the one hand, with the integration of the main legal and political innovations
of the Revolution and the Napoleonic Age on the other hand – was in the situation of 1814 not a
mistake, but met the needs of the time. Thus, it is no wonder that the monarchical constitutionalism of the Charte became the most influential model for European constitutionalism in the 19th
century. Even so, Louis XVIII was well aware of the fact that normative regulations were no
guarantor for the continued existence of both the political system of the Charte and the monarchy
as such, but that there was a need for sensible political action. Hence the king’s realpolitik was
characterized by moderation and forethought. Louis XVIII denied the ambitions of the ultraroyalists to return to pre-revolutionary conditions and their retaliation politics, he showed prudence with regard to the use of his constitutional rights, and he understood himself as a “reserve
authority” acting in accordance with the ideal of a constitutional monarch. That finds expression
in the practice of parliamentary dissolutions, which were not abused as political weapons but seen
as a means to establish a feasible constitutional practice. Altogether, Louis’ legitimization strategy
aimed at stabilizing the system of monarchical constitutionalism and at positioning the Bourbon
dynasty as the best guarantor for a flourishing development of the country by showing the will to
reform and adaptation. Hence “popularizing” politics to a certain extent, the political system became dependent on its capability to meet the expectations of the people, but gained new authority which was the more important as the concept of divine rights was no longer a trustworthy
source of legitimacy. The person of the king is not to be idealized, in particular because there
62
Bagge 1952 Idées politiques, p. 179. Cf. also Rosanvallon 1994 La monarchie impossible.
22
were a number of setbacks in the constitutional development, mainly after the king’s conservative
turn in the wake of the assassination of the Duke of Berry. Nonetheless, the politics of
Louis XVIII helped the new constitutional system to settle down and maintained at least the
chance for a long term transformation of the country towards democratic structures.
This chance however was missed under Louis’ successor Charles X, who was incapable of developing the legitimisation politics of his older brother. Louis XVIII had come to a modus
vivendi with both the revolutionary heritage and the Charte. Charles X though combated the former and negated the latter. He made excessive use of his prerogatives and under his rule the constitution degraded to nothing more than a tool for his rigid reactionary course.
Under these circumstances, when the appointment of ministers was carried out without taking
parliamentary majorities into consideration and when the dissolution of the second chamber was
to be interpreted only as political arbitrariness, it is not astonishing that the latent conflict between crown and chamber grew into a manifest constitutional conflict in early 1830. In this situation and in complete misapprehension of the facts, Charles X, convinced that he would serve the
“sûreté de l’Etat”, 63 exposed himself by suspending elementary parts of the constitution. He thus
ignored the longsighted advice of Louis XVIII, who had already written in 1814: “[…] vous Rois
mes Successeurs en cherchant à faire le bonheur de vos sujets, seule consolation du poids d’une
Couronne – n´oubliez jamais que vous leur devez avant tout de maintenir les lois et de vous faire
respecter” 64 By violating the constitution himself and breaking the imagined treaty between nation and king, hence perverting rule to despotism, Charles X had not only prepared his and his
dynasty’s own fall, but also the revision of the Charte constitutionnelle: The July Ordinances at the
latest had proven the deficits of the constitution and the conviction was almost common, that
these deficits were to be eliminated. At that point a constitutional revision indeed had become
inevitable.
5. Conclusion
The above findings may lead back to the research questions formulated at the beginning of this
paper, the first of them asking for the roots of the constitutional conflict between king and parliament, which finally culminated in the July Revolution of 1830.
Polignac, Auguste Jules Armand Marie de. Études historiques, politiques et morales sur l’État de la société européenne, vers le milieu du dix-neuvième siècle. Paris 1845, p. 291.
64
AMAE, MD France 646 – Fonds Bourbons, fol. 42r.
63
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In summary it may be said that the Charte constitutionnelle of 1814 despite or perhaps just because of its unclear position between monarchical and dynastical tradition was cut out for becoming the fundament for a calm political and social evolution of the country. What was decisive
though was the way in which the king as the predominant power in the constitutional system of
the Charte would make use of his prerogatives and in how far he would be able to take the responsibility of becoming a mediator in a system full of cleavages. Louis XVIII overcame this
challenge in an exemplary manner: As a dispassionate personality he was keen for compromise
and liked to act as a ruler not engaged in day-to-day politics, so that the parliamentary system was
able to develop within the frame of monarchical constitutionalism. The evolution of the constitutional system was abruptly interrupted by Louis’ successor Charles X, who as a passionate adherent of unrestricted monarchical rule mistook “restoration” for “reaction” and replaced consensus
by confrontation. The prerequisite for the later revision of the Charte constitutionnelle was therefore
the inability of Charles X to preserve the existing constitution as a solid basis for the political
coexistence of crown and parliament.
With regard to the second question on the concrete revision process of the Charte constitutionnelle and the reasons for these changes, above all the terrific speed of the revision is remarkable.
The bourgeois political elite, based on the Chamber of Deputies, was itself surprised by the quick
downfall of the Bourbon monarchy, but realized the need for determined action if its concept of
the future constitutional system was to be pushed through against their republican as well as
Bonapartist antagonists. Already at the end of July the Duke of Orléans was proclaimed regent
and not even two weeks after the first violent clashes in Paris the new constitution was passed.
However fast the revision might have been, the two main aims of the liberals were clear right
from the beginning: On the one hand the restriction of royal prerogatives for the benefit of the
parliament, on the other hand the preservation of the monarchy as such. The new Charte constitutionnelle put these aims into a constitutional form, not only by eliminating those “defects” of the
old constitution which might foster a “constitutional coup” of the king again, but also by the
repudiation of the legitimist theory of the divine right of kings and its replacement with the concept of “parliamentary sovereignty”. Consequently the constitutional change of 1830 could be
interpreted as a legal and somewhat selfish power transfer from king to parliament, above all the
Chamber of Deputies, without questioning the monarchical system as such.
That leads to the last research question, which asked for the evaluation of the constitutional
change in more general terms. What can be denied is the idea of an “inevitable act”. Rather than
that, the year 1830 marked the consequence of a careless dealing with the existing constitution,
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above all by Charles X. The origin of the political change can therefore be seen as the result of
perpetuated violations of the political and constitutional “culture” of the Restoration, culminating
in a drastic erosion of legitimacy for the Bourbon monarchy. When the king’s claim to power
failed miserably in the July Revolution, the bourgeois liberals saw their chance to realize their
political ambitions.
65
The new constitution represented certainly no revolution of the political
system, yet its “revolutionary element” was nevertheless glaring. The transfer of the constituent
power from the monarch to the parliament meant a crucial reformulation of the monarchy,
which had no longer a right of its own. It was reduced to a sole element of the constitution and
became “legalized”, or, to put it another way: The monarch as a kind of “transcendental” and
therefore unassailable constitutional organ was “materialized”, what guaranteed his responsibility
and liability. It was the conscious intention of the leading political circles that the power of the
king was not to be given by the people, e.g. in form of a plebiscite as in the Napoleonic era, but
by the parliament. Knowing that the elevation of the people to the exclusive holder of sovereignty meant a jeopardizing of its own position, the parliament set itself up as mouthpiece of the
whole nation. As a consequence, the Chamber of Deputies was able to make rhetorical use of
“popular sovereignty” and “representation of the people” without being dependent on the people at the same time.
The substantial accomplishment of popular sovereignty did not take place for the time being
but was to be postponed to the Revolution of 1848. Thus, the July Revolution of 1830 became de
facto only an intermediate stage of a “revolutionary cycle” starting in 1789, which gradually and
with certain aberrations paved the way for modern democratic institutions in France. However, it
has to be left open whether this development had necessarily to be a revolutionary one.
65
Besides the bipolar interpretation of the French constitutional development between 1814 and 1830 there are also
other explanations in the literatur: Beyme 1973 Parlamentarische Regierungssysteme, p. 101 and Morabito, Marcel;
Daniel Bourmaud. Histoire constitutionnelle de la France. 1789-1958. Paris 1991, p. 187 tend to differentiate three
stages, whereas Kirsch 1999 Monarch und Parlament, p. 340 tries to subdivide the Restoration into four phases. In
any case the death of Louis XVIII and the accession of Charles X to the throne was a radical break.
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