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International Journal of Economy, Management and Social Sciences, 2(5) May 2013, Pages: 133-155
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Theories of Economic Integration:
A Survey of the Economic and Political Literature
Amr Sadek Hosny
Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Northwest Quadrant Building B, Room 4428, Milwaukee, WI 53201, USA.
AR TIC LE INF O
AB STR AC T
Keywords:
This paper aims at presenting a survey of the literature on economic integration theories, both from
an economic and a political perspective with a special attention to the case of developing countries.
More specifically, we start by defining economic integration, and its forms. Then, a survey of
theories of economic integration, both traditional and new is presented in section two. Section three
focuses on economic integration theories adjusted to the special needs of developing countries.
Section four discusses the political incentives or determinants of economic integration. Finally,
section five provides an executive summary and concludes.
economic integration
political determiants of integration
developing countries
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1.
Introduction
Economic integration according to Balassa (1961) is defined as "the abolition of discrimination within an area". And according to Kahnert
et al (1969) economic integration is "the process of removing progressively those discriminations which occur at national borders".
Therefore, scientifically, measures which merely diminish discrimination between countries are considered forms of cooperation not
integration. According to Allen (1963, p.450) economic integration may mean something different to nearly everyone. That's why Allen
(1963, p.450) argues that one of the many useful elements of the well known Balassa (1961) book is that it evidently defines integration,
clearly differentiating between it and cooperation.
Furthermore, Lipsey (1960, p.496) provided the following definition of the customs union theory (economic integration theory)
as follows: "The theory of customs unions may be defined as that branch of tariff theory which deals with the effects of geographically discriminatory
changes in trade barriers [among countries]"
Integration according to Machlup (1977) is the process of combining separate economies into a larger economic region. Machlup
(1977) and Staley (1977, p.243) further argue that integration is concerned with the "utilization of all potential opportunities of efficient
division of labor".
An important question arises, and it is why study economic integration theories? Chou (1967) answered this question when he
argued that the main reason behind studying the traditional theory of economic integration is to evaluate the desirability of a customs union
from the world's welfare point of view using static effects as criteria. New (dynamic) theory of economic integration has introduced
dynamic effects of economic integration to this analysis. This is what we will study in-detail in section two of this paper.
1.1. Forms of Economic Integration
One cannot talk about the different forms of economic integration without mentioning the work of Balassa (1961) which is considered the
cornerstone of any work done on issues of economic integration. Balassa's book written in 1961, titled: "The Theory of Economic
Integration" has been reviewed by many authors in internationally recognized journals. Some of these book reviews include Allen (1963,
p.449-454) who described the book as an important contribution to an adequate understanding of economic integration. Havens (1962,
p.47-48) also describes the book as making a worthwhile contribution to the theory of economic integration. In Ingram's (1962, p.612-614)
review of the book, the author argues that Balassa has succeeded extremely well in explaining the theory of economic integration. Other
book reviews of Balassa's work include Eastman (1962, p.466-467), Meyer (1962, p.389-391), and Hasson (1962, p.614-615). Balassa's
book is widely cited in any book, article, or paper discussing economic integration – whether theory or policy.
According to Allen's (1963, p.450) review of Balassa's book: the basic ingredient of any integration form is the elimination of
barriers to trade among two or more countries. Allen (1963, p.450) also stresses the point that although traditional international trade theory
has dealt with the effects of reduction of trade barriers, a separate theoretical framework is needed to study issues of economic integration.
* Corresponding author.
Email address: [email protected]
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Economic integration can take many forms. According to Balasaa (1962) there are four different stages of economic integration.
The first is a Free Trade Area (FTA), then a Customs Union (CU), then a Common Market (CM), and finally an Economic Union.
Panagariya (1998, p.2; and 2000, p.288) argue that the term PTA, whether used to stand for Preferential Trade Area, Preferential
Trade Agreement or Preferential Trade Arrangement, has an advantage of being wider in that it can be used to describe FTAs, CUs and
arrangements involving partial trade preferences.
Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) 1 usually entail lower tariff barriers among participating nations than with non-member
nations. Panagariya (1998, p.2; and 2000, p.288) describe PTAs as an arrangement between two or more countries in which goods
produced within the union are subject to lower trade barriers than the goods produced outside the union. The trade arrangement among the
eight Muslim countries of the Developing 8 Organization is an example of a PTA.
A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 2 is a PTA in which member countries do not impose any trade barriers (zero tariffs) on goods
produced within the union. However, each country keeps its own tariff barriers to trade with non-members. This is usually referred to as
"trade integration". A good example is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formed by the United States of America
(USA), Canada, and Mexico in 1993. More specifically, paragraph (8) of article (XXIV) of the GATT defines a free trade area as follows:
"For the purposes of this Agreement:
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations
of commerce …. are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories."
quoted from Par.8, art. XXIV, GATT
A Customs Union (CU) is an FTA in which member countries apply a common external tariff on a good imported from outside
countries. This common external tariff can, of course, differ across goods but not across union partners. The most famous example is the
European Community (EC), formed in 1957 by West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. More
specifically paragraph (8) of article (XXIV) of the GATT defines a Customs Union as follows:
"For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce …... are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories, and,
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members
of the union to the trade of territories not included in the union"
quoted from Par.8, art. XXIV, GATT
A Common Market (CM) is a CU which further allows free movement of labor and capital among member nations. This is
usually referred to as "factor integration". At the beginning of 1993, the EU achieved the status of a CM.
The most advanced type of economic integration is the Economic Union, where the monetary and fiscal policies of member states
are harmonized and sometimes even completely unified. This is usually referred to as "policy integration". The extreme case of an
Economic Union could be a Monetary Union (MU). A good example for the former is the countries of the EU who use a single currency,
the Euro.
2.
The Gains from Economic Integration
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, p.82) argue that the theory of preferential trade agreements (theory of economic integration) has
undergone two phases of evolution, each reflecting the contrasting policy concerns of its time. Therefore, the purpose of this section will be
two-fold. In sub-section one, we will identify traditional economic integration or PTA theories that explain possible gains from trade and
economic integration, or what is commonly referred to as the static analysis of PTAs. Then we will review the historical developments of
these theories. In sub-section two, we will discuss new economic integration theories that have evolved with changing economic conditions
and trade environments, or what is commonly referred to as the dynamic analysis of economic integration.
2.1. Traditional Economic Integration Theories
Studies discussing trade integration gains and explaining the theoretical implications of preferential trade agreements are based on the
pioneering study of Viner (1950). Viner's book titled: "The Customs Union Issue" was reviewed by many economists in well known
journals. These include Catudal (1951, p.210) who describes Viner's work on the economics of customs unions as the first time that anyone
has subjected the issue of gains from economic integration to such a detailed and critical analysis from a purely economic point of view.
Salera (1951, p.84) has also described Viner's book as the first rigorous treatment of the subject. Other book reviews of Viner's book
include Cheng (1952, p.126), Ellsworth (1951, p.466-467), Imlah (1951, p.60), Henderson (1951, p.398-400), Martin (1951, p.75), Stopler
(1951, p.989-991), and Kreps (1950, p.207-208). We will review Viner's traditional customs unions theory, as well as the subsequent
developments made by many authors, especially Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957, 1960).
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2.1.1. Viner's Traditional Customs Unions Theory
Viner's study was the first to identify concrete criteria to distinguish between the possible advantages and disadvantages of economic
integration. Viner's so called "static analysis" of economic integration has divided possible effects of economic integration into the well
known trade creation and trade diversion effects.
Trade creation refers to the case when two or more countries enter into a trade agreement, and trade shifts from a high-cost
supplier member country to a low-cost supplier member country in the union.
Trade diversion may occur when imports are shifted from a low-cost supplier of a non-member country of the union (third
country) to a high-cost supplier member country inside the union. This may be the case if common tariff after the union protects the highcost supplier member country inside the union.
This can be illustrated by the following example in table (1). Suppose that country A enters a customs union with country B or C.
In both cases, country A will be better off since the domestic price of commodity X in country A (36) is higher than in country B (25) or C
(15). The direction of trade will shift from a high-cost member (country A) to a low-cost member (country B or C). This is an example of
trade creation.
Table 1. Price of commodity X in three countries
Price of commodity X
Country A
36
Country B
25
Country C
15
If, however, country A levies a tariff of 100% on commodity X, then it would buy it from country C which is the low-cost
producer in this case. If country A enters a customs union with country B, then country A will buy commodity X from country B (selling at
25), not from country C (selling at 30). The direction of trade has therefore shifted from an originally low-cost non-member country
(country C) to a high-cost member country (country B). This is an example of trade diversion.
Therefore, we can see that the whole customs union issue can be disentangled in the free trade-protection argument. As Salera
(1951, p.84) points out that the main purpose of any customs union is to shift sources of supply. Hence, if this shift is from a high-cost to a
low-cost source, then customs unions are considered a movement towards free trade. If the shift is in the other direction, then customs
union may become a device for making tariff protection more effective. Viner (1950) claimed that trade creation raises the home country's
welfare 3 , while trade diversion lowers it.
Viner (1950) has also made the case that size does matter. He identified economies of scale, where the larger the economic area
of the customs union, the more likely is a customs union to operate in the free trade direction.
Viner's General Conclusion
According to Kreps (1950, p.207) Viner's general conclusion concerning customs union is rather negative. Viner has concluded that
customs unions are unlikely to provide more economic gains than harm, unless strict circumstances prevail. This can be seen from the
following paragraph taken from Viner's book, and cited in Kreps (1950, p.207).
"Customs unions are not important, and are unlikely to yield more economic benefit than harm, unless they are between sizable countries which
practice substantial protection of substantially similar industries"
quoted from Viner (1950, p.135)
This conclusion is supported by the idea that trade-diverting effects of customs union may outweigh their trade-creating effects,
even if the resulting union tariff is lower than the average level of the previous tariff (Martin 1951, p.75). Therefore, Viner in his conclusion
calls for worldwide non-discrimination of trade barriers. Imlah's (1951, p.60) study includes Viner's conclusion on the role of customs
union in raising the economic well-being for the peoples of the world in general as follows:
"… customs union is only a partial, uncertain, and otherwise imperfect mean of doing what a world-wide non-discriminatory reduction of trade
barriers can do more fully, more certainly, and equitably…"
quoted from Viner (1950, p.135)
In a nutshell, Viner's theory basically stipulates that countries are motivated to integrate if integration is likely to produce static
gains more than losses. Or in other words, trade creation more than trade diversion.
2.1.2 Developments made to the Viner Analysis
Many developments have been made to the Viner static analysis of economic integration effects. This sub-section will try to identify the
major developments.
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Trade expansion vs. Trade creation and diversion
According to Hay (1957, p.85), Meade (1955) has admired but criticized Viner's notion of trade diversion where a customs union may
actually lead to misallocation of the world's resources. Meade (1955) argued that Viner's analysis is only true under conditions of inelastic
demand and completely elastic supply. So if demand was allowed to be more elastic, Meade concludes that a customs union may actually
increase the volume of trade even though there is trade diversion. This effect was named "trade expansion" by Meade. Meade (1955)
argues that this effect should be added to the traditional Viner analysis of trade creation and diversion, as trade diversion in this case may
not be that harmful.
Production and Consumption effects of Customs Unions
This point is perhaps the most important contribution to the theory of customs unions. Lipsey (1957, p.40) argues that Viner has concluded
that trade creation in the sense that production shifts from the high-cost source to the low-cost source is considered the "good thing", while
trade diversion is considered the "bad thing" in terms of economic welfare. However, as Lipsey (1957, p.40-41) argues this must not be the
case, as economic welfare includes both production and consumption effects. The Viner analysis has concentrated on the production side
only, neglecting the consumption effect. This is illustrated as follows: when a customs union is formed, relative prices in the domestic
markets of member countries change as a result of the reduction in tariff barriers between them. These price changes have two effects. A
production effect as illustrated by Viner (1950), and secondly, a consumption effect where union members will obviously increase their
consumption of each other's products, while reducing consumption from countries outside the union. According to Sheer (1981, p.44), the
weakness in Viner's analysis was the assumption that consumption is independent of these relative price changes. Therefore, even if world
production is fixed, there will still be some changes in world consumption due to the relative change in prices. Gehrels (1956-1957, p.61)
identified consumption effects as the response of consumers to the drop in import prices caused by the tariff removal.
Studies by Lipsey (1957, p.40; and 1960, p.504) argue that the first effect "production effect of the union" has been taken into
account by Viner, while the second effect "consumption effect of the union" has not. Lipsey (1957, p.40-41; and 1960, p.504) claimed that
Viner's conclusion that trade diversion is a bad thing implies a welfare judgment. However, a welfare judgment in turn requires the
combination of the two effects just mentioned, not only one. Consequently, Lipsey (1957, p.41) concludes that although the Viner
classification of trade creation and trade diversion is fundamental to classify changes in the production effect, it cannot be used to make
judgments regarding the economic welfare of customs unions. This same point of view is shared by Gehrels (1956-1957, p.61), Lipsey
(1960, p.499), and Krauss (1972, p.417).
Another important study by Lipsey (1960, p.504) reviewed the issue of the production effect and consumption effect of customs
unions as argued by Lipsey (1957, p.40) and Gehrels (1956-1957, p.61). The paper reached the conclusion that this distinction is not fully
satisfactory. Viner's analysis, according to the paper, emphasized substitution in production, while ruling out substitution in consumption.
Lipsey (1960, p.504) argued that this distinction is misleading because consumption changes in themselves will stimulate production
changes. Therefore, he suggested that a more satisfactory distinction be made, and that is between "inter-country substitution" and "intercommodity substitution". Inter-country substitution is when one country is substituted by another as Viner's original trade creation and
diversion analysis explains. While, inter-commodity substitution is when one commodity is substituted by another as a result of the relative
price change.
Trade-Diversion and Welfare
Studies by Cooper and Masselll (1965a, p.742), Johnson (1975, p.117), and Pomfret (1997, p.182) summarized the implications of the issue
of production and consumption effects of a customs union in simple words. Johnson (1975, p.117), for example, said that trade-diversion
may actually be welfare-increasing if we take into account both production and substitution effects, in the sense that the welfare losses
resulting from the diversion to a high-cost supplier country may be more than outweighed by the welfare gains resulting from the reduced
prices to consumers due to the elimination of tariff on imports. Pomfret (1997, p.182) argues that this results in increased consumer surplus
whether or not the increased imports were from the least-cost supplier.
Secondary effects
Another development to the Viner study cited in Meade (1955) is the idea that Viner has concentrated his analysis on the effect of tariff
reduction on a single commodity. Meade (1955, p.67-82) according to Hawtrey (1956, p.338) argues that additional welfare may be gained
if we consider the secondary effects on complements and substitute goods. He cites the example of Holland reducing its duty on imports of
beer from Belgium, while the duty on beer from other countries remains unchanged. Meade (1955, p.83) according to Hawtrey (1956,
p.338) argues that one must trace out the repercussions of this tariff reduction of a single commodity on all the quantities of all the products
traded internationally to be able to assess the actual effect of this change on economic welfare of the country.
Small vs. Large Tariff reductions
Another study by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-1957) made an important contribution to the Viner analysis. This study differentiated
between small and large tariff reductions in a customs union. They argue that a small reduction in tariffs must raise welfare, while a large
reduction may raise or lower it. The same view is shared by the studies by Meade (1955, p.50-51) and Lipsey (1960, p.507), and De Melo,
Panagariya, and Rodrik (1993, p. 171-172) which claim that economic welfare is more likely to raise in the case of tariffs being merely
reduced, than being completely removed.
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Gradual Tariff reductions
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-1957, p.21) also dealt with the consequences of reducing tariffs in stages. They concluded that initial stages of
tariff reductions raise welfare, while final stages lower it, depending on the specific assumptions made in that study.
The Terms of Trade effect
Krauss (1972, p.421) argued that studies analyzing the welfare impacts of economic integration so far have assumed that the country at
question is a small country with no effect on world prices. However, this may not always be true. If the country is large enough to change
world prices, and if this country levies a tariff, it will reduce the demand for imports and will therefore cause the prices of those imported
goods to fall in world markets relative to its exports, and thus improving its terms of trade. This process is known as the terms of trade
effect. Krauss (1972, p.421) argued that allowing for the terms of trade effect, will dramatically alter the perspective of the analysis.
Integration between Competitive vs. Complementary countries
Viner (1950), Meyer (1956, p.328-330), and Lipsey (1960, p.499) claimed that gains will arise between countries of a union if they are
producing the same commodity. Makower and Morton (1953, p.41) claimed that these gains will be larger the larger is the difference
between the costs at which the same commodity is produced in the countries of the union, under the assumption of fixed demand. Sheer
(1981, p.45) agrees with the above two arguments. Meyer (1956, p.323) defined complementary goods as where the consumption of one
good enhances the satisfaction yielded by the other. While, competitive goods are where the consumption of one good is a substitute for the
other, diminishing the satisfaction it can provide. A simple example is cars and petrol, in comparison to blue cars and green cars.
Meade (1955, p.107-111) suggested that a customs union may be welfare increasing if the partner countries are actually
competitive but potentially complementary, if the initial tariff levels were very high, and if each partner is the principle supplier to the other
partner of the traded products (Hillmann 1957, p.492; and Sheer 1981, p.45).
Trade between countries of similar vs. different levels of income
On one hand, the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model of factor-proportions states that a country will have a comparative advantage in – tend to
export – those products which require factors of production that are relatively abundant and therefore relatively cheap within its borders.
The factor-price equalization theorem originating from the H-O model argued that countries with different factor endowments and at
different levels of development (different per capita income) are expected to trade with each other the most, and that the prices of the
factors of production will tend to converge between the two countries after trade or integration occurs.
On the other hand, Linder (1961, p.87-90), according to Auten (1962, p.53-54), Kravis (1963, p.184-185), Watkins (1963, p.122),
and Sakamoto (1969, p.298-301), argued that the H-O model although holding true for natural-resource intensive products such as
agriculture, does not hold for manufacturing products as data on the flows of foreign trade reveal. Linder then argues that a country cannot
enjoy a comparative advantage in any good without it being produced or demanded for the domestic market first. Therefore, it follows that
if comparative advantage is related to demand preferences; trade should most likely occur between countries of similar demand structures.
Linder (1961, p.110-117), according to Bhagwati (1962, p.517) and Kravis (1963, p.185), argued that per capita income may be considered
an index of consumption preferences or a primary determinant of demand structures. Therefore, Linder's main conclusion is that countries
with similar per capita incomes (similar demand) would develop similar industries, and that they would enjoy more trade potential with one
another in similar but differentiated products (Linder 1961; and Kemp 1965, p.200).
The above debate was mainly cited in international trade literature, rather than in economic integration literature. Sakamoto
(1969, p.300-301) made an interesting contribution to Linder's hypothesis in this respect, by applying it specifically to the case of economic
integration. As countries integrate, markets are enlarged, and in order that a country may benefit from economies of scale, its product must
be demanded in the new member country of the union. Therefore, similarity of demand preferences, proxied by similarity of per capita
income, is an important element in the success of economic integration efforts. In other words, the Linder hypothesis suggests that similar
demand structures determine trade in manufacturing goods rather than differences in supply side factors (i.e. H-O's factor endowments).
To conclude, countries should enjoy more trade potential if they have similar per capita incomes according to the Linder
hypothesis, or different per capita incomes according to the comparative advantage theory or the H-O model.
Intra-industry trade vs. Inter-industry trade
Intra-industry trade (IIT) differs from inter-industry trade. Intra-industry trade refers to trade between two countries of products belonging
to the same industry, while Inter-industry trade refers to trade between two countries of products of different industries. A distinction has
also been made between horizontal IIT (where goods are differentiated by attributes) and vertical IIT (where goods are differentiated by
quality).
Pelzman (1978, p.297), and Zdenek and Greenway (1984, p.444) argued that the traditional customs unions theory concluded that
inter-industry specialization is what drives trade integration. However, recent empirical studies have concluded that intra-industry
specialization is the driving force. For example, Menon and Dixon (1995, p.19) empirically proved that IIT has contributed to more than
half the growth of trade between Australia and New Zealand on average during the period 1986-1991. Likewise, a study by Koçyigit and
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Sen (2007, p.80-81) concluded that Turkey's pattern of external trade with the EU has been increasingly of the IIT type after the formation
of the customs union agreement between them in 1996.
This debate although important, is not the intention of this study. What is important to us here is the link between per capita
income and the pattern of trade.
Linking Per capita income with the Pattern of trade
Studies dating back to Lancaster (1980), Greenway (1981), and Zdenek and Greenway (1984, p.445-448) concluded that the greater the
overlap of preferences in demand (similarity of per capita income) between potential trade partners, the greater the scope for intra-industry
trade. Furthermore, recent studies such as Clark and Stanley (1999, p.91) have also concluded that intra-industry trade tends to fall between
countries having different factor endowments proxied by differences in per capita income.
Therefore, to bring the above debate to a close, one can conclude that the impact of per capita income on trade is not settled in the
literature. On one hand, the Linder hypothesis states that intra-industry trade should increase when countries have similar per capita
income. On the other hand, comparative advantage theory states that inter-industry should increase when countries have dissimilar per
capita incomes. Therefore, the increase or decrease in trade flows between member countries of a union will be determined by the similarity
of per capita income and the pattern of trade; whether it follows the lines of inter-industry or intra-industry trade.
Other Contributions to the Viner analysis
Other contributions to the theory of customs unions include Lipsey (1960, p.508-509), Spraos (1964), and Bhagwati (1971). Lipsey (1960,
p.508-509), for example, reached two rather interesting conclusions. The first is that given a country's volume of international trade, a
customs union will more likely produce welfare gains the higher is the proportion of trade with its partner in the union, and the lower the
proportion with the rest of the world. The second is that countries most likely to benefit from economic integration are those making a high
proportion of their total expenditure on domestic trade. Or in other words, the lower the volume of foreign trade as a percentage of the
countries' GDP.
Conclusion of theoretical developments to the Viner analysis
Finally, an important note to emphasize is that developments made to Viner's theory of customs unions have all generally concluded that
there is no possible direct answer to whether a customs union increases world welfare or not. Meade (1955) has summarized it all when he
wrote the following:
"Our main conclusion must be that it is impossible to pass judgment upon customs union in general. They may or may not be instruments for
leading to a more economic use of resources. It all depends upon the particular circumstances of the case"
quoted from Meade (1955), as in Rosseaux (1957, p.75)
2.2. New Economic Integration Theories
The best way to start discussion of this sub-section is to present the following conclusion from Hasson's (1962) study:
"Static analysis of trade division and trade creation is insufficient"
quoted from Hasson (1962, p.614).
Why is static analysis of PTAs insufficient?
Krauss (1972, p.417-419) argued that studies by Viner (1950, p.135) and Cooper and Massell (1965a, p.743) have concluded that a nonpreferential tariff policy (free trade) is superior to customs unions as a trade liberalizing device. In other words, these studies have
concluded that the argument that the reason behind forming customs unions is a better allocation of resources is no longer valid. Therefore,
one should stop analyzing the welfare impacts of customs union using static effects. As a result, Balassa (1962), and Cooper and Massell
(1965a, p.743) have introduced another tool (dynamic effects) into the analysis of the welfare effects of economic integration, as a more
efficient economic reason or rationale behind the formation of customs unions or economic integration schemes in general.
Likewise, Sheer (1981, p.53) concluded that the main theorem of international economics was that free trade in competitive
markets ensures production and consumption efficiency in each country and for the whole world. The trend towards forming PTAs –
guided by the static analysis of PTAs in terms of trade creation and trade diversion – was first regarded as a movement toward free trade,
and a tool for increasing real income. This has proved wrong during the years. Therefore, Sheer (1981, p.53) concluded that static analysis
of economic integration theory provides no simple maxims or principle, and that it is the dynamic analysis of economic integration that has
to be stressed.
Dynamic vs. Static analysis of integration
Balassa (1962), and Cooper and Massell (1965a, p.743) were perhaps the first to ever introduce the concept of dynamic effects of economic
integration. This analysis added a new dimension to this area of study. Balassa's dynamic theory of economic integration proved that the
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static analysis in terms of trade creation and trade diversion is simply not enough to fully capture or analyze welfare gains from economic
integration.
According to Allen (1963. p.451), Balassa (1962) listed the principle dynamic effects of integration as large-scale economies,
technological change, as well as the impact of integration on market structure and competition, productivity growth, risk and uncertainty,
and investment activity. The same view is shared by Kreinin (1963, p.193). According to Brada and Mendez (1988, p.163-164) integration
is assumed to raise investment and reduce risks. This can be explained by the fact that a larger market will raise the expected return on
investments and reduce uncertainty by enabling firms to lower their costs as a result of increased economies of scale, and a bigger pool of
consumers. Schiff and Winters (1998, p.179) summarized the definition of the dynamic effects of economic integration schemes as
anything that affects the country's rate of economic growth over the medium term.
Old Regionalism vs. New Regionalism
A number of recent studies have referred to the static effects and developments of the theory of economic integration so far (Viner and
developments) as "old regionalism", while "new regionalism" is represented by dynamic effects such as increased competition, investment
flows, economies of scale, technology transfer, and improved productivity. (Sheer 1981, p.47; El-Agra 1988; De Melo and Panagariya
1993, p.17; Fernandez 1997, p.6; Lawrence 1997, p.19-24; Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2003, p.3; UNCTAD 2007, p.54).
Bhagwati (1993, p.28-31) referred to the same processes as "first regionalism" and "second regionalism". Goldstein (2002, p.11) argues
that integration agreements are now about much more than merely reducing tariffs and quotas.
Lawrence (1997, p.19) made a simple comparison between old and new regionalism as in the following table.
Table 2. Regionalism: The old and the new
Old Regionalism
Import substitution
Planned allocation of resources
Led by governments
Mainly industrial products
New Regionalism
Export orientation
Market allocation of resources
Led by private firms
All goods, services and investment
Source: Lawrence (1997, p.19)
Current forces driving integration
It is now obvious that new regional integration theories have emerged with the changing of economic environments and conditions.
Lawrence (1997, p.18) pointed out that the forces driving the current integration developments differ radically from those driving previous
waves of regionalism. Issues of private sector participation, competition, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the increased importance of
services all contributed to changing the scenes from those that prevailed during the Viner and following near period.
Economies of Scale
Corden (1972, p.465) first introduced the concept of economies of scale into the customs union theory. Economies of scale – reductions in
inputs per unit of output – result from the efficient use of factors of production at large outputs. Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975, p.38) argue
that small markets increase costs, limit the extent of product specialization, reduce competition, and lessen the incentives for technological
improvements.
Investment creation and Investment diversion
Studies by Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1995), and Dunning and Robson (1998) introduced the concepts of investment creation and
diversion as an extension of Viner's theory. Studies by and Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland (1995), and Dee and Gali (2003), Kalotay (2007)
applied these concepts to the case of the European Union.
When investment barriers are removed, investment creation according to Dee and Gali (2003, p.7) is the case when production is
moved from a high-cost source to a lower-cost source in the union. Investment diversion occurs when production is moved from a low-cost
non-member country to a higher-cost member country of the union as a result of the PTA.
Increased importance of Private sector participation
An interesting fact according to Lawrence (1997, p.19), is that the current wave of regionalism or integration is actually supported by
private firms. This can be seen from the case of the NAFTA, where the US Chamber of Commerce in the USA, and the Canadian
Manufacturers Association in Canada were the main supporters of the conclusion of this trade agreement.
Increased importance of Services
The world services sector has been booming both in terms of contribution to world trade and world GDP. As figure (1) shows, the share of
the services sector to world GDP has been steadily increasing over the last three decades from nearly 50% of world GDP in the 1970s to
nearly 70% in the 2000s. Likewise, services exports have dramatically increased from nearly $185 bn in 1975 to nearly $2,768 bn in 2006.
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Figure 1. The Importance of the Services Sector to Trade and GDP (1971-2006)
Source: WDI online
Moreover, Lawrence (1997, p.20) argued that FDI in services has been growing more rapidly than in goods. As manufacturing
firms move to other countries, other services firms providing complementary inputs and services such as banking, advertising, and
transporting also accompany them. The rising importance of the services sector has significantly changed the world economic environment
and created new incentives of integration.
Increased importance of Foreign Direct Investment
Direct investment according to Ethier (1998, p.1150) is nowadays much more prominent, and is growing faster than trade. Foreign direct
investments are nowadays considered a major incentive of integration between countries, especially if integration is between developing
countries, because of its link with two important variables; exports and economic growth.
Lawrence (1997, p.19-20) argued that foreign investment and exports are increasingly becoming complementary activities, and
that the relation between them may work in both ways. Some argue that FDI can lead to better economic integration benefits in terms of
trade expansion, while others argue that economic integration can lead to more FDI flows to the region. Regarding the former, Shams
(2003, p.3) claimed that FDI can boost market-driven integration schemes, as they create more scope for mutual trade and increase the
degree of market interpenetration. Regarding the latter, Inotai (1991, p.38) claimed that the formation of an economic integration scheme
by itself may lead to increased FDI flows to the integrated region as a whole.
Regarding the link between FDI and economic growth, studies have proved that increased investments and more rapid
technological change as a result of integration may significantly contribute to the economic growth of member countries. This argument
can be especially important to the case of developing countries, where FDI can be thought of as a route through which developing countries
can modernize (Schiff and Winters 1998, p.180). For example, Brada and Mendez (1998, p.163) concluded that these dynamic effects of
the free trade area between the countries of Latin America (LAFTA) led to an increase of 1.09% in these countries GNP in 1977.
Conclusion of the New (Dynamic) Theories of Economic Integration
First of all, we have seen that whether it is called old and new regionalism, or first wave and second wave of regionalism, they all refer to
static and dynamic effects of economic integration. Current Studies have concluded that dynamic effects of economic integration have
recently emerged as a result of recent changes that are shaping the world economy today. However, some analysts have argued that
economic integration theories - especially those of the Viner period - may be irrelevant to the case of developing countries. This issue is the
primary concern of the following section.
3.
Theories of Economic Integration for Developing Countries
Balassa (1965, p.16) argued that the theoretical literature of economic integration has dealt almost exclusively with customs union among
industrialized countries. These countries problems are not of economic development, but with relative marginal adjustments in production
and consumption patterns. A number of studies have, consequently, repudiated the standard customs union theory, and rejected the
traditional trade creation, trade diversion analysis. Studies by Meier (1960), Abdel Jaber (1971, p.256), and Andic, Andic and Dosser
(1971, p.25) have argued that the Viner analysis of economic integration has limited relevance, if any, to the case of developing countries.
Therefore, new theories of economic integration adjusted to the special needs of developing countries have emerged following
the Viner period. Studies most cited in the literature include Allen (1961), Brown (1961), Bhambri (1962), El-Naggar (1964), Cooper and
Massell (1965b), Mikesell (1965), Chou (1967), Kahnert et al (1969), and Andic, Andic and Dosser (1971).
In short, Makower and Morton (1953, p.33) and Abdel Jaber (1971, p.260) argued that traditional economic integration theory
has attempted to answer the two following questions:
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1.
What is the effect of economic integration on world welfare?
2.
What are the factors that affect the desirability of economic integration?
From a developing country point of view, we will discuss the limitations of the answer to the first question in sub-section one,
and the limitations of the answer to the second question in sub-section two. Sub-section three will stress the importance of other factors
affecting the desirability of economic integration between developing countries.
3.2. Limitations of the Production effects
Mikesell (1965, p.205-229) argued that although developments made by Lipsey (1957, p.40; and 1960, p.504) to the traditional theory of
economic integration in the sense that production effects are not sufficient to judge the welfare impact of economic integration, there are
further limitations to this analysis if one looks at it from a developing country perspective.
Employment and productivity effects
It is established that in most developing countries, there exists a situation of generally low productivity, plus mounting unemployment.
Therefore, if trade diversion occurs and moves labor from low-productive to high-productive sectors or activities, it will increase welfare.
In the case of unemployment, the gain in welfare will be more obvious (Demas 1965, p.87, Sakamoto 1969, p.283). Therefore, according to
Abdel Jaber (1971, p.259), welfare impacts of economic integration among developing countries should not be confined to production and
consumption effects only, but should also include employment, productivity, and income effects.
The need for a development perspective
A number of studies have argued that economic integration in the case of developing countries should be treated as an approach to
economic development, not as a tariff issue (Andic, Andic and Dosser 1971, p.25; Abdel Jaber 1971, p.256; Balassa and Stoutjesdijk 1975,
p.45; Axline 1977, p.83; and Khazeh and Clark 1990, p.317). Furthermore, Robertson (1970, p.771) in his review of Kahnert et al (1969)
argued that integration theory has been merely concerned with the benefits of better resource allocation, whereas development is concerned
with the benefits of faster growth in the long run and the employment of idle or under-utilized resources.
Shams (2003, p.31) presented a case study of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and concluded that the
utmost purpose of regional integration in that region is the economic development of its members as its name reveals, rather than forming
different degrees of PTAs. Member countries of SADC since its origins in the 1970s have been focusing their efforts on implementing
certain development projects such as alleviating poverty, promoting health and education, and combating HIV/AIDS, rather than reducing
tariffs and promoting intra-regional trade.
Changing pattern of trade with developed countries
Mikesell (1965, p.209) made another important point. He argued that most imports of developing countries from developed countries are
capital goods. From a dynamic point of view, integration among developing countries will require larger investments. Since an already
large part of this investment is imported from developed countries as capital goods, the level of imports of integrated developing countries
might then increase. Mikesell (1965, p.209) concluded that the long-run objective of integration between developing countries should not
be to decrease trade with the rest of the world, but rather to change its pattern over time.
Another way of looking at this issue is based on the assumption that an important factor of the determinants of the level of actual
imports of most developing countries is their level or availability of foreign exchange. Therefore, according to Kitamura (1966, p.50),
Mikesell (1965, p.209), and Sakamoto (1969, p.293) if trade diversion occurs as a result of integration between developing countries in
consumer goods, this would release more foreign exchange to be directed to more imports of capital goods from the outside (developed)
world. Once again, on balance the volume of trade with the outside world may not change, or in fact it may increase, but the important
thing is that the pattern of this trade will change.
The importance of being unimportant
Kreinin (1964, p.193-194) claimed that potential gains from economic integration are especially pronounced in small and medium-sized
member countries. This can be explained by the fact that if integration or trade in general takes place between a small country and a larger
one – whether they are developing or developed countries - the small country will tend to gain more because its exports will now be
demanded by a larger pool of consumers. This will be especially relevant to the case of a small developing country if it integrates with a
larger developed country with higher purchasing power.
Benefits of trade diversion
A number of studies have claimed that trade diversion may actually be beneficial in the case of developing countries (Bhambri 1962, p.245;
Demas 1965, p.87-88; Chou 1967, p.354; and Sakamoto 1969, p.297). First, it will enlarge the size of the market and help reduce costs due
to economies of scale. Second, import substitution over a wider area will enable the integrated region as a whole to spend higher
proportions of its foreign exchange on imports of capital goods, therefore contributing to increased levels of investment and economic
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growth (Linder 1966, p.39, Sakamoto 1969, p.283, and Axline 1977, p.85). Another argument for trade diversion is that it will allow
consumers to purchase imports at lower prices after the removal of tariffs, thus increasing consumer surplus. However, as Elkan (1975,
p.59) argues, this has to be weighed against the tariff revenue lost in this process. This may be of special importance to developing
countries, as most of them rely on tariff revenue as a principle source of overall government revenue.
Efficient Trade Diversion
Linder (1966) and Sakamoto (1969, p.297) introduced an interesting term; that is efficient trade diversion. They argue that if economic
integration between a group of developing countries occurs and leads to trade diversion, it must not be welfare reducing. The shift in
production will occur from an efficient developed country (third country) to the relatively efficient developing country member within the
new union, putting aside the expected employment and income effects.
Protection for Industrial development
Viner (1950, p.41-49) and Meyer (1956, p.330) have argued that a customs union, or more generally economic integration, may be
sometimes regarded as a step towards free trade, or sometimes a step towards more protection. Some studies dealing with the case of
developing countries in particular have argued that protection may be beneficial. For example, Cooper and Masselll (1965b, p.462) and
Sakamoto (1969, p.304) claimed that the principle objective of any integration scheme among developing countries should be to foster
industrial development, which can be economically achieved through protection. This is because protection resulting from economic
integration is, according to Sakamoto (1969, p.283-284), Axline (1977, p.84) and Andic, Andic, and Dosser (1971, p.16), the equivalent of
import substitution on a wider scale, which is an important tool of industrial development. Cooper and Masselll (1965b, p.468) concluded
that the evaluation of the impact of a customs union on a member country must take into account not only the changes in each country's
national income, but also the changes in each country's size of industrial sector.
Although the analysis of Cooper and Masselll (1965b) has been based on the assumption that integration takes place between a
North developed country and a South developing country, one can still make conclusions relevant to the case of two developing countries
entering a union. If two developing countries enter a union and trade diversion occurs in industrial products, welfare in terms of
consumption will increase as prices will decrease after the tariff removal. While, welfare in terms of production will decrease – welfare
meaning the efficient use of resources - because production is now shifted towards one of the two inefficient developing countries in the
union compared to the outside efficient world. However, this trade diversion in industrial products, plus a common external tariff that
protects their domestic industries, may lead to the development of the industrial sectors in the two countries. This case will be especially
beneficial if the two developing countries are complementary, because this will mean that each country will expand its industrial production
to supply the other's market (inferred from Cooper and Masselll 1965b, p.475).
An important note, however, has to be made in this regard. Hansen (1969, p.257) and Elkan (1975, p.59-68) argued that the fruits
of industrial development pertaining to the developing countries as a result of integration may be unequally distributed among member
countries of the union. Elkan (1975, p.59) calls this "backwash", where a large proportion of the economic benefits of integration are
concentrated in one or few member countries. Elkan (1975, p.68), and Axline (1977, p.86-87) argue that the economically weaker and
geographically remote member countries tend to benefit less than their counterparts in the union.
The Training Ground Theory
The above argument that favors protection for the sake of stimulating industrial development in economic integration schemes of
developing countries is more thoroughly discussed or theorized in what is called the "Training Ground Theory". This theory, according to
Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.4), Inotai (1991, p.6-7), and Inotai (1997, p.529), depends on the hypothesis that during the first phase
of integration between developing countries, international competitiveness of developing countries can be gradually improved by relying
on the regional market in the first phase of industrialization. Free trade among member countries plus the usually high common external
tariff on imports from the outside world should provide temporary protection of infant industries as well as a sufficient large market for
future industrial development. This process - termed "import-substituting industrialization" by Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.4) - will secure
sufficient time for the development of the industrial sectors of the member developing countries. Entrance or openness to world markets
may then come at a later stage after developing countries have reached a reasonable degree of efficiency and technical development. Thus,
economic integration among developing countries may be considered as a transitional period or a stepping stone towards open competition
with the outside world after a short period of learning or training; hence the name training ground theory.
Despite the theoretical soundness of this theory, a study by Inotai (1991, p.7) presented some arguments against its actual
implementation. This study argued that (a) developing regional markets created were in many cases not large enough to allow industrial
development or economy of scale advantages, (b) little or no actual structural upgrading took place as a consequence of the gradual
learning process, and (c) there are wide differences in the pattern and nature of demand and tastes of extra versus intra-regional trade.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that developing countries will eventually commit themselves to opening or liberalizing trade with the
rest of the world. Eventually, protection instead of being temporary may actually become permanent.
The Static vs. Dynamic approach
A number of studies have suggested that emphasis should be put on dynamic rather than static effects in evaluating the desirability of
economic integration among developing countries (Sakamoto 1969, p.283-284; Abdel Jaber 1971, p.256; Axline 1977, p.85; and Khazeh
and Clark 1990, p.318). Moreover, Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.3-4) argues that the traditional theory of economic integration, centered on the
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static effects of resource allocation, suggest that there is little scope of benefits accruing to developing countries from economic integration.
The paper therefore concludes that the basic rationale for economic integration among developing countries should be a dynamic one.
Furthermore, Abdel Jaber (1971, 264-265) argued that the production effects of the simple static analysis are concerned with
changes in the production mix on a given production possibility frontier (PPF). Changes in production of goods being traded in the union
will occur at a higher or lower point on the PPF. Demas (1965, p.85-86) and Abdel Jaber (1971, p.265) claimed that the traditional
economic integration theory relies heavily on the neo-classical assumptions of full employment, perfect competition, constant returns to
scale, and perfect mobility of factors of production, therefore its analysis was confined to the study of static effects of economic integration.
Meanwhile, Kitamura (1966, p.55-56) and Mikesell (1965, p.206), according to Abdel Jaber (1971, p.265), concluded that dynamic effects
of economic integration are far more important than static effects. Dynamic effects of economic integration may lead to higher rates of
growth and exploitation of unused economic capacities, which in turn may lead to shifting the PPF itself. Obviously, larger gains of
integration will be achieved if the whole PPF is shifted outwards, rather than movements along the PPF itself.
An obvious drawback, however, of the dynamic approach in comparison to the static approach of estimating the welfare effects of
economic integration is that no reliable method exists to quantify dynamic effects, unlike static effects.
Economies of Scale
Developing countries in general are known to be specialized in primary products. Abdel Jaber (1971, p.256-257) argued that there's nothing
wrong with specialization in primary products, if the economic surplus from the primary sector could be redistributed or reinvested
productively to other sectors. However, as these assumptions are far from reality, developing countries have advocated a policy of
diversification and import substitution to different extents in an attempt to accelerate economic growth. However, according to Demas
(1965, p.36), balanced growth can be achieved by small developing countries by increasing the size of the market, benefiting from
economies of scale, and expanding their inter-industry transactions. Demas (1965, p.36), as reviewed by Villamil (1966, p.213) and
Yotopoulos (1967, p.246), therefore argued that economic development can be attained to developing countries through economic
integration. A study by Pearson and Ingram (1980, p.1006-1007) on the gains from industrial integration between Ghana and the Ivory
Coast reaffirms this conclusion.
International competitiveness
We have argued that developing countries, in the past, have pursued economic integration based on arguments such as the benefits of trade
diversion, the benefits of import-substituting industrialization, and the training ground theory. Then, with the introduction of the concepts
of dynamic effects of integration, developing countries started to base their arguments for integration on issues like economies of scale and
investment creation. Nowadays, new initiatives of economic integration between developing countries, according to Rueda-Junquera (2006,
p.8), go beyond these previous arguments. Most developing countries are now adopting trade liberalization and deregulation policies, as
part of their overall stabilization and adjustment programs as agreed with international organizations. This recent approach aims at making
economic integration policies compatible with, and complementary to, other policies to enhance international competitiveness in general.
Therefore, developing countries are now looking at economic integration schemes as an instrument for a more competitive insertion into
the global economy.
3.3. Limitations of the Factors affecting the desirability of Economic Integration
Traditional economic integration theory has depended on a number of factors to reach the conclusion that net static effects determine the
welfare impacts of integration. Based on these factors, according to Abdel Jaber (1971, p.261), some generalizations about the desirability
of economic integration have been concluded.
Competitiveness and Complementarity
We recall that Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1960, p.499) suggested that more benefits of economic integration will accrue to competitive
countries (countries producing similar products) than to complementary countries (countries producing dissimilar products). Makower and
Morton (1961, p.35) added that these gains of integration will be larger the larger the cost differences of producing the same good in the
potential member countries of a union.
This analysis tends to be in favor of developing countries, as most developing countries specialize in exports of primary products,
therefore developing countries may be said to be competitive in the Vinerian way. Although this is true, the fact that most of these exports
are targeted at developed country markets hinders the benefits of economic integration between developing countries because it may not
actually expand their levels of intra-trade (El-Naggar 1964, p.13-14). However, as argued by Abdel Jaber (1971, p.261), the category of
primary products itself is too large, and once disaggregated, potential benefits may arise. Therefore, Balassa (1965, p.25) argued that the
previous understanding of the criterion of competitiveness and complementarity is not at all relevant to the case of developing countries. In
fact, Mikesell (1965, p.212) claimed that developing countries should aim at reaching a substantial degree of complementarity between
them.
More recently, papers like Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.68), Inotai (1991, p.5-6), and Shams (2003, p.2) have continued to
argue that complementarity or dissimilarity of economic structures would be better to the case of economic integration among developing
countries. Greenway and Milner (1990, p.59), for example, argue that one significant problem of the poor trade and integration
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performance between South-South countries is that they are at comparable stages of development and therefore have comparable
production structures. A union among similar (competitive) countries assumes that trade will come from intra-industry specialization. Such
trade expansion has been evident in the case of developed industrialized countries, where market size and incomes may support such
specialization. However, this is obviously less possible in the case of smaller poorer markets that characterize developing country markets.
Therefore, a union among dissimilar (complementary) countries is encouraged.
Size of the union
Traditional theory suggests that the bigger the size of the countries entering the union, the larger the benefits of economic integration.
Abdel Jaber (1971, p.262) argues that if we take GNP as a measure of economic size, developing countries' gains from integration will
definitely be small or even negligible. However, as Balassa (1961, p.38) argues the gains of economic integration do not only depend on the
size of the union, but also on the rate at which it increases. And since most developing countries are growing at higher rates than already
developed countries, developing countries can still benefit largely from integration based on this criterion. Furthermore, if we take the size
of the union to mean population size, developing countries will surely benefit from integration as they are usually over populated.
Proportion of trade with member countries
As we have previously shown in section two of this paper, Lipsey (1960, p.508-509) argued that a customs union will more likely produce
welfare gains the higher is the proportion of trade with its partner in the union, and the lower the proportion with the rest of the world. It is
established that trade between developing countries over the years has always been rather small in comparison to trade between developed
countries, implying that welfare gains of economic integration between developing countries will tend to be small.
However, studies by Balassa (1965, p.32-34), Bhambri (1962, p.237-238), and Abdel Jaber (1971, p.263) argue that this
implication should not be taken as given. These studies list several factors that limit trade between developing countries, and claim that if
these obstacles are removed, trade is likely to increase between developing countries entering a trade agreement. These factors include (a)
low level of economic development, (b) inadequate transport facilities, (c) foreign exchange controls and other import restrictions, (d)
inadequate marketing, and (e) absence of standardized specifications.
The setting of growing regional trade as a target
It is widely agreed that the best indicator of a successful economic integration agreement is the growing level or share of intra or interregional trade to total trade of the member countries. Although this is an important aspect of integration, Inotai (1991, p.10) argues that it
should not be the only target. Other targets such as joint industrial development and establishment of infrastructural links are of equal
importance. Furthermore, growing regional trade may actually be the result of trade diversion from other more efficient, more competitive
external countries. Therefore, growing regional trade can be seen as a positive development only if it is accompanied by improvements in
its overall competitiveness in world markets.
3.4. Other factors affecting the desirability of Economic Integration
This sub-section aims at identifying factors that have been cited in the traditional economic integration theory, and are of particular
importance to the case of developing countries. Factors that need special elaboration include initial tariff rates, volume of foreign trade as a
percentage of GDP, transport costs, coordination of macro-economic policies, and the package approach.
Initial tariff rates
As we can recall, Meade (1955) and Hillmann (1957, p.492) have suggested that the higher the initial tariff rates between countries entering
a customs union, the larger are the expected gains of economic integration between these countries. This point is of special relevance to the
case of developing countries, because initial domestic tariffs of most developing countries are quite high, either due to revenue or
protection purposes.
Volume of Foreign trade as a percentage of GDP
As we have previously shown in section two of this paper, Lipsey (1960, p.508-509) argued that a customs union will more likely produce
welfare gains, the lower is the percentage of foreign trade to the member countries' GDP. This factor is especially important for developing
countries because, as fig. (2) shows, trade as a percentage of GDP of low income groups has always been lower than that of high income
country groups, although this ratio has increased in the past few years.
This observation, however, has to be taken with caution because both middle income country groups and LDCs have trade
percentages of GDP higher than that of the high income group. We can therefore conclude that this criterion has no definite final
implication, as sub-groups within developing countries may have higher or lower ratios of trade to GDP than do high income groups.
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Figure 2. Trade as a percentage of GDP in selected country groups
Source: WDI Online
Distance or Transport costs
Transport costs tend to diminish the potential gains from trade integration between any set of countries. Moreover, Clark and Stanley
(1999, p.91) have concluded that distance negatively influences intra-industry trade in particular. This is especially important for the case of
developing countries entering into trade agreements with each other for at least two reasons. The first is that the Linder hypothesis as
previously discussed states that countries with similar per capita incomes tend to depend on intra-industry trade. The second is that
transport facilities in general are relatively poor, or even absent. However, some transport infrastructure for trade purposes may exist in
developing countries, but as Bhambri (1962, p.338) argues these facilities were originally designed to encourage the transport of exports of
primary products of developing countries to the industrialized countries of Europe and North America. Thus, as Balassa (1965, p.31) argues
transport costs between two neighboring developing countries may be actually higher than between one of them and a remote developed
country. This point needs to be taken with careful consideration when discussing economic integration between developing countries, and
that's why Abdel Jaber (1971, p.262) suggests that the issue of improvement of existing transport facilities should be included and
emphasized in economic integration schemes and preparations between developing countries.
Coordinating macroeconomic policies
A study by Shams (2003, p.9-10) argued that even if all trade prerequisites were present at the conclusion of an economic integration
agreement between developing countries, differences in macroeconomic policies in general plus the lack of coordination between member
countries may be the reason behind limited trade growth between member countries. The study cites the example of MERCOSUR where
the two most important countries, Brazil and Argentina, lacked coordination at the macroeconomic policy level, especially in exchange rate
policy. Therefore, we can see that although Brazil and Argentina satisfied a number of pre-integration desirability factors such as low
transport costs and large market size, they still needed better coordination of macroeconomic policies to achieve full trade potential of
integration. Shams (2003, p.11) therefore concludes that MERCOSUR needs to formulate a common exchange rate policy, in order to
prevent large swings in exchange rates and subsequent lobbying for protection from import-sensitive sectors.
It is worth mentioning that the issue of policy coordination between member countries of a union dates back to Kahnert et al
(1969) and Hirschman (1971, p.22). Hirschman (1971, p.22), for example, argued that in order that trade agreements be durable,
participating countries should try to uniform their internal monetary and foreign exchange policies. He further argues that such a
development might actually be more important in promoting trade between the member countries than the customs preferences themselves.
De Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik (1993, p. 176-177) further argue that such required coordination is not confined to these policies alone,
but can be extended to include industrial policies, environmental policies, and social and welfare policies as well.
Lorenz (1992, p.86) stressed the point that harmonization of policies among member countries of a union may definitely harm
some members more than others, He, therefore, stresses the importance of adjustment and compensating policies in this regard.
The Package Approach
According to Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975, p.53), this approach specifically and explicitly aims at facilitating the integration process and
enhancing the stability of an integration agreement by assuring that each member country is responsible for a single integration project
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from a package of such projects. Integration projects may include transportation, communication, public utilities, education and research,
agriculture, or mining and industry.
An important condition for the successful application of the package approach, however, is that comprehensive information
regarding the distribution of benefits and costs of each project on each member country should be available. Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975,
p.54) argue that although this approach may seem plausible, problems such as financing, monitoring and controlling may arise.
4.
The Political Determinants of Economic Integration
The study of the political determinants or incentives of economic integration is indispensable. Allen (1963, p.450) has argued that Balassa's
(1961) pioneering book on the theory of economic integration has ignored the political, and other non-economic, aspects of integration,
despite its obvious concreteness of the subject. One cannot deny that both elements of integration - economic and political - are closely
connected and interrelated. Ezenwe (1978, p.158) argued that economic integration must be seen as part of a process in which the final
outcome will be essentially determined by political factors. Grossman and Helpman (1994, p.833) said that "politics" is the answer to the
question of why free trade is so often preached but rarely practiced. Allen (1963, p.450) further says that:
"…. It is not really possible to separate the economic from the political elements of integration. Economic losses and gains from
integration are in some cases systematically related to political factors…".
quoted from Allen (1963, p.450)
Political officials are the ones who eventually sign economic integration agreements. Therefore, political motives and incentives
are vital determinants to their conclusion. Some studies, for example World Bank (2000, p.11) have argued that the purpose of integration
is often political, and that the economic consequences – good or bad – are the side effects of the political decision. This section will discuss
political factors or determinants of economic integration of general importance in sub-section one. Sub-section two will concentrate on the
political factors of specific importance to developing countries. Finally, sub-section three will relate the political and economic
determinants of economic integration together.
4.1. Political factors of General Importance
A number of studies have identified a number of factors that can act as political incentives or disincentives of economic integration (Haas
1958; Inotai 1991; Moravcsik 1991; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; and World Bank 2000). This sub-section will discuss the
political incentives of economic integration that are of general importance to all countries.
International Negotiations
Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.9) argued that one of the possible gains of integration is the ability of the member countries to extract
better terms if they bargain together in international negotiations. This same view of increased bargaining power as an incentive to
integration is shared by Kitamura (1966), Inotai (1991, p.37), De Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik (1993, p. 174-175), Fernandez (1997, p.2223), World Bank (2000, p.17-21), and Schiff and Winters (2003, p.180-183). Recent Studies have argued that Western European countries,
for example, have been able to cut out better deals with the USA in their position as members of the European Community, than would
have been possible if they had dealt individually with the USA. Likewise, the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) managed to control oil supply and prices in international negotiations.
Interest group support
Numerous studies have argued that public officials may enter into trade agreements to gain support of certain interest groups/lobbies,
whether export-oriented or import-competing sectors, or others such as certain labor unions or those responsible for fiscal sustainability
fearing import duty losses (Axline 1977, p.89; Lorenz 1992, p.86; Grossman and Helpman 1994, p.833 and 1995, p.670; Levy 1997,
p.506); Krishna 1998, p.227; Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998, p.577; Schiff and Winters 1998, p.188; Mansfield and Milner 1999, p.603;
World Bank 2000, p.26-27; and Albertin 2008, p.18).
However, as it is almost impossible for a single trade agreement to satisfy all politically potent sectors or players, Grossman and
Helpman (1995, p.680-687) argue that officials may allow for extended periods of adjustment or even exclude sensitive sectors from a trade
agreement in order to successfully implement it. Here we can cite the example of the European Community excluding agriculture, and the
Caribbean Basin Initiative excluding sugar.
A number of studies have considered producers as an interest group as having more political weight or power than consumer
groups (Grossman and Helpman 1995, p.673; Krishna 1998, p.229; World Bank 2000, p.26-27; and Ornelas 2005, p.1476-1477).
According to this argument, one can make two points. First, a PTA in general will be favored politically than free non-preferential trade.
This is because it will limit producers' general exposure to competition maintaining high external protection from the rest of the world
(Grossman and Helpman 1995, p.673-680; Krishna 1998, p.229; and World Bank 2000, p.27). Second, a PTA that is trade-diverting will be
favored politically than a PTA that is trade-creating (Krishna 1998, p.244). This is because producers will be granted a bigger chance of
achieving gains or profits. If producers in a given country were originally producing at low costs (efficient) before integration, then they
will continue to produce and sell to their partner country after integration. But if they were producing at high costs (inefficient) and trade
diversion occurs away from the rest of the world, the tariff reduction after integration will allow them to produce and sell to their partner
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country, gaining a new market share which was previously not there. It follows that the greater the trade diversion, the more likely it is that
politicians will gain support from interest groups such as producers (Krishna, p.229).
An important note, however, needs to be made and that is that politicians must strike a balance between accommodating interest
groups' support and promoting the economic welfare of their countries. Gaining support of certain lobbies although beneficial to politicians,
may not be beneficial to the country's welfare at large.
Regional Leadership
Many articles have emphasized the importance of political leadership in any economic integration initiative (Milne 1974, p.293-294;
Moravcsik 1991, p.23-24). Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.14) argued that the non-clear existence of a regional leader in any regional integration
scheme may be a setback to the whole integration effort. He cites an example of the case of the Central American Common Market, where
the lack of a regional leader has been a main reason behind its weak implementation.
Political Regimes or Institutions
It is quite obvious that countries with different political regimes and institutions will probably face more difficulties in forming effective
PTAs. Mansfield and Milner (1999, p.607) claim that in order for a PTA to succeed, substantial institutional heterogeneity is needed. This
is why, according to the authors, the European Community Act has succeeded relative to the integration efforts in Asia where there exists a
wide variation in its countries political regimes. In this regard, a study by Axline (1977, 103-104) suggested that if a large group of
countries established an integration scheme that failed to succeed, a "new start" can include more intensive integration on a less intensive
scale, whereby a smaller group of the former members of the unsuccessful integration scheme may launch a successful integration scheme
of their own. So, if countries in Asia as a whole did not succeed to integrate, a sub-group of Asian countries may stand a better chance of
success.
Legal and Institutional System
A study by Lawrence (1997, p.22-24) introduced the concepts of "shallow integration" and "deep integration". According to this study,
deeper integration is currently becoming more important than simple shallow integration. Shallow integration means that after a trade
agreement is concluded, the only thing changed is the tariff or what he termed "border barriers". However, once tariffs are removed, there
still remain complex problems between the union countries due to different regulatory policies. Deep integration, therefore, refers to the
need to further change "other barriers" such as reconciling different national practices with common rules and supra-national
implementation mechanisms. These national practices according to Lawrence (1997, p.24), De Rosa (1998, p.47), Ethier (1998, p.1152),
Panagariya (1998, p.43), and Pomfret (2005, p.8-10) may include competition policy, product standards, tax policy, administrative
procedures, investment policy, and labor or environmental standards. De Melo and Panagariya (1993, p.17) have described this "second
wave of regionalization" as having an additional focus on the coordination of the whole legal and institutional setup in member countries of
a union.
Hirschman (1971, p.22) made an important note when he argued that the prospect of less freedom in implementation of such
internal policies is precisely what makes governments so skittish about entering into effective trade integration agreements.
This issue of harmonizing domestic policies will be especially important if member countries in the union are of different levels
of development. Panagariya (1998, p.44) argues that the agenda for deep integration is likely to be determined by rich, developed countries
in the union. And it is the smaller, developing countries that will have to adjust their standards to those of the developing countries,
regardless of whether these are appropriate to their conditions.
Political Commitment
Economic integration schemes require strong political commitment on the part of member countries to be able to advance to common
objectives. Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.9) claims that the strong and sustained political commitment of the member countries of the European
Union was the driving force behind its successful evolution. Lack of political commitment, according to Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.14), may
be reflected in governments not complying with commitments signed in the integration agreement, for example not abiding with tariff
reductions, or removing certain sensitive goods or services from the schedule of commitments, or imposing non-tariff restrictions.
Lack of political commitment to the successful conclusion of any integration agreement is an obvious reason of why many
integration schemes have not reached their full potential. Shams (2003, p.16) argues that there are generally two explanations for this
situation. The first is the different political ideologies of member countries as well as their different external alliances. The second
explanation is the question of the distribution of gains of integration. This point was originally provided by Hansen (1969, p.257-263). If
potential gains of integration are unequally distributed and if an adequate compensation mechanism is absent, member countries will not
encourage integration schemes that threaten their sovereignty.
Competitiveness and Complementarity
We have used the same sub-title when we previously discussed the factors affecting economic integration between countries in general and
in developing countries as well. This time we are talking about political complementarity and competitiveness. Haas and Schmitter (1964,
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p.712) argued that complementarity between political elites is an essential factor affecting the success of any economic integration
initiative. Corresponding political groups, for example military men and labor leaders, should think alike and share similar values. In other
words, they should be complementary in their ideals not competitive.
Integration for Security
Study by the World Bank (2000, p.12-16), and Schiff and Winters (2003, p.168-174) argued that many leading economic integration
schemes were originally created to encourage intra-regional security. These studies cite the example of the EU, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN
economic groups. It is argued that increasing trade as a result of integration reduces risks of internal conflict, as cross-national trade
relations and mutual interests are established. Furthermore, Shams (2003, p.15) also argued that the treaty establishing the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) included principles on political cooperation and maintain regional peace and security. The
author claimed that this group is behaving more as a security organization, rather than an economic organization.
Likewise, World Bank (2000, p.16-17) argued that countries may also enter into integration agreements for the sake of extraregional security. Examples are the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 in response to the regional hegemony of
Iran, Iraq, and Israel (Kechichian 1985, p.853-854), and the formation of ASEAN in response of spreading communism in the region.
Religion
A study by Ali (2005, p.1) argued that religion has played a significant role in shaping political, economic, and cultural characteristics of
countries. The same study argues that religion has been an important factor in enhancing cooperation and integration at the national and
global levels. A clear example in this regard is the Protocol on the Preferential Tariff Scheme for TPS-OIC (PRETAS) between the member
countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) comprising all Islamic nations of the world. The incentive behind forming
this agreement is clearly political, as the only criterion that approves a country's membership is the Islamic religion, not any economic
criteria as with other PTAs of the world.
Migration
Schiff and Winters (1998, p.185; and 2003, p.174-175) argue that economic integration agreements between neighboring countries in
particular (regional integration agreements) can reduce the probabilities of illegal border migration and all its associated problems. The
most evident case of this argument is the NAFTA, where one of the most important reasons that led the US to sign this agreement was its
border problems with its less-developed southern neighbor Mexico.
However, as Schiff and Winters (2003, p.175) argue, migration of workers may still take place if the PTA reaches the level of a
common market or economic union where factors become freely mobile between member countries. This is the why the EU required Spain
and Portugal to wait for a transitional period of thirteen years before being granted free access to other EU member's labor markets.
Likewise, this same concern is perhaps one of the reasons why the EU has so far been reluctant to consider Turkish accession seriously.
International Political Economy
According to Schiff and Winters (1998, p.186-187), the term international political economy describes how individual economies make
decisions about their international relations with other countries in terms of political economy. In terms of economic analysis, Mansfield
and Milner (1999, p.610) claim that allies in terms of international politics may be willing to form economic integration arrangements
between themselves that divert trade from their adversaries outside the arrangement, if they believe that by doing so they will create more
economic damage to their foes than to themselves.
Moreover, international political allies forming an economic integration arrangement are unlikely to permit their adversaries to
join the arrangement. This is evident from the case of the European Union which did not allow membership to former states of the Soviet
bloc, until after the end of the cold war and the Warsaw Pact. A second example is that the United States of America's first ever free trade
area was with Israel, its most important ally in the Middle East back in 1985. By 2006, the US concluded FTAs with Morocco, Jordan and
Oman, and negotiations are underway with Egypt. The USA is now thinking of forming a Middle East FTA by 2013 that will basically
include its international political allies in the Middle East region. It is obvious that Iran, for example, is not expected to join this agreement.
This example clearly shows that PTAs are sometimes concluded on political and not economical basis. The US cannot possibly benefit
economically from integration with Israel, because of the lack of nearly all the economic static and dynamic incentives of integration, such
as trade creation or economies of scale. In contrast, a US FTA with Iran may be economically feasible because of Iran's large market and
comparative advantage in a number of exports such as petroleum products. Nevertheless, such an FTA is unmistakably not politically
feasible.
Strategic Interaction
Strategic interaction in the sense that countries tend to form PTAs in response of other countries (usually their political competitors)
forming PTAs is becoming a principle guide to the formation of FTAs (De Melo and Panagariya 1993, p.5-6; Mansfield 1998, p.527; and
Mansfield and Milner 1999, p.614). Countries in East Asia are forming FTAs in response to the USA's NAFTA and Europe's European
Union. Likewise, it has been argued that the EFTA 4 was created in response to the formation of the EEC or European Economic
Community (now the EU). Shams (2003, p.20) cited an example from Africa which is the case of the ECOWAS which enforced the
dominance of Nigeria, and the UEMOA organization being developed to resist the dominance of Nigeria in the region. 5
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4.2. Political factors of Special Importance to Developing Countries
This sub-section will discuss the political incentives of economic integration that are of special importance to developing countries. These
include…..
The Dependency Theory
An important argument that favored protection in economic integration schemes of developing countries, according to Inotai (1991, p.7-8),
is based on the dependency theory. This theory is of special importance to the case of developing countries in specific. It stipulates that
politicians and economists of developing countries may actually encourage economic integration schemes with other developing countries
as a mean of gradually eliminating the historically deep economic and structural dependence of their countries on the developed world.
Economic integration among developing countries, according to Axline (1977, p.86) and Inotai (1991, p.8), is thought to strengthen their
self-reliance, and improve their collective economic and trade position against developed countries.
However, as Inotai (1991, p.8) concluded, this theory has not been so successful, as actual implementation led to increased
inefficiencies, low quality production, and loss of competitiveness. External dependence could not be avoided as developing countries
lacked the required resources, financial flows, and technological and managerial skills. Even trade links with the outside developed world
could not be foregone because it consisted of essential processed manufactured and capital goods which could not be efficiently produced
by developing countries.
The stage of Political entrance
Studies by Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.705-706), and more recently Inotai (1991, p.9-10) argued that economic stakeholders in developed
countries are the ones who originally encourage entrance in economic integration schemes. Only then, do political officials respond with
adequate policy measures. Or in other words, economic integration usually precedes political integration. Political integration according to
Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.709) means "any arrangement under which existing nation states cease to act as autonomous decision-making
units with respect to an important range of policies". Examples include the European Union and the Central American Common Market
(CACM).
The complete opposite, according to Inotai (1991, p.9-10), is what usually happens in developing countries. Economic integration
between developing countries is often derived from political concepts and efforts, and is then forced to work on economically insufficiently
prepared national economic agents. Therefore, the exact stage of political interference or involvement might be crucial for the successful
implementation of economic integration agreements. This argument explains why some historical agreements have not succeeded in the
long run, such as the experience of the West Indies Federation 6 according to Milne (1974, p.296), and the formation of the United Arab
Republic between Egypt and Syria in the 1950s.
4.3. Political and Economic Factors Combined
We have, so far, identified the economic and political factors affecting the success of any economic integration initiative. What we have not
done is link these two factors together. Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.713-720) have argued that the interaction between these two may yield
"high", "mixed", or "low" ratings of the potential success of a union. They have also identified the following four possibilities: (a) Identical
economic aims with strong political commitment, (b) converging economic aims with strong political commitment, (c) identical economic
aims with weak political commitment, and (d) converging economic aims with weak political commitment. They argue that (a) and (b)
deserve a high rating, (c) a mixed rating, and finally (d) a low rating. Unfortunately, they provide evidence that situation (d) is the most
prevailing. This analysis has showed that favorable political and economic factors combined must be present for an economic integration
scheme to succeed.
5.
Conclusion
The objective of this study was to present a literature review of economic integration. To achieve this, we have divided the paper into four
sections. Section one introduced the concept of economic integration, and its different forms or stages. Section two presented a survey of
theories of economic integration, both traditional (static) and new (dynamic). Section three focused on the economic integration theories
adjusted to the special needs of developing countries. Section four discussed the political incentives or determinants of economic
integration.
5.1. Economic Integration
Section one presented the definitions of economic integration, as well as the different forms of economic integration. Balassa's (1961)
definition "the abolition of discrimination within an area" can be considered the most precise. Then we identified five stages of economic
integration ranging from a simple Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA) to a Free Trade Area (FTA), then a Customs Union (CU), then a
Common Market (CM), and finally an Economic Union which is the most advanced stage. We provided detailed definitions and examples
of each stage. The next step was to study the evolution of economic integration theories through time, and that is what section two
attempted to do.
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5.2. The Gains from Economic Integration
Section two aimed at presenting a literature review of economic integration theories. Any theory's purpose is to present a logical
explanation of a certain phenomenon. So economic integration theory aims at explaining why are economic integration schemes formed
and what are their expected benefits. Chou (1967) argued that the main reason behind studying the traditional theory of economic
integration is to evaluate the factors that affect the desirability of a customs union from the world's welfare point of view using static effects
as criteria. New (dynamic) theory of economic integration introduced dynamic effects to this analysis.
5.2.1. Static Effects of Economic Integration
The first study to identify concrete criteria to distinguish between the possible advantages and disadvantages of economic
integration was the pioneering study of Viner (1950). Static effects according to Viner (1950) are trade creation and trade diversion. Trade
creation (diversion) occurs when trade shifts from a high-cost supplier member country (low-cost supplier of a non-member country) to a
low-cost supplier (high-cost supplier) member country in the union. Viner (1950) claimed that trade creation raises the home country's
welfare, while trade diversion lowers it.
Developments to the traditional Viner analysis included the concepts of trade expansion vs. trade creation and diversion, where if
demand was allowed to be more elastic, a customs union may actually increase the volume of trade even though there is trade diversion
(Meade 1955). Then we discussed the importance of including consumption effects as well as production effects of integration to reach a
true measure of the impact of an economic integration scheme on welfare (Lipsey 1957, p.40-41; and 1960, p.499-504). Then we argued,
according to Cooper and Masselll (1965a, p.742; and Pomfret 1997, p.182), that trade diversion may not always be a bad thing in terms of
economic welfare if we take into consideration the substitution effects that provide consumers with lower prices after the elimination of
tariffs on imports. Meade (1955, p.67-83) also proved that analysis of the traditional theory concentrated on the effect of tariff reduction on
a single commodity. He argued that if secondary effects of this tariff reduction are considered on complement and substitute goods,
additional welfare may be gained. De Melo, Panagariya, and Rodrik (1993, p. 171-172) provided evidence that small tariff reductions are
preferable to large reductions. Moreover, tariffs should be reduced gradually according to Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-1957, p.21). Krauss
(1972, p.421) argued that allowing for the terms of trade effect will alter the results of the analysis, as Viner has originally assumed that the
countries are too small to affect world prices.
Other developments to the static effects concluded that integration between potentially complementary countries may be welfare
increasing (Meade's 1955, p.107-111), instead of the general proposition that integration should be between competitive countries. Then we
tackled the issue of should countries with similar or different levels of income be encouraged to integrate, and we concluded that countries
should enjoy more trade potential if they have similar per capita incomes according to Linder (1961), with the pattern of trade following the
lines of intra-industry trade, or different per capita incomes according to the (H-O model) of comparative advantage theory, with the pattern
of trade following the lines of inter-industry trade. Other contributions to the Viner analysis included that of Lipsey (1960, p.508-509) who
reached two conclusions. The first is that a customs union will more likely produce welfare gains to a country the higher is the proportion
of trade with its partner in the union, and the lower the proportion with the rest of the world. The second is that countries most likely to
benefit from economic integration are those who have lower volumes of foreign trade as a percentage of their GDP. Finally, we concluded
by a statement quoted from Meade (1955) which stated that there is no general, one-size-fit-all, conclusion on the benefits of forming
economic integration schemes, and that it all depends on the specific circumstances of the case at hand.
5.2.2. Dynamic Effects of Economic Integration
The second part of section two identified the new (dynamic) theories of economic integration which introduced dynamic effects to the
analysis of the expected benefits of economic integration. Hasson (1962, p.614) argued that the static analysis in terms of trade creation and
trade diversion is no longer sufficient. Two reasons may be cited for this argument. The first is that studies such as Krauss (1972, p.417419), Viner (1950, p.135), and Cooper and Massell (1965a, p.743) have concluded that a non-preferential tariff policy (free trade) is
superior to customs unions as a trade liberalizing device and as a means of achieving world economic welfare. The second reason,
according to Lawrence (1997, p.18), is that the forces driving the current integration developments differ radically from those driving
previous waves of regionalism. As a result, studies by Balassa (1962), and Cooper and Massell (1965a, p.743) introduced another tool
(dynamic effects) into the analysis of the welfare effects of economic integration.
Dynamic effects or incentives of integration include economies of scale (Corden 1972, p.465), technological change (Balassa
1962; and Kreinin 1963, p.193), as well as the impact of integration on market structure and competition, productivity growth, and risk and
uncertainty (Sheer 1981, p.47; El-Agra 1988; and Fernandez 1997, p.6). Studies by Dunning and Robson (1998), and Gali (2003, p.7)
introduced the concepts of investment creation and diversion as an extension of Viner's theory. Moreover, issues such as the increased
importance of the private sector (Lawrence 1997, p.19), and the services sector (Lawrence (1997, p.20), and foreign direct investment
(Inotai 1991, p.38; and Ethier 1998, p.1150), have all contributed to the changing of the economic environments and conditions that have
previously governed the analysis of economic integration schemes.
5.3. Theories of Economic Integration for Developing Countries
Section three dealt with economic integration theories adjusted to the special needs of developing countries. Studies by Meier (1960),
Abdel Jaber (1971, p.256), and Andic, Andic and Dosser (1971, p.25) have argued that the Viner analysis of economic integration has
limited relevance, if any, to the case of developing countries. Previous studies have argued about two issues. They argued that production
effects are the tool that one can use to study the effect of economic integration on welfare. These studies have also agreed on certain factors
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that may affect the desirability of forming PTAs in general. The first part of this section discussed the limitations of the first argument,
while the second discussed the limitations of the second argument. The third part of this section stressed the importance of other factors
affecting the desirability of economic integration between developing countries.
5.3.1. Limitations of Production Effects
Although previous developments that have been made to the Viner analysis argued that production effects are not sufficient, Mikesell
(1965, p.205-229) argued that there are further limitations to this analysis if one looks at it from a developing country perspective. Demas
1965, p.87, Sakamoto 1969, p.283, and Abdel Jaber (1971, p.259) argued that welfare impacts of economic integration among developing
countries should not be confined to production and consumption effects only, but should also include employment, productivity, and
income effects. Andic, Andic and Dosser (1971, p.25), and Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975, p.45) among others argued that economic
integration in the case of developing countries should be treated as an approach to economic development, not as a tariff issue. Moreover,
Mikesell (1965, p.209), and Kitamura (1966, p.50) concluded that the long-run objective of integration between developing countries
should not be to decrease trade with the rest of the world, but rather to change its pattern over time. Kreinin (1964, p.193-194) claimed that
potential gains from economic integration are especially pronounced in small and medium-sized member countries. A rule called the
importance of being unimportant stipulates that small countries tend to gain more because their exports will now be demanded by a larger
pool of consumers. This will be especially relevant to the case of a small developing country if it integrates with a larger developed country
with higher purchasing power.
Studies by Bhambri (1962, p.245) and Chou (1967, p.354) have claimed that trade diversion may actually be beneficial in the
case of developing countries. Linder (1966, p.39), and Axline (1977, p.85) argued that trade diversion translates into import substitution
over a wider area, which will enable the integrated region as a whole to spend higher proportions of its foreign exchange on imports of
capital goods, therefore contributing to increased levels of investment and economic growth. On the same point, Cooper and Masselll
(1965b, p.462) claimed that protection resulting from import substitution on a wider scale might be an important tool of gradual industrial
development, which according to Sakamoto (1969, p.304) should be the principle objective of any integration scheme among developing
countries. Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.4), Inotai (1991, p.6-7) among others termed this the "Training Ground Theory", while
Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.4) termed it "import-substituting industrialization". Another argument for protection was made by Sakamoto
(1969, p.297) who introduced the term efficient trade diversion; which states that the shift in production will occur from an efficient
developed country (third country) to the relatively efficient developing country member within the new union.
A number of studies have suggested that emphasis should be put on dynamic rather than static effects in evaluating the
desirability of economic integration among developing countries (Sakamoto 1969, p.283-284; Abdel Jaber 1971, p.256; Axline 1977, p.85;
and Khazeh and Clark 1990, p.318). Demas (1965, p.36) argued that economic development can be attained to developing countries
through economic integration because it will lead to an increase in the size of the market and allow them to benefit from economies of
scale. A final important point was made by Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.8) who went beyond previous arguments of static and dynamic
analysis, and argued that most developing countries nowadays aim at making economic integration policies compatible with, and
complementary to, other policies to enhance their international competitiveness in general, as part of their overall stabilization and
adjustment programs as agreed with international organizations.
5.3.2. Limitations of the Factors affecting the desirability of Economic Integration
Balassa (1965, p.25) argued that what Viner (1950) and Lipsey (1960, p.499) previously concluded about the benefits of economic
integration accruing to competitive countries rather than complementary countries is not at all relevant to the case of developing countries.
In fact, Mikesell (1965, p.212) and more recently Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.68) claimed that developing countries should aim at
reaching a substantial degree of complementarity between them.
Traditional theory suggested that the bigger the size of the countries entering the union, the larger the benefits of economic
integration. If we take GNP as a measure of economic size, Abdel Jaber (1971, p.262) argues that developing countries' gains from
integration will definitely be small or even negligible. However, as Balassa (1961, p.38) argues the gains of economic integration do not
only depend on the size of the union, but also on the rate at which it increases. However, if we take the size of the union to mean population
size, developing countries will surely benefit from integration as they are usually over populated.
It is established that trade between developing countries over the years has always been rather small in comparison to trade
between developed countries, implying that welfare gains of economic integration between developing countries will tend to be small
according to the arguments presented in Lipsey (1960, p.508-509). However, studies by Balassa (1965, p.32-34), and Bhambri (1962,
p.237-238) argued that this implication should not be taken as given, as the removal of certain factors that limit trade between developing
countries should lead to an increase in trade between developing countries entering a trade agreement. Finally, Inotai (1991, p.10) argued
that although a growing level or share of intra or inter-regional trade to total trade of the member countries is widely considered as that the
best indicator of a successful economic integration agreement, it should not be the only target. Other targets such as joint industrial
development and establishment of infrastructural links should be of equal importance.
5.3.3. Other factors affecting the desirability of Economic Integration
The fact that initial domestic tariffs of most developing countries are usually quite high may actually be beneficial, because as Meade
(1955) and Hillmann (1957, p.492) claimed, the higher the initial tariff rates between countries entering a customs union, the larger are the
expected gains of economic integration between these countries. We have then shown that the argument made by Lipsey (1960, p.508-509)
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that a customs union will more likely produce welfare gains, the lower is the percentage of foreign trade to the member countries' GDP, has
to be taken with caution because while low income groups as classified by the World Bank have low trade/GDP percentages compared to
high income groups, both middle income country groups and LDCs have trade percentages of GDP higher than that of the high income
group. It has also been argued that distance or transport costs tend to diminish the potential gains from trade integration between any set of
countries. This is why Abdel Jaber (1971, p.262) suggested that the issue of improvement of existing transport facilities should be
emphasized in economic integration schemes between developing countries.
A study by Shams (2003, p.9-10) argued that differences in macroeconomic policies in general plus the lack of coordination
between member countries may be the reason behind limited regional trade growth. This point is especially important to developing
countries, because they tend to focus on tariff issues and rarely take such matters into consideration when negotiating trade agreements with
each other. Finally, Balassa and Stoutjesdijk (1975, p.53) emphasized the importance of "The Package Approach" which specifically aims
at assuring that each member country in a union is responsible for a single integration project from a package of such projects. This
approach can be very appropriate for developing countries because it aims at increasing their levels of economic development hand in hand
with increasing their levels of regional trade.
5.4. The Political Determinants of Economic Integration
Ezenwe (1978, p.158) argued that economic integration must be seen as part of a process in which the final outcome will be determined by
political factors. Allen (1963, p.450) further argued that one cannot really separate the economic from the political elements of integration,
as economic losses and gains from integration are in some cases systematically related to political factors. We started by discussing
political factors of economic integration of general importance. Then we concentrated on political factors of specific importance to
developing countries. Finally, we related the political and economic determinants of economic integration together.
5.4.1. Political factors of General Importance
Kitamura (1966), Heimenz and Langhammer (1990, p.9), and World Bank (2000, p.17-21) among others argued that one of the possible
political motives of economic integration is the ability of the member countries to strengthen their bargaining power in international
negotiations. Other studies, by Lorenz (1992, p.86), Grossman and Helpman 1994, p.833 and 1995, p.670), and Schiff and Winters (1998,
p.188) among others, argued that public officials may enter into trade agreements to gain support of certain interest groups/lobbies, whether
export-oriented or import-competing sectors, or others such as certain labor unions or those responsible for fiscal sustainability fearing
import duty losses. In this regard, most writers have considered producers as an interest group to have more political weight than
consumers. As a result, Krishna (1998, p.27) argued that (a) a PTA in general will be favored politically than free non-preferential trade,
and (b) a PTA that is trade-diverting will be favored politically than a PTA that is trade-creating.
Studies as old as Milne (1974, p.293-294) and as recent as Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.14) emphasized the importance of political
leadership in any economic integration initiative. Mansfield and Milner (1999, p.607) claimed that in order for a PTA to succeed,
substantial institutional heterogeneity is needed. This is why the European Community Act has succeeded relative to the integration efforts
in Asia where there exists a wide variation in its countries political regimes. In this regard, a study by Axline (1977, 103-104) suggested
that a smaller group of the former members of an unsuccessful integration scheme may launch a successful integration scheme of their own.
So, if countries in Asia in whole did not succeed to integrate, a sub-group of Asian countries may stand a better chance of success. On the
same note, Lawrence (1997, p.22-24) introduced the concepts of "shallow integration" and "deep integration". Deep integration refers to the
need to further change barriers other than tariffs (shallow integration) such as reconciling different national practices with common rules
and supra-national implementation mechanisms. Hirschman (1971, p.22) argued that the prospect of less freedom in implementation of
such internal policies is precisely what makes governments so skittish about entering into effective trade integration agreements. In this
regard, economic integration schemes require strong political commitment on the part of member countries to be able to advance to
common objectives. Rueda-Junquera (2006, p.9) cited the example of the EU where strong and sustained political commitment of its
member countries was the driving force behind its successful evolution.
Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.712) introduced the concepts of political complementarity and competitiveness. Corresponding
political groups and elites, for example military men and labor leaders, should think alike and share similar values, or in other words, they
should be complementary in their ideals not competitive. Achieving security may also be a strong political incentive of integration. A study
by World Bank (2000, p.12-17) argued that many economic integration schemes were originally created to encourage intra-regional
security, such as the EU, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN economic groups, or to encourage extra-regional security, for example the case of the
GCC.
Other political incentives to economic integration may include common religion, according to Ali (2005. p.1), as the case of the
PRETAS between the member countries of the OIC. Another incentive is the fear of illegal migration as the case of the NAFTA according
to Schiff and Winters (1998, p.185; and 2003, p.174-175). Another incentive of integration between countries is the desire to form
economic integration arrangements between political allies that do not permit their adversaries to join the arrangement according to
Mansfield and Milner (1999, p.610), such as the case of the USA thinking of forming a Middle East FTA by 2013 including its
international political allies in the Middle East region, and excluding Iran. Finally, De Melo and Panagariya (1993, p.5-6) among others
argued that countries may tend to form PTAs in response of other countries (usually their political competitors) forming PTAs. An example
of this strategic interaction process is the formation of the EFTA in response to the formation of the EEC (now the EU).
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5.4.2. Political factors of Special Importance to Developing Countries
Two important factors of specific importance to developing countries are the dependency theory and the stage of political entrance. The
Dependency theory, according to Axline (1977, p.86) and Inotai (1991, p.8), stipulates that politicians and economists of developing
countries may actually encourage economic integration schemes with other developing countries as a mean of strengthening their selfreliance and gradually eliminating the historically deep economic and structural dependence of their countries on the developed world.
Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.705-706) argued that the stage of political interference is critical. They argued that economic
stakeholders in developed countries are the ones who originally encourage entrance in economic integration schemes, and only then do
political officials respond with adequate policy measures. In other words, economic integration usually precedes political integration.
Examples include the European Union and the Central American Common Market. The complete opposite, according to Inotai (1991, p.910), is what usually happens in developing countries, where economic integration is often derived from political concepts and efforts, and is
then forced to work on economically insufficiently prepared national economic agents. Examples include the unsuccessful experiences of
the West Indies Federation and the United Arab Republic in the late 1950s.
5.4.3. Political and Economic Factors Combined
Haas and Schmitter (1964, p.713-720) linked the political and economic factors of integration together. They argued that the interaction
between these two may yield high, mixed, or low ratings of the potential success of a union. They have also identified four combinations of
identical/converging economic aims with strong/weak political commitment. As expected, they provided evidence that favorable political
and economic factors combined must be present for an economic integration scheme to succeed.
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Footnotes
1
The terms Regional Arrangement or Regional Trade Arrangement or Regional Integration Arrangements may be sometimes used as substitutes for the
word PTA. (Panagariya 1998, p.3)
2
The acronym FTA is often used to refer to a Free Trade Agreement or Free Trade Arrangement or Free Trade Area. (Panagariya 1998, p.3)
3
Welfare is defined as better use of economic resources (or economic efficiency).
4
The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) is a trade bloc established in 1960 between the countries of Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein in
response to the formation of the EEC.
5
UEMOA is the West African Economic and Monetary Union.
6
The West Indies Federation was created in 1958 by a group of Caribbean provinces.