Download China in Antarctica: A History

Southeast Review of Asian Studies
Volume 37 (2015), pp. 1–19
China in Antarctica: A History
JONATHAN HARRINGTON
Troy University
Since its discovery in the early 1820s, Antarctica has drawn interest from a myriad of
adventurers, scientists, fishermen and policymakers across the world. In 1958, the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) tried to join a group of nations that had composed the
Antarctic Treaty but was thwarted by the many non-Soviet countries suspicious of its
intentions. In the late 1970s, the PRC again renewed its interest in Antarctica and, in
1985, became a full Consultative Party (CP) to the Antarctic Treaty. That same year, it
established its first base on the continent; it has since built four more bases and the
PRC’s Antarctic operation now rivals those of the more established Antarctic powers.
However, despite its growing influence, little is written in English about China’s rise on
the continent. The purpose of this analysis is to provide some insight into the evolution
of and motivations behind China’s Antarctic strategy. This analysis asserts that China
has mostly embraced status quo institutions and is making a significant contribution to
polar research on the continent.
Xuelong to the Rescue
On January 2, 2014, the Chinese ice breaker Xuelong
(Snow Dragon)
carried out a successful mission to rescue fifty-two passengers from the
Akademik Shokalskiy, a Russian-flagged scientific research vessel that had
become trapped in pack ice off the coast of Antarctica. An Australian
icebreaker, the Aurora Australis, tried for days to reach the passengers but it
was the Xuelong, a Chinese icebreaking ship, that ultimately transported the
passengers to safety via helicopter (Cowell and Wong 2014). After the
rescue, the Xuelong, itself, became lodged in the ice for almost one week
before breaking free (Jha 2014). This rescue mission was a multinational
effort, including participants from New Zealand, the United States, Russia
and France (China Daily 1/7/14). Later that year, the Xuelong also engaged
in a multinational search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 in the Southern
Ocean off the coast of Australia (China Daily, 3/21/14).
The exploits of the Xuelong serve as an important indicator of the rise
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Antarctica (Einhorn 2014). In
30 short years, the PRC has become one of the more influential powers on
© 2015 Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies
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J. Harrington
the continent. However, few English-language works detail its activities.
While press coverage in China documenting the exploits of Chinese
scientists and explorers is almost universally positive, the opposite is true
in the Western media. Many journalists as well as some academics,
especially in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, are
suspicious of China’s real intentions. A common refrain from these
observers is that the PRC is a rising power bent on challenging the status
quo in Antarctica (Brady 2012; Beng 2013; Robson 2013; CampbellDollaghan 2014). Yet, as the subsequent analysis demonstrates, PRC
policymakers have slowly moved to embrace status quo conventions and
institutions, as well as promote scientific research on the continent.
China’s Antarctic policy should be viewed within the context of the
state’s overall environmental foreign policy and international organization
(IO) engagement strategy (Harrington 2014). Since its first contact with
global environmental institutions in 1972, China has accrued numerous
economic, scientific, political and social benefits from its foreign
environmental policies. Now, it is one of the world’s biggest contributors of
environmental science and technology and its participation in various
organizations and negotiations on the international stage provides legal and
institutional models for its own domestic environmental management
(Economy 2007; Harrington 2005). While these efforts do not always lead
to constructive, environmentally-friendly outcomes, they do signify that
China is a full participant in global environmental governance (Lewis 2013).
This transition from newcomer to leader over the past 30 years is quite
apparent in Antarctica, where environmental research is now the primary
focus of most actors on the continent.
The PRC’s historical experience in Antarctica can be broken down into
four major periods (Zhou 1994; Brady 2010). First, during the Pre-Reform
Period (1950s-78), PRC efforts to join the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)
were thwarted by a combination of domestic challenges and Cold War
geopolitics, best exemplified by the acceptance of the Republic of China
(ROC) as the legitimate representative of the Chinese nation in the UN.
Also, the PRC neither had an active presence nor did it make an attempt to
establish operations on the continent. The main focus of the Fight for
Legitimacy Period (1979-89) was China’s pursuit of full membership in the
ATS. During the Consolidation, Capacity Building and Cooperation Period
(1990-2005), China’s main objectives were to deepen its footprint on the
continent, expand its scientific agenda, and learn from scholars and
engineers from ATS countries about how to conduct world-class research.
As a result, PRC policymakers adopted an accommodative approach to
participation in Antarctic institutions. Finally, during the current Quest
for Leadership Period (2005-present), the PRC has significantly increased
China in Antarctica: A History
3
its funding and manpower on the continent, engaging in ambitious
infrastructure projects and asserting its role in Antarctic governance.
The Conquest of Antarctica: A Very Short History
Most historians attribute the initial discovery of the Antarctic continent to
British navigator Captain James Cook, who circumnavigated the land mass
between 1772 and 1775. His reports detailing abundant populations of
whales, seals, and other wildlife drew the attention of a slew of explorers
and profiteers. American Nathaniel Palmer, along with British and Russian
sailors, first set eyes on the Sandwich Islands in the 1820s. A series of naval
and private expeditions from the United States, Australia, Norway,
Germany and France followed. These visits culminated in intensity during
the so-called Heroic Period (1890s to 1914), during which mostly privatelyfunded adventurers competed to reach the South Pole (Larson 2011).
Norwegian Roald Amundsen became the first to achieve this milestone,
planting the flag of his nation into Antarctic ice on December 14, 1911
(Belanger 2006).
FIGURE 1
Map of Antarctic territorial claims. © 2015 Guardian News and Media
Limited or its affiliated companies. http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/feb/28/
-sp-antarctica-privateer-explorers-scientific-research-territory-polar-code.
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J. Harrington
By 1943, seven nations—Chile, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, France and Norway—had claimed large swaths of the
continent. While the United States did not make a formal claim, it
eventually became the dominant actor in the region and the Cold War
rivalry between it and the Soviet Union spilled onto the continent. This
struggle reached its highest intensity during the Third International
Geophysical Year (IGY) which ran from July 1957 to December 1958
(Moore 2004; Joyner 1998). Ultimately, both superpowers, along with
several other states, conducted a series of negotiations that led to the
creation of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Antonello 2013; Stokke and Vidas
1996).
The Pre-Reform Period: 1950s-78
As the Republic of China was the official representative of the Chinese
nation in the United Nations (UN), the PRC was effectively kept from
participating in many IOs; the Soviet Union was the only communist
country represented at the Antarctic Treaty negotiations. Mao Zedong did
express interest in joining the treaty negotiations and Soviet leaders briefly
took up his cause, but strong opposition from the United States stymied
their efforts (Belanger 2006). Many of the participating states were hesitant
to allow signatories to the treaty that did not already possess an established
physical presence on the continent.
The Antarctic Treaty included six key elements:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Preservation and conservation of living resources
Suspension of national enforcement of jurisdictional claims to a
later date (2048)
Facilitation of the right to inspection of national facilities
Promotion of scientific cooperation
Promotion of scientific research
Restriction of the use of Antarctica to peaceful activities (no
militarization) (Joyner 1998)
For China, the obstacles to joining the treaty proved daunting. The PRC, as
a developing country, was not thought to be capable of conducting
“significant research activities” on the continent. In addition, PRC
policymakers argued that it was irrelevant whether or not a nation had a
physical presence in Antarctica to warrant inclusion, as international space
not legitimately occupied by any state should be managed by all as a
“common heritage of mankind.” They rejected outright all territorial
ambitions made by the seven claimants (Chen 2013).
China in Antarctica: A History
5
During the dark days of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC limited its
participation in IOs. However, the PRC replaced the ROC as the legal
representative of the Chinese nation in the UN in 1971, a pivotal point on
the path to its eventual rise in Antarctica (Song 2013). Chinese scientists
were now able to venture out beyond China’s borders to connect with their
international colleagues as part of “conference diplomacy” (Harrington
2005). These actions were a necessary part of the knowledge-building
process; while Chinese scientists engaged in cold climate research on the
Himalayan Plateau, they did not have any experience in Antarctica (Yao et.
al. 2012).
Additionally, as more countries developed the capacity to engage in onthe-ground operations, and as Cold War competition waned, new members
began to join the ATS. Member states were able to expand their activities as
long as they observed basic environmental protocols (Stokke and Vidas
1996). Also, with military operations are banned on the continent, scientific
achievement grew in importance as a reflection of interstate competition, a
trend that has only strengthened with the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty
Environmental Protocol in 1991 (Dudeny and Walton 2012). These
characteristics have created favorable conditions for China to pursue its
national interests without major hindrance in Antarctica.
The Fight for Legitimacy Period: 1979-90
The rise of Deng Xiaoping and his embracing of the Four Modernizations
(agriculture, industry, national defense and science and technology)
heralded a new era of international scientific engagement and cooperation
which eventually included research in both Antarctica and the Arctic.
Baum (1980) notes that the “Four Modernizations. . . represented an
unprecedented commitment to the wholesale upgrading of China’s
economic and technical capabilities” (Baum 1980, 5). Of central importance
was an expanded engagement with the industrialized world in education,
investment, science, and trade. Corporate and political leaders from around
the world responded by welcoming Chinese delegations with open arms
(Kent 2007). The PRC transitioned “from alienation to integration” as it
quickly moved to cement its official status as the legal representative of the
Chinese nation in the UN and with other intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) (Kent 2007, 33). Between 1978 and 1983, it joined more than 300
international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Kent 2007).
China’s environmental scientists were among the first to venture
abroad as part of these efforts. In 1972, the PRC sent a delegation to the
landmark United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm and it joined the United Nations Environment Programme in
1973. The PRC, driven by a desire for both greater international
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J. Harrington
engagement and new technology in the emerging field of environmental
science, pursued partnerships with environmental INGOS and IGOs.
Contact with global environmental epistemic communities served as a
catalyst to domestic epistemic community development in a wide range of
scientific fields, including the polar sciences (Economy 2007).
China eventually sought to establish a physical presence in Antarctica.
In 1979, journalist Jin Renbo
charted the PRC’s first inroad into
the continent when he accompanied a scientific research team on a trip to
one of Chile’s bases on the Antarctic Peninsula. As most bases were
constructed in close proximity to one another, he had an opportunity to
meet with scientists from seven countries, including the United States and
Japan. The following year, another journalist was invited to visit Australiaadministered Casey Station in East Antarctica (Meng 2014). In 1981 Li
Huamei
, the PRC’s first female scientist to travel to the continent,
visited New Zealand-controlled Scott Station. During her time there she
had a chance meeting with a U.S.-based Taiwanese scientist. She also
visited McMurdo Station, the main U.S. base of operations and home to
more than 1,000 scientists and support personnel during the peak summer
months (Sun 1984).
While these isolated visits proved fruitful, PRC officials desired greater
recognition from other countries and once again lobbied for full
membership in the ATS. In 1983, Chinese scientists attended their first
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) as a Non-Consultative
Party (NCP) delegation; NCPs could participate in meetings but were not
allowed to cast a vote. According to Meng (2014), China had not been
accepted as a full member in the ATS because of its lack of significant
research activity in the region and its delegation was asked to leave the
room before important topics were put before full members of the ATS for
a vote.
China’s exclusion from decision-making in the ATS drew the ire of
PRC leadership in Zhongnanhai
. It responded by mobilizing a
major research expedition the following year that included 591 participants,
two vessels, and representatives from more than 60 organizations (Shi and
Ren 1989; Meng 2014). The primary objective of this mobilization of
individuals and resources was to establish China’s first base on King
George Island, near the Antarctic Peninsula. With the opening of
Changcheng
(Great Wall) Station in February 1985 China
demonstrated its commitment to “significant research” and, consequently,
became a full voting member of the Antarctic Treaty later that year (Li
1985).
China’s activities in Antarctica quickly drew the attention of many
Chinese scholars. While the great majority of their research projects
addressed scientific questions, some of these scholars discussed the political
China in Antarctica: A History
7
context of the ATS and the prospects for Chinese participation in Antarctic
governance. Most echoed previous themes that critiqued U.S. dominance in
Antarctica and called for a greater role for the United Nations on the
continent (Lan 1980; Mu and Li 1985; Yu 1982). Wu (1991), for example,
noted that the greatest threat to stability on the continent would be the
potential for competition among the original seven claimants to Antarctic
territory. As a result, he advocated for PRC leaders to support collective
governance over interstate competition on the continent. He also predicted
that U.S. domination would falter and international laws and institutions
would fill the security void in Antarctica and around the world (Wu 1991).
Wu’s claims proved prophetic as China increasingly embraced collective
governance while consistently opposing territorial claims by other states.
China’s desire to join the ATS was motivated by other factors. Some
scholars observed the potential benefits of Antarctica’s living and nonliving resources to the PRC (Lan 1980). In 1982, the United States
proposed creation of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) which would allow states to
conduct mining and drilling operations (Crockett and Clarksen 1987).
China was a strong supporter of this initiative, which provided further
incentive for it to join the ATS.
Ultimately, domestic politics in France, Australia and the United States
doomed the CRAMRA. New scientific evidence about human-related
damage to the global climate and the ozone layer, in addition to the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Alaska, engendered strong domestic support for global
environmental initiatives and led to the negotiation among ATS countries
of the 1991 Environmental Protocol (Rothwell 2000). It banned all mining
activities and made environmental protection a central focus of the ATS
(Joyner 1997; Beck 1991; Bergin 1991). Chinese policymakers, aware of the
decline of international support for CRAMRA, agreed to the protocol,
which was formally ratified by China in 1996 (Meng 2013).
These policymakers realized that further efforts were required to
cement China’s status as a major player on the continent. The PRC, for
example, lacked a mainland base and had no physical presence in eastern
Antarctica. To remedy this, Chinese scientists proposed construction of a
second station in the Larsemann Hills at Prydz Bay, which also hosted
detachments from Russia and India. Zhongshan Zhan )
(Sun Yat-sen
Station), formally dedicated in 1989, quickly proved useful as the PRC
could now mount independent expeditions to interior regions of the
continent (Xu 2004).
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J. Harrington
Consolidation, Capacity Building and Cooperation Period: 1991-2004
By the early 1990s, China had bolstered its reputation as a respected
member of the ATS. However, with infrastructure projects largely
completed, the PRC turned to more robust scientific research. Its activities
on the continent became more tightly connected to its increasing
engagement in global eco-politics. There are many examples of this focus
on the environment: Premier Li Peng’s high-profile speech at the 1992
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
FIGURE 2
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. © 2011 Commonwealth of Australia.
https://www1.data.antarctica.gov.au/aadc/mapcat/display_map.cfm?map_id=13939.
China in Antarctica: A History
9
the PRC’s signings of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Forest Principles agreement,
and the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. As a result, climate
change research has become a major focus of Chinese scientists in
Antarctica (Kent 2007).
China’s engagement with the issues of global climate change proved
particularly useful in its relations with developing countries as its support
for climate change science contrasted sharply with that of the United States.
As a developing nation, China, itself, was not bound by agreements to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the levels required of developed
countries, such as the United States (Buckingham 2013). Consequently,
climate change policy proved a wedge issue, isolating the United States
while providing China an opportunity to improve relations with other
developed countries (Harrington 2005) and enhance its reputation as the
leader of the developing world (Chen 2012). The reputational value of
China’s climate policy was highlighted at the 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. U.S. President
George W. Bush publically expressed doubts about the link between human
activities and global warming and officially quashed any hope that the
United States would ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Not surprisingly, attendees
booed the U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his address at the
meeting. In contrast, the PRC’s keynote speaker, Premier Zhu Rongji was
commended for strengthening China’s commitment to global climate
change governance institutions (Harrington 2005; Nielson and Ho 2013).
As it took a more significant role in the worldwide debate over climate
change, the PRC simultaneously bolstered the capacity of its scientists to
conduct research in Antarctica. Most of these activities were supported by
the Guojia Haiyangju
State Oceanic Administration). In 1989,
China upgraded its activities on both poles through the establishment of
the Zhongguo Jidi Yanjiu Zhongxin
(Polar Research
Institute) in Shanghai. An additional coordination body, the National
Expedition Committee was upgraded and renamed the Guojia Haijjangju
Jidi Kaocha Banggongshi
(China Arctic and
Antarctic Administration) to oversee its polar initiatives (Brady 2010).
China purchased its first dedicated icebreaker, the Xuelong, in 1994.
The PRC’s status as a relative newcomer to the continent limited its
initial output of research during this period. Chinese scientists not only
needed the time to develop the experience and expertise required of these
new research programs but also the contacts and relationships necessary to
develop collaborative projects with researchers from other countries.
Indeed, few of these scientists had international experience prior to 1978.
Further complicating these efforts was the language barrier; much of the
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J. Harrington
research that was produced was published in Chinese, making it less
accessible to foreign scholars.
However, Chinese scientists quickly developed an ability to collaborate
with other scholars. Aksnes and Hessen (2009) find that between 1981 and
2007, their proportion of the total number of articles written by researchers
on the continent increased from 0.22 percent to 3.07 percent. Zhang and
Hua (2014) note that the number of Chinese-language articles on Antarctica
more than doubled during the first decade of the twenty-first century
(Zhang and Hua 2014). Furthermore, half of the Chinese-authored
publications in English featured a co-author from a different country, the
same proportion found for scholars from the United States (Aksnes and
Hessen 2009).
These efforts to produce research reinforced China’s commitment to
the Environmental Protocol. This support also signaled its tacit acceptance
of status quo norms, particularly those that emphasized environmental
protection. Chinese policymakers did continue to harbor lingering
concerns about U.S. domination of the ATS, but they did not aggressively
challenge its role (Shi 2013), consistently voting in favor of ATS decisions,
measures, protocols, and recommendations (Harrington 2014).
During this period, Chinese policymakers also observed with great
interest the claims on territory and questions of sovereignty on the
continent. Wu (1991) notes that countries often treat their Antarctic bases
as de facto sovereign spaces. Specially Protected Areas (SPAs), sponsored by
ATS states, are also subject to this influence. Officially, SPAs are
established to encourage environmental protection. However, sponsor
countries manage these areas around their bases, which allow them to
expand administrative management functions well beyond base boundaries
(Haward and Cooper 2014). In the last few years, China has sponsored
Specially Protected Areas in close proximity to its own bases (Chen, Zhou,
and Qin 2012).
The PRC has consistently rejected land claims made by states like
Australia while simultaneously working with them to exercise
administrative authority over these territories, as in the case of Zhongshan
Station, located in the center of Australia’s Antarctic claim. However,
China’s accession to the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1996
upset this balance. UNCLOS works with member states to define exclusive
rights to coastlines and waterways, including undersea continental shelves
(Hemmings 2010). These member states have used UNCLOS to reinforce
their claims over marine assets and sea beds hundreds of miles off the
Antarctic coast (Vidas 2000; Xu, Sun and Wang 2010). Australia, which
initiated the first Antarctic continental shelf claim in 2004, has
simultaneously voiced support for the ATS while also protecting its
territorial ambitions given its proximity to and long presence on the
China in Antarctica: A History
11
continent. China, without the proximity to make a territorial claim, has
championed the collective leadership structure of the ATS (Yang and Cai
2013). At the same time, China has used UNCLOS to reinforce its claims to
most of the South China Sea where both proximity and history have
provided the justification for a more assertive posture (Dodds 2011).
Ultimately, the PRC did not build any bases during the 1990s. Chinese
scientists did greatly expand their inland operations, however. The decade
opened with China’s first land crossing of the continent (Xinhua 1990).
Scientists were especially interested in conducting research in areas that
had not yet been mapped or explored by other nations and Zhongshan
Station proved an effective launch point for these activities. During the
1999-2000 summer season, scientists travelled deep into the Antarctic
mainland and traversed multiple 4,000-meter-high peaks, including a failed
attempt to cross Dome A, the highest ice dome in East Antarctica.
Quest for Leadership Period: 2005-present
The eventual summit of Dome A by a Chinese team in early 2005 turned
out to be a pivotal moment in China’s Antarctic enterprise. It was later
revealed that Chinese scientists had an audacious plan to establish a new
station at that location (Zhang 2011). China was slated to join Russia and
Japan, along with a cooperative effort between France and Italy, as the only
countries with bases atop ice domes. This goal was later approved as part of
the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10), in which funding for Antarctic
operations doubled to more than USD 40 million per year and included
appropriations for the new station (Brady 2010). These expenditures
exceeded USD 55 million in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-15).
China’s station atop the dome, Kunlun (
), was completed in
2009. Its location possessed unique qualities that would allow Chinese
scholars to conduct impactful research in two areas: climate change and
astronomy (Li 2012). Kunlun sits atop more than 3,000 meters of ice which
also makes it a perfect location for deep ice core drilling. One goal of
China’s scientists is to recover the longest ice core in history, which could
reveal one million or more years of climatic history and greatly advance
climate change research (Zhang 2011).
Dome A is also an ideal location for astronomers (Li 2012). It receives
virtually no precipitation. It also experiences long uninterrupted periods of
darkness during the winter months (Burton 2012). These conditions are
especially suited to searching for planets and supernovae (Yock 2007;
Moore, Fu and Ashley 2013). The station already hosts three major
multinational astronomy projects.
Not surprisingly, given its location, the researchers at Kunlun Station
faced a number of difficulties. The station is subject to dangerous weather
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conditions and is farther from the coastline than any base on the continent,
which makes logistical support exceedingly difficult; until 2014, the only
way to reach Kunlun Station was overland. In 2013, a second summer
logistical base, Taishan
was built half-way between Zhongshan and
Kunlun Stations to better utilize the facilities in both winter and summer
(China Daily 12/27/13). China is also scheduled to put a new icebreaker in
service in 2015 (China Daily 1/5/14).
The construction of Kunlun Station provides strong evidence that
China is serious about conducting “significant” research and not simply
competing for resources or engaging in interstate competition. Kunlun
Station is not suitable for mining or extractive activity. Its remote location
and poor weather severely limits its use as a transport hub or human
settlement. Aside from research, the only other possible use for the station
could be as a launch point for deeper exploration into East Antarctica, as it
is located hundreds of miles from the nearest inland base in unexplored
territory (Zhang 2011). In addition, China’s fifth base, planned for the
Terra Nova area along the Ross Sea coast near McMurdo Station, is
intended to support the study of bio-ecology and satellite remote sensing, as
well as provide opportunities for further international collaboration.
China, through its actions on the continent, has been motivated by a
desire to conduct scientific research but also to serve the needs of its
citizens, while supporting the status quo of Antarctic governance. One can
see these goals at work in the recent debate over the establishment of
Marine Protected Areas (MPA). In 2006, China officially joined the
Convention on the Conservation of Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),
a function of rising living standards and increased domestic demand for
living resources, such as fish. Membership in CCAMLR also allowed the
PRC to take the Chinese seat in the organization in place of the ROC,
which has a large fishing industry (Brady 2010).
Coastal East Antarctica and the Ross Sea region have served as the
backdrop for disputes between the PRC and other CCAMLR members. In
2005, the United States and New Zealand began serious discussions to
establish a large MPA between the Ross Sea coastline and New Zealand.
After lengthy negotiations, the two states proposed the creation of a 2.2
million km2 protected area that would restrict fishing across significant
swaths of territory and would remain in place for 30 years (Lee 2013). Both
states, along with a host of nongovernmental environmental organizations,
insisted these restrictions were necessary to preserve the last pristine
marine ecosystem in the world (Weller 2013; Osterblom and Sumaila 2011).
In addition, the European Union and Australia proposed an MPA along the
coast of East Antarctica.
Disagreements among the parties came to a head in October 2012,
when both proposals for these protected areas were submitted for review
China in Antarctica: A History
13
and approval, by consensus, at the 31st CCAMLR meeting. Russia and the
Ukraine, two active fishing nations, were the most vocal opponents of the
proposals. Russia questioned the legitimacy of the body to create such a
large protected area. China was less vocal in its objections but still
supported the position of the fishing countries, noting that there was little
evidence to support a no-take policy over such a large area. Ultimately, the
MPA proposals were withdrawn from consideration. Subsequent, lessrestrictive versions of these proposals were rejected again in July 2013.
Russia, the Ukraine, and China maintained their objections to the MPAs
(Morton 2013), opposing them again in September 2013 and October 2014.
Only the Ukraine eventually changed its position.
Given China’s long-standing objections to territorial claims made by
some ATS members, its opposition to the MPAs was not surprising.
However, China has paid a public relations price for siding with Russia
against the proposals. In fact, Western negotiators had high hopes that
China might change its position in the weeks leading up to the October
2014 meeting. Ultimately, China continued to stand firmly with Russia in
opposition.
This author believes that China’s objections to the MPAs have more to
do with its own freedom of action and less to do with fishing. The
Australia-EU MPA, for example, includes the coastline around Zhongshan
Station. If fully implemented, it could limit the PRC’s operations within its
de facto sphere of influence. PRC officials surely recalled Australia’s actions
in 2004, when it became the first ATS member to formally file an UNCLOS
outer-continental shelf sovereignty claim along its East Antarctic coastline
(Dodds 2011; Xu, Sun and Wang 2010; Jabour and Hemmings 2007). This
claim, perceived as a land grab, set off a potentially serious confrontation
with China and other states that have bases on the territory claimed by
Australia. In a similar vein, the U.S.-New Zealand MPA could allow both
countries to expand their spheres of influence over China’s planned Terra
Nova base.
Additionally, member countries will need to monitor both of the
proposed MPAs for compliance. Unlike more proximate countries with
significant resources invested in Antarctica, like Australia and New
Zealand, China is not yet able to take a policing role on the continent. As a
consequence, it fears that active enforcement of MPA regulations could give
monitoring countries an advantage in claiming territory in the future.
It is still possible that China will acquiesce to a dramatically weakened
version of the MPAs. In June 2015, the United States and China jointly
declared their desire to resolve the Ross Sea MPA issue (U.S. Department
of State, June 24, 2015). The topic will again come up for discussion at the
Annual CCAMLR meeting in Hobart, Australia in late-2015. While China
has offered resistance to these MPAs, it supports the status quo in
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Antarctica and opposes the potential for another country to threaten the
stability of relations on the continent.
The Future
Over the past few decades, the PRC has built a considerable presence in
Antarctica. In some ways, it is fitting that scientists and engineers engaged
in two search-and-rescue missions during their 30th scientific expedition to
the frozen continent. In 1984, China could never have carried out a
helicopter airlift of dozens of tourists and scientists in ice pack thousands of
miles from its coastline. Yet, the Xuelong’s successful recovery of the
passengers of the Akademik Shokalskiy is a testament to its growing
capabilities.
On balance, Chinese activities have had a positive effect on Antarctic
research and governance. Chinese polar scientists are well integrated into
global epistemic communities. Scientists are making unique contributions,
especially in the areas of astronomy, climate change, and fisheries
management (Guo and Shi 2009). Chinese investment in infrastructure and
bases support a long-term commitment to scientific research on the
continent. China is also a defender of collective governance and opposes
territorial encroachment by claimant countries.
The current governance regime presents few barriers to future Chinese
expansion as long as the PRC continues to honor environmental norms.
After it builds its fifth station in the Ross Sea region, China will rank
among the top five countries in terms of bases on and investment in
Antarctica (Harrington 2014). The collaboration of Chinese scientists with
scientific teams from around the world has greatly enhanced China’s
capability and influence in the production of meaningful scholarship,
especially as it relates to climate change. China receives reputational
benefits at home and abroad for both its scientific achievements and
willingness to collaborate in the collective governance of the continent. At
present, embracing the status quo seems to offer the best route for China to
pursue its national interests (Harrington 2014).
Of course, the PRC may take a different path as conditions change.
Russia’s aggression in Europe and the tensions it has caused may damage
the potential for cooperative management of living marine resources in the
Southern Ocean. As demands grows for aquatic resources, pressure on
fisheries will continue to mount; the same is true for Antarctica’s mineral
wealth (Zhu, Yan, and Ling 2005). As glaciers melt and seas warm, more of
the continent will become accessible to human activity and may prompt
states to make more aggressive claims on wider swaths of territory. There is
no way of knowing how China might react to these challenges to collective
governance and the status quo. However, China’s role in Antarctica as a
China in Antarctica: A History
15
proponent of scientific research and collective governance will increase in
importance as its stature on the international stage grows.
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