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Science and ethics: normative ethics may not need a foundation
– but it does need science
0. Introduction
How do we know right from wrong? Do we dig deep into our intuitions? Do we reach for higher
wisdom? Normative ethics concerns questions about right and wrong and the criteria to
distinguish them. It is not about how the world is but about how it should be. This makes
normative inquiry a different endeavor than scientific inquiry. Regarding the latter, whatever
scientists find out about the world is not qualified in terms of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Still, some
ethicists defend the view that the use of the methods and findings of science is an important
element in finding out how we should live. Representatives of this approach mostly appeal to
philosophical naturalism to defend their view (e.g., Casebeer 2003; Flanagan, Sarkissian, &
Wong 2008; Kurtz 2007). Critics of this ‘scientific ethics’, not surprisingly, are convinced that it
commits the naturalistic fallacy. A less famous albeit related criticism is that science is hardly
relevant for normative ethics (e.g., Rosenberg 2000; Woolcock 1999; Farber 1994).
In this paper I consider recent trends in evolutionary ethics and their critics. While making clear
that many of these criticisms imply that morality needs some ‘foundation’, I will argue why and
how normative inquiry may not need a ‘foundation’ but can benefit form science instead. But
first, let me explain the meaning of the naturalistic fallacy and its relation to ‘foundations’ in
normative ethics.
1. The naturalistic fallacy and the quest for a foundation
‘Foundational’ normative ethicists attempt to derive a coherent normative system out of one or
several non-empirically derived first principles (Rosenberg 2000). Certain nineteenth century
intellectuals did exactly that: they developed a normative system that attempted to ground ethics
in evolution. Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) evolutionary ethics is a case in point. He reasoned
that evolution by natural selection results in adaptations that are morally better. Whatever is more
evolved is therefore better. Thus we should promote evolution by natural selection (Moore
1993/1903).
Spencer was instantly refuted by philosophers. George Edward Moore dedicated substantial parts
of his Principia Ethica to Spencer’s evolutionary ethics (Moore 1993/1903, §33). According to
Moore, Spencer must have been influenced by a crucial fallacy, which he coined the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’. In the explication of this fallacy, Moore built on Sidgwick’s insights which were in turn
inspired by Hume’s work. Since many interpretations of both Moore’s and Hume’s formulations
exist (e.g., Curry 2008), it can be helpful to illustrate Hume and Moore’s reasoning with a recent
example.
Hume noticed that in every moral system the author first establishes some descriptive statements
and then makes prescriptive or moral conclusions (Hume 1739-1740).
Take the following example (cf. Ferguson 2001):
Premise: humans are evolutionary disposed to act altruistically.
Conclusion: it is good to act altruistically.
However, according to Hume this is a wrong kind of reasoning because the conclusion does not
logically follow from the premise: there is a difference in meaning between ‘we are evolutionary
disposed to’ and ‘it is good to’. This difference in meaning between any descriptive statement and
any prescriptive statements is known as Hume’s ‘is/ought’ gap. Accepting this gap has
consequences for ‘scientific ethics’. If scientists find that something is the case, then it does not
logically follow that anything in the descriptive statement ought to be the case. There is no such
simple logical connection between scientific statements and ethical statements.
According to Hume, “a reason should be given” for why the moral statement follows from the
descriptive statements. This can be done by adding a second premise, as is done next:
Premise 1: humans are evolutionary disposed to act altruistically
Premise 2: it is good to do everything humans are disposed to by their evolution.
Conclusion: it is good to act altruistically.
Now the conclusion follows logically from the premises. However, it comes at the cost of
premise 2 being a prescription instead of a description. As a result, one still hasn’t derived a
moral principle from only factual statements. Therefore, one can still not derive moral
conclusions from science alone. But maybe we can show at least one moral statement to be true?
Moore rejects this specific solution. To understand this, it is important to know that the
naturalistic fallacy rejects only some first principles: ‘Ethics’– in Moore’s terminology – is about
moral ‘truth’ and not about ‘practice’ (Moore 1993/1903, §3-§5). According to Moore, in Ethics
all comes down to finding a first statement upon which ‘Ethics’ can be built. This first statement
provides an answer to Ethics’ “first question”, i.e. “What is good?” (idem, §2). Moore adds:
“Unless this first question be fully understood, and its true answer clearly recognized, the rest of
Ethics is as good as useless from the point of view of systematic knowledge” (idem, §5). Thus we
have to find a first moral principle – such as the second premise in the example – and this
principle must state what ‘good’ is. So far so good, where it not that Moore insists that finding
such a first moral principle is impossible. But what kind of first principles has Moore in mind? In
the case of ‘Ethics’ one must define ‘good’. What Moore has in mind is an analytic definition of
the word ‘good’ (idem, §6). A true analytic definition describes the real nature of a notion
denoted by the word; it enumerates the simple notions that are already in the meaning of the
complex notion (idem, §7). Analytic statements only explicate what is already in the meaning of
the subject – here ‘good’. This meaning of ‘good’ describes its true nature. How do we find this
meaning? We do not need any observation to establish the real nature of a notion. Every normal
user of a certain language, when thinking clearly, instantly grasps when an analytic statement is
true. We can derive the true meaning of ‘good’ by clear thinking alone. Now ‘good’ is
indefinable, says Moore. ‘Good’ is already a simple notion. ‘Good’ only means ‘good’ and
nothing else. Those who define ‘good’ as something else and claim this definition to be true all
commit the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (idem, §1 - §15).We intuitively acknowledge that we cannot
define ‘good’, in that for any definition of ‘good’ as something else we can meaningfully ask
whether this ‘something else’ is indeed ‘good’. This means that we never instantly grasp that such
a statement is true, thus it is never analytically true. This argument was dubbed the ‘open question
argument’ (idem, §13).
The core idea is that we cannot analytically derive a first moral principle. According to Moore,
‘naturalists’ – up to his time – made this very mistake. They tried to show that ‘good’ was
identical to something else. Contrary to what the term seems to imply, Moore’s argument also
applies for metaphysical properties (idem, §66 - §85). Religiously grounded normative systems
are equally debunked (see also diCarlo & Teehan 2007).
2. Twentieth century scientific ethics and its critics
2.1. Moral guidance without foundations
Though Moore denounced all ‘naturalist’ moral systems, there have been numerous evolutionary
ethicists who did not commit the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., T.H. Huxley; G.G. Simpson). Since the
last decades of the twentieth century, accounts again proliferate that defend a closer interplay
between science and normative ethics without committing the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., Binmore
2005; Ruse 2008). Though all argue that science is relevant for ethics, they do not attempt to start
from a first moral principle. Neither do they attempt to analytically derive a first moral principle.
Where do they start then? I will illustrate the least controversial and I think most general way in
which scientific findings have an impact on ethics. Afterwards I explicate the form of the
reasoning and its relation to the naturalistic fallacy.
Scientific information is conditionally relevant for morality. If we accept certain moral principles,
then we can use everything we know to infer rules that help us to reach these ends. In other
words, scientific knowledge is instrumental to ethics (Rosenberg 2000), or science can help us to
infer hypothetical imperatives (Binmore 2005). Consider the following example. The Kibbutzim
in Israel are modern communities that are unique in their organization of production, ownership,
consumption and child care (Agassi 1989). From the start these communities wanted to create a
society were all would be equal. Property was held in common. Every member received an equal
wage depending on his or her needs. Men and women were expected to participate equally in all
kinds of work: household chores, child care, politics, farming etc. Children were raised away
from their parents by trained nurses and teachers. It was hoped that this would liberate women
from their traditional mother roles. But after one generation, this system ended. Women again did
more child care than men; meanwhile men participated more in politics and field work. They also
took up the majority of leading and managing positions. Because of these ‘role patterns’, men had
easier access to cars, an office and an apartment in town. Regarding these patterns, some
commentaries want to eradicate all these gender differences. In that case, it can be helpful to seek
for the most plausible explanation of the gender differences. There exist theories that explain
gender inequality as a consequence of the specific social organization of e.g. production,
ownership and so on. Because of its unique constellation, the Israeli Kibbutzim are often taken as
a test case for these specific theories of gender inequality. But could we really want a society that
has managed to eradicate gender differences? What is the most plausible explanation? I will only
discuss the explanation of child care asymmetries. I certainly do not claim that this explanation
also applies to other aspects of the traditional role pattern; we cannot conclude anything about
those aspects without more scientific information. In all cultures, mothers spend substantially
more time with their children than fathers do. This is probably partly modified by the social
environment. But biology plays also a role in ‘molding’ mothers into this role: A lactating
woman’s body experiences an increase in the hormone prolactin, a hormone which is plausibly
related to increased satisfaction. Moreover, breastfeeding heightens the concentration of blood
hormones like oxytocin, prolactin and cortisol, which again have a motivating role in nursing
behavior, as tested in nonhuman primates (Maestripieri, Hoffman, Anderson, Carter, & Higley
2009) Expectant mothers and fathers both experience an increase in prolactin levels and, in
humans, higher prolactin levels are correlated with more paternal behavior (Storey, Walsh,
Quinton, & Wynne-Edwards 2000). But men still have a higher threshold for responding to
babies than most women (Silk 2002) and they feel less protective towards infants (Alley 1983). It
is suggested that these biological factors make it more satisfying for mothers than for fathers to
nurture their children and induce nursing behavior in females (Hrdy 2005). In other words, while
men can be induced to be more responsive to children, many mothers – not necessarily women in
general, maybe only those who have been pregnant or are lactating – will want to spend more
time with their children than most fathers want to. If these differences in desires are – even partly
– caused by hormonal changes during pregnancy and lactation, then we may expect these
differences in desires to exist over a vast range of social environments. Along this line of thought,
one can expect that eradicating the resulting ‘role patterns’ would demand that men and women
constantly compensate for these tendencies. This could be very hard to do, and it could be
dissatisfying. As a consequence, a more effective and satisfying solution to eradicate injustice
could allow for role patterns to evolve without disvaluing one or the other role in, e.g., economic
terms. This implies that one takes into account the inherent desires people have; men who prefer
child care above politics may as well fulfill this role; women who do prefer politics over child
care may pursue their ambitions. But if a majority of mothers spontaneously want to specialize in
child care and service work, why wouldn’t we allow them their choice? Another finding inspired
by evolutionary theories is that grandparents often invest heavily in their grandchildren (Pollet
2007). It is suggested that during our evolution, children did benefit from the help of others than
their parents (Sear & Mace 2008). Thus we can also consider promoting institutionalized child
care or familial assistance, benefiting those mothers who pursue demanding occupations. The
point is that we want both sexes to be considered equally worthy. We also want equal freedom of
choice. It is important to know that some choices could be more specific to men while other
choices could be more specific to women. Gender equality can mean that there exist role patterns
while everybody can pursue their specific ambitions, whatever they are.
Does this account commit the naturalistic fallacy or not? We wanted to know whether sex
differences in occupational habits were to be eradicated or not. We concluded that differences in
time spent in caring for children ought not to be eradicated. This conclusion follows from the
scientifically supported premise that desire to spend time with children is higher in most mothers
than in most men and the moral premise that one ought to promote equal freedom of life choices.
The first premise is a scientific finding. But what is the epistemological status of the second,
moral premise? Clearly, we did not try to establish its truth. It was just used as an assumption.
Therefore, we did not commit the naturalistic fallacy. But this opens the door for another
criticism: If we had used other moral assumptions, our conclusions would have been different as
well. How can scientific information then ever resolve ethical disputes? How can we argue for
one moral assumption and against another?
2.2. Criticisms of scientific ethics and the quest for a foundation
Farber reviews accounts of evolutionary ethics throughout history (Farber 1994). According to
him, sociobiology – the predecessor and behavioral variant of evolutionary psychology – “offers
no new hope, no new foundation” for ethics (idem, 156). Indeed, Farber warns against
reinventing the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary ethics. He is not enthusiastic about other
accounts either. Farber discusses a range of programs in twentieth-century evolutionary ethics, of
which several do not commit the naturalistic fallacy and do not attempt to ground anything. In the
end he concludes that “the newest program for an evolutionary ethics looks […] unpromising as a
theory of ethics” (idem, 166-7). Why doesn’t science promise progress in normative ethics?
Science won’t contribute a foundation since only ethics can ground a moral theory (idem, 163).
What else can science do? In the end, Farber carefully proposes another possibility: “perhaps if
philosophers develop an ethical theory […] that is nonfoundationalist, evolutionary
considerations may enter the philosophical arena” (idem, 165).
Others do not leave this possibility open. Woolcock argues that, “in order to have some normative
relevance, a descriptive theory would seem to have to be able to leap the “is/ought” gap”
(Woolcock 1999, 290). He acknowledges that evolutionary theory cannot do this; we have to
solve our moral differences through normative justification (ibidem). This can’t be an analytic
definition. But what other kinds of justifications are possible? And is a justification really
necessary for ethics?
Rosenberg mentions the two ways in which science can inform ethics. However, “for a theory of
human nature to have ramifications for moral philosophy itself, it will have to do more than any
of these things” (Rosenberg 2000, 120). We must at least be able to derive some moral statement
– a principle, value, obligation, etc. – from a descriptive theory. We cannot begin with
assumptions with normative content because then “these assumptions are doing all the real work,
and […] the biological theory makes no distinctive contribution to the derivation” (ibidem).
Again, we can try to find a derivation that does not commit the naturalistic fallacy; or we can
consider an ethics where no moral statements are derived from descriptive statements alone. I will
argue that the method of normative inquiry may not need to be foundational. But it needs to be
more scientific.
3. Naturalistic ethics and the methods of the sciences
Until now, I have only considered the role of scientific findings in ethics. Naturalistic ethicists
focus on the method of normative inquiry:
“Ethical naturalism is not chiefly concerned with ontology but with the proper way of
approaching moral inquiry.” (Flanagan, 2008, p.5)
Casebeer and Flanagan also make clear what this method consists of:
“The principal approach that I will use […] is best typified as a form of methodological
naturalism, by which I mean that the methodological and epistemological assumptions of the
natural sciences should serve as standards for this inquiry.” (Casebeer 2003, 9)
“The claims of ethical naturalism cannot be shielded from empirical testing. […] ethical science
must be continuous with other sciences”. (Flanagan 2008, 5)
What is the reason of this scientism? According to Rosenberg, naturalism implies that the
methods of the natural sciences are to be the guide for philosophy because of the contingent
historical fact that science has been successful in its aim, i.e. the aim of predicting new
phenomena and controlling the observable world. In other words, in the course of history the
scientific method has shown to be successful in achieving its goals, while other methods haven’t
been successful in achieving their goals. An example can clarify this. Wilson (Wilson 2007, 251252) treats methods and aims that have been tried and failed in the course of recent history.
Before the 16-17th century ‘rational intuition’ was thought to give us direct access to natural laws.
Some patterns in nature were supposed to reflect natural laws or motions, others were unnatural
motions. Natural motions were essential to the particular substance (e.g. falling down is essential
to an earthy object), unnatural motions were induced by an external substance (e.g. the parabolic
motion of a projectile is not essential to the object; someone or something – an external substance
– must have thrown it). Natural laws, so it was believed, could not be found by observation; they
were to be found by the method of rational intuition. The aim of science was to deduce these
natural laws. However, this constellation of methods and aims did not lead to great progress in
questions such as projectile motion. Galileo changed the aim: one should not seek to distinguish
the natural laws versus the unnatural motions. One should try to find exceptionless patterns in the
observable world and forget about whether they are essential or not to the object. These patterns
can be found by observation and experiments on the behavior of changing things. This new
science was very successful (Wilson 2007, 254).
The reasoning is that, if a certain constellation of methods and aims have shown to be
unproductive, it is reasonable to try more successful methods and aims. The reason is thus
historical or contingent. But can the method and aim of science serve as standard for ethical
inquiry? According to Rosenberg, the aim of science is prediction and control of the natural
world. This cannot be easily translated into normative inquiry. But science does put constraints on
what methods are possible for ethics. For one thing, a normative system that is built upon
irrefutable first moral principles is liable to be inconsistent with science. An example is the
catholic’s church persistent focus on chastity, even in regions that are destroyed by aids. The
value of no sex outside marriage is an absolute value according to Catholic teachings. Whether it
is a ticket to heaven, we cannot tell, but a total dedication to monogamy would stop the spreading
of HIV. This is a value that Catholics also want. But the pope will only focus on measures that do
not interfere with promoting monogamy. This leads to the reluctance to promote safe sex in
Catholic organizations and HIV victims that could have been avoided. Naturalistic ethicists will
also promote safe sex because the dedication to monogamy that is necessary to stop HIV will
never come into existence. This illustrates that foundational ethics can lead to the endorsement of
very impractical moral values, and that this can be disastrous. Naturalistic ethicists would not
appeal to foundations in ethics because, among others, foundational normative systems are liable
to lead to a too strict adherence to prescriptions that are impossible according to observation.
There is another reason why naturalistic ethics is nonfoundational. If science preferably endorses
a certain method and aim because this aim-method constellation is successful, then we can apply
this reasoning to normative ethics. The twentieth century was dominated by analytic ethicists who
aimed at truth, derived by the analytic method. This was not highly successful for normative
ethics. Rawls’ reflective equilibrium on the other hand started a revival of normative ethics in the
twentieth century. Reflective equilibrium does not try to build a normative system on first moral
principles. Instead, it considers generalizing moral principles and our moral judgments, and tries
to make them consistent with each other; these principles and judgments are then adapted until
they are consistent with science (Daniels 1996). Thus, this nonfoundational ethical theory may be
more successful than foundational systems. Whether this is in general true must be
4. Conclusion
What can we conclude from all this? There certainly are ethical theories that are
nonfoundationalist. These theories stress the importance of science for ethical progress.
Naturalistic ethics, in the broad sense, does not allow foundations because they are liable to be
inconsistent with science and because nonfoundational ethics like reflective equilibrium have
shown to be more successful in yielding convincing normative claims. Scientific ethics,
naturalistic ethics and reflective equilibrium consider a major role for scientific findings in ethical
progress. Those scientific findings may not be relevant for a normative system that is aimed at
truth, but they are relevant for normative systems that aim to achieve specific observable states of
the world that are considered valuable.
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