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JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council J 0 M U N X I I I Forum: Historic Security Council Issue: The Munich Conference Student Officer: Simay Erciyas Position: Deputy Chair INTRODUCTION The Munich Conference recalls the conference held by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France in September 30, 1938. The conference was to particularly mediate between Germany and Czechoslovakia over a crisis activated by the recent extremely stiffened German demands about German annexation of Sudetenland, currently within the borders of Czechoslovakia, as well as, annexation of majorly Pole and Magyar regions of Czechoslovakia to Poland 1
and Hungary. However, neither Czechoslovakia nor the Soviet Union were asked to attend the conference. Would the four powers of the conference entre war with Czechoslovakia against Germany, if it did not accept German demands? Would Czechoslovakia find the essential military support from any other state, if it chose to go into a war with Germany? Would Germany be willing give up or at least ease its demands from Czechoslovakia for the sake of ‘saving European peace’? These were all questions to be addressed by the Munich Conference. KEY TERMS Sudetenland Refers particularly to northern, southwest, and western areas of Czechoslovakia which were inhabited primarily by 3 German speakers.
Appeasement The policy of making diplomatic concessions to the enemy power when war must be avoided for the best. Adolf Hitler
5 German leader (his position was referred to as Fuhrer in German) who represented Germany at the Munich Conference. 6
Neville Chamberlain Individual who served as Prime Minister of United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940 and presented United Kingdom at the Munich Conference. Edouard Daladier 4 The French premier, first elected in 1933, who represented Germany at the Munich Conference. JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council Benito Mussolini
7 Individual who served as the Prime Minister of Italy from 1922 to 1943 and represented Italy at the Munich Conference. Annex (annexation) (The act of) adding a territory to one’s own territory by appropriation Anglo-­‐German Naval Agreement:
8 While signing the Munich Agreement, Chamberlain and Hitler also signed a paper promising to avoid going into war with each other due to their mutual desire to resolve differences of the past and preserve peace assured by the Munich agreement. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Background Information: Czechoslovakia was broken off from Austro-­‐Hungarian Empire and established as an independent state in 1919. Just like its origin state Austro-­‐Hungary, Czechoslovakia also homed various nationalities: 3.200.000 Germans, 7.450.000, Czechs 2.300.000, Slovaks 720.000, Magyars (Hungarians) 560.000, Ruthenes and 100.000 2
Poles. Contaminating many disparate nationalities which were each resentful of living under a foreigner rule, nationalist uprisings were bound to be a major challenge to the Czechoslovakian governors in the upcoming years. This was especially true for Germans who lived in the region on the western border with Germany referred to as the Sudetenland. Germans of Sudetenland demanded a union with the Germany. For such an aim, Sudeten Germans Peoples Party was created in 1931. The party was personally encouraged and financially supported by Figure 1 Map of Europe (1919) Hitler to rebel against the Czech http://www.bbc.co.uk/staticarchive/654f63644b36afb5a785aa4647ac0f0bff
government. d89633.gif Czechoslovakian government was not to recognise Sudeten Germans’ stances, as doing so would leave the government to be depicted as highly vulnerable by not only its own people, but also by other Great Powers. Other non-­‐Czech nationalities would be emboldened to revolt for their own independence. More literally, Sudetenland was highly-­‐valued by the Czech government also because of the region possessed a site to many essential raw materials (like: coal and lignite mines). Production done within the region drew the economy of Czechoslovakia; one that was emerging to trouble the economies of long-­‐existing Great Powers. For this reason, giving up Sudetenland would be an immense economic burden on the Czech government as it contained many natural resources. Hitler was known at the time for his goals of rising a merely German nation, the Reich, from which no Germans would be excluded in any part of the world. Hence, why he was so determined to free Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakian rule. Additionally, the fact that region was rich in natural resources and economically active also JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council grew Hitler’s appetite towards Sudetenland. His plan was simple, yet astute. He strategically planned to expose Czechoslovakia as a politically instable state, so seeing Czechoslovakia as incapable of keeping order in its own state, other European Powers would allow the transition of the Sudetenland region into the German borders. Therefore, he closely collaborated with and relied on the Sudeten Germans Peoples Party to create political unrest in Czechoslovakia through their nationalist uprisings. The political and social unrest continued throughout the summer of 1938. They were successful to achieve their primary communal goal: Sudeten Germans were presented to be maltreated by the Czechs giving Hitler the excuse for his aggressive stance. Czechoslovakia had a well-­‐developed and professional army. France and USSR also had signed a military agreement promising to support Czechoslovakia in case of an attack from another state. Nevertheless, Hitler was sure that France would not give the promised support to Czechoslovakia and USSR would be lenient to enter a war due to the ongoing conflicts within its own state. Hitler expected that a war with Czechoslovakia would be merely between the two states, not requiring the activation of alliance systems. Britain maintained its prevalent policy of remaining peace and existing ‘balance of power’ amongst European powers in 1930s. Therefore, if Hitler could really convince Neville Chamberlain (Britain) that Czechoslovakia was incapable of controlling a multinational state, then not only British support but also support from France and Russia would be guaranteed. That is exactly what happened with the appeasement policy of Britain. Despite the military agreements with Czechoslovakia, no nation was keen or capable of going into a war with Germany. Britain, who was still a major 1
naval power at the time, did not have an efficient army or air forces to fight at the ‘too faraway foreign lands’. The military chiefs of Chamberlain predicted that a war with Germany would mean the death of over one million people in just 60 days. Chamberlain was not keen on risking such a war with Germany and started attempts for negotiation with Hitler in September 1938. During their first meeting in Berchtesgaden (Southern Germany), Hitler demanded the transfer of Sudetenland to Germany. Overlooking the necessity to consult with Czechoslovakia, Britain agreed on handing over to Germany the Czech regions with population over 50% constituting of Germans. France and Russia also agreed the terms of this negotiation between Britain and Germany. nd
The second meeting of Hitler and Chamberlain was planned to be in September 22 to work out the final details of the negotiations made in Berchtesgaden. To surprise of Chamberlain, Hitler now demanded more than simply taking over major German areas in Czechoslovakian borders. Hitler also wanted to annex Sudetenland entirely and demanded return of the major Pole and Hungarian regions to Poland and Hungary. France and Britain rejected the new terms of the negotiation and started mobilising for war. Mussolini suggested a third conference to be held in favour of solving the problems through negotiations rather than war; referred to as The Munich Conference. Representatives of Italy, Germany, France and Britain were asked to attend this conference in Munich. Czechoslovakia was not asked to attend, neither was Soviet Union. This was regarded as a major disrespect and taken as an insult by the Soviet Union leader, Joseph Stalin. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE During the conference critical decisions were made concerning the destiny of the currently Czech owned Sudetenland. The four powers agreed the annexation of Sudetenland by Germany without consulting with JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council Czechoslovakia. This approach to the crisis was known as appeasement, which was a policy especially initiated by the British prime minister, Chamberlain. German Approach:
8 à Hitler gave order to start preparations for a military attack the small republic next-­‐door, Czechoslovakia on st
October 1 , 1938. à On March 28, 1928, Hitler sent an order to the head of Sudeten Germans Peoples Party, Konrad Henlein, to cause trouble in Czechoslovakia. à But his order was appalled by the General Staff: war on Czechoslovakia would quickly escalate into another European war. The small republic had allied great powers of the time: Britain, France and Soviet Russia. German army had suffered a major defeat in World War I and was not ready for another defeat. à Hitler replaced the chief of the General Staff that opposed his orders with a new chief. à The new chief General Staff and the new one organised a group of conspirators and generated a plan to arrest Hitler the moment he gave an order to actually invade Czechoslovakia. à The whole scenario relied on Britain and France holding a firm stance against Hitler’s demands. à British premier, Chamberlain, was surprisingly sympathetic to Hitler’s demands, thus favoured anything it may take to warrant peace in Europe. à September 15, 1938, Chamberlain met Hitler. Chamberlain, being the head of the government of Europe’s one of the most powerful states, Hitler was soother throughout the discussion. He used the ‘persecution’ of the Sudeten Germans to convince Chamberlain to simply handover Sudetenland to Germany. à Although Chamberlain had asked Hitler to delay any military actions until the British government and France approve. à Nevertheless, Hitler secretly kept preparing for invasion of Czechoslovakia. He earned the stance of Poland and Hungary while splitting Czechoslovakia, promising each Czech lands containing Poles and Magyars. nd
à On September 22 , Chamberlain and Hitler met again. Chamberlain had come with the relief to announce to Hitler that both British government and France were to comply with his demands. Hitler rejected his precious demands and called for occupation of Sudetenland by the German Army by October 1s, as well as, removal of all non-­‐Germans from the area. à This gave opportunity for anti-­‐Hitler conspirators in Germany to proceed with their plans as soon as he gave the order to invade Czechoslovakia. Hitler’s demanding stance was also unpopular by the German nation, who did not want to undergo another major war. à Hitler decided to step-­‐back. He sent a letter to Chamberlain that he would be appeased if the Sudetenland was simply given to Germany and he would even prevent any further challenge to Czechoslovakian territories. à As Mussolini had suggested, a conference in Munich was to be held between the four powers. à However, the Nazis secretly submitted a proposal to Mussolini, which he would introduce to Munich Conference as it was his own approach to the Sudeten-­‐question. à This Mussolini incited and German influenced agreement, The Munich Agreement, was signed by the four th
leaders on October 10 . Please note a key feature of the nature of Hitler’s politics: Demand more every time Czechoslovakia was about to give in. 8
British Approach : à Many British at the time wanted peace. They would not support Czechoslovakia in case of a war in 1938. à Treaty of Versailles, signed at the end of World War I, proposed respect for ‘self-­‐determinism’. This meant that nations sharing language or religion ought to form their own national state. The approach was JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council contradictory in its nature, regards to annexation of Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia by the terms of the treaty, as the region was vastly populated by Germans. Hitler’s complaints, after all, seemed reasonable. à Britain still had not recovered from the social and economic debt as a result of the First World War. à Britain also feared the expansion of Bolshevik Russia, who could easily take advantage of an unstable Germany. A more strengthened Germany would serve as a better buffer against Russian expansion. à Peace in Europe was desirable, having seen the vast economic and social implications of a world war. Maintaining peace was believed to require avoiding feelings of revenge. Britain already found the terms of Treaty of Versailles excessively hard on Germany at the time, thus leading Chamberlain to support German demands. French Approach: à Initially, France did not favour the appeasement policy of Britain. This was because France saw Germany responsible for the damage that had been done to French grounds during World War I. à Also, helping Germany would aid it economically recover from the burden post-­‐World War I. French policy was to create as much burden on Germany as possible, prevent its easy recovery from the war, thus prevent it from gaining the strength to invade France once again. à Chamberlain was able to persuade Daladier that European peace could only be assured once Hitler is appeased. Italian Approach (Why did Mussolini call for a conference?)
9 à After receiving hostility for invading Abyssinia from the Western Allies, Mussolini could only seek an alliance with Germany. à During the Spanish civil wars of 1936, both Hitler and Mussolini sent troops in support of Nationalists against the Republicans, which were supported by Stalin (of Russia). This helped to strengthen Hitler-­‐
Mussolini relationships, witnessing the strength of each other’s military, and possibility of harmonising their powers. à In September 1937, Mussolini visited Germany. Hitler prepared an ostentatious parade of the Germany military to successfully convince Mussolini for an alliance. à Chamberlain asked Mussolini to negotiate with Hitler on his behalf. On this order, Mussolini called for a joint summit of Germany, Britain, France and Italy. Hitler agreed to this call and chosen location was to be Munich. à It was an opportunity for Mussolini to act as an impressing ‘mediating’ figure. à At the conference, Mussolini introduced his modified solution. Indeed, Mussolini’s new approach was incited by Nazis themselves, containing the basic essence of Hitler’s ultimate demands, and was given to Mussolini in secret. à Chamberlain and Daladier, desperate to ensure peace, accepted Mussolini’s approach at the conference. TIMELINE 15 September: Neville Chamberlain meets Hitler in Berchtesgaden and admitted that Sudeten Germans should freely be able to choose by which country they wish to be ruled. 18 September: Chamberlain persuades France to agree his appeasement approach. 21 September: Chamberlain informs the Czech government that they must agree to such decisions taken by Britain and France. JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council 22 September: Chamberlain reassures Hitler that Sudeten Germans are now free to decide. Hitler abandons his demands, saying no longer wants the Sudeten Germans to decide, but demands that Sudetenland must be th
returned to Germany immediately. To this demand, on 24 of September, Czechoslovakia prepares its army to fight Germany. 29 September: Chamberlain meets Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier at Munich and the agreement. According to the agreement, Sudetenland will be returned to Germany immediately. Czechoslovakia was left to agree with the terms of the negotiation with the counter possibility of going into war with Germany without any allies. Hitler also signed the Anglo-­‐German naval agreement with Chamberlain, which assured the countries that they would not go to war again. 30 September: Chamberlain and Daladier were welcomed in their country with joyous crowds, relieved of the absenteeism of fears of war. Chamberlain announced, to the British public, his accomplishment of “peace with honour, [which he believed to be] the peace at the time being” (Chamberlain, Encyclopaedia Britannica). His words were criticized by Winston Churchill, stating that “[Chamberlain] was given the choice between war and dishonour, [and he] chose dishonour and [he] will have war” (Chamberlain, Encyclopaedia Britannica). Figure 2 M ap Displaying the territorial changes after the M unich Agreement http://www.ustrcr.cz/en/milestones-­‐in-­‐recent-­‐czech-­‐history-­‐1938-­‐1989 Results of the 2
appeasement: à Promised parts of Czechoslovakia were distributed to Poland and Hungary. à Both Britain and Germany earned a year to prepare their militaries for a war. à Hitler was emboldened to take a more firm stand for his demands, who interpreted the lack of British or French opposition as fear of German powers. à Russia understood that neither Britain nor France could be trusted for stopping Germany, hence a war with Germany was inevitable. JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council à Chamberlain was morally ready for war, who had learned that war was inevitable, despite his appeasement policy. 2
Invasion of Czechoslovakia: On 15 March 1939, German troops invaded Czechoslovakia, annexing Bohemia, and establishing protectorate over Slovakia. It appeared that, after all, Hitler was not truthful about his reasons to annex Sudetenland, who used nationalistic aspirations as an excuse to annex a greater part of Czechoslovakia. th
On 17 of March, Chamberlain spoke about his fears that Germany could invade other countries. st
On 31 March, Chamberlain promised British support to Poland and Hungary, if German were to pose a threat. st
On October 1 , 1938, the German troops occupied the Sudetenland, followed by the Polish and Hungarian annexation of Czech areas with a population consisting majorly of Poles and Magyars. What happened next? The following year (March 1939), Hitler annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia, following an invasion of Poland in September. Munich Agreement proved to be, in Hitler’s perspective, nothing more than a pretext to appease Hitler’s expansionist to totalitarian intentions. USEFUL WEBSITES AND BOOKS http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/czechoslovakia_1938.htm 1 http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/chamberlainandappeasementrev1.shtml http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/397522/Munich-­‐Agreement http://spartacus-­‐educational.com/2WWdaladier.htm 3 4 http://www.biography.com/people/adolf-­‐hitler-­‐9340144 5 http://www.biography.com/people/neville-­‐chamberlain-­‐9243721 http://www.history.com/topics/world-­‐war-­‐ii/benito-­‐mussolini
6 7 http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/triumph/tr-­‐munich.htm 8 http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/italy_and_germany_1936_to_1940.htm 9 2 JoMUN XIII Historic Security Council WORKS CITED "Adolf Hitler." Bio. A&E Television Networks, 2015. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
5 "Benito Mussolini." History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 29 Apr. 2015. <http://www.history.com/topics/world-­‐war-­‐ii/benito-­‐mussolini>.
7 "Chamberlain and Appeasement." BBC News. BBC, n.d. Web. 29 Apr. 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir1/chamberlainandappeasementrev1.sht
ml>.
2 "Italy and Germany 1936 to 1940." History Learning Site. HistoryLearningSite.co.uk, 30 June 2004. Web. 02 May 2015. <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/italy_and_germany_1936_to_1940.htm>. 9 "Munich Agreement | Europe [1938]." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Encyclopedia Britannica, 9 Feb. 2015. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/397522/Munich-­‐Agreement>.
"Neville Chamberlain." Bio. A&E Television Networks, 2015. Web. 29 Apr. 2015.
3 6 Simkin, John. "Spartacus Educational." Spartacus Educational. Spartacus Educational, Sept. 1997. Web. 29 Apr. 2015. <http://spartacus-­‐educational.com/2WWdaladier.htm>.
4 "The Czech Crisis of 1938". HistoryLearningSite.co.uk. 2014. Web. <http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/czechoslovakia_1938.htm.>
1 "Triumph of Hitler: Conquest at Munich." The History Place. The History Place, 2001. Web. 02 May 2015. <http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/triumph/tr-­‐munich.htm>.
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