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Transcript
Anaconda Plan – Union Approach
The Anaconda Plan was originally developed by General Winfield Scott prior to the Civil War. It was part of a grand
plan designed to control the seceding states.
It called for the blockade of southern ports and in taking control of the Mississippi River to cut the South in two. It was
not unlike the actions of an Anaconda snake in slowly constricting and suffocating its victim hence the name.
The Mississippi
Scott’s plan called for small bands of troops to make an aggressive move south down the Mississippi River and seizing
key objectives along the way. They would be part of a larger force numbering 70,000 or more but would be broken
down into smaller segments for speed and would launched their attacks via amphibious assaults.
They would be trailed by a more traditional army that would secure the captured objectives along the way with forts in
New Orleans being the ultimate objective. Once these forts could be taken, the Confederacy would be cut in two and
severely weakened.
There were problems with this part of the plan however. The navy did not at that time possess the ships they would
need to carry out these amphibious assaults. Also they were short of trained Captains and navy personnel that would be
necessary for the plan’s success.
The Blockade
The most important aspect of this plan would be the naval blockade of the entire south including the Gulf of Mexico
and the eastern Atlantic seaboard. If the southern states could not export cotton and other goods to Europe, they would
be severely hampered financially and this would greatly affect their ability to wage war.
Shortly after the shots were fired on Fort Sumter, Lincoln had proposed a naval blockade of the south. Although the
blockade was already in place, the navy did not yet have enough ships or men to enforce it with maximum effect. This
would come later on as the war progressed.
Criticism of the Plan
The Anaconda Plan had its critics by those who thought the war could be won quickly with a few decisive land battles in
the east. They didn’t think the south had the stomach for the war and would give up quickly when faced with losses.
Although the plan was not officially adopted, Lincoln followed it as a rough plan throughout the war and understood the
importance of controlling the Mississippi even when others did not.
Many historians would argue that the Union victories on the Mississippi were more critical to the outcome of the war
then the clash of the great armies in the east. It is debatable whether the blockade was critical to defeating the south but
it certainly proved to have some effect.
Though it was never fully implemented, the Anaconda Plan proved it’s value and regained lost credibility following the
war as a plan that could have ended the war sooner.
Confederate Strategy
There were several strategy options available to Confederate leaders at the beginning of the Civil War to
oppose the Union plan.
The Northern strategy for the conduct of the war was proposed by General-in-Chief Winfield Scott. The
technical name was a cordon offensive. It meant attacking everywhere, encircling the enemy. It emulated the
way constrictors attack and so was named “The Anaconda Plan” after the great snake of the Amazon region.
Confederate president Jefferson Davis settled on an offensive-defensive strategy as a response to the Northern
plan. The basic concept was to remain on the defensive until an opportunity presented itself to launch offensive
operations. It ensured that all Northern thrusts would be met thereby assuring Confederate citizens that their
homes would be defended, at least initially. Davis’ plan also fit the image he wished to promote to the world
that the South was fighting only in self-defense.
Criticisms
One major criticism that historians unleash against Davis’ strategy is that the Southern armies too often took to
the offensive wasting meager resources as well as lives for little or no gains. A second objection questions why
Confederate leaders failed to encourage wild-scale guerrilla warfare from the start of the war. Guerrilla warfare
would have conserved resources and drawn the war out. The Northern public would likely not have supported
such a conflict for long. Southern guerrillas operating in the Western and Trans-Mississippi theatres during the
war had much success tying up Union forces.
Guerrilla War Not Possible
Although many historians believe that a guerrilla war might have won Southern independence, the concept did
not sit well with the notion of Southern honor, the ideal of meeting the enemy on the field of battle according
to the regular methods of warfare.
West Pointers like Lee, Beauregard, Johnston and others thought irregular war was too abhorrent an idea. It is
difficult to imagine them leading guerrilla bands. It also seems unlikely that the institution of slavery could
have been kept intact if the Confederacy had resorted to guerrilla warfare.
Guerrilla war also did not suit the national image that the Confederacy wished to cultivate of a civilized nation
in being. Such a state should have proper armed forces and engage in traditional warfare. Guerrilla war would
have made European recognition harder to achieve and with no outside help guerrilla wars almost inevitably
fail.
Offensive Action Popular
It was politically difficult for Confederate leaders to avoid offensive action. Evidence indicates tremendous
popular sentiment in the South during the war for offensive operations. Confederate citizens were constantly
clamoring for taking the war to the enemy and reacted to news of Southern armies advancing onto Northern
soil with great enthusiasm.
Many Confederate generals had a fondness for the attack. General Lee had become convinced by observing
General Scott’s offensives in Mexico in 1847, that much could be achieved by bold offensive moves. Other
Southern commanders were equally sure that the attack was the best policy. Defensive minded commanders
like J. E. Johnston were unpopular with the general public and hence with the government as well.
Besides its unpopularity, a totally defensive strategy might not have worked for the Confederacy either. On
those occasions when Southern armies were forced on the defensive, the campaign usually ended in sieges or
counteroffensives which ultimately resulted in huge casualties.
A Possibility Not Considered
A third course of action for Confederate leaders would have been the adoption of “semi-guerrilla warfare.” This
strategy would have involved fielding a small mobile army or two that could have lived primarily off the land,
or in any case would have required fewer supplies to sustain them. Union armies would have been allowed
inside the Confederacy but then constantly harassed by the smaller Confederate mobile armies supported by
guerrilla bands operating locally.
Historical examples indicated how successful this type of strategy could be. Fabius used the concept effectively
against Hannibal in the Second Punic War. The Russians had great success against Napoleon with it, and the
Americans themselves followed a similar course to victory in the Revolutionary War.
The main problem with the strategy was that it meant surrendering territory to the enemy and almost
guaranteed a lengthy conflict. Given that the concept was well known at the time it is odd to note that it does
not even seem to have even been seriously considered by Southern political or military leaders as a war strategy.