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TheBalfourDeclaration,November1917
Introduction
OneofthemostimportantstatementsofBritishforeignpolicyofthetwentieth
century,the‘BalfourDeclaration’wasnomorethanashort,vagueletterthathadno
legalstatus.IthadnotbeendebatedinParliament.Yetitwasoneofthemost
significanteventsleadingultimatelytothecreationofthestateofIsraelandconflict
betweenJewsandArabs.
Inthisletterof2November1917,Britain’sForeignSecretary,ArthurBalfour,wrote
toLordLionelWalterRothschild,asafigureheadoftheJewishcommunityinBritain:
HisMajesty'sgovernmentviewwithfavourtheestablishmentin
PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishpeople,andwillusetheir
bestendeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeing
clearlyunderstoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudice
thecivilandreligiousrightsofexistingnon-Jewishcommunitiesin
Palestine,ortherightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedbyJewsinany
othercountry.
ThisletterwaslaterincorporatedwithinthetermsofBritain’sMandatefor
Palestine,andsobecamealegalrequirementuponBritain.
Wheredidtheideaofthedeclarationcomefromoriginally?
In1903theBritishgovernmenthadofferedpartofEastAfricatotheJewishpeople
asahomelandandrefugefrompersecution;thiswasknownasthe‘Uganda
Scheme’.ZionistopinionwassplitbetweenthosewhowelcomedUgandaasa
temporaryrefuge,andthosedeterminedtoholdoutforahomelandinPalestine.
TheZionistCongressof1905declinedBritain’soffer.
Emergingfromthiscul-de-sac,Zionistscontinuedtolobbyforahomelandin
Palestine,(thenpartoftheOttomanEmpire)andmadesignificantinroadsintothe
Britishpoliticalestablishment.
OnceBritaindeclaredwaronTurkeyon5November1914,theideaofaJewish
homelandinOttomanPalestinebegantoseemlessremote.Presumingthatthe
Turkswouldeventuallybedefeated,Britainbegantothinkintermsofcarvingupthe
OttomanEmpire.On9November1914,LloydGeorgespokeinCabinetaboutthe
‘ultimatedestinyofPalestine’which,hetoldHerbertSamuel,hesawasbecoming
aJewishstate.1Inearly1915,Samuel,(himselfJewish),putforwardtotheCabinet
amemorandum,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,whichadvocatedtheannexationof
PalestinebyBritaintoallowfortheultimateself-governmentofJewishimmigrants.2
PrimeMinisterAsquiththoughttheideaabsurd,butfromthenonthegovernment
becameincreasinglysympathetictoZionistgoals.
2
InMarch1916theForeignOfficerespondedtoasuggestionfromLucienWolf,a
JewishopponentofZionism,thattheAlliesshouldmakeadeclarationsupporting
thesettlementofJewsinPalestineasarefugefrompersecution.ForeignSecretary
EdwardGreywaspreparedtogofurther,insupportinganautonomousJewish
settlementinPalestine,andsawthisashavingthepotentialtowintheacclaimof
worldJewryforBritain.3ButWeizmannandtheZionistsfundamentallydisagreed
withWolfaboutthereasonsforsuchasettlement,whichtheyenvisionednotjustas
arefugefrompersecution,butasahomeforahomelesspeople,wheretheycould
stopbeingtheassimilatedmembersofothercultures.
WhatwastheroleofWeizmann?
ChaimWeizmannwasaRussianJewwhocametoBritainin1904toworkasLecturer
inChemistryatManchesterUniversity.Hesoonbecamethechiefspokesmanofthe
ZionistcauseinBritain,winningtheadherenceofsuchinfluentialfiguresasCPScott,
editoroftheManchesterGuardian.Weizmannusedhisremarkablecharmand
audacitytolobbyfortheZionistcauseatthehighestlevels,representinghimselfas
themouthpieceofthewholeJewishpeople.4
BytheFirstWorldWarWeizmann,thechemist,hadalsodiscoveredsomethingof
criticalimportancetothewareffort:ameansofproducingtheingredientsforlarge
quantitiesofexplosivesthroughbacterialfermentation.Offeringhisprocessfor
makingacetonetothegovernment,atatimewhentheneedformunitionshad
neverbeengreater,undoubtedlyenhancedWeizmann’sreputationamongstthe
politicalestablishment,notleastwiththeMinisterofMunitions,LloydGeorge,who
wasalreadysympathetictoZionism.AlthoughLloydGeorgelatersuggestedthatthe
BalfourDeclarationhadbeenarewardforWeizmann’schemicalwork,thereisno
evidenceforthis,andWeizmannhimselfdeniedtheidea.5
WhywereBritishpoliticianspredisposedtotheideaofZionism?
LloydGeorgehadfirstbeenconnectedwiththeZionistcausein1903whenhislaw
firmactedforHerzlconcerningthe‘UgandaScheme’,6aprojectwhichthethen
PrimeMinister,ArthurBalfour,alsoendorsed.BalfourhimselfmetWeizmannin
1906.7However,theactiveZionismofbothmenseemstohavegrownaftera
meetingbetweenWeizmannandLloydGeorge,HerbertSamuelandJosiah
Wedgwood,arrangedbyScottinDecember1914.Weizmannwassurprisedto
discoverthateveryonepresentseemedfavourablydisposedtohisideas.8Sowhat
hadinclinedthesepoliticalfigurestotheZionistcause?
LloydGeorge’sZionistconvictionsstemmedfromaconvergenceofreligiousideals,
romanticnotionsandimperialistobjectives:whattheZionistswantedinPalestine
dovetailedwithbothhisreligiousformationandwhatwouldserveBritishinterests.
ThroughhisWelshChapelupbringing,hehadbeenseepedinthehistoryofthe
Jewishpeopleinitsbiblicalheyday.InPalestinehesaw‘ahistoricandsacredland,
throbbingfromDantoBeershebawithimmortaltraditions’.9Zionismoffered(the
nowatheist)LloydGeorgetheromanticprospectofputtingIsraelbackonthemap,
3
wheretohimitbelonged,inthecourseofproviding‘anationalhearthandarefuge
forthehuntedchildrenofIsrael’.10
Inhismemorandumonthe‘FutureofPalestine’in1915,HerbertSamuelhad
remindedtheBritishCabinetthat‘widespreadanddeep-rootedintheProtestant
worldisasympathywiththeideaofrestoringtheHebrewpeopletothelandwhich
wastobetheirinheritance’andthattherewasinBritain‘anintenseinterestinthe
fulfilmentoftheprophecieswhichhaveforetoldit’.11Fromhischildhood,Arthur
BalfourhadbeensteepedinpreciselythisBible-reading,evangelicalculture,andhis
resultinginterestintheJewishpeoplemadehislaterconversiontoZionismasimple
matter.LongbeforehemetWeizmann,hehadbelievedthatChristendom’sdebtto
JudaismhadbeenshamefullyrepaidbytheChristianworld.Toreturnthehomeless
JewishpeopletoZionwouldallowBritainthehonourofrightingthiswrong.12Once
BalfourbecameForeignSecretaryinlate1916,hismeetingswithWeizmannbecame
moreintense,ononeoccasioncontinuingintoalongwalkinthesmallhours.Itwas
afterthisthatBalfourinformedtheCabinet,inMarch1917,thathewasaZionist.13
TherapidconversionofSirMarkSykestoZionismtookplacein1916aftermeeting
firstDrMosesGaster,theSephardicChiefRabbi,andthenaGentileZionist,James
Malcolm,andseemstohavestemmedfromhisdeephatredofinjusticeand
sympathyfortheJewsasunderdogs.Sykes’conversiontothisviewwasalmostas
significantasBalfour’s;heseemstohavegalvanisedtheCabinettoconsideraZionist
declarationasakeytogainingAmericansupportinthewar.Althoughnomorethan
aPoliticalSecretarytotheCabinet,during1917SykesassumedtheroleofintermediarybetweentheZionistsandWhitehall,keepinguppersistentpressureonhis
politicalsuperiorstoachieveadeclaration.14
ItwasSykeswhoopenedtheeyesofLeopoldAmerytoZionism.Amerywasanother
SecretarytotheCabinet,andinfactasecretJew.Ameryexplainedhisnew-found
supportforZionisminstrategicterms:therewouldbegreatadvantagetoBritainin
havingagratefulJewishpopulationinPalestine.HealsoforesawareductioninantiSemitismoncethepositionoftheJewswasnormalisedandtheyhadalandoftheir
own.ItwouldbeAmerywhomadesignificantchangestothedraftoftheeventual
declaration.15
LordAlfredMilner,GeneralJanSmutsandLordRobertCecilalsobecameconverts
whobroughttheir‘eagerandactiveinfluence’tobear.16
Whatisnoticeableaboutthepro-Zionistsentimentsofnon-JewslikeLloydGeorge
andBalfouristhewaytheycombinedadeeplyemotionalsympathyfortheZionist
dream–BalfourcouldbemovedtotearslisteningtoWeizmann–withascarcelyveiledanti-Semitism.LordRobertCecil,Under-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,used
languagecharacteristicofthisattitudewhenhecommented:‘Idonotthinkitiseasy
toexaggeratetheinternationalpoweroftheJews’.17Itwaswidelybelievedthat
somemysteriousbutwell-organisedJewishconspiracywasbentondeterminingthe
outcomeofthewar;theirinfluenceand,aboveall,theirmoney,couldswayRussia,
theUnitedStatesorGermany,toBritain’sgoodorill.Togaintheinternational
4
favouroftheJewswasthereforeinBritain’svitalinterest;tooffendcouldbefatal.
SinceWeizmannimpliedthatZionismspokefortheJewsoftheworld,itfollowed
thattheZionistsshouldbehelped.Itwas,LloydGeorgewrotelater,aquestionof
making‘acontractwithJewry’.18
HowdidthetidemoveinfavouroftheZionistidea?
Formostof1916therewasnocriticaldesireintheCabinettopursuetheZionist
goal:PrimeMinisterAsquithwasscepticalandLloydGeorgewastakenupwith
IrelandandMunitions.However,inDecember1916therewasachangeof
government,withLloydGeorgebecomingPrimeMinisterofanadministrationthat
includedMilner,BalfourandCecil–allconvincedZionists–supportedbya
secretariatthatincludedthenewZionists,SykesandAmery.
InFebruary1917SykesbegandiscussionswithWeizmann,(whosestatusinLondon
wasnowsemi-official,sincetheZionistshadbeengrantedtheirrequesttouse
officialchannelsfortheirinternationalcommunications).19TheZionistswereagainst
anyideaofanAnglo-FrenchcondominiumoverPalestine(asimpliedbytheSykesPicotagreement).TheyhadurgedBritaintoannexPalestinesothatshecouldactas
thesoleprotectoroftheJewishcause.20TheCabinetwaspersuadedtojettison
Sykes-Picot’splansforaninternationaladministrationinPalestine,andmove
towardsexclusiveBritishcontrol.WhenAllenbytookovercommandofthe
ExpeditionaryForceinPalestineinJune1917,hewasinstructedtocapture
JerusalembyChristmas.Forthefirsttimeitbegantolookapracticalpossibilitythat
BritaincouldchampionaJewishNationalHome.
MeanwhiletherehadbeenrevolutioninRussiainFebruary1917.Afterwidespread
mutiniesintheRussianarmy,therewasdoubtthatRussiawouldcontinuetofighton
theAlliedside.TheBritishgovernmentwasconvincedthatRussianJewsweremainly
pro-Zionist,andthataBritishpronouncementinfavourofZionismwouldtherefore
helptokeepRussiainthewar.
ForeignSecretaryBalfourreturnedfromtheUnitedStatesinApril1917withthe
supportofPresidentWilsonforaBritishdeclarationconcerningPalestine.InJune
theFrenchForeignSecretary,JulesCambon,alsogavehissupportto‘Jewish
colonisationinPalestine’.21
Thesamemonth,WeizmannwarnedLondonthattheGermangovernmentwas
planningtotakeuptheZionistcause,andthatJewishopinioncouldswingagainst
Britainandinfavourofherenemy.Whateverthetruthofthisclaim,the‘German
threat’remainedapotentinfluenceontheCabinetrightthroughtoOctober,when
theDeclarationwasapproved.22WeizmannalsoimpliedthatthemajorityofJews
worldwidewereZionists,whowouldapplaudBritain’sactions.Infact,Zionists
remainedaverysmallminorityamongstJewsforsometimetocome.23Underthis
pressurefromWeizmann,BalfourinvitedLordRothschildtosubmitaformulafora
declarationsupportingaJewishNationalHome.
5
Howwasthedeclarationfirstdrafted?
JewishZionistsandgovernmentofficialsworkedtogetheronthefirstdraftofa
declarationthatwaseventuallyproposedtoBalfourbyLordWalterRothschildin
July1917.24Thewordingrepresentedavictoryforthosewhothoughtthata
moderatewordingwasmorelikelytogainofficialapprovaloverthosewhowanted
todemandaJewishstatefromtheoutset.Eventhismoderatewordingrequired
BritaintoacceptthatPalestineshouldbereconstitutedasthenationalhomeofthe
Jewishpeople,implyingnoplacefortheexistingmajorityArabpopulation.
Whatkindofoppositionwastheretotheidea?
Fromtheoutset,almostalltheoppositiontoadeclarationcamefromwithinthe
Jewishcommunityitself.VeryfewArabswereawarethatsuchaproposalwasinthe
offing,andsotheirvoicewaslargelysilentinthedebatethatragedthroughthe
summerandautumnof1917.SherifHusseinandFeisalhadbeeninformedofthe
planviaJamesMalcolm,SykesandLawrence,andhadgiventheirreluctantassent.25
However,theArabsinPalestineitselfcouldnotbeconsulted(LloydGeorgelater
argued)astheywereinenemyterritory,andwerethereforedeemedtobefighting
againstBritain.26OnlyafewEuropeanvoiceswereraisedontheirbehalf.
ThedisagreementbetweenWolfandWeizmannwhichwasdevelopingin1917
eruptedinpubliccontroversyon24MaywhentheConjointCommitteeoftheJewish
BoardofDeputiesandtheAnglo-JewishAssociationwrotetoTheTimes,advocating
theirmorelimitedobjectiveforJewishsettlementinPalestine.27Theirletter
condemnedtheZionistplanasnotonlywrong,butdangerous,inclaimingspecial
rightsforJewsoverthelocalmajority.TheletterrejectedtheZionistconceptofthe
JewsasahomelessnationalitythatneededahomeinPalestine.Inwhatamounted
toapowerstrugglewithintheEnglishJewishcommunity,theZionistfaction
narrowlydefeatedtheConjointCommitteethefollowingmonth.28
However,thiswasnottheendoftheprotestfromwithintheJewishcommunity.
InAugust,EdwinMontagu,the(Jewish)SecretaryofStateforIndia,launcheda
vehementprotestintheCabinetentitled‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresent
Government’.Montagu’soppositiontoZionism,whichhecalled‘amischievous
politicalcreed’,wasbasedonafearthatJewslikehimself,whowerethoroughly
assimilatedinanothercountry,wouldbeexpectedtouproottoPalestine,andthus
losethecitizenshiptheycovetedsohighly.MontagualsoaskedwhethertheZionist
planintendedtomovePalestinianArabsoutofthewayforJews.29
Montagucontinuedhisattackonadeclarationtotheveryend.TheninOctober
1917therecameanotherlastminuteprotest,thistimefromLordCurzon,Leaderof
theHouseofLords.IgnoringtheinternalJewishfeud,theformerViceroyofIndia
outlinedtheimpracticalitiesandambiguities,ashesawthem,intheZionistplanfor
Palestine.WerealltheJewsoftheworldsupposedtofitinthissmallcountry?Did
theZionistsreallyintendtoestablishaJewishstate,ornot?Andwhatwastohappen
totheindigenousArabpopulation,whowouldneveracceptasubordinaterole?The
ideaofaJewishNationalHomewas,hecautioned,arecipeforfailure.30
6
Howdidthedraftsofthedeclarationchangeduring1917?
ThedraftsofthedeclarationwerediscussedatthreemeetingsoftheWarCabinet,
on3September,4Octoberand31October,1917.31
The3SeptemberCabinetmeetingconsideredamoreconciliatorydraftofthe
declarationfromLordMilner,whichproposedPalestineasahomefortheJewish
people,ratherthanthehomeofthepreviousdraft.UndertheforceofMontagu’s
attack,theCabinetdeferredadecisiononthedeclaration,anddecidedtoseekthe
opinionofPresidentWilsononthematter.
DuringSeptemberWeizmannandRothschildcontinuedtopressurethegovernment
toissueitsdeclaration,sayingthatMontaguonlyrepresentedaminority
‘assimilationist’view,whilsttheZionistsrepresentedthe‘non-assimilated’masses.
BecauseofthedelayscreatedbyMontagu’sobjections,therewasdoubtasto
whetherthedeclarationwouldbeapprovedattheCabinetmeetingon4October.
LeopoldAmeryrelateshow,halfanhourbeforethemeeting,Milneraskedhimto
draftadditionalclauseswhichwouldhelpmeettheconcernsaboutthedeclaration,
bothpro-ArabandJewish,withoutchangingitssubstance.32
ThenewAmery-Milnerdraftread:
HisMajesty’sGovernmentviewswithfavourtheestablishmentin
PalestineofanationalhomefortheJewishraceandwilluseitsbest
endeavourstofacilitatetheachievementofthisobject,itbeing
clearlyunderstoodthatnothingshallbedonewhichmayprejudice
thecivilandreligiousrightsofexistingnon-Jewishcommunitiesin
Palestineortherightsandpoliticalstatusenjoyedinanyother
countrybysuchJewswhoarefullycontentedwiththeirexisting
nationality.
Nevertheless,theOctober4Cabinetmeetingcontinuedtodeferadecisiononthe
declarationbecauseofanotherpleafromMontagu;itwasdecidedtosubmitthe
newAmery-MilnerdrafttoPresidentWilsonandtorepresentativeJewishleadersin
Britain.
ThedeclarationwouldnowonlybemodifiedinveryminorwaysatthefinalCabinet
meetingof31OctoberbeforeitwassenttoLordRothschild,whohadbeenoneof
itsoriginalauthorsthreemonthsbefore.
Whatwasthesignificanceoftheadditionalsafeguardingclauses?
ItwouldseemthatAmeryhastilytackedonthetwosafeguardingclauses(firstly,
protectingtherightsofthenon-JewishcommunitiesinPalestine,andsecondly,the
rightsofJewsinothercountries)thefirsttosatisfyLordCurzon,andthesecondto
mollifyMontagu.
7
Thecomplaintsof‘assimilatedJews’likeMontaguhadbeenattheforefrontof
publicdebateformonthsduetotheirfearthattheveryexistenceofa‘Jewish
NationalHome’wouldcallintoquestionthepatrioticloyaltyofJewsinother
countries–thisbeingwartime-andcouldthusbeacauseofanti-Semitism.Thenew
clause,safeguardingthestatusofJewsinothercountries,addressedthisfear.This
additiontothedeclarationisnotentirelysurprising,givenwhathadgonebefore.
Bycontrast,therehadbeenverylittletosuggestthattheconcernsoftheArab
populationofPalestinewerelikelytobeheededatthisjuncture.UnlikeJews,their
voiceswererarelyheardinthedebate,andsoitwasuptootherstospeakontheir
behalf.WhenchallengedabouttheArabpopulation,ZionistslikeLordWalter
RothschildinsistedtherewasnoquestionthattheJewishNationalHomewouldever
encroachontherightsofthelocalmajority.33Butthe‘assimilationists’werenotso
sure.HowcouldthisapparentfairnessbereconciledwiththeZionistinsistencethat
theJewswereanexceptionalcase,whomustgetspecialtreatmentwhenitcameto
unfetteredimmigration,forexample?
Infact,theZionistshadcomeupwithwhattheydeemedasolutiontothe‘Arab
problem’.SinceitwasplainlyunrealistictoimposeasmallJewishpopulationonan
Arabmajority,theanswerwasforBritaintorunPalestine,andwhileshekeptorder,
forJewishimmigrationtoincreasetothepointthattherewasaJewishmajority.At
thatmomenttheJewswouldbestrongenoughtogovernthemselves.Beyondthis
planforeventualdomination,andassurancesthatArabswouldnotsufferasaresult
ofthedeclaration,Zionistsseemedunwillingorunabletoengagewiththeissueof
howArabswouldreactwhenaJewishNationalHomewasplantedintheirmidst.
Norwasthereanyseriousattempttodealwiththisissueatgovernmentalleveluntil
Curzonintervenedattheeleventhhour.Somelonevoiceshadspokenoutfromthe
East.Britain’sChiefPoliticalOfficerinEgypt,GilbertClayton,hadcautionedagainst
anypublicpronouncementinAugust1917,observingthatitwouldnothelpmatters
iftheArabsweretobeprovokedatthistimebyZionism.34GertrudeBell,who
criticisedtheZionistsfortalkingasthoughPalestinewasemptyofpeople,conveyed
herviewstotheCabinetviaEdwinMontagu.35
Howeverthesewarningsweretoolittle,toolate,tohaveanyfundamentaleffect.
Theclauseprotectingtherightsofthe‘non-Jewishcommunities’wasnottheresult
ofseriousdiscussionaboutwhatwouldhappentotheArabs.IftheCabinethadbeen
deeplyconcernedaboutthefuturestatusofArabsinPalestine,itmighthavebeen
expectedthatthisnewclausewouldmakementionoftheirpoliticalrights.However,
byreferringonlytotheircivilandreligiousrights,itseemsthattheCabinetbelieved
thatPalestinianArabshadnopoliticalrights.When,attheSanRemoconferenceof
1920,theFrenchtriedtoinserttheword‘political’intothelistof‘non-Jewish’rights
thattheBritishwouldberequiredtoprotectundertheMandate,thesuggestionwas
rejected.36
8
Whywasthedeclarationfinallyadopted?
DespitetheconcernsofLordCurzon,theCabinetmeetingof31Octoberwas
persuadedbyBalfour’sargumentsthattherewasavitalpropagandaassettobe
gainedbymakingthedeclaration,becauseworldJewishopinionwouldthenswing
behindBritainandtheAllies,andnotagainstthem,especiallyinrevolutionary
Russia,andtheUnitedStates,wherethemajorityofJews,(orsotheyhadbeen
convincedbyWeizmann),werepro-Zionist.BalfourgatheredthatalltheCabinet
were‘nowagreedthatfromapurelydiplomaticandpoliticalpointofviewitwas
desirablethatsomedeclarationfavourabletotheaspirationsoftheJewish
nationalistsshouldnowbemade’.Ifsuchanassurancecouldbegiventhen‘we
shouldbeabletocarryonanextremelyusefulpropagandabothinRussiaand
America’.37
ThemotivesarticulatedbytheWarCabinetforfinallyapprovingtheDeclaration
werethereforepragmaticones,relatedtoanassessmentofBritain’swarinterests.
Butthis‘propagandaasset’explanationshouldnotobscurewhyBalfourandLloyd
GeorgeweredisposedtotheZionistcauseinthefirstplace.Onanumberoflater
occasionsBalfourexplainedthathisheartfeltdesirehadbeentogivetheJewish
peoplewhatheregardedastheirrightfulhome.38
LeonardStein,thehighlyplacedZionisthistorianoftheDeclaration,observesthat
thissympathyforthehomelessnessoftheJewsmight‘havelittletodowiththeWar
Cabinet’sconsciousmotivesforapprovingtheDeclaration,butwithoutthis
backgroundneitheritsoriginsnoritssignificancecanbeunderstood’.39
1
Monroe,E,Britain’sMomentintheMiddleEast,1914-1956,(Methuen,London,
1965),p.26;Samuel,RtHonViscount,Memoirs,(TheCressetPress,London,1945),
p.142.
2
Samuel,H,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,
TheNationalArchivesoftheUK,hereafterTNA,CAB37/123/43.
3
TheForeignSecretarytoldBritain’sambassadorsinFranceandRussiainMarch
1916thathiscolleaguesbelievedthatWolf’sscheme‘mightbemadefarmore
attractivetothemajorityofJewsifitheldouttothemtheprospectthatwhenin
thecourseoftimetheJewishcolonistsinPalestinegrowstrongenoughtocope
withtheArabpopulationtheymaybeallowedtotakethemanagementofthe
internalaffairsofPalestine(withtheexceptionofJerusalemandtheHolyPlaces)
intotheirownhands.[…]oursoleobjectistofindanarrangementwhichwouldbe
soattractivetothemajorityofJewsastoenableustostrikeabargainforJewish
support’;telegram,GreytoBertieandBuchanan,11March1916,
TNA,FO371/2817/43776.
4
IsraelSieff,oneofWeizmann’scircleofalliesinManchester,commentedinhis
memoirsonhowWeizmannbehavedasthoughhehadaJewishstatebehindhim,
9
whenactuallyhehadnomorethanahandfulofsupporters;Glancy,J,‘Chaim
WeizmannandhowtheBalfourDeclarationwasmadeinManchester’,TheJC.com,
1November2012,http://www.thejc.com/lifestyle/lifestyle-features/89026/chaim-
weizmann-and-how-balfour-declaration-was-made-manchester[accessed
September2015].
5
Weizmann,C,TrialandError:TheAutobiographyofChaimWeizmann,(Harperand
Brothers,NewYork,1949),p.150.
6
Hamilton,J,God,GunsandIsrael:Britain,theFirstWorldWarandtheJewsinthe
HolyLand,(SuttonPublishing,Thrupp,2004),pp.86-7.
7
Weizmann,pp.109-11.
8
Ibid,p.150.TheroleofC.P.Scottasahighlyconnectedfacilitatorcannotbe
underestimatedinexplaininghowWeizmanngainedthesympathyofkey
establishmentfigures.Weizmannrecounts:‘Itbecameapracticewithme,
wheneverIhappenedtobeinLondon,andMrScottcameuponthenighttrain,
tomeethimatEustonStationforbreakfast.Hisusualgreetingtomewas:“Now,
DrWeizmann,tellmewhatyouwantmetodoforyou,”andbreakfastwouldpass
inconversationonZionistaffairs’.Ibid.
9
LloydGeorge,D,MemoirsofthePeaceConference,Vol.2,(YaleUniversityPress,
NewHaven,1939),p.721.
10
Ibid,p.722.
11
Samuel,H,‘ThefutureofPalestine’,MemorandumtotheCabinet,January1915,
TNA,CAB37/123/43.
12
Dugdale,B,ArthurJamesBalfour,1906-1930,(Hutchinson,London,c.1936),
p.159-60.
13
Amery,L.S,MyPoliticalLife,Vol.2,(Hutchinson,London,1953),p.114.
14
Sykes,C,TwoStudiesinVirtue,(Collins,London,1953),pp.180ff;Amery,p.115.
15
Ibid;seealsoRubinstein,W,‘TheSecretofLeopoldAmery’,History
Today,1February1999,andhttp://www.balfourproject.org/the-secret-of-
leopold-amery/[accessedSeptember2015].
16
LloydGeorge,p.723.
17
LordRobertCecil,ParliamentaryUnder-SecretaryattheForeignOffice,minutinga
despatch,11February1916,fromMcMahoninCairo,whohadreceived
10
suggestionsfromtheheadoftheJewishcommunityinAlexandriathatBritain
shouldsupportZionistaspirationsinPalestine;TNA,FO371/2671/35433.
18
LloydGeorge,p.726.
19
Sykes’sonbelievedthatthegrantingofofficialfacilitiesforcommunicationsin
1916wasacrucialmoment,afterwhichtheBritishGovernmentwasessentially
obligatedtoaccedetoZionistrequests;Sykes(1953),pp.187-88.
20
Sokolov,MemorandumfortheForeignOffice,12April1916,TNA,
FO371/2817/63314.
21
CambontoSokolov,4June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458.
22
Forexample,GrahamtoLordHardinge,13June1917,ibid,describing
Weizmann’swarningsthattheGermansmighttakeuptheZionistcausefortheir
ownpropagandapurposes.
23
DavidFromkincalculatesthatin1913,thelastdateforwhichtherewerefigures,
onlyaboutonepercentoftheworld’sJewshadsignifiedtheiradherenceto
Zionism.Fromkin,D,APeacetoEndAllPeace:CreatingtheModernMiddleEast,
1914-1922,(Penguin,London,1991),p.294.
24
Foradescriptionofthejointdraftingofadeclaration,seeLewis,G,Balfourand
Weizmann:theZionist,theZealotandtheEmergenceofIsrael,(Continuum,
London,2009),p.145.Onceawordinghadbeenagreed,Rothschildwroteto
Balfouron18July1917:‘AtlastIamabletosendtoyoutheformulayouaskedme
for.IfHMGwillsendmeamessageonthelinesofthisformula,ifthey&you
approveofit,IwillhanditontotheZionistFederation&alsoannounceitata
meetingcalledforthatpurpose’.TothisBalfourapologeticallyrepliedthe
followingday:‘MydearWalter…Iwillhavetheformulawhichyousentme
carefullyconsideredbutthematterisofcourseofthehighestimportanceandI
fearitmaybenecessarytoreferittotheCabinet.Ishallnotthereforebeableto
letyouhaveananswerassoonasIshouldotherwisehavewishedtodo’;Balfour
toRothschild,19July1917,Private,TNA,FO371/3083/143082.
25
JamesMalcolmtoLordPeel,17August1936,TNA,CO733/319/5.
26
LloydGeorge,p.737.
27
SeeLewis,pp.138-9.
28
RonaldGrahamdrewLordHardinge’sattentiontoanextractfromTheTimeson
18June1917,reporting‘themeetingoftheJewishBoardofDeputies[which]
resultedinatriumphfortheZionists,althoughthisBoardhashithertobeen
regardedasastrongholdofanti-Zionism,andthemostthattheZionistsexpected
11
wasthatasubstantialminorityofvoteswouldbecastinfavouroftheirpolicy.
MrLucienWolfwashowleddowneachtimethatheattemptedtospeakandwas
notallowedtosayaword.HadnotacertainnumberofDeputiesvotedagainst
theinstructionsgiventothembytheirelectors,theZionistmajoritywouldhave
beenlarger.InanycasethisvotemeansthedissolutionoftheConjointCommittee
anditwillnolongerbenecessarytoconsultthatbody...’GrahamtoHardinge,
Confidential,18June1917,TNA,FO371/3058/123458.
29
Montagu,Memorandum,‘TheAnti-SemitismofthePresentGovernment’,
submittedtotheBritishCabinet,23August1917,TNA,CAB24/24/71.
Montaguobservedthatwhateverthe‘JewishNationalHome’meant,heassumed
‘thatitmeansthatMahommedansandChristiansaretomakewayfortheJews
andthattheJewsshouldbeputinallpositionsofpreference’.Montaguwasalso
extremelynervousthatZionismwouldcallinquestionhiscredentialsasapatriotic
Englishgentleman,observing:‘“Ihavebeenstrivingallmylifetoescapefromthe
Ghetto”’;LloydGeorge,p.733.
30
LordCurzon,MemorandumsubmittedtotheCabinet,‘TheFutureofPalestine’,
26October1917,TNA,FO371/3083/207407.
31
TherelevantCabinetminutescanbefoundinTNA,CO733/347/7.
32
Amery,p.116.
33
Forexample,LordRothschild,quotedinTheTimes,18June1917.
34
Stein,L,TheBalfourDeclaration,(ValentineMitchell,London,1961)p.523.
35
Howell,G,DaughteroftheDesert:TheRemarkableLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan,
London,2007)p.383.Republishedin2015asHowell,G,QueenoftheDesert:the
ExtraordinaryLifeofGertrudeBell,(Pan,London,2015).
36
ThiswasdiscussedatSanRemoon24April1920.Inarguingforpoliticalrightsto
begrantedtothenon-Jewishcommunity,theFrenchwereactuallyseekingto
protectwhattheyregardedasthetraditionalrightsoftheCatholicreligious
communityinPalestine.TheyfearedthatifthewordingoftheBalfourDeclaration
wasinsertedintothepeacetreaty,onlytheJewswouldhavepoliticalrights.
Millerandexplainedthattheywereonlyseekingelectoralrightsformembersof
thereligiouscommunity,notcollectivepoliticalrightsfortheArabs.Nevertheless,
Curzoninsistedthatthefirstprovisoofthedeclarationcouldnotbechanged
becausethewordingofthedeclarationinitsentiretywasregardedasacharterof
rightsfortheJewishpeople.HehadmetwithZionistrepresentativesjustpriorto
theConferenceandhadpersonallyundertakentopreservetheoriginaltextofthe
Declaration.TheproceedingsatSanRemocanbefoundatMinutes,Meeting
Number12,24April1920inTNA,FO371/5244/E5636.However,itwouldseem
thatCurzonknewhishandsweretiedandsohesaidwhatheknewhewas
12
obligatedtosay.Inprivateheminuted,‘Iamquitewillingtowater(sic)the
PalestinianMandatewhichIcordiallydistrust’;referredtobyHubertYounginhis
lettertoRobertVansittart,30June1920,TNA,FO371/5244/7369.
37
Cabinetminutes,31October1917,TNA,CO733/347/7.
38
See,forexample,Meinertzhagen,R,MiddleEastDiary,1917-1956,(TheCresset
Press,London,1959),p.8.
39
Stein,p.552.