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in Human Geography
Book review forum: Explaining Human Actions and Environmental Changes
Bradley B Walters
Dialogues in Human Geography 2011 1: 370
DOI: 10.1177/2043820611421561
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Book review forum
Dialogues in Human Geography
1(3) 370–389
ª The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/2043820611421561
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Book review forum
Andrew P Vayda, Explaining Human Actions and
Environmental Changes. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press,
2009; 316 pp.: 9780759103238, US$75 (hbk).
Reviewed by: Bradley B Walters, Mount Allison
University, Canada
The social sciences are rife with what at times seem
irreconcilable disagreements about the appropriate
role of theories, methods, empirical evidence, and
practical applications. Diversity of ideas and methods can be a good thing, of course, but the extent to
which competing fields, theories and approaches
exist in virtual isolation of one another is certainly
not. Yet many of these disagreements appear related
to differences, often unacknowledged and frequently misunderstood, in little-examined and often
vague or inexplicit notions of causation and causal
explanation. In this regard, there is a real value for
social scientists to turn to ideas about causal reasoning and explanation that may well underlie such
disagreements (Vayda and Walters, 2011). This
suggestion is in no way intended to advocate a
return to a form of scientific positivism that is often
associated (albeit naively) with the concepts of causation. To the contrary, the particular view of causal
explanation advocated throughout Andrew Vayda’s
book, Explaining Human Actions and Environmental Changes, offers an opportunity to break through
some of the intellectual and methodological log
jams that currently exist between interpretivist,
poststructuralist and neopositivist schools of social
science research.
It is thus appropriate that contributions to this
special feature exploring the work of Andrew
Vayda span the range of key subfields in humanenvironment geography: land change science
(Turner), political ecology (Klooster, Rocheleau),
and cultural ecology (Doolittle). The diverse efforts
to build bridges across disparate fields in humanenvironment studies (including not only the above
three subfields, but also coupled socio-ecological
systems, ecological anthropology, human behavioral ecology, environmental sociology and ecological economics) reveal a growing appetite for
theoretical and disciplinary integration. However,
a recurring theme of Vayda’s collection is that such
integration will not be effectively achieved simply
through the advancement of better theory or refined
methods, as is often advocated. Instead, Vayda
argues that social scientists (and many natural scientists) can find common language and analytical
ground to stand on through the application of a
methodology that, first, relegates theory and methods to supporting rather than leading roles and, second, focuses research on clear questions and
analysis on concrete events and the causal connections between them.1
As noted by Billie Turner and Dianne Rocheleau here, Vayda’s methodological arguments
share important parallels with influential, early
writings of political ecologist Piers Blaikie, who
advocated building ‘chains of explanation’ that
link local actors to wider political and economic
influences (e.g. Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987).
The chains of explanation approach has proven
difficult to apply empirically and Blaikie, himself, has acknowledged (1999: 140) that it provides little guidance for establishing causal
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Book review forum
371
connections between social and environmental
factors, especially where such interactions are
occurring over historical time and widely differing points in space (Walters and Vayda, 2009:
546). Vayda’s methodological approach faces
these shortcomings head on, and arguably overcomes them. It is therefore puzzling that Piers
Blaikie is held up as a paragon within political
ecology, while Vayda continues to be viewed
with skepticism by many political ecologists,
including Rocheleau here.
Turner correctly identifies the problem of confirmation bias as a central methodological theme that
cross-cuts much of Vayda’s criticisms of other
fields and subfields of research. Yet it is important
to remember that the problem of confirmation bias
is not just a matter of cherry-picking favored theories; it is more broadly a methodological concern
that relates also to the common tendency for
researchers to preselect favored methods with which
to conduct their research and analysis. Perhaps this
explains why Turner appears to view Vayda’s
approach to causal analysis as categorically different from that used by land change scientists. Specifically, Turner asks us to consider whether causal
attribution is best evaluated using quantitativestatistical methods of the kind deployed in land
change science or by using Vayda’s more qualitative, abductive reasoning strategy. In so doing, he
correctly recognizes that both entail forms of eliminative inference, yet he overlooks the potential for
practical synergies between them.
Part of the difficulty is that Vayda does not highlight quantitative-statistical methods in his methodological discussions (although he does make
appropriate, even if limited, use of them in his field
research, e.g. Vayda and Sahur, 1996), and so his
brief but pointed criticisms of regression models
as used in land change and other studies (pp. 15–
17) might lead some to conclude that he is categorically against their use, which he is not. That being
said, his book would have benefited from more concrete examples drawn from the relevant literature to
illustrate both effective and problematic uses of
these quantitative methods in human-environment
research. Either way, the bottom line is that there
is no inherent a priori reason why regression models
or other quantitative-statistical methods cannot be
judiciously used to aid in event-based causal analysis, nor is there an a priori reason why they must be.
Dan Klooster appears to see much potential for
synergies between Vayda’s event-based, abductive
approach and research in political ecology –
although it awaits others to attempt to articulate
what these synergies might actually look like in
practice. More critically, Klooster takes Vayda to
task on two fronts. First, he raises the question of
whether the problem of confirmation bias, serious
as it is, justifies our abandoning the search for general theory in human-environment research. Second, Klooster criticizes Vayda for failing to
address the issue of researcher ‘positionality’ and
the social construction of knowledge about nature
that this may entail. Noting that a researcher’s positionality may constitute a heuristic bias ‘much
deeper than mere sloppy thinking’, Klooster argues
that researcher bias needs to be viewed as a problem
beyond just the predilection towards favoring certain theories over others, but also a predilection
towards asking some questions, but not others.
Rocheleau echoes Klooster in suggesting that
Vayda has not sufficiently dealt with the challenge
of researcher positionality. More broadly, Rocheleau’s essay constitutes a defense of political ecology in light of Vayda’s (and my) explicit
criticisms of this subfield.2 Indeed, Vayda can seem
unsparing in his criticism of individual researchers
(e.g. Steve Lansing, pp. 40–43) and research programs (e.g. political ecology, pp. 27–36, 129–142;
Darwinian Ecological Anthropology, pp. 143–
189). In response, Rocheleau argues that Vayda is
prone to selective reading of the literature and that,
in fact, not all political ecologists are equally guilty
of the methodological sins attributed to them.
There is a certain splitting of hairs here, because
Vayda and I were clear that it was not our intention
to paint all political ecologists with the same critical
brush, the provocative title of our original essay notwithstanding. As I see it, there are at the heart of the
matter two central issues here. The first, well articulated by Vayda, concerns the problem of confirmation bias in explanation (see especially pp. 29–43).
For example, the possibility of social structure as a
cause does not entail its necessity or inevitability
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372
Dialogues in Human Geography 1(3)
as a cause. Failure to recognize this encourages an
often unwarranted biasing of structural or discourse
factors in many poststructuralist explanations. This
was noted by us as a fairly widespread problem
within the newly emerging subfield of political ecology in the 1990s and, frankly, it continues to be so.
But, lest Rocheleau (and others) presume that political ecology is somehow being unfairly singled out
in this regard, it is important to emphasize, as Vayda
does, that such confirmation bias is widespread in
scientific research, in general, and can be found
wherever research is guided by the desire to seek
confirmation of pre-existing, favored theories or
explanatory factors (on this, see Chamberlin,
1890; Ioannidis, 2005; Nickerson, 1998). Vayda’s
lucid arguments on the problem of confirmation bias
are thus absolutely warranted and should be taken
seriously by all researchers, not just political
ecologists.
The second key issue raised by Vayda’s (and my)
critique of poststructuralist/political ecology studies
is admittedly less satisfactorily resolved. Specifically, if we agree that social structure and discourse
are at least sometimes causally relevant, the question remains: is it practical or even desirable for analytical purposes to reduce or translate relevant social
structures and discourses to events or event language? Vayda’s extensive critiques of holism and
related concepts (systems, processes, structures)
reveal where he sides on this matter (pp. 24–26,
191–203; see also McCay, 2008). Yet this volume
offers few concrete illustrations of how event analysis can be applied to address social structural or
discourse influences and, as such, his case for the
use of events is apt to be insufficiently compelling
for Rocheleau and some others.
It is straightforward enough to conceptualize
policy-related changes as discrete events for the
sake of causal analysis (e.g. Walters, 2008), but how
do we get at event descriptions of potentially relevant structural influences that may be more murkily
embedded in the historical past? In fact, Vayda
would likely agree that the murkiness of history in
the world is in part what enables much sloppy thinking and so many analytical shortcuts to take place in
the social sciences. But he would further argue the
existence of such complexity is no excuse for
making causal claims about social structures
without simultaneously providing as much analytical precision and empirical evidence as is practically possible to defend such claims. In a similar
fashion, Vayda’s skepticism about the existence and
influence of systems and processes is not so much a
flat-out refutation, but rather a call for greater specificity and higher standards of evidence when claims
are made as to their existence and causal influence.
Thus, for example, returns on investment capital
may well be causally relevant to explaining deforestation in certain situations, but such influences need
to be clearly specified and empirically demonstrated
in the case at hand, not simply assumed in light of
their co-occurrence within a wider capitalist political economy.
Finally, it is perhaps not surprising that the cultural ecologist William Doolittle offers only praise
of Vayda, the ecological anthropologist, given the
commonalities in their academic pedigrees. Both
scholars put much stake in the role of clear thinking,
meticulous attention to detail, and rigorous appraisal of evidence. Both have likewise been engaged
in the research enterprise long enough to appreciate
the faddishness of theory and the recurring errors of
methodology that beset social science scholarship
(cf. McCay, 2008). There is much wisdom encapsulated in Doolittle’s review, as there is in Andrew
Vayda’s important and challenging book.
Notes
1. Important in this regard is to make a distinction
between the tools and techniques of research – methods
– and the logic and justifications guiding the deployment of tools and techniques and interpretation of
research results – methodology (see Vayda and Walters, 2011: 2).
2. Chapter 6, ‘Against political ecology’ (pp. 129–142),
is co-authored with me (Brad Walters). Other coauthored chapters include 3 (with Brad Walters and
Indah Setyawati) and 8 (with Bonnie McCay and Cristina Eghenter).
References
Blaikie P (1999) A review of political ecology: Issues,
epistemology and analytical narratives. Zeitschrift für
Wirtschaftsgeographie 43: 131–147.
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Book review forum
373
Blaikie P and Brookfield H (1987) Land Degradation and
Society. London: Methuen.
Chamberlin TC (1890) The method of multiple working
hypotheses. Science (old series) 15(366): 92–96. Reprinted in: Vayda AP and Walters BB (eds) (2011)
Causal Explanation for Social Scientists: A Reader.
Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 168–178.
Ioannidis JPA (2005) Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Medicine 2(8): e124. Available at:
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.
1371%2Fjournal.pmed.0020124.
McCay BJ (2008) An intellectual history of ecological
anthropology. In: Walters BB, McCay BJ, West P, and
Lees S (eds) Against the Grain: The Vayda Tradition
in Human Ecology and Ecological Anthropology. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 11–26.
Nickerson RS (1998) Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous
phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology 2(2): 175–220. Reprinted in: Vayda AP and
Walters BB (eds) (2011) Causal Explanation for
Social Scientists. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Vayda AP and Sahur A (1996) Bugis settlers in East Kalimantan’s Kutai National Park: Their past and present
and some possibilities for their future. A CIFOR Special Publication, Center for International Forestry
Research, Jakarta.
Vayda AP and Walters BB (eds) (2011) Causal Explanation for Social Scientists: A Reader. Lanham, MD:
AltaMira Press.
Walters BB (2008) Events, politics and environmental
change. In: Walters BB, McCay BJ, West P, and Lees
S (eds) Against the Grain: The Vayda Tradition in
Human Ecology and Ecological Anthropology. Lanham,
MD: AltaMira Press, 67–79.
Walters BB and Vayda AP (2009) Event ecology, causal
historical analysis and human-environment research.
Annals of the Association of American Geographers
99(3): 534–553.
Reviewed by: William E Doolittle, University of
Texas, USA
there were precious few constant voices of sanity, one
of which was Pete Vayda (others in my opinion
include Bob Netting and Karl Butzer). And, just how
many pages does it take to tell the truth in these matters? Precisely 237! (not counting the bibliography
and index). Pete must have played baseball in his
youth, and learned well from his coaches who, as all
former ball players know, harp constantly about keeping your eye on the ball. Later, as a student, he must
have taken a course on the philosophy of science,
something most subscribers to _____ism didn’t do but
should have done. But, alas, they are not scientists.
They pretend to be intellectuals, but most are not even
good scholars. This book is all about the truth, and not
being distracted. It is an intellectual treatise built on
solid scholarship, hence the first word in the title –
explaining – is most appropriate.
The ten chapters of this tome are slightly rewritten versions of papers published between 1989 and
2008, eight in journals, and two in edited volumes
(four are book reviews). They progress, in large
part, from newest to oldest and from most general
A former associate dean of arts and sciences I knew
back in my early days at Mississippi State University
kept coming to mind as I read this book. Oh, how he
would have appreciated it. A biologist who rarely
published anything longer than five pages, he was
always perplexed by the lengthy writings of historians. More than once I heard him ask: ‘How many
pages does it take these people to tell the truth?’ During the past five decades there have doubtless been
hundreds of thousands (perhaps more than a million!)
pages published on human impacts on the environment. Most of these have been polemics, sometimes
pondering, typically pontificating political, economic, and social agendas. If it wasn’t Marxism, feminism, postmodernism, poststructuralism, or Foucault
(who never existed1), it was _____ ecology or some
such nonsense. It was a world gone mad, I tell you,
enough to drive my old dean crazy. Through it all
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