Download Grand Strategy Confederacy Union The fire

Grand Strategy Confederacy The fire‐power of the rifle‐musket meant that battlefield tactics now favored the defenders. The Union, having no option but to attack, was bound to suffer heavy casualties. Southerners hoped that Northern opinion might come to question high losses. If Northern will collapsed, the Confederacy would win by default. Farmer wrote: “Many historians claim that Davis and Lee, Davis’s most important military advisor and field commander, pursued a flawed military strategy… Arguably a more defensive strategy would have conserved manpower, thereby enabling the Confederacy to prolong the war and perhaps exhaust Union will.” Was Lee and Davis too Virginia focused? Alan Farmer argues that, Virginia had to be Lee’s “rightful priority” as he was the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. If anyone “was to blame for a Virginia‐focused strategy it was Davis,” Farmer alleges that Virginia “had to be defended,” since it was “the Confederacy’s most important industrial state.” In addition, Virginia’s “geographical conditions very much favored the defender.” For these reasons, asserted Farmer, “it thus made sense to send the best men and resources to the best army (the Army of Northern Virginia) and the best general (Lee!).” Millet and Maslowski assert that Lee underestimated the problems many Confederate commanders faced in both the Western and trans‐
Union General Winfield Scott’s Anaconda Plan represented the first coherent strategic proposal by the Union during the Civil War. His plan was analogous to the South American snake in several ways. Similar to the reptile which slowly crushed its victims, Scott’s plan would grind down the Confederacy instead of bleeding it to death in huge battles by: (1) driving down the Mississippi and taking Vicksburg before driving on to Mobile (2) occupying the upper south (3) blockading confederate ports. Scott’s strategy was to exhaust the enemy. The main focus of his plan was the blockade as well as the successful isolation of the trans‐
Mississippi West by thrusting down the Mississippi river. The eastern half of the Confederacy would become a peninsula surrounded on three sides by the Union navy and bottled up on the landward side by the Union army. Like the anaconda, the North would grasp the Confederacy in its “constricting coil” and wait for suffocation to begin. Scott’s plan sought to grind down/exhaust the Confederacy rather than bleeding it to death in huge battles by driving down the Mississippi and taking Vicksburg prior to driving on to Mobil, occupying the upper south, and blockading Confederate ports. The main focus of his plan was the blockade as well as the successful isolation of the trans‐
Mississippi West by thrusting down the Mississippi river. Mississippi theaters as well as the significance of those war zones for the survival of the Confederacy. Lee is considered to be one of the foremost proponents of an “active” strategy that emphasized the offensive in any offensive‐
defensive strategy. He argued that winning battles on northern soil would hasten both the enemy’s demoralization and European intervention. Either short‐term or long‐term occupation of northern soil would also enable confederate soldiers to plunder northern resources while bolstering home‐front morale. In contrast, according to Lee, a more passive defensive strategy would yield the initiative by giving the Union Army time to mobilize and the choice of when and where to fight. Despite Lee’s urgings, Jefferson Davis accepted the more “passive” defensive component of the offensive‐defensive strategy. Farmer described this strategy as “placing conventional armies in an essentially defensive posture to protect as much territory as possible and launching offensive movements when circumstances seemed promising.” Davis believed the strategy advocated by Lee would rally the northern population in support of the war, weaken southern appeals for help by showing it as the aggressor, and was contrary to any strategy dictated by modern weapons better suited to defense. Lee has earned “immortality in military annals” for “leading the Army of Northern Virginia to destruction.” Farmer defended Lee’s approach: “Lee, like all Civil War generals, recognized the advantage of fighting on the defensive. But he also knew that a purely defensive strategy would result in the In Lincoln’s War, Geoffrey Perret compared Scotts strategy of a western offensive operation along the Mississippi River to physically split the Confederacy combined with an eastern defensive action and naval blockade (which he says was strategically sound) with McDowell’s strategy of a thrust to Richmond, in essence a rattlesnake‐quick strike. McDowell’s strategy ignored the Confederacy’s advantages in defending Richmond (remember that geography in northern VA favored the Confederacy) and did not offer an alternative in the event the Confederacy relocated its capital. In the end, Scott’s plan appealed to neither the generals nor the public who wanted more decisive action than what Scott proposed. It was estimated that Scott’s plan would prolong the fighting‐a prospect unacceptable to Lincoln. In other words, Scott’s plan may have been strategically sound, but it was not politically expedient—it was too passive and it amounted to sitting back and waiting for the South to surrender.
As a result, Lincoln chose McDowell’s Plan because it seemed more speedy and aggressive. While Perret claimed Lincoln’s “Forward to Richmond” strategy was ultimately successful, Colonel Cole Kingseed criticized Perret for failing to convince his readers that this was a militarily sound plan that a CinC should have chosen. According to Kingseed, Lincoln was merely placating the public (after all, the press was the one who labeled it the “Anaconda Plan”), choosing as a politician and not a commander in chief. As James McPherson points out, Scott’s strategy was one of limited means that matched the limited goals they were originally fighting to achieve. McPherson also mentioned how Scott deprecated wars of conquest, believing the South could never be harmoniously forced back into the Union—
Confederacy being picked off at will. The only hope in Lee’s view (and surely he was right) was to retain the initiative and risk attack, hoping for a great Waterloo‐type victory.” Farmer doubted if even “a purely defensive strategy would have succeeded” and he credited Lee with recognizing how “this effusion of blood served a purpose.” Lee realized “the key to success lay in winning victories that depressed Union and bolstered Confederate morale.” Despite costing the South dearly, Lee’s “victories against great odds buoyed Confederate morale and depressed the North”. In addition, Farmer credited Lee with having a broader vision and clearer vision insofar as “victories might also convince Britain and France to recognise [sic] the Confederacy.” Farmer cited historians Grade McWhiney and Perry Jamieson; both scholars held “that Lee’s offensive strategy extracted a hideous price in battlefield casualties: the South literally bled itself to death in the first three years of the war.” Yet another historian, Emory Thomas, charged Lee with developing “a confidence in attacking that made him miscalculate….” While this strategy worked for Winfield Scott during the Mexican War against an enemy armed with “shorter‐range muskets,” it was not well‐
suited against “an enemy well led and armed with rifles….” Within a framework largely shaped by Davis and Lee, Confederate forces fought numerous battles, raised civilian hopes, stretched Northern will to the limit on more than one occasion but ultimately failed to achieve independence. This failure does not mean that the offensive‐defensive strategy was flawed. rather, a military presence/garrison would be required in the South for generations. Scott’s plan called for envelopment, not invasion. Scott’s plan necessitated less bloodshed. The chief drawback, as Scott and everyone else recognized, was that his plan would take time for the navy to acquire ample ships for the blockade, to build/purchase gunboats and to train men for the expedition down the trans‐Mississippi, etc…. The public and Lincoln were simply too impatient, urging instant and vigorous action instead. Furthermore, northern public opinion demanded that the rebellion be crushed and the CSA Congress prevented from meeting, as scheduled, in Richmond. There were even some allegations that Scott was only reluctant to invade VA because it was his native state. It was unfathomable to many northerners how Scott could lead less than 11,000 men 175 miles in hostile territory amidst a population of 8 million people and defeat a larger Mexican force/capture the Mexican capital and then hesitate to lead a larger force less of a distance against a smaller force. Despite the overwhelming offensive spirit that existed at the time, Scott stuck to his guns, arguing unconvincingly that the ninety‐day regimental volunteers required training before they were ready for a campaign. According to McPherson, Scott was out of touch with the political currents at the time. Public pressure was simply too strong to ignore and the administration could not afford to delay military action in VA. Nonetheless, Scott’s recommendation to blockade southern seaports was adopted as was his There was no other rational strategy. Lee simply did not win enough battles. Because the Army of Northern Virginia “embodied the Confederacy…[and] sustained Southern hopes” and morale, “few Southerners contemplated serious resistance after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox.” In reality, “only a fraction of Southerners under arms” were surrendered by Lee; still, the Army of Northern Virginia enjoyed so much “prestige and symbolic importance” that its surrender was enough. To those who attribute the defeat of the Confederacy to its leaders’ attempts to fight a conventional war rather than a guerilla war, Farmer retorted such a “strategy in 1861 was inconceivable,” since it would have resulted in significant territorial losses (and thus slaves). Farmer explained “this would have alienated most Southerners” and could only succeed in eroding Union willpower as long as Southern resolve remained strong. Farmer declared “irregular units could not have supplied battlefield victories of the magnitude Lee’s army won in 1862‐3‐victories essential to national morale.” Furthermore, Britain and France were unlikely to recognize “a fledgling Confederacy that relied on guerilla units rather than on a formal army.” Without this outside support, the guerilla war was unlikely to succeed. When Davis finally called for “an all‐out guerilla war in April 1865, there were no takers [since] most Southerners recognized that a guerilla war would simply extend the misery with little prospect of winning independence.” proposal to move down the Mississippi River. McPherson does acknowledge that time would show how ultimate victory depended upon the destruction of rebel armies. Originally, the blockade was imposed on South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. Approximately one week later, Lincoln extended the blockade to Virginia and North Carolina. Then again, declaring a blockade is different than actually imposing one. Perret mentioned that the Union Navy consisted of a whopping 23 wooden ships in 1861 while McPherson stated that less than a dozen warships were ready to patrol U.S. waters at the outset of war. Simply put, the Union navy lacked both the size and strength to bottle up every southern port. According to Woodward, the Southern Lobby missed a critical early window of opportunity to import much needed raw material with which to build its own navy to challenge the blockade which become ever tighter as the war progressed. Instead, as Woodward noted, the Southern Lobby attempted to receive official recognition that the blockade was illegal due to its ineffectiveness. If, as they alleged, the blockade was illegal, the British Royal Navy as well as other countries, would be forced to protect neutral ships carrying trade to and from the Confederacy (e.g. the “Trent Affair”). Another strategic miscalculation (contradictory in fact) was the Cotton Embargo the Confederacy imposed in an attempt to pressure Britain (whom they believed depended on “King Cotton”) to officially recognize the CSA as a precursor to intervening on behalf of the Confederacy. Due to a “bumper crop” in 1860, British merchants/manufacturers had a grace period to find substitute markets/fabric. In addition, “King Corn” proved to be more important to Great Britain in the end. Furthermore, as Woodward points out, the cotton embargo prevented the Confederacy from acquiring much needed capital in exchange for cotton sales. David Surdam argued that the blockade prevented the South from exploiting its ability to set cotton prices. The CSA could have raised the price of cotton by reducing its supply through taxes on cotton exports. Not only would this raise the market price of cotton, but it would have provided an important source of revenue in meeting war costs. Both Surdam and Bartholomees agree that the cotton embargo was an ineffective economic policy and a week attempt at economic coercion. According to Woodward, the Union blockade was “pivotal” insofar as it prevented the South’s major source of capital (cotton) from being exported in sufficient quantities while barring much needed contraband from finding its way to Southern ports. In this way, argues Woodward, the blockade was “severely damaging to the Confederacy”. This contrasts with Perret who asserts the Union blockade had little if any effect on the outcome of the war. Perret argued that approximately 80% everything shipped to the South got through, despite the fact that the U.S.N. devoted most of its men and ships to the blockade. In fact, Perret identified blockade running as the most successful Confederate operation of the war. According to Perret, the South got virtually everything it wanted. It can be argued that the CSA could have banned the import of nonessentials (i.e. contraband) earlier than it actually did. Perret stated that by the time all the major southern ports were closed, the South had already industrialized to the point of being self‐sufficient. Lincoln viewed the blockade as another facet of economic warfare—as such, it became part of Lincoln’s national/military strategy. According to Alan Farmer, the blockade frustrated Southern hopes of making good its lack of materials by trading with Europe—in other words, it was another reason why the Confederacy lost. According to Farmer, the blockade coupled with exorbitant use of the printing press in the South led to demand‐pull inflation where too many dollars were chasing too few goods. Such deprivations exacerbated the sense of defeatism which, in turn, contributed to the South’s defeat. England’s predisposition also aided the blockade. If England bought the Confederate definition of a blockade (i.e. strict), it’s own efforts to wage economic warfare and bring its naval strength (already stretched) to bear on a truly global empire would be menaced. By this, the British desire to stay out of the war agreed with the Union desire to keep them out. Whereas al l the Union had to do was avoid anything that might pull them in (e.g. the Trent affair), the Southern Lobby had to overcome all the compelling reasons for Britain to stay out. This problem was compounded by the fact that not Every Englishmen wanted to intervene, let alone on the side of the South. Furthermore, even if foreign countries agreed to enter the war on the side of the South, the Union blockade made it less likely that any contraband would ever make its way to southern ports. The South attempted to break the blockade by various methods, ranging from contact mines and submarines, to privateers, commerce raiders, and ironclads. One historical interpretation holds that had the South used the grace period it was given to build a navy of ironclads, it could have challenged the Union blockade as the ironclad rendered the wooden vessels comprising the Union Navy obsolete and both sides would have enjoyed parity (maybe not even that as Gideon Welles did not sanction the construction of ironclads right away). According to Surdam, the Union blockade was worth the expense (i.e. those resources had at least as much effect as they might have had had they been allocated elsewhere). In terms of whether the Union blockade was the single decisive factor, Bartholomees doesn’t think so—rather, he attributes the Confederate collapse to a number of interrelated reasons: logistical problems, physical effect of four years of attrition, psychological effect of Sherman’s march through GA, political disaster of Lincoln’s reelection in 1864 which dashed Southern hopes that northern will was waning, etc.. Even still, Bartholomees thinks it was more significant than Surdam suggested. Both Surdam and Bartholomees think the Union blockade was significant in degrading/disrupting southern inter‐coastal shipping trade which otherwise could have helped alleviate many of its internal transportation problems. Instead, an increased reliance on railroad transports exacerbated the problem of replacing railroad ties, rails, rolling stock, locomotives, etc. Finally, Surdam argued the Union Navy’s control of American waters was decisive insofar as it allowed the Union to project its power along thousands of miles of coastline and rivers, subsist large armies in VA, strangulate the southern economy, move troops, etc…