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Trent Affair
1
Trent Affair
The Trent Affair, also known as the Mason and Slidell Affair, was an
international diplomatic incident that occurred during the American Civil War.
On November 8, 1861, the USS San Jacinto, commanded by Union Captain
Charles Wilkes, intercepted the British mail packet RMS Trent and removed, as
contraband of war, two Confederate diplomats, James Mason and John Slidell.
The envoys were bound for Great Britain and France to press the Confederacy’s
case for diplomatic recognition in Europe.
The initial reaction in the United States was to rally against Britain, threatening
war; but President Abraham Lincoln and his top advisors did not want to risk
war. In the Confederate States, the hope was that the incident would lead to a
permanent rupture in Anglo-American relations and even diplomatic recognition
by Britain of the Confederacy. Confederates realized their independence
potentially depended on a war between Britain and the U.S. In Britain, the public
expressed outrage at this violation of neutral rights and insult to their national
honor. The British government demanded an apology and the release of the
prisoners while it took steps to strengthen its military forces in Canada and the
Atlantic.
James Murray Mason (1798–1871).
After several weeks of tension and loose talk of war, the crisis was resolved
when the Lincoln administration released the envoys and disavowed Captain
Wilkes's actions. No formal apology was issued. Mason and Slidell resumed their
voyage to Britain but failed in their goal of achieving diplomatic recognition.
General background
The Confederacy and its president, Jefferson Davis, believed from the beginning
that European dependence on cotton for its textile industry would lead to
diplomatic recognition and intervention, in the form of mediation. Historian
Charles Hubbard:
John Slidell (1793–1871).
Davis left foreign policy to others in government and, rather than developing an aggressive diplomatic effort,
tended to expect events to accomplish diplomatic objectives. The new president was committed to the notion
that cotton would secure recognition and legitimacy from the powers of Europe. One of the Confederacy's
strongest hopes at the time was the belief that the British, fearing a devastating impact on their textile mills,
would recognize the Confederate States and break the Union blockade. The men Davis selected as secretary of
state and emissaries to Europe were chosen for political and personal reasons – not for their diplomatic
potential. This was due, in part, to the belief that cotton could accomplish the Confederate objectives with little
help from Confederate diplomats.[1]
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The Union’s main focus in foreign affairs was just the opposite: to prevent any
British recognition of the South. There had been continuous improvement in
Anglo-American relations throughout the 1850s. The issues of the Oregon
territory, British involvement in Texas, and the Canadian border dispute had all
been resolved in the 1840s. Secretary of State William H. Seward, the primary
architect of American foreign policy during the war, intended to maintain the
policy principles that had served the country well since the American
Revolution—non-intervention by the United States in the affairs of other
countries and resistance to foreign intervention in the affairs of the United States
and other countries in the Western hemisphere.[2]
British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston urged a policy of neutrality. His
international concerns were centered in Europe, where he had to watch both
Napoleon III’s ambitions in Europe and Bismarck’s rise in Prussia. During the
Civil War, British reactions to American events were shaped by past British
policies and their own national interests, both strategically and economically. In
the Western Hemisphere, as relations with the United States improved, Britain
had become cautious about confronting the United States over issues in Central
America. As a naval power, Britain had a long record of insisting that neutral
nations honor (abide by) its blockades of hostile countries, a perspective that led
from the earliest days of the war to de facto support for the Union blockade and
frustration in the South.[3]
The Russian Minister in Washington, Eduard de Stoeckl, noted, “The Cabinet of
London is watching attentively the internal dissensions of the Union and awaits
the result with an impatience which it has difficulty in disguising.” De Stoeckl
advised his government that Britain would recognize the Confederate States at its
earliest opportunity. Cassius Clay, the U.S. minister in Russia, stated, “I saw at a
glance where the feeling of England was. They hoped for our ruin! They are
jealous of our power. They care neither for the South nor the North. They hate
both.”[4]
William H. Seward (1801–1872) (c.
1860–1865).
Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount
Palmerston (1784–1865).
At the beginning of the Civil War, the U.S. minister to the Court of St. James was Charles Francis Adams. He made
clear that Washington considered the war strictly an internal insurrection affording the Confederacy no rights under
international law. Any movement by Britain towards officially recognizing the Confederacy would be considered an
unfriendly act towards the United States. Seward’s instructions to Adams included the suggestion that it be made
clear to Britain that a nation with widely scattered possessions, as well as a homeland that included Scotland and
Ireland, should be very wary of “set[ting] a dangerous precedent.”[5]
Lord Lyons, an experienced diplomat, was the British minister to the U.S. He warned London about Seward:
I cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous foreign minister. His view of the relations between the United
States and Great Britain had always been that they are a good material to make political capital of.... I do not
think Mr. Seward would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be well disposed to play the
old game of seeking popularity here by displaying violence toward us.[6]
Despite his distrust of Seward, throughout 1861 Lyons maintained a “calm and measured” diplomacy that contributed
to a peaceful resolution to the Trent crisis.[7]
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Issue of diplomatic recognition (February–August 1861)
The Trent affair did not erupt as a major crisis until late November 1861. The
first link in the chain of events occurred in February 1861, when the Confederacy
created a three person European delegation consisting of William Lowndes
Yancey, Pierre Rost, and Ambrose Dudley Mann. Their instructions from
Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs were to explain to these
governments the nature and purposes of the southern cause, to open diplomatic
relations, and to “negotiate treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation.”
Toombs' instructions included a long legal argument on states’ rights and the
right of secession. Because of the reliance on the double attack of cotton and
legality, many important issues were absent from the instructions including the
blockade of Southern ports, privateering, trade with the North, slavery, and the
informal blockade the Southerners had imposed whereby no cotton was being
shipped out.[8]
William Lowndes Yancey
(1814–1863).
British leaders—and those on the Continent—generally believed that division of
the U.S. was inevitable. They considered Union efforts to resist a fait accompli to
be unreasonable, but they also viewed Union resistance as a fact that they had to
deal with. Believing the war’s outcome to be predetermined, the British saw any
action they could take to encourage the end of the war as a humanitarian gesture.
Lyons was instructed by Russell to use his own office and any other parties who
might promote a settlement of the war.[9]
The commissioners met informally with Foreign Secretary Lord Russell on May
3. Although word of Fort Sumter had just reached London, the immediate
implications of open warfare was not discussed at the meeting. Instead the
envoys emphasized the peaceful intent of their new nation and the legality of
John Russell, 1st Earl Russell
secession as a remedy to Northern violations of states’ rights. They closed with
(1792–1878).
their strongest argument: the importance of cotton to Europe. Slavery was
discussed only when Russell asked Yancey whether the international slave trade
would be reopened by the Confederacy (a position Yancey had advocated in recent years); Yancey’s reply was that
this was not part of the Confederacy’s agenda. Russell was noncommittal, promising the matters raised would be
discussed with the full Cabinet.[10]
In the mean time, the British were attempting to determine what official stance they should have to the war. On May
13, 1861, on the recommendation of Russell, Queen Victoria issued a declaration of neutrality that served as
recognition of Southern belligerency—a status that provided Confederate ships the same privileges in foreign ports
that U.S. ships received. Confederate ships could obtain fuel, supplies and repairs in neutral ports but could not
secure military equipment or arms. The availability of Britain’s far-flung colonial ports made it possible for
Confederate ships to pursue Union shipping throughout much of the world. France, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Brazil followed suit. Belligerency also gave the Confederate government the opportunity to purchase supplies,
contract with British companies, and purchase a navy to search out and seize Union ships. The Queen’s proclamation
made clear that Britons were prohibited from joining the military of either side, equipping any ships for military use
in the war, breaking any proper blockade, and from transporting military goods, documents, or personnel to either
side.[11]
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On May 18, Adams met with Russell to protest the declaration of neutrality.
Adams argued that Great Britain had recognized a state of belligerency “before
they [the Confederacy] had ever showed their capacity to maintain any kind of
warfare whatever, except within one of their own harbors under every possible
advantage […] it considered them a maritime power before they had ever
exhibited a single privateer upon the ocean.” The major United States concern at
this point was that the recognition of belligerency was the first step towards
diplomatic recognition. While Russell indicated that recognition was not
currently being considered, he would not rule it out in the future, although he did
agree to notify Adams if the government’s position changed.[12]
Meanwhile, in Washington, Seward was upset with both the proclamation of
neutrality and Russell’s meetings with the Confederates. In a May 21 letter to
Adams, which he instructed Adams to share with the British, Seward protested
Charles Francis Adams, Sr.
(1807–1886).
the British reception of the Confederate envoys and ordered Adams to have no
dealings with the British as long as they were meeting with them. Formal
recognition would make Britain an enemy of the United States. President Lincoln reviewed the letter, softened the
language, and told Adams not to give Russell a copy but to limit himself to quoting only those portions that Adams
thought appropriate. Adams in turn was shocked by even the revised letter, feeling that it almost amounted to a threat
to wage war against all of Europe. When he met with Russell on June 12, after receiving the dispatch, Adams was
told that Great Britain had often met with representatives of rebels against nations that Great Britain was at peace
with, but that he had no further intention of meeting with the Confederate mission.[13]
Further problems developed over possible diplomatic recognition when, in mid-August, Seward became aware that
Britain was secretly negotiating with the Confederacy in order to obtain its agreement to abide by the Declaration of
Paris. The 1856 Declaration of Paris abolished privateering, protected neutral goods shipped to belligerents except
for “contrabands of war,” and recognized blockades only if they were proved effective. The United States had failed
to sign the treaty originally, but after the Union declared a blockade of the Confederacy, Seward ordered the U.S.
ministers to Britain and France to reopen negotiations to restrict the Confederate use of privateers.[14]
However, on May 18 Russell had instructed Lyons to seek Confederate
agreement to abide by the Paris Declaration. Lyons assigned this task to Robert
Bunch, the British consul in Charleston, South Carolina, who was directed to
contact South Carolina Governor Francis Wilkinson Pickens. Bunch exceeded
his instructions: he bypassed Pickens, and openly assured the Confederates that
agreement to the Paris Declaration was "the first step to [British] recognition."
His indiscretion soon came to Union ears. Robert Mure, a British-born
Charleston merchant, was arrested in New York. Mure, a colonel in the South
Carolina militia, had a British diplomatic passport issued by Bunch, and was
carrying a British diplomatic pouch (which was searched). The pouch contained
some actual correspondence from Bunch to Britain, and also pro-Confederate
pamphlets, personal letters from Southerners to European correspondents, and a
Confederate dispatch which recounted Bunch's dealings with the Confederacy,
including the talk of recognition.[15]
Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, 1st
Viscount Lyons
When confronted Russell admitted that his government was attempting to get agreement from the Confederacy to
adhere to the provisions of the treaty relating to neutral goods (but not privateering), but he denied that this was in
any way a step towards extending diplomatic relations to the Confederates. Rather than reacting as he had to the
earlier recognition of belligerency, Seward let this matter drop. He did demand Bunch's recall, but Russell
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refused.[16]
Under Napoleon III, France's overall foreign policy objectives were at odds with Britain's, but France generally took
positions regarding the Civil War combatants similar to, and often supportive of, Britain's. Cooperation between
Britain and France was begun in the U.S. between Henri Mercier, the French minister, and Lyons. For example, on
June 15 they tried to see Seward together regarding the proclamation of neutrality, but Seward insisted that he meet
with them separately.[17]
Edouard Thouvenel was the French Foreign Minister for all of 1861 until the fall of 1862. He was generally
perceived to be pro-Union and was influential in dampening Napoleon’s initial inclination towards diplomatic
recognition of Confederate independence. Thouvenel met unofficially with Confederate envoy Pierre Rost in June
and told him not to expect diplomatic recognition.[18]
William L. Dayton of New Jersey was appointed by Lincoln as U.S. minister to France. He had no foreign affairs
experience and did not speak French, but was assisted a great deal by the U.S. consul general in Paris, John Bigelow.
When Adams made his protest to Russell on the recognition of Confederate belligerency, Dayton made a similar
protest to Thouvenel. Napoleon offered “his good office” to the United States in resolving the conflict with the South
and Dayton was directed by Seward to acknowledge that “if any mediation were at all admissible, it would be his
own that we should seek or accept.” [19]
When news of the Confederate victory at the First Battle of Bull Run reached Europe it reinforced British opinion
that Confederate independence was inevitable. Hoping to take advantage of this battlefield success, Yancey
requested a meeting with Russell but was rebuffed and told that any communications should be in writing. Yancey
submitted a long letter on August 14 detailing again the reasons why the Confederacy should receive formal
recognition and requesting another meeting with Russell. Russell’s August 24 reply, directed to the commissioners
“of the so-styled Confederate States of America” reiterated the British position that it considered the war as an
internal matter rather than a war for independence. British policy would change only if “the fortune of arms or the
more peaceful mode of negotiation shall have determined the respective positions of the two belligerents.” No
meeting was scheduled and this was the last communication between the British government and the Confederate
diplomats. When the Trent Affair erupted in November and December the Confederacy had no effective way to
communicate directly with Great Britain and they were left totally out of the negotiation process.[20]
By August 1861, Yancey was sick, frustrated, and ready to resign. Also in August President Davis had decided that
he needed diplomats in Britain and France better suited to serve as Confederate ministers once diplomatic
recognition was granted. His choices were John Slidell of Louisiana and James Mason of Virginia. Both men were
widely respected throughout the South and had some background in foreign affairs. Slidell had been appointed as a
negotiator by President Polk at the end of the Mexican War, and Mason had been chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee from 1847 to 1860.[21]
R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia was the new Confederate Secretary of State. His instructions to Mason and Slidell were
to emphasize the stronger position of the Confederacy now that it had expanded from seven to eleven states, with the
likelihood that Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky would also eventually join the new nation. An independent
Confederacy would restrict the industrial and maritime ambitions of the United States and lead to a mutually
beneficial commercial alliance between Great Britain, France, and the Confederate States. A balance of power would
be restored in the Western Hemisphere as the United States’ territorial ambitions would be restricted. They were to
liken the Confederate situation to Italy’s struggles for independence which Britain had supported, and were to quote
Russell’s own letters which justified that support. Of immediate importance, they were to make a detailed argument
against the legality of the Union blockade. Along with their formal written instructions, Mason and Slidell carried a
number of documents supporting their positions.[22]
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Pursuit and capture (August–November 1861)
The intended departure of the diplomats was no secret,[23] and the Union
government received daily intelligence on their movements. By October 1 Slidell
and Mason were in Charleston, South Carolina. Their original plan was to run the
blockade in CSS Nashville, a fast steamer, and sail directly to Britain. But the
main channel into Charleston was guarded by five Union ships, and Nashville’s
draft was too deep for any side channels. A night escape was considered, but
tides and strong night winds prevented this. An overland route through Mexico
and departure from Matamoros was also considered, but the delay of several
months was unacceptable.[24]
The steamer Gordon was suggested as an alternative. She had a shallow enough
draught to use the back channels and could make over 12 knots, more than
enough to elude Union pursuit. The Gordon was offered to the Confederate
government either as a purchase for $62,000 or as a charter for $10,000. The
Charles Wilkes
Confederate Treasury could not afford this, but a local cotton broker, George
Trenholm, paid the $10,000 in return for half the cargo space on the return trip. Renamed the Theodora, the ship left
Charleston at 1 A.M. on October 12, and successfully evaded Union ships enforcing the blockade. On the 14th, she
arrived at Nassau in the Bahamas, but had missed connections with a British steamer going to St. Thomas in the
Danish West Indies, the main point of departure for British ships from the Caribbean to Britain.[25] However, they
discovered that British mail ships might be anchored in Spanish Cuba, and the Theodora turned southwest towards
Cuba. The Theodora appeared off the coast of Cuba on October 15, with her coal bunkers nearly empty. An
approaching Spanish warship hailed the Theodora. Slidell and George Eustis, Jr. went aboard, and were informed
that British mail packets did indeed dock at the port of Havana, but that the last one had just left, and that the next
one, the paddle steamer RMS Trent, would arrive in three weeks. The Theodora docked in Cárdenas, Cuba on
October 16, and Mason and Slidell disembarked. The two diplomats decided to stay in Cardenas before making an
overland trek to Havana to catch the next British ship.[26][27]
Meanwhile, rumors reached the Federal government that Mason and Slidell had escaped aboard the Nashville. Union
intelligence had not immediately recognized that Mason and Slidell had left Charleston on Theodora. U.S. Navy
Secretary Gideon Welles reacted to the rumor that Mason and Slidell had escaped from Charleston by ordering
Admiral Samuel F. DuPont to dispatch a fast warship to Britain to intercept the Nashville. On October 15, the Union
sidewheel steamer USS James Adger, under the command of John B. Marchand, began steaming towards Europe
with orders to pursue the Nashville to the English Channel if necessary. The James Adger reached Britain and
docked in Southampton Harbor in early November.[26] The British government was aware that the United States
would attempt to capture the diplomats and believed they were on Nashville. Palmerston ordered a Royal Navy
warship to patrol within the three-mile limit around Nashville's expected port of call, to assure that any capture
would occur outside British territorial waters. This would avoid the diplomatic crisis that would result if James
Adger pursued Nashville into British waters. When Nashville arrived on November 21, the British were surprised
that the envoys were not on board.[28]
The Union steam frigate USS San Jacinto, commanded by Captain Charles Wilkes, arrived in St. Thomas on
October 13. The San Jacinto had cruised off the African coast for nearly a month before setting course westward
with orders to join a U.S. Navy force preparing to attack Port Royal, South Carolina. However in St. Thomas, Wilkes
learned that the Confederate raider CSS Sumter had captured three U.S. merchant ships near Cienfuegos in July.
Wilkes headed there, despite the unlikelihood that Sumter would have remained in the area. In Cienfuegos he learned
from a newspaper that Mason and Slidell were scheduled to leave Havana on November 7 in the British mail packet
RMS Trent, bound first for St. Thomas and then England. He realized that the ship would need to use the “narrow
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Bahama Channel, the only deepwater route between Cuba and the shallow Grand Bahama Bank.” Wilkes discussed
legal options with his second in command, Lt. D. M. Fairfax, before making plans to intercept and reviewed law
books on the subject. Wilkes adopted the position that Mason and Slidell would qualify as “contraband,” subject to
seizure by a United States ship.[29]
This aggressive decision making was typical of Wilkes' command style. On one hand, he was recognized as “a
distinguished explorer, author, and naval officer.”[30] On the other, he “had a reputation as a stubborn, overzealous,
impulsive, and sometimes insubordinate officer.”[31] Treasury officer George Harrington had warned Seward about
Wilkes: “He will give us trouble. He has a superabundance of self-esteem and a deficiency of judgment. When he
commanded his great exploring mission he court-martialed nearly all his officers; he alone was right, everybody else
was wrong.”[32]
The Trent left on November 7 as scheduled, with Mason, Slidell, their secretaries, and Slidell’s wife and children
aboard. Just as Wilkes had predicted, the Trent passed through Bahama Channel, where the San Jacinto was waiting.
Around noon on November 8, lookouts aboard the San Jacinto spotted Trent, which unfurled the Union Jack as it
neared. San Jacinto then fired a shot across the bow of Trent, which Captain James Moir of the Trent ignored. San
Jacinto fired a second shot from her forward pivot gun which landed right in front of Trent. Trent stopped following
the second shot. Lieutenant Fairfax was summoned to the quarterdeck, where Wilkes presented him with the
following written instructions:
On boarding her you will demand the papers of the steamer, her clearance from Havana, with the list of
passengers and crew.
Should Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustice [sic] and Mr. McFarland be on board make them prisoners and
send them on board this ship and take possession of her [the Trent] as a prize. … They must be brought on
board.
All trunks, cases, packages and bags belonging to them you will take possession of and send on board this
ship; any dispatches found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession of those on board the steamer, will
be taken possession of, examined, and retained if necessary.[33]
Fairfax then boarded the Trent from a cutter. Two cutters carrying a party of twenty men armed with pistols and
cutlasses sidled up to Trent.[26][34] Fairfax, certain that Wilkes was creating an international incident and not wanting
to enlarge its scope, ordered his armed escort to remain in the cutter. Upon boarding, Fairfax was escorted to an
outraged Captain Moir, and announced that he had orders "to arrest Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell and their secretaries,
and send them prisoners on board the United States war vessel nearby." The crew and passengers then threatened
Lieutenant Fairfax, and the armed party in the two cutters beside the Trent responded to the threats by climbing
aboard to protect him. Captain Moir refused Fairfax’s request for a passenger list, but Slidell and Mason came
forward and identified themselves. Moir also refused to allow a search of the vessel for contraband, and Fairfax
failed to force the issue which would have required seizing the ship as a prize, arguably an act of war. Mason and
Slidell made a formal refusal to go voluntarily with Fairfax, but did not resist when Fairfax's crewmen escorted them
to the cutter.[26][35]
Wilkes would later claim that he believed that the Trent was carrying “highly important dispatches and were
endowed with instructions inimical to the United States.” Along with the failure of Fairfax to insist on a search of
Trent, there was another reason why no papers were found in the luggage that was carried with the diplomats.
Mason’s daughter, writing in 1906, said that the Confederate dispatch bag had been secured by Commander
Williams RN, a passenger on Trent, and later delivered to the Confederate envoys in London. This was a clear
violation of the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation.[36]
International law required that when “contraband” was discovered on a ship, the ship should be taken to the nearest
prize court for adjudication. While this was Wilkes’ initial determination, Fairfax argued against this since
transferring crew from San Jacinto to Trent would leave San Jacinto dangerously undermanned, and it would
seriously inconvenience Trent's other passengers as well as mail recipients. Wilkes, whose ultimate responsibility it
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was, agreed and the ship was allowed to proceed to St. Thomas, absent the two Confederate envoys and their
secretaries.[37]
San Jacinto arrived in Hampton Roads, Virginia on November 15, where Wilkes wired news of the capture to
Washington. He was then ordered to Boston where he delivered the captives to Fort Warren, a prison for captured
Confederates.[38]
American reaction (November 16 – December 18, 1861)
Most Northerners learned of the Trent capture on November 16 when the news hit afternoon newspapers. By
Monday, November 18, the press seemed “universally engulfed in a massive wave of chauvinistic elation.” Mason
and Slidell, “the caged ambassadors,” were denounced as “knaves,” “cowards,” “snobs,” and “cold, cruel, and
selfish.”[39]
Everyone was eager to present a legal justification for the capture. The British consul in Boston remarked that every
other citizen was “walking around with a Law Book under his arm and proving the right of the S. Jacintho [sic] to
stop H.M.’s mail boat.” Many newspapers likewise argued for the legality of Wilkes’ actions, and numerous lawyers
stepped forward to add their approval.[40] Harvard law professor Theophilus Parsons wrote, “I am just as certain that
Wilkes had a legal right to take Mason and Slidell from the Trent, as I am that our government has a legal right to
blockade the port of Charleston.” Caleb Cushing, a prominent Democrat, and former Attorney General (under
Franklin Pierce) concurred: “In my judgment, the act of Captain Wilkes was one which any and every self-respecting
nation must and would have done by its own sovereign right and power, regardless of circumstances.” Richard Henry
Dana, Jr., considered an expert on maritime law, justified the detention because the envoys were engaged “solely [in]
a mission hostile to the United States,” making them guilty of “treason within our municipal law.” Edward Everett, a
former minister to Great Britain and a former Secretary of State, also argued that “the detention was perfectly lawful
[and] their confinement in Fort Warren will be perfectly lawful.”[41]
A banquet was given to honor Wilkes at the Revere House in Boston on November 26. Massachusetts governor John
A. Andrew praised Wilkes for his “manly and heroic success” and spoke of the “exultation of the American heart”
when Wilkes “fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the British Lion at its head." George T. Bigelow,
the chief justice of Massachusetts, spoke admiringly of Wilkes: “In common with all loyal men of the North, I have
been sighing, for the last six months, for someone who would be willing to say to himself, ‘I will take the
responsibility.’”[42] On December 2 Congress passed unanimously a resolution thanking Wilkes “for his brave, adroit
and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of the traitors, James M. Mason and John Slidell” and proposing that
he receive a “gold medal with suitable emblems and devices, in testimony of the high sense entertained by Congress
of his good conduct.”[43]
But as the matter was given closer study, people began to have doubts. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles
reflected the ambiguity that many felt when he wrote to Wilkes of “the emphatic approval” of the Navy Department
for his actions while cautioning him that the failure to take the Trent to a prize court “must by no means be permitted
to constitute a precedent hereafter for the treatment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obligations.”[44] On
November 24, the New York Times claimed to find no actual on point precedent. Thurlow Weed’s Albany Evening
Journal suggested that if Wilkes had “exercised an unwarranted discretion, our government will properly disavow
the proceedings and grant England ‘every satisfaction’ consistent with honor and justice.”[45] It did not take long for
others to comment that the capture of Mason and Slidell very much resembled the search and impressment practices
that the United States had always opposed since its founding and which had previously led to the War of 1812 with
Britain. The idea of humans as contraband failed to strike a resonant chord with many.[46]
Henry Adams wrote to his brother on the impressment issue:
Good God, what’s got into you all? What in Hell do you mean by deserting now the great principles of our
fathers; by returning to the vomit of that dog Great Britain? What do you mean by asserting now principles
against which every Adams yet has protested and resisted? You’re mad, all of you.[47]
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People also started to realize that the issue might be resolved less on legalities and more on the necessity of avoiding
a serious conflict with Britain. Elder statesmen James Buchanan, Thomas Ewing, Lewis Cass, and Robert J. Walker
all publicly came out for the necessity of releasing them. By the third week of December much of the editorial
opinion started to mirror these opinions and prepare the American citizens for the release of the prisoners.[48] The
opinion that Wilkes had operated without orders and had erred by, in effect, holding a prize court on the deck of the
San Jacinto was being spread.[49]
The United States was initially very reluctant to back down. Seward had lost the initial opportunity to immediately
release the two envoys as an affirmation of a long-held U.S. interpretation of international law. He had written to
Adams at the end of November that Wilkes had not acted under instructions, but would hold back any more
information until it had received some response from Great Britain. He reiterated that recognition of the Confederacy
would likely lead to war.[50]
Lincoln was at first enthused about the capture and reluctant to let them go, but as reality set in he stated:
I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to American principles concerning the rights
of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting … on the right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has
done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release, we must give them up,
apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation
to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years.[51]
On December 4, Lincoln met with Alexander Galt, the Canadian Minister of Finance. Lincoln told him that he had
no desire for troubles with England or any unfriendly designs toward Canada. When Galt asked specifically about
the Trent incident, Lincoln replied, “Oh, that’ll be got along with.” Galt forwarded his account of the meeting to
Lyons who forwarded it to Russell. Galt wrote that, despite Lincoln’s assurances, “I cannot, however, divest my mind
of the impression that the policy of the American Govt is so subject to popular impulses, that no assurance can be or
ought to be relied on under present circumstances.”[52] Lincoln’s annual message to Congress did not touch directly
on the Trent affair but, relying on estimates from Secretary of War Simon Cameron that the U.S. could field a
3,000,000 man army, stated that he could “show the world, that while engaged in quelling disturbances at home we
are able to protect ourselves from abroad.”[53]
Finance also played a role: Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase was concerned with any events that might affect
American interests in Europe. Chase was aware of the intent of New York banks to suspend specie payments, and he
would later make a lengthy argument at the Christmas cabinet meeting in support of Seward. In his diary, Chase
wrote that the release of Mason and Slidell “…was like gall and wormwood to me. But we cannot afford delays
while the matter hangs in uncertainty, the public mind will remain disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious
harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered.” [54] Warren notes, “Although the Trent affair did not
cause the national banking crisis, it contributed to the virtual collapse of a haphazard system of war finance, which
depended on public confidence.”[55]
On December 15 the first news on British reaction reached the United States. Britain first learned of the events on
November 27. Lincoln was with Senator Orville Browning when Seward brought in the first newspaper dispatches,
which indicated Palmerston was demanding a release of the prisoners and an apology. Browning thought the threat
of war by Britain was “foolish” but said, “We will fight her to the death.” That night at a diplomatic reception Seward
was overheard by William H. Russell saying, “We will wrap the whole world in flames.”[56] The mood in Congress
had also changed. When they debated the issue on December 16 and 17, Clement L. Vallandigham, a peace
Democrat, proposed a resolution stating that the U.S. maintain the seizure as a matter of honor. The motion was
opposed and referred to a committee by the vote of 109 to 16.[57] The official response of the government still
awaited the formal British response which did not arrive in America until December 18.
9
Trent Affair
10
British reaction (November 27 – December 31, 1861)
When the USS James Adger arrived in Southampton and Commander Marchand learned from The Times that his
targets had arrived in Cuba, he reacted to the news by boasting that he would capture the two envoys within sight of
the British shore if necessary, even if they were on a British ship.[58] As a result of the concerns raised by
Marchand’s statements, the British Foreign Office requested a judicial opinion from the three Law Officers of the
Crown (the queen’s advocate, the attorney general, and the solicitor general) on the legality of capturing the
diplomats from a British ship.[59] The written reply dated November 12 declared:
The United States’ man-of-war falling in with the British mail steamer [this was the example used in the
hypothetical submitted by the cabinet] beyond the territorial limits of the United Kingdom might cause her to
bring-to, might board her, examine her papers, open the general mail bags, and examine the contents thereof,
without, however opening any mail bag or packet addressed to any officer or Department of Her Majesty’s
Government.
The United States’ ship of war may put a prize-crew on board the West India steamer, and carry her off to a
port of the United States for adjudication by a Prize Court there; but she would have no right to move Messrs.
Mason and Slidell, and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue her voyage.[60]
On November 12 Palmerston advised Adams in person that the British nonetheless would take offense if the envoys
were removed from a British ship. Palmerston emphasized that seizing the Confederates would be “highly
inexpedient in every way [Palmerston] could view it” and a few more Confederates in Britain would not “produce
any change in policy already adopted.” Palmerston questioned the presence of Adger in British waters, and Adams
assured Palmerston that he had read Marchand’s orders (Marchand had visited Adams while in Great Britain) which
limited him to seizing Mason and Slidell from a Confederate ship.[61]
The news of the actual capture of Mason and Slidell did not arrive in London until November 27.[62] Much of the
public and many of the newspapers immediately perceived it as an outrageous insult to British honor, and a flagrant
violation of maritime law. The London Chronicle’s response was typical:
“
Mr. Seward … is exerting himself to provoke a quarrel with all Europe, in that spirit of senseless egotism which induces the Americans, with
their dwarf fleet and shapeless mass of incoherent squads which they call an army, to fancy themselves the equal of France by land and Great
[63]
Britain by sea.
”
The London Standard saw the capture as “but one of a series of premeditated blows aimed at this country … to
involve it in a war with the Northern States.”[64] A letter from an American visitor written to Seward declared, “The
people are frantic with rage, and were the country polled I fear 999 men out of 1,000 would declare for immediate
war.” A member of Parliament stated that unless America set matters right the British flag should “be torn into shreds
and sent to Washington for use of the Presidential water-closets.”[65]
The Times published its first report from the United States on December 4, and its correspondent, W. H. Russell,
wrote of American reactions, “There is so much violence of spirit among the lower orders of the people and they are
… so saturated with pride and vanity that any honorable concession … would prove fatal to its authors.”[66] Times
editor John T. Delane, however, took a moderate stance and warned the people not to “regard the act in the worst
light” and to question whether it made sense that the United States, despite British misgivings about Seward that
went back to the earliest days of the Lincoln administration, would “force a quarrel upon the Powers of Europe.”[67]
The government got its first solid information on the Trent from Commander Williams who went directly to London
after he arrived in England. He spent several hours with the Admiralty and the prime minister. Initial reaction among
political leaders was firmly opposed to the American actions. Lord Clarendon, a former foreign secretary, expressed
what many felt when he accused Seward of “trying to provoke us into a quarrel and finding that it could not be
effected at Washington he was determined to compass it at sea.”[68]
Trent Affair
Resisting Russell’s call for an immediate cabinet meeting, Palmerston again called on the Law Officers to prepare a
brief based on the actual events that had occurred, and an emergency cabinet meeting was scheduled two days later
for Friday, November 29. Palmerston also informed the War Office that budget reductions scheduled for 1862
should be put on hold.[69] Russell met briefly with Adams on November 29 to determine whether he could shed any
light on American intent. Adams was unaware that Seward had already sent him a letter indicating Wilkes had acted
without orders and was unable to provide Russell any information that might defuse the situation.[70]
Palmerston reportedly began the emergency cabinet meeting by throwing his hat on the table and declaring, "I don't
know whether you are going to stand this, but I'll be damned if I do." The Law officers' report was read and
confirmed the illegality of Wilkes’ actions. Dispatches from Lyons were given to all in attendance. These dispatches
described the excitement in America in support of the capture, referred to previous dispatches in which Lyons had
warned that Seward might provoke such an incident, and described the difficulty that the United States might have in
acknowledging that Wilkes had erred. Lyons also recommended a show of force including sending reinforcements to
Canada. Palmerston indicated to Lord Russell that it was very possible that the entire incident had been a “deliberate
and premeditated insult” designed by Seward to “provoke” a confrontation with Britain.[71]
After several days of discussion, on November 30 Russell sent to Queen Victoria the drafts of the dispatches
intended for Lord Lyons to deliver to Seward. The Queen in turn asked her husband and consort, Prince Albert, to
review the matter. Although ill with typhoid that would shortly take his life, Albert read through the dispatches,
decided the ultimatum was too belligerent, and composed a softened version. In his November 30 response to
Palmerston, Albert wrote:
The Queen … should have liked to have seen the expression of a hope [in the message to Seward] that the
American captain did not act under instructions, or, if he did that he misapprehended them [and] that the
United States government must be fully aware that the British Government could not allow its flag to be
insulted, and the security of her mail communications to be placed in jeopardy, and [that] Her Majesty’s
Government are unwilling to believe that the United States Government intended wantonly to put an insult
upon this country and to add to their many distressing complications by forcing a question of dispute upon us,
and that we are therefore glad to believe … that they would spontaneously offer such redress as alone could
satisfy this country, viz: the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology.[72]
The cabinet incorporated in its official letter to Seward Albert’s suggestions that would allow Washington to disavow
both Wilkes’ actions and any American intent to insult the British flag. The British still demanded an apology and
the release of the Confederate emissaries.[73] Lyons’ private instructions directed him to give Seward seven days to
reply and to close the British Legation in Washington and return home if a satisfactory response was not
forthcoming. In a further effort to defuse the situation, Russell added his own private note telling Lyons to meet with
Seward and advise him of the contents of the official letter before it was actually delivered. Lyons was told that as
long as the commissioners were released, the British would “be rather easy about the apology” and that an
explanation sent through Adams would probably be satisfactory. He reiterated that the British would fight if
necessary, and suggested that the “best thing would be if Seward could be turned out and a rational man put in his
place.” The dispatches were shipped on December 1 via the Europa.[74]
While military preparations were accelerated, diplomacy would be on hold for the rest of the month while Britain
waited for the American response. There had been unrest in the British financial markets since the news of the Trent
was first received. Consols, which had initially declined in value in the early part of the month, fell by another 2
percent, reaching the level during the first year of the Crimean War. Other securities fell another 4 to 5 percent.
Railway stocks and colonial and foreign securities declined. The Times noted that the financial markets were reacting
as if war were a certainty.[75]
In the early deliberations over the appropriate British response to the capture of the diplomats, there was concern that
Napoleon III would take advantage of a Union-British war to act against British interests in “Europe or
elsewhere”.[76] French and British interests clashed in Indochina, in building the Suez Canal, in Italy, and in Mexico.
11
Trent Affair
Palmerston saw French stockpiling of coal in the West Indies as indicating France was preparing for war with
Britain. The French navy remained smaller, but had otherwise shown itself equal to the British navy in the Crimean
War. A possible buildup of ironclads by the French would present a clear threat in the English Channel.[77]
France quickly alleviated many of Britain's concerns. On November 28, with no knowledge of the British response
or any input from Mercier in the U.S., Napoleon met with his cabinet. They had no doubts about the illegality of the
U.S. actions and agreed to support whatever demands Britain made. Thouvenel wrote to Count Charles de Flahault
in London to inform Britain of their decision. After learning of the actual content of the British note, Thouvenel
advised the British ambassador Lord Cowley, that the demand had his complete approval, and on December 4
instructions were sent to Mercier to support Lyons.[78]
A minor stir occurred when General Winfield Scott, until recently the commander of all Union troops, and Thurlow
Weed, a known confidant of Seward, arrived in Paris. Their mission, to counter Confederate propaganda efforts with
propaganda efforts of their own, had been determined before the Trent affair, but the timing was considered odd by
Cowley. Rumors circulated that Scott was blaming the whole incident on Seward who had somehow manipulated
Lincoln into acquiescing with the seizure. Scott put the rumors to rest with a December 4 letter that was published in
the Paris Constitutional and reprinted throughout Europe, including most London papers. Denying the rumors, Scott
stated that “every instinct of prudence as well as of good neighborhood prompts our government to regard no
honorable sacrifice too great for the preservation of the friendship of Great Britain.”[79]
The benign intentions of the United States were also argued by John Bright and Richard Cobden, strong supporters
of the United States and leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League in Britain. Both had expressed strong reservations
about the legality of American actions, but argued strongly that the United States had no aggressive designs against
Great Britain. Bright publicly disputed that the confrontation had been intentionally engineered by Washington. In an
early December speech to his constituents, he condemned the British military preparations “before we have made a
representation to the American Government, before we have heard a word from it in reply, [we] should be all up in
arms, every sword leaping from its scabbard and every man looking about for his pistols and blunderbusses?”
Cobden joined with Bright by speaking at public meetings and by writing letters to newspapers, organizers of
meetings that he could not attend, and influential people in and out of Britain. As time passed and voices opposing
war were heard more and more, the Cabinet also began considering alternatives to war, including arbitration.[80]
Military preparations (December 1860 – December 1861)
Even before the Civil War erupted, Britain, with her worldwide interests, needed to have a military policy regarding
the divided United States. In 1860 Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Milne took command of the North America and West
Indies station of the Royal Navy. On December 22, 1860, with secession still in its early stages, Milne’s orders were
to avoid “any measure or demonstration likely to give umbrage to any party in the United States, or to bear the
appearance of partizanship on either side; if the internal dissensions in those States should be carried to the extent of
separation.” Until May 1861, in compliance with these instructions and as part of a long-standing policy of the Royal
Navy to avoid ports where desertion was likely, Milne avoided the American coast. In May the Neutrality
Proclamation of May 13 was issued. This increased British concern over the threat of Confederate privateers and
Union blockading ships to British neutral rights, and Milne was reinforced. On June 1 British ports were closed to
any naval prizes, a policy that was of great advantage to the Union. Milne did monitor the effectiveness of the Union
blockade, but no effort to contest its effectiveness was ever attempted, and the monitoring was discontinued in
November 1861.[81]
Milne received a letter from Lyons on June 14 that said he did not “regard a sudden declaration of war against us by
the United States as an event altogether impossible at any moment.” Milne warned his scattered forces, and in a June
27 letter to the Admiralty asked for further reinforcements and deplored the weakness of the defenses in the West
Indies. Referring to Jamaica, Milne reported conditions that included, “works badly contrived and worse executed –
unserviceable guns – decayed gun cartridges – corroded shot – the absence of stores of all kinds and of ammunition,
12
Trent Affair
with dilapidated and damp powder magazines."[82] Milne made it clear that his existing forces were totally absorbed
simply in protecting commerce and defending possessions, many inadequately. He had only a single ship available
“for any special service that may be suddenly required."[83]
On the land, at the end of March 1861, Britain had 2,100 regular troops in Nova Scotia, 2,200 in the rest of Canada,
and scattered posts in British Columbia, Bermuda, and the West Indies. Lieutenant General Sir William Fenwick
Williams, Commander in Chief, North America, did what he could with his small forces, but he wrote repeatedly to
the authorities back in Britain that he needed considerable reinforcements to prepare his defenses adequately.[84]
Some land reinforcements were sent in May and June. However when Palmerston, alarmed by the blockade and the
Bunch affair, pressed for increasing the number of regular troops in Canada to 10,000, he met resistance. Sir George
Cornwall Lewis, head of the War Office, questioned whether there was any real threat to Great Britain. He judged it
“incredible that any Government of ordinary prudence should at a moment of civil war gratuitously increase the
number of its enemies, and, moreover, incur the hostility of so formidable a power as England.” In the debate in
Parliament on June 21 there was general opposition to reinforcements, based on political, military, and economic
arguments. A long standing issue was the attempt by Parliament to shift more of the burden on Canadian defense to
the local government. Colonial secretary Newcastle, felt that the requests by Williams were part of a pattern of the
“last few years” in which he had “been very fertile of demands and suggestions.” Newcastle was also concerned that
there were no winter quarters available for additional troops and he feared desertions would be a serious problem.[85]
Lord Somerset, the First Lord of the Admiralty, opposed Palmerston’s inclination to reinforce Milne. He felt that the
existing force made up largely of steam ships was superior to the primarily sail ships of the Union fleet, and he was
reluctant to incur additional expenses while Britain was in the process of rebuilding her fleet with iron ships. This
resistance by Parliament and the cabinet led historian Kenneth Bourne to conclude, “When, therefore the news of the
Trent outrage arrived in England the British were still not properly prepared for the war which almost everyone
agreed was inevitable if the Union did not back down.”[86]
From the beginning of the Trent crisis British leaders were aware that a viable military option was an essential part
of defending the nation’s interests. The First Lord of the Admiralty believed Canada could not be defended from a
serious attack by the U.S. and winning it back later would be difficult and costly. Bourne noted, “After 1815 the
ambiguity of Anglo-American relations, the parsimony of the house of commons [sic] and the enormous practical
difficulties involved always seemed to have prevented adequate preparations being made for an Anglo-American
war.”[87] Somerset suggested a naval war as opposed to a ground war.[88]
British India was the main source of the saltpeter used in Union gunpowder. Within hours of learning of the Trent
Affair Russell moved to halt the export of saltpeter.[89] Military preparation began quickly after news of the Trent
reached Great Britain. Secretary of War Sir George Lewis proposed within a week to send “thirty thousand rifles, an
artillery battery, and some officers to Canada.” He wrote to Lord Palmerston on December 3, “I propose to engage a
Cunard Steamer & send out one regiment & one battery of artillery next week” followed as quickly as possible by
three more regiments and more artillery.[90] Given that realities of the North Atlantic in winter, however, the
reinforcements would have to land in Nova Scotia, since the St. Lawrence begins to ice up in December.
Russell was concerned that Lewis and Palmerston might take actions prematurely that would eliminate what chances
for peace that there were, so he requested “a small committee …[to] assist Lewis, & the Duke of Somerset” with their
war plans. The group was created and convened on December 9. The group consisted of Palmerston, Lewis,
Somerset, Russell, Newcastle, Lord Granville (foreign secretary) and the Duke of Cambridge (commander-in-chief
of the British Army), advised by Earl de Grey (Lewis’ undersecretary), Lord Seaton (a former commander-in-chief in
Canada), General John Fox Burgoyne (the inspector general of fortifications) and Colonel P. L. MacDougall (the
former commander of the Royal Canadian Rifles). The first priority of the committee was Canadian defense, and the
committee relied on both plans developed by previous explorations of the issue and information that the committee
developed on its own from the testimony of experts.[91]
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Trent Affair
The current resources in Canada consisted of five thousand regular troops and about an equal number of “ill-trained”
militia of which only one-fifth were organized. During December the British managed to send 11,000 troops using
18 transport ships and by the end of the month they were prepared to send an additional 28,400 men. By the end of
December, as the crisis ended, reinforcements had raised the count to 924 officers and 17,658 men against an
anticipated American invasion of from 50,000 to 200,000 troops.[92]
In Canada, General Williams had toured the available forts and fortifications in November and December. Historian
Gordon Warren wrote that Williams found that, “forts were either decaying or nonexistent, and the amount of
necessary remedial work was stupefying.”[93] On December 2, at Williams’ urging, the Canadian government agreed
to raise its active volunteer force to 7,500. Canadian law provided for the Sedentary Militia, which consisted of all
Canadian males between ages 16 and 50. Bourne said of the Sedentary Militia and the status of the Canadian militia:
In spite of its proud record – or perhaps because of it – the Canadian militia had been allowed to decline into a
mere paper force. By law the entire male population between eighteen and sixty was liable for service but the
vast majority of these, the sedentary militia, had no existence beyond enrolment. The only active force, the
volunteers, received a mere six or twelve days’ annual training according to the arm of the service, and of the
5,000 authorized there were only some 4,422 in June 1861 – a “miserable small force! And many of them but
ill-trained, unless greatly improved since last year”, was Newcastle’s comment.[94]
Williams, on December 20 began training one company of 75 men from each battalion of the Sedentary Militia,
about 38,000 men in total.[95] Warren describes the Sedentary militia:
Untrained and undisciplined, they showed up in all manner of dress, with belts of basswood bark and sprigs of
green balsam in their hats, carrying an assortment of flintlocks, shotguns, rifles, and scythes. Their officers,
prefacing orders with ‘please’, recoiled in horror as formations of the backwoodsmen zigzagged on command
to wheel to the left.[95]
His task was not dissimilar to the one that the Union and Confederates had faced at the beginning of the Civil War.
Canadian governor Charles Monck believed that by April he would be able to mobilize a total of 100,000 troops
from this group (assuming Britain provided most of the arms), a target suggested by Newcastle with the expectation
that substantial British troops would be available by then in Canada.[96]
It was within the context of a generally unprepared Canadian military that military ground plans were formulated –
plans contingent on troops that would not be available until spring 1862.[97] Canada was not prepared for war with
the United States.[98] In the War Cabinet there had been disagreement between Macdougall, who believed that the
Union would suspend the war and turn its full attention to Canada, and Burgoyne, who believed the war would
continue. Both agreed, however that Canada would face a major ground assault from the United States – an assault
that both recognized would be difficult to oppose.[99] The defense depended on “an extensive system of
fortifications” and “seizing command of the lakes”. While Burgoyne stressed the natural tactical advantages of
fighting on the defense out of strong fortifications, the fact was that the fortification plans previously made had never
been executed. On the Great Lakes, both Canada and the United States had no naval assets to speak of in November.
The British would be vulnerable here at least until the spring of 1862.[100]
In order to counter their weaknesses to an American offensive, the idea of a Canadian invasion of the United States
was proposed. It was hoped that a successful invasion would occupy Portland and large sections of Maine, requiring
the U.S. to divert troops that would otherwise be occupied with an invasion of Canada directed at its east-west
communication and transportation lines. Burgoyne, Seaton, and Macdougall all supported the plan and Lewis
recommended it to Palmerston on December 3. However no preparations for this attack were ever made, and success
depended on the attack being initiated at the very beginning of the war.[101] Macdougall believed that “a strong party
is believed to exist in Maine in favor of annexation to Canada” (a belief that Bourne characterizes as “dubious”), and
that this party would assist a British invasion. The Admiralty hydrographer, Captain Washington, and Milne both felt
that if such a party existed that it would be best to postpone an attack and wait until it became apparent that “the state
was inclined to change masters.”[102]
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Trent Affair
It should be noted that the Times reported different numbers regarding Canadian military preparedness from those
described above. Rather than 38,000 unprepared militia, it stated that there was a Militia Army of circa 66,615
militiamen and volunteers "quite equal in all these respects to any force the United States can bring against them."
[103]
The Times also reported that by February 10, 1862 modern arms and equipment for 105,550 had arrived in
Canada along with 20 million cartridges.[104]
From our Correspondent Montreal, Dec. 23. By the time this reaches you Canada will have fully 60,000 men
in arms to resist the invasion of her soil... A month ago Canada was at the mercy of the enemy; a month hence
it will stand armed to the teeth and capable of offering a firm defence against any force that is likely to be
brought against it during the winter.[105]
Putting aside whatever volunteer and militia battalions might have been mobilized in British North America (i.e, the
Province of Canada, equivalent to the southern third of modern-day Ontario and Quebec, and the colonies of New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, which did not include much of modern
Newfoundland's territory on Labrador), in 1862 (none were mobilized in 1861), the reality is that Britain's effective
order of battle in the theater amounted to the following: 1860 – four infantry battalions, four batteries of garrison
artillery; July, 1861 reinforcement – three infantry battalions, one field artillery battery, and personnel to bring the
existing garrisons' units to strength; "Trent affair" reinforcement – eight infantry battalions, five batteries of field
artillery, eight batteries of garrison artillery, three companies of engineers, various service and support elements, and
the headquarters staff; the grand total in British North America by New Year's amounted to 14 infantry battalions
(elements of one battalion and part of the headquarters staff were unable to land in Nova Scotia because of the North
Atlantic winter; the staff officers involved had to land in Boston and travel overland to Montreal via the U.S.); six
batteries of field artillery; 12 of garrison artillery; and three of engineers, plus the various headquarters, service, and
support elements.[106]
Of the above, five infantry battalions, three field artillery batteries, and six garrison artillery batteries moved by sea
from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to St. John, New Brunswick, then overland by sleigh from St. John to Riviere du Loup,
Province of Canada, between Jan. 1, 1852 and March 13, 1862. The 10-day-long overland passage, and the railway
from Riviere du Loup to Ville du Quebec, was within a day's march of the border (in some locations, the overland
trail was almost within rifle shot from U.S. territory in Maine), so the British staff planned on deploying infantry to
defend the road, if necessary. Including the units sent overland and the British forces already in the Province of
Canada, British field forces in the province would have amounted to nine infantry battalions and four field artillery
batteries by mid-March, 1862, aa force equivalent to three brigades (ie, one division), with the equivalent of two
more split between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.[107]
As a point of comparison, the United States had begun its mobilization in April, 1861, with the first call for 75,000
short-service volunteers (3 months); the subsequent call for 500,000 long-service volunteers (24–36 months) came in
July, 1861. By Dec. 31, 1861, U.S. forces amounting to 425,000 were listed as "present for duty" with their units in
the Official Records; another 52,000 were listed variously as: present but detached for temporary “extra or daily”
duty; sick; or under arrest.[108] These troops were organized into regiments, brigades, and divisions, with divisions
made up of three brigades (each of 3–4 infantry battalions) and a divisional artillery battalion of 3–4 batteries each.
The divisions had been organized in 1861 (the first, Banks' Division of the Army of the Potomac, as early as July)
and by January, included 13 such formations in the Army of the Potomac; two in Western Virginia; one (Burnside's)
in Maryland; one (Sherman's) in South Carolina; five more in the Army of the Ohio; and one each in Missouri and
Tennessee, for a total of 24; this total does not include multiple separate brigade-level formations, much less units in
garrison at various fortifications and other posts from Maine to California. Additional divisions were organized in
1862; the organizational orders of battle are listed throughout the U.S. Official Records and sources derived from
them, including Dyer.
It was at sea that the British had their greatest strength and their greatest ability to bring the war to the United States
if necessary. The Admiralty, on December 1, wrote to Russell that Milne “should give his particular attention to the
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Trent Affair
measures that may be necessary for the protection of the valuable trade between America, the West Indies, and
England.” However Somerset issued provisional orders to British naval units around the world to be prepared to
attack American shipping wherever it might be found. The Cabinet was also agreed that establishing and maintaining
a tight blockade was essential to British success.[109]
In 1864 Milne wrote that his own plan was:
… to have secured our own bases, especially Bermuda and Halifax, raised the blockade of the Southern Ports
by means of the squadron then at Mexico under the orders of Commodore Dunlop and that I had with me at
Bermuda and then to have immediately blockaded as effectually as my means admitted the chief Northern
Ports, and to have acted in Chesapeake Bay in co-operation with the Southern Forces …[110]
Regarding possible joint operations with the Confederacy, Somerset wrote to Milne on December 15:
…generally it will be well to avoid as much as possible any combined operations on a great scale (except as
far as the fleet may be concerned), under any specious project such as for an attack on Washington or
Baltimore; — experience proves almost invariably the great evils of combined operations by armies of
different countries; and in this case, the advantage of the enemy of the defensive station will far more than
compensate for the union of forces against it.[111]
Somerset was opposed to attacking heavily fortified positions and Milne concurred:
The object of the war can of course only be considered to cripple the enemy. That is his trade and of his trade
it can only be his shipping. No object would be gained if the Forts alone are to be attacked, as modern views
deprecate any damage to a town. If ships are fired upon in a Port the town must suffer; therefore the shipping
cannot be fired on. This actually reserves operations to against vessels at sea. If a town is undefended or the
defenses subdued an embargo might be put on it and a subsidy demanded.[112]
The British strongly believed that they had naval superiority over the Union. Although Union ships outnumbered
Milne’s available force, many of the United States fleet were simply remodeled merchant ships, and the British had
an advantage in the number of total guns available. Bourne suggested that this advantage could change during the
war as both sides turned more to ironclads. In particular, British ironclads had a deeper draught and could not operate
in American coastal waters, leaving a close blockade dependent on wooden ships vulnerable to Union ironclads.[113]
Of course, the military option was not needed. If it had been, Warren concluded that, “Britain’s world dominance of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had vanished; the Royal Navy, although more powerful than ever, no longer
ruled the waves.”[114] Military historian Russell Weigley concurs in Warren’s analysis and adds:
The Royal Navy retained the appearance of maritime supremacy principally because it existed in a naval
vacuum, with no serious rivals except for halfhearted and sporadic challenges by the French. At that, the
British Navy would have had a difficult time making itself felt on the North American coast. The coming of
steam power had destroyed the ability of its best warships to cruise indefinitely in American waters as the
blockading squadrons had done in 1812. Even with a major base at Halifax, or possible aid from Confederate
ports, the British Navy would have found it a precarious venture to try to keep station on the U.S. Coast. No
steam navy operated with success against any reasonably formidable enemy at the distances from its home
ports that a trans-Atlantic war would have imposed on the British fleet until the U.S. Navy fought the Japanese
in World War II.[115]
In February 1862, Cambridge, the British Army commander-in-chief, provided a different analysis of British military
reaction to the Trent affair:
I do not at all regret the demonstration, though we are not as it appears to have war. It will be a valuable lesson
to the Americans, and to the World at large, and will so prove to all what England can and will do, when the
necessity for so doing arises. It also established the fact that we are not that insignificant military Power,
which some people are disposed to make out, and that the military organization of our departments is now
such, that at any moment we can be, and are prepared should it arise. It also proves that we have an able staff
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Trent Affair
to conduct the details of a difficult operation.[116]
Resolution (December 17, 1861 – January 14, 1862)
On December 17, Adams received Seward’s November 30 dispatch stating that Wilkes acted without orders, and
Adams immediately told Russell. Russell was encouraged by the news, but deferred any action until a formal
response to the British communication was received. The note was not released to the public, but rumors were
published by the press of the Union intent. Russell refused to confirm the information, and John Bright later asked in
Parliament, “How came it that this dispatch was never published for the information of the people of this
country?”[117]
In Washington, Lyons received the official response and his instructions on December 18. As instructed, Lyons met
with Seward on December 19 and described the contents of the British response without actually delivering them.
Seward was told that the British would expect a formal reply within seven days of Seward’s receipt of the official
communication. At Seward’s request, Lyons gave him an unofficial copy of the British response which Seward
immediately shared with Lincoln. On Saturday December 21 Lyons visited Seward to deliver the “British
ultimatum,” but after further discussion they agreed that the formal delivery would be postponed for another two
days. Lyons and Seward reached an agreement that the seven day deadline should not be considered as part of the
official communication from the British government.[118]
Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a frequent consultant to
President Lincoln on foreign relations, had recognized immediately that the United States must release Mason and
Slidell, but he had remained publicly silent during the weeks of high excitement. Sumner had traveled in England
and carried on regular correspondence with many political activists in Britain. In December he received particularly
alarming letters from Richard Cobden and John Bright. Bright and Cobden discussed the preparations of the
government for war and the widespread doubts, including their own, of the legality of Wilkes’ actions. The Duchess
of Argyll, a strong antislavery advocate in Great Britain, wrote Sumner that the capture of the envoys “the maddest
act that ever was done, and, unless the [United States] government intend to force us to war, utterly
inconceivable."[119]
Sumner took these letters to Lincoln, who had just learned of the official British demand. Sumner and Lincoln met
daily over the next week and discussed the ramifications of a war with Great Britain. In a December 24 letter Sumner
wrote that the concerns were over the British fleet breaking the blockade and establishing their own blockade,
French recognition of the Confederacy and movement into Mexico and Latin America, and the post-war (assuming
Confederate independence) widespread smuggling of British manufactures via the South that would cripple
American manufacturing. Lincoln thought that he could meet directly with Lyons and “show him in five minutes that
I am heartily for peace,” but Sumner persuaded him of the diplomatic impropriety of such a meeting. Both men
ended up agreeing that arbitration might be the best solution, and Sumner was invited to attend a cabinet meeting
scheduled for Christmas morning.[120]
Relevant information from Europe flowed to Washington right up to the time of the cabinet meeting. On December
25 a letter written on December 6 by Adams was received in Washington. Adams wrote:
The passions of the country are up and a collision is inevitable if the Government of the United States should,
before the news reaches the other side, have assumed the position of Captain Wilkes in a manner to preclude
the possibility of explanation. … Ministers and people now fully believe it is the intention of the [U.S.]
Government to drive them into hostilities.[121]
Two messages from American consuls in Great Britain were also received at the same time. From Manchester the
news was that Britain was arming “with the greatest energy” and from London the message was that a “strong fleet”
was being built with work going on around the clock, seven days a week. Thurlow Weed, who had moved from Paris
to London to insure that General Scott’s letter was circulated, also sent a letter advising Seward that “such prompt
and gigantic preparations were never known.”[122]
17
Trent Affair
With all of the negative news, the official response from France also arrived. Dayton had already told Seward of his
own meeting with Thouvenel, in which the French foreign minister had told him that Wilkes’ actions were “a clear
breach of international law” but that France would “remain a spectator in any war between the United States and
England.”[123] A direct message was received on Christmas from Thouvenel (it was actually delivered during the
cabinet meeting) urging that the United States release the prisoners and in so doing affirm the rights of neutrals on
the seas that France and the United States had repeatedly argued against Great Britain.[124]
Seward had prepared a draft of his intended response to the British prior to the cabinet meeting and he was the only
one present who had a detailed, organized position to present. His main point in the debate was that releasing the
prisoners was consistent with the traditional American position on the right of neutrals, and the public would accept
it as such. Both Chase and Attorney General Edward Bates were strongly influenced by the various messages from
Europe, and Postmaster Montgomery Blair had been in favor of releasing the captives even before the meeting.
Lincoln clung to arbitration but received no support, the primary objection being the time that would be involved and
an impatient Britain. No decision was made at the meeting and a new meeting was scheduled for the next day.
Lincoln indicated he wished to prepare his own paper for this meeting. The next day Seward’s proposal to release the
prisoners was accepted without dissent. Lincoln did not submit a counter argument, indicating afterwards to Seward
that he had found he was unable to draft a convincing rebuttal to Seward’s position.[125]
Seward’s reply was “a long, highly political document.”[126] Seward stated that Wilkes had acted on his own and
denied allegations by the British that the seizure itself had been conducted in a discourteous and violent manner. The
capture and search of Trent was consistent with international law, and Wilkes’ only error was in failing to take Trent
to a port for judicial determination. The release of the prisoners was therefore required in order “to do to the British
nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us.” Seward’s reply, in effect, accepted Wilkes’
treatment of the prisoners as contraband and also equated their capture with the British exercise of impressment of
British citizens off of neutral ships.[127]
Lyons was summoned to Seward’s office on December 27 and presented with the response. Focusing on the release
of the prisoners rather than Seward’s stated analysis of the situation, Lyons forwarded the message and decided to
remain in Washington until further instructions were received. The news of the release was published by December
29 and the public response was generally positive. Among those opposed to the decision was Wilkes who
characterized it “as a craven yielding and an abandonment of all the good … done by [their] capture.”[128]
Mason and Slidell were released from Fort Warren and boarded the Royal Navy screw sloop HMS Rinaldo at
Provincetown, Massachusetts. The Rinaldo took them to St. Thomas; on January 14, they left on the British mail
packet La Plata bound for Southampton. The news of their release reached Britain on January 8. The British
accepted the news as a diplomatic victory. Palmerston noted that Seward’s response contained “many doctrines of
international law” contrary to the British interpretation, and Russell wrote a detailed response to Seward contesting
his legal interpretations, but, in fact, the crisis was over.[129]
Aftermath
Historian Charles Hubbard describes the Confederate perspective to the resolution of the crisis:
The resolution of the Trent affair dealt a serious blow to Confederate diplomatic efforts. First, it deflected the
recognition momentum developed during the summer and fall of 1861. It created a feeling in Great Britain that
the United States was prepared to defend itself when necessary, but recognized its responsibility to comply
with international law. Moreover, it produced a feeling in Great Britain and France that peace could be
preserved as long as the Europeans maintained strict neutrality in regard to the American belligerents.[130]
The issue of diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy, however, remained alive. It was considered further
throughout 1862 by the British and French governments within the context of formally extending an offer, difficult
to refuse, for mediation of the war. As the war in America intensified and the bloody results of the Battle of Shiloh
became known, the humanitarian reasons for European intervention seemed to have more merit.[131] However the
18
Trent Affair
Emancipation Proclamation announced in September, 1862, made it clear that the issue of slavery was now at the
forefront of the war. At first the British reaction to the Battle of Antietam and the preliminary announcement of the
Emancipation proclamation was that this would only create a slave rebellion within the South as the war itself
became progressively more violent.[132] Only in November 1862 did the momentum for European intervention
reverse course.[133]
Notes
[1] Hubbard pg. 7. Hubbard further writes that Davis’ policy was “a rigid and inflexible policy based on economic coercion and force. The
stubborn reliance of the Confederates on a King Cotton strategy resulted in a natural resistance to coercion from the Europeans. Davis’s policy
was to hold back cotton until the Europeans “came to get it.” The opinions of Secretary of War Judah Benjamin and Secretary of the Treasury
Christopher Memminger that cotton should be immediately exported in order to build up foreign credits was overridden by Davis. Hubbard
pg. 21–25
[2] Jones pp. 2–3. Hubbard p. 17. Mahin p. 12.
[3] Berwanger p. 874. Hubbard p. 18. Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights, p. 9. Baxter wrote, “the British government, while
defending the rights of British merchants and shipowners, kept one eye on the precedents and the other on the future interests of the mistress
of the sea.”
[4] Graebner p. 60–61.
[5] Mahin p. 47. Taylor p. 177.
[6] Mahin p. 7. Mahin notes that Seward had talked in the 1850s of annexing Canada and in February 1861 had spoken frequently of reuniting
the North and South by a foreign war.
[7] Dubrulle pg. 1234.
[8] Donald, Baker, Holt pp. 311–312. Hubbard pp. 27–29
[9] Jones pp. 3–4, 35.
[10] Hubbard pp. 34–39. Walther p. 308. Russell had written to Lyons about the arrival of the three Confederates: “If it can possibly be helped,
Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the southerners when they come, but unofficially, and keep them at a
proper distance.” Graebner p. 64.
[11] Mahin p. 48. Graebner p. 63. Donald, Baker, Holt p. 312.
[12] Mahin pp. 48–49. Hubbard p. 39. Jones p. 34
[13] Donald, Baker pg. 314. Mahin pg. 48–49. Taylor pg. 175–179. Taylor notes that British officials already believed that Seward would
provoke an international crisis as a diversion from the Union’s internal problems. For example, an article in the New York Times, believed to
have been planted by Seward in order to transmit a warning to Britain, had said that any permanent dissolution of the Union would invariably
lead to United States acquisition of Canada.
[14] Mahin pg. 54–55. The negotiations between the United States and Britain failed when Lord Russell, aware that the treaty would obligate the
British to treat Confederate privateers as pirates, informed Adams on August 19, 1861 that, “Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake
any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States.”
[15] Berwanger, pp 39-51
[16] Mahin pp. 54–56. Hubbard pp. 50–51.
[17] Warren pg. 79–80.
[18] Mahin pg. 98.
[19] Mahin pg. 96–97.
[20] Walther pg. 316–318. Hubbard, pp. 43–44, 55. Monaghan, p. 174. Monaghan notes that as the news of the Trent Affair reached London,
Russell made the following reply to written correspondence from the Confederate commissioners: “Lord Russell presents his compliments to
Mr. Yancey, Mr. Rost, and Mr. Mann. He has had the honor to receive their letters of the 27th and 30th of November, but in the present state
of affairs he must decline to enter into any official communication with them.”
[21] Mahin, p. 58. Hubbard, p. 58
[22] Hubbard pg. 58–59.
[23] Weigley pg. 78. Weigley suggests an interesting alternative hypothesis to the traditional narrative of events when he writes, “The
Confederate government may have intended the Mason-Slidell mission as a trap to bring the United States and Great Britain to war. The
itinerary of the two emissaries was suspiciously well advertised. At Havana, they fraternized and dined with the officers of the San Jacinto,
again publicizing their departure plans. On board the Trent, Slidell appeared unduly eager to become a captive.”
[24] Hubbard pg. 60–61. Mahin pg. 58. Musicant pg. 110.
[25] Musicant pg. 110–111
[26] http:/ / h42day. 100megsfree5. com/ histanex/ 11anxs/ 08trent. html
[27] Musicant pg. 110–111. Mahin pg. 59
[28] Musicant pg. 111. Monaghan pg. 173
[29] Mahin, p. 59. Donald, Baker, Holt, p. 315. Ferris, p. 22. Wilkes later said that he had consulted “all the authorities on international law to
which I had access, viz, Kent, Wheaton and Vattel, besides various decisions of Sir William Scott and other judges of the Admiralty Court of
19
Trent Affair
Great Britain.” Musicant pg. 111. Musicant notes that the availability of the law texts on San Jacinto were the result of the complex legal
situations that were likely to have been encountered in her two year anti-slave-trade patrol of the African coast.
[30] Donald, Baker, Holt, p. 314
[31] Mahin, p. 59
[32] Nevins pg. 387-388
[33] Fairfax pg. 136–137
[34] Fairfax, p. 137
[35] Fairfax pg. 137–139. Ferris pg. 23–24
[36] Mahin, p. 60. Ferris, p. 22. Monaghan, p. 167. Williams was the only British naval officer involved in the incident.
[37] Mahin, p. 61. Ferris, pp. 25–26. Fairfax, p. 140. Fairfax adds the following in his account of the proceedings, “I gave my real reasons some
weeks afterward to Secretary Chase, whom I met by chance at the Treasury Department, he having asked me to explain why I had not literally
obeyed Captain Wilkes's instructions. I told him that it was because I was impressed with England's sympathy for the South and felt that she
would be glad to have so good a ground to declare war against the United States. Mr. Chase seemed surprised, and exclaimed, ‘You have
certainly relieved the Government from great embarrassment, to say the least.’”
[38] Mahin, p. 61
[39] Ferris, pp. 32–33. Jones, p. 83. Jones wrote, “The seizure of these two Southerners in particular drew a triumphant response. Mason had
been a principle (sic) advocate of the hated Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and Slidell had earned a reputation as one of the
most dedicated secessionists in Congress.” Charles Francis Adams Jr., p. 541. Charles Francis Adams Jr., son of the U. S. Minister to Great
Britain, wrote, “Probably no two men in the entire South were more thoroughly obnoxious to those of the Union side than Mason and Slidell.”
[40] Ferris, pp. 33-35
[41] Charles Francis Adams Jr., pp. 548–549
[42] Charles Francis Adams Jr., p. 547
[43] Charles Francis Adams Jr., p. 548
[44] Charles Francis Adams, Jr., p. 548.
[45] Ferris, p. 34.
[46] Jones pg 83.
[47] Jones, p. 89.
[48] Ferris, pp. 35–36
[49] Donald, Holt, Baker, p. 315
[50] Nevins, pp. 392–393. Jones pg. 89
[51] Mahin, p. 62. Nevins, pp. 392–393.
[52] Mahin, p. 64. Warren, pp. 170–171
[53] Warren, p. 170.
[54] Warren, p. 173.
[55] Niven, pp. 270–273.
[56] Jones, p. 88. Warren, pp. 174–175.
[57] Warren, pp. 175–176.
[58] Mahin pg. 64–65. Nevins pg. 389. The Nashville had captured and destroyed the Union merchant ship Harvey Birch on its trip. Adams tried
to have the ship declared a pirate. British authorities held it briefly in port, but by November 28 Russell had determined that she was properly
documented as a CSA warship, and its officers were properly credentialed by the CSA. Ferris pg. 37–41
[59] Mahin pg. 65
[60] Baxter, “Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861–1865 pg. 84–86. Warren pg. 96–97. Warren writes that at a cabinet
meeting on November 11 Lord Chancellor Richard Bethell, an Admiralty judge for twenty three years, and Dr. Stephen Lushington, a judge
on the High Court of the Admiralty, both argued that simply removing the envoys would not have been a violation of international law.
[61] Mahin pg. 65. Ferris pg. 12–17. Warren pg. 95, 101.
[62] Donald, Baker pg. 316. Mahin pg. 25.
[63] Donald, Baker, and Holt pg. 315
[64] Warren pg. 107
[65] Warren pg. 105.
[66] Mahin pg. 69
[67] Warren pg. 106–107
[68] Warren pg. 109
[69] Ferris pg 44
[70] Warren pg. 109.
[71] Jones pg. 84–85. Ferris pg. 52. Mahin pg. 69. Lyons, in a private letter, reported to Palmerston that (although he could not “vouch for the
truth” of his source) he had heard that unbeknownst to Lincoln, Seward had directly ordered the capture by Wilkes. Mahin pg. 70.
[72] Mahin pg 68–69
[73] Jones pg. 85.
[74] Ferris pg. 52–53.
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Trent Affair
[75] Warren pg. 146–147
[76] Ferris pg. 76. Clarendon in September, anticipating the U.S. would pick a fight with Britain wrote that he felt “N[apoleon] w[oul]d instantly
leave us in the lurch and do something in Europe w[hic]h we can’t stand.”
[77] Warren pg. 85.
[78] Ferris pg. 79.
[79] Ferris pg. 80–84.
[80] Warren pg. 149–152.
[81] Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 10–12.
[82] Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 14
[83] Bourne pg 601
[84] Bourne pg. 601
[85] Bourne pg. 602–605
[86] Bourne pg 604–605
[87] Bourne pg. 600
[88] Ferris pg. 63
[89] Donald, Holt,Baker pg. 316. Ferris pg 62
[90] Ferris pg 64
[91] Ferris pg. 64. Warren pg. 133. Bourne pg. 607.
[92] Warren pg. 132–133. Mahin pg. 72. Ferris pg. 65. Ferris indicates in footnote no. 30 on page 219 that his account is based largely on Bourne
who “is the only scholar, I believe, who has examined most of the pertinent archival sources.”
[93] Warren pg. 134. Warren further wrote, “At Toronto and Kingston, he proposed earthworks with heavy ordnance, and allocated two hundred
men for extending and strengthening them. A new ten-gun battery was to replace the rusty cannon overlooking the Grand Trunk Railway
tracks, wharf, and channel, and a Royal Artillery officer arrived to instruct men in its use. Williams wanted to blow bridges over the St.
Lawrence and, in the event of attack, close Toronto by sinking ships. Desperate moves were necessary.”
[94] Bourne pg. 611
[95] Warren pg. 133.
[96] Warren pg. 134.
[97] Warren pg. 135
[98] Warren pg. 34-35
[99] Bourne pg. 609. Bourne wrote, “The vast length of the exposed frontier made it virtually impossible for the British to defend it in its entirety
– but, worse, the Americans were peculiarly well placed to attack it. They not only had superior local resources in men and material, they also
had excellent communications for concentrating those resources upon the frontier and for reinforcing them from the heart of commercial and
industrial America – in fact sufficiently good communications in Macdougall’s view to outweigh the difficulties of a winter campaign.”
[100] Bourne pg. 610–613. On the lake situation Bourne wrote, “Quite clearly there could be no hope of securing the command of the lakes
unless adequate preparations were made in advance of hostilities. But the time was peculiarly unfavorable for such measures; the whole
question of colonial military expenditure had recently been investigated by a committee of the house of commons whose bias was plainly to
encourage greater efforts on the part of the colonists themselves. On 17 October, therefore, Somerset had concluded that the defence of all the
lakes would be ‘very difficult’ and that the main effort must be left to the Canadians themselves, though ‘perhaps with proper arrangements we
might defend Lake Ontario and Kingston Dockyard.’ But even for this limited programme no preparation had been made by the time Lewis
raised the matter at the Cabinet of 4 December. Nor was anything done later.”
[101] Bourne pg. 620–621. On December 26 de Gray had prepared a memorandum indicating 7,640 troops would be needed for the initial attack.
Macdougall had prepared a memorandum on December 3 in which he suggested that 50,000 troops would be necessary to guarantee success.
[102] Bourne pg. 625–626. Washington wrote, “Possibly a very strict blockade, without an attack, might induce the people of Maine to consider
whether it would not be for their interest to declare themselves independent of the United States, and so profit by all the advantages that would
be derived from railway communication with Canada and the Lakes.”
[103] The Times, 6th January 1862, pg 9 and The Times, 8th January 1862, pg 19
[104] 10th February 1862, pg10
[105] The Times, 8th January 1862, pg 10
[106] Campbell, pg. 64
[107] Campbell, pg. 60–63
[108] Moody et al, pg. 775–776
[109] Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg 16. Bourne pg. 623–627.)
[110] Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 17
[111] Bourne pg. 627 fn 4
[112] Bourne pg 625
[113] Bourne pg. 623–624.
[114] Warren pg. 154
[115] Weigley pg. 80–81.
21
Trent Affair
[116] Bourne pg. 630. Bourne wrote (pg. 231), “By the destruction of American shipping, by a severe blockade, by the harassing of the Northern
coastal cities and perhaps by the occupation of Maine the British might, while being unable to secure a decisive military victory, not only draw
off the enemy from hard-pressed Canada and inspire the South morally and materially, but, above all, so sap the North’s moral and economic
strength as to bring her Government to sue for peace on unfavourable terms.”
[117] Mahin, p. 73.
[118] Ferris, pp. 131–135.
[119] Donald, pp. 31–36.
[120] Donald, pp. 36–38.
[121] Mahin, p. 70. Ferris, p. 180.
[122] Ferris, p. 80.
[123] Mahin, p. 98. Warren, p. 158. The words in quotes are Dayton’s.
[124] Weigley, p. 79. Ferris, pp. 181–182.
[125] Ferris, pp. 181–183. Taylor, p. 184.
[126] Taylor, p. 184.
[127] Ferris, p. 184.
[128] Ferris, pp. 188–191.
[129] Ferris, pp. 192–196.
[130] Hubbard pg. 64
[131] Jones pg. 117–137
[132] Jones pg. 138–180.
[133] Jones pg. 223.
Bibliography
General sources
• Adams, Jr., Charles Francis (April 1912), "The Trent Affair", The American Historical Review (American
Historical Association) 17 (3), ISSN 0002-8762, OCLC 1830326
• Adams, Ephraim Douglass (1924), ""VII: The Trent"" (http://web.archive.org/web/20070927044755/http://
www.gutenberg.org/files/13789/13789.txt) (txt), Great Britain and the American Civil War, 1, Longmans
Green, ISBN n/a, OCLC 251298695, archived from the original (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13789/
13789.txt) on 27 September 2007, retrieved 21 September 2009
• Bourne, Kenneth. "British Preparations for War with the North, 1861–1862," The English Historical Review Vol
76 No 301 (Oct 1961) pp 600–632 in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/558199)
• Campbell, W.E. "The Trent Affair of 1861,". The (Canadian) Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin. Vol. 2, No. 4,
Winter 1999 pp 56–65
• Moody, John Sheldon, et al. The war of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the Union and
Confederate armies; Series 3 – Volume 1; United States. War Dept., pp. 775
• Donald, David Herbert, Baker, Jean Harvey, and Holt, Michael F. The Civil War and Reconstruction. (2001)
ISBN 0-393-97427-8
• Foreman, Amanda. A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War (2011)
• Goodwin, Doris Kearns. Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln. (2005) ISBN
978-0-684-82490-1
• Fairfax, D. Macneil. Captain Wilkes’s Seizure of Mason and Slidell in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: North
to Antietam edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel. (1885).
• Ferris, Norman B. The Trent Affair: A Diplomatic Crisis. (1977) ISBN 0-87049-169-5
• Graebner, Norman A. "Northern Diplomacy and European Neutrality," in Why the North Won the Civil War
edited by David Herbert Donald. (1960) ISBN 0-684-82506-6 (1996 Revision)
• Hubbard, Charles M. The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy. (1998) ISBN 1-57233-092-9
• Jones, Howard. Union in Peril: The Crisis Over British Intervention in the Civil War. (1992) ISBN
0-8032-7597-8
• Mahin, Dean B. One War at A Time: The International Dimensions of the Civil War. (1999) ISBN 1-57488-209-0
22
Trent Affair
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Monaghan, Jay. Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs. (1945). ISBN 0-8032-8231-1 (1997 edition)
Musicant, Ivan. Divided Waters: The Naval History of the Civil War. (1995) ISBN 0-7858-1210-5
Nevins, Allan. The war for the Union: The Improvised War 1861–1862. (1959)
Niven, John. Salmon P. Chase: A Biography. (1995) ISBN 0-19-504653-6
Taylor, John M. William Henry Seward: Lincoln’s Right Hand. (1991) ISBN 1-57488-119-1
Walther, Eric H. William Lowndes Yancey: The Coming of the Civil War. (2006) ISBN 978-0-7394-8030-4
Warren, Gordon H. Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas, (1981) ISBN
0-930350-12-X
• Weigley, Russell F., A Great Civil War. (2000) ISBN 0-253-33738-0
Primary sources
• Baxter, James P. 3rd. "Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861–1865". American Historical
Review Vol 34 No 1 (Oct 1928) in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1836481)
• Baxter, James P. 3rd. "The British Government and Neutral Rights, 1861–1865." American Historical Review
Vol 34 No 1 (Oct 1928) in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/1836476)
• Library of Congress Memory Archive for November 8 (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/nov08.html)
• Harper's Weekly news magazine coverage (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1861/
november/trent-affair.htm)
External links
• People involved (http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/h582/2001/trent.htm)
• Newspaper coverage of the Trent Affair (http://www.newsinhistory.com/feature/
trent-affair-crisis-during-us-civil-war-great-britain-almost-fights-united-states)
23
Article Sources and Contributors
Article Sources and Contributors
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
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