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Introduction After the shocking attacks of 1941, the seemingly invincible Japanese surprised Western powers with their successes in the rapid gain of territory in Asia. World War II was a particularly brutal war and possibly more so in the Pacific Theater. A visible difference in race arguably fueled the atrocities carried out by both sides in Pacific battles.1 Nonetheless, the Allies and Japanese were equally guilty of vicious acts of violence upon the other. Western powers in Asia suffered early defeats at the hands of the Japanese and the stunning Japanese victories helped in generating storied images of its soldiers. The swiftness of early Japanese victories “spawned the myth of the Japanese superman (and) to the Japanese, they were months of glorious victory that once and for all confirmed their innate superiority.”2 Fueling their samurai spirit and confidence, the overzealousness of these early Japanese victories likely led to the abuse of both combatant and non-combatant personnel alike. Imperial Japanese attempts to expand into mainland Asia and into former European and American colonies in South East Asia led to reports of enslavement and the harsh treatment of the 1 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 10. 2 Dower, War Without Mercy, 260. 2 local populations.3 Consequently, feelings of resentment and revenge against the former menace still linger in the Orient because of Japanese aggressions that led and continued throughout the war. In June 1942, Japanese advances in the Pacific ended with its defeat by the U.S. Navy at the Battle of Midway. Debatably the turning point in the Pacific Theater during World War II, the devastation Japan suffered at Midway led to the Allied counterattack and the “island hopping” campaign that would rapidly encroach upon the Japanese islands. The U.S. advance eventually landed American G.I.‟s on Okinawa and within striking distance of the Japanese mainland. To prepare the country for the expected landing on the main islands of Japan, the Imperial Japanese military poised itself and the population to defend against an Allied assault, insisting, “That the war must be won at any cost, by waging a decisive struggle in the homeland.”4 As defense preparations took place, internal discussions within the highest levels of Japanese leadership debated on their future courses of action. Near the end of 1944, the United States increased its planning efforts in preparation for the submission of the Axis 3 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 222. 4 Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1959), 176. 3 countries and the end of World War II. Developing the framework for Germany upon the Nazi defeat gave insight to what American planners would face as they prepared for the inevitable occupation of Japan. Yet, despite Allied victories in both the European and Asian theaters of war, the occupation of Germany and Japan would not be the same. The Occupation and subsequent division of Axis Germany by the Allied Powers highlighted the ideological differences existing among the victors. The Western Powers, led by the United States, controlled parts of Germany while Communist Soviet Union held the remainder. The end of the war brought about the beginning of the Cold War as these ideological disparities divided the world while the United States and the Soviet Union vied to expand their global influence for the next half century. As abruptly as the war began for the U.S. with the attack on Pearl Harbor, it ended just as dramatically for Japan with the atomic destructions of two cities and the echo of the national surrender broadcast of Japanese Emperor Hirohito to the population. Nonetheless, the quick end to the war and the relatively smooth transition to the post-war occupation resulted from efforts that took place well before the deployment of “Fat Man” on the city of Nagasaki. come easy to the Japanese. The decision to surrender did not Even after the atomic bombings, 4 Japanese military and political leaders stood on opposing sides deliberating the need to continue the war and the need to end the suffering. Ultimately, Emperor Hirohito made the decision to accept the surrender terms and avoid prolonging the war. In the Pacific Theater of the war, the Japanese surrender and the following Allied Occupation did not culminate in a divided country. There would be no iconic “Berlin Wall” to create a visible reminder of the divisiveness between the Allies and no such symbol in Japan rose to introduce the world to the coming Cold War. In Japan, the United States, armed with very recently learned lessons from the planning of post-war Germany, led and carried out the Allied Occupation. Although American efforts primarily ended the war in the Pacific, the Chinese, British, and Dutch agreed to send troops to aid with occupation duties. The American government also planned to use other Asian troops for the Occupation to show world solidarity against the Japanese. Not only would using Asian troops benefit the cause, but it would also “force the Japanese to realize that the greater part of the world, both Occidental and Oriental, (was) against them and would afford them no basis for interpreting the war in the Pacific as a racial war as one designed to spread „white imperialism‟ throughout Asia.”5 5 Nevertheless, Americans State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period, August 11, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 5 represented the bulk of the occupying army. Furthermore, American officials back in Washington, D.C., produced the policies that governed the Occupation. Despite the hesitant and subtle offers by the Western Powers for their contribution, the Soviet Union played a minor, if any, role in the planning and eventual occupation. With an overwhelming military force and a majority stakeholder in Japan, there was very little opposition to American actions as they presided over Japan and molded it into a tranquil country. American policy makers worked with the goal of transforming Japan into a democratic country with western ideals to influence everyday issues such as education, labor, healthcare, banking, and religion. The American victors sought to make Japan into a society that would “live in freedom and peace with her neighbors in the community of nations”.6 Differences in ideology, culture, and perhaps race, helped to spawn savagery in the fighting in the Pacific Theater of the war. The suffering that Japanese troops brought to Asia during the Pacific Campaign of World War II ended with their military‟s surrender in 1945. Despite that, the period in Japan after States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 609, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23, 2009). 6 MacArthur, statement on the Second Anniversary of V-J Day, September 2, 1947, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), 193. 6 their surrender did not bring about massive panic or turmoil but rather relative calm and comparative peace to the country. The Allied Occupation of Japan would create the foundations of a strong American-Japanese relationship. Over time, it appeared as if the transformation resulting from the Occupation would be a complete overhaul of Japanese values and their way of life. Draft American policies and their variations for occupied Japan came from men in Washington. Behind closed doors a small group of military and political figures in the United States discussed, debated, and eventually decided American policies for Japan as they arose. As policies passed Washington, and in due course became official guidelines for the Occupation Army and its leaders, the policies evolved to meet the changing conditions encountered in Japan. From their genesis to the final release to the Japanese, policy changes occurred as these men met in the United States. Who was this ominous group of men making policy to rebuild Japan, and what possible influences existed to alter any decisions made by them? Policies for post-war Japan created by the Americans did not pass without debate. The introduction, discussions, debates, and recommendations all needed to meet approval prior their release to officials in Japan. Once the policies arrived in Japan, did the leaders of the Occupation change them? Since they were the ones on the ground, living and working with the 7 Japanese, was there any reason for the occupying army to adjust or challenge policies handed to them from afar? The final challenges to these policies, of course, would come from the people affected by the policies, namely the Japanese population. However, was there a link for these two groups to interact and to influence policy? With U.S. policy makers in the United States and the Japanese population separated by thousands of miles, did one influence the other in any way? Could empathy or hatred towards the Japanese have influenced the way that American policy makers drafted Occupation policies? Planning for the Occupation of Japan upon her surrender began years before the use of the atomic bombs. However, of the planning that took place, how much of American intentions actually became policy? Issues such as terms of the surrender, the machinery required or needed to conduct an occupation of Japan, the fate of the Emperor, as well as numerous civil concerns like food and medicine, education, land reform, and basic democratic rights that America hoped to bring to its former enemy did not resolve quickly. These required continuous refinement even throughout the Allied Occupation. Rebuilding Japan was undoubtedly a large undertaking. In addition to the structural damage caused by the countless sorties of Allied fire bombings and the devastation caused by the atomic bombs, the psyche of the Japanese population also 8 needed repair. The Japanese, a once proud race, who could earlier boast of having “never lost a war,” suddenly found themselves forced to surrender in order to survive.7 To some Japanese, the day of surrender, August 15, 1945,”was the longest day the people of Japan had ever lived through.”8 On that day, besides hearing the news of capitulation, the voice of the Emperor, not heard by a vast majority of the country, brought to the population the realization that all was lost. Previous news of victorious battles afar and the defeat of the enemy became obvious falsehoods that the Japanese had to accept. Besides rebuilding the infrastructure, the Allies faced a people with a damaged psyche and the enormous charge of rebuilding the Japanese way of life and perhaps fostering an amicable relationship between the former foes. Rebuilding the government, the food distribution system, education, and even the religious beliefs of the people became a daunting task that required the efforts of more than an occupying military force or even the hard work of the victorious American military. To provide the expertise in rebuilding or recreating “a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations”9 required the skills and 7 The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day (New York: Kodansha International, 1980), 19. 8 The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day, 7. 9 State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating 9 intellect of various specialists to guide the Japanese in their reconstruction toward becoming a reliable, trustworthy country. The victorious Allies had countless goals for Japan. However, with the appointment of a United States general to lead the Occupation, American ambitions overwhelmingly influenced post-war objectives in Japan. Within the United States, the myriad of American goals needed direction and coordination. They needed leadership from a single entity in order to synchronize and provide unity of effort. As numerous American, as well as Allied, groups competed for agency-centric agendas, the United States State Department determined the need for a committee to harmonize the efforts of the various agencies. With the start of planning and the discussion of the end of the war with Japan, the U.S. State Department sought a means “to coordinate planning among civilian and military agencies”.10 Bringing in the Navy and War Departments, the State Department proposed the creation of a committee to provide the guidance for American and, eventually, Allied policymaking in the aftermath of World War II. This committee met in secret with only the results of their work known in the policies set forth for worldwide United States post-war efforts. The committee also became heavily involved in the planning for post-war Japan. to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 551. 10 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 209. 10 These policy makers in Washington eventually “drafted the three basic documents that established the initial objectives of the occupation: the Potsdam Declaration in which the United States, Great Britain, and China announced the terms of surrender; ‟The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan‟ that was sent to MacArthur in late August and made public on September 22; and a comprehensive military directive elaborating postsurrender policy.”11 The transformation of the Japanese and their government after World War II took place amid a world destroyed by war and the rising threat of Communism. Japan‟s government and its society ended up mirroring a western democracy with western ideals. The United States undoubtedly developed the policies that governed the Occupation. Was this by original design or was there any Japanese influence to shape it? How much of the original intent of the U.S. planning committee survived the bureaucracy to become policies? With the end of World War II and the occupation that followed, did the Americans who developed the policies for the Occupation take into account conditions on the ground or of the culture? What was the driving force that created and passed Occupation policies? 11 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 73. 11 The study of this post-war planning committee and the U.S. initial post-surrender policies of Japan is the subject of this paper. This paper also intends to study what caused these policies to evolve as they worked through the bureaucracy and to determine what influenced U.S. policy makers as they tried to rebuild the Japanese. Finally, this paper will study how the Allied control machinery for the Japanese Empire came about, what the general intentions of the Occupation were, and how much influence a small group in Washington had on the actions of the Occupation, an occupation that continues to show its influence on the Japanese today. 12 Chapter 1 Studies of the SWNCC The United States State Department, in conjunction with the War and Navy Departments, created the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to synchronize American planning efforts in preparation for the end of the fighting. Due to the classified nature of the SWNCC during World War II, there were few, if any, publications dedicated to the Committee and its activities during the post-World War II era. Rather, the historiography of the SWNCC includes mainly footnotes in larger works dedicated to analyzing the Allied Occupation of Japan. From its inception and throughout the Occupation, the activities of the SWNCC remained a secret. It was not until the U.S. government declassified SWNCC records that details of their meetings became public. Because “(t)he Committee agreed that no copies of minutes of committee meetings or of SWNCC papers should be distributed to others than those on the regular distribution list and those within the three Departments „who need to know‟”1, limited documentation existed regarding the meetings they held. The Committee restricted copies of these minutes and agendas to its members and marked them with 1 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 13th meeting, March 9, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 13 RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET classifications. Close American Allies were not privy to SWNCC meetings or their documents prior to publication. Even the surrender terms used to end the war required the need for modification and declassification by SWNCC before allowing the Allies to edit them and before releasing the final version. The results of SWNCC closed-door sessions ultimately provided the guidance to post-war Japan and became the policies that became public. Published SWNCC policies guided General MacArthur‟s General Headquarters (GHQ) in rebuilding Japan after the war and they became available both in English and in Japanese. The United States National Archives presumably holds all declassified copies of the agendas and minutes of the SWNCC and its Subcommittee for the Far East in microfilm form. The minutes approved by SWNCC provide the primary source and general ideas concerning the conduct of the Occupation, the intent of General MacArthur‟s authority, and the treatment of the Japanese Emperor. These sources contain documentation dealing with the internal discussions that took place among the different members from various parts of the United States Government. Placed in sequential order and analyzed alone, the SWNCC documents provide a good, but limited, understanding of what took place as policies developed. 14 An analysis of the minutes and agenda of the SWNCC shows the concerns the Committee dealt with in their weekly meetings. Since the SWNCC was composed of multiple U.S. government agencies, one can gain an awareness of the military and diplomatic issues that changed SWNCC policies as they circulated for editing. Studying these first-hand accounts shows the initiation, development, discussion, and policy debates regarding SWNCC actions. Although a thorough study of every action the SWNCC conducted near the end of the war and during the Occupation would provide a complete overview of the Committee and its effects, it would require a considerable amount of time to examine the numerous policies passed by SWNCC. The Committee involved itself in all aspects of reconstructing Japan. Subsequently, the U.S. National Archives holds documents that include policies dealing with everything from the “Allied Participation in the Occupation of Japan” to “Control of Media of Public Information in Japan” (also known as the SWNCC-70 series and SWNCC-91, respectively).2 Whether MacArthur‟s GHQ adapted all these policies as written is well beyond the scope of this paper. What this paper intends to focus on are the changes that occurred in SWNCC policies, specifically the United 2 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes, May 9, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 3, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1205. 15 States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, as they made their way from inception to final form. Although a plan existed for post-surrender Japan, SWNCC policies changed as discussions about their content occurred and American perceptions of the Japanese changed. The United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) collection of books document most past government transcripts and correspondence between the United States and foreign countries involving the SWNCC. Much of the once classified or restricted documents and letters between high-level diplomatic and military officials are available to the public. Using these documents, one gains an appreciation of the difficulties in negotiating and resolving issues among many countries, often with conflicting objectives. Correspondence between the various U.S. Departments, General MacArthur‟s staff, and the President are contained in these books, and they show the evolution of SWNCC documents as they progressed from draft to final form. As each document presented by the SWNCC moved through the bureaucracy, various government entities edited them and provided explanations for the eventual endorsement or rejection to proposed policies. These memorandums show the discussions that took place behind the scenes and exchanges taking place beyond those that occurred in SWNCC meetings. Studying the evolution of SWNCC policies, one can see how the 16 thinking of the policy makers changed as the documents made its way to final approval and released. The United States National Archive microfilms and the FRUS books provide not only the policies derived from SWNCC decisions but also provide a sense of the ideas that architects of SWNCC policies held. Since both SWNCC documents and the FRUS provide views from within and beyond the closed doors of SWNCC meetings, studying both allows one to gain a broad appreciation of the issues. A study of the documents contained in the FRUS gives a “paper trail” of a directive and shows the metamorphosis of a policy from its inauguration to the final form sent to General MacArthur for his implementation. Studying this paper trail, one can gain an understanding into what drove the changes in policy through the questions and concerns that arose both within SWNCC meetings and via official government correspondence. Because classified SWNCC agendas and minutes did not become available to the public until the 1970s, books by former members of the Committee written shortly after the Occupation and before the declassification of SWNCC papers have vague references and citations to SWNCC and rarely mention what took place during the meetings. Additionally, a majority of the books about the U.S. Occupation of Japan mention the SWNCC in footnotes or endnotes with only a few pages dedicated to telling the SWNCC story. 17 Memoirs and autobiographies are first-hand accounts depicting SWNCC activities. Accounts by former SWNCC Department of State members Hugh Borton, Justin Williams, and Dean Acheson, provide a glimpse into their workings and thought processes as well as dealings with others on the Committee. A majority of their memoirs mentions SWNCC policies but infrequently discuss details of SWNCC meetings. Statements from General MacArthur and members of his GHQ staff also provide observations to the policies that General MacArthur had to implement. Additionally, translated books by Japanese politicians and officials in office during the Occupation refer to these American policy makers. In his memoirs, former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida gives his observations on American policies during the Occupation.3 These accounts help to gain an indication into Japanese leadership thoughts, opinions, and actions regarding American efforts to rebuild the country and show a general reaction to U.S. policies from the Japanese. The Japanese government also gathered published U.S. policy documents into a series of books dealing with the Occupation. Presented in both English and Japanese, Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan shows the final drafts of 3 Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans. Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 104-106. 18 SWNCC policies that the Japanese government received and ultimately released to the public.4 A study of secondary sources written in the latter part of the 20th Century provides much of the impetus for this study. As mentioned earlier, a majority of primary and secondary sources consigns the activities of the SWNCC to the footnotes or endnotes and, in some cases, fails to articulate the SWNCC decision process due to security classifications. Along with a number of other primary sources, policy papers, and government directives, numerous secondary sources provide insight into life during the U.S. Occupation. The surge in information from the Occupation that occurred nearly 40 years after the end of World War II has provided much of the readings referenced in this paper as well as some of the sources used. Eiji Takemae‟s Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, originally written in Japanese, is one book that provides an in-depth description of the U.S. Occupation of Japan. From the turning point of the war to the eventual signing of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco, the book depicts life in Japan during the reign of General MacArthur‟s super-government. The book tells of the initial acceptance of U.S. policies in Japan and the eventual resistance to change carried out by Japanese 4 Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, bk. 19 government officials. Takemae discusses how Shigeru Yoshida, who became Prime Minister of Japan in 1946, developed a close relationship with MacArthur along with a resentment of “Americans‟ overzealous recourse to these instruments of unilateralism” that discounted Japan‟s past and the traditions “that influenced equally well-intentioned Japanese officials.”5 Takemae shows how officials like Yoshida sometimes grew weary of American policies that ignored the plight of the Japanese. Additionally, the book discusses much of the processes involved in planning and implementing the desires of the United States. He provides some mention of the SWNCC but focuses on the reactions and effects of SWNCC policies on the Japanese. SWNCC policies dealing with the initial surrender (SWNCC-150), reform of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC-228), and even the report dealing with the treatment of the Emperor are a few of the SWNCC policies discussed. John Dower, a foremost expert in Japanese-American affairs, provides an in-depth study of the racial aspect of World War II and the U.S. Occupation in his books War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War and Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. In War Without Mercy, Dower discusses how feelings of racial superiority played a part in the brutality 5 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 114. 20 suffered by all sides during World War II. He discusses the many ways that race influenced the Pacific Theater of World War II and attributes many of the atrocities as well as the viciousness of the war to the color of skin and the differences in culture. The racial feelings that held throughout the war in the Pacific as well as the feelings of ethical superiority probably played on war decisions made on both sides. The Allied perception of the Japanese being lesser humans along with the initial Japanese victories and the stories of their fighting spirit fueled the image of an indomitable, mysterious force and became considerations when planning for the possible resistance by the population during any invasion of the Japanese mainland.6 In Embracing Defeat, Dower gives accounts of the Occupation from the grassroots perspective. Takemae‟s Inside GHQ, on the other hand, attempts to provide a general understanding of the Occupation by touching on the relevant SWNCC tasks of rewriting a new constitution, revamping the education system, redistributing the land, as well as setting labor policy and restricting the country‟s ability to “wage war.” Dower also focuses on how the U.S. presence affected life for the population and provides background to many practices that still exist in Japan because of American troops that ran and 6 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 302. 21 integrated into the daily lives of Japanese society during the Occupation. 22 Chapter 2 Planning for the Aftermath of War United States officials debated on how World War II in the Pacific would end. Besides the philosophical and ethical debate over the use of the atomic bombs, there was an additional debate on how to deal with the impeding occupation. Issues dealing with the disposition of former Axis territories and materials were concerns that America and her allies questioned and occasionally argued over. Additionally, since the Allies had planned to conduct an assault on Japan proper pending the outcome of the atomic bombs, her early surrender caught the United States ill equipped to suddenly take over and run the country because the initial policies for Japan were in place, but the long-term plans were not developed.1 With the need to consider a relatively unfamiliar race and culture, Allied planning for the aftermath of war was distinct in Europe and in Japan. Differences in planning created unique characteristics for the respective occupations. However, it was final troop posturing and Allied presence during the days leading to the Axis defeat that played a significant part in the distribution of post-war politics and responsibilities. 1 When Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 227. 23 Germany surrendered, the British and Russians still had large armies in German territory, while in Japan, because the United States primarily orchestrated the Japanese defeat, American forces became the preponderance of the military presence in the country.2 As a result, the rules and policies received from Washington ultimately directed the Allied troops during the Occupation. As the Allies in Europe began the reconstruction of the continent, the United States planned a different path for the expected occupation of Japan. The Japanese government would play a large part in the rebuilding of their country since ”contrary to the practice of direct military government adopted in defeated Germany, this occupation was conducted „indirectly‟-that is, through existing organs of government and entailed buttressing the influence of two of the most undemocratic institutions of the presurrender regime: the bureaucracy and the throne.”3 The U.S. realized the importance of the existing government in Japan and the use of the Emperor to the Occupation. Both of these instruments would prove crucial to Japan‟s relatively quick recovery from defeat. The U.S. was initially unaware of how the Japanese would react to their presence upon entering the country. 2 The Allies, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 426. 3 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 212. 24 showing a wartime understanding of the Japanese enemy, planned a post-war occupation of Japan that reflected fears that little semblance of order would remain to control the country after her defeat. The West viewed the Japanese as little men who were unpredictable and irrational.4 Whether it was by invasion or after surrender, the Americans planned to take full control of the government because it was “not believed that any Japanese Government which may be in existence at the time of unconditional surrender or total defeat will have sufficient prestige and power greatly to influence the general situation.”5 Eventually, whereas Germany‟s loss led to the complete dismantling of the German government, in the Pacific Theater, large portions, if not all, of the Japanese government remained intact to carry out the orders of the United States.6 Besides utilizing a portion of the existing Japanese government, the Allies looked to retain the use of the Imperial Throne. The use of the existing Japanese governmental structure enabled a relatively smooth transition between pre- and postsurrender governments and allowed the Japanese government the 4 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 111. 5 U.S. Department of State, An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States, June 22, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 559, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23, 2009). 6 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 426. 25 opportunity to lead in complying with the surrender documents and rebuilding the country.7 Discussions regarding the assignment of a leader for Japan‟s Occupation took place amid disagreements between American and Russian officials. American officials talked about the “comparative war efforts in the Pacific of the United States and the U.S.S.R. and declared it to be „unthinkable‟ that any but an American should be Supreme Commander in Japan.”8 The American position would ultimately hold and with Americans solely in charge of efforts in Japan, compared to Europe, the stature of the U.S. military and its policies grew in importance. When General MacArthur gained the task of leading the Occupation of Japan, his power and prestige increased while the Allied victory in Europe diluted the supreme powers that General Dwight Eisenhower once held as the division of Germany among the Allies demonstrated.9 As the complex issues of the surrender and occupation emerged, the War Department‟s Civil Affairs Division and the Navy Department‟s Occupied Areas Division “were becoming restive over not having clearly defined policies on which to base plans 7 Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 100. 8 Hugh Borton, Francis C. Jones, and Bertie R. Pearn, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 148. 9 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 426. 26 for the occupation of enemy-occupied territory.”10 Nonetheless, the War and Navy Departments‟ efforts in planning for an occupation would continue but would eventually require the involvement of the State Department to enable military policies abroad. The Treasury Department helped to draft the post-war policy for Germany. Then Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Henry Morgenthau drafted the plan that ultimately became the Occupation Policy for Germany (also known as JCS-1067). However, debates on the merit of using Morgenthau‟s plan as a model for Japan arose. The U.S. State, War, and Navy Departments agreed that the Occupation of Japan required a document similar to Morganthau‟s but that it needed to be a document giving basic policy rather than a directive with numerous sections directing an assortment of policies dealing with economic and administrative or relief issues.11 The plan for Japan needed to be straightforward and simple in its intentions. In addition to rejecting the Germany model for Japan, the eventual plan for Japan avoided partition of the islands and placing it under the governance of multiple countries. 10 Rather, the final plan for Hugh Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 14. 11 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 28th meeting, April 16, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 27 Japan entailed the United States leading the reconstruction efforts. Additionally, State Department staffs conducting research work for the pre-surrender Japanese policy did not feel compelled to follow the policies created for Germany and “believed that it would be disastrous for the success of the occupation and American objectives in Japan if the German policies were applied to Japan.”12 In hindsight, the efforts of the U.S. departments of the State, War, Navy, and Treasury lacked unity in their efforts in the planning for the end of the war. For the State Department, the Secretary of State created the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC) within the department to institute post-war polices and to help develop the international relations needed to carry out those policies.13 The work of the PWC remained one centered on directives of a political nature with occasion to defer to the armed forces on questions dealing with military matters. The SWNCC and Its Origin Specific departments within the United States stated their goals and the requirements needed in order to properly manage their portion of the post-war environment. 12 13 Prior to the Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 17. Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 14. 28 Occupation, the departments recognized the need to synchronize their efforts and, “it was obvious to everyone concerned with postwar policy planning that difficulties of interdepartmental communication must be eliminated if coordinated postwar policies were to be developed.”14 These governmental concerns culminated in the creation of the SWNCC. To alleviate duplication of effort, conflicting priorities and to streamline efforts, on November 29, 1944, Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., sent letters to the Secretaries of War and the Navy with a proposal regarding the formation of a committee.15 Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal agreed to the formation of a committee “to represent the three Secretaries in formulating recommendations to the Secretary of State on questions having both military and political aspects, and in coordinating the views of the three departments in matters of common interest.”16 A joint letter from Stimson and Forrestal dated December 1, 1944, agreed to the establishment of the SWNCC.17 14 This agreement resulted in “the formation of the State- Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter, November 29, 1944, and Stimson and Forrestal to Stettinius, letter, December 1, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 16 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18. 17 Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., letter, December 1, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 15 29 War-Navy Coordinating Committee, commonly referred to by its acronym, SWNCC (pronounced „swink‟).”18 Beginning with its first meeting on December 19, 1944, SWNCC met continuously at least once a week and promptly began work on post-war planning. It was during this first meeting that the Committee dispensed with formal procedures to create a charter that delineated the committee‟s functions and “agreed that for the time being, at least, nothing other than the letters between the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of War and Navy would be necessary.”19 Thus, the gentlemanly agreements of the Secretaries provided the necessity and approval to stand up the SWNCC and its responsibilities. It would not be for another nine months, in August 1945, that concerns to formalize the mission of the Committee became the subject of discussion with a recommendation for approval by the President‟s signature.20 In addition to an informal charter, the Committee agreed on the parameters it would work in. The Committee would work issues having politico-military implications, would make recommendations for approval to the 18 Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 121. 19 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 1st meeting, December 19, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and minutes of meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 20 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 22nd meeting, August 31, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 30 three secretaries, and would only work in matters that pertained to their “sphere of interest.”21 Since most of the post-war planning for Japan involved some degree of diplomatic maneuvering, the State Department took the lead role in forming the SWNCC and in leading the planning efforts. The SWNCC became primarily a State Department entity because their purpose was to make recommendations to the Secretary of State, and ultimately, the sitting chairpersons of both the SWNCC and its Subcommittee for the Far East were always State Department representatives.22 The War Department along with the Navy Department (the next influential departments in the U.S. government) provided the capacity needed for a thorough understanding of the different needs and goals of the various departments. First chaired by Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, the SWNCC meetings at the State Department building in Washington, D.C., worked to build a plan to affect the surrender of Japan. Wartime issues such as Japanese atrocities against American prisoners of war, the definition of ”unconditional surrender” of the Japanese, as well as Russia‟s role in post-war Japan highlighted the early meetings. As the war progressed and signs of its resolution came within sight, the members met more 21 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 1st meeting, December 19, 1944. 22 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 19. 31 frequently. As stated in Acting Secretary Stettinius‟ proposal for the Committee, SWNCC‟s intentions were to “occupy itself with the formulation of the surrender terms for Japan, the military administration of civil affairs in the Far East and such questions as may arise in connection with the disposition of various territories now occupied by the enemy” while coordinating the studies as well as the efforts of the different departments.23 SWNCC‟s work in developing and coordinating the efforts of the various U.S. governmental departments helped lay the framework for the policies of the Occupation. Meeting in secrecy, the SWNCC initially oversaw post-war policies globally as well as in the Pacific Theater of the war. SWNCC members were briefly involved in policy making of postWorld War II Germany, Austria, and Korea along with settling other war-related issues around the globe. However, soon after its establishment, SWNCC‟s focus fell primarily on Asia. The creation of an Informal Policy Committee on Germany in early 1945 shifted jurisdiction of policies for Germany away from the State, War, and Navy Departments, leaving those Departments to dedicate their efforts solely to the planning in East Asia.24 23 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter, November 9, 1944, in U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the Far East, vol. V. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 1274-1275, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1944v05 (accessed March 23, 2009). 24 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 20. 32 Thus, unlike the European Theater, the Occupation of Japan became primarily an American one. With relatively smaller contingencies of British, Dutch, and Chinese troops to help rebuild Japan, the United States set policies that overwhelming became reflections of American desires. Although the Americans consulted their Allies on some occupation issues, it would be after the bulk of the work was completed and the matter to consult the Allies became merely a formality. Since SWNCC meetings discussed classified U.S. policies, the agenda and the minutes of the meetings became classified documents. When the Committee consulted non-U.S. members, it was often after extensive debate and after a policy version approved by the SWNCC was “sanitized”, or stripped of sensitive information, in order to gain approval for release to American Allies. Oftentimes, there were differences in the policies of the Allies in post-war Japan and it was likely the American perspective prevailed and became policy. With lessons learned during its planning for post-war Germany, SWNCC plans for Japan were different from those in Europe. Instead of dividing the country into various zones led by each participating Allied country, a single leader would become the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and run Japan. General Douglas MacArthur later received appointment 33 as SCAP and under him, the Occupation of Japan would take on the flavor of an American-led reconstruction. The Subcommittee for the Far East Rebuilding a destroyed Japan required more than the use of diplomacy, it required the needs of all U.S. instruments of national power. Thus, the military and diplomatic portions of the government took active parts in the planning. Economic as well as informational/public relations aspects of the instruments of power also played roles and participated in the planning as needed. To deal with the increase in tasking for the post-surrender of Japan, SWNCC designated an ad hoc subcommittee to focus exclusively on Asia. Less than a month after the first meeting of SWNCC, the Subcommittee for the Far East formed with the responsibility of being the first step in preparing policy papers for the approval of SWNCC.25 Comprised of members of the State, War, and Navy Departments, this subcommittee looked at the post-war problems, attempted to build compromise for the three departments, built policies based upon documents previously used only by the State Department, and submitted 25 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18. 34 decisions for approval by the SWNCC prior to a document becoming United States policy.26 The Subcommittee for the Far East ultimately did the bulk of forming U.S. policies for Japan and produced the initial drafts for SWNCC-150, or the “U.S. Initial Post-Defeat Policy for Japan.” The Subcommittee provided inputs to the SWNCC for consideration to offices above them, as well as to the President of the United States.27 As situations in the Pacific theater changed, SWNCC documents went through various iterations and eventually became the guiding principles for General MacArthur and the GHQ during the Occupation. In most cases, SWNCC approval of a paper made the document official United States policy except in cases such as the post-surrender policy, when “President Truman‟s approval of it was obtained before it was formally transmitted to General Douglas MacArthur.”28 Attendance at SWNCC and Subcommittee meetings averaged to about twenty members throughout their existences. In addition to representatives from all three departments, representatives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other departments met on an ad hoc basis to provide inputs to policies brought up in SWNCC 26 Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 33. 27 Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 121-130. 28 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 19. 35 agendas.29 Along with those in the Subcommittee, there were lower planning groups of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who assessed the effects of military and non-military policies on the U.S. military. These planning groups worked with the Subcommittee to prepare SWNCC drafts for approval by the President once ratified by the SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.30 Inputs from these groups, as well as other governmental departments (education, economics, etc.) led to the construction of policies developed by the SWNCC. 29 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter, November 9, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1944:V, 1275. 30 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 210. 36 Chapter 3 Preliminary SWNCC Issues After the defeat of Nazi Germany and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the end of World War II was imminent. Although August 15, 1945, the day Emperor Hirohito addressed the Japanese people, was the day Japan concluded the war in the Pacific, it was not until September 2, 1945, on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay, that the surrender became official. For the SWNCC, the surrender was a subject that they spent the previous months defining and formalizing. The matter of defining “unconditional surrender” became a topic of debate. Within SWNCC and as early as February 1945, the interpretation of “unconditional surrender” needed clarity to precisely articulate post-war objectives in Japan. The Committee was unaware of the implications that rested on the definition of what constituted unconditional surrender. The sudden interest in the meaning of unconditional surrender surprised members of the SWNCC and it now is apparent that preparations for the use of the atomic bomb, “The Manhattan Project,” were secret from even the SWNCC.1 1 The assumption was Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 135. 37 that unconditional surrender did not necessitate total destruction of the Japanese nation.2 For the military members on the Committee, unconditional surrender meant a total military defeat to include an invasion of Japan. On the other hand, members of the State Department regarded unconditional surrender as “encompassing the unconditional dissipation of the Japanese militaristic enterprise” by methods other than solely military means.3 The SWNCC also discussed the possible situations facing the Allies as they planned for the defeat of Japan. The stereotypes placed on the Japanese promoted Western policy maker expectations of how the Japanese people would react if the Allies conducted a successful landing on the main islands since Westerners believed that the Japanese were unbeatable and would not surrender without a final bitter struggle.4 Thus, the Committee believed in three scenarios for the end of fighting. Members of SWNCC believed that while unconditional surrender and total defeat were two real possibilities the Allies would have to face, a third possibility, the conquest of the Japanese main islands but with continued organized resistance elsewhere, was 2 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 213. 3 Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35. 4 Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans. Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 32. 38 so remote a possibility that it was unnecessary to draft a proclamation to deal with it.5 With their logistics and war fighting ability decimated by Allied submarine attacks and with the encroachment of the U.S. so close to the mainland, the Japanese had little ability left to fight outside Japan. Eventually, there was little organized Japanese resistance abroad once the Emperor announced the end of the war. SWNCC had to deal with the issue of determining the leadership for the Occupation. Unlike the situation in Europe, the United States became the sole country leading the reconstruction of Japan. As the planning for the surrender of Japan proceeded, SWNCC discussions during the drafting of the initial post-surrender policies included deciding what the leadership structure of the Occupation would be. SWNCC recommended the idea of appointing an American to lead the Occupation. In an August 11, 1945, report on the “National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period”, SWNCC stated its reasons favoring an American to lead the occupation. In it, SWNCC stressed that, because of the preponderance of effort against Japan, the optimum positioning of the bulk of its forces to occupy and control the Japanese 5 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 23rd meeting, May 11, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 39 islands, and the United Nations recognized interests of the U.S. in preserving security and peace in the region, the controlling voice in the Occupation should be the United States who should also designate a commander of all occupational forces.6 Finally, SWNCC believed that it was “essential that throughout the entire period of occupation complete unity of control should be retained by the Supreme Commander and that the division of responsibilities would result in chaotic conditions and loss of efficient control.”7 With the exception of the Soviet proposal for dual Supreme Commanders, there was little disagreement to the appointment of an American for the position.8 After a discussion on the body to govern Japan, an informal SWNCC vote in August 1945 established the Americans‟ preference for a one-man authority versus a council.9 Reflecting the war efforts in the Pacific, the United States further clarified its 6 State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, National Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period, August 11, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 608, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23, 2009). 7 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, September 26,1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 7, SFE 129-141, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205. 8 Hugh Borton, Francis C. Jones, and Bertie R. Pearn, Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 148. 9 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 33rd meeting, August 14,1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947,The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 40 authoritative position in Japan by making a unilateral decision to appoint General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander. Although SWNCC policy denied other countries a controlling voice in the Occupation, the U.S. attempted to share the burden when President Truman allowed the participation of other countries under the condition that they integrated under U.S. command.10 The United States did not want zones of occupation and tried to provide policies acceptable to the Allies. To emphasize the U.S. position among the Allies, the initial directives stated that, “in the event of any differences of opinion among them, the policies of the United States (would) govern.”11 SWNCC also resolved which Allies to inform of any policy findings. Shortly after the appointment of MacArthur, the debate over who to inform of the decision and what to do in the event of a disagreement between the Allies over this and any other issues followed. On the policies passed to SCAP, SWNCC debated on whether to and when the appropriate time was to inform the Allies of their decisions. The discussions centered on whether or not to inform Allies prior to releasing directives to the public and which Allies were going to be privy to the information. 10 After discussing the repercussions of not Takemae, Inside GHQ, 93. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 427. 11 41 informing Allies prior to publication of a directive, SWNCC agreed it was desirable that directives and policy statements issued to the Supreme Commander be disclosed to the Allies and released to the public and that in the event that release to the public was undesired, that only Britain, Russia, and China receive the directives and policy statements in advance.12 released most approved policies to the public. SWNCC However, SCAP did not release planned occupation moves plans until they became public as per their standard operating procedures.13 During the debates for defining unconditional surrender and the Occupation leadership, the question of retaining the Emperor system surfaced.14 The fate of Emperor Hirohito was another issue SWNCC needed to resolve. In the European Theater, the war leaders of the Axis Powers of Germany and Italy did not survive to witness defeat at the hands of the Allies. Death allowed both Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini to elude standing trial to face imminent charges against humanity. Emperor Hirohito, on the other hand, survived the war long enough to end it. He later became an essential part of the transition to Allied Occupation. 12 In Japan‟s defeat, the voice of the Emperor U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 24th meeting, September 12, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194. 13 Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 107. 14 Dunn et al., Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan, 35. 42 not only brought an end to the fighting, but also provided an avenue for the occupation armies to control the population. The fate of the Japanese Emperor divided Washington. In the White House, a document circulated stating that General MacArthur should examine Hirohito‟s role in the war to establish whether or not he should be on trial as a war criminal, a view held by a few in the State Department that studied the Far East, especially China experts.15 Within the U.S. State Department, for those who understood Japan, arguments were “for his retention as the main stabilizing factor in Japan” or for his removal “because he was a weak leader who had yielded to the military demand for war and who could not be relied upon.”16 Additionally, ranking officials in Washington, members of Congress, and a majority of the press believed in ending the Imperial Japanese Throne and called for a trial of Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal.17 SWNCC eventually studied the issue of retaining the Throne and would later recommend in March 1946 that SCAP advocate the elimination of the Imperial Institute.18 However, General MacArthur saw the value of the Emperor and lobbied for his innocence, or at a minimum, the Emperor‟s 15 Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 147. Acheson, Present at the Creation, 112. 17 Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 147. 18 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes, March 7, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 7, SFE 129-141, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205. 16 43 avoidance of a war crimes trial. As an advocate of the Throne and the Emperor, General MacArthur went so far as to secretly dissuade questions from the Emperor‟s staff regarding the Emperor‟s rumored resignation while simultaneously “praising him as the leader of the new democracy.”19 The Emperor provided the United States the means to calm the Japanese population and allow a peaceful transition to the Occupation. With the preservation of the Emperor and the Throne, SWNCC‟s directive for the ”Reform of the Japanese Governmental System” (SWNCC-228) intended to enable the Japanese to determine the future of the Emperor System by either eliminating it or restructuring it to be more in line with a democratic system.20 Surrender Documents American policy makers faced numerous issues in rebuilding Japan. As a result, the Subcommittee for the Far East produced many documents for SWNCC to review. In turn, these documents faced meticulous scrutiny by SWNCC members before their release and subsequent publication. The Potsdam Declaration became the basis for the initial post-surrender policy. That document, along with the directive to General MacArthur, became the first 19 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 27. 20 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 274. 44 to announce United States and Allied goals and set the objectives for the Occupation. Thus, the preliminary control documents for the administration of Japan were the Potsdam Declaration, the “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” and the “Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” The first two documents described the structure and objectives of the Occupation, while the directive guided MacArthur and stated his authorities. All these documents passed from the Subcommittee for the Far East, to the SWNCC, to the President for approval, and then finally to the Japanese. The Potsdam Declaration The United States, Britain, and China signed the Potsdam Declaration. Issued on July 26, 1945, it stated the terms of surrender that the Japanese would eventually accept on August 10 that same year. The declaration stated that the Allies sought for Japan the elimination “for all time” the leadership and influence that led the country to war, the surrender of all Japanese armed forces and the eradication of their war-making capability, the submission to trial and punishment of war criminals, the removal of “all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people”, and the establishment of “freedom of speech, of 45 religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights”.21 It not only sought an end to militarism that led to the war, but also called for the end of Japan‟s means to conduct war while also ending its ability to build and maintain a war-making capability. In a sense, the Potsdam Declaration reflected a compromise in the meaning of unconditional surrender from what the diplomatic and military sides of the SWNCC had debated earlier. With the end of war in Europe allowing the backing of the full offensive military capacity of the Allies, the Potsdam Declaration combined both the threat of total military destruction by invasion with the stated required Japanese actions needed to end its war-making industry. The Declaration established the stationing of Allied troops in Japan as an occupying force. Since there was doubt as to whether the Japanese mind could completely discredit militarism, an occupation by foreign troops on their homeland, regardless of how long, was a way to bring home a visible sign of the extent of Japan‟s defeat.22 Western society understood the Japanese to be repressed citizens who “did not understand or appreciate the Western sense of fair play” which led them to brutal and 21 Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “Potsdam Declaration,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, 9-11. 22 Joseph W. Ballantine, Comments on Memorandum Forwarded by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson on “Observations on Post-Hostilities Policy Toward Japan,” August 6, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 588. 46 sadistic acts of war.23 The Allies were dealing with a relatively unknown foe that swiftly defeated the colonial powers in Asia just a few years earlier. With an expected resistance to the Occupation, the presence of troops was another means to highlight total defeat to the Japanese. Additionally, the use of a multi-racial occupying army helped to solidify a united global front against the Japanese aggression. As another means of isolating the Japanese from the international community and further displaying their defeat, the Allies also took charge of Japan‟s international relations immediately after the Japanese surrendered.24 The release of the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent acceptance by the Japanese was the primer for the initial postsurrender policy. A few fundamental policy changes occurred between the declaration and the initial policy and the latter merely expanded upon the terms set in the Potsdam Declaration. While planning the end of the war, SWNCC and the Subcommittee for the Far East also dealt with war issues developing outside Japan including the resolution of both Japanese and U.S. atrocities, the use of foreign airstrips, and the disarmament of the enemy. 23 They also debated minor changes that developed Dower, Embracing Defeat, 214. U.S. Department of State, An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of the United States, June 22, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 560. 24 47 between the Potsdam Declaration and the initial post-surrender policy. However, the Committee remained focused on objectives of the United States. SWNCC stated the “ultimate objective of the Allies in Japan was to guarantee that Japan would never again menace the peace” so they sought to encourage fundamental liberties for the Japanese and proposed to allow Japan an economy “directed at the ultimate aim of security against Japanese militarism.”25 The following years of the Occupation saw the introduction of SWNCC policies to handle the issues introduced in the Potsdam Declaration. Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Along with determining who would lead the Occupation, SWNCC handled the decisions that helped shaped the authorities of the Supreme Commander. On August 14, 1945, President Truman sent the directive to General Douglas MacArthur designating him as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers “in accordance with the agreement among the Governments of the United States, Chinese Republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan.”26 25 Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 58. Harry S Truman, Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 647-648. 26 48 SWNCC provided the guidance for General MacArthur, GHQ, and Occupation forces. The Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers “was intended to be forwarded to General MacArthur with instructions to use it as a guide rather than as a document to be literally adhered to, thus giving him the authority to alter it to meet circumstances as they exist at the time of issuance.”27 After receiving his appointment as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur received the following instructions on September 6, 1945, which the Japanese later made public.28 1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State is subordinate to you as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope. 2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the Japanese Government to the extent that such an arrangement produces satisfactory results. This does not prejudice your right to act directly if required. You may enforce the orders issued by you by the employment of such measures as you deem necessary, including the use of force. 3. The statement of intentions contained in the Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect.29 27 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 20th meeting, August 11, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, microfilm, U.S. National Archives, T1194. 28 Japan, “Message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur concerning the Authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 109. 29 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Instructions to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (Message No. 1), September 6, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 712. 49 With these authorities, MacArthur set out to rebuild the Japanese society and Japan as quick as he could since it seemed that “most of the American authorities regarded Japan as a defeated nation, to be reformed in the shortest possible time.”30 To reflect the urgency of the matter, MacArthur‟s appointment as SCAP and his authorities came into effect once he received their transmissions from President Truman.31 Given the directives as a starting point, MacArthur and the GHQ looked to shape the conduct of the Occupation and to mold Japan from a militaristic country to a peaceful, self-governing one. With his experience and time in the Orient, MacArthur felt he had a thorough understanding of the “Oriental” mind and may have done what he thought was best for the Japanese population and the reconstruction effort. His presence during the execution of the Pacific campaign and his experience living and working in various assignments around Asia helped when President Truman appointed him to the position. Rather than strictly follow the policies given to him by SWNCC, MacArthur believed that, while some critics were thousands of miles away in Washington with no knowledge of conditions existing and who would “applied here wholly inadaptable principles and methods,” 30 William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 44. 31 Harry S Truman, Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 648. 50 these critics did not confront the realities he directly faced.32 One instance of MacArthur‟s possible foresight to the situation in Japan shows his concerns mirroring those of the men in Washington. Before the policies for the Occupation became public, MacArthur came out with a summary of his goals and plans that “reflected very closely those approved in Washington by the SWNCC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Truman” and in hindsight, they were merely a synopsis of the goals stated in the initial post-surrender policies that had previously been developed, unbeknownst to him.33 Given how close his goals were to those approved by SWNCC, perhaps MacArthur had a correct understanding of the situation in Japan. Nonetheless, there is little evidence showing SWNCC having to constantly consult or seek the advice of General MacArthur in respect to the Occupation. When directives did pass to GHQ, MacArthur adjusted the means to meet SWNCC policies and sought to highlight that those in Japan were in charge and that ”SCAP‟s objectives were decided in Washington, but SCAP‟s methods for achieving them were devised in Tokyo.”34 32 MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), 166. 33 Russell D. Buhite, Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America’s East Asian Policy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 68. 34 Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, 107. 51 United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan The governing document for the Occupation went through several iterations. Even after public release, the U.S. policy for the Occupation continued in revision. The Subcommittee for the Far East provided the first draft for the U.S. Initial PostSurrender Policy for Japan. As early as April 1945, during their 16th meeting, the Subcommittee began a “point-by-point examination of the paper” by editing the document to strengthen the language and by revising the wording to provide consistency in the tone and content of the draft in order to synchronize the inputs from the various U.S. Departments.35 On April 19, 1945, the Subcommittee‟s “Summary of United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan” became the basis for the “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” and the “core of the wide-ranging directives that MacArthur‟s headquarters would issue to the Japanese government in the early months of occupation.”36 The policy included parts addressing the ultimate goals of the United States and the Allied authority along with political and economic policies. After the SWNCC and various U.S. Government Departments incorporated tenets of military, 35 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 16th meeting, April 12, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 36 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 211. 52 political, and economic ideals to promote democracy into the drafts and revisions, SWNCC formally adopted the summary document as the first draft of the U.S. Initial Post-Defeat Policy for Japan and designated it SWNCC-150/1 (after 15 August, „Post-Defeat‟ would become „Post-Surrender‟).37 The policy stated the following for the Occupation: The general objectives of the United States in regard to Japan are: 1. The unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan; 2. The stripping from the Japanese Empire of territories, including the Mandated Islands, in harmony with the Cairo Declaration and such other pertinent agreements as may be reached by the United Nations, and to which the United States is a party; 3. The creation of conditions which will insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world; 4. The eventual emergence of a government in Japan which will respect the rights of other states and Japan‟s international obligations; and 5. The eventual participation of Japan in a world economic system on a reasonable basis.38 Expanding on the Potsdam Declaration, the general objectives of the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy also looked to eliminate militarism and prevent Japanese aggression from reemerging. This first draft spawned the discussions to determine, who or what, would lead the occupation force. 37 This draft of the Takemae, Inside GHQ, 213-214. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 550-551. 38 53 Initial Post-Surrender Policy initially stated that a United Nations person or armed forces was going to take charge of the Occupation, however, a suggestion from the Chief of Naval Operations commented that there would probably be no United Nations Armed Force to lead the task and that supreme power should fall to the Commander in Chief of the occupying force, presumably an American.39 Subsequently, the policy changed to reflect that “the supreme allied commander” rather than a United Nations entity would have supreme authority over the affairs of the Japanese Empire.40 When the second version of the policy (SWNCC-150/2) came out on August 12, the authority read “the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.”41 With no substantial changes to SWNCC 150/342, President Truman approved the fourth version of SWNCC-150 and forwarded a copy to 39 L.S. Sabin, Memorandum for Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, May 1, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 536. 40 State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 551. 41 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 609. 42 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of 36th meeting, August 24, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb1945-22Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 54 MacArthur on September 6, 1945.43 It stated, “the occupation forces will be under the commander of a Supreme Commander designated by the United States.”44 This presidential-approved version, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC-150/4), maintained the following as guiding principles for the development of policy for the Occupation: The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan to which policies in the initial period must conform, are: (a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world. (b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.45 43 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes, September 6, 1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 2, SFE 107-112, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1205. 44 Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 93. 45 Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 91. 55 Nearly two weeks later, on September 22, the White House publicly released the policy as SWNCC-150/4/A.46 As the Occupation progressed, SWNCC-150 would continue in revision as the Committee looked to achieve its stated goals for Japan. Additionally, the means to meet the realization of the U.S. objectives included “those predominately military in character such as the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed forces, and other predominately political in character such as the encouragement of the Japanese to form democratic and representative organizations and to develop a desire for individual liberties.”47 SWNCC provided the coordination to support both the military and political ambitions of the United States. 46 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 226. U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, September 26, 1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 1, SFE 100-106, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205. 47 56 Chapter 4 Occupation Policies and Other Considerations The policies SWNCC passed before and throughout the Occupation aimed to meet the objectives spelled out in the Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. To ensure that Japan would remain peaceful and to reassure the world that the Japanese would not repeat their imperialistic attitude, SWNCC policies looked to eradicate militarism within Japanese society and to change the leadership that led their country down the path of war. Eliminating militarism and the capacity of Japan to wage war entailed a multi-faceted approach that would involve more than just the removal of the Imperial Japanese Military. Additionally, eliminating the leadership that led the Japanese to war was more than simply bringing Emperor Hirohito and Japanese military leaders to trial. To purge the thoughts of militarism and ultra-nationalistic ideology, SWNCC passed policies to re-edify the Japanese through educational and labor reforms and the suppression of Shintoism as a state religion.1 1 The Committee passed “Policy for the James F. Byrnes, statement to Acting Political Adviser in Japan (George Atcheson, Jr.), October 12, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 57 Revision of the Japanese Educational System” (SWNCC-108), which became the basis for a comprehensive policy statement on postwar education reform and “proposed to abolish textbooks espousing jingoism and ultra-nationalism” which had been “recommended by the military and had been a powerful influence on young minds.”2 This policy, along with SWNCC-162, or the “Positive Policy for Reorientation of the Japanese,” was a strategy calling for changes in “ideologies and attitudes of mind”, advocated utilizing “all possible media and channels”, and proposed using the support of progressive Japanese, under American guidance, to shape parts of Japanese culture into a “liberal democratic ethos”.3 These instructions ingrained the Japanese with Western culture that promoted democracy and hoped to sway the population from the Imperialistic attitude that led them down the path to war. The eradication of militarism in Japan also required a change in the Japanese mindset. Both within the United States and with its Allies, there were differences in how harsh the treatment of the Japanese should be and to what extent and speed Printing Office, 1945), 749, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23, 2009). 2 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 348. 3 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 383-384. 58 political and economic reform would occur.4 To accomplish the gradual elimination of militarism, SWNCC planned successive periods to monitor progress of the Occupation and the effects its American policies were having. Contingent on the reactions of the Japanese, SWNCC planned for three different periods in the treatment of the country. Japan would first face stern discipline enforced by the military occupation, then after close surveillance and the progressive relaxation of restrictions, a supervisory agency might replace the military government and reach a final period terminating with “the ultimate aim of the United States, namely a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations.”5 These distinct periods of Allied control: complete Japanese subordination to the surrender terms with retributions, surveillance to determine how much control the Allies would return to the Japanese and the complete demilitarization of Japan were necessary to eliminate militarism and its tendencies.6 Although SWNCC suggested that the succession of these periods were contingent on the behavior of the Japanese, the U.S. Navy, in their “Summary of U.S. Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to 4 William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 43-44. 5 State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 551. 6 Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 32-33. 59 Japan” stated, “It is questioned whether Japanese behavior is the only standard which ought to be used in determining what the treatment is to be.”7 Regardless, it was an easy way to gauge the effectiveness of SWNCC policies and to become a measure of success for the Occupation. Besides the surrender of the Japanese armed forces and the visible presence of foreign troops in Japan, SWNCC policies provided additional assurances against the possibility of a revitalized military and included instruction regarding disarmament and the disposal of war material as well as the repatriation of Japanese abroad. SWNCC passed industrial reforms that regulated Japan‟s production of armament, heavy industry, aircraft, and ships, and thus, limited Japan‟s “warmaking” capability (in SWNCC-93, 94, 95, and 96, respectively). Additionally, the Committee called for the “dissolution of Japan‟s large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan‟s trade and industry” and contributed to the war-making capability of its industries, especially under the influence of militaristic leadership.8 To deal with the leadership that led Japan to war, SWNCC members discussed not only a reform in the government but also the treatment of former military leaders and the Emperor. 7 L.S. Sabin, Memorandum for Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, May 1, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 537. 8 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 334. 60 Imperial Japanese leaders stood trial for their roles in the war and there was a call to include Emperor Hirohito as part of the proceedings. Upon his removal from office and based upon the determination of conditions in Japan, SWNCC sought the arrest of Hirohito as a war criminal in their discussions while drafting “The Treatment of the Person of Hirohito, Emperor of Japan” (SWNCC-55).9 However, out of necessity, General MacArthur sought and succeeded in sparing the Emperor from having to stand trial as a war criminal. Although some believed the intense loyalty to the Emperor created Japanese aggression, others in the U.S. State Department believed that neither the Emperor nor the Imperial institution caused Japan‟s aggression, but that Japan‟s pre-war constitution enabled military leaders and ultranationalists to take advantage of the Throne to meet their objectives.10 SWNCC looked to abolish the leadership and the influences that led the country to war. This included passing policies to change not only the Japanese government but also the people that followed it. A Subcommittee for the Far East report recommended that to “permit the development in Japan of a more liberal and 9 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 45th meeting, October 3, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 10 Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 148. 61 enlightened attitude regarding the imperial institution”, the essence of the Japanese Constitution needed reform to “eliminate the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to have it made clear that the Emperor is under the Constitution.”11 The Subcommittee discussed the possible outcomes for the role of the Emperor in either a British or U.S. democratic system of government. Whereas during the war, the Emperor was a god-like entity under whose name the Imperial Japanese military carried out their conquests, SWNCC policymakers, when drafting “Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan” (SWNCC209), looked to give the Japanese population a controlling voice in guiding the country by placing the Emperor and the role of the Throne in a lesser role in the eyes of the Japanese.12 A new constitution along with the purging and trials of wartime leaders helped to reform the government and create one that would eventually preside over the people. SWNCC involvement in ”The Reform of the Japanese Governmental System” (SWNCC-228) paved the way for the freedoms sought in the Potsdam Declaration that helped design the framework for GHQ to draft 11 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan, March 7, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 7, SFE 129-141, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205. 12 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 48th meeting, October 23, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 62 the new Japanese Constitution. Faced with the need to change the Japanese mindset with policies to influence their way of life, SWNCC shaped Japanese society during the Occupation with its involvement in the daily reconstruction of the country. SWNCC-228 also addressed the possible resurgence of the Imperial Japanese military. SWNCC believed that unless preventative measures were taken, “one of the most important points of view was that the defeated enemy Japan was capable of military revival and renewed aggression in the Pacific and Asia.”13 As a precautionary measure in reforming Japan, SWNCC included the possible immediate need of additional forces in order to implement any change and to mitigate against the long term concern that “no nationalistic or military clique or combination should again be able to dominate (the) country and lead it into a war of aggression.”14 Race and the Superiority Complex After the surrender of Japan and the end of the war, the Allies continued to view the Japanese as a lower class of people that needed reeducation, a reintroduction to religion, and a reversion to a democratic style of government. 13 The West Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 57. Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 101. 14 63 believed that reforming the framework of Japanese society needed to happen even if it included revamping it, since the Allies agreed that Japanese society constituted “a self-perpetuating instrument of imperialism.”15 Race possibly contributed to the differences in the Allied Occupations in Europe and Asia. U.S. State Department Japan experts and those in SWNCC considered this during their post-war planning. Where post-war Germany existed as a divided country with its entire government destroyed, post-war Japan came under the rule of a single Supreme Commander without becoming a divided country. Much like the structure of the occupations of Germany and Japan were different, so were the feelings towards the defeated enemy. The distinct differences in race and culture between the Germans and Japanese created a large disparity in the conduct of the wars and the aftermath.16 For the Japanese, unlike the Germans, they were still a dissimilar race that was non-white, non-Christian, and non-Western and “where Nazism was perceived as a cancer in a fundamentally mature „Western‟ society, Japanese militarism and ultranationalism were construed as reflecting the essence of a feudalistic, Oriental culture that was cancerous in and of 15 Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 78. John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 78-80. 16 64 itself.”17 The stories of the crazed population ready to strike unsuspecting occupation troops did not materialize as predicted when the Americans arrived on the Japanese mainland. It was an expectation after all, because “the Japanese had been taught that they had never lost a war, that surrender was dishonorable, and that the only decent alternative to victory was death.”18 These lingering differences between the former Axis partners remained prominent among the Allies as the Occupation began. The United States was just learning about the Japanese people. Americans mistakenly believed that Japanese were fundamentally a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic people as a whole.19 The assumption of Japanese society perpetuating imperialism “was based more on a Western view of the situation than on informed analyses of Japanese character and history.”20 The racial stereotypes that influenced the brutality of the war abated as the Occupation changed the views of the Japanese and the Americans from their wartime perceptions of each other. When the United States arrived to conduct the Occupation of Japan, American troops discovered that the situation in the country was different than was anticipated. 17 They realized that Dower, Embracing Defeat, 79-80. The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day (New York: Kodansha International, 1980), 19. 19 Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans. Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 32. 20 Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 78. 18 65 their plan needed revision due to changes in the occupation pattern and that they “overestimated the power of resistance of the Japanese people.”21 The United States personnel needed to conduct the Occupation were poorly prepared. Because the first occupiers had little or no training in the Japanese language or culture, Americans, while attempting to overcome their stereotypes of the Japanese, had little choice but to govern through what existed of the Japanese government.22 Without the linguistic or technocratic capacity to preside over Japan, the United States, rather than establish the direct military government originally planned under secret orders (code-named “Blacklist”), relied on the existing government system as stated in the SWNCC post-surrender policy.23 The U.S. State Department recognized the deficiency in its personnel who they thought would be capable of administering the Occupation. Because the State Department realized that an Allied government was “bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and inefficient,” they planned to encourage Japanese involvement in order to enable a transition from a military government to a developed democratic institution.24 SCAP allowed nearly the entire civilian bureaucracy to remain intact to run the daily 21 Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 31. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 27. 23 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 212. 24 [U.S. Department of State?], Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward Japan, August 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 586. 22 66 government business.25 Much of the lower governments as well as the Prime Minister remained in place. Gone were the militaristic leaders that influenced the Emperor and the Throne. The ideals of racial superiority that continued during the Occupation were often detrimental to progress of the reconstruction.26 However, as the Allies maintain their occupation of Japan, they recognized that their racial hatred toward the Japanese was unfounded. Feelings of racial and ethnical superiority subsided as the Allies saw potential not only in the rapid progress in reconstruction but also in the relative ease that Japanese cooperation had in making the Occupation a comparative success. With the stereotypes and racial biases unsubstantiated, SWNCC policies had to readjust for Western ideals that did not fit the Japanese mold. A majority of the Japanese were not militarists or even ultra-nationalists. Japanese experts and scholars in the West, largely ignored by the U.S. Government and war planners during the war, had already predicted the war exhaustion of the Japanese and knew that unlike their militarist leaders, the Japanese people welcomed peace.27 In contrast to the initial expectations of the Japanese ability to govern after 25 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 219-220. 26 Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 106. 27 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 301. 67 the surrender, the existing Japanese government provided a significant boost to the reconstruction effort. Although alleged American experts on Japan lacked a true understanding of the Japanese, they became primary advisors on how to handle rebuilding the country. During the Occupation, the opinions of American Japan experts were considered sufficient enough and often their expert opinion clashed with the experience of the Japanese who found that in order to achieve any desired effects, they had to work with the aid and approval of SCAP and “the work of reform-whether idealistic or not from the American point of view-progressed.”28 For the Japanese, their point of view had little effect on American progress reports. However, since the SWNCC developed U.S. occupation goals unilaterally, there would be little regard for Japanese opinion. Whether it was the devastation of their country or the disillusionment of the mystique of their “superiority”, the Japanese peacefully collaborated with the United States as a way to rebuild and reconstitute.29 U.S. policy makers who felt sympathy for the Japanese showed their concern when drafting later SWNCC policies and took into account the culture and the 28 Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 106. George Atcheson, memorandum to Secretary of State, September 27, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945: VI, 724-725. 29 68 considerations of the Japanese. For both sides, “demeaning and dehumanizing wartime stereotypes had to be corrected.”30 As this realization became known, the occupiers suddenly shifted from the feelings of haughtiness to one of humbleness as they realized how unprepared its personnel were to handle the daunting tasking of remaking a country. Suddenly, the vanquished became valuable assets to the victors. Much like the Emperor, initially thought deserving to stand trial for war crimes, the occupiers needed the Japanese to aid in the transition. Regardless of whom it involved, General MacArthur understood the perceptions of a “master race,” stated that the Occupation should be for only a limited time and promoted an early exit for the occupying army.31 MacArthur was aware that not all Allies agreed to the U.S. policies. However, he criticized those countries for lacking the knowledge, vision, and patience for unity in the principles of the Potsdam Declaration and who were not only a hindrance to progress, but also hypocritical “who, from selfish motives, would exploit as slaves a thoroughly defeated nation and people, thus serving the identical 30 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 213-214. MacArthur, message to the War Department in support of Congressional appropriations for the occupation of Japan, February 20, 1947, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), 185. 31 69 philosophy of evil which Allied soldiers opposed.”32 As stated in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies would not enslave the Japanese upon their surrender.33 Enslavement of the Japanese undoubtedly would perpetuate an image of superiority. SWNCC planners linked the Imperial cult to Japan‟s extreme racial consciousness and anti-foreign complex and addressed the concerns in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan by prohibiting laws that discriminated due to race or nationality and guaranteeing all people in Japan with the same basic political and civil rights.34 Providing equality to everyone in Japan, regardless of race, enabled the Japanese to experience diversity in society. To preclude the image of a Japan surging ahead of its neighbors, in the early drafts of the Initial PostSurrender Policy for Japan, SWNCC inserted a “standard of living” clause that prohibited the Japanese to maintain a standard of living outside that of their neighboring countries that would incite any image of “superiority.”35 32 MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946, in A Soldier Speaks, 166. 33 Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “Potsdam Declaration,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, p. 9. 34 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 436. 35 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of the 19th meeting, April 18, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198. 70 The Threat of Communism As the world around the reconstruction of Japan changed, United States policy for the Occupation followed suit. Americans no longer saw the Japanese as former enemies but as a newly discovered ally against emerging threats.36 The Soviet Union, the events in China, and the follow-on events in Korea brought about a new concern for Americans in Asia. With the Communists gaining power in Asia and the eventual revolution occurring in China, United States goals and visions for Japan altered. The spread of Communism throughout Asia exposed the western flank of the United States and an urgency to reinforce it grew as America‟s western defense perimeter for Communist containment in Asia stretched from Japan to South East Asia to India.37 Because of Japan‟s position in America‟s defense perimeter, the United States adjusted its focus in its Occupation policies to counter the Communist threat. Absent the grip of Imperial rule, various organizations within Japan took advantage of the newly found freedoms under the Occupation. The recently gained freedoms cultivated an environment ripe for Communism with U.S. officials not aggressively pursuing Communist groups but instead focusing on 36 Hugh Borton. American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 31. 37 Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 169. 71 the militarists and the Japanese war leaders while American policies were becoming “ambivalent and often contradictory as SCAP was implementing policies from Washington, which seemed to profit the Communists.”38 Communist parties became active and labor unions became vocal against the government. The reform of the labor unions and the freedom for people to express their opinions and to protest made it simple for parties opposed to the Occupation to thrive. With the promise of freedom and a change from the repressive militaristic rule, SCAP had to balance the rights of the people and their control by the government. As the revolutionary events in China and Korea unfolded, the United States shifted its focus in Japan from managing the Occupation to the goal of stopping or halting the spread of Communism. Suppressing Communist threats both outside and within Japan entailed a hard-line Cold War stance. Instead of purging pre-war rightwing militarists, the U.S. looked for Communists in labor and government positions, softened its stance on the breakup of the industrial conglomerates and of reparations from the war, and allowed wartime leaders to gain power as Japan became a key ally in the Cold War39 38 39 Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 47. Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous, 169. 72 As the Occupation progressed, SWNCC developed U.S. policies in Japan to counter growing Communist influence. The Soviet Union‟s non-existent role in post-surrender Japan grew divisive along the lines of ideology and their influence became the growing threat in the region. The Communists were already overtaking China, and later, the Korean Peninsula would become a target. For the U.S., “the chief concern of the military was to safeguard Japan‟s industrial potential against Russian designs.”40 Rebuilding the economy was an essential part of reconstructing Japan and became more crucial as the Occupation and the Cold War progressed. Thus, it was important for SWNCC to pass policies such as those regulating the heavy industry (SWNCC-94) that not only curbed the rise of militarism but also focused on rebuilding the economy as stated in the Potsdam Declaration. The United States‟ role in Japan provided Americans with the opportunity to rebuild the country, to foster a new democracy and gave them the chance to gain a new ally against a growing Communist threat. With the advent of the Cold War and the rising tide of war on the Korean Peninsula, Japan became a valuable military and political foothold in Asia for the United States. SWNCC polices such as SWNCC-150, SWNCC-108, and SWNCC- 228 focused on freedom and democracy, free trade, 40 Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, 18. 73 education/religion, and the determination of their form of government and helped to counter the growing Communist threat. The new threat for the United States shifted from an Asian one to a Communist one. As post-World War II gave way to the Cold War, the “traits which the Americans and English had associated with the Japanese, with great empirical sobriety, were suddenly perceived to be really more relevant to the Communists” and with their homogeneity and monolithic control, fanaticism, and megalomania bent on world conquest, the Chinese seemed to conveniently fill the description.41 41 Dower, War Without Mercy, 307. 74 Conclusion The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee initially engaged in post-war issues in both Germany and Japan. Additionally, SWNCC provided the means to handle various concerns that emerged from areas of the war such as matters dealing with other allies and countries, post-surrender financial issues, disposition of war material/industries of the defeated states, and prisoner of war matters. However, SWNCC‟s focus eventually became Asia, specifically, the reconstruction of Japan. When the first waves of Americans arrived in Japan shortly after the surrender, they faced few confrontations upon arrival and experienced first-hand the Japanese and their way of life. Because the Japanese had grown weary of the fighting, not all continued to resist the surrender as expected. In addition to exhaustion from the war, “popular reaction to the surrender news ranged across the political and emotional spectrum and the most common responses were anguished tears and misery at defeat or deep sighs of relief that the war was over and one had survived.”1 1 The Japanese, fearful of wartime propaganda Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 232. 75 depicting Americans as demons, found that they were not subject to the torture, rape, or murder expected from U.S. soldiers.2 The SWNCC‟s “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” (SWNCC-150) laid the groundwork for the reconstruction of the country. This document stated the basic tenets for the occupation of Japan and announced the command structure to lead the effort. SWNCC minutes from meetings discussing SWNCC-150 show the decision process for naming an American to lead the reconstruction efforts in Japan and changes in the “U.S. Initial Summary for the Post-Defeat Policy for Japan” and the published version of the “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” document the final decision made by the Committee. This single- person, single-country leadership of the Occupation resulted from discussions in which SWNCC and American policy makers provided the justification for the unilateral decision of the United States in appointing General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. General MacArthur‟s role in the reconstruction was significant. As the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, MacArthur‟s image in Japan rivaled that of the Japanese Emperor. During his tenor of leading the Occupation, he received over 500,000 letters from the Japanese expressing their support of 2 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 301. 76 his task and often addressed him “in a formal style of Japanese that had previously been reserved for the emperor.”3 SWNCC gave him absolute power and despite the power he held, MacArthur did not abuse it.4 SCAP understood the issues facing a people that were beaten and he sought to bring them back to normalcy. MacArthur knew the importance of rebuilding Japan and stated that it was the duty of the United States to do so. Were it otherwise-were we but to insure the thoroughness of Japan‟s defeat, then leave her prostrate in the ashes of total collapse, history would point to a task poorly done and but partially complete. It is equally for us now to guide her people to rededicate themselves to higher principles, ideals and purposes, to help them rise to the full measure of new and loftier standards of social and political morality-that they firmly may meet the challenge to future utility in the service of mankind.5 MacArthur‟s support of the Imperial Throne and the need to utilize it undoubtedly aided in the Occupation. 3 MacArthur Rinjirō Sodei, Dear General MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the American Occupation, ed. John Junkerman, trans. Shizue Matsuda (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 2. 4 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Instructions to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (Message No. 1), September 6, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 712, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23, 2009). 5 MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), 165. 77 relied on the Japanese bureaucracy to carry out its policies.6 He sought to use the existing Japanese Government as stated in his directives “to build a future for the people of Japan based upon considerations of realism and justice” and wanted to avoid harsh action in order to instill “principles of liberty and right heretofore unknown to them.”7 The use of the Emperor for the Occupation was a move that probably saved the lives of not only the Japanese but the Occupation army as well.8 Thus, the SWNCC debates that dealt with the fate of the Emperor and the SWNCC policy (SWNCC-55) that directed the study of the Emperor‟s effect on the population in preparation for his arrest gave General MacArthur and the Occupation the link it needed to bridge the question of how to connect a Western government with that of an Oriental one. The Emperor was that key and the SWNCC-directed investigation led to the realization that the Emperor would be crucial to the Occupation. General MacArthur spared the Emperor from the trials that some of Hirohito‟s loyal officers faced. Additionally, MacArthur spared the Emperor the humiliation of a guilty finding and possibly facing a death penalty. 6 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 27. 7 MacArthur, address to members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946, in A Soldier Speaks, 165. 8 Joseph C. Grew, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew) to the Secretary of State, January 3, 1944 [1945], in Foreign Relations of the United States,1945:VI, 516. 78 The first few Americans to arrive on Japanese soil realized that they were ill prepared and unable to carry out the Occupation effectively. The lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge forced American occupiers to use the Japanese in administering the Occupation. Despite superficial differences in skin color, both the victor and the vanquished found a way to rebuild a broken country. With the use of the existing Japanese Government, Emperor Hirohito, and the Japanese themselves, the U.S. successes in rebuilding Japan led General MacArthur to feel that the progress was going so smoothly early on, that a cut in occupying troops was possible and an early exit was in sight.9 The United States‟ occupation of Japan intended to rid Japanese society of the militarism that led them down the path of Imperial aggression and the outbreak of war in the Pacific. By passing policies to abolish Japan‟s military after World War II, destroying its industrial capacity to construct war materials, and Japan‟s renouncement of a military, SWNCC met the Allies‟ goal of demilitarizing the Japanese and prevented the Japanese from again disturbing the harmony of the world. From declarations set forth in the Potsdam Declaration and expanded upon in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the intent of the United States with regard to Japan‟s military was 9 Douglas MacArthur, statement, September 17, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 715-716. 79 clear. However, the rise in Communism changed the security environment in Asia. This change provided the impetus for the U.S. to alter SWNCC developed policy for Japan‟s military and would lead to the expansion of Japanese police forces and the creation of the Japanese Self Defense Force.10 As stated in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the second ultimate objective of the United States was “to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states”.11 This goal of the U.S. was for a democratic government, which the Japanese succeeded in developing and building. The new constitution and the resulting government that replaced the Imperial system provided the Japanese with a government that allowed the involvement of its people and was in line with a western style of governing.12 The democratic government created as a result of the restructuring of the Japanese constitution continues to operate today. The accomplishments as a result of SWNCC polices during the Occupation were unique. Forging a new alliance with Japan was remarkable since “there was no adequate precedent in the history 10 William J. Sebald and Russell Brines. With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 197-198. 11 Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, 91. 12 Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 274. 80 of the United States or, indeed, in the recent history of man for the Occupation” that the disarmament and the demobilization of the Imperial Japanese military occurred before the end of 1945 and all without a single noteworthy incident.13 This success can be attributed to the realization of both sides the error of their misleading perceptions. Americans realized the war-weariness and diversification of the Japanese and recognized they had to work together to make the Occupation a success. The U.S. occupiers needed the Japanese due to their lack of cultural knowledge. Americans, especially, needed the existing Japanese government to aid them in the Occupation. SWNCC policies stated the need for the existing Japanese government in order to carry out their occupation plans. Without it, controlling the country might have proved to be more challenging due to the differences and stereotypes that persisted during the war and hindered the use of the full potential of the Japanese. As the American stereotype of the Japanese slowly fell, so did the Japanese thoughts of the Americans. Former Prime Minister Yoshida stated of his observations of the American occupiers, “There was no room for doubt concerning the goodwill which they bore towards the Japanese people.”14 13 Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 79. Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans. Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 104. 14 81 The United States intended to bring democracy to Japan by inoculating them against militarism and the rise of Communism.15 To do this, SWNCC developed policies that would provide “not only the active promotion of American objectives throughout the media, but also „minimum control and censorship‟ of the press, radio, film, and private communications.”16 By providing images of freedom and democracy, promoting a free trade economy, instilling western values in education and religion, and enabling the Japanese to choose their form of government, the United States hoped to sway the country away from the grasps of Communism. Perhaps the most visible change in the Japanese after the Occupation was their rapid rise in becoming an economic powerhouse. As a nation roughly the size of California, Japan is one of the world‟s largest economies and has become a leader in electronics, automobiles and other manufacturing with worldclass industrial leaders and a “highly educated workforce, the world‟s healthiest population, remarkable degrees of social integration, and cooperative patterns within its cooperate world.”17 With Japan‟s economy second only to the United States, the fifth general objective of the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, “the eventual participation of Japan in a 15 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 75. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 75. 17 Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 365. 16 82 world economic system on a reasonable basis” has undoubtedly been achieved.18 SWNCC policies also allowed SCAP to mold Japan into a new country and allowed it to emerge from the ashes of destruction to become a significant ally during the Korean War and throughout the Cold War. Numerous SWNCC policies shaped everyday life for the Japanese including the regulation of money, the distribution of food, the construct of the government as well as retaining the symbol of the Emperor. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the politicomilitary structure and responsibilities of the United States. Among other things, the Act led to the creation of the Department of Defense, eliminated the War Department, and created the National Security Council, which would take on some of the tasks of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.19 Although SWNCC existed for brief period, in a short span of time, it created the policies that shaped the conduct of the U.S. Occupation of Japan. SWNCC was subsequently renamed the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Chaired by a member of the State Department, it received the assignment of resolving 18 State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 550-551. 19 Takemae, Inside GHQ, 457-458. 83 and coordinating actions and decisions of the State and Defense Secretaries as well as the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.20 The policies developed to govern the Occupation originated in the United States. SWNCC‟s actions intended “to infuse into the hearts and minds of the Japanese people principles of liberty and right heretofore unknown to them”21 and to create a Japan with the ideals of a Western country. If there was any Japanese influence to shape the policies during their drafting, it came from those personnel in the U.S. State Department who felt Japan could become a valuable ally. The experiences in Japan and the images of the Japanese, whether positive or not, influenced those in SWNCC who worked, visited, or lived in Japan. Outside of these few people, the drafting, discussions, debates, and approval of SWNCC policies prior to their release to GHQ occurred within the Committee. Men with different backgrounds, agendas and skill sets made up the SWNCC. These men were diplomats, military officers, economists, and even educators with a desire to spread democracy and freedom to the Japanese. The results of the SWNCC policies speak for themselves. SWNCC provided a guideline for GHQ to follow. 20 Its guiding U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 60th meeting, October 3, 1947, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of Meetings, microfilm, U.S. National Archives, T1194. 21 MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946, in A Soldier Speaks, 165. 84 principles allowed the United States to turn a former enemy into a steadfast ally. The roles of SWNCC and the Subcommittee on the Far East were invaluable before and after the surrender and during the Occupation. They acted as the link between Washington and SCAP and between the United States and its Allies, and they ultimately made the recommendation to regard Japan as “less as a former enemy and more as a possible future ally.”22 The post-surrender policy stated that the Japanese government “will support the objectives of the United States.”23 It is no accident, then, that the U.S. and Japan maintain close ties militarily, politically, and economically. In today‟s economically strained environment, the need for a country to synchronize as well as coordinate efforts among a number of national entities is important. As with any national goal, coordinating efforts enabled the United States to concentrate its energy, to speak in unison, and to optimize resources. The work of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in managing the efforts of the various U.S. Departments in the aftermath of World War II helped to ensure success in the rebuilding of Japan. As World War II ended and the dawn of the Occupation approached, the SWNCC provided valuable guidance needed to undertake the task of rebuilding a 22 Hugh Borton. American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 31. 23 Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 91. 85 country and a population who had just suffered through devastation brought by war and sorrow brought by defeat. The role played by the Committee in rebuilding Japan was crucial and successful. Because of SWNCC, for the first time in U.S. history, a multi-departmental policymaking body existed to take rapid action on urgent policy issues created by military situations.24 They had the support of the State, War, and Navy Departments and even the White House, and “when President Truman came into office, he relied heavily on SWNCC‟s recommendations.”25 24 Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 121. 25 Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 29. 86 Bibliography Primary Sources Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969. Borton, Hugh. American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan. New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967. ------. Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton. New York: Lexington Books, 2002. Japan. Division of Special Records, Foreign Office. 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