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Introduction
After the shocking attacks of 1941, the seemingly
invincible Japanese surprised Western powers with their
successes in the rapid gain of territory in Asia.
World War II
was a particularly brutal war and possibly more so in the
Pacific Theater.
A visible difference in race arguably fueled
the atrocities carried out by both sides in Pacific battles.1
Nonetheless, the Allies and Japanese were equally guilty of
vicious acts of violence upon the other.
Western powers in Asia
suffered early defeats at the hands of the Japanese and the
stunning Japanese victories helped in generating storied images
of its soldiers.
The swiftness of early Japanese victories
“spawned the myth of the Japanese superman (and) to the Japanese,
they were months of glorious victory that once and for all
confirmed their innate superiority.”2
Fueling their samurai
spirit and confidence, the overzealousness of these early
Japanese victories likely led to the abuse of both combatant and
non-combatant personnel alike.
Imperial Japanese attempts to expand into mainland Asia and
into former European and American colonies in South East Asia
led to reports of enslavement and the harsh treatment of the
1
John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 10.
2
Dower, War Without Mercy, 260.
2
local populations.3
Consequently, feelings of resentment and
revenge against the former menace still linger in the Orient
because of Japanese aggressions that led and continued
throughout the war.
In June 1942, Japanese advances in the Pacific ended with
its defeat by the U.S. Navy at the Battle of Midway.
Debatably
the turning point in the Pacific Theater during World War II,
the devastation Japan suffered at Midway led to the Allied
counterattack and the “island hopping” campaign that would
rapidly encroach upon the Japanese islands.
The U.S. advance
eventually landed American G.I.‟s on Okinawa and within striking
distance of the Japanese mainland.
To prepare the country for the expected landing on the main
islands of Japan, the Imperial Japanese military poised itself
and the population to defend against an Allied assault,
insisting, “That the war must be won at any cost, by waging a
decisive struggle in the homeland.”4
As defense preparations
took place, internal discussions within the highest levels of
Japanese leadership debated on their future courses of action.
Near the end of 1944, the United States increased its
planning efforts in preparation for the submission of the Axis
3
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second
World War (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001),
222.
4
Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific
War (Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, 1959), 176.
3
countries and the end of World War II.
Developing the framework
for Germany upon the Nazi defeat gave insight to what American
planners would face as they prepared for the inevitable
occupation of Japan.
Yet, despite Allied victories in both the
European and Asian theaters of war, the occupation of Germany
and Japan would not be the same.
The Occupation and subsequent division of Axis Germany by
the Allied Powers highlighted the ideological differences
existing among the victors.
The Western Powers, led by the
United States, controlled parts of Germany while Communist
Soviet Union held the remainder.
The end of the war brought
about the beginning of the Cold War as these ideological
disparities divided the world while the United States and the
Soviet Union vied to expand their global influence for the next
half century.
As abruptly as the war began for the U.S. with the attack
on Pearl Harbor, it ended just as dramatically for Japan with
the atomic destructions of two cities and the echo of the
national surrender broadcast of Japanese Emperor Hirohito to the
population.
Nonetheless, the quick end to the war and the
relatively smooth transition to the post-war occupation resulted
from efforts that took place well before the deployment of “Fat
Man” on the city of Nagasaki.
come easy to the Japanese.
The decision to surrender did not
Even after the atomic bombings,
4
Japanese military and political leaders stood on opposing sides
deliberating the need to continue the war and the need to end
the suffering.
Ultimately, Emperor Hirohito made the decision
to accept the surrender terms and avoid prolonging the war.
In the Pacific Theater of the war, the Japanese surrender
and the following Allied Occupation did not culminate in a
divided country.
There would be no iconic “Berlin Wall” to
create a visible reminder of the divisiveness between the Allies
and no such symbol in Japan rose to introduce the world to the
coming Cold War.
In Japan, the United States, armed with very
recently learned lessons from the planning of post-war Germany,
led and carried out the Allied Occupation.
Although American
efforts primarily ended the war in the Pacific, the Chinese,
British, and Dutch agreed to send troops to aid with occupation
duties.
The American government also planned to use other Asian
troops for the Occupation to show world solidarity against the
Japanese.
Not only would using Asian troops benefit the cause,
but it would also “force the Japanese to realize that the
greater part of the world, both Occidental and Oriental, (was)
against them and would afford them no basis for interpreting the
war in the Pacific as a racial war as one designed to spread
„white imperialism‟ throughout Asia.”5
5
Nevertheless, Americans
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, National
Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period,
August 11, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
5
represented the bulk of the occupying army.
Furthermore,
American officials back in Washington, D.C., produced the
policies that governed the Occupation.
Despite the hesitant and
subtle offers by the Western Powers for their contribution, the
Soviet Union played a minor, if any, role in the planning and
eventual occupation.
With an overwhelming military force and a majority
stakeholder in Japan, there was very little opposition to
American actions as they presided over Japan and molded it into
a tranquil country.
American policy makers worked with the goal
of transforming Japan into a democratic country with western
ideals to influence everyday issues such as education, labor,
healthcare, banking, and religion.
The American victors sought
to make Japan into a society that would “live in freedom and
peace with her neighbors in the community of nations”.6
Differences in ideology, culture, and perhaps race, helped
to spawn savagery in the fighting in the Pacific Theater of the
war.
The suffering that Japanese troops brought to Asia during
the Pacific Campaign of World War II ended with their military‟s
surrender in 1945.
Despite that, the period in Japan after
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol.
VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 609,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06
(accessed March 23, 2009).
6
MacArthur, statement on the Second Anniversary of V-J Day, September 2, 1947,
in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1965), 193.
6
their surrender did not bring about massive panic or turmoil but
rather relative calm and comparative peace to the country.
The Allied Occupation of Japan would create the foundations
of a strong American-Japanese relationship.
Over time, it
appeared as if the transformation resulting from the Occupation
would be a complete overhaul of Japanese values and their way of
life.
Draft American policies and their variations for occupied
Japan came from men in Washington.
Behind closed doors a small
group of military and political figures in the United States
discussed, debated, and eventually decided American policies for
Japan as they arose.
As policies passed Washington, and in due
course became official guidelines for the Occupation Army and
its leaders, the policies evolved to meet the changing
conditions encountered in Japan.
From their genesis to the
final release to the Japanese, policy changes occurred as these
men met in the United States.
Who was this ominous group of men
making policy to rebuild Japan, and what possible influences
existed to alter any decisions made by them?
Policies for post-war Japan created by the Americans did
not pass without debate.
The introduction, discussions, debates,
and recommendations all needed to meet approval prior their
release to officials in Japan.
Once the policies arrived in
Japan, did the leaders of the Occupation change them?
Since
they were the ones on the ground, living and working with the
7
Japanese, was there any reason for the occupying army to adjust
or challenge policies handed to them from afar?
The final
challenges to these policies, of course, would come from the
people affected by the policies, namely the Japanese population.
However, was there a link for these two groups to interact and
to influence policy?
With U.S. policy makers in the United
States and the Japanese population separated by thousands of
miles, did one influence the other in any way?
Could empathy or
hatred towards the Japanese have influenced the way that
American policy makers drafted Occupation policies?
Planning for the Occupation of Japan upon her surrender
began years before the use of the atomic bombs.
However, of the
planning that took place, how much of American intentions
actually became policy?
Issues such as terms of the surrender,
the machinery required or needed to conduct an occupation of
Japan, the fate of the Emperor, as well as numerous civil
concerns like food and medicine, education, land reform, and
basic democratic rights that America hoped to bring to its
former enemy did not resolve quickly.
These required continuous
refinement even throughout the Allied Occupation.
Rebuilding Japan was undoubtedly a large undertaking.
In
addition to the structural damage caused by the countless
sorties of Allied fire bombings and the devastation caused by
the atomic bombs, the psyche of the Japanese population also
8
needed repair.
The Japanese, a once proud race, who could
earlier boast of having “never lost a war,” suddenly found
themselves forced to surrender in order to survive.7
To some
Japanese, the day of surrender, August 15, 1945,”was the longest
day the people of Japan had ever lived through.”8
On that day,
besides hearing the news of capitulation, the voice of the
Emperor, not heard by a vast majority of the country, brought to
the population the realization that all was lost.
Previous news
of victorious battles afar and the defeat of the enemy became
obvious falsehoods that the Japanese had to accept.
Besides
rebuilding the infrastructure, the Allies faced a people with a
damaged psyche and the enormous charge of rebuilding the
Japanese way of life and perhaps fostering an amicable
relationship between the former foes.
Rebuilding the government, the food distribution system,
education, and even the religious beliefs of the people became a
daunting task that required the efforts of more than an
occupying military force or even the hard work of the victorious
American military.
To provide the expertise in rebuilding or
recreating “a Japan properly discharging its responsibilities in
the family of peaceful nations”9 required the skills and
7
The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day (New York: Kodansha
International, 1980), 19.
8
The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day, 7.
9
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, Politico-Military
Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating
9
intellect of various specialists to guide the Japanese in their
reconstruction toward becoming a reliable, trustworthy country.
The victorious Allies had countless goals for Japan.
However, with the appointment of a United States general to lead
the Occupation, American ambitions overwhelmingly influenced
post-war objectives in Japan.
Within the United States, the
myriad of American goals needed direction and coordination.
They needed leadership from a single entity in order to
synchronize and provide unity of effort.
As numerous American,
as well as Allied, groups competed for agency-centric agendas,
the United States State Department determined the need for a
committee to harmonize the efforts of the various agencies.
With the start of planning and the discussion of the end of the
war with Japan, the U.S. State Department sought a means “to
coordinate planning among civilian and military agencies”.10
Bringing in the Navy and War Departments, the State Department
proposed the creation of a committee to provide the guidance for
American and, eventually, Allied policymaking in the aftermath
of World War II.
This committee met in secret with only the
results of their work known in the policies set forth for
worldwide United States post-war efforts.
The committee also
became heavily involved in the planning for post-war Japan.
to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI,
551.
10
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 209.
10
These policy makers in Washington eventually “drafted the three
basic documents that established the initial objectives of the
occupation: the Potsdam Declaration in which the United States,
Great Britain, and China announced the terms of surrender; ‟The
United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan‟
that was sent to MacArthur in late August and made public on
September 22; and a comprehensive military directive elaborating
postsurrender policy.”11
The transformation of the Japanese and their government
after World War II took place amid a world destroyed by war and
the rising threat of Communism.
Japan‟s government and its
society ended up mirroring a western democracy with western
ideals.
The United States undoubtedly developed the policies
that governed the Occupation.
Was this by original design or
was there any Japanese influence to shape it?
How much of the
original intent of the U.S. planning committee survived the
bureaucracy to become policies?
With the end of World War II
and the occupation that followed, did the Americans who
developed the policies for the Occupation take into account
conditions on the ground or of the culture?
What was the
driving force that created and passed Occupation policies?
11
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 73.
11
The study of this post-war planning committee and the U.S.
initial post-surrender policies of Japan is the subject of this
paper.
This paper also intends to study what caused these
policies to evolve as they worked through the bureaucracy and to
determine what influenced U.S. policy makers as they tried to
rebuild the Japanese.
Finally, this paper will study how the
Allied control machinery for the Japanese Empire came about,
what the general intentions of the Occupation were, and how much
influence a small group in Washington had on the actions of the
Occupation, an occupation that continues to show its influence
on the Japanese today.
12
Chapter 1
Studies of the SWNCC
The United States State Department, in conjunction with the
War and Navy Departments, created the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to synchronize American planning
efforts in preparation for the end of the fighting.
Due to the
classified nature of the SWNCC during World War II, there were
few, if any, publications dedicated to the Committee and its
activities during the post-World War II era.
Rather, the
historiography of the SWNCC includes mainly footnotes in larger
works dedicated to analyzing the Allied Occupation of Japan.
From its inception and throughout the Occupation, the
activities of the SWNCC remained a secret.
It was not until the
U.S. government declassified SWNCC records that details of their
meetings became public.
Because “(t)he Committee agreed that no
copies of minutes of committee meetings or of SWNCC papers
should be distributed to others than those on the regular
distribution list and those within the three Departments „who
need to know‟”1, limited documentation existed regarding the
meetings they held.
The Committee restricted copies of these
minutes and agendas to its members and marked them with
1
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 13th meeting,
March 9, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes
of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
13
RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET classifications.
Close American Allies were not privy to SWNCC meetings or their
documents prior to publication.
Even the surrender terms used
to end the war required the need for modification and
declassification by SWNCC before allowing the Allies to edit
them and before releasing the final version.
The results of
SWNCC closed-door sessions ultimately provided the guidance to
post-war Japan and became the policies that became public.
Published SWNCC policies guided General MacArthur‟s General
Headquarters (GHQ) in rebuilding Japan after the war and they
became available both in English and in Japanese.
The United States National Archives presumably holds all
declassified copies of the agendas and minutes of the SWNCC and
its Subcommittee for the Far East in microfilm form.
The
minutes approved by SWNCC provide the primary source and general
ideas concerning the conduct of the Occupation, the intent of
General MacArthur‟s authority, and the treatment of the Japanese
Emperor.
These sources contain documentation dealing with the
internal discussions that took place among the different members
from various parts of the United States Government.
Placed in
sequential order and analyzed alone, the SWNCC documents provide
a good, but limited, understanding of what took place as
policies developed.
14
An analysis of the minutes and agenda of the SWNCC shows
the concerns the Committee dealt with in their weekly meetings.
Since the SWNCC was composed of multiple U.S. government
agencies, one can gain an awareness of the military and
diplomatic issues that changed SWNCC policies as they circulated
for editing.
Studying these first-hand accounts shows the
initiation, development, discussion, and policy debates
regarding SWNCC actions.
Although a thorough study of every action the SWNCC
conducted near the end of the war and during the Occupation
would provide a complete overview of the Committee and its
effects, it would require a considerable amount of time to
examine the numerous policies passed by SWNCC.
The Committee
involved itself in all aspects of reconstructing Japan.
Subsequently, the U.S. National Archives holds documents that
include policies dealing with everything from the “Allied
Participation in the Occupation of Japan” to “Control of Media
of Public Information in Japan” (also known as the SWNCC-70
series and SWNCC-91, respectively).2
Whether MacArthur‟s GHQ
adapted all these policies as written is well beyond the scope
of this paper.
What this paper intends to focus on are the
changes that occurred in SWNCC policies, specifically the United
2
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes, May
9, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 3, The
National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General Services
Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1205.
15
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, as they made
their way from inception to final form.
Although a plan existed
for post-surrender Japan, SWNCC policies changed as discussions
about their content occurred and American perceptions of the
Japanese changed.
The United States Department of State Foreign Relations of
the United States (FRUS) collection of books document most past
government transcripts and correspondence between the United
States and foreign countries involving the SWNCC.
Much of the
once classified or restricted documents and letters between
high-level diplomatic and military officials are available to
the public.
Using these documents, one gains an appreciation of
the difficulties in negotiating and resolving issues among many
countries, often with conflicting objectives.
Correspondence
between the various U.S. Departments, General MacArthur‟s staff,
and the President are contained in these books, and they show
the evolution of SWNCC documents as they progressed from draft
to final form.
As each document presented by the SWNCC moved
through the bureaucracy, various government entities edited them
and provided explanations for the eventual endorsement or
rejection to proposed policies.
These memorandums show the
discussions that took place behind the scenes and exchanges
taking place beyond those that occurred in SWNCC meetings.
Studying the evolution of SWNCC policies, one can see how the
16
thinking of the policy makers changed as the documents made its
way to final approval and released.
The United States National Archive microfilms and the FRUS
books provide not only the policies derived from SWNCC decisions
but also provide a sense of the ideas that architects of SWNCC
policies held.
Since both SWNCC documents and the FRUS provide
views from within and beyond the closed doors of SWNCC meetings,
studying both allows one to gain a broad appreciation of the
issues.
A study of the documents contained in the FRUS gives a
“paper trail” of a directive and shows the metamorphosis of a
policy from its inauguration to the final form sent to General
MacArthur for his implementation.
Studying this paper trail,
one can gain an understanding into what drove the changes in
policy through the questions and concerns that arose both within
SWNCC meetings and via official government correspondence.
Because classified SWNCC agendas and minutes did not become
available to the public until the 1970s, books by former members
of the Committee written shortly after the Occupation and before
the declassification of SWNCC papers have vague references and
citations to SWNCC and rarely mention what took place during the
meetings.
Additionally, a majority of the books about the U.S.
Occupation of Japan mention the SWNCC in footnotes or endnotes
with only a few pages dedicated to telling the SWNCC story.
17
Memoirs and autobiographies are first-hand accounts
depicting SWNCC activities.
Accounts by former SWNCC Department
of State members Hugh Borton, Justin Williams, and Dean Acheson,
provide a glimpse into their workings and thought processes as
well as dealings with others on the Committee.
A majority of
their memoirs mentions SWNCC policies but infrequently discuss
details of SWNCC meetings.
Statements from General MacArthur
and members of his GHQ staff also provide observations to the
policies that General MacArthur had to implement.
Additionally,
translated books by Japanese politicians and officials in office
during the Occupation refer to these American policy makers.
In
his memoirs, former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
gives his observations on American policies during the
Occupation.3
These accounts help to gain an indication into
Japanese leadership thoughts, opinions, and actions regarding
American efforts to rebuild the country and show a general
reaction to U.S. policies from the Japanese.
The Japanese government also gathered published U.S. policy
documents into a series of books dealing with the Occupation.
Presented in both English and Japanese, Documents Concerning the
Allied Occupation and Control of Japan shows the final drafts of
3
Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans.
Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2007), 104-106.
18
SWNCC policies that the Japanese government received and
ultimately released to the public.4
A study of secondary sources written in the latter part of
the 20th Century provides much of the impetus for this study.
As
mentioned earlier, a majority of primary and secondary sources
consigns the activities of the SWNCC to the footnotes or
endnotes and, in some cases, fails to articulate the SWNCC
decision process due to security classifications.
Along with a
number of other primary sources, policy papers, and government
directives, numerous secondary sources provide insight into life
during the U.S. Occupation.
The surge in information from the
Occupation that occurred nearly 40 years after the end of World
War II has provided much of the readings referenced in this
paper as well as some of the sources used.
Eiji Takemae‟s Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan
and its Legacy, originally written in Japanese, is one book that
provides an in-depth description of the U.S. Occupation of Japan.
From the turning point of the war to the eventual signing of the
Peace Treaty in San Francisco, the book depicts life in Japan
during the reign of General MacArthur‟s super-government.
The
book tells of the initial acceptance of U.S. policies in Japan
and the eventual resistance to change carried out by Japanese
4
Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Documents Concerning the
Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24,
1949, bk.
19
government officials.
Takemae discusses how Shigeru Yoshida,
who became Prime Minister of Japan in 1946, developed a close
relationship with MacArthur along with a resentment of
“Americans‟ overzealous recourse to these instruments of
unilateralism” that discounted Japan‟s past and the traditions
“that influenced equally well-intentioned Japanese officials.”5
Takemae shows how officials like Yoshida sometimes grew weary of
American policies that ignored the plight of the Japanese.
Additionally, the book discusses much of the processes involved
in planning and implementing the desires of the United States.
He provides some mention of the SWNCC but focuses on the
reactions and effects of SWNCC policies on the Japanese.
SWNCC
policies dealing with the initial surrender (SWNCC-150), reform
of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC-228), and even the
report dealing with the treatment of the Emperor are a few of
the SWNCC policies discussed.
John Dower, a foremost expert in Japanese-American affairs,
provides an in-depth study of the racial aspect of World War II
and the U.S. Occupation in his books War Without Mercy: Race and
Power in the Pacific War and Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake
of World War II.
In War Without Mercy, Dower discusses how
feelings of racial superiority played a part in the brutality
5
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 114.
20
suffered by all sides during World War II.
He discusses the
many ways that race influenced the Pacific Theater of World War
II and attributes many of the atrocities as well as the
viciousness of the war to the color of skin and the differences
in culture.
The racial feelings that held throughout the war in
the Pacific as well as the feelings of ethical superiority
probably played on war decisions made on both sides.
The Allied
perception of the Japanese being lesser humans along with the
initial Japanese victories and the stories of their fighting
spirit fueled the image of an indomitable, mysterious force and
became considerations when planning for the possible resistance
by the population during any invasion of the Japanese mainland.6
In Embracing Defeat, Dower gives accounts of the Occupation
from the grassroots perspective.
Takemae‟s Inside GHQ, on the
other hand, attempts to provide a general understanding of the
Occupation by touching on the relevant SWNCC tasks of rewriting
a new constitution, revamping the education system,
redistributing the land, as well as setting labor policy and
restricting the country‟s ability to “wage war.”
Dower also
focuses on how the U.S. presence affected life for the
population and provides background to many practices that still
exist in Japan because of American troops that ran and
6
John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 302.
21
integrated into the daily lives of Japanese society during the
Occupation.
22
Chapter 2
Planning for the Aftermath of War
United States officials debated on how World War II in the
Pacific would end.
Besides the philosophical and ethical debate
over the use of the atomic bombs, there was an additional debate
on how to deal with the impeding occupation.
Issues dealing
with the disposition of former Axis territories and materials
were concerns that America and her allies questioned and
occasionally argued over.
Additionally, since the Allies had
planned to conduct an assault on Japan proper pending the
outcome of the atomic bombs, her early surrender caught the
United States ill equipped to suddenly take over and run the
country because the initial policies for Japan were in place,
but the long-term plans were not developed.1
With the need to consider a relatively unfamiliar race and
culture, Allied planning for the aftermath of war was distinct
in Europe and in Japan.
Differences in planning created unique
characteristics for the respective occupations.
However, it was
final troop posturing and Allied presence during the days
leading to the Axis defeat that played a significant part in the
distribution of post-war politics and responsibilities.
1
When
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 227.
23
Germany surrendered, the British and Russians still had large
armies in German territory, while in Japan, because the United
States primarily orchestrated the Japanese defeat, American
forces became the preponderance of the military presence in the
country.2
As a result, the rules and policies received from
Washington ultimately directed the Allied troops during the
Occupation.
As the Allies in Europe began the reconstruction of the
continent, the United States planned a different path for the
expected occupation of Japan.
The Japanese government would
play a large part in the rebuilding of their country
since ”contrary to the practice of direct military government
adopted in defeated Germany, this occupation was conducted
„indirectly‟-that is, through existing organs of government and
entailed buttressing the influence of two of the most
undemocratic institutions of the presurrender regime: the
bureaucracy and the throne.”3
The U.S. realized the importance
of the existing government in Japan and the use of the Emperor
to the Occupation.
Both of these instruments would prove
crucial to Japan‟s relatively quick recovery from defeat.
The U.S. was initially unaware of how the Japanese would
react to their presence upon entering the country.
2
The Allies,
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 426.
3
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 212.
24
showing a wartime understanding of the Japanese enemy, planned a
post-war occupation of Japan that reflected fears that little
semblance of order would remain to control the country after her
defeat.
The West viewed the Japanese as little men who were
unpredictable and irrational.4
Whether it was by invasion or
after surrender, the Americans planned to take full control of
the government because it was “not believed that any Japanese
Government which may be in existence at the time of
unconditional surrender or total defeat will have sufficient
prestige and power greatly to influence the general situation.”5
Eventually, whereas Germany‟s loss led to the complete
dismantling of the German government, in the Pacific Theater,
large portions, if not all, of the Japanese government remained
intact to carry out the orders of the United States.6
Besides utilizing a portion of the existing Japanese
government, the Allies looked to retain the use of the Imperial
Throne.
The use of the existing Japanese governmental structure
enabled a relatively smooth transition between pre- and postsurrender governments and allowed the Japanese government the
4
John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 111.
5
U.S. Department of State, An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific
at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of
the United States, June 22, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British
Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1945), 559,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06 (accessed March 23,
2009).
6
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 426.
25
opportunity to lead in complying with the surrender documents
and rebuilding the country.7
Discussions regarding the assignment of a leader for
Japan‟s Occupation took place amid disagreements between
American and Russian officials.
American officials talked about
the “comparative war efforts in the Pacific of the United States
and the U.S.S.R. and declared it to be „unthinkable‟ that any
but an American should be Supreme Commander in Japan.”8
The
American position would ultimately hold and with Americans
solely in charge of efforts in Japan, compared to Europe, the
stature of the U.S. military and its policies grew in importance.
When General MacArthur gained the task of leading the Occupation
of Japan, his power and prestige increased while the Allied
victory in Europe diluted the supreme powers that General Dwight
Eisenhower once held as the division of Germany among the Allies
demonstrated.9
As the complex issues of the surrender and occupation
emerged, the War Department‟s Civil Affairs Division and the
Navy Department‟s Occupied Areas Division “were becoming restive
over not having clearly defined policies on which to base plans
7
Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A
Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 100.
8
Hugh Borton, Francis C. Jones, and Bertie R. Pearn, Survey of International
Affairs 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford University Press,
1955), 148.
9
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 426.
26
for the occupation of enemy-occupied territory.”10
Nonetheless,
the War and Navy Departments‟ efforts in planning for an
occupation would continue but would eventually require the
involvement of the State Department to enable military policies
abroad.
The Treasury Department helped to draft the post-war policy
for Germany.
Then Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Henry
Morgenthau drafted the plan that ultimately became the
Occupation Policy for Germany (also known as JCS-1067).
However,
debates on the merit of using Morgenthau‟s plan as a model for
Japan arose.
The U.S. State, War, and Navy Departments agreed
that the Occupation of Japan required a document similar to
Morganthau‟s but that it needed to be a document giving basic
policy rather than a directive with numerous sections directing
an assortment of policies dealing with economic and
administrative or relief issues.11
The plan for Japan needed to
be straightforward and simple in its intentions.
In addition to
rejecting the Germany model for Japan, the eventual plan for
Japan avoided partition of the islands and placing it under the
governance of multiple countries.
10
Rather, the final plan for
Hugh Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York:
Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 14.
11
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 28th meeting, April 16, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
27
Japan entailed the United States leading the reconstruction
efforts.
Additionally, State Department staffs conducting
research work for the pre-surrender Japanese policy did not feel
compelled to follow the policies created for Germany and
“believed that it would be disastrous for the success of the
occupation and American objectives in Japan if the German
policies were applied to Japan.”12
In hindsight, the efforts of the U.S. departments of the
State, War, Navy, and Treasury lacked unity in their efforts in
the planning for the end of the war.
For the State Department,
the Secretary of State created the Postwar Programs Committee
(PWC) within the department to institute post-war polices and to
help develop the international relations needed to carry out
those policies.13
The work of the PWC remained one centered on
directives of a political nature with occasion to defer to the
armed forces on questions dealing with military matters.
The SWNCC and Its Origin
Specific departments within the United States stated their
goals and the requirements needed in order to properly manage
their portion of the post-war environment.
12
13
Prior to the
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 17.
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 14.
28
Occupation, the departments recognized the need to synchronize
their efforts and, “it was obvious to everyone concerned with
postwar policy planning that difficulties of interdepartmental
communication must be eliminated if coordinated postwar policies
were to be developed.”14
These governmental concerns culminated in the creation of
the SWNCC.
To alleviate duplication of effort, conflicting
priorities and to streamline efforts, on November 29, 1944,
Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., sent
letters to the Secretaries of War and the Navy with a proposal
regarding the formation of a committee.15
Secretary of War Henry
Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal agreed to the
formation of a committee “to represent the three Secretaries in
formulating recommendations to the Secretary of State on
questions having both military and political aspects, and in
coordinating the views of the three departments in matters of
common interest.”16
A joint letter from Stimson and Forrestal
dated December 1, 1944, agreed to the establishment of the
SWNCC.17
14
This agreement resulted in “the formation of the State-
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18.
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter,
November 29, 1944, and Stimson and Forrestal to Stettinius, letter, December
1, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and Minutes of
Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
16
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18.
17
Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal to Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., letter,
December 1, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
15
29
War-Navy Coordinating Committee, commonly referred to by its
acronym, SWNCC (pronounced „swink‟).”18
Beginning with its first meeting on December 19, 1944,
SWNCC met continuously at least once a week and promptly began
work on post-war planning.
It was during this first meeting
that the Committee dispensed with formal procedures to create a
charter that delineated the committee‟s functions and “agreed
that for the time being, at least, nothing other than the
letters between the Secretary of State and the Secretaries of
War and Navy would be necessary.”19
Thus, the gentlemanly
agreements of the Secretaries provided the necessity and
approval to stand up the SWNCC and its responsibilities.
It
would not be for another nine months, in August 1945, that
concerns to formalize the mission of the Committee became the
subject of discussion with a recommendation for approval by the
President‟s signature.20
In addition to an informal charter, the
Committee agreed on the parameters it would work in.
The
Committee would work issues having politico-military
implications, would make recommendations for approval to the
18
Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton
(New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 121.
19
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 1st meeting,
December 19, 1944, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
minutes of meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
20
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 22nd meeting,
August 31, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
30
three secretaries, and would only work in matters that pertained
to their “sphere of interest.”21
Since most of the post-war planning for Japan involved some
degree of diplomatic maneuvering, the State Department took the
lead role in forming the SWNCC and in leading the planning
efforts.
The SWNCC became primarily a State Department entity
because their purpose was to make recommendations to the
Secretary of State, and ultimately, the sitting chairpersons of
both the SWNCC and its Subcommittee for the Far East were always
State Department representatives.22
The War Department along
with the Navy Department (the next influential departments in
the U.S. government) provided the capacity needed for a thorough
understanding of the different needs and goals of the various
departments.
First chaired by Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn,
the SWNCC meetings at the State Department building in
Washington, D.C., worked to build a plan to affect the surrender
of Japan.
Wartime issues such as Japanese atrocities against
American prisoners of war, the definition of ”unconditional
surrender” of the Japanese, as well as Russia‟s role in post-war
Japan highlighted the early meetings.
As the war progressed and
signs of its resolution came within sight, the members met more
21
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 1st meeting,
December 19, 1944.
22
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 19.
31
frequently.
As stated in Acting Secretary Stettinius‟ proposal
for the Committee, SWNCC‟s intentions were to “occupy itself
with the formulation of the surrender terms for Japan, the
military administration of civil affairs in the Far East and
such questions as may arise in connection with the disposition
of various territories now occupied by the enemy” while
coordinating the studies as well as the efforts of the different
departments.23
SWNCC‟s work in developing and coordinating the
efforts of the various U.S. governmental departments helped lay
the framework for the policies of the Occupation.
Meeting in secrecy, the SWNCC initially oversaw post-war
policies globally as well as in the Pacific Theater of the war.
SWNCC members were briefly involved in policy making of postWorld War II Germany, Austria, and Korea along with settling
other war-related issues around the globe.
However, soon after
its establishment, SWNCC‟s focus fell primarily on Asia.
The
creation of an Informal Policy Committee on Germany in early
1945 shifted jurisdiction of policies for Germany away from the
State, War, and Navy Departments, leaving those Departments to
dedicate their efforts solely to the planning in East Asia.24
23
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter,
November 9, 1944, in U.S. Department of State Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, the
Far East, vol. V. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944),
1274-1275, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1944v05 (accessed
March 23, 2009).
24
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 20.
32
Thus, unlike the European Theater, the Occupation of Japan
became primarily an American one.
With relatively smaller
contingencies of British, Dutch, and Chinese troops to help
rebuild Japan, the United States set policies that overwhelming
became reflections of American desires.
Although the Americans
consulted their Allies on some occupation issues, it would be
after the bulk of the work was completed and the matter to
consult the Allies became merely a formality.
Since SWNCC meetings discussed classified U.S. policies,
the agenda and the minutes of the meetings became classified
documents.
When the Committee consulted non-U.S. members, it
was often after extensive debate and after a policy version
approved by the SWNCC was “sanitized”, or stripped of sensitive
information, in order to gain approval for release to American
Allies.
Oftentimes, there were differences in the policies of
the Allies in post-war Japan and it was likely the American
perspective prevailed and became policy.
With lessons learned during its planning for post-war
Germany, SWNCC plans for Japan were different from those in
Europe.
Instead of dividing the country into various zones led
by each participating Allied country, a single leader would
become the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and
run Japan.
General Douglas MacArthur later received appointment
33
as SCAP and under him, the Occupation of Japan would take on the
flavor of an American-led reconstruction.
The Subcommittee for the Far East
Rebuilding a destroyed Japan required more than the use of
diplomacy, it required the needs of all U.S. instruments of
national power.
Thus, the military and diplomatic portions of
the government took active parts in the planning.
Economic as
well as informational/public relations aspects of the
instruments of power also played roles and participated in the
planning as needed.
To deal with the increase in tasking for the post-surrender
of Japan, SWNCC designated an ad hoc subcommittee to focus
exclusively on Asia.
Less than a month after the first meeting
of SWNCC, the Subcommittee for the Far East formed with the
responsibility of being the first step in preparing policy
papers for the approval of SWNCC.25
Comprised of members of the
State, War, and Navy Departments, this subcommittee looked at
the post-war problems, attempted to build compromise for the
three departments, built policies based upon documents
previously used only by the State Department, and submitted
25
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 18.
34
decisions for approval by the SWNCC prior to a document becoming
United States policy.26
The Subcommittee for the Far East ultimately did the bulk
of forming U.S. policies for Japan and produced the initial
drafts for SWNCC-150, or the “U.S. Initial Post-Defeat Policy
for Japan.”
The Subcommittee provided inputs to the SWNCC for
consideration to offices above them, as well as to the President
of the United States.27
As situations in the Pacific theater
changed, SWNCC documents went through various iterations and
eventually became the guiding principles for General MacArthur
and the GHQ during the Occupation.
In most cases, SWNCC
approval of a paper made the document official United States
policy except in cases such as the post-surrender policy, when
“President Truman‟s approval of it was obtained before it was
formally transmitted to General Douglas MacArthur.”28
Attendance at SWNCC and Subcommittee meetings averaged to
about twenty members throughout their existences.
In addition
to representatives from all three departments, representatives
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other departments met on an
ad hoc basis to provide inputs to policies brought up in SWNCC
26
Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 33.
27
Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 121-130.
28
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 19.
35
agendas.29
Along with those in the Subcommittee, there were
lower planning groups of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who assessed
the effects of military and non-military policies on the U.S.
military.
These planning groups worked with the Subcommittee to
prepare SWNCC drafts for approval by the President once ratified
by the SWNCC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.30
Inputs from these
groups, as well as other governmental departments (education,
economics, etc.) led to the construction of policies developed
by the SWNCC.
29
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. to Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, letter,
November 9, 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1944:V, 1275.
30
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 210.
36
Chapter 3
Preliminary SWNCC Issues
After the defeat of Nazi Germany and the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the end of World War II was imminent.
Although August 15, 1945, the day Emperor Hirohito addressed the
Japanese people, was the day Japan concluded the war in the
Pacific, it was not until September 2, 1945, on the deck of the
battleship USS Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay, that the
surrender became official.
For the SWNCC, the surrender was a
subject that they spent the previous months defining and
formalizing.
The matter of defining “unconditional surrender” became a
topic of debate.
Within SWNCC and as early as February 1945,
the interpretation of “unconditional surrender” needed clarity
to precisely articulate post-war objectives in Japan.
The
Committee was unaware of the implications that rested on the
definition of what constituted unconditional surrender.
The
sudden interest in the meaning of unconditional surrender
surprised members of the SWNCC and it now is apparent that
preparations for the use of the atomic bomb, “The Manhattan
Project,” were secret from even the SWNCC.1
1
The assumption was
Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton
(New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 135.
37
that unconditional surrender did not necessitate total
destruction of the Japanese nation.2
For the military members on
the Committee, unconditional surrender meant a total military
defeat to include an invasion of Japan.
On the other hand,
members of the State Department regarded unconditional surrender
as “encompassing the unconditional dissipation of the Japanese
militaristic enterprise” by methods other than solely military
means.3
The SWNCC also discussed the possible situations facing the
Allies as they planned for the defeat of Japan.
The stereotypes
placed on the Japanese promoted Western policy maker
expectations of how the Japanese people would react if the
Allies conducted a successful landing on the main islands since
Westerners believed that the Japanese were unbeatable and would
not surrender without a final bitter struggle.4
Thus, the
Committee believed in three scenarios for the end of fighting.
Members of SWNCC believed that while unconditional surrender and
total defeat were two real possibilities the Allies would have
to face, a third possibility, the conquest of the Japanese main
islands but with continued organized resistance elsewhere, was
2
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 213.
3
Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 35.
4
Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans.
Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2007), 32.
38
so remote a possibility that it was unnecessary to draft a
proclamation to deal with it.5
With their logistics and war
fighting ability decimated by Allied submarine attacks and with
the encroachment of the U.S. so close to the mainland, the
Japanese had little ability left to fight outside Japan.
Eventually, there was little organized Japanese resistance
abroad once the Emperor announced the end of the war.
SWNCC had to deal with the issue of determining the
leadership for the Occupation.
Unlike the situation in Europe,
the United States became the sole country leading the
reconstruction of Japan.
As the planning for the surrender of
Japan proceeded, SWNCC discussions during the drafting of the
initial post-surrender policies included deciding what the
leadership structure of the Occupation would be.
SWNCC
recommended the idea of appointing an American to lead the
Occupation.
In an August 11, 1945, report on the “National
Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat
Period”, SWNCC stated its reasons favoring an American to lead
the occupation.
In it, SWNCC stressed that, because of the
preponderance of effort against Japan, the optimum positioning
of the bulk of its forces to occupy and control the Japanese
5
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 23rd meeting, May 11, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
39
islands, and the United Nations recognized interests of the U.S.
in preserving security and peace in the region, the controlling
voice in the Occupation should be the United States who should
also designate a commander of all occupational forces.6
Finally,
SWNCC believed that it was “essential that throughout the entire
period of occupation complete unity of control should be
retained by the Supreme Commander and that the division of
responsibilities would result in chaotic conditions and loss of
efficient control.”7
With the exception of the Soviet proposal
for dual Supreme Commanders, there was little disagreement to
the appointment of an American for the position.8
After a discussion on the body to govern Japan, an informal
SWNCC vote in August 1945 established the Americans‟ preference
for a one-man authority versus a council.9
Reflecting the war
efforts in the Pacific, the United States further clarified its
6
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, National
Composition of Forces to Occupy Japan Proper in the Post-Defeat Period,
August 11, 1945, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol.
VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 608,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06
(accessed March 23, 2009).
7
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Politico-Military Problems in
the Far East: Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, September
26,1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 7, SFE
129-141, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205.
8
Hugh Borton, Francis C. Jones, and Bertie R. Pearn, Survey of International
Affairs 1939-1946: The Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford University Press,
1955), 148.
9
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 33rd meeting, August 14,1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947,The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
40
authoritative position in Japan by making a unilateral decision
to appoint General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander.
Although SWNCC policy denied other countries a controlling
voice in the Occupation, the U.S. attempted to share the burden
when President Truman allowed the participation of other
countries under the condition that they integrated under U.S.
command.10
The United States did not want zones of occupation
and tried to provide policies acceptable to the Allies.
To
emphasize the U.S. position among the Allies, the initial
directives stated that, “in the event of any differences of
opinion among them, the policies of the United States (would)
govern.”11
SWNCC also resolved which Allies to inform of any policy
findings.
Shortly after the appointment of MacArthur, the
debate over who to inform of the decision and what to do in the
event of a disagreement between the Allies over this and any
other issues followed.
On the policies passed to SCAP, SWNCC
debated on whether to and when the appropriate time was to
inform the Allies of their decisions.
The discussions centered
on whether or not to inform Allies prior to releasing directives
to the public and which Allies were going to be privy to the
information.
10
After discussing the repercussions of not
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 93.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 427.
11
41
informing Allies prior to publication of a directive, SWNCC
agreed it was desirable that directives and policy statements
issued to the Supreme Commander be disclosed to the Allies and
released to the public and that in the event that release to the
public was undesired, that only Britain, Russia, and China
receive the directives and policy statements in advance.12
released most approved policies to the public.
SWNCC
However, SCAP
did not release planned occupation moves plans until they became
public as per their standard operating procedures.13
During the debates for defining unconditional surrender
and the Occupation leadership, the question of retaining the
Emperor system surfaced.14
The fate of Emperor Hirohito was
another issue SWNCC needed to resolve.
In the European Theater,
the war leaders of the Axis Powers of Germany and Italy did not
survive to witness defeat at the hands of the Allies.
Death
allowed both Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini to elude standing
trial to face imminent charges against humanity.
Emperor
Hirohito, on the other hand, survived the war long enough to end
it.
He later became an essential part of the transition to
Allied Occupation.
12
In Japan‟s defeat, the voice of the Emperor
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 24th meeting,
September 12, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
Minutes of Meetings, U.S. National Archives, microfilm, T1194.
13
Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A
Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 107.
14
Dunn et al., Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan, 35.
42
not only brought an end to the fighting, but also provided an
avenue for the occupation armies to control the population.
The fate of the Japanese Emperor divided Washington.
In
the White House, a document circulated stating that General
MacArthur should examine Hirohito‟s role in the war to establish
whether or not he should be on trial as a war criminal, a view
held by a few in the State Department that studied the Far East,
especially China experts.15
Within the U.S. State Department,
for those who understood Japan, arguments were “for his
retention as the main stabilizing factor in Japan” or for his
removal “because he was a weak leader who had yielded to the
military demand for war and who could not be relied upon.”16
Additionally, ranking officials in Washington, members of
Congress, and a majority of the press believed in ending the
Imperial Japanese Throne and called for a trial of Emperor
Hirohito as a war criminal.17
SWNCC eventually studied the issue
of retaining the Throne and would later recommend in March 1946
that SCAP advocate the elimination of the Imperial Institute.18
However, General MacArthur saw the value of the Emperor and
lobbied for his innocence, or at a minimum, the Emperor‟s
15
Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 147.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, 112.
17
Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century, 147.
18
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes,
March 7, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 7,
SFE 129-141, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205.
16
43
avoidance of a war crimes trial.
As an advocate of the Throne
and the Emperor, General MacArthur went so far as to secretly
dissuade questions from the Emperor‟s staff regarding the
Emperor‟s rumored resignation while simultaneously “praising him
as the leader of the new democracy.”19
The Emperor provided the
United States the means to calm the Japanese population and
allow a peaceful transition to the Occupation.
With the
preservation of the Emperor and the Throne, SWNCC‟s directive
for the ”Reform of the Japanese Governmental System” (SWNCC-228)
intended to enable the Japanese to determine the future of the
Emperor System by either eliminating it or restructuring it to
be more in line with a democratic system.20
Surrender Documents
American policy makers faced numerous issues in rebuilding
Japan.
As a result, the Subcommittee for the Far East produced
many documents for SWNCC to review.
In turn, these documents
faced meticulous scrutiny by SWNCC members before their release
and subsequent publication.
The Potsdam Declaration became the
basis for the initial post-surrender policy.
That document,
along with the directive to General MacArthur, became the first
19
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 27.
20
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 274.
44
to announce United States and Allied goals and set the
objectives for the Occupation.
Thus, the preliminary control
documents for the administration of Japan were the Potsdam
Declaration, the “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”
and the “Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers.”
The first two documents described the structure and
objectives of the Occupation, while the directive guided
MacArthur and stated his authorities.
All these documents
passed from the Subcommittee for the Far East, to the SWNCC, to
the President for approval, and then finally to the Japanese.
The Potsdam Declaration
The United States, Britain, and China signed the Potsdam
Declaration.
Issued on July 26, 1945, it stated the terms of
surrender that the Japanese would eventually accept on August 10
that same year.
The declaration stated that the Allies sought
for Japan the elimination “for all time” the leadership and
influence that led the country to war, the surrender of all
Japanese armed forces and the eradication of their war-making
capability, the submission to trial and punishment of war
criminals, the removal of “all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people”, and the establishment of “freedom of speech, of
45
religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental
human rights”.21
It not only sought an end to militarism that
led to the war, but also called for the end of Japan‟s means to
conduct war while also ending its ability to build and maintain
a war-making capability.
In a sense, the Potsdam Declaration
reflected a compromise in the meaning of unconditional surrender
from what the diplomatic and military sides of the SWNCC had
debated earlier.
With the end of war in Europe allowing the
backing of the full offensive military capacity of the Allies,
the Potsdam Declaration combined both the threat of total
military destruction by invasion with the stated required
Japanese actions needed to end its war-making industry.
The Declaration established the stationing of Allied troops
in Japan as an occupying force.
Since there was doubt as to
whether the Japanese mind could completely discredit militarism,
an occupation by foreign troops on their homeland, regardless of
how long, was a way to bring home a visible sign of the extent
of Japan‟s defeat.22
Western society understood the Japanese to
be repressed citizens who “did not understand or appreciate the
Western sense of fair play” which led them to brutal and
21
Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “Potsdam Declaration,”
Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I,
Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, 9-11.
22
Joseph W. Ballantine, Comments on Memorandum Forwarded by Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson on “Observations on Post-Hostilities Policy Toward Japan,”
August 6, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI, 588.
46
sadistic acts of war.23
The Allies were dealing with a
relatively unknown foe that swiftly defeated the colonial powers
in Asia just a few years earlier.
With an expected resistance
to the Occupation, the presence of troops was another means to
highlight total defeat to the Japanese.
Additionally, the use
of a multi-racial occupying army helped to solidify a united
global front against the Japanese aggression.
As another means
of isolating the Japanese from the international community and
further displaying their defeat, the Allies also took charge of
Japan‟s international relations immediately after the Japanese
surrendered.24
The release of the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent
acceptance by the Japanese was the primer for the initial postsurrender policy.
A few fundamental policy changes occurred
between the declaration and the initial policy and the latter
merely expanded upon the terms set in the Potsdam Declaration.
While planning the end of the war, SWNCC and the Subcommittee
for the Far East also dealt with war issues developing outside
Japan including the resolution of both Japanese and U.S.
atrocities, the use of foreign airstrips, and the disarmament of
the enemy.
23
They also debated minor changes that developed
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 214.
U.S. Department of State, An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific
at the Close of the War in the Far East and the Objectives and Policies of
the United States, June 22, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States
1945:VI, 560.
24
47
between the Potsdam Declaration and the initial post-surrender
policy.
However, the Committee remained focused on objectives
of the United States.
SWNCC stated the “ultimate objective of
the Allies in Japan was to guarantee that Japan would never
again menace the peace” so they sought to encourage fundamental
liberties for the Japanese and proposed to allow Japan an
economy “directed at the ultimate aim of security against
Japanese militarism.”25
The following years of the Occupation
saw the introduction of SWNCC policies to handle the issues
introduced in the Potsdam Declaration.
Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
Along with determining who would lead the Occupation, SWNCC
handled the decisions that helped shaped the authorities of the
Supreme Commander.
On August 14, 1945, President Truman sent
the directive to General Douglas MacArthur designating him as
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers “in accordance with
the agreement among the Governments of the United States,
Chinese Republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the purpose of enforcing the surrender of Japan.”26
25
Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 58.
Harry S Truman, Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 647-648.
26
48
SWNCC provided the guidance for General MacArthur, GHQ, and
Occupation forces.
The Directive to the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers “was intended to be forwarded to General
MacArthur with instructions to use it as a guide rather than as
a document to be literally adhered to, thus giving him the
authority to alter it to meet circumstances as they exist at the
time of issuance.”27
After receiving his appointment as Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur received the
following instructions on September 6, 1945, which the Japanese
later made public.28
1. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese
Government to rule the State is subordinate to you
as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Since
your authority is supreme, you will not entertain
any question on the part of the Japanese as to its
scope.
2. Control of Japan shall be exercised through the
Japanese Government to the extent that such an
arrangement produces satisfactory results.
This
does not prejudice your right to act directly if
required. You may enforce the orders issued by you
by the employment of such measures as you deem
necessary, including the use of force.
3. The statement of intentions contained in the
Potsdam Declaration will be given full effect.29
27
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 20th meeting,
August 11, 1945, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
Minutes of Meetings, microfilm, U.S. National Archives, T1194.
28
Japan, “Message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur concerning the
Authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,” Documents
Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 109.
29
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Instructions to General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur (Message No. 1), September 6, 1945, in Foreign Relations of
the United States 1945:VI, 712.
49
With these authorities, MacArthur set out to rebuild the
Japanese society and Japan as quick as he could since it seemed
that “most of the American authorities regarded Japan as a
defeated nation, to be reformed in the shortest possible time.”30
To reflect the urgency of the matter, MacArthur‟s appointment as
SCAP and his authorities came into effect once he received their
transmissions from President Truman.31
Given the directives as a starting point, MacArthur and the
GHQ looked to shape the conduct of the Occupation and to mold
Japan from a militaristic country to a peaceful, self-governing
one.
With his experience and time in the Orient, MacArthur felt
he had a thorough understanding of the “Oriental” mind and may
have done what he thought was best for the Japanese population
and the reconstruction effort.
His presence during the
execution of the Pacific campaign and his experience living and
working in various assignments around Asia helped when President
Truman appointed him to the position.
Rather than strictly
follow the policies given to him by SWNCC, MacArthur believed
that, while some critics were thousands of miles away in
Washington with no knowledge of conditions existing and who
would “applied here wholly inadaptable principles and methods,”
30
William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal
History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 44.
31
Harry S Truman, Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 648.
50
these critics did not confront the realities he directly faced.32
One instance of MacArthur‟s possible foresight to the situation
in Japan shows his concerns mirroring those of the men in
Washington.
Before the policies for the Occupation became
public, MacArthur came out with a summary of his goals and plans
that “reflected very closely those approved in Washington by the
SWNCC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Truman” and in
hindsight, they were merely a synopsis of the goals stated in
the initial post-surrender policies that had previously been
developed, unbeknownst to him.33
Given how close his goals were
to those approved by SWNCC, perhaps MacArthur had a correct
understanding of the situation in Japan.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence showing SWNCC having
to constantly consult or seek the advice of General MacArthur in
respect to the Occupation.
When directives did pass to GHQ,
MacArthur adjusted the means to meet SWNCC policies and sought
to highlight that those in Japan were in charge and that ”SCAP‟s
objectives were decided in Washington, but SCAP‟s methods for
achieving them were devised in Tokyo.”34
32
MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5,
1946, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1965), 166.
33
Russell D. Buhite, Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in
America’s East Asian Policy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2008), 68.
34
Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, 107.
51
United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan
The governing document for the Occupation went through
several iterations.
Even after public release, the U.S. policy
for the Occupation continued in revision.
The Subcommittee for
the Far East provided the first draft for the U.S. Initial PostSurrender Policy for Japan.
As early as April 1945, during
their 16th meeting, the Subcommittee began a “point-by-point
examination of the paper” by editing the document to strengthen
the language and by revising the wording to provide consistency
in the tone and content of the draft in order to synchronize the
inputs from the various U.S. Departments.35
On April 19, 1945,
the Subcommittee‟s “Summary of United States Initial Post-Defeat
Policy Relating to Japan” became the basis for the “United
States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” and the “core of
the wide-ranging directives that MacArthur‟s headquarters would
issue to the Japanese government in the early months of
occupation.”36
The policy included parts addressing the ultimate
goals of the United States and the Allied authority along with
political and economic policies.
After the SWNCC and various
U.S. Government Departments incorporated tenets of military,
35
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 16th meeting, April 12, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
36
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 211.
52
political, and economic ideals to promote democracy into the
drafts and revisions, SWNCC formally adopted the summary
document as the first draft of the U.S. Initial Post-Defeat
Policy for Japan and designated it SWNCC-150/1 (after 15 August,
„Post-Defeat‟ would become „Post-Surrender‟).37
The policy
stated the following for the Occupation:
The general objectives of the United States in regard
to Japan are:
1. The unconditional surrender or total defeat of
Japan;
2. The
stripping
from
the
Japanese
Empire
of
territories, including the Mandated Islands, in
harmony with the Cairo Declaration and such other
pertinent agreements as may be reached by the United
Nations, and to which the United States is a party;
3. The creation of conditions which will insure that
Japan will not again become a menace to the peace
and security of the world;
4. The eventual emergence of a government in Japan
which will respect the rights of other states and
Japan‟s international obligations; and
5. The eventual participation of Japan in a world
economic system on a reasonable basis.38
Expanding on the Potsdam Declaration, the general objectives of
the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy also looked to eliminate
militarism and prevent Japanese aggression from reemerging.
This first draft spawned the discussions to determine, who
or what, would lead the occupation force.
37
This draft of the
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 213-214.
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy
Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1945:VI, 550-551.
38
53
Initial Post-Surrender Policy initially stated that a United
Nations person or armed forces was going to take charge of the
Occupation, however, a suggestion from the Chief of Naval
Operations commented that there would probably be no United
Nations Armed Force to lead the task and that supreme power
should fall to the Commander in Chief of the occupying force,
presumably an American.39
Subsequently, the policy changed to
reflect that “the supreme allied commander” rather than a United
Nations entity would have supreme authority over the affairs of
the Japanese Empire.40
When the second version of the policy
(SWNCC-150/2) came out on August 12, the authority read “the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps
as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.”41
With no
substantial changes to SWNCC 150/342, President Truman approved
the fourth version of SWNCC-150 and forwarded a copy to
39
L.S. Sabin, Memorandum for Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for the Far East, May 1, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1945:VI, 536.
40
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy
Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1945:VI, 551.
41
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, United States Initial Post-Defeat
Policy Relating to Japan, August 12, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1945:VI, 609.
42
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
36th meeting, August 24, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the
Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb1945-22Dec1947,
The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service, General
Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
54
MacArthur on September 6, 1945.43
It stated, “the occupation
forces will be under the commander of a Supreme Commander
designated by the United States.”44
This presidential-approved version, the United States
Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC-150/4),
maintained the following as guiding principles for the
development of policy for the Occupation:
The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard
to Japan to which policies in the initial period must
conform, are:
(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a
menace to the United States or to the peace and
security of the world.
(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a
peaceful and responsible government which will
respect the rights of other states and will support
the objectives of the United States as reflected in
the ideals and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations. The United States desires that this
government should conform as closely as may be to
principles of democratic self-government but it is
not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to
impose upon Japan any form of government not
supported by the freely expressed will of the
people.45
43
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes,
September 6, 1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948,
Roll 2, SFE 107-112, The National Archives, National Archives and Records
Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1205.
44
Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents
Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 93.
45
Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents
Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 91.
55
Nearly two weeks later, on September 22, the White House
publicly released the policy as SWNCC-150/4/A.46
As the
Occupation progressed, SWNCC-150 would continue in revision as
the Committee looked to achieve its stated goals for Japan.
Additionally, the means to meet the realization of the U.S.
objectives included “those predominately military in character
such as the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese armed
forces, and other predominately political in character such as
the encouragement of the Japanese to form democratic and
representative organizations and to develop a desire for
individual liberties.”47
SWNCC provided the coordination to
support both the military and political ambitions of the United
States.
46
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 226.
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Politico-Military Problems in
the Far East: Allied Control Machinery for the Japanese Empire, September 26,
1945, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East 1945-1948, Roll 1, SFE
100-106, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205.
47
56
Chapter 4
Occupation Policies and Other Considerations
The policies SWNCC passed before and throughout the
Occupation aimed to meet the objectives spelled out in the
Potsdam Declaration and the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy
for Japan.
To ensure that Japan would remain peaceful and to
reassure the world that the Japanese would not repeat their
imperialistic attitude, SWNCC policies looked to eradicate
militarism within Japanese society and to change the leadership
that led their country down the path of war.
Eliminating
militarism and the capacity of Japan to wage war entailed a
multi-faceted approach that would involve more than just the
removal of the Imperial Japanese Military.
Additionally,
eliminating the leadership that led the Japanese to war was more
than simply bringing Emperor Hirohito and Japanese military
leaders to trial.
To purge the thoughts of militarism and ultra-nationalistic
ideology, SWNCC passed policies to re-edify the Japanese through
educational and labor reforms and the suppression of Shintoism
as a state religion.1
1
The Committee passed “Policy for the
James F. Byrnes, statement to Acting Political Adviser in Japan (George
Atcheson, Jr.), October 12, 1945, in U.S. Department of State Foreign
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British
Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
57
Revision of the Japanese Educational System” (SWNCC-108), which
became the basis for a comprehensive policy statement on postwar
education reform and “proposed to abolish textbooks espousing
jingoism and ultra-nationalism” which had been “recommended by
the military and had been a powerful influence on young minds.”2
This policy, along with SWNCC-162, or the “Positive Policy for
Reorientation of the Japanese,” was a strategy calling for
changes in “ideologies and attitudes of mind”, advocated
utilizing “all possible media and channels”, and proposed using
the support of progressive Japanese, under American guidance, to
shape parts of Japanese culture into a “liberal democratic
ethos”.3
These instructions ingrained the Japanese with Western
culture that promoted democracy and hoped to sway the population
from the Imperialistic attitude that led them down the path to
war.
The eradication of militarism in Japan also required a
change in the Japanese mindset.
Both within the United States
and with its Allies, there were differences in how harsh the
treatment of the Japanese should be and to what extent and speed
Printing Office, 1945), 749,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06
(accessed March 23, 2009).
2
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 348.
3
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 383-384.
58
political and economic reform would occur.4
To accomplish the
gradual elimination of militarism, SWNCC planned successive
periods to monitor progress of the Occupation and the effects
its American policies were having.
Contingent on the reactions
of the Japanese, SWNCC planned for three different periods in
the treatment of the country.
Japan would first face stern
discipline enforced by the military occupation, then after close
surveillance and the progressive relaxation of restrictions, a
supervisory agency might replace the military government and
reach a final period terminating with “the ultimate aim of the
United States, namely a Japan properly discharging its
responsibilities in the family of peaceful nations.”5
These
distinct periods of Allied control: complete Japanese
subordination to the surrender terms with retributions,
surveillance to determine how much control the Allies would
return to the Japanese and the complete demilitarization of
Japan were necessary to eliminate militarism and its tendencies.6
Although SWNCC suggested that the succession of these periods
were contingent on the behavior of the Japanese, the U.S. Navy,
in their “Summary of U.S. Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to
4
William J. Sebald and Russell Brines, With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal
History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 43-44.
5
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, Politico-Military
Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating
to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945:VI,
551.
6
Frederick S. Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 32-33.
59
Japan” stated, “It is questioned whether Japanese behavior is
the only standard which ought to be used in determining what the
treatment is to be.”7
Regardless, it was an easy way to gauge
the effectiveness of SWNCC policies and to become a measure of
success for the Occupation.
Besides the surrender of the Japanese armed forces and the
visible presence of foreign troops in Japan, SWNCC policies
provided additional assurances against the possibility of a
revitalized military and included instruction regarding
disarmament and the disposal of war material as well as the
repatriation of Japanese abroad.
SWNCC passed industrial
reforms that regulated Japan‟s production of armament, heavy
industry, aircraft, and ships, and thus, limited Japan‟s “warmaking” capability (in SWNCC-93, 94, 95, and 96, respectively).
Additionally, the Committee called for the “dissolution of
Japan‟s large industrial and banking combinations which have
exercised control of a great part of Japan‟s trade and industry”
and contributed to the war-making capability of its industries,
especially under the influence of militaristic leadership.8
To deal with the leadership that led Japan to war, SWNCC
members discussed not only a reform in the government but also
the treatment of former military leaders and the Emperor.
7
L.S. Sabin, Memorandum for Chairman, State-War-Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for the Far East, May 1, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1945:VI, 537.
8
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 334.
60
Imperial Japanese leaders stood trial for their roles in the war
and there was a call to include Emperor Hirohito as part of the
proceedings.
Upon his removal from office and based upon the
determination of conditions in Japan, SWNCC sought the arrest of
Hirohito as a war criminal in their discussions while drafting
“The Treatment of the Person of Hirohito, Emperor of Japan”
(SWNCC-55).9
However, out of necessity, General MacArthur sought
and succeeded in sparing the Emperor from having to stand trial
as a war criminal.
Although some believed the intense loyalty
to the Emperor created Japanese aggression, others in the U.S.
State Department believed that neither the Emperor nor the
Imperial institution caused Japan‟s aggression, but that Japan‟s
pre-war constitution enabled military leaders and ultranationalists to take advantage of the Throne to meet their
objectives.10
SWNCC looked to abolish the leadership and the influences
that led the country to war.
This included passing policies to
change not only the Japanese government but also the people that
followed it.
A Subcommittee for the Far East report recommended
that to “permit the development in Japan of a more liberal and
9
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 45th meeting, October 3, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
10
Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton
(New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 148.
61
enlightened attitude regarding the imperial institution”,
the
essence of the Japanese Constitution needed reform to “eliminate
the implications that the imperial line is divine and so as to
have it made clear that the Emperor is under the Constitution.”11
The Subcommittee discussed the possible outcomes for the role of
the Emperor in either a British or U.S. democratic system of
government.
Whereas during the war, the Emperor was a god-like
entity under whose name the Imperial Japanese military carried
out their conquests, SWNCC policymakers, when drafting
“Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan” (SWNCC209), looked to give the Japanese population a controlling voice
in guiding the country by placing the Emperor and the role of
the Throne in a lesser role in the eyes of the Japanese.12
A new constitution along with the purging and trials of
wartime leaders helped to reform the government and create one
that would eventually preside over the people.
SWNCC
involvement in ”The Reform of the Japanese Governmental System”
(SWNCC-228) paved the way for the freedoms sought in the Potsdam
Declaration that helped design the framework for GHQ to draft
11
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Treatment of the Institution of
the Emperor of Japan, March 7, 1946, Records of the Subcommittee for the Far
East 1945-1948, Roll 7, SFE 129-141, The National Archives, National Archives
and Records Service, General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, T1205.
12
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 48th meeting, October 23, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee
for the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
62
the new Japanese Constitution.
Faced with the need to change
the Japanese mindset with policies to influence their way of
life, SWNCC shaped Japanese society during the Occupation with
its involvement in the daily reconstruction of the country.
SWNCC-228 also addressed the possible resurgence of the
Imperial Japanese military.
SWNCC believed that unless
preventative measures were taken, “one of the most important
points of view was that the defeated enemy Japan was capable of
military revival and renewed aggression in the Pacific and
Asia.”13
As a precautionary measure in reforming Japan, SWNCC
included the possible immediate need of additional forces in
order to implement any change and to mitigate against the long
term concern that “no nationalistic or military clique or
combination should again be able to dominate (the) country and
lead it into a war of aggression.”14
Race and the Superiority Complex
After the surrender of Japan and the end of the war, the
Allies continued to view the Japanese as a lower class of people
that needed reeducation, a reintroduction to religion, and a
reversion to a democratic style of government.
13
The West
Dunn et al., Peace-making and the Settlement with Japan, 57.
Justin Williams, Sr., Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur: A
Participant’s Account (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 101.
14
63
believed that reforming the framework of Japanese society needed
to happen even if it included revamping it, since the Allies
agreed that Japanese society constituted “a self-perpetuating
instrument of imperialism.”15
Race possibly contributed to the differences in the Allied
Occupations in Europe and Asia.
U.S. State Department Japan
experts and those in SWNCC considered this during their post-war
planning.
Where post-war Germany existed as a divided country
with its entire government destroyed, post-war Japan came under
the rule of a single Supreme Commander without becoming a
divided country.
Much like the structure of the occupations of
Germany and Japan were different, so were the feelings towards
the defeated enemy.
The distinct differences in race and
culture between the Germans and Japanese created a large
disparity in the conduct of the wars and the aftermath.16
For
the Japanese, unlike the Germans, they were still a dissimilar
race that was non-white, non-Christian, and non-Western and
“where Nazism was perceived as a cancer in a fundamentally
mature „Western‟ society, Japanese militarism and
ultranationalism were construed as reflecting the essence of a
feudalistic, Oriental culture that was cancerous in and of
15
Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 78.
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 78-80.
16
64
itself.”17
The stories of the crazed population ready to strike
unsuspecting occupation troops did not materialize as predicted
when the Americans arrived on the Japanese mainland.
It was an
expectation after all, because “the Japanese had been taught
that they had never lost a war, that surrender was dishonorable,
and that the only decent alternative to victory was death.”18
These lingering differences between the former Axis partners
remained prominent among the Allies as the Occupation began.
The United States was just learning about the Japanese
people.
Americans mistakenly believed that Japanese were
fundamentally a militaristic and ultra-nationalistic people as a
whole.19
The assumption of Japanese society perpetuating
imperialism “was based more on a Western view of the situation
than on informed analyses of Japanese character and history.”20
The racial stereotypes that influenced the brutality of the war
abated as the Occupation changed the views of the Japanese and
the Americans from their wartime perceptions of each other.
When the United States arrived to conduct the Occupation of
Japan, American troops discovered that the situation in the
country was different than was anticipated.
17
They realized that
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 79-80.
The Pacific War Research Society, Japan’s Longest Day (New York: Kodansha
International, 1980), 19.
19
Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans.
Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2007), 32.
20
Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 78.
18
65
their plan needed revision due to changes in the occupation
pattern and that they “overestimated the power of resistance of
the Japanese people.”21
The United States personnel needed to
conduct the Occupation were poorly prepared.
Because the first
occupiers had little or no training in the Japanese language or
culture, Americans, while attempting to overcome their
stereotypes of the Japanese, had little choice but to govern
through what existed of the Japanese government.22
Without the
linguistic or technocratic capacity to preside over Japan, the
United States, rather than establish the direct military
government originally planned under secret orders (code-named
“Blacklist”), relied on the existing government system as stated
in the SWNCC post-surrender policy.23
The U.S. State Department recognized the deficiency in its
personnel who they thought would be capable of administering the
Occupation.
Because the State Department realized that an
Allied government was “bound to be bungling, undiplomatic, and
inefficient,” they planned to encourage Japanese involvement in
order to enable a transition from a military government to a
developed democratic institution.24
SCAP allowed nearly the
entire civilian bureaucracy to remain intact to run the daily
21
Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 31.
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 27.
23
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 212.
24
[U.S. Department of State?], Observations on Post Hostilities Policy Toward
Japan, August 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1945:VI, 586.
22
66
government business.25
Much of the lower governments as well as
the Prime Minister remained in place.
Gone were the
militaristic leaders that influenced the Emperor and the Throne.
The ideals of racial superiority that continued during the
Occupation were often detrimental to progress of the
reconstruction.26
However, as the Allies maintain their
occupation of Japan, they recognized that their racial hatred
toward the Japanese was unfounded.
Feelings of racial and
ethnical superiority subsided as the Allies saw potential not
only in the rapid progress in reconstruction but also in the
relative ease that Japanese cooperation had in making the
Occupation a comparative success.
With the stereotypes and racial biases unsubstantiated,
SWNCC policies had to readjust for Western ideals that did not
fit the Japanese mold.
A majority of the Japanese were not
militarists or even ultra-nationalists.
Japanese experts and
scholars in the West, largely ignored by the U.S. Government and
war planners during the war, had already predicted the war
exhaustion of the Japanese and knew that unlike their militarist
leaders, the Japanese people welcomed peace.27
In contrast to
the initial expectations of the Japanese ability to govern after
25
Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 219-220.
26
Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 106.
27
John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 301.
67
the surrender, the existing Japanese government provided a
significant boost to the reconstruction effort.
Although alleged American experts on Japan lacked a true
understanding of the Japanese, they became primary advisors on
how to handle rebuilding the country.
During the Occupation,
the opinions of American Japan experts were considered
sufficient enough and often their expert opinion clashed with
the experience of the Japanese who found that in order to
achieve any desired effects, they had to work with the aid and
approval of SCAP and “the work of reform-whether idealistic or
not from the American point of view-progressed.”28
For the
Japanese, their point of view had little effect on American
progress reports.
However, since the SWNCC developed U.S.
occupation goals unilaterally, there would be little regard for
Japanese opinion.
Whether it was the devastation of their country or the
disillusionment of the mystique of their “superiority”, the
Japanese peacefully collaborated with the United States as a way
to rebuild and reconstitute.29
U.S. policy makers who felt
sympathy for the Japanese showed their concern when drafting
later SWNCC policies and took into account the culture and the
28
Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru, 106.
George Atcheson, memorandum to Secretary of State, September 27, 1945, in
Foreign Relations of the United States 1945: VI, 724-725.
29
68
considerations of the Japanese.
For both sides, “demeaning and
dehumanizing wartime stereotypes had to be corrected.”30
As this realization became known, the occupiers suddenly
shifted from the feelings of haughtiness to one of humbleness as
they realized how unprepared its personnel were to handle the
daunting tasking of remaking a country.
Suddenly, the
vanquished became valuable assets to the victors.
Much like the
Emperor, initially thought deserving to stand trial for war
crimes, the occupiers needed the Japanese to aid in the
transition.
Regardless of whom it involved, General MacArthur
understood the perceptions of a “master race,” stated that the
Occupation should be for only a limited time and promoted an
early exit for the occupying army.31 MacArthur was aware that not
all Allies agreed to the U.S. policies.
However, he criticized
those countries for lacking the knowledge, vision, and patience
for unity in the principles of the Potsdam Declaration and who
were not only a hindrance to progress, but also hypocritical
“who, from selfish motives, would exploit as slaves a thoroughly
defeated nation and people, thus serving the identical
30
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 213-214.
MacArthur, message to the War Department in support of Congressional
appropriations for the occupation of Japan, February 20, 1947, in A Soldier
Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur,
ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965),
185.
31
69
philosophy of evil which Allied soldiers opposed.”32
As stated
in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies would not enslave the
Japanese upon their surrender.33
Enslavement of the Japanese
undoubtedly would perpetuate an image of superiority.
SWNCC planners linked the Imperial cult to Japan‟s extreme
racial consciousness and anti-foreign complex and addressed the
concerns in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan by
prohibiting laws that discriminated due to race or nationality
and guaranteeing all people in Japan with the same basic
political and civil rights.34
Providing equality to everyone in
Japan, regardless of race, enabled the Japanese to experience
diversity in society.
To preclude the image of a Japan surging
ahead of its neighbors, in the early drafts of the Initial PostSurrender Policy for Japan, SWNCC inserted a “standard of
living” clause that prohibited the Japanese to maintain a
standard of living outside that of their neighboring countries
that would incite any image of “superiority.”35
32
MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5,
1946, in A Soldier Speaks, 166.
33
Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “Potsdam Declaration,”
Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan: Volume I,
Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, p. 9.
34
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 436.
35
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, minutes of
the 19th meeting, April 18, 1945, Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for
the Far East 1945-1947, Roll 1, Minutes for meetings 1-73, 05Feb194522Dec1947, The National Archives, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, 1975, microfilm, T1198.
70
The Threat of Communism
As the world around the reconstruction of Japan changed,
United States policy for the Occupation followed suit.
Americans no longer saw the Japanese as former enemies but as a
newly discovered ally against emerging threats.36
The Soviet
Union, the events in China, and the follow-on events in Korea
brought about a new concern for Americans in Asia.
With the Communists gaining power in Asia and the eventual
revolution occurring in China, United States goals and visions
for Japan altered.
The spread of Communism throughout Asia
exposed the western flank of the United States and an urgency to
reinforce it grew as America‟s western defense perimeter for
Communist containment in Asia stretched from Japan to South East
Asia to India.37
Because of Japan‟s position in America‟s
defense perimeter, the United States adjusted its focus in its
Occupation policies to counter the Communist threat.
Absent the grip of Imperial rule, various organizations
within Japan took advantage of the newly found freedoms under
the Occupation.
The recently gained freedoms cultivated an
environment ripe for Communism with U.S. officials not
aggressively pursuing Communist groups but instead focusing on
36
Hugh Borton. American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York:
Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 31.
37
Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in
Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 169.
71
the militarists and the Japanese war leaders while American
policies were becoming “ambivalent and often contradictory as
SCAP was implementing policies from Washington, which seemed to
profit the Communists.”38
Communist parties became active and
labor unions became vocal against the government.
The reform of
the labor unions and the freedom for people to express their
opinions and to protest made it simple for parties opposed to
the Occupation to thrive.
With the promise of freedom and a
change from the repressive militaristic rule, SCAP had to
balance the rights of the people and their control by the
government.
As the revolutionary events in China and Korea unfolded,
the United States shifted its focus in Japan from managing the
Occupation to the goal of stopping or halting the spread of
Communism.
Suppressing Communist threats both outside and
within Japan entailed a hard-line Cold War stance.
Instead of
purging pre-war rightwing militarists, the U.S. looked for
Communists in labor and government positions, softened its
stance on the breakup of the industrial conglomerates and of
reparations from the war, and allowed wartime leaders to gain
power as Japan became a key ally in the Cold War39
38
39
Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 47.
Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous, 169.
72
As the Occupation progressed, SWNCC developed U.S. policies
in Japan to counter growing Communist influence.
The Soviet
Union‟s non-existent role in post-surrender Japan grew divisive
along the lines of ideology and their influence became the
growing threat in the region.
The Communists were already
overtaking China, and later, the Korean Peninsula would become a
target.
For the U.S., “the chief concern of the military was to
safeguard Japan‟s industrial potential against Russian
designs.”40
Rebuilding the economy was an essential part of
reconstructing Japan and became more crucial as the Occupation
and the Cold War progressed.
Thus, it was important for SWNCC
to pass policies such as those regulating the heavy industry
(SWNCC-94) that not only curbed the rise of militarism but also
focused on rebuilding the economy as stated in the Potsdam
Declaration.
The United States‟ role in Japan provided Americans with
the opportunity to rebuild the country, to foster a new
democracy and gave them the chance to gain a new ally against a
growing Communist threat.
With the advent of the Cold War and
the rising tide of war on the Korean Peninsula, Japan became a
valuable military and political foothold in Asia for the United
States.
SWNCC polices such as SWNCC-150, SWNCC-108, and SWNCC-
228 focused on freedom and democracy, free trade,
40
Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur, 18.
73
education/religion, and the determination of their form of
government and helped to counter the growing Communist threat.
The new threat for the United States shifted from an Asian
one to a Communist one.
As post-World War II gave way to the
Cold War, the “traits which the Americans and English had
associated with the Japanese, with great empirical sobriety,
were suddenly perceived to be really more relevant to the
Communists” and with their homogeneity and monolithic control,
fanaticism, and megalomania bent on world conquest, the Chinese
seemed to conveniently fill the description.41
41
Dower, War Without Mercy, 307.
74
Conclusion
The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee initially engaged
in post-war issues in both Germany and Japan.
Additionally,
SWNCC provided the means to handle various concerns that emerged
from areas of the war such as matters dealing with other allies
and countries, post-surrender financial issues, disposition of
war material/industries of the defeated states, and prisoner of
war matters.
However, SWNCC‟s focus eventually became Asia,
specifically, the reconstruction of Japan.
When the first waves of Americans arrived in Japan shortly
after the surrender, they faced few confrontations upon arrival
and experienced first-hand the Japanese and their way of life.
Because the Japanese had grown weary of the fighting, not all
continued to resist the surrender as expected.
In addition to
exhaustion from the war, “popular reaction to the surrender news
ranged across the political and emotional spectrum and the most
common responses were anguished tears and misery at defeat or
deep sighs of relief that the war was over and one had
survived.”1
1
The Japanese, fearful of wartime propaganda
Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 232.
75
depicting Americans as demons, found that they were not subject
to the torture, rape, or murder expected from U.S. soldiers.2
The SWNCC‟s “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”
(SWNCC-150) laid the groundwork for the reconstruction of the
country.
This document stated the basic tenets for the
occupation of Japan and announced the command structure to lead
the effort.
SWNCC minutes from meetings discussing SWNCC-150
show the decision process for naming an American to lead the
reconstruction efforts in Japan and changes in the “U.S. Initial
Summary for the Post-Defeat Policy for Japan” and the published
version of the “U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan”
document the final decision made by the Committee.
This single-
person, single-country leadership of the Occupation resulted
from discussions in which SWNCC and American policy makers
provided the justification for the unilateral decision of the
United States in appointing General MacArthur as the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers.
General MacArthur‟s role in the reconstruction was
significant.
As the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
MacArthur‟s image in Japan rivaled that of the Japanese Emperor.
During his tenor of leading the Occupation, he received over
500,000 letters from the Japanese expressing their support of
2
John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 301.
76
his task and often addressed him “in a formal style of Japanese
that had previously been reserved for the emperor.”3
SWNCC gave
him absolute power and despite the power he held, MacArthur did
not abuse it.4
SCAP understood the issues facing a people that
were beaten and he sought to bring them back to normalcy.
MacArthur knew the importance of rebuilding Japan and stated
that it was the duty of the United States to do so.
Were
it
otherwise-were
we
but
to
insure
the
thoroughness of Japan‟s defeat, then leave her
prostrate in the ashes of total collapse, history
would point to a task poorly done and but partially
complete.
It is equally for us now to guide her
people to rededicate themselves to higher principles,
ideals and purposes, to help them rise to the full
measure of new and loftier standards of social and
political morality-that they firmly may meet the
challenge to future utility in the service of mankind.5
MacArthur‟s support of the Imperial Throne and the need to
utilize it undoubtedly aided in the Occupation.
3
MacArthur
Rinjirō Sodei, Dear General MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the
American Occupation, ed. John Junkerman, trans. Shizue Matsuda (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 2.
4
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Instructions to General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur (Message No. 1), September 6, 1945, in U.S. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The
British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1945), 712,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945v06
(accessed March 23, 2009).
5
MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5,
1946, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1965), 165.
77
relied on the Japanese bureaucracy to carry out its policies.6
He sought to use the existing Japanese Government as stated in
his directives “to build a future for the people of Japan based
upon considerations of realism and justice” and wanted to avoid
harsh action in order to instill “principles of liberty and
right heretofore unknown to them.”7
The use of the Emperor for the Occupation was a move that
probably saved the lives of not only the Japanese but the
Occupation army as well.8
Thus, the SWNCC debates that dealt
with the fate of the Emperor and the SWNCC policy (SWNCC-55)
that directed the study of the Emperor‟s effect on the
population in preparation for his arrest gave General MacArthur
and the Occupation the link it needed to bridge the question of
how to connect a Western government with that of an Oriental one.
The Emperor was that key and the SWNCC-directed investigation
led to the realization that the Emperor would be crucial to the
Occupation.
General MacArthur spared the Emperor from the
trials that some of Hirohito‟s loyal officers faced.
Additionally, MacArthur spared the Emperor the humiliation of a
guilty finding and possibly facing a death penalty.
6
John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New
York: W.W. Norton/The Free Press, 1999), 27.
7
MacArthur, address to members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5, 1946,
in A Soldier Speaks, 165.
8
Joseph C. Grew, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Grew) to the
Secretary of State, January 3, 1944 [1945], in Foreign Relations of the
United States,1945:VI, 516.
78
The first few Americans to arrive on Japanese soil realized
that they were ill prepared and unable to carry out the
Occupation effectively.
The lack of cultural and linguistic
knowledge forced American occupiers to use the Japanese in
administering the Occupation.
Despite superficial differences
in skin color, both the victor and the vanquished found a way to
rebuild a broken country.
With the use of the existing Japanese
Government, Emperor Hirohito, and the Japanese themselves, the
U.S. successes in rebuilding Japan led General MacArthur to feel
that the progress was going so smoothly early on, that a cut in
occupying troops was possible and an early exit was in sight.9
The United States‟ occupation of Japan intended to rid
Japanese society of the militarism that led them down the path
of Imperial aggression and the outbreak of war in the Pacific.
By passing policies to abolish Japan‟s military after World War
II, destroying its industrial capacity to construct war
materials, and Japan‟s renouncement of a military, SWNCC met the
Allies‟ goal of demilitarizing the Japanese and prevented the
Japanese from again disturbing the harmony of the world.
From
declarations set forth in the Potsdam Declaration and expanded
upon in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, the
intent of the United States with regard to Japan‟s military was
9
Douglas MacArthur, statement, September 17, 1945, in Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1945:VI, 715-716.
79
clear.
However, the rise in Communism changed the security
environment in Asia.
This change provided the impetus for the
U.S. to alter SWNCC developed policy for Japan‟s military and
would lead to the expansion of Japanese police forces and the
creation of the Japanese Self Defense Force.10
As stated in the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for
Japan, the second ultimate objective of the United States was
“to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and
responsible government which will respect the rights of other
states”.11
This goal of the U.S. was for a democratic government,
which the Japanese succeeded in developing and building.
The
new constitution and the resulting government that replaced the
Imperial system provided the Japanese with a government that
allowed the involvement of its people and was in line with a
western style of governing.12
The democratic government created
as a result of the restructuring of the Japanese constitution
continues to operate today.
The accomplishments as a result of SWNCC polices during the
Occupation were unique.
Forging a new alliance with Japan was
remarkable since “there was no adequate precedent in the history
10
William J. Sebald and Russell Brines. With MacArthur in Japan: a Personal
History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 197-198.
11
Japan, Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, “United States Initial
Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation
and Control of Japan: Volume I, Basic Documents, January 24, 1949, 91.
12
Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy,
trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), 274.
80
of the United States or, indeed, in the recent history of man
for the Occupation” that the disarmament and the demobilization
of the Imperial Japanese military occurred before the end of
1945 and all without a single noteworthy incident.13
This
success can be attributed to the realization of both sides the
error of their misleading perceptions. Americans realized the
war-weariness and diversification of the Japanese and recognized
they had to work together to make the Occupation a success.
The
U.S. occupiers needed the Japanese due to their lack of cultural
knowledge.
Americans, especially, needed the existing Japanese
government to aid them in the Occupation.
SWNCC policies stated
the need for the existing Japanese government in order to carry
out their occupation plans.
Without it, controlling the country
might have proved to be more challenging due to the differences
and stereotypes that persisted during the war and hindered the
use of the full potential of the Japanese.
As the American
stereotype of the Japanese slowly fell, so did the Japanese
thoughts of the Americans.
Former Prime Minister Yoshida stated
of his observations of the American occupiers, “There was no
room for doubt concerning the goodwill which they bore towards
the Japanese people.”14
13
Sebald and Brines, With MacArthur in Japan, 79.
Shigeru Yoshida, Yoshida Shigeru: Last Meiji Man, ed. Nara Hiroshi, trans.
Ken‟ichi Yoshida and Nara Hiroshi (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2007), 104.
14
81
The United States intended to bring democracy to Japan by
inoculating them against militarism and the rise of Communism.15
To do this, SWNCC developed policies that would provide “not
only the active promotion of American objectives throughout the
media, but also „minimum control and censorship‟ of the press,
radio, film, and private communications.”16
By providing images
of freedom and democracy, promoting a free trade economy,
instilling western values in education and religion, and
enabling the Japanese to choose their form of government, the
United States hoped to sway the country away from the grasps of
Communism.
Perhaps the most visible change in the Japanese after the
Occupation was their rapid rise in becoming an economic
powerhouse.
As a nation roughly the size of California, Japan
is one of the world‟s largest economies and has become a leader
in electronics, automobiles and other manufacturing with worldclass industrial leaders and a “highly educated workforce, the
world‟s healthiest population, remarkable degrees of social
integration, and cooperative patterns within its cooperate
world.”17
With Japan‟s economy second only to the United States,
the fifth general objective of the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender
Policy for Japan, “the eventual participation of Japan in a
15
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 75.
Dower, Embracing Defeat, 75.
17
Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 365.
16
82
world economic system on a reasonable basis” has undoubtedly
been achieved.18
SWNCC policies also allowed SCAP to mold Japan into a new
country and allowed it to emerge from the ashes of destruction
to become a significant ally during the Korean War and
throughout the Cold War.
Numerous SWNCC policies shaped
everyday life for the Japanese including the regulation of money,
the distribution of food, the construct of the government as
well as retaining the symbol of the Emperor.
The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the politicomilitary structure and responsibilities of the United States.
Among other things, the Act led to the creation of the
Department of Defense, eliminated the War Department, and
created the National Security Council, which would take on some
of the tasks of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.19
Although SWNCC existed for brief period, in a short span of time,
it created the policies that shaped the conduct of the U.S.
Occupation of Japan.
SWNCC was subsequently renamed the State-Army-Navy-Air
Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC).
Chaired by a member of
the State Department, it received the assignment of resolving
18
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, PoliticoMilitary Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy
Relating to Japan, June 11, 1945, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1945:VI, 550-551.
19
Takemae, Inside GHQ, 457-458.
83
and coordinating actions and decisions of the State and Defense
Secretaries as well as the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force.20
The policies developed to govern the Occupation originated
in the United States.
SWNCC‟s actions intended “to infuse into
the hearts and minds of the Japanese people principles of
liberty and right heretofore unknown to them”21 and to create a
Japan with the ideals of a Western country.
If there was any
Japanese influence to shape the policies during their drafting,
it came from those personnel in the U.S. State Department who
felt Japan could become a valuable ally.
The experiences in
Japan and the images of the Japanese, whether positive or not,
influenced those in SWNCC who worked, visited, or lived in Japan.
Outside of these few people, the drafting, discussions, debates,
and approval of SWNCC policies prior to their release to GHQ
occurred within the Committee.
Men with different backgrounds,
agendas and skill sets made up the SWNCC.
These men were
diplomats, military officers, economists, and even educators
with a desire to spread democracy and freedom to the Japanese.
The results of the SWNCC policies speak for themselves.
SWNCC provided a guideline for GHQ to follow.
20
Its guiding
U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, minutes of the 60th meeting,
October 3, 1947, U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Agenda and
Minutes of Meetings, microfilm, U.S. National Archives, T1194.
21
MacArthur, address to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, April 5,
1946, in A Soldier Speaks, 165.
84
principles allowed the United States to turn a former enemy into
a steadfast ally.
The roles of SWNCC and the Subcommittee on
the Far East were invaluable before and after the surrender and
during the Occupation.
They acted as the link between
Washington and SCAP and between the United States and its Allies,
and they ultimately made the recommendation to regard Japan as
“less as a former enemy and more as a possible future ally.”22
The post-surrender policy stated that the Japanese government
“will support the objectives of the United States.”23
It is no
accident, then, that the U.S. and Japan maintain close ties
militarily, politically, and economically.
In today‟s economically strained environment, the need for
a country to synchronize as well as coordinate efforts among a
number of national entities is important.
As with any national
goal, coordinating efforts enabled the United States to
concentrate its energy, to speak in unison, and to optimize
resources.
The work of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee in managing the efforts of the various U.S.
Departments in the aftermath of World War II helped to ensure
success in the rebuilding of Japan.
As World War II ended and
the dawn of the Occupation approached, the SWNCC provided
valuable guidance needed to undertake the task of rebuilding a
22
Hugh Borton. American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York:
Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute Columbia University, 1967), 31.
23
Japan, “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” Documents
Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan, 91.
85
country and a population who had just suffered through
devastation brought by war and sorrow brought by defeat.
The
role played by the Committee in rebuilding Japan was crucial and
successful.
Because of SWNCC, for the first time in U.S.
history, a multi-departmental policymaking body existed to take
rapid action on urgent policy issues created by military
situations.24
They had the support of the State, War, and Navy
Departments and even the White House, and “when President Truman
came into office, he relied heavily on SWNCC‟s
recommendations.”25
24
Hugh Borton, Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton
(New York: Lexington Books, 2002), 121.
25
Borton, American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan, 29.
86
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Columbia University, 1967.
------. Spanning Japan’s Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh
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