Download WWI WAR GUILT EVIDENCE PACKET

WWI WAR GUILT EVIDENCE PACKET
CONTENTS:
Austria-Hungary Guilty Documents
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The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia
The July Crisis: The Russian Viewpoint
The July Crisis: The Serbian Viewpoint
Germany Guilty Documents
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"Hammer and Anvil Speech" (excerpts)
The “War Council” (December 1912)
The 'Blank Check'
Prince Lichnowsky's Account
Russia Guilty Documents
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The German Declaration of War on Russia
The July Crisis: The Austrian Viewpoint
The July Crisis: The German Viewpoint
Alliances / War Plans Documents
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Expanded Version of the Triple Alliance, 5 December, 1912
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention, 18 August, 1892
Map of Schlieffen Plan (Germany) & Plan XVII (France)
Nationalism / Imperialism Documents
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Excerpt from Program of The Narodna Odbrana (1911)
Map of the Balkans (1914)
Map of Ethnic Groups in Austria-Hungary (1910)
Map of Colonial Holdings in Africa (1914)
Militarism / Industrialization Documents
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Military Statistics (1914)
Map of Military Spending Between 1908-1913
Tables of Industrial Statistics
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY GUILTY
The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia
Vienna, July 22, 1914
Your Excellency will present the following note to the Royal Government on the afternoon of Thursday, July 23:
On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister at the Court of Vienna made, in the name of his
Government, the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: Serbia recognizes that her rights were not affected by the state of affairs created in Bosnia, and states that she
will accordingly accommodate herself to the decisions to be reached by the Powers in connection with Article 25
of the Treaty of Berlin. Serbia, in accepting the advice of the Great Powers, binds herself to desist from the
attitude of protest and opposition which she has assumed with regard to the annexation since October last, and
she furthermore binds herself to alter the tendency of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary, and to live on
the footing of friendly and neighborly relations with the latter in the future. Now the history of the past few years, and particularly the painful events of the 28th of June, have proved the
existence of a subversive movement in Serbia, whose object it is to separate certain portions of its territory from
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This movement, which came into being under the very eyes of the Serbian
Government, subsequently found expression outside of the territory of the Kingdom in acts of terrorism, in a
number of attempts at assassination, and in murders. It is clear from the statements and confessions of the criminal authors of the assassination of the twenty-eighth of
June, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived at Belgrade, that the murderers received the weapons and the
bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana,
and, finally, that the dispatch of the criminals and of their weapons to Bosnia was arranged and effected under the
conduct of Serbian frontier authorities. The results brought out by the inquiry no longer permit the Imperial and Royal Government to maintain the
attitude of patient tolerance which it has observed for years toward those agitations which center at Belgrade and
are spread thence into the territories of the Monarchy. Instead, these results impose upon the Imperial and Royal
Government the obligation to put an end to those intrigues, which constitute a standing menace to the peace of
the Monarchy. The Royal Serbian Government will furthermore pledge itself: 1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general
tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;
2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and
in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves
with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to
make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;
3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching
corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against AustriaHungary;
4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty
of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government
reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its
possession;
5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of
the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;
6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be
found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take
part in the proceedings held for this purpose;
7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official,
who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;
8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and
explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier
Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;
9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high
Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to
express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of
June;
10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the
foregoing points.
The Imperial and Royal Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government by Saturday, the twenty-fifth
instant, at 6 p.m., at the latest. The July Crisis: The Russian Viewpoint
Statement by M. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 2, 1914
. . . The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg had communicated
the text of the note [i.e., the ultimatum to Serbia] seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken
note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of
execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incompatible with the
dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in these demands, and
equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her
conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most
friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The
Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note . . .
Despite the fact that Serbia had reprobated the crime, and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to
an extent beyond the expectations, not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers—despite these facts, the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade considered the Serbian reply insufficient.
Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it
involved no humiliation of Serbia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to
this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Government, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory
intervention by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Serbia, proceeded to mobilize and declared war officially
against Serbia, and the following day Belgrade [the Serb capital] was bombarded. The manifesto which
accompanied the declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and carried out the crime of
Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State,
aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia throughout all classes of European society.
In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she
could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order
mobilization [against Austria] … This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the
Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia,
five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts
towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been
ordered. . . . .
When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our
preparations, the [Russian] Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's recognition
that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed
not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Serbia. Germany
considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary.
The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.
The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as
to be ready for every emergency.
But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find
some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accent any proposed settlement of the
problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.
In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Government on the 31st July demanded of the Russian
Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 1st August and threatened,
should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilization.
On the following day, the 1st August, the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a
declaration of war to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The July Crisis: The Serbian Viewpoint
Statement of Prime Minister Pashitch, July 19, 1914 (to be transmitted to foreign governments via Serbia's
accredited ambassadors):
Immediately after the Sarajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable
crime, which, in the opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian press
further contended that that idea w as spread and propagated by various [nationalist] associations, such as the
"Narodna Odbrana," . . . which were tolerated by the Serbian Government.
On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of
condolence, and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been
committed. Nevertheless, the press of the [Austro-Hungarian] Monarchy continued hold Serbia responsible for the
Sarajevo outrage. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press began to spread various false reports, designed to
mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade press to reply in self-defense, and sometimes to active
hostility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. . . .the Serbian
Government hastened to warn the press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to
simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading reports. The action of the Serbian Government was
ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers. . . (being) unable to avert these polemics between
the Serbian and the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself,
guarantee the complete independence of the press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of
newspapers. . . .
The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who
might be proved to have played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they
had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives.
. . . During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the
Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to
trial. . . . It is evident . . that Austria is contemplating some action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated
whether the measures which are to be taken-more especially military measures-will depend upon the reply and
the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the
Serbian Government being unable to give a categorically satisfactory reply. . . .
The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans
should be firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion
in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austrian Government to (take a line of action) which may humiliate the dignity
of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which could not be accepted.
I have the honor therefore to request you to impress upon the Government to which you are accredited our desire
to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every attempt against the peace and public
safety of the neighboring Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event
of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in
Serbia-should such, of course, exist.
But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be
unacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence.
Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the
friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or
necessity arise.
Source: The Serbian Blue Book (from Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the European
War, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 7860, 1915)
GERMANY GUILTY
Bernhard von Bülow , "Hammer and Anvil Speech" before the Reichstag,
December 11, 1899 (excerpts)
In our nineteenth century, England has increased its colonial empire -- the largest the world has seen since the
days of the Romans -- further and further; the French have put down roots in North Africa and East Africa and
created for themselves a new empire in the Far East; Russia has begun its mighty course of victory in Asia,
leading it to the high plateau of the Pamir and to the coasts of the Pacific Ocean. Four years ago the SinoJapanese war, scarcely one and a half years ago the Spanish-American War have put things further in motion;
they've led to great, momentous, far-reaching decisions, shaken old empires, and added new and serious
ferment. [...]
The English prime minister said a long time ago that the strong states were getting stronger and stronger and the
weak ones weaker and weaker. [...] We don't want to step on the toes of any foreign power, but at the same time
we don't want our own feet tramped by any foreign power (Bravo!) and we don't intend to be shoved aside by any
foreign power, not in political nor in economic terms. (Loud applause)
It is time, high time, that we [...] make it clear in our own minds what stance we have to take and how we need to
prepare ourselves in the face of the processes taking place around us which carry the seeds within them for the
restructuring of power relationships for the unforeseeable future. To stand inactively to one side, as we have done
so often in the past, either from native modesty (Laughter) or because we were completely absorbed in our own
internal arguments or for doctrinaire reasons -- to stand dreamily to one side while other people split up the pie,
we cannot and we will not do that. (Applause)
We cannot for the simple reason that we now have interests in all parts of the world. [...] The rapid growth of our
population, the unprecedented blossoming of our industries, the hard work of our merchants, in short the mighty
vitality of the German people have woven us into the world economy and pulled us into international politics. If the
English speak of a 'Greater Britain;' if the French speak of a 'Nouvelle France;' if the Russians open up Asia; then
we, too, have the right to a greater Germany (Bravo! from the right, laughter from the left), not in the sense of
conquest, but indeed in the sense of peaceful extension of our trade and its infrastructures. [...] We cannot and
will not permit that the order of the day passes over the German people [...]
There is a lot of envy present in the world against us (calls from the left), political envy and economic envy. There
are individuals and there are interest groups, and there are movements, and there are perhaps even peoples that
believe that the German was easier to have around and that the German was more pleasant for his neighbors in
those earlier days, when, in spite of our education and in spite of our culture, foreigners looked down on us in
political and economic matters like cavaliers with their noses in the air looking down on the humble tutor. (Very
true! - Laughter)
These times of political faintness and economic and political humility should never return. (Lively Bravo)
We don't ever again want to become, as Friedrich List put it, the 'slaves of humanity.' But we'll only be able to
keep ourselves at the fore if we realize that there is no welfare for us without power, without a strong army and a
strong fleet. (Very true! from the right; objections from the left )
The means, gentlemen, for a people of almost 60 million -- dwelling in the middle of Europe and, at the same
time, stretching its economic antennae out to all sides -- to battle its way through in the struggle for existence
without strong armaments on land and at sea, have not yet been found. (Very true! from the right)
In the coming century the German people will be a hammer or an anvil.
The "War Council" (December 1912)
Sunday: summoned to the palace to see His Majesty at 11 o’clock along with Tirpitz, Heeringen (Vice Admiral),
and General von Moltke. H.M. with a telegraphic report on the political situation sent by the ambassador in
London, Prince Lichnowski. As Grey’s spokesman, Haldane informed Lichnowski that if we attack France,
England will come to France’s aid, for England cannot tolerate a disturbance in the European balance of power.
H.M. welcomed this message as providing the desired clarification for all those who have been lulled into a false
sense of security by the recently friendly English press.
H.M. painted the following picture:
Austria must deal firmly with the Slavs living outside its borders (the Serbs) if it does not want to lose control over
the Slavs under the Austrian monarchy. If Russia were to support the Serbs, which she is apparently already
doing (Sassonov's remark that Russia will go straight into Galicia if the Austrians march into Serbia), war would be
inevitable for us. But there is hope that Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania—and perhaps even Turkey—will take our
side. Bulgaria has already offered Turkey an alliance. We really went to great lengths to persuade the Turks.
Recently, H.M. also tried to convince the crown prince of Romania, who stopped here on his way to Brussels, to
come to an agreement with Bulgaria. If these powers ally themselves with Austria, it will free us up to throw our
full weight behind a war against France. According to His Majesty, the fleet will naturally have to prepare for war
against England. After Haldane’s statement, the possibility of a war against Russia alone—as discussed by the
chief of the Admiralty in his last talk—will not be considered. So, immediate submarine warfare against English
troop transports on the Schelde River or near Dunkirk, mine warfare up to the Thames. To Tirpitz: rapid
construction of additional submarines, etc. A conference is recommended for all interested naval offices. Gen. v.
Moltke: “I consider a war inevitable—the sooner, the better. But we should do a better job of gaining popular
support for a war against Russia, in line with the Kaiser’s remarks.” H.M. confirmed this and asked the secretary
of state to use the press to work toward this end. T. called attention to the fact that the navy would gladly see a
major war delayed by one and a half years. Moltke said that even then the navy would not be ready, and the
army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to
arm themselves more rapidly.
That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results.
The chief of the general staff says: the sooner war comes, the better; however, he hasn’t concluded from this that
we should give Russia or France, or even both, an ultimatum that would trigger a war for which they would carry
the blame.
I wrote to the chancellor in the afternoon about influencing the press.
Source: Entry from the diary of Georg Alexander von Müller (December 8, 1912).
Original German text reprinted in John C. G. Röhl, Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. und die Deutsche Politik
[Kaiser, Court and State: Wilhelm II and German Politics]. Munich, 1987, pp. 175-76.
The 'Blank Check'
Telegram from the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, to the German Ambassador at Vienna.
Berlin, July 6, 1914 C
onfidential. For Your Excellency's personal information and guidance.
The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador yesterday delivered to the Emperor a confidential personal letter from the
Emperor Francis Joseph, which depicts the present situation from the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and
describes the measures which Vienna has in view. A copy is now being forwarded to Your Excellency.
I replied to Count Szagyeny today on behalf of His Majesty that His Majesty sends his thanks to the Emperor
Francis Joseph for his letter and would soon answer it personally. In the meantime His Majesty desires to say that
he is not blind to the danger which threatens Austria-Hungary and thus the Triple Alliance as a result of the
Russian and Serbian Pan-Slavic agitation. Even though His Majesty is known to feel no unqualified confidence in
Bulgaria and her ruler, and naturally inclines more to ward our old ally Rumania and her Hohenzollern prince, yet
he quite understands that the Emperor Francis Joseph, in view of the attitude of Rumania and of the danger of a
new Balkan alliance aimed directly at the Danube Monarchy, is anxious to bring about an understanding between
Bulgaria and the Triple alliance [...]. His Majesty will, further more, make an effort at Bucharest, according to the
wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to influence King Carol to the fulfilment of the duties of his alliance, to the
renunciation of Serbia, and to the suppression of the Rumanian agitations directed against Austria-Hungary. Finally, as far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between
Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Francis Joseph may,
however, rest assured that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of
his alliance and of his ancient friendship. Prince Lichnowsky's Account
(German Ambassador to England)
Sir Edward Grey [the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs] begged us to come forward with a proposal of our own.
We insisted on war.... The impression grew continually stronger that we desired war under any circumstances. In
no other way was it possible to interpret our attitude... Then, on July 29 [1914], Sir Edward decided to give his famous warning. I replied that I had invariably reported
that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister
said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."
Soon after this events were precipitated. Until this time, following the directions he received from Berlin, Count
Berchtold had played the part of the strong man. When at last he decided to change his course, and after Russia
had negotiated and waited a whole week in vain, we answered the Russian mobilization with the ultimatum and
the declaration of war...
It is shown by all official publications and is not disproved by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its
contents and to its omissions, constitutes a grave indictment against ourselves, that: 1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of
a World War must have been known to us. Whether we were acquainted with the wording of the ultimatum is
completely immaterial. 2. During the period between the 23rd and the 30th of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof emphatically declared that he
could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under
Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, and although an agreement about
the two points at issue could easily have been reached and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content
himself with the Serbian reply. 3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold showed a disposition to change his course, we sent an ultimatum to
St. Petersburg merely because of the Russian mobilization and though Austria had not been attacked; and on the
31st of July we declared war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a
single man to march as long as negotiations were still going on. Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a
peaceful settlement. In view of these incontestable facts, it is no wonder that the whole civilized world outside of Germany places the
sole responsibility for the World War upon our shoulders.
RUSSIA GUILTY
The German Declaration of War on Russia
Presented by the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg (August 1, 1914)
The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a
peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the
German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of
Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her
forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military
proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the
German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very
existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the
Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military
acts. Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it necessary to answer]* this demand, and
having shown by this refusal [this attitude]* that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on
the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:
His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and
considers himself at war with Russia.
*The words in brackets occur in the original.
The July Crisis: The Austrian Viewpoint
The Serbian Government who, by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighborly
relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented
way ; they permitted associations formed on Serbian territory under the leadership of high officers, civil servants,
teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of
Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning
the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle
against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of
murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted
person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Serbia. . . .
there was no room for any doubt that our honor, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded
that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Serbia and obtain guarantees for the security of AustriaHungary. . . .
. . . . From the beginning, the [Austro-Hungarian] Government met the apprehensions of the [European] Powers
with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own
interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon
herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Serbia should be carried through as a question directly
concerning Austria- Hungary and this State [viz., Serbia]. The request made by Russia for an extension of the
time given to Serbia for answering our demands would have given the [Serbian] Government an opportunity for
new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the interference of single
Powers in the interests of Serbia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although
before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Serbia had ordered general mobilization, and thereby publicly
proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war.
There can be no doubt that the small Serbian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was
scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighboring Monarchy [Austria-Hungary] of the
territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs [viz., Bosnia- Herzegovina], if she had not been sure of the
secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist
tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of [Serbia] in
her struggle for the realization of the Great-Serbian projects.
In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary
force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Muscovite rule, suppressing their
culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal
dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles [Black Sea outlet], which would secure to the
Russian Empire predominance in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening
independent of the will of other countries.
As the realization of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was
therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the endeavor of Russian policy to
weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union [i.e., the Dual Alliance] which barred the
way to the universal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to
hem in the [Austro- Hungarian] Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union [of Slavic states], and to undermine
its authority by the pan-Slavist and Serbian intrigues in its frontier territories . . . In this criminal game of Russian
diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Serbia was a catspaw
which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.
The [Austro-Hungarian] Government . . . again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the [Russian
Government] that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Serbian territory, and would
not touch the sovereignty of Serbia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian
Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied
with the solemn declarations of [Austria-Hungary]. As early as the 24th July, in the communiqué of that date, she
assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilized a single man
against Russia, she ordered the mobilization of the military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan; this was
a threat to the Monarchy. On the 31st July she ordered general mobilization, disregarding the repeated warnings
of the [Austro-Hungarian] Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Government, which had been made on
the 26th, that preparatory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures
which must consist in the mobilization of the army, and that mobilization meant war.
On the 24th July the [Austro-Hungarian] Ambassador in conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our
dynasty from Serbian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Serbia. The attainment of
this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorized by the
possibility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Serbia under her protection; she must make
an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Serbian Kingdom continued impunity in
her hostility to Austria-Hungary.
. . . It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilization in the
Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the [Russian Government] answered by
mobilizing the whole of the Russian forces. . . .
Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted
with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia. They took
the road pointed out by honor and duty.
Source: The Austro-Hungarian Red Book (From Collected Documents relating to the outbreak of the European
War, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd.7860, 1915)
The July Crisis: The German Viewpoint
On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, were
assassinated by a member of a band of Serbian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the AustroHungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy . . was prepared and abetted in Belgrade [the Serb
capital] with the cooperation of Serbian officials, and executed with arms from the Serbian State arsenal. This
crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world not only in regard to the aims of the Serbian policies
directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the
criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Serbia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of
these aims.
We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia
upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not,
however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude
not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as
our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection
of all the Slavs under one Russian scepter would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the
Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would
be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to
have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, permitted
Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her [military]
preparations.. . . .
From this moment [i.e., with rejection of the Austrian ultimatum by Serbia on July 25], Austria was in fact in a state
of war with Serbia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.
From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria
alone, which it would have to settle with Serbia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localizing of the war,
and toward convincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defense,
forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilized country possessed the right
to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the Serbians against
their just punishment. . . .
The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th, according to which Russia could not
possibly remain indifferent in the Serbo-Austrian conflict. . . . The German Government declared . . that AustriaHungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by
Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Serbia, the decision concerning the peace of the
world rested exclusively with [Russia]. [On July 26th] the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin [the
German capital]. . .
After the Russian general mobilization [i.e., full mobilization against Germany and Austria] became known [on July
31st] . . the German ambassador at St. Petersburg [the Russian capital] was instructed to explain to the Russian
Government that Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the
Russian army and navy which must be followed by [German] mobilization if Russia did not cease its military
measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us. . . . As the time limit given to Russia had expired . . .
H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st . . .
Source: The German White Book (From Collected Documents relating to the outbreak of the European War,
British Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 7860, 1915)
ALLIANCES / WAR PLANS GUILTY
Excerpts from the Expanded
Version of the Triple Alliance, 5 December, 1912 (Original Signed in 1882)
ARTICLE 1. The High Contracting Parties mutually promise peace and friendship, and will enter into no alliance
or engagement directed against any one of their States. They engage to proceed to an exchange of ideas on political and economic questions of a general nature which
may arise, and they further promise one another mutual support within the limits of their own interests. ARTICLE 2. In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, should be attacked by France for any reason
whatsoever, the two other Contracting Parties shall be bound to lend help and assistance with all their forces to
the Party attacked. This same obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of any aggression without direct provocation by France
against Germany. ARTICLE 4. In case a Great Power non-signatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states
of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make
war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them
reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its
Ally. ARTICLE 5. If the peace of any of the High Contracting Parties should chance to be threatened under the
circumstances foreseen by the preceding Articles, the High Contracting Parties shall take counsel together in
ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to eventual cooperation. They engage henceforward, in all cases of common participation in a war, to conclude neither armistice, nor
peace, nor treaty, except by common agreement among themselves. ARTICLE 12. The High contracting Parties mutually pledge secrecy on the content of the present Treaty.
ARTICLE 13. The signatory Powers reserve the right to introduce later, in form of protocol and of a common
accord, any modifications whose usefulness might be demonstrated by the circumstances.
ARTICLE 14. The present Treaty will remain in force for the space of six years following the expiration of the
current Treaty; but if it had not been denounced one year in advance by one or the other of the contracting High
Parties, it will remain in force for the length of six further years.
The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention (18 August, 1892 )
France and Russia, being animated by a common desire to preserve peace, and having no other object than to
meet the necessities of a defensive war, provoked by an attack of the forces of the Triple Alliance against either of
them, have agreed upon the following provisions: 1. If France is attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available
forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall employ all her available
forces to attack Germany. 2. In case the forces of the Triple Alliance, or of any one of the Powers belonging to it, should be mobilized,
France and Russia, at the first news of this event and without previous agreement being necessary, shall mobilize
immediately and simultaneously the whole of their forces, and shall transport them as far as possible to their
frontiers. 3. The available forces to be employed against Germany shall be, on the part of France, 1,300,000 men, on the
part of Russia, 700,000 or 800,000 men. These forces shall engage to the full with such speed that Germany will have to fight simultaneously on the East
and on the West. 4. The General Staffs of the Armies of the two countries shall cooperate with each other at all times in the
preparation and facilitation of the execution of the measures mentioned above. They shall communicate with each other, while there is still peace, all information relative to the armies of the
Triple Alliance which is already in their possession or shall come into their possession. Ways and means of corresponding in time of war shall be studied and worked out in advance. 5. France and Russia shall not conclude peace separately. 6. The present Convention shall have the same duration as the Triple Alliance. 7. All the clauses enumerated above shall be kept absolutely secret. Map of Schlieffen Plan (Germany) & Plan XVII (France)
NATIONALISM / IMPERIALISM GUILTY
Excerpt from Program of The Narodna Odbrana (1911)
(The Black Hand)
A secret, patriotic society, the Narodna Odbrana or 'Defense of the People' was founded in Serbia in
approximately 1908. Its intent was to strengthen a spirit of nationalism.
The following is an excerpt from a description of the society's program which appeared in the Narodna Odbrana,
published by the Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society.
The annexation [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] was only one of the blows which the enemies of Serbia have aimed
at this land. Many blows preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new
attack may not find Serbia equally unprepared.
The object assigned to the work to be done by the people of every class is the preparation for war in all forms of
national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day. This is to be effected through strengthening
of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvements,
etc. A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Serbia, in which every Serbian, from child to
greybeard, is a rifleman.
The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new
Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old; stronger in civilization and more advanced
economically, our northern enemies come against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us
and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Serbian
people are faced by the question 'to be or not to be?'
The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight against the enemies with whom we stand face to face, our
people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards
the so-called peaceful present-day conditions as war, and demands heroes, too, for this struggle of today which
we are carrying on in Serbia and beyond the frontier.
In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Serbia. It is hoped
that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside Serbia to take a more energetic share in the work
of private initiative, so that the new present-day movement for the creation of a powerful Serbian Narodna
Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Serbian territories.
The Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy. Just as once the Turks
attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us today from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the
necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position.
For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the
conquered Serbian territories and their union with Serbia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants
alike.
Map of the Balkans (1914)
Map of Ethnic Groups in Austria-Hungary (1910)
Map of Colonial Holdings in Africa (1914)
MILITARISM / INDUSTRIALIZATION GUILTY
Military Statistics (1914)
GERMANY (Population: 67 million)
Military Forces:
Army
• Peacetime strength 1914: 840,000 Stehendes Heer (Standing Army)
• Reserves 1914: 3 million, including
Navy
• Peacetime strength 1914: 72,000
• Battleships (Dreadnoughts): 13
• Battleships (Pre-Dreadnoughts): 30
• Battlecruisers: 6
• Cruisers (Armoured cruisers + Protected cruisers): 14
• Light cruisers: 35
• Destroyers: 152
• Submarines: 30
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (Population: 48.5 million)
Military Forces:
Army
• Peacetime strength 1914: 415,000
• Reserves 1914: 1.4 million
Navy
•Peacetime strength 1914: 20,000
• Battleships (Dreadnoughts): 3
• Battleships (pre-Dreadnoughts): 12
• Cruisers ( Armoured cruiser): 3
• Light cruisers: 4
• Destroyers: 18
• Submarines: 14
REPUBLIC OF FRANCE (Population: 39.6 million)
Military Forces:
Army
• Peacetime strength 1914: 823,000
• Reserves 1914: 2.9 million
Navy
• Peacetime strength 1914: 65,000
• Battleships (Dreadnoughts): 4
• Battleships (pre-Dreadnoughts): 21
• Cruisers (Armoured cruisers + Protected cruisers): 19
• Light cruisers: 6
• Destroyers: 81
• Submarines: 67
BRITISH EMPIRE (Population: 46 million)
Military Forces:
Army
• Peacetime strength 1914: 247,500
• Reserves 1914: 414,000
Navy
• Peacetime strength 1914: 136,500
• Reserves: 28,000 Fleet Reserve and 30,000 Royal Naval Reserve (RNR)
• Battleships (Dreadnoughts): 24
• Battleships (pre-Dreadnoughts): 38
• Battlecruisers: 10
• Cruisers (Armoured cruisers + Protected cruisers): 47
• Light cruisers: 61
• Destroyers: 225
• Submarines: 75
RUSSIAN EMPIRE (Population: 167 million)
Military Forces:
Army
• Peacetime strength 1914: 1.4 million
• Reserves 1914: 5.1 million
Navy
• Peacetime strength 1914: 60,000
• Battleships (Dreadnoughts): 2
• Battleships (pre-Dreadnoughts): 11
• Cruisers (Armoured cruisers + Protected cruisers): 8
• Light cruisers: 5
• Destroyers: 106
• Submarines: 36
Map of Military Spending Between 1908-1913
Tables of Industrial Statistics
Table 1
Percentage Distribution of the World's Manufacturing Production, 1870 and 1913
(percentage of world total)
USA
Germany
U.K.
France
Russia
Italy
Canada
Belgium
Sweden
Japan
India
1870
1913
23.3
13.2
31.8
10.3
3.7
2.4
1.0
2.9
0.4
-
35.8
15.7
14.0
6.4
5.5
2.7
2.3
2.1
1.0
1.2
1.1
11.0
Table 2
Output of Coal and Lignite - Selected Countries, Annual Averages
(in million metric tonnes)
1820-4
1840-4
1860-4
1880-4
1900-4
UK
France
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Russia
17.7
34.2
86.3
158.9
230.4
1.1
3.5
10.0
20.2
33.0
1.2
4.4
20.8
65.7
157.3
0.1
0.52
4.1
17.0
38.8
4.1
10.2
17.5
23.3
0.04
3.7
17.3
Table 3
Output of Pig Iron - Selected Countries, Annual Averages
(in thousand metric tons)
1781-90
1825-29
1855-59
1875-79
1900-14
UK
France
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Russia
69
669
3,583
6,484
8,778
141
212
900
1,462
2,665
90
422
1,770
7,925
85
306
418
1,425
312
484
1,070
164
254
424
2,773
Table 4
Growth of the Cotton Industry in Selected Countries
(Cotton Spindles - Selected Countries, Annual Total Figures [in 1000's])
1834
1877
1913
UK
France
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Russia
10,000
39,500
55,700
2,500
5,000
7,400
626(`36)
4,700
11,186
800
1,558
4,909
200
800
1,492
700 (1840)
2,500
9,212
Table 5
Spread of Railways in Ten Selected Countries
(Length of line open [in kilometers [1km = 5/8 mile])
Austria-Hungary
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Russia
Spain
Sweden
1840
1860
1880
1900
144
334
496
469
2,390
20
17
27
-
4,543
1,730
9,167
11,089
14,603
2,404
335
1,626
1,917
527
18,507
4,112
23,089
33,838
25,060
9,290
1,846
22,865
7,490
5,876
36,330
4,591
38,109
51,678
30,079
16,429
2,776
53,234
13,214
11,303