Download Bank-related loan supply factors during the crisis: an analysis based

Bank-related loan supply factors
during the crisis: an analysis based
on the German bank lending survey
Barno Blaes
Discussion Paper
Series 1: Economic Studies
No 31/2011
Discussion Papers represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.
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Reproduction permitted only if source is stated.
ISBN 978-3–86558–7– (Printversion)
ISBN 978-3–86558–7– (Internetversion)
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24
4. Over the past three months, how has the demand for loans or
credit lines to enterprises changed at your bank, apart from normal
seasonal fluctuations?
2.C. Perception of risk
- Expectations regarding general economic activity
- Industry or firm-specific outlook
- Risk on the collateral demanded
- Competition from other banks
- Competition from non-banks
- Competition from market financing
2.B. Pressure from competition
- Costs related to your bank’s capital position
- Your bank’s ability to access market financing
- Your bank’s liquidity position
2.A. Costs of funds and balance sheet constraints
1=“Decreased
considerably”
1=“Contributed
considerably to
tightening”
2. Over the past three months, how have the following factors
affected your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of
loans or credit lines to enterprises (as described in question 1)?
2=“Decreased
somewhat”
2=“Contributed
somewhat to
tightening”
2=“Tightened
somewhat”
3=“Remained
basically unchanged”
3=“Contributed to
basically unchanged standards”
3=“Remained
basically unchanged”
Table 1: BLS questionnaire, questions 1, 2 and 4.
1=“Tightened
considerably”
G39V
1. Over the past three months, how have your bank’s credit standards as applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?
4FF
4=“Increased
somewhat”
4=“Contributed
somewhat to
easing”
4=“Eased
somewhat”
4=“Increased
considerably”
4=“Contributed
considerably
to easing”
5=“Eased
considerably”
0=“Not
applicable
(NA)“
25
7
8
Your ability to access market financing
Your liquidity position
0
0
Competition from non-banks
Competition from market financing
2
Risk on the collateral demanded
5
11
Industry or firm-specific outlook
4. Loan demand
12
Expectations regarding economic activity
2.C. Perception of risk
0
Competition from other banks
2.B. Pressure from competition
2
Your bank’s capital position
2.A. Costs of funds and balance sheet constraints
2
1.15%
0.46%
2.54%
2.76%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1.85%
1.66%
0.46%
0.46%
1=“Tightened/
decreased considerably”
102
46
68
66
1
2
6
14
34
42
53
23.50%
10.67%
15.70%
15.21%
0.26%
0.53%
1.50%
3.24%
8.08%
9.68%
12.21%
2=“Tightened/
decreased
somewhat”
243
382
334
326
382
368
353
391
373
390
362
55.99%
88.63%
77.14%
75.12%
99.48%
97.87%
88.03%
90.51%
88.60%
89.63%
83.41%
3=“Remained
basically unchanged”
80
1
20
29
1
6
41
18
7
1
17
18.43%
0.23%
4.62%
6.68%
0.26%
1.60%
10.22%
4.17%
1.66%
0.23%
3.92%
4=“Eased/
increased somewhat”
4
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0.92%
0.00%
0.00%
0.23%
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0.00%
0.25%
0.23%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
5=“Eased/
increased considerably”
434
431
433
434
384
376
401
432
421
435
434
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Total
observations
Table 2: BLS responses to questions 1, 2 and 4: descriptive statistics for the whole period 2002Q4-2010Q2 (frequency of responses and percentages of total responses).
1. Credit standards
26
3
5
Your bank’s ability to access market financing
Your bank’s liquidity position
0
0
Competition from non-banks
Competition from market financing
0
Risk on the collateral demanded
3
4
Industry or firm-specific outlook
4. Loan demand
4
Expectations regarding general economic activity
2.C. Perception of risk
0
Competition from other banks
2.B. Pressure from competition
0
Your bank’s capital position
2.A. Costs of funds and balance sheet constraints
1
2.14%
0.00%
2.88%
2.86%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
3.60%
2.16%
0.00%
0.71%
1=“Tightened/
decreased
considerably”
18
12
28
31
0
0
1
11
19
14
25
12.86%
8.63%
20.14%
22.14%
0.00%
0.00%
0.77%
7.91%
13.67%
10.00%
17.86%
2=“Tightened/
decreased
somewhat”
83
127
103
98
115
127
118
121
117
126
110
59.29%
91.37%
74.10%
70.00%
100.00%
99.22%
90.77%
87.05%
84.17%
90.00%
78.57%
3=“Remained
basically unchanged”
34
0
4
7
0
1
11
1
0
0
4
24.29%
0.00%
2.88%
5.00%
0.00%
0.78%
8.46%
0.72%
0.00%
0.00%
2.86%
4=“Eased/
increased somewhat”
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1.43%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.72%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
5=“Eased/
increased
considerably”
140
139
139
140
115
128
130
139
139
140
140
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Total
observations
Table 3: BLS responses to questions 1, 2 and 4: descriptive statistics for the crisis period 2007Q3-2009Q4 (frequency of responses and percentages of total responses).
1. Credit standards
Table 4: Loans to non-financial corporations, balanced panel (OLS, entity
fixed effects, heteroscedasticity robust estimates).
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Δ ln of real GDP (-2)
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Δ ln(loan)
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5I6
Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan)
'H'8MMM 'H))MMM
'-I8MM
5')-'6
5')&.6
5')HI6
Δ ln of real insolvency claims (-2) '')'MMM '''(MMM '')'MM
5'''-'6 5'''&(6 5'''--6
Spread
'8&&MMM 'K)KMMM 'I88MM
5'&'K6
5'&--6
5'&-I6
$
5-6
)-I)MM )&-'MM
')K(
5'.8'6
5'.).6
5'.8-6
$
5&6
)K(&MM
)88&MM
)-.IMM
5'8I(6
5'8H.6
5'I)-6
3
5H6
'(I-MMM '(K.MMM 'KK)MMM
5'&'H6
5'&))6
5'&KK6
3
5)6
)HHHMM
).&(MMM
'KI
5'HK86
5'.'&6
5'.8K6
$
P,
5-6
&)&IMMM
5'.('6
$
P,
5&6
H)K.MMM
5'IHI6
3
P,
5H6
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,
'.&KMM
5'&&.6
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5H6
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5&6
"
P,
5H6
,
'I).MMM
)HH.
'I)8MMM
5').&6
5'K-K6
5')I)6
%
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-'
-'
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'-K'MMM '-..MM '-H.MM
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5')&(6
5')-&6
'''(MMM '''KMMM '''(MMM
5'''&(6 5'''&86 5'''-)6
'K.(MMM 'KI8MMM '88'MM
5'&--6
5'&&K6
5'&I(6
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5'HIH6
5'HH'6
)H-8
)H8-
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5'())6
5'()'6
5'.HK6
'K.-MMM 'K()MMM 'K'(MM
5'&.86
5'&.86
5'-&-6
)-H.MM
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'8('
5'H((6
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5'.KI6
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5'I))6
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5'(&86
'-8&MM
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'&H.
5'-.(6
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5'&H)6
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5')II6
5')K&6
5'&''6
-8K
-8K
-8K
')-&
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')8.
)H
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-'
-'
-'
&8
Table 5: Loans to non-financial corporations, balanced panel (FGLS, corrected for groupwise heteroscedasticity and panel-specific AR1)
D4A94"# $
5)6
Δ ln(loan)
5-6
Δ ln(loan)
5H6
Δ ln(loan)
5.6
&K 5I6
Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan)
'-(-MM 'H-(MMM '-(-MM
'-8KMM
'H'&MM
Δ ln of real GDP (-2)
5')I&6
5')I.6
5')IH6
5')I-6
5')I-6
Δ ln of real insolvency claims (-2) '''IMM '''IMMM '''IMM '''IMMM '''IMM
5'''&.6 5'''&.6 5'''&.6 5'''&H6 5'''&.6
Spread
'.)KMMM 'I.-MMM 'I'&MMM 'I8KMMM '8-.MMM
5')K)6
5')()6
5')(.6
5')KK6
5')KK6
$
5-6
))8&MMM ))&.MMM
'&((
)'&.MM )''HMM
5'H'-6
5'H&K6
5'.I&6
5'H&&6
5'H)(6
$
5&6
)K.(MMM )K''MMM ).)HMM
)&&IM
'(8H
5'II(6
5'II.6
5'I8I6
5'IK86
5'8'-6
3
5H6
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'I8.MM
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5'-'H6
5'-)-6
5'-H'6
5'-)&6
5'-)'6
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5)6
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5'-)K6
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5'H-H6
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5'--&6
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5-6
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5'88H6
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5&6
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5-'I&6
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5'I()6
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P,
5)6
)'..M
5'I)K6
,
'H.(MM
5')((6
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5&6
'H'KMM 'I)IMMM
5')8&6
5'&-)6
"
5H6
'&)'
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5')H'6
5').I6
F
P,
'-&-
5&6
5'-&'6
"
)))KMMM
P,
5H6
5'&.86
,
'I&8
).8)
'.'&
'IHK
'8(8
5'.I86
5))H&6
5'HK.6
5'.H'6
5'.)(6
%
-8K
-8K
-8K
-8K
-8K
G
)H
)H
)H
)H
)H
-'
-'
-'
-'
-'
&
))I)
)).'
)-.8
)&&.
)HKK
MMM['')*MM[''.*M[')$
5&6
Δ ln(loan)
'H'&MM
5')IH6
'''IMM
5'''&H6
'88)MMM
5')(K6
'--(
5'I'(6
'I-(
5'8'(6
'H((
5'-H86
'8'.
5'HH.6
)&K'
5'K&'6
H-'5-))K6
')H5'8'&6
))-(M
5'I-86
'IH8MMM
5'&-&6
''-8I
5').H6
'-I5'-&'6
)').MMM
5'&I&6
'I(.
5'HIK6
-8K
)H
-'
)IIH
Table 6: Loans to non-financial corporations, balanced panel (OLS, with
entity and time fixed effects)
5)6
5&6
5-6
D4A94"# $
Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan)
$
5-6
)&)-MM
')8(
')(H
5'.&I6
5'8H)6
5'8-K6
$
5&6
)I8-MMM
)'8&MM
)'-IMM
5'H(86
5'HK86
5'H.)6
3
5H6
'8&&MM
'IH'8.-MM
5'-'-6
5'H&.6
5'-).6
3
5)6
)-.)MM
)&K(
)HH&MM
5'.-.6
5'8.I6
5'.H)6
$
P,
5-6
&..8MMM &.8-MMM
5'8K86
5'8&.6
$
P,
5&6
-.I.MMM -.IIMMM
5'K))6
5'K)'6
3
P,
5H6
'H&I
5'8(K6
3
P,
5)6
'&((
5'(8K6
F
5&6
"
5H6
F
P,
5&6
"
P,
5H6
,
'K.K
'&8K
'-'.
5'(IK6
5))H&6
5)'-86
%
-8K
-8K
-8K
A
'&'K
'&&I
'&&.
G
)H
)H
)H
-'
-'
-'
MMM['')*MM[''.*M[')$
5H6
5.6
5I6
'(&'M
5'H8'6
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5'I8K6
'IKHM
5'-&K6
)-(KMM
5'.8'6
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5'&-K6
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5'&..6
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''.&.
5'.I)6
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5'I-'6
'IH5'H-&6
)-&.
5'K'.6
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5'K)(6
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5'().6
'&-)
5)'&&6
'&I'
5'(IK6
'&.H
5'&H'6
'&H'
5'&.(6
''K(I
Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan)
)'&-MM
5'H.)6
)-I)MM
5'I)(6
'I(8MM
5'-))6
)&8KMM
5'.&86
'-'&
5')K.6
')8H
5'&I'6
5'-)-6
5'--86
))-HMMM '(88MMM
''-))
5)&I'6
-8K
'&)H
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-'
5'&K-6
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5)&..6
-8K
'&-K
)H
-'
5'&(-6
)'8&
5)-&-6
-8K
'&HK
)H
-'
&(
Table 7: Loans to non-financial corporations, unbalanced panel (OLS,
fixed effects, heteroscedasticity robust estimates)
5)6
5&6
5-6
D4A94"# $
Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan) Δ ln(loan)
'&IHMM
'&8(MM
'&.IMM
Δ ln of real GDP (-2)
5'))-6
5'))-6
5'))'6
Δ ln of real insolvency claims (-2) '''8MMM '''8MMM '''IMMM
5'''&)6 5'''&)6
5'''&)6
Spread
'I.8MMM '8I)MMM '8K(MMM
5'&'I6
5'&&K6
5'&&86
$
5-6
)&H-MM
))&-MM
'(&'MM
5'H.'6
5'H'H6
5'H)'6
$
5&6
)-(8M
)-&-M
)'I(
5'IK-6
5'IHK6
5'K))6
3
5H6
'KI)MMM 'K8IMMM '888MMM
5')K.6
5')(&6
5'&)I6
3
5)6
).8IMMM
)I-8MMM
).)IMMM
5'H'.6
5'H)-6
5'H'&6
,
'I)(MM
5'&&.6
F
5&6
'&88M
5').86
"
5H6
'HI8
5'-.86
,
'8'&MMM
)8'8M
'KI-MMM
5')K86
5'K-'6
5'&'-6
%
HI8
HI8
HI8
A
')'(
')&&
')&&
G
&I
&I
&I
-'
-'
-'
MMM['')*MM[''.*M[')$
-' The following Discussion Papers have been published since 2010:
Series 1: Economic Studies
01
02
2010
2010
Optimal monetary policy in a small open
economy with financial frictions
Rossana Merola
Price, wage and employment response
to shocks: evidence from the WDN survey
Bertola, Dabusinskas
Hoeberichts, Izquierdo, Kwapil
Montornès, Radowski
03
2010
Exports versus FDI revisited:
Does finance matter?
C. M. Buch, I. Kesternich
A. Lipponer, M. Schnitzer
04
2010
Heterogeneity in money holdings
Ralph Setzer
across euro area countries:
the role of housing
Paul van den Noord
Guntram Wolff
05
2010
Loan supply in Germany
during the financial crises
U. Busch
M. Scharnagl, J. Scheithauer
06
2010
Empirical simultaneous confidence
regions for path-forecasts
Òscar Jordà, Malte Knüppel
Massimiliano Marcellino
07
2010
Monetary policy, housing booms
and financial (im)balances
Sandra Eickmeier
Boris Hofmann
08
2010
On the nonlinear influence of
Reserve Bank of Australia
interventions on exchange rates
Stefan Reitz
Jan C. Ruelke
Mark P. Taylor
09
2010
Banking and sovereign risk
in the euro area
S. Gerlach
A. Schulz, G. B. Wolff
10
2010
Trend and cycle features in German
residential investment before and after
reunification
Thomas A. Knetsch
31
11
2010
What can EMU countries’ sovereign
bond spreads tell us about market
perceptions of default probabilities
Niko Dötz
during the recent financial crisis?
Christoph Fischer
Tobias Dümmler
Stephan Kienle
12
2010
User costs of housing when households face
a credit constraint – evidence for Germany
13
2010
Extraordinary measures in extraordinary times –
14
2010
public measures in support of the financial
Stéphanie Marie Stolz
sector in the EU and the United States
Michael Wedow
The discontinuous integration of Western
Europe’s heterogeneous market for
corporate control from 1995 to 2007
Rainer Frey
15
2010
Bubbles and incentives:
Ulf von Kalckreuth
a post-mortem of the Neuer Markt in Germany Leonid Silbermann
16
2010
Rapid demographic change and the allocation
of public education resources: evidence from
East Germany
Gerhard Kempkes
17
2010
The determinants of cross-border bank flows
to emerging markets – new empirical evidence Sabine Herrmann
on the spread of financial crisis
Dubravko Mihaljek
18
2010
Government expenditures and unemployment: Eric Mayer, Stéphane Moyen
a DSGE perspective
Nikolai Stähler
19
2010
NAIRU estimates for Germany: new evidence
on the inflation-unemployment trade-off
Florian Kajuth
20
2010
Macroeconomic factors and
micro-level bank risk
32
Claudia M. Buch
Sandra Eickmeier, Esteban Prieto
21
22
23
24
2010
2010
2010
2010
How useful is the carry-over effect
for short-term economic forecasting?
Karl-Heinz Tödter
Deep habits and the macroeconomic effects
of government debt
Rym Aloui
Price-level targeting
C. Gerberding
when there is price-level drift
R. Gerke, F. Hammermann
The home bias in equities
P. Harms
and distribution costs
M. Hoffmann, C. Ortseifer
25
2010
Instability and indeterminacy in
a simple search and matching model
Michael Krause
Thomas Lubik
26
2010
Toward a Taylor rule for fiscal policy
M. Kliem, A. Kriwoluzky
27
2010
Forecast uncertainty and the
Bank of England interest rate decisions
Guido Schultefrankenfeld
01
2011
Long-run growth expectations
and “global imbalances”
M. Hoffmann
M. Krause, T. Laubach
02
2011
Robust monetary policy in a
New Keynesian model with imperfect
interest rate pass-through
Rafael Gerke
Felix Hammermann
03
04
2011
2011
The impact of fiscal policy on
economic activity over the business cycle –
evidence from a threshold VAR analysis
Anja Baum
Gerrit B. Koester
Classical time-varying FAVAR models –
S. Eickmeier
estimation, forecasting and structural analysis
W. Lemke, M. Marcellino
33
05
06
07
2011
2011
2011
The changing international transmission of
Sandra Eickmeier
financial shocks: evidence from a classical
time-varying FAVAR
Wolfgang Lemke
Massimiliano Marcellino
FiMod – a DSGE model for
Nikolai Stähler
fiscal policy simulations
Carlos Thomas
Portfolio holdings in the euro area –
home bias and the role of international,
Axel Jochem
domestic and sector-specific factors
Ute Volz
08
2011
Seasonality in house prices
F. Kajuth, T. Schmidt
09
2011
The third pillar in Europe:
institutional factors and individual decisions
Julia Le Blanc
10
2011
In search for yield? Survey-based
evidence on bank risk taking
C. M. Buch
S. Eickmeier, E. Prieto
11
2011
Fatigue in payment diaries –
empirical evidence from Germany
Tobias Schmidt
Christoph Fischer
12
2011
Currency blocs in the 21st century
13
2011
How informative are central bank assessments Malte Knüppel
of macroeconomic risks?
Guido Schultefrankenfeld
14
2011
Evaluating macroeconomic risk forecasts
Malte Knüppel
Guido Schultefrankenfeld
15
2011
Crises, rescues, and policy transmission
through international banks
Claudia M. Buch
Cathérine Tahmee Koch
Michael Koetter
16
2011
Substitution between net and gross settlement
systems – A concern for financial stability?
Ben Craig
Falko Fecht
34
17
18
19
20
2011
2011
2011
2011
Recent developments in quantitative models
of sovereign default
Nikolai Stähler
Exchange rate dynamics, expectations,
and monetary policy
Qianying Chen
An information economics perspective
D. Hoewer
on main bank relationships and firm R&D
T. Schmidt, W. Sofka
Foreign demand for euro banknotes
Nikolaus Bartzsch
issued in Germany: estimation using
direct approaches
Gerhard Rösl
Franz Seitz
21
2011
Foreign demand for euro banknotes
issued in Germany: estimation using
indirect approaches
Nikolaus Bartzsch
Gerhard Rösl
Franz Seitz
22
2011
Using cash to monitor liquidity –
implications for payments, currency
demand and withdrawal behavior
Ulf von Kalckreuth
Tobias Schmidt
Helmut Stix
23
2011
Home-field advantage or a matter of
ambiguity aversion? Local bias among
German individual investors
Markus Baltzer
Oscar Stolper
Andreas Walter
24
2011
Monetary transmission right from the start:
on the information content of the
eurosystem’s main refinancing operations
Puriya Abbassi
Dieter Nautz
Output sensitivity of inflation in
the euro area: indirect evidence from
disaggregated consumer prices
Annette Fröhling
Kirsten Lommatzsch
Detecting multiple breaks in long memory:
the case of U.S. inflation
Uwe Hassler
Barbara Meller
25
26
2011
2011
35
27
28
2011
2011
How do credit supply shocks propagate
Sandra Eickmeier
internationally? A GVAR approach
Tim Ng
Reforming the labor market and
improving competitiveness:
Tim Schwarzmüller
an analysis for Spain using FiMod
Nikolai Stähler
29
2011
Cross-border bank lending,
risk aversion and the financial crisis
Cornelia Düwel, Rainer Frey
Alexander Lipponer
30
2011
The use of tax havens in exemption
regimes
Anna Gumpert
James R. Hines, Jr.
Monika Schnitzer
31
2011
Bank-related loan supply factors
during the crisis: an analysis based on the
German bank lending survey
36
Barno Blaes
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies
01
02
03
04
2010
2010
2010
2010
Deriving the term structure of banking
Stefan Eichler
crisis risk with a compound option
approach: the case of Kazakhstan
Alexander Karmann
Dominik Maltritz
Recovery determinants of distressed banks:
Thomas Kick
Regulators, market discipline,
Michael Koetter
or the environment?
Tigran Poghosyan
Purchase and redemption decisions of mutual
Stephan Jank
fund investors and the role of fund families
Michael Wedow
What drives portfolio investments of
German banks in emerging capital markets?
Christian Wildmann
05
2010
Bank liquidity creation and
risk taking during distress
Berger, Bouwman
Kick, Schaeck
06
2010
Performance and regulatory effects of
non-compliant loans in German synthetic
mortgage-backed securities transactions
Gaby Trinkaus
Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk, their
earnings from term transformation, and
the dynamics of the term structure
Christoph Memmel
07
08
09
2010
2010
2010
Completeness, interconnectedness and
distribution of interbank exposures –
a parameterized analysis of the stability
of financial networks
Angelika Sachs
Do banks benefit from internationalization?
Revisiting the market power-risk nexus
C. M. Buch
C. Tahmee Koch, M. Koetter
37
10
11
2010
2010
Do specialization benefits outweigh
Rolf Böve
concentration risks in credit portfolios
of German banks?
Klaus Düllmann
Andreas Pfingsten
Are there disadvantaged clienteles
in mutual funds?
Stephan Jank
12
2010
Interbank tiering and money center banks
Ben Craig, Goetz von Peter
13
2010
Are banks using hidden reserves
Sven Bornemann, Thomas Kick
to beat earnings benchmarks?
Evidence from Germany
Christoph Memmel
Andreas Pfingsten
How correlated are changes in banks’ net
interest income and in their present value?
Christoph Memmel
Contingent capital to strengthen the private
safety net for financial institutions:
Cocos to the rescue?
George M. von Furstenberg
14
01
2010
2011
02
2011
Gauging the impact of a low-interest rate
environment on German life insurers
Anke Kablau
Michael Wedow
03
2011
Do capital buffers mitigate volatility
of bank lending? A simulation study
Frank Heid
Ulrich Krüger
04
2011
The price impact of lending relationships
Ingrid Stein
05
2011
Does modeling framework matter?
A comparative study of structural
and reduced-form models
Yalin Gündüz
Marliese Uhrig-Homburg
Contagion at the interbank market
with stochastic LGD
Christoph Memmel
Angelika Sachs, Ingrid Stein
06
38
2011
07
2011
The two-sided effect of financial
globalization on output volatility
Barbara Meller
Klaus Düllmann
Natalia Puzanova
08
2011
Systemic risk contributions:
a credit portfolio approach
09
2011
The importance of qualitative risk
assessment in banking supervision
before and during the crisis
Thomas Kick
Andreas Pfingsten
10
2011
Bank bailouts, interventions, and
moral hazard
Lammertjan Dam
Michael Koetter
11
2011
Improvements in rating models
for the German corporate sector
Till Förstemann
The effect of the interbank network
structure on contagion and common shocks
Co-Pierre Georg
12
2011
13
2011
Banks’ management of the net interest
margin: evidence from Germany
Christoph Memmel
Andrea Schertler
14
2011
A hierarchical Archimedean copula
for portfolio credit risk modelling
Natalia Puzanova
39
Visiting researcher at the Deutsche Bundesbank
The Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt is looking for a visiting researcher. Among others
under certain conditions visiting researchers have access to a wide range of data in the
Bundesbank. They include micro data on firms and banks not available in the public.
Visitors should prepare a research project during their stay at the Bundesbank. Candidates
must hold a PhD and be engaged in the field of either macroeconomics and monetary
economics, financial markets or international economics. Proposed research projects
should be from these fields. The visiting term will be from 3 to 6 months. Salary is
commensurate with experience.
Applicants are requested to send a CV, copies of recent papers, letters of reference and a
proposal for a research project to:
Deutsche Bundesbank
Personalabteilung
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
60431 Frankfurt
GERMANY