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C H A P T E R
7
The Origins of World War I
On June 28, 1914, a Serbian nationalist assassinated the Austrian archduke and heir
to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia. While Ferdinand was sitting in
the open backseat of a car—it was a beautiful sunny day—a 19-year-old youth
stepped out into the street and fired several shots. Before the archduke himself
expired, after several times dismissing his wound as “nothing,” his wife Sophie had
already died from a bullet in the stomach.
The assassin was Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian of Serbian nationality. Himself
stricken with tuberculosis, he was fond of quoting Nietzsche’s lines from Ecce Homo:
“Insatiable as the flame, I glow and consume myself.” Princip wished to see Bosnia
break away from the Austro-Hungarian Empire and become part of a Greater Serbia.
Austria-Hungary soon declared war on Serbia, and by August 4 most of the major
European powers were involved in World War I. To understand how a major war
could follow from the shooting of an Austrian archduke, it is necessary to investigate
the combustible atmosphere that transformed the spark of an assassination into an
all-consuming fire that would bring about the deaths of millions.
NATIONALISM
Nationalism was the first element at work. (See Chapter 2 for a more general treatment
of nationalism, as well as imperialism and militarism.) This passion was especially
strong in the Balkans. Serbia had gained complete independence from the Ottoman
Empire in 1878. In that year major European powers at the Congress of Berlin allowed
Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina even though these provinces were
still legally part of the Ottoman Empire and ethnic Serbians were the largest national
group in the occupied province. After King Peter I came to the throne in 1903, Serbia
stepped up its efforts to incorporate ethnic Serbian areas still outside its national
borders; it was outraged when Austria completely annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1908. Serbia made threats and appealed to Russia for help. Germany promised
Austria its backing and sent the Russians a note demanding that the tsarist government recognize the annexation and not support Serbia in the matter. Russia yielded,
and without Russian support Serbia had to acknowledge the annexation. As a result
of strong Austrian pressure, Serbia also promised to cease activities that were hostile
to its northern neighbor.
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Sarajevo, 1914: Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in the rear of the
automobile in which they would soon be assassinated.
Despite its promise, Serbia failed to curtail such actions. In fact, within a short
period, several new nationalistic societies appeared. One of these was the conspiratorial
group Unity or Death, commonly referred to as the Black Hand, which specialized in
encouraging ethnic Serbs in areas such as Bosnia to work for unification with Serbia. It
helped smuggle men, guns, and propaganda to sympathetic individuals still outside
Serbian borders. Led by the chief of intelligence of the Serbian army, the Black Hand
organized Princip’s bloody deed. Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 further increased
tensions in the area. Although Serbia greatly expanded its territory at the expense of the
Ottoman Turkish Empire, Austria-Hungary prevented the Serbs from gaining land along
the Adriatic coast by successfully supporting the creation of an independent Albania. The
new Albania, however, did not obtain all the territory it wished; most notably, Kosovo
went to Serbia, which the Albanian majority residing there would continue to resent for
decades afterward. (See Chapter 33 for a discussion of the conflict there in the 1990s.)
Although the Serbian nationalism of the Black Hand and Princip had precipitated
the crisis, the nationalism displayed by other powers widened it. Kaiser Wilhelm II and
segments of the German public, including many intellectuals and politicians, believed in
the superiority of the German nation and culture. Some Germans dreamed of uniting all
Germans in a Pan-German state that would include large areas of Austria-Hungary.
Pan-Germanists were countered by Russian Pan-Slavists, who dreamed of politically uniting with Russia the many Orthodox Slavs who populated the Balkans. As
the control of the Ottoman Turkish Empire in the Balkans weakened during the
century preceding World War I, the Russians planned to exercise increasing influence
in the area but instead suffered a number of disappointments. Russia lost the influence it once had in Bulgaria and, along with Serbia, suffered a diplomatic defeat when
Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. In exchange for this
annexation, the Russian government had hoped to gain Austro-Hungarian diplomatic
SERBIAN
NATIONALISM
NATIONALISM OF
OTHER EUROPEAN
NATIONS
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support for its goal of pressuring the Turks to allow Russian warships through the
Turkish Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, but Russian efforts were
unsuccessful and only heightened the frustrations of Russian nationalists.
A quickening of French nationalism was also apparent. An anti-German disturbance in late 1913 in a French town in the German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine
symbolized the painful loss of these provinces to Germany in the Franco-Prussian
War. Ten-year-old Raymond Poincaré had watched the Germans march through his
hometown in Lorraine in 1870. Elected premier of France in 1912 and president in
1913, he played an active role in leading France into war with Germany in 1914.
Nor were the Serbians, Germans, Russians, and French alone in their nationalism.
As Winston Churchill later wrote about this period, “National passions, unduly exalted
in the decline of religion, burned beneath the surface of every land with fierce, if
shrouded fires.” Not even the rival faith of socialism could compete with nationalism.
For 25 years, the Second International Workingman’s Association had preached the
international brotherhood of the working class. It had also often criticized war,
attributing it to capitalist forces. Yet the vast majority of its members supported their
homelands in the crucial days of early August 1914.
IMPERIALISM
FIRST MOROCCAN
CRISIS AND ITS
EFFECTS
Imperialism was the second combustible element in the prewar atmosphere. The
influential German historian Fritz Fischer has written of German imperialistic aims in
Europe, Africa, and the Near East and identified them as a chief cause of the war.
Although some historians have disputed his charges, what is undeniable is that imperialistic rivalries stimulated hostile feelings between some of the major European powers.
The first Moroccan crisis of 1905 serves as an excellent illustration. In 1904
Great Britain and France had concluded the Entente Cordiale, an understanding
concerning their overseas spheres of influence. As part of the agreement, Great Britain
recognized France’s desire to control Morocco. Germany disliked the Entente and
thought that a stiff challenge to the French position in Morocco might split it apart.
In 1905 Kaiser Wilhelm II landed at Tangier and recognized the sultan of Morocco
as a ruler independent of French control. Wilhelm also demanded an international
conference, which assembled in 1906, to discuss the situation. Meanwhile, the British
had become so alarmed at German belligerence over Morocco, as well as at the continuing German naval buildup, that they moved much closer to France. While not
going as far as the French would have liked—a promise of British support in case of
war with Germany—Great Britain’s foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, did authorize
informal military conversations with the French. These conversations continued from
time to time over the years and strengthened the impression among some French
statesmen that Great Britain would back France in case of a war with Germany.
In addition to bringing Great Britain closer to France, the Moroccan crisis also
helped to bring about the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. It was not an alliance but
primarily a settlement over spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet.
Nevertheless, it brought Great Britain closer to Russia, France’s ally. The Entente
increased the Germans’ fear of encirclement and to some extent induced them to
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vigorously back the Dual Monarchy in the annexation crisis of 1908—itself a manifestation of Austro-Hungarian imperialism. Again in 1914, Germany’s uncompromising
support of Austria-Hungary reflected its fear of losing its only real ally.
MILITARISM
Militarism also contributed to the outbreak of World War I. European nations feverishly
expanded their military forces and armaments in the years immediately before 1914.
German and Austrian military spending doubled between 1910 and 1914, and other
European nations increased their expenditures markedly. By 1914 both Germany and
France had assembled standing armies of 800,000 men, with 1 million more in the
reserves. About 1.2 million Russians were under arms, although the Russian army was
inferior in equipment, training, and leadership. By 1905 the British had begun construction on a new battleship, the Dreadnought, designed to be the most powerful ship
ever built. Germany responded with increased naval expenditures of its own. From
1900 to 1911, German naval spending nearly tripled. Such contests did little to
increase the security of either side; instead, they heightened the hostility and mistrust
already existing among nations.
Another manifestation of the militarism of the era was the failure of the peace
conferences of 1899 and 1907. Most government and military leaders were more concerned with keeping up in the arms race and maintaining absolute national sovereignty
than with achieving disarmament and arbitrating disputes. At the 1907 conference, the
delegates quickly postponed the issue of disarmament and passed a resolution calling
for further study of the question. The delegates then spent weeks thrashing out the
guidelines for the proper conduct of warfare. It was as if they were saying to the world,
“Disarmament is a fool’s dream, but war will surely come. So let us agree on the rules.”
In this militaristic era, the plans and advice of military leaders played an increasingly influential role in government decisions. Germany chose war in 1914 partly
because it feared that if it waited, Russia’s rearmament program would make Russia a
stronger foe. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, which the French and Russian generals knew
in broad outline, was a key factor in the peace options and war plans of several nations.
In the plan, the German general staff had assumed that in a two-front war with France
and Russia, Germany could not defeat both opponents simultaneously. Germany had
therefore decided to knock out France first by an invasion through Belgium, while
holding off the slowly mobilizing Russians. After defeating France, Germany would
then concentrate its forces in the east and crush the Russians. For this plan to work,
the German military could not give the Russians a significant head start in mobilizing
their forces. Russia, on the other hand, reacting in part to strong French pressure, had
to do just what Germany hoped it could not do—divert German troops to the Russian
front before France could be defeated. Other nations had their own military plans that
demanded lead time for mobilization and deployment of troops.
Thus, in those final hectic days, military considerations afforded diplomacy little
time to reach a peaceful settlement. Because it included the military necessity of invading neutral Belgium, the Schlieffen Plan was also likely to bring Great Britain, which
wanted nearby Belgium free from either French or German control, into the war.
SCHLIEFFEN PLAN
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That troops, weapons, and plans had such influence was partly a result of the continuing belief that war could be more beneficial than harmful. Perhaps the most famous
extreme statement of this position came from the German General Friedrich von
Bernhardi in his book of 1911, Germany and the Next War. It reflected Darwinian influences and contained such statements as “war is a biological necessity” and “the struggle
for existence . . . is the basis of all healthy development.” Although European political
leaders were generally less Darwinian sounding, by mid-1914 most of them still expected
a brief and not terribly destructive war—a “short, cleansing thunderstorm,” in Winston
Churchill’s words.
THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM AND WAR PREPARATION
THE AUSTRIAN
ULTIMATUM
AND RUSSIAN
MOBILIZATION
As the events of July and August 1914 clearly indicate, the two European alliance systems were the mechanisms that transformed a local conflict into World War I. After
the shooting of Ferdinand, Austria was convinced that the Serbian government was
implicated. The government in Vienna believed that, one way or another, it must
crush the threat to its empire posed by advocates of Greater Serbia. Before acting,
however, Austria sought to keep Russia from mobilizing to aid Serbia, or at least to
ensure German backing against Russia should intervention occur. Germany, especially
its military leadership, was happy to comply. It believed that sooner or later war with
Russia would come, and when it did Germany would need Austrian help. The middle
of 1914, after the assassination of Ferdinand and before further Russian modernization and railway development, seemed an appropriate time to deal with Russia. In
early July, Germany granted almost unconditional backing—a “blank check”—to her
ally, and Austria sent an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23. Austria demanded an end
to anti-Austrian organizations and propaganda, the removal of officers and officials
accused by Austria of being hostile, Austrian participation in the investigation of the
assassination plot, and the suppression of subversive movements directed against
Austria-Hungary. The Serbian government was given 48 hours to reply.
Serbia was aware that Russia, its chief supporter, advised caution but would
nevertheless ultimately back Serbia in case of hostilities. Russia supported Serbia
because after the diplomatic defeat of 1908 it did not wish to lose further influence
and power in the Balkans to Austria-Hungary. Serbia was Russia’s last bastion of
influence in the area. If Austria was allowed to crush Serbia, either diplomatically or
militarily, Russia’s hopes in the Balkans would be finally smashed. After hearing of
Austria’s ultimatum, the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Sazonov, declared, “It means
a European war!” He accused Austria of “setting fire to Europe,” and on July 25 his
government approved preliminary military preparations. This was done in the hope
that it would frighten Austria into arriving at some sort of compromise. Russia also
wished to be prepared in case it was necessary to come to the aid of Serbia.
In addition to its concern about Austria, the tsarist government had also become
increasingly troubled about growing German influence in the Ottoman Empire. It is not
difficult, therefore, to understand why some Russian officials perceived the demands
placed on Serbia as part of a united effort by Austria and Germany to strengthen the
Germanic influence in areas long considered of special interest to the Russians.
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Serbia, Austria, Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain in cartoon suggesting
how the alliance systems would work.
Partly because of Russian support, Serbia did not accept all the Austrian demands.
Nevertheless, its carefully worded reply reflected a conciliatory spirit. Austria, however,
despite some belated German qualms, would recognize nothing less than unconditional
acceptance. On July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia and bombarded Belgrade, the
Serbian capital.
Meanwhile, Russia’s ally, France, had been giving strong support to the tsarist
government. The French remembered the 1870 war with Prussia (became Germany
in 1871) and did not wish to be isolated again in a struggle with Germany. Accordingly,
they were prepared to give full backing to their major ally, Russia. In addition, a war
against Germany, if won, held out the hope of recovering the lost provinces of Alsace
and Lorraine. From July 20 to 23 French President Poincaré and Premier Viviani were
in St. Petersburg encouraging the Russians to stand firm.
After some indecisiveness about how to proceed, on July 30 Russia finally
decided on a general mobilization of its troops. The French encouraged such an action
because France knew of the general thrust of the Schlieffen Plan. If Russia mobilized
substantially ahead of Germany, there would be less likelihood that Germany could
swiftly defeat France.
Because of Germany’s war plan, it was no surprise that after several warnings
on previous days, Germany, on July 31, sent an ultimatum with a 12-hour limit
demanding that Russia end its war preparations along the German frontier. On the
same day, Germany asked the French government what its position would be in case
of a Russian-German war. On August 1 the French replied that France would consult
THE REACTIONS OF
GERMANY, FRANCE,
AND GREAT BRITAIN
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B
I O G R A P H Y
Inflamed with Patriotism
To me those hours seemed like a release from
the painful feelings of my youth. . . . Overpowered by stormy enthusiasm, I fell down
on my knees and thanked Heaven from an
overflowing heart for granting me the good
fortune of being permitted to live at this time.
A fight for freedom had begun, mightier
than the earth had ever seen; for once Destiny
had begun its course, the conviction dawned
on even the broad masses that this time not
the fate of Serbia or Austria was involved, but
whether the German nation was to be or not
to be. . . .
As a boy and young man I had so often
felt the desire to prove at least once by deeds
that for me national enthusiasm was no
empty whim. . . . Thus my heart, like that of
a million others, overflowed with proud joy
that at last I would be able to redeem myself
from this paralyzing feeling. I had so often
sung “Deutschland uber Alles” and shouted
“Heil” at the top of my lungs, that it seemed
to me almost a belated act of grace to be
allowed to stand as a witness in the divine
court of the eternal judge and proclaim the
sincerity of this conviction. . . . [I] was ready
at any time to die for my people and for the
Reich which embodied it. . . . [D]ays later I
was wearing the tunic which I was not to doff
until nearly six years later.*
...
Adolf Hitler, describing his feelings at the start of
World War I, when he was 25 and living an
impoverished life in Munich. On August 3, 1914,
he volunteered to enlist in the German army. See
Chapters 13 and 18 for more on Hitler’s youth
and his dictatorship in Germany.
*From Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler, translated by Ralph
Manheim. Copyright © 1943 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
Reprinted by permission.
its own interests. On the same day, the government in Paris ordered mobilization.
Germany also mobilized on that day and, having received no reply to its ultimatum,
declared war on Russia. Two days later, certain that France was preparing to aid Russia
and unwilling to lose any more time, Germany declared war on France and directed
its attack through neutral Belgium.
As a result of British-French friendship and military conversations that followed
from their entente and the Moroccan crisis of 1905, Great Britain had already been
moving toward support of France. A few days before, for example, the British cabinet had voted to give assurance to the French that the British navy would protect the
French coast and shipping against any German attack. However, the invasion of Belgium
made it much easier to decide on a declaration of war. The neutrality of Belgium,
just across the English Channel from Great Britain, was considered essential to
British interests. Great Britain, along with France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, had
been one of the guarantors of that neutrality since the Treaty of London in 1839.
Thus, on August 4 Great Britain declared war on Germany. “All for just a word—
‘neutrality’—just for a piece of paper,” lamented German Chancellor BethmannHollweg, who nevertheless had earlier in the day stated, “Whatever our lot may be,
August 4, 1914, will remain for all eternity one of Germany’s greatest days.”
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With the British declaration, almost all the major European powers that would
enter the war were committed. Great Britain, France, and Russia opposed Germany
and Austria-Hungary. The fear of being left without an ally helped ensure such a widespread war. Italy, the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance, did
not enter the war at this time on the grounds that the alliance was a defensive one
and Germany had taken the offensive.
SUMMARY
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the immediate cause of World
War I, but four prominent background factors helped to explain how such an event
could lead to a war as vast as World War I. As with the Boxer Rebellion of 1900,
nationalism, imperialism, and militarism all played a part. So, too, did a fourth factor:
the alliance system.
Historians have debated and will continue to debate which nation was most at
fault. In recent years, many books, including David Fromkin’s Europe’s Last Summer:
Who Started the Great War in 1914? (see Suggested Sources), have followed Fischer’s
lead in placing the primary blame on Germany. Yet none of the nations that went to
war in the summer of 1914 had done all they might have done to prevent the conflict
from occurring. Despite some late and relatively weak diplomatic efforts to slow the
rapid escalation of events, each nation finally valued security, prestige, influence, and
allies more than peace. Only after years of death and destruction did many realize
that in 1914 they had undervalued the fruits of peace and vastly underestimated the
human and material costs of modern warfare.
SUGGESTED
SOURCES
Berghahn, V. R. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914. 2nd ed. 1993. An account that
balances well the effect of both domestic and international considerations on Germany’s
foreign policy.
Dedijer, Vladimir. The Road to Sarajevo. 1966. A detailed but fascinating account of the events
leading up to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand; sympathetic with the
idealism of the conspirators.
Evans, R. J. W., and Hartmut Pogge van Strandmann, eds. The Coming of the First World War.
1989. A series of essays that delineates the position of each major country that entered
the war in July and August and also looks at the influence of public opinion.*
Ferguson, Niall. The Pity of War: Explaining World War I. 2000. A lively revisionist work that
challenges many traditional views about the war and its causes; places much blame on
Britain for the start and expansion of the war to a global one.*
Fischer, Fritz. World Power or Decline. 1975. A summation of the author’s controversial case for
primarily blaming Germany’s imperialist aims for causing World War I.*
Fromkin, David. Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? 2004. A well-written
recent defense of Fritz Fischer’s thesis that Germany bore the chief responsibility for
starting WWI.*
Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig, eds. The Origins of World War I. 2003. The
scholarly contributors to this large collection offer many fresh reassessments.
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Herrmann, David G. The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. 1997. A scholarly
work that argues that the changing military capabilities of the powers in the decade
before the war strongly affected the diplomacy leading to it.*
Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War. 2nd ed. 1992. A concise overview of the causes
of the war and a reexamination of differing historical interpretations of them.*
Kennedy, Paul M., ed. The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914. 1985. An excellent and
comprehensive collection of essays on the war.*
Lafore, Laurence. The Long Fuse. 2nd ed. 1997. A readable work on the origins of the war that
while emphasizing Serbian-Austrian tensions also examines the concerns of the other
major powers.*
Lieven, D. C. B. Russia and the Origins of the First World War. 1983. A clear, well-balanced analysis
of why Russia became involved in World War I.*
Remak, Joachim. The Origin of World War I: 1871–1914. 2nd ed. 1995. A good, brief, balanced
introduction to the subject.*
Strachan, Hew. The Outbreak of the First World War. 2005. A concise reexamination by a leading
British scholar; especially good on attitudes toward war among socialists, intellectuals,
and the general public.*
WEB
SOURCES
www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914m.html. This site contains links to various pre–World War I
documents, including many that relate to the causes of the war.
www.worldwar1.com/tlss1914.htm and www.worldwar1.com/tlplot.htm. These two web pages
from the same general site contain numerous links to the background and causes of
WWI.
www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwone/origins_01.shtml. A good essay on the origins of the war
with links provided by a British professor on BBC’s history site.
*Paperback available.