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Philosophy 220
The Moral Status of
Terrorism
Some Definitions: Terrorism
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Coming up with a useful, non-controversial definition of
terrorism can be difficult.
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One big problem is avoiding question-begging definitions. A definition is
question-begging when it includes an assumed moral stance, such as defining it
as wrong (eg. “Terrorism is an immoral type of armed conflict.”)
Terrorism (borrowed from Sterba): the use or threat of
violence against innocent people to elicit terror in them, or in
some other group of people, in order to further a political
objective (391).
Notice what this definition implies: (1)terrorism can be an act
of state or non-state individuals/groups; (2)terrorism is
always and only directed at innocents/noncombatants;
(3)aim of terrorism is some political goal.
Khatchadourian, “Terrorism and
Morality”
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K begins by reiterating something that we’ve
already noted: it is difficult to articulate a morally
neutral (non question-begging) definition of
terrorism.
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This is complicated by the common rhetorical use of
the term by governments to characterize the
behavior of any opposing forces—one person’s
“freedom fighter” is another government’s “terrorist.”
Despite this, we can identify a “common core of
meaning.”
What’s at the core?
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At the core, K defines terrorist acts as: “acts of
coercion or actual use of force, aiming at
monetary gain (predatory terrorism), revenge
(retaliatory terrorism), a political end (political
terrorism), or a putative moral/religious end
(moralistic/religious terrorism).
Another element of the core is the distinction
between the “immediate victims” and the
“victimized” (the “indirect but real target” of
terrorist acts).
Putting JWT to Work
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K seeks to correct the lack of attention paid to the
question of the moral status of torture by employing the
conceptual machinery of Just War Theory, particularly
the principles governing the analysis of Jus in Bello.
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The three principles K focuses our attention on are: Necessity,
Discrimination and Proportionality. K argues that the various
forms of terrorism typically violate these principles.
With regard to the Jus ad Bellum demand for a “just
cause,” K insists that typically terrorist acts do not
satisfy this demand.
“Just Cause” as self-defense.
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K’s abbreviation of the Jus ad Bellum
requirement for a just cause is “the selfdefensive use of force.”
Clearly, predatory and retaliatory terrorism don’t
meet this standard.
Just as clearly, political terrorism, when the
political goals are immoral, would fail as well.
But, it’s not clear that it would fail if the goals
were morally acceptable. The same is true of
moralistic/religious terrorism.
Necessity and Terrorism
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The Jus in Bello principle of necessity requires the use
of minimal force to accomplish morally appropriate
ends. Among a range of possible tactical means, we
should always pick the one that causes the least
destruction and loss of life.
Applying this principle to the various forms of terrorism,
K. argues that the principle of necessity seems to
clearly rule out predatory and retaliatory forms.
He doesn’t speak to political or moralistic/ religious
forms. Would these always violate the principle?
Discrimination and Terrorism
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The Jus in Bello principle of discrimination requires combatants to
distinguish between “non-innocent” and innocent” targets and limit
violent aggression (to the extent possible) only to the former.
Once again, K argues that in predatory and retaliatory forms,
terrorism typically fails to discriminate properly. The situation is
much more complex in political and m/r forms, as it is in war.
K. identifies a number of factors which clarify the situation with
regard to both these forms of terrorism and war:
• “Innocence” refers to moral status relative to the actions in question.
• “Innocence” is a matter of degree.
• The relativity defined in terms of degree is causal responsibility for the
wrong which provokes the actions in question.
• Causation can be direct or indirect.
Proportionality and Terrorism
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Proportionality has both Jus in
and Jus ad significance. In
both cases, the evaluation
ultimately requires some sort
of comparative calculation.
The calculation in the former
requires that we measure the
tactical or strategic benefits
obtained against the costs
associated with the
act/campaign.
Jus ad Proportionality
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K. argues that the calculation required to
evaluate the decision to violently respond
to a given provocation (to war or
terrorism) runs afoul of a difficulty we
discussed in conjunction with
consequentialist moral reasoning.
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The comparison of incomparables.
What about Rights-Based Theories?
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K. relies on the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
Key element: “Everyone has the right to life” (407c1).
Condition of the possibility of meaning/value? Don’t buy
that? How about a little Kant? To kill someone is to treat
them as a means to your end, rather than as an end in
themselves.
Implication: The killing of innocents (?) justified only on
2 conditions (Ibid.):
• It’s the lesser of two evils;
• No one’s human or moral rights are violated. (?)
The Final Word
So for K. terrorism is immoral.
 But there is at least a plausible argument
to be made, from the JWT perspective for
political and moralistic/religious forms.
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Sterba, “T and International Justice”
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We’ve already seen Sterba’s definition of T.
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The use or threat of violence against innocent people to elicit terror in them, or in some
other group of people, in order to further a political objective.
Obviously, this definition includes acts like the
attacks on the WTC buildings (and probably the
Pentagon), but just as obviously it includes lots
of actions taken by our government over the
past 50-100 years: atomic bombings of Japan,
Iraq Sanction Regime, Iran-Contra (supporting
terrorism).
JWT and Anti-War Pacifism
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Sterba develops a framework for the moral
evaluation of T by drawing together JWT with a
particular strain of pacifism: Anti-War Pacifism.
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A-W P distinguished from more other forms.
• Nonviolent Pacifism: “any use of violence is morally
prohibited;”
• Nonlethal Pacifism: “any lethal use of force is morally
prohibited. (416c1).
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Sterba believes that A-W P is straight-forwardly
justified by JWT.
The JWT in A-W P
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Jus ad Bellum
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Jus in Bello
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Aggression sufficient to justify?
Non-violent means exhausted?
Violent means neither hopeless or too costly?
Typically, wars have not added up.
Proportional?
Discriminating?
Typically, no.
JWT + A-W P = JWP (Just War Pacifism)
JWP and Terrorism
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Clearly, JWP rules out most acts of terrorism, but
because it does not rely on a theory of Nonviolent
Pacifism, it does not in principle rule out a justifiable use
of violence against innocents.
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Harm to innocents justified if the harm is: trivial, easily
reparable, non-reparable but substantially outweighed by
consequences.
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Spelunker thought experiment.
Atomic Bombings? (Unconditional Surrender?)
Counter-City Bombings? (Early vs. Late?)
Palestinian Suicide Bombings?
9/11?
Afghanistan? Iraq?