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Comprehensive
Written Exam
Prepared for:
Dr. Denise S. Mewborn
Lisa Sheehy
June 2001
Setting Out on a Journey ...................................................................................... 1
Positioning Myself and Posing the Problem ........................................................ 2
Struggling with Constructivism ............................................................................ 4
Joining a Conversation of Duality ....................................................................... 8
Deconstructing Duality ....................................................................................... 10
Troubling Integrated Theories ........................................................................... 13
Re-presenting the Synergism Hypothesis as a Theoretical Perspective ........... 15
Fashioning a Theoretical Framework ............................................................... 18
Characterizing the Synergistic Researcher ....................................................... 21
References .............................................................................................................. 21
Every day you may make progress. Every step may be fruitful.
Yet there will stretch out before you an ever-lengthening, ever-ascending,
ever-improving path. You know you will never get to the end of the journey.
But this, so far from discouraging, only adds to the joy and glory of the climb.
Winston Churchill
Setting Out on a Journey
I had previously made the claim that I planned to use social constructivism as a
theoretical framework to study cooperative learning as I observed my own students engaged in
mathematical activities together. Thus, the exam questions originally posed by Dr. Mewborn
were:
 How do you see social constructivism facilitating your thinking about cooperative
learning? What aspects of social constructivism support your personal theories and
experiences? Which ones contradict or support your personal theories and experiences?
How have social constructivist ideas influenced your teaching?
 You have expressed a desire to study events in your own classroom as a way of
informing your teaching. Therefore, your own experiences, biases, and beliefs will come
into play when you conduct your research and analyze your data. Qualitative researchers
offer multiple ways of dealing with one’s own subjectivity in the research process.
Describe how you propose to deal with your subjectivity when you conduct research with
your own students.
As I began working with question #1, I felt increasingly frustrated with, trapped by, and
disillusioned with social constructivism as a sole framework. I spoke with Dr. Mewborn and
explained that I no longer “saw social constructivism facilitating my thinking about cooperative
learning.” Our conversation from that point went something like this:
Dr. Mewborn: Why not?
Me: Well, it’s just so limiting. I think there’s a lot more to it. Maybe I have a limited
understanding of cooperative learning because I use a limited perspective for viewing it.
Dr. Mewborn: Can you think of a theory that doesn’t feel so limiting?
Me: Signe and I have been talking a lot about things I have been reading lately. I’m
starting to make sense of some ideas that are new to me like poststructuralist theory,
Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, how scholars in other disciplines talk about
constructing knowledge socially… I think there might be something there for me.
After more discussion, the purpose of this exam was restated as a place for me to write about all
of this, find what out what was there for me, state a theoretical framework for studying
1
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cooperative learning, and describe the role of the researcher in this study. What this exam has
become is a recounting of the theoretical journey (at times it has felt more like a hunt) that I have
been on, a description of where I am now, and possible directions in which I am headed.
Positioning Myself and Posing the Problem
I plan to conduct a research study on cooperative learning in mathematics education.
Specifically, I plan to focus the study on the question of how not if cooperative learning works.
Since this study will be done in an effort to satisfy the requirements for a Ph.D. in mathematics
education at the University of Georgia, part of the framework for this study is the dissertation
with all of its guidelines, tradition, and rigor. During my doctoral studies, I have heard many
times phrases such as “you need to situate yourself theoretically,” “state a priori, macro and
mid-level theories,” and “a theoretical framework and literature review comprise your Chapter
Two.” As a result of the several conversations with Dr. Mewborn about the questions that she
posed for this exam, it became apparent to me that the time had come for me to “do some theory
work.”
As I set out to do this task, I rather quickly identified two significant problems. One, I
realized that I had a very difficult time determining the importance, place and purpose of a
theoretical framework. And two, I had assumed all along that my theoretical framework would
be or would rely heavily upon social constructivism. It was the turning of my attention to and
focusing on these concerns that became a catalyst for the writing of this exam.
Is it important to situate yourself theoretically before you do your study? Initially, I
thought this notion of an a priori theory was rather romantic. I read Barbara Jaworski (1994) and
decided that I would be a “constructivist researcher” and “co-construct” my study with the
participants. I read Jacques Derrida (Caputo, 1993) and knew that the approach I would take was
3
“deconstructing” cooperative learning. I studied social constructivism in a course on learning
theories in mathematics education and determined that clearly social constructivism was the
theoretical framework for studying cooperative learning. I met Dr. Bettie St. Pierre, studied
under her guidance for a year, and decided that since I agreed with just about everything she
said, I, too, might have a postmodern/ poststructuralist view of the world.
Perhaps I was wooed by the smooth talk of experienced and respected researchers and
philosophers. Maybe I was too eager to align myself with and use someone else’s theory as my a
priori. This “idolizing” and eagerness can be a dangerous move. Similar to some romances, what
attracts you in the beginning can end up being the very the thing that makes you feel trapped. I
can imagine stating a theoretical framework up front, collecting data, realizing that the
framework is not helpful and then feeling obligated to somehow make it fit. The alternative is to
not situate myself theoretically before the study. However, this move can also be dangerous.
In his discussion of the practicality of theory, Wenger (1998) supports stating theory up
front. He then describes theory as a perspective “ not a recipe; it does not tell you just what to do.
Rather it acts as a guide about what to pay attention to, what difficulties to expect, and how to
approach problems” (p. 9). When I observe my students in cooperative learning activities and
interview them about their experiences, clearly there will be aspects on which I will choose to
focus. I believe that situating myself theoretically before data collection will provide helpful
guidance in making these choices.
However, a theoretical framework can not serve solely as a data collection guide. Dr.
Mewborn has explained over and over that “a theoretical framework is what you will use to
analyze your data” (personal communication, several times). Providing a framework within
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which to make sense of data that I have not yet collected is problematic for me. I find myself
back in the dilemma of whether to state theory a priori or not.
A solution to this dilemma rests in making the distinction that “situating myself
theoretically” includes two interrelated components. One is an a priori theoretical perspective…
a way of viewing. This perspective will guide my methodology. The other component is a more
specific theoretical framework… ways of making sense of what you are viewing. This
framework will inform my data analysis. Although this theoretical framework will stem from the
theoretical perspective, I do not feel obligated to plan data analysis strategies a priori:
If I map out the exact path I will take from the start then I may miss the opportunity
to go where my participants are going or to go down the road less traveled. Although
my a prioi theories about learning and meaning making have brought me to this
point in the journey, I need them to not dictate the path from here (Journal Entry,
December 2000)
Making this distinction between “what you see” and “how you make sense of what you see” is
essential. The remainder of this exam is a discussion of my development of a theoretical
perspective for studying cooperative learning and a theoretical framework for making sense of
how students learn mathematics together in meaningful ways.
Struggling with Constructivism
I mentioned earlier that assuming my theoretical framework would be or would rely
heavily upon social constructivism has become problematic. There are several areas in which
questions have arisen:
1. Theoretical ~ Is social constructivism a framework, a philosophy, a perspective, a
learning theory or something else?
2. Methodological ~ Will social constructivism inform a study of cooperative learning?
3. Epistemological ~ Do I really believe that social constructivism adequately describes
how students learn?
5
I realize that before I can address the above questions, I needed to seriously address much more
general questions:
-3. What is social constructivism, really?
-2. What is its relationship to just plain constructivism?
-1. What about radical constructivism?
As I have searched of answers to all of the above questions, confining myself to social
constructivism has become increasingly problematic.
While most would agree with Von Glasersfeld (1996) when he identifies the
“key idea that sets constructivism apart from other theories of cognition… [as] the idea
that what we call knowledge does not and cannot have the purpose of producing
representations of an independent reality, but instead has adaptive functioning” (p.3), it
appears that many educational researchers have a difficult time answering questions –1,
-2, and -3 with any consistency. It seems as if some have constructed their own meanings
that are both contextual and political in nature. Boudourides (1998) offers a nice
summary of constructivism and its many forms (in a way that is reflective of my own
thinking) in the following discussion:
A first ‘mild’ (or ‘trivial’) version of constructivism originating in the work of
Piaget holds that knowledge is actively constructed by the learner and not
passively transmitted by the educator. In addition, there is the radical
constructivism of von Glasersfeld… in which cognition is considered adaptive in
the sense that it is based on and constantly modified by a learner’s experience.
Beyond that, there is the social constructivist version of Vygotsky, who in an
effort to challenge Piaget’s ideas developed a fully cultural psychology stressing
the primary role of communication and social life in meaning formation and
cognition. The latter version of constructivism is accentuated by theories of
sociology of scientific knowledge… which argue that all knowledge is a social
construct in the frame of science and technology studies (Boudourides, 1998).
6
Although there are those who discuss the commonalties of the types of constructivism (e.g.
Staver, 1998; Ernest, 1995), it seems that it is more popular (or at least more fun) to polarize the
versions, choose an extreme, and enter into debate. With the radical constructivists on one end of
a continuum and the social constructivists on the other, they dispute over “whether the mind is
located in the head or in the individual-in-social-action, and whether learning is primarily a
process of active cognitive reorganization or a process of enculturation into a community of
practice continues” (Cobb, 1994, p. 35). I am not sure where I would place myself on this
continuum, nor am I sure that I really want to. It is an argument that I would rather not engage in,
and yet I feel that constructivism as a theoretical perspective has potential.
In a criticism of constructivsm, Kozloff (1998) states that “constructivist ‘theory’ is a
mishmash of overlapping platitudes and absurdities… Taken separately, constructivist
‘propositions’ are merely simpleminded. Taken together, they are indistinguishable from the
verbal behavior of a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia.” This “schizophrenia” is
apparent in the following journal entry I made as I was struggling to make sense of the
constructivist literature I had been reading and reflecting on:
I argue that socially constructed knowledge is individual knowledge… I don’t think
there is such a thing as social knowledge. How can an inanimate thing have
knowledge? It is not possible. I like Paul Cobb’s notion of social knowledge as “taken
as shared” where cultural norms, traditions, language, etc. are taken as shared
meanings. But it is always the individual with his or her own knowledge, which is
dynamic and “multiple” in truths. I would argue that the knowledge that I hold is, has
been and continues to be influenced by, adaptive to, and created in response to those
and that which I encounter. We are not separate from the world that we live in, but
maybe our knowledge can be. There is a constant exchange of information from the
inter to intramental planes. I believe we have Inner Voice (Vygotsky) in our intramental
plane which allows (affords) us the opportunity to hold multiple truths. I am not sure if
we can exchange information from intermental plane to intermental without going
intramental first. This is because I think that in order to process ideas, we have to attach
language to it (even if we are just repeating the language of another) and the
interpretation of language is an intra activity. (Journal Entry, April 9, 2001)
7
I find value in both ends of the individual/social debate but clearly have a lot of difficulty
deciding which end I want to locate myself closest to. Thus I end up feeling as if I am just
running back and forth.
When I was first introduced to constructivism it sounded so simple and wonderful – we
construct our own knowledge based on our experiences. Social constructivism added the idea
that we do this constructing with other people. I believe that cooperative learning is an effective
and meaningful strategy so it seemed clear that I had found my theory. But things got fuzzy
when I reflected on the meaning of theory, critically investigated what constructivism is, and
thought about cooperative learning from a social constructivist perspective. Suchting (1992)
describes this journey well as he discusses constructivism and the danger of its rhetoric:
Certain words and combinations of words are repeated like mantras, and while
this procedure may well eventually produce in some what chanting is often
designed to do, namely, produce a certain feeling of enlightenment without the
tiresome business of intellectual effort, this feeling nearly always disappears with
the immersion of the head in the cold water of critical interrogation. (p. 247)
The “cold water of critical interrogation” shocked me as I found dichotomies and
inconsistencies that were and continue to be difficult to reconcile. Not ready to totally abandon
the idea of adopting a social constructivist perspective for my proposed study, but wanting a way
to escape the apparent dualities and inconsistencies within the theory, I decided to take the
challenge offered by Kozloff (1998):
If one were interested in cogent, well-written, intellectually rigorous and
illuminating works on how human beings collaboratively produce knowledge
(and folly), one would not pay much attention to the watery soup served up by
constructivists in education and psychology, but to:
(1) Emile Durkheim—The elementary forms of the religious life (1912); (2)
David Hume—A treatise of human nature (1738); (3) Peter Berger and Thomas
Luckmann—The social construction of reality (1966); (4) George Herbert
Mead—On social psychology (1934); (5) Harold Garfinkel — Ethnomethodology
(1966); (6) Karl Mannheim—Ideology and utopia (1955); (7) Alfred
Schutz—Collected works (1962, 1964) and The phenomenology of the social
8
world (1967); (8) Charles MacKay — Extraordinary popular delusions and the
madness of crowds (1931); and (9) Kenneth Burke—A grammar of motives
(1969) and A rhetoric of motives (1969).
Although I did not read all of his recommendations, I did take seriously the challenge to read
about (social) constructivism in a variety of fields: science, sociology, philosophy, anthropology,
and theology to name a few. I have learned that there is no escape from the polarization of the
individual and the society, the internal and the external. Similar conversations about dualities,
dichotomies, and polar opposites occur in each discipline.
Joining a Conversation of Duality
When I first started reading about social constructivism across the disciplines, ideas
seemed very disconnected. Language quickly became an issue. I found that words like
knowledge, reality, constructivsm, constructionsim, postmodern, objective, etc. were clearly
context-, discipline-, and author-dependent. Consider the following three books:
The Social Construction of Reality (Peter Berger &Thomas Luckman, 1966)
The Social Construction of What? (Ian Hacking, 1999)
Social Constructivsm as a Philosophy of Mathematics Education (Paul Ernest, 1998).
Hacking cites Berger & Luckman and Ernest. Earnest cites Berger and Luckman – as a matter of
fact, the table of contents of Ernest’s book is very similar to that of Berger and Luckman’s. I
imagined that the books would be similar or that at least language would be used consistently oh, the naiveté. Similar titles do not necessarily equal similar content.
It is important to note that Berger and Luckman are sociologists, Paul Ernest is professor
of mathematics education, and Hacking is philosopher of science. Because of the context within
each author was discussing the possibilities and implications for knowledge that has been
socially constructed, at first read they seemed to be discussing different ideas using different
9
terminology. Upon further inspection, I realized that (at least for me) Berger and Luckman’s
concept of “society as subjective reality” is analogous to Hacking’s notion of “social
construction” which is analogous to Ernest’s view of “fallibilism.” Each author also presented a
binary view of social constructivism: society as objective reality, realism, and absolutism,
respectively.
As I continued to study and reflect on past readings, it became apparent to me that
long-standing dualistic debates have developed and are seen in many disciplines. The
dichotomies presented in Table 1 appear to parallel an overarching struggle between the
individual (the internal) and the society (the external). Where you place a greater trust affects
where you situate yourself theoretically.
Table 1
Dualities and Binaries Across the Disciplines
Discipline
Duality
Anthropological
Methodology
Objectivity / Subjectivity
Heshusius (1992)
Mathematics
Absolutism / Fallibilism
Ernest (1998b)
Mathematics Education
Radical & Social Constructivism
Staver (1998)
Pedagogical Strategies
Competitive / Cooperative
Johnson & Johnson (1991)
Philosophy
Reductionism / Holism
Hacking (1999)
Psychology
(Levels of Consciousness)
Participatory / Reflective
Jay Earley (1999)
Sociology
Society of Objective Reality / Subjective Reality
Berger & Luckman (1966)
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Language Development
Piaget / Vygotsky
Boudourides (1998)
Ian Hacking (1999) vividly describes and reminds us of the on going process in the
polarity debate:
…there are contemporary versions of problems that have vexed Western thinkers
for millennia… old words tend to become
hulks encrusted with
barnacles. But scrape off the parasites for yourself, and you might glimpse the
gleaming hull of an Aristotle or a Plato shining through. My observation is not
that we ought to be doing the same things that they began, but that the same old
things are still being done” (p.63).
I believe there is value in continuing this same old polarized debate – it is important to hear and
be challenged by different perspectives. But there is also value in striving to find some common
ground.
Deconstructing Duality
Steffe (1995) claims that “conflicts can paralyze action” (p. 489). If we consider the roles
of constructivsm/realism in classrooms, the action becomes linked to children and they are much
too valuable to become casualties of theoretical wars. Steffe gives the following invitation:
I agree with Ernest that we should give respect to those positions with which we
disagree. But I go even further by asking the proponents of particular
epistemologies to seriously consider how they might modify their ways of thinking
in view of their differences with other epistemologies… (p. 489)
It seems that he is suggesting a sort of “meet in the middle,” peacekeeping strategy. Keep on
mind, that inherent in the idea of “meeting in the middle” is the assumption that there are two
ends. Thus, Steffe’s proposal makes sense if you assume that a continuum is the only way to
think about these apparently dichotomous positions.
The polarization of theoretical perspectives is a product of language – a structural move.
We classify objects, people, and ideas in binaries all the time. “Derrida (1977) lists some of these
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polarities for us: ‘normal/abnormal, … fulfilled/empty… positive/negative’”(cited in Crotty,
1998, p. 206). I am sure that you can think of others such as black/white, good/bad, and
young/old. St. Pierre and Pillow (2000) remind us to be aware of the fact that polarities are a part
of the structure of our language.
We must point out that this sort of structural mistake is difficult to avoid since we
are always speaking within the language of humanism, our mother tongue, a
discourse that spawns structure after structure after structure – binaries,
categories,
and other grids of regularity. (p. 4)
Being aware of this difficulty may entail just recognizing that it exists (having a
poststructural theoretical perspective) or it may involve taking some sort of action
(deconstructive methodologies) against the limits of our humanistic language. I argue that you
cannot have a poststructuralist theoretical perspective unless you have engaged in some form of
deconstruction. In their discussion of overcoming and moving beyond Cartesian dualisms,
Heshusius and Ballard (1996) explain that “postmodern deconstructionist thought demystifies
Cartesian dualisms in that it claims the impossibility of modernity’s belief in
representation…and that it points to the impossibility of describing reality through a transparent
language” (p. 9). If we have come to the place where we are demystified and are able to point to
the impossibilities of language, then I claim we have already applied “deconstructivist
methodologies [that] aim to generate skepticism about beliefs that are often taken for granted
within sociology, economics, psychology, and other social scientific discourses” (Collins, 2000,
p. 53)
I next look at the implications of deconstructing the binaries listed in Table 1 and viewing
them with a poststructural lens. In Caputo’s discussion of a roundtable discussion with Jacque
Derrida, he metaphorically describes the process of deconstructing as follows:
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Whenever one runs up against a limit, deconstruction presses against it. Whenever
deconstruction finds a nutshell – a secure axiom or a pithy maxim – the very idea
is to crack it open and disturb this tranquility. Indeed, that is a good rule of thumb
in deconstruction. That is what deconstruction is all about, its very meaning and
mission, if it has any. One might even say that cracking nutshells is what
deconstruction is. In a nutshell. (p. 32)
Cracking open dualism (challenging the reality of the aforementioned dichotomies) can free us
up to accept Steffe’s invitation. But, instead of modifying views, integrating ideas that once
seemed polar opposites now becomes a possibility. What follows is a list of examples of this act
of integration. Although some of these scholars did not claim to have “deconstructed duality,” I
argue that by offering or suggesting integrated theoretical perspectives, they have cracked open
the confining nutshell of duality.
Mathematics Education:
Paul Cobb (1994) asserts that instead of “adjudicating a dispute between opposing
perspective,” we would do well to “explore ways of coordinating (emphasis added)
cognitive constructivist and sociocultural perspectives in mathematics education” (p.
35).
Philosophy of Science:
Michael Polanyi takes the position that the knower is not separate from the known: they
are integrated. “Equal stress must be put on both terms - "personal" and "knowledge" -to avoid reductionism in either direction: into fuzzy subjectivism and taste or sterile
formalism. In this pragmatic epistemology, knowledge is embodied in human experience
and performance” (Rothfork, 1995).
Qualities of Consciousness (psychology):
Jay Earley (1999) offers an integrated philosophy as “solutions to the planetary crisis
[the loss of meaning, empathy, and vitality in today’s world] in the consciousness realm
involve integrating (emphasis added) participatory and reflexive consciousness.”
Science:
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David Griffin (1988) proposes a unified science that he calls “Postmodern Organicism”
where science and the world are reenchanted. He claims that adopting a postmodern
organismic philosophy we would give heed to Stephen Toulman's call for “‘a single
integrated system (emphasis added) united by universal principles,’ which portrays ‘all
things in the world – human, natural, and divine – as related together in an orderly way’”
(p. 30).
Sociology:
Gerard Delaney (1997) claims that “the constructivist – realist debate is a confused one”
(p. 131) and that “the constructivist – realist divide is in fact a false dichotomy … the two
sides can in fact be interpreted in reconcilable fashion” (p. 133). He offers an integrated
(emphasis added) notion of ‘constructivist realism.”
Adopting an integrated theoretical perspective for a study on cooperative learning sounds
like a much better choice than trying to place myself somewhere on a continuum with the
individual student at one end and society (the group) at the other. Cooperative learning requires
individuals working as a team; therefore, it is important to study both the individual and the
group. As such, integrated theories become very enticing. Selecting an integrated perspective can
feel like taking the best of both worlds and meeting in the middle.
Troubling Integrated Theories
“This constant intertwining and blending of elements once seen as distinct… if we are
looking through post-structuralist eyes, the once clear cut lines of demarcation appear blurred…
The traditional antinomies, so dear to our heart – where have the gone?” (Crotty, 1998, p.209).
Greer (1996) echoes Crotty’s concerns as he cautions that “in the ferment of new ideas,
liberalization of methodology, and openness to concepts from many disciplines, there are risks of
losing balance through over-compensation” (p. 182). Consider the inherent risk that lies in
adopting an integrated theoretical perspective. The clear-cut lines of demarcation I am
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considering are the lines between the individual and the social. That “blending of elements” is
problematic for me because I physically see four individual students and one cooperative group.
If I tried to blur the lines and observe both the individuals and the group at the same time, I
would most likely focus on the interactions between students – what is happening on the
intermental planes.
Steffe (1995) claimed that “clearly there is a crucial need to work out what Bauersfeld
identifies as the ‘urgent research questions’ – how we understand and describe in detail the
relationships between observable social realities and individual development” (p. 507). Perhaps
this acknowledgement makes him nervous, because Dr. Steffe is always saying to me “Please
don’t lose the individual in your study!” He says this with such concern in his voice. I assure him
that I will not lose the individual and then walk away wondering how that could even happen. I
know that I would never lose sight of the fact that I am working with individual students who
form a group, but I am becoming aware that the language of an integrated perspective could
easily shroud the individual. It is once again language and labeling that are troubling. Is
cooperative learning a label for a group or an individual in a group or the integration? If I say
integrate then do I miss the other of the separate?
Derrida’s concept of the “other” of language (e.g. Caputo, 1993, Crotty, 1998, St. Pierre,
2000) is pertinent to this discussion. Caputo (1993) offers one of Derrida’s descriptions of this
“other:”
The other is never simply outside or inside language. The other is never conceivable
or referable except by means of resources of linguistic difference, yet it is never
reducible to a string of signifiers. The other is a being of marginality, on the margins
of language, occupying the point of contact where language opens up to things and
where things break in upon and break open language. (p. 457)
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The other is always there, is unavoidable, and is difficult to describe. In the reality of a moment I
can be aware of the blended elements of a cooperative learning environment, but the written
description or re-presentation, by nature, must focus on one element at a time. Language is
limited in that way. In describing a scene, an event or even person, we focus on different aspects
until we feel we have adequately described the whole.
As a theory, integration makes sense; it feels right. As a theoretical perspective for guiding the
methodology of a study on cooperative learning, it feels limited. As I said earlier, the theoretical
perspective I adopt would help guide what I pay attention to. I want to pay attention to the group
as a whole, the individual students and the interactions among and between the individuals.
Although integrated theories offer a solution to the polarized debates, I agree with Hacking
(1999) who says
I do not want peace between the constructionist and the scientist… it’s a dilemma that
doesn’t need to be solved … we analytic philosophers should be humble, and
acknowledge that what is confused is sometimes more useful than what has been
clarified. (p.29)
The next section discusses an approach to adopting a theoretical perspective that, rather
than simply integrating theories, maintains the integrity and strength of the individual theories. It
is a perspective cognizant of the fact that “each of these traditions [theories of social practice and
theories of identity] has something crucial to contribute” (Wenger, 1994, p. 15).
Re-presenting the Synergism Hypothesis as a Theoretical Perspective
Dr. Peter Corning (Director of the Institute for the Study of Complex Systems in Palo
Alto, California) also enters the dialectic discussion of theory, but with a significantly different
perspective than those previously presented. Remarking on the holism and reductionism debate
of the past century, Corning (1998) argues that:
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what sets the present era apart is the fact that the scientific enterprise seems to be in
the process of bridging the theoretical chasm between holism and reductionism;
there seems to be a growing appreciation of the inextricable relationships between
(and within) wholes and parts . . . relationships which necessitate multi-leveled,
multi-disciplinary, “interactional” analyses.
He proposes that instead of adopting a theoretical perspective that focuses on a single aspect of a
researchable situation or integrating two or more perspectives, one should adopt a perspective
that guides the researcher to look through, well, all these lenses. In reacting to Einstein’s
statement that “we should make things as simple as possible, but not simpler,” Corning (1998)
makes the claim that “theoretical simplifications, or generalizations, may serve to identify key
features, common properties, or important relationships among various phenomena. Equally
important, a concept which encompasses a broad range of phenomena may also serve as the
anchor for a theoretical framework.” He offers a “synergy paradigm” as this type of concept and
claims that this “implies a… research focus which gives equal weight to both reductionist and
holistic perspectives…”
Initially, Corning’s suggested paradigm seemed rather idealistic. Certainly, I want to “see
it all” in a cooperative learning environment. But, because I believe research is a systematic
approach to a search for answers, claiming that I will create a situation where students are doing
mathematics cooperatively and then observe all of the pieces is problematic. This approach does
not feel much different than the one I have taken for the past ten years as I have incorporated
cooperative learning into my classroom… the approach that left me with many questions and few
answers.
Upon further investigation and reflection, I have found that the adoption of Corning’s
proposed ‘synergistic” theoretical perspective can lend itself nicely to a systemic approach of
17
addressing the question of how students learn cooperatively. Corning (1999) offers the following
description of a this “synergistic perspective:”
A synergy perspective suggests a paradigm that explicitly focuses on both wholes
and parts, and on the interactions that occur among the parts, between parts and
wholes and between wholes at various levels (referring to Michael Polanyi’s
hierarchy of levels) of interaction and causation.
It is important to point out that Corning does not ever claim that his theory is
integrated—multi-leveled and interactional, but not integrated. Corning encourages researchers
to pay attention to the individual components. He does not JUST mesh them together with the
whole (the individual is not lost) - this is an aspect of synergism that I really appreciate Corning
also notes that the traditional view synergism (the whole is greater than the sum of its parts) is
“actually a caricature, a narrow and perhaps misleading definition of a multi-faceted concept.”
He prefers to claim that “the effects produced by wholes are different (emphasis original) from
what the parts can produce alone.”
I currently choose to adopt of theoretical perspective based on this synergism paradigm.
This decision then begs the question: What does this mean for me as I study cooperative
learning? My answer is simply and profoundly - simultaneous direction and freedom. A
synergistic perspective provides the direction to for focusing on and collecting data with a
systematic tri-fold approach that is comprised of the part, the whole, and the part/whole aspects
of cooperative learning. The individual students are the “parts,” the cooperative group is the
“whole,” and both the internal and external, verbal and nonverbal exchanges are the
“interactions.” The freedom this perspective provides lies in the idea that “All these dualisms
that I started with... pieces of all of them are important to me” (journal entry, May 2001). So the
dilemma of where to place myself on that individual/society continuum becomes non-existent. I
can freely move back and forth along the continuum using the aspects of a specific theory or
18
philosophy that feel right to me (and applicable to a study cooperative learning) and leave the
rest behind. No longer do I feel trapped by the “intellectual shackles” (Corning, 1998) of a
solitary perspective
Fashioning a Theoretical Framework
I agree with Paul Ernest (1998a) that a “qualitative research paradigm provides a methodology,
that is, a general theoretical perspective on knowledge and research, that allows specific
methods, instruments, and techniques to be selected for particular projects” (p. 22-23). As I said
earlier, the theoretical perspective I use for informing and guiding data collection will inform and
guide the framework within with I analyze and make sense of the data. I turn now to the
description of what a theoretical framework could look like in the context of a study on
cooperative learning with a synergistic theoretical perspective.
For me, learning is a combination of discourse, experience, individual thought, and
reflection. I want to describe and analyze these components of learning (specifically
cooperative learning) within the context of the three previously discussed ingredients of a
synergy paradigm: the part, the whole, and the interactions. As I search for answers to the
questions of: How will I do this? How will I pay attention to all these aspects? What are
some of the tools that can help me make sense of what I am looking at?, I am reminded that
“a synergy paradigm implies a multi-leveled, interactional research focus” - thus it “invites
both inter and intra-level analyses and explanatory models” (Corning, 1999).
OKAY:
HERE’S WHERE I AM STUCK!!
Some of the tools I would like to use to inform interview protocols and data analysis are…
 Emergent and Grounded Qualities (Earley, 1999)
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 Intra and Intermental Planes (Vygotsky, 1978)
 Inner Voice (Wertsch and Toma)
 Adaptation and Perturbations (Piaget and von Glasersfeld)
I don’t really know what to say about them… Do I just define what they mean to me? Do I
discuss how I would use them in a hypothetical situation (in the absence of data)? I get pretty
uptight when I get to this point and I freeze.
What follows is a visual representation of all these ideas about analysis, etc. that are running
around in my mind. The creation this model helped things seem so much clearer for me… I look
at it now and I’m not so sure…
20
Intramental
planes
Visualization
Object Creation
Cognition
Researcher...
as a participant (PC) ~ inter
as an observer (RC) ~ intra
what do I “transfer?”
why? (that’s my subjectivity)
emergent
qualities
individual
constructions
what do I take back? why?
(that’s my intersubjectivity)
Socio-cultural
taken as shared
ground qualities
Socially Constructed
Participatory Consciousness
Intersubjectivity
intermental plane
Focus of Study
What gets transefered
from intra to inter? why?
The “black box”
What happens here?
Theorectical Framework
Subjectivity
trust, power,
personalities
Working together not as
dichotomies!!
(postmodern theory frees
me from black/white box)...
objectivity/subjectivity
reflexive/participatory
realism/constructivism
radical/social
science/faith
humanist/enchantment
grounded/emergent
Critical Realism
Reflexive
Consciousness
21
Characterizing the Synergistic Researcher
Not only does adopting a synergistic theoretical perspective help determine a theoretical
framework but it also helps define the role of the researcher. I have wrestled again and again
with the multiple roles I would have in doing a study on cooperative learning: teacher,
researcher, friend, etc… Once again adopting a synergistic theoretical perspective provides me
freedom from this tension. It becomes necessary to be aware of and include all of those roles. I
am free to be my multiple-self. I can be more reflective and objective in one moment and then in
another be participatory and very subjective. I can look at the research process both with a
critical realistic perspective in one moment and then in another with a constructivist perspective.
Multiplicity becomes a solution not a problem within a synergy paradigm.
Note: I wrote a short story about 4 women who decided to do a research study together (see the
other attached file if you are interested). They were Jayne (a youth minister), Sherry (a beginning
qualitative methodologist), Esther (a reform-oriented secondary mathematics teacher), and Leslie
(a student of learning theories). The following is an excerpt from the conclusion of the story:
It’s difficult, don’t you think, when people with different agendas and passions get
together to do an interview. There were times when it got very tense and times when it all
seemed very natural. I suppose if Jayne, Esther, Sherry, and Leslie keep working together
they’ll learn to balance it all. You might wonder why they would keep working together?
Well that’s where I come in. My name is Lisa Sheehy… I am a high school mathematics
teacher who is on staff with Young Life who has just gone back to graduate school to get
her Ph.D. in secondary mathematics education. The women I introduced you to be
actually just part of me that sometimes conflict, sometimes work together naturally, and
are striving towards balance. Doing research sometimes feels “schizophrenic”. Maybe it
should? (Sheehy, 2001)
Yes ~ I think it should.
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