Download Khrushchev and agriculture

Khrushchev and agriculture
The problems of agriculture
In September 1953 Khrushchev laid out new plans for the failing agricultural sector. He was regarded as
something of an agricultural expert, being the son of a peasant. For the first time since the late 1920s there
was an honest analysis of the situation:
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there were fewer animals in the USSR than before the Revolution
farmers' income was far too low because of the low State procurement prices
productivity was very low
the party had been deliberately misled by the use of 'biological yields'
high taxes on farmers were a disincentive to progress
Under Khrushchev there was a fundamental reversal in the relationship between the agricultural sector and the
rest of the economy. Agriculture now became the recipient of industry and investment.
Khrushchev's remedies
Pricing was the first important element to change. It is difficult to generalise about many different crops,
but on average procurement prices rose by about 25 per cent between 1953 and 1956. Costs to the kolkhozy
were cut - such as the cost of transport and the hire of equipment from the MTS. Peasant taxation was also
reorganised so that it was paid on plot-size rather than for example on fruit trees and livestock. Peasants
without livestock were not expected to provide meat. Large increases in the production of fertilizer and farm
machinery were announced.
All these measures would take time to show rewards, so Khrushchev then launched his most famous ‘virgin
lands’ campaign. Between 1954 and 1956 the areas of Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Urals were ploughed up
and put into cultivation. By 1956 an extra 35.9 million hectares were cultivated, equal to the total cultivated
area of Canada. To achieve this a great political campaign was launched. Komsomol members flocked out to
help in this gigantic experiment. Those who settled had to endure difficult conditions - inadequate housing and
other amenities - as well as uncertain crop yields. 1955 was a drought year though it was followed by a good
year in 1956.
Other reforms followed. Kolkhozy were allowed to set their own production targets, and given more freedom to
decide how to use their land. They were told only what they had to deliver to the State. However, the move to
amalgamate smaller collectives into larger units continued, the number being roughly halved between 1950 and
1960. The MTS were abolished altogether and repair stations set up instead, for whose services kolkhozy had to
pay. The machinery was sold off to the farms.
Another agricultural failure?
At the 21st Party Congress Khrushchev boasted that the USSR would soon overtake the USA in its production of
meat and butter. Agriculture was put at the centre of political debate for a decade and was made a higher
priority in investment. The virgin lands experiment was a mixed success. In 1956 they contributed over
50 per cent of the total grain harvest for the USSR. However, erosion by wind proved to be a difficult problem:
13,000 square miles had their topsoil removed in 1960 alone. Results were unpredictable, as the poor harvest
of 1963 proved. Khrushchev then had to suffer the humiliation of importing grain from the capitalist West.
Khrushchev seemed to be drawn to simple solutions. He urged farmers to grow more maize, which had been
successfully grown in the Ukraine, to provide fodder to improve the quality of Soviet livestock. Eighty-five
million acres were planted, but only about one-sixth was harvested ripe - a colossal waste of manpower and
land. He later began a campaign to increase fertilizer production by 700 per cent, to boost yields from existing
fields rather than to convert more marginal land to production. The targets set proved to be impossible to reach
in the time.
The pricing system, despite being a significant improvement on Stalin's time, did little to encourage farmers to
grow what was needed. The State altered prices almost at random and the prices offered to farmers were often
less than the costs of production. This was the case for eggs, milk and meat. Shortages caused the government
to raise the prices of meat and dairy products suddenly in 1%2. This caused protests in Novocherkassk, which
despite the attempts of Praesidium leaders to calm the crowds, resulted in troops firing on rioters who broke
into the city soviet headquarters. Twenty-four were killed, though a news blackout stopped this becoming
public knowledge for thirty years.
The sale of produce from private plots provided half of a peasant's income. Despite making up only 3 per cent
of the total cultivated area, these produced over 30 per cent of the USSR's produce. There was still little
incentive to work hard on the collective fields. Initiative was lacking to improve the farmer's lot. Those who
showed some eagerness to better themselves still left the collectives. On top of this there were many
ill-conceived government initiatives, such as Khrushchev's own craze for maize, which was grown in land and
climate to which it was not suited - with inevitable results.
The closing of the MTS aimed to make kolkhozy more independent, but had unfortunate results. There were not
the barns on farms to store equipment nor the expertise to maintain them. Mechanics from the former MTS
tended to return to industry where living standards and amenities were better. Farm machinery rotted in the
fields for want of small spare parts.
Thus, while there were short term benefits to Khrushchev’s schemes, the long term benefits are doubtful. As
Westwood says, “The virgin lands, on which Khrushchev had staked his reputation, turned out to be an
achievement concealed within a failure”(Endurance and Endeavour). The achievement was the amount of land
being cultivated. Land under wheat increased to 67 million hectares, compared with only 39 million hectares in
1950. However, growth in production fell far short of the returns expected from such an increase in land and
investment. Khrushchev also made the mistake of not leaving policies alone. He expanded programmes, did not
alternate crops and worked the land too hard, leading to erosion and infertility.