Download 01. The name of the author(s) of the target article: Wilson, D. S.

01. The name of the author(s) of the target article:
Wilson, D. S., Hayes, S. C., Biglan, A., & Embry, D. D.
02. Four separate word counts (abstract: 58, main text: 993, references: 514; entire text:
1639)
It Takes Evolved Conservation Desires to Combat Evolved Exploitation Desires:
Intentional Change Viewed as an Intertemporal Choice within an Evolutionary
Framework
X.T. Wang,
Psychology Department, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD 57069, USA
[email protected]
Phone 605-677-5183
Shu Li
[email protected]
& Li-Lin Rao
[email protected]
Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing (100101), China
Abstract: Intentional change when viewed as making a risky or intertemporal choice with
evolutionary relevance helps understand its successes and its failures. To promote
future-oriented ecological rationality requires establishing a linkage between non-genetic,
cultural, and symbolic selections, and genetically congruent adaptations. Coupled with
biophilic instinct, intentional conservation is more likely to prevail against evolved desires of
environmental exploitation.
As Wilson, Hayes. Biglan and Embry argue in the target article, evolution must be at the
center of a science of change. We agree with the need to incorporate social and cultural
learning into a general evolutionary framework. However, in our view, it is a daunting task, if
not impossible, to integrate domain-specific “massive modularity” theories of evolutionary
psychology with “blank slate” theories of learning and conditioning. In this commentary, we
focus on the proposal of Wilson et al. concerning phenotypic plasticity that enables organisms
to respond adaptively to their environments, including successfully making intentional
cultural changes at scales ranging from individuals, small groups, and up to large populations.
We discuss intentional and cultural changes within an evolutionary framework of
decision-making.
One way of connecting extant literature of judgment and decision making with the theme
of intentional change is to consider change as part of risk and uncertainty. Risks are often
measured in terms of expected changes as gains or losses. Uncertainty is inherent in changes
perceived in opportunities or threats, or benefits or harms. Throughout human evolution and
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individual life history, we live with uncertainties and deal with risks. Some of the risks are
evolutionarily recurrent, while others are evolutionarily novel. Recurrent risks forge evolved
innate mechanisms to deal with them, whereas novel risks result in actions that are less
prepared and more variable and malleable. To understand why some intentional changes
succeed and others fail, identifying risks as evolutionarily recurrent or novel is necessary. In
addition, the understanding of social and cultural factors that activate or inhibit risk
management mechanisms in modern times, is important.
As an example of how risk preference of people adapts to unique features of social
group living and cultural systems, Wang (1996, 2002, 2008) demonstrated that the framing
effect, an irrational risk preference reversal due to different ways of framing or phrasing the
same choice outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), occurs in large anonymous group
contexts. However, the framing effect disappears in evolutionarily typical small group
contexts, and adapts to cultural specifics. Data from the US show that group size, which
separates the framing effects from no framing effects, is very close to Dunbar’s number of
150, which serves as an upper curtailing for social interactions (Dunbar 1992, 1998).
However, a Chinese sample of group-size dependent framing effects shows a higher group
size at the switching point (Wang, 1996). This finding indicates a larger conceptual scope of
“we-group” has adapted to a culture of higher population density, lower mobility, and more
extended social connections. Moreover, new studies found that work experience in large
corporations significantly reduces framing effects (e.g., Shimizu & Udagawa, 2011). These
studies suggest experience-induced changes in group-size-sensitive risk preference, which
adapts to the environment and culture of an organization.
Another example of cultural adaptation was revealed in a cooperative behavior field
study. Rao et al. (2011) found that behavioral changes on an even larger scale of communities
can happen automatically due to “selection by consequence” or social transmission as
expected by Wilson et al. in the target article. The degree of prosocial behavior after the
devastating 2008 Wenchuan earthquake increased proportionally with the level of residential
devastation. When threatened by natural hazards, mutual aid can serve as an adaptive
mechanism to increase the survival chances of individuals.
Wilson et al. argue, “left unmanaged, evolutionary processes often take us where we
prefer not to go.” An example in decision-making relevant to the above observation is the
study of delay of gratification and self-control. People discount the future when they prefer a
smaller and sooner (SS) reward to a larger and later (LL) reward. When viewing intentional
change as a choice between SS and LL rewards, a set of interesting evolutionary questions
can be derived. Some possible questions are, “To what extent should natural selection favor a
choice preference that is future-oriented and green? To what extent can symbolically,
culturally, or religiously made changes (e.g., future-oriented green choices) overcome,
counterbalance, or change unmanaged evolutionary desires of environmental exploitation?”
One non-genetic system that may promote future-oriented choices is the symbotype.
According to Wilson et al. a symbotype is a network of symbolic relations that regulates
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behavior in a way similar to a genotype that produces a phenotype. To achieve such goal, we
argue that education via symbotype is necessary but not sufficient. It takes evolved
conservation desires to combat effectively evolved exploitation desires (see also Penn, 2003;
E.O. Wilson, 1984, 1993, 2002). Cultural adaptations are foremost biological adaptations.
Rational planning is often victimized by seeking pleasure. The success of intentional changes
thus depends on establishing an effective link between intentional behavior and a consistent
and stronger reinforcement or prevention mechanism (e.g., conditioning or emotions). Such
mechanisms should be hardwired, evolutionarily stable, and intrinsic.
Ecologically destructive humans are ecologically rational (Penn, 2003). In his book,
Biophilia, E O Wilson (1984) proposes that humans have instinctive aesthetic preferences for
natural environments and other species. Available evidence indicates that education is not
sufficient for evoking conservation behavior (e.g., Hirst, Berry, & Soderstrom, 1981; Miller,
Brickman, & Bolen, 1975). An evolutionary perspective suggests that environmental
education will be most effective for triggering changes when it shows how the destruction of
the environment harms individual interests (Ridley & Low 1993; Heinen 1995, 1996; E. O.
Wilson, 1984). Moreover, joint forces of symbolic and religious systems should be more
efficient than either one alone. Cumulating evidence shows that education plus cultural,
traditional, and religious beliefs is an effective means to promote environmental protection
and conservation of local biodiversity as practiced by the Chinese ethnic minorities (e.g., Luo,
Liu, & Zhang, 2009; Hongmao, Zaifu, Youkai, & Jinxiu, 2002; Xu & Wilkes, 2004). The
suggestion that our evolved “human nature” is a source of environmental exploitation and
degradation is not a claim that nothing can be done, but a warning that effective conservation
will have to incorporate an understanding of relevant evolved psychological processes to
modify human actions (M. Wilson, Daly, & Gordon, 1998:517).
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