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Raoul Moati – The Night of Being
Review by Sergio Genovesi
From Deleuze to Derrida, from Badiou to Nancy and Marion, the concept of event
(évènement) witnessed an important development in the last fifty years French philosophy
and is present in the most influential authors' thought. Today, this notion still plays a central
role in several attempts to rethink ontology and phenomenology, such as Claude Romano's
event hermeneutics (hermenéutique événementiale). Even if the ideas of these philosophers
substantially differ from each other and cannot be simply grouped together, we can trace at
least one common issue in the notion of possibility. Events - with capital E - are happenings
inaugurating a new horizon of possibility. They can actualize unforeseeable potentialities or
make the impossible possible. For this reason, Events are said to be extraordinary moments
and it has been argued that they should be unpredictable (imprévisible) or even impossible
(impossible) since they lie beyond the ordinary structure of possibilities in which normal
ontological movements take place. It goes without saying that the foundation of the modal
structure of Being in such Events attests several theoretical problems If such Events
overstep the general structure of Being, how are they supposed to happen? And where
should an Event take place and have a place if Being cannot harbor its excess?
Some years before the flourishing of French “event” philosophy, Emmanuel Levinas
formulated the notion of nocturnal events (événements nocturnes) in the preface of his
masterwork Totalité et Infini. Levinas' purpose is not to develop a philosophy of events.
Indeed, in the whole book the expression "nocturnal event" is no more used and the
adjective "nocturnal" appears just a few more times. However, even this parsimonious use
of the term is enough to give us an important suggestion.The ultimate events that allow the
deployment of new possibilities and which our comprehension of the world is based on are
maybe not to be thought as impossible (im-possible), neither as unpredictable (im-prévisible). They could rather be just invisible (in-visible).
After his impressive book on Derrida and Searle, Raoul Moati keeps deepening his
researches about contemporary French philosophy dedicating an entire essay to Levinas and
his idea of nocturnal events. What these two works have in common is the great attention
given to the concept of intentionality and its Husserlian origins in the phenomenological
tradition. Levinas and the Night of Being offers a fine reconstruction of the path undertaken
by Levinas in Totalité et Infini to trace the way from the sensible ego to the infinite Other.
Moreover, Moati shows us to what extent Levinas takes distance from other
phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre as well as what does he own to
their ideas. This review will first address which are the ontological and phenomenological
involvements of nocturnal events that Moati highlights in his book. We will then retrace the
way to the infinite in the context of a nocturnal conception of Being. Finally, we will have an
overview of this book and its English translation by Daniel Wyche.
The night of Being.
What Levinas reproaches to ontology and phenomenology is not, as other philosophers
would have it, to be a sort of metaphysics of presence. Moati shows that the main critic that
Levinas addresses to ontology and phenomenology is to be in a certain sense a metaphysics
of light: they are based on “structures of illumination” (p. 65), such as intuition,
intentionality or comprehension. Sight and touch tended to have absolute primacy in the
philosophical tradition, where “to be” means thus to be visible and graspable (p. 67). The
immediate consequence of this “diurnal sense of being” (p. XVI), from which Totalité et
Infini attempts to liberate ontology, is that there is no more room left for otherness and
exteriority: being becomes a totalizing structure and the Other is reduced to the self. A
drastic rethinking of ontology, as a nocturnal broadening, is therefore needed in order to
establish a place for those events that cannot be understood as being part of Being as a
totality. That is to say,the nocturnal events.
There must be an ontology that establishes a place for ultimate events of being.
[...] Such events will no longer draw their significance from a Hegelian
totalization or even from phenomenological constitution (Husserl) or the
comprehension of the sense of being (Heidegger). The horizon of their
deployment consists in a relation to being that overflows the light of objective
evidence and of which all of these cases constitute various avatars (p. 11).
The representation of Being that Moati presents us with is thus not that of a light irradiating
the sensible world anymore, nor would it be that of a unique and totalizing illuminated
surface. There are actually more than one illuminated surfaces, and we are only able to
perceive them because of the dark background that encloses and undergirds them. Being
does not correspond to these bright spots, but rather to the infinite night surrounding them.
This night can be lightened by our "structures of illumination"and this is what originates
diurnal events. However, there will always be a dark part not being seen in which nocturnal
events are taking place.
Nocturnal events are “the nocturnal dramas by which being exhaustively produces itself”
and amount to “a more originary experience for consciousness than transcendental
constitution”(p. 15). Is it possible to find a concrete case of nocturnal events? Moati
provides us several examples taken from Levinas' philosophy to describe these "nocturnal
dramas", among them we find the erotic encounter, fecundity, sociality and messianic
peace. All these are for Levinas elements that, on the one hand, ground our primordial
openness toward the Other and his or her face and which, on the other hand, constitute the
base of an ontology that renounces to contain Being within the unity and recognises rather
its plurality, taking up the discontinuity of the same and the other (p. 81).
Even though Levinas affirms the primacy of events that are more primordial than subjective
comprehension and transcendental constitution, Moati decisively stresses that this gesture
does not correspond to a denial of the fundamental role that subjectivity, sensibility and ego
play on the path to infinity. Indeed, without the ego's sensible rooting in Being, no
experience of infinite otherness would be possible: “the metaphysical alterity of the Other
requires the precondition of the position of the self, a here-below positioned in relation to
an over-there” (p. 30). We will now see how nocturnal events and the sensible ego lead us
on the way to infinity.
The terrestrial condition.
While in the first and last chapters of Levinas and the Night of Being Moati outlines the idea
of a nocturnal ontology and unfolds the ontological involvements of nocturnal events, in the
central chapters he deploys Levinas theory of the sensible ego and follows the path to
infinity he had already sketched in Totalité et infini. The book structure self is in this way a
good representation of the nocturnal conception of being, where nocturnal events are the
dark frame of our illuminated terrestrial experience.
First of all, Moati recalls the Levinasian notions of jouissance and element (élément). As it is
known, according to Levinas the pre-objective degree of sensation corresponds to what he
calls il y a (there is), that is the undefined existence without the existent, the
undifferentiated element in which the self is originally immersed, the starting point of any
further experience: “the element is the content from which forms are carved out, but it is
not, as such, itself delimited by anything” (p. 52). The first break in the uniformity of the
element coincides with the subject's jouissance, representing “the concrete mark of
separation” (p. 41). Enjoyment is “the contact between sensibility and the formless quality
of the element” (p. 94). It corresponds to sensation and more precisely to the very moment
when the instrumental schema of the sensible is rejected and the subject just perceives his
or her distinction and independence from the elemental world. Before having the possibility
to be part of an ethical encounter with the Other, the subject should first have an ontic
consistency: “enjoyment thus reveals the fundamental priority of the ontic for ontology” (p.
47). This idea of a detachment and a constitution of the subject from and through the
element questions the phenomenological distinction between constituent and constituted.
Indeed, if on the one hand the ego shapes objectivity starting from the undifferentiated
element, it is itself in turn delimited by the element:
Enjoyment reveals the impossibility of reducing the constituted to the position
of the intentional correlate of the constitutive acts of transcendental
consciousness. Every constituted object reveals itself through enjoyment just as
much as it occupies the position of the constituent, which is to say the sensible
nourishment of the self (p. 55).
Once subjectivity consolidated, the self is ready for the encounter with the Other. This
encounter begins in two other well known topoi of the Levinasian production: the dwelling
(demeure), that is “the starting-place of any finalized human activity” (p. 91), and the labor
(travail), that consists “in the transformation of elemental nature into a world of identifiable
things” (p. 94). In order to encounter the Other, that is to manifest himself or herself to the
Other, the subject should first have some possession to share with the Other, something to
communicate to him or her. Here lies the fundamental importance of labor. It allows us to
substantialize the element and fix it between the dwelling's walls. Through labor we make
the world and its objects identifiable and we start having possessions. At this point, Moati
highlights and develops another great Levinasian intuition that, as the idea of a nocturnal
ontology does, anticipates and responds to several difficult theoretical issues emerging in
later event philosophy, especially the ones related to the possibility of the given and to its
ontological status. Labor and possession - says Moati - turn the category of being into the
category of having and they do that through a neutralization of being:
The thing is also, therefore, nothing more than the element, because it coincides
with an element whose ontological independence has been neutralized and, in
other words, whose being has been anesthetized. Put differently, through labor
and the possession that results from it, the being (l’être) of the element
becomes the having (l’avoir) of the self. [...] The element becomes something
only through the suspension of its being. Here, the ontological frontiers of the
element no longer exceed those of the self, which is to say that we are now
dealing with being insofar as it is possessed by someone (the self) (p. 95).
Furthermore, in the event of the encounter our possessions become gift for the Other (p.
136), and this gift is the content of the fundamental relation of teaching, that is the
constitutive relation that marks the Other as such. As someone being my master not
because of his or her deeper knowledges, but because of his or her radical otherness (p.
126). Our shared world, that is the object of our ontology, does not follow the logic of being
anymore, but that of having and giving. We are here facing a movement from être to il y a,
from sein to es gibt.
Nocturnal events.
Our possessions, shared in the social contest, exceed thus the ontology of light and become
constitutive of the nocturnal event of sociality, a feature that marks us as humans. As the
last step of the reconstruction, Moati finally points out how such nocturnal events, way far
from being transcendent moments indirectly concerning the terrestrial condition, are not to
be thought separately from our sensible way of being and how it grounds all other diurnal
activities. We will now cite two cases Moati presents us with: sociality and fecundity.
Sociality is the base of our relationship with the Other. Because ofit we always already
possess the idea of the infinite (p. 107), which otherwise would be paradoxical and
unreachable, for it would be reducible to totality of the self. Through sociality, ultimate
event of Being, it is possible to articulate a relationship between the two terms (me and the
Other) and at the same time maintain their separation (p. 112). It is remarkable that
sociality is an event of Being itself, constitutively belonging to its nocturnal structure.
Because of sociality, Being is not a totalized monolithic Eleatic Being but is rather open and
plurivocal. Moreover, in reason of this fundamental sociality, subjects can live their ethical
relationship with the others expressing themselves through their discourse and
interlocutory presence. Discours and teaching are the way in which the Other reveals to us
his or her transcendence and allows us to have a relation with the infinite without reducing
it to ourselves. Moati stresses one more time that this kind of expression is not to be
understood in the context of a structure of illumination: “The one who expresses himself or
herself does not draw his or her intelligibility from the light "borrowed" from intentionality
and unveiling, from which the same emerges” (p. 115).
If sociality allows a relation without totalising elements of a plurivocal being, fecundity
makes possible the production and realization of the infinite becoming of being. Moreover,
it also represents a valuable alternative to the Heideggerian Geworfenheit to describe our
terrestrial condition and our rooting in the concrete temporal situation. Moati recalls the
famous example of the father/son relationship and gives us an account of its ontological
meaning:
For the self, to be is also, through fecundity, to be other. The father is his son, in
the precise sense in which the father transcends the horizon of his own selfhood
in the son. The selfhood of the son, in the form from which the self of the father
emerges, no longer coincides with the selfhood of the departure, that of the
father. In fecundity, the self is discontinuous, fragmented. This discontinuity is
an ultimate event of being itself, insofar as it is social, which is to say,
transcendent and plural (p. 172).
Levinas and phenomenology.
As we mentioned before, together with a detailed development of the concept of nocturnal
events and a reconstruction of the sensible ego's relation with the infinite, Moati provides
us with illuminating comparisons between Levinas and other prominent phenomenologists
throughout this book . These comparisons aim at explaining to what extent he kept
following the Husserlian and Heideggerian ideas and what kind of disagreements he had
with his contemporaries.
It goes without saying that the greatest dissent with Husserl concerns the ideas of
transcendental ego and intentionality. We already saw how Levinas gives up the primacy of
intentionality as a mean of objective representation since it is reduced to a structure of
illumination, and how the distinction between constituent and constituted is questioned.
Besides it, Moati also stresses the fact that Levinas cannot accept Husserl's notion of
transcendental ego for at least two reasons.First of all, the ego is always already sensible
and we cannot think of an ego beyond its sensible situation. Second, Levinas reproaches the
subjective non determination of the concept of transcendental ego. Indeed, its generality
“hinders the possibility of establishing a relation that departs from the concrete
immanence, from which only the other may speak — which is to say, deploy its ethical
infiniteness” (p. 182). All these remarks could be summed up in the general critic that
Husserlian phenomenology brings about a totalization of the other and reduces it to the
self.
Concerning Heidegger, Moati highlights that in the eyes of Levinas his historical and
temporal conception of Dasein and thrownness (Geworfenheit) surely represent a step
forward compared to the Husserlian suprahistorical model of consciousness. However, it
would be a mistake to describe the sensible installation of our sensible ego within the
element in terms of thrownness. More specifically, the concept of thrownness is linked to a
conception of our existence based on the notion of power, that Levinas instead wants to
quit: thrownness reveals our limits only in regard to the power that we have over our being.
On the contrary, for Levinas our primordial situation is a position that locates consciousness
beyond any positive or negative reference to power (p. 78) and corresponds to the
nocturnal event of fecundity. While thrownness puts us in the tragic condition of being
powerless faced with our historical sensible determination and subject to the given horizon
of possibility that is opened up to us with our birth, fecundity frees our terrestrial condition
from this tragic connotation. Indeed, fecundity is here situated in the context of an ontology
that renounces every claim of totalization and, therefore, renounces the primary role of
power in representing our relationship with the Other: “the primacy of sensible happiness
over any condition of misfortune becomes intelligible only once the nocturnal event of
fecundity is elucidated, which in turn opens up the sensible depth of our being-in-the-world.
It is thus fecundity that exhausts the reference to power and allows us to grasp the depth of
our foundation in being” (p. 83).
Another important disagreement drawn by Moati concerns Sartre. It is true that for both
Levinas and Sartre the Other cannot be the object of a phenomenological reduction because
of his or her transcendence and the encounter with the other takes the form of a
dispossession of the world. But in this disagreement, Sartre understands this dispossession
as a kind of alienation from the world, while for Levinas it actually corresponds to the “real
becoming an objective world” (p. 135). Indeed, Levinas sees a world that is only possessed
and not shared, a silent world without discourse, as a contradictory world that remains
subjective and relative. Since sociality grounds our being in the world, sharing our
possessions with the other becomes the realization of our humanity and does not imply for
us any kind of loss. The world is always a common world.
The last comparison that Moati presents us with is the one with Derrida and focuses
especially on Derrida's essay Violence et métaphysique. First of all, Moati points out a
misunderstanding concerning the concept of "transcendental violence" in Derrida's reading
of Totalité et infini. This misunderstanding is caused by the different grasping of the concept
of intentionality and egoity that the two authors have: while Derrida thinks about the ego in
the ethical relation as a transcendental ego (even if, as we all know, he strongly criticizes the
Husserlian idea of transcendental), Levinas is instead talking about a sensible ego. The
critique Derrida addresses to Levinas on "transcendental violence" thus misses its
addressee, since Levinas refuses to problematize the subject's relation with the other in
transcendental terms (p. 181). Moreover, the most stimulating remark that is formulated by
Moati in this comparison is for sure the one concerning their two different conceptions of
eschatology, for this thematic directly relates to event philosophy. Roughly, the greatest
difference between the two authors lies in the fact that Derrida thinks the infinite in
eschatology as a negativity, an endless process of spacing produced by the infinite waiting
for an Other that never comes. In other words, as an infinite différance. For Derrida history
designates “the ever-unachieved work of transcendental constitution”and is to be
understood as “opening up to a nonpresence at the heart of phenomenality” (p. 186). On
the other hand, eschatology “lies in history as the movement of overflowing the closure of
finite sameness” (p. 187). Quite the opposite, Levinas sees eschatology as a relation to
positive infinity. The Other manifests his or her infinite transcendence to us in a positive
way, without a negative withdrawing. For Levinas eschatology is not contained within
history but rather suspends it, “not only in that the transcendent passage from finite totality
to the positivity of the infinite happens through it, but also in that eschatology suspends any
recourse to our constituent powers to deduce the event of the revelation of the infinite” (p.
187).
I would like to underline this final remark. In his late works, starting with Psyche. Inventions
de l'autre, Derrida explicitly mentions the event of the coming of the Other as a
fundamental - even quasi-transcendental - element of our experience and the human
condition. Nevertheless, for Derrida the Other never comes and should never come in order
to keep open the empty space needed to welcome him or her. This is why the event is
impossible for Derrida; its conditions of possibility are its condition of impossibility. Levinas'
nocturnal events, and above all the event of sociality allowing our relationship with the
infinite transcendence of the Other, free us from the paradox of an impossible foundation of
our experience and knowledge. Indeed, both in Derrida and Levinas, our theoretical
openness is based on the previous ethical striving for the Other. But while the Levinasian
ethics finds its foundation in the nocturnal event of sociality, Derrida always misses the
fundamental encounter with the Other..
In the night of Being, the Derridean spectre of the impossible could be chased by invisible
ghostbusters: the nocturnal events.
_______________
Levinas and the Night of Being is an outstanding work of research in which Raoul Moati fully
develops the ontological and phenomenological consequences of the notion of "nocturnal
event" - on which very fewwas previously written - and properly contextualizes Levinas
production in the phenomenological frame. Moati's reading of Levinas thus provides us with
new conceptual instruments to understand the key concept of ethics and otherness,
theoretical core of Totalité et infini. Inlight of his knowledge of phenomenology and French
philosophy, Moati manages to explain with a remarkable clarity what is Levinas' relation
toward Husserlian phenomenology and how it is developed in contemporary philosophy,
while also presenting critical readings of his work, such as the Derridean argument. Even
though the chapters dedicated to the reconstruction of the sensible ego's relation to infinity
give us a general glimpse of Levinasian main concepts, I would not suggest reading this
book to first approach Levinas' philosophy because of its complex critique of ontology and
phenomenology. I would rather warmly suggest this reading to anyone who is already
familiar with Levinasian ideas in general and with Totalité et Infini in particular. Indeed,
Moati's book not only helps us understanding his work by giving us a rigorous
phenomenological context but it also prevents us from misreading Levinas as an antimetaphysical or anti-ontological author. On the contrary, Moati shows us that anontology is
definitively possible insofar as we accept to also consider its nocturnal component.
Last but not least, I would like to spend a few words about Daniel Wyche's translation as
conclusion. Translating such a book is for sure not an easy task. Beyond the difficulties
caused by philosophical jargon and complex argumentative structures there are several
expressions in French, untranslatable in English, that should be rendered with neologism or
directly rewritten in French. The most complex paragraphs may therefore prove more
difficult to understand in the English version. It is maybe for this reason that the author
chose to completely rewrite several passages exclusively for the English version. Overall,
Wyche's realized an elegant translation and managed to render in English concepts that are
so idiosyncratically French. . However, I would suggest to francophone readers to check
also the original version, at least the least clear passages.