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Why Truman Bombed Hiroshima
By
Bruce Lee
The Magic summaries and the Ultra intercepts of German communications were one of
the key reasons that the Allies were able to foil the Axis plans of world domination.
Only six Americans were authorized to read these intercepts. Of these six men, only one
was elected. That was President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he did not see, nor did he
read, everything. The other policy-making recipients of Magic were Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox,
the chief of naval operations (the last being Adm. E.J. King) and Gen. George
Marshall, the Army chief of staff. The most important of these decision makers was
Gen. Marshall.
Marshall also knew prior to the February 1945 Yalta Conference that Russia would
break its nonaggression pact with Japan and attack Manchuria about 90 days after the
surrender of Germany (V-E Day). The Magic Summaries documented the shift of Soviet
troops by rail from Europe to the Far East for this purpose. Because of a major
intelligence failure, Marshall also believed that the Japanese had maintained their
troop strength in Manchuria and were capable to resisting a Soviet attack. But Tokyo
had secretly brought back many of its troops from Manchuria to defend the home
islands of Japan from an American invasion, leaving Manchuria and Korea easy prey
for the Russians.
Marshall also knew from the Magic decrypts that the Japanese home islands were to be
defended from invasion and occupation by 2.3 million troops, another 4 million Army
and Navy employees and a newly created armed militia numbering 25 million. These
defenders were sworn to fight to the death, which so many Japanese troops had done in
battles throughout the Pacific.
To effectively invade and occupy Japan, American strategists foresaw two invasions,
scheduled for November 1945 and March 1946. The first invasion, on the island of
Kyushu would employ some 770,000 American troops. The follow-up invasion on the
plains of Tokyo, leading to the forced occupation of Japan, called for 2 million
American troops.
This brings us to the heart of the Enola Gay argument made by revisionist historians
who claim
(1) That President Truman either invented after the fact high invasion casualty
estimates to provide moral and political justification for the use of atomic weapons; or
(2) That Truman was never told about potentially high invasion casualties; or
(3) That archival documentation for pre-invasion casualty estimates does not exist; or
(4) That the pre-invasion estimates were minuscule.
But according to documents I have uncovered, a conference to discuss pre-invasion
casualties was held at the White House on June 18, 1945, between President Truman
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the Pacific, Gen. Douglas MacArthur submitted
rather optimistic casualty estimates. This caused Adm. William D. Leahy, Truman’s
military advisor, to take charge of the session. Based on the experience at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa, Leahy predicted that in an invasion of Japan, 30% to 35% of U.S.
soldiers would be killed or wounded during the first 30 days. Truman obviously
understood what Leahy said. The president remarked that the invasion
Station 1 – Opinion Essay on Use of the Bomb (con’t.)
would create another Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed.
Suddenly and only after being advised about the buildup of Japanese forces and
fortifications by Magic intelligence, MacArthur medical staff revised its pre-invasion
needs for hospital beds upwards by 300%. MacArthur’s chief surgeon, Brig. Gen. Guy
Denit, estimated that a 120-day campaign to invade and occupy only the island of
Kyushu would result in 395,000 casualties.
Marshall then learned from the Magic Summaries, just before the Potsdam Conference
convened on July 17, 1945, about behind-the-scenes negotiations between Japan and
the Soviet Union. From June 3–14, 1945, Koki Hirota, a Japanese envoy with Emperor
Hirohito’s blessing, had met with the Russian ambassador to Tokyo to propose a new
relationship between the two countries. Japan proposed to carve up Asia with the
USSR. According to the Magic Diplomatic Summaries of July 3, 1945, Hirota told the
Russian ambassador: “Japan will increase her naval strength in the future, and that,
together with the Russian Army, would make a force unequaled in the world....” The
Magic Summaries further revealed that throughout June and July 1945, Japan’s
militarist leaders were adamantly determined that they would never surrender
unconditionally to the British and the Americans.
On July 4, 1945, the British agree to the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. On July
16, during the Potsdam Conference, the first A-bomb was successfully tested. A way
had been found to end the war quickly and decisively. This was the situation on July 26
when the U.S., Britain and China issued the Potsdam Declaration to Japan to
surrender unconditionally, “The alternative,” said the declaration, “is complete and
utter destruction.”
On July 25, Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki announced to the Japanese press that
the Potsdam declaration was to be ignored.” Meanwhile, the Magic Summaries
revealed that Tokyo was demanding that Moscow accept a special envoy from Emperor
Hirohito, presumably to cement the deal offering to divide Asia between Japan and
Russia while Moscow brokered a Japanese surrender with the U.S. and Britain that
would be acceptable to Tokyo.
This is what the Americans President Truman, Secretary of War Stimson and Gen.
Marshall knew the day before the first atom bomb fell on Japan. Confronted by an
enemy leadership that was self-deluded, neither prepared to surrender nor to negotiate
seriously, the Americans decided that the only way to end the war quickly would be to
use overwhelming force: nuclear weapons.
Two bombs were dropped. The Russians invaded Manchuria. On August 10, Emperor
Hirohito overruled his militarist advisors and accepted the Potsdam declaration. Japan
surrendered.
Propaganda Campaign
But the Americans continued to read the Japanese codes. Almost immediately; the
Magic Summaries revealed that the new foreign minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, had
begun a world-wide propaganda campaign to brand the Americans as war criminals
for using nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s goals included keeping Emperor Hirohito from
being tried for instigating a war of aggression, and diverting Western attention away
from the many Japanese atrocities committed since the start of the Sino-Japanese war
in 1937. “Since the Americans have recently been raising an uproar about the question
of our mistreatment of prisoners [of war],’’ Shigemitsu instructed his diplomats in the
Sept. 15, 1945, Magic Summary, “I think we should
Station 1 – Opinion Essay on Use of the Bomb (con’t.)
make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question in our propaganda. That
propaganda campaign has borne its final fruit in the revisionist account of the bombing
of Japan.
Yet the evidence is crystal clear. The use of nuclear weapons to end World War II
quickly and decisively averted the death or maiming of hundreds of thousands
American soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen. It also saved the lives of some 400,000
Allied prisoners of war and civilian detainees in Japanese hands, all of whom were to
be executed in the event of an American invasion of Japan. Above all, it saved untold
hundreds of thousands more Japanese-perhaps millions-from becoming casualties of
pre-invasion bombing and shelling, followed by two invasions and forcible occupation.
—Lee, Bruce. Retrieved December 22, 2006 from
http://www.centurychina.com/wiihist/hiroshima/ytruman.htm)
Article Summary: “Hiroshima: Was it Necessary?”
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With the end of the European war, the Allies focused their efforts on Japan. Japan still
fought fanatically, despite being badly hurt by bombing and blockade.
The Potsdam Proclamation, which demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan, was
issued. It made no mention of Japan’s central surrender condition: the status of the
emperor. Japan rejected the Proclamation.
The Japanese believed the emperor to be a god (this is a key point).
The United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russia declared
war against Japan.
Japan, because of its military, still refused to surrender.
Japanese peace advocates, fearing the imminent destruction of the emperor, prevailed
upon the emperor to break with tradition and make government policy by calling for
peace now. The emperor did so.
As the result of the emperor’s call for surrender, the entire Japanese cabinet, including the
military, agreed to surrender. The cabinet saw that this would allow the emperor to be
retained.
Even Japan’s doves would have fought to the death had they not felt the emperor would
be spared. They saw “unconditional surrender” as a threat to the emperor.
President Truman had been advised of the importance of the emperor to the Japanese.
Japan was seeking Russia’s help to end the war in July 1945. The United States was
aware of this at the time thru intercepted Japanese cables. But the United States did not
keep up with this change in Japan’s position.
The United States chose military methods of ending the war rather than diplomatic
methods. The desire for revenge helped make military methods more attractive.
Was it necessary to use the atomic bomb on Japan to end the war without an invasion of
the Japanese mainland? Quotes from historians who felt it was not necessary can be
found in: Article. Quotes from prominent Americans who felt the atomic bombings were
not necessary can be found in: Quotes.
We probably could have ended the war sooner with fewer deaths on all sides by using the
full carrot and stick: 1) offer retention of the emperor for a quick surrender; 2) threaten
Russian invasion; and 3) atomic destruction as the alternative. None of these key
incentives to surrender were used prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Had the above method failed and had the Russian invasion failed to bring surrender soon,
the atomic bombs were still available – but as a last resort.
After the atomic bombings, Japan was allowed to retain their emperor, anyway.
—Long, Doug. “Hiroshima: Was it Necessary?” Retrieved December 22, 2006 from
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
Declassified TOP SECRET Documents
http://www.dannen.com/decision/handy.html
http://www.dannen.com/decision/handy.html
Truman Tells Stalin About the Bomb
http://www.dannen.com/decision/potsdam.html
President Truman’s Personal Diary
http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-jl25.html
http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-ag09.html
Nagasaki Exploratorium
http://www.exploratorium.edu/nagasaki/photos.html#journey/01.gif
International Rules of Warfare signed off on by Roosevelt
http://www.dannen.com/decision/int-law.html#D
Letter from the Manhattan Project Scientists
http://www.dannen.com/decision/45-07-17.html