Download Moral Development: Theories and Evidence

Moral Development: Changing Theories and Evidence
Darcia Narvaez, University of Notre Dame
Moral development has been traditionally viewed as the inculcation of cultural values and moral
practices as if the child is largely a passive recipient (hence lectures and rote memorization). Piaget
(1932/1965) revolutionized development theory by documenting how individuals construct their
understanding of the world through shifting understandings that are modified by experience in
interaction with maturation (e.g., working memory increases through childhood). Countless studies
have shown how individuals are active learners, not passive tabula rasa, applying what they know to
incoming information and often getting it wrong if the information is too advanced for or culturally
different from their current knowledge (e.g., Bartlett, 1932). In short, individuals learn by actively
constructing knowledge about the world from experience. Understanding develops initially as tacit
knowledge which sometimes can be accessed explicitly (Keil & Wilson, 1999).
But this does not say enough. Vygotsky (1935) emphasized the relational aspects of learning,
how learning is scaffolded by those with more experience. Parents do this with their children, for
example, when teaching them to dance they hold them first, then have them stand on their feet to
learn the steps or the feel of the music, giving the child more and more independent control of the
action. Knowledge is built as the learner internalizes the actions and voice of the mentor for
particular situations until she can perform on her own (Rogoff, 1990). Thus knowledge, especially
explicit understanding, develops within a guided context.
In a way these two perspectives align with contemporary cognitive science’s understanding
of learning (see Hogarth, 2001, for an extensive review). Learning involves both the deliberate
conscious system (explicit knowledge) and unconscious implicit systems (tacit knowledge). The
deliberative or conscious mind can learn and access theory and apply rules and procedures (“top
down”). But most of learning in life takes place without consciousness from multiple systems
keeping records of events and associations in implicit systems. The implicit mind (adaptive
unconscious or intuitive mind) learns effortlessly from everyday experience about what works to
help meet one’s goals (“bottom up”; Reber, 1993). It appears that most of human behavior is
governed by implicit rather than deliberative systems (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), although one must
distinguish seat-of-the-pants intuition from well-education intuition (Narvaez, 2009).
The Focus on Moral Reasoning. Moral reasoning research, the primary focus of moral
psychology for over 50 years, has often emphasized the deliberate mind, asking people to articulate
reasons for making judgments (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984). However, only those with extensive
reasoning practice, like moral philosophers, are able to articulate what they know in this manner,
making it more appropriate to use measures of tacit knowledge (Rest, 1979; 1986). Indeed,
documented with tens of thousands of subjects, moral judgment develops tacitly from an emphasis
on prioritizing personal interest, to an appreciation of the rules and order of society and, with higher
education, to an ability to think postconventionally in terms of procedural justice and fair practice
(Rest et al., 1999). Those with greater preferences for postconventional thinking are more supportive
of human rights, more democratic as teachers, cheat less and are more cooperative (Rest, 1979;
1986). We also know that moral judgment best develops in a context of engaging cognitive conflict,
discussion of relevant moral dilemmas whether in the classroom with peers or at home with
responsive parents (for a review, see Lapsley, 1996). Moreover, individuals who select enriched
social environments maintain higher levels of moral reasoning during and after college (Rest, 1986).
My research has measured moral information processing with tasks like reaction time,
comprehension (e.g., recall, theme comprehension) of stories that have embedded moral content
(e.g., Narvaez & Gleason, 2007), finding that moral judgment development influences how one
perceives moral events.
Expanding the Components of Moral Functioning. Despite its importance, moral reasoning is only
one of several psychological processes related to ethics that is individually constructed with social
mediation. Other components or processes that have been identified are moral sensitivity (e.g., moral
perception, empathic response, taking the perspective of others), moral focus/motivation (e.g., ethical
identity, integrity), ethical action skills (e.g., perseverance, resolving conflicts nonviolently) (Rest, 1983;
Narvaez & Rest, 1995). Many of these capacities involve the implicit mind more than the
deliberative mind and influence moral perception and moral action (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009).
Moral exemplars exhibit actionable sets of procedural, declarative and conditional knowledge in
these components. For example, experts in ethical sensitivity are better at accurately discerning
moral situations and seeing action possibilities (Varela, 1999). They are able to take on the
perspective of the other in an effort to be morally responsive to others (Monroe, 1994). Experts in
ethical judgment are able to hold multiple perspectives as they reason about duty and consequences
to solve complex problems (Kohlberg, 1984). Experts in ethical focus prioritize and deepen
commitment to ethical goals (Walker & Frimer, 2009). Experts in ethical action know how to
implement the task step by step, persevering over years of commitment (Colby & Damon, 1991).
Virtue overall has to do with embodied understanding. Embodied cognition can be described as
‘mesh,’ the particular way that situational affordances (action possibilities), knowledge (effectivity),
and goals combine to foster action (Glenberg, 1997).
The Nature of Ethical Know-How. The virtuous person has more and better organized
knowledge about their area of excellence; they have highly tuned perceptual sensibilities for it and a
deep moral desire for it; they exhibit highly automatized, effortless responses in combination with
deliberative self-guidance. Ethical know-how or mature moral functioning (see Narvaez, 2009, for a
review) is evident in action that balances intuition and deliberation with individual capacities for
habituated empathic concern (Stout, 2009), moral imagination (Dewey, 1934), and moral
metacognition (e.g., moral self-regulation, moral self-reflection). Mature moral functioning also
involves collective capacities for moral dialogue and moral institutions. These capacities are related
to moral innovation (Tough, 2008). Many of these abilities develop with experience and can be
fostered through educational intervention.
Moral functioning can be fostered like any expertise. Experts-in-training actively build
capacities through extended, focused, deliberate practice under the guidance of a mentor (Ericsson
& Charness, 1994; Ericsson et al., 1993), training both deliberative and intuitive understanding
(Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006). The implicit mind develops understanding through
immersed experience which fosters perceptions, sensibilities and trains up emotions and intuitions
based on what works in the particular environment. At the same time, the deliberative mind learns
such things as theory, logical procedures, explicit self understanding and goal setting. Novice to
expert pedagogy involves coached guidance, the guide on the side whispering into the ear about
what is known to work and what to watch for, and extensive opportunities to practice in
environments that give good feedback about what is effective. Environments matter for developing
intuitions and fostering mindsets but the deliberate mind can select the environments (Hogarth,
2001).
Ethical skills can be fostered in all domains of study—in school settings, at home, and in
communities. Adaptive ethical education (Narvaez, in press) fosters expertise in the four
components (judgment, sensitivity, focus/motivation, action), taking both minds into account
(deliberative and implicit). But in terms of ethical education, more is required. Integrative Ethical
Education (IEE; Narvaez, 2006; 2007; 2008) synthesizes the research literature across psychology
and education into five basic suggestions for ethical education: (1) Establish a caring relationship
with the child or mentee. As emotion-based creatures, humans need trust and social connection to
be engaged in learning (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). (2) Design a climate supportive of ethics and
excellence. Climates or cultures encourage some behaviors and not others. Climates that support
autonomy, competence and belonging foster motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and prosocial behavior
(Solomon et al., 1988). Socially toxic environments discourage moral development (Garbarino,
1995). (3) Cultivate ethical skill development with a novice-to-expert pedagogy. This can be done in
every area of academic instruction (Narvaez, 2006). (4) Help mentees develop self-regulation for
ethics and excellence, a requirement for success in any domain (Zimmerman, Bonner & Kovach,
2000). (5) Restore the village of support for the student and all community members
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979). Individuals flourish in communities where they are known and supported
(Lerner, Dowling & Anderson, 2003). IEE provides a basic framework for ethical education. Mature
functioning comes with much practice and maturation (plus brain myelinzation occurring in middle
age speeds neuronal communication, facilitating the synthesizing of knowledge; Giedd et al., 1999).
Importance of Early Life Experience. But moral development begins from birth, if not before.
Neurobiological research studies are demonstrating the epigenetic effects of early experience. Many
children are not receiving the care mammals require. For example, even in the womb, the brain of
the child is influenced by the depression or stress experienced by the mother, shaping the brain for
hyperactive stress response after birth, which is linked to “unsociable and inconsiderate behaviours”
in childhood (p. 435, Lupien et al., 2009). Human mammalian needs are reflected in the
“environment of evolutionary adaptedness” or EEA (as named by Bowlby, 1951) and are
increasingly corroborated by neurobiological studies (see Narvaez & Panksepp, 2009, for a review).
Some EEA characteristics have been identified by anthropologists for infants and young children
(Hewlett & Lamb, 2005), for example: breastfeeding for 2-5 years (the immune system develops to
adult level by age 5; breastmilk is 80% probiotic); constant touch in first two years of life (linked to
multiple system development); prompt response to cries and distress (linked to emotion regulation
and personality); multiple adult caregivers beyond parents; and multi-age play groups. Modern
childrearing practices have upended most of these principles with negative consequences that appear
to be snowballing (e.g., epidemics of depression and anxiety; NICHD, 2004).
These findings have been integrated into a moral development theory (Triune Ethics theory;
TET; Narvaez, 2008), examining the effects of early life experience on moral functioning. According
to TET, moral capabilities, which are always based in neurological and physical systems, are
compromised by modern childrearing practices. For example, vagal nerve function is related to
immune, emotion, cardiac, digestive system function. With inconsistent or neglectful parenting the
vagal nerve is compromised. Vagal nerve response not only is related to multiple health effects, it
accompanies expressions of compassion and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Eggum, 2008).
When physiological and psychological system needs are compromised by poor care, the
systems resort to a default primitive survival orientation, resulting in a self-focused orientation to the
moral life (the Security ethic or “bunker” morality). In this case, the “panic/distress” and/or
“fear/anxiety” emotional systems are easily evoked, compromising the ability to have open-hearted
relationships with others, making “negative morality” more morally salient (i.e., harming others for
justice reasons). The more advanced ethics (emotional Engagement with others in the moment—
“harmony” morality, and Imaginative concern for those not present—“mindful” morality) require
EEA caregiving and are compromised without it. The Engagement ethic, rooted in the proper
functioning of the “care” and “play” emotional circuits, underlies prosocial behavior. The
Imagination ethic requires proper functioning of the prefrontal cortex (executive functions) for the
cognitive aspects of prosocial behavior and is also affected by early experience. In sum, early
experience sets the trajectory for life in most every way, including moral capabilities. Although the
brain is malleable, it is much more difficult to repair poor emotional system setup after it is
established, and such repair may never reach optimality.
Centrality of moral identity. Some time ago, Blasi (1984) emphasized the importance of moral
identity as key to moral action. One has a moral identity when moral constructs—moral desires,
integrity and willpower—are fundamental to self identity. An areas of increasing interest among
researchers (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), moral identity has been
especially noted as a factor driving moral action (Colby & Damon, 1991), social information
processing and moral evaluation (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele & Lasky, 2006).
In summary, moral development research has moved from an emphasis on deliberative
reasoning to a broader view of embodied processes that include perception/sensitivity,
focus/motivation and action/implementation. Best practice for cultivating moral capacities involves
a novice-to-expert pedagogy but also caring relationships, supportive climate, fostering moral selfactualization, and a village of support. Moral maturity combines deliberative and intuitive processes
in capacities for moral self regulation, and practices such as habituated empathic concern, moral
dialogue and moral institutions. Moral development research is also looking at early life and its
impact on moral functioning, finding that neglectful caregiving from the view of mammalian needs
underdevelops brain systems required for optimal moral functioning.
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