Download TPP entry should be conditioned on human rights

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Text: The United State Federal Government should condition the (Insert the plan’s
engagement action) on significant improvements in Human Rights in the Peoples
Republic of China.
Cplan is Competitive – Conditional Policies are not engagement. Attaching the string
makes it something other than a policy of engagement.
Smith 5 — Karen E. Smith, Professor of International Relations and Director of the European Foreign
Policy Unit at the London School of Economics, 2005 (“Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or
mutually reinforcing?,” Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement, May, Available Online at
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/484.pdf, Accessed 07-25-2013, p. 23)
First, a few definitions. ‘Engagement’
is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government
and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal
political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of
engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in
particular. Some observers have variously labelled this strategy one of interdependence, or of ‘oxygen’: economic activity leads to positive
political consequences.19 ‘Conditionality’, in contrast, is the linking, by a state or international organisation, of perceived
benefits to another state (such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfillment of economic and/or political
conditions. ‘Positive conditionality’ entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions;
‘negative conditionality’ involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates
the conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of ‘asphyxiation’).20To put it simply, engagement implies
ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of looking at it,
engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more
of a top-down strategy.
China will say yes to the condition
King 12 – political columnist, citing Gordon Chang, JD @ Cornell (Ruth, “WHAT OBAMA NEEDS TO SAY
TO CHINA’S NEXT SUPREMO: GORDON CHANG,” http://www.ruthfullyyours.com/2012/02/14/whatobama-needs-to-say-to-chinas-next-supremo-gordon-chang/)
Vice President Xi Jinping, slated to become China’s next supremo, arrives at the White House tomorrow. We have been told
[1] that the Obama administration will not “sacrifice the important issues for the sake of having a comfortable visit,” yet
there is a sense of pessimism in Washington about America’s ability to persuade China to
move in the right direction. It seems that everyone here believes that Beijing owns the
century and controls our destiny. The truth, however, is that we have the ability to get China to
do what we want. Why? Because at the moment the Chinese economy is faltering — most
indicators are pointing to low single-digit growth and “hot money” is gushing out of the country — and Washington
holds the key to rescuing it. China at the moment is in trouble because, among other things, export growth, once
the engine of its economic “miracle,” has been on a long downward trend. Last month, exports fell 0.5% on a year-to-year
basis and 14.2% month-on-month, a performance well below consensus estimates. That’s a problem for Beijing because it is
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dependent on sales abroad to keep Chinese factories humming and workers employed, and the
American market is
extraordinarily important to them. The general narrative is that, when the global downturn hit in 2008,
Chinese exporters started selling more to other markets and became less reliant on tapped-out American consumers. The
facts tell the opposite story, however. In 2008, 90.1% of China’s overall trade surplus related to sales to the United States.
That already staggering figure increased to 115.7% in 2009, and 149.2% in 2010. And last year? Last year, the figure was a
simply unbelievable 190.5%. In 2011, China’s trade surplus against the United States hit $295.5 billion, easily surpassing the
2010 record of $273.1 billion. It would seem, on first glance, that China’s dependence on the American market cannot
continue this sharp upward trend. Nonetheless, we have to remember that the reason for increasing Chinese
reliance on us was that factory orders from the 27-nation European Union, China’s largest
export market, collapsed in the second half of the year. As a result, Chinese factory owners began to flee because
they could not pay their debts, some of them even committed suicide, and worker protests flared. This year, it appears, the
drought of European orders to China will last the entire year. It’s possible, therefore, that sales to the U.S. will
account for an even larger share of China’s total. All this means that President Obama has
enormous leverage over Xi Jinping’s Communist Party, whose legitimacy depends on the continual
delivery of prosperity. So despite what everyone here thinks, we can get China to stop its cyber
attacks on us, end its harassment of American vessels on international waters, cease its threats over a dozen
issues. We can even pressure the Chinese to withdraw their support for the Iranian regime and scale back help to North
Korea. Xi has adopted an unusually conciliatory tone to America before his visit, and his colleagues in Beijing have toned
down their verbal assaults on us in recent weeks. They know that, in fact, they are playing a weak hand. And
they know the meaning of “190.5%.” We
have the political will to use it.
have the leverage over China. They only issue is whether we
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Net-Benefit – Human Rights Credibility
The unconditional nature of the plan would hurt US human rights credibility. The
counterplan is key to restoring the US leadership on human rights
CHRD 15 – Chinese Human Rights Defenders, coalition of Chinese and international human rights nongovernmental organizations. The network is dedicated to the promotion of human rights through
peaceful efforts to push for democratic and rule of law reforms and to strengthen grassroots activism in
China (“The US Must Press China for Concrete Human Rights Gains before Xi’s State Visit,”
https://www.nchrd.org/2015/09/the-us-must-press-china-for-concrete-human-rights-gains-before-xisstate-visit/)
Before Xi’s visit, the Obama administration has
a high-level opportunity—and perhaps its last one—to put
human rights firmly at the top of its agenda and exert some real pressure on the Chinese
government to end its systematic rights abuses. Making China respect basic human rights
and rule of law is critical to ensuring that China honors any commitments it might make to
cooperate on issues of climate change, cyber-security, regional security, or currency
manipulation. President Obama and Xi’s two previous summits—in California and Beijing—and the US-China
Human Rights Dialogue (held in 2013 and 2015) have been accompanied by a rapidly worsening human
rights situation. The bilateral dialogues may have ended with strong public statements by the US on
China’s human rights problems, but, without substantive pressure, no improvements have come about
as a result of these meetings. The highly choreographed and symbolic gestures of a state visit only benefit Xi. The visit
would boost his much-needed political legitimacy at home, while Chinese state media will censor any statement from Obama
critical of China’s human rights. The visit also will send the wrong signals to China’s embattled human
rights communities and persecuted ethnic and religious groups. They have paid a heavy toll under Xi
for their efforts to strive for social justice, rule of law, freedom, equal respect, and dignity. China’s human rights
defenders and victims of rights abuses are in urgent need of a strong show of moral support
from democratic nations and human rights stakeholders around the world. In interviews conducted by CHRD last week,
dozens of activists and lawyers in China told us that they believe Xi’s US visit should not proceed as scheduled unless the
Chinese government meets certain preconditions, including releasing the detained lawyers, who have been held for nearly
two months, and granting amnesty to a significant number of prisoners of conscience. “This is an opportunity for the US
government to show its support for human rights and rule of law [in China],” one lawyer said. “The US should call on Xi to
immediately release all detained lawyers and human rights defenders, immediately halt the intense suppression of NGOs,
stop religious persecution, and end repressive policies towards ethnic Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minority groups.”
Another lawyer added: “The US should send a clear signal to China and cancel the summit unless
there are improvements to the human rights situation.” “If the White House lays out the red
carpet for President Xi, it sends a clear message to China’s human rights activists that our
journey will only become increasingly more arduous,” another lawyer told CHRD. “The whole world can
see that Xi’s record on human rights is getting worse,” said one activist, “and the Obama administration
shouldn’t turn a blind eye to what’s happening.” “Without substantial improvement before the visit, it
will hurt Chinese civil society, and harm America’s image and strategic interests,” another
activist said. “We’ll be sorely disappointed if the Obama administration doesn’t exert significant pressure on
Xi. The Chinese government’s persecution of civil society actors is full of blood and tears, with so many families torn apart,”
said another lawyer.
The counterplan will be modelled globally solidifying the US as a leader on Human
Rights
Schulz 9 - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as
Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic
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Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American
Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china_human_rights.pdf)
The decision to de-link human rights and trade, made early in the Clinton administration, removed one
vehicle for exerting pressure on China—albeit a vehicle that had yielded limited results—without offering up an
alternative. The Bush administration further softened policy on China’s human rights record, subordinating
the issue to economic priorities and strategic concerns about North Korea. Though it maintained pressure on China to improve its
record on religious rights in the country, the Bush administration chose, ironically enough, to drop China from the
State Department’s list of worst human rights violators three days before China’s crackdown on Tibet in
March 2008. Yet the state of human rights in China is critically important both in terms of international
human rights norms and American interests. To be sure, there are no mass killings going on in China, as there are in Darfur, and
while Beijing is highly repressive, its authoritarian leaders are more open to outside influence than the generals who rule in Myanmar. But
measured by the sheer numbers of people being affected by abuse of their rights, China may be the
premier violator of civil and political rights in the world. Furthermore, because of China’s very size and
reach, its posture toward human rights has a profound influence on how human rights norms and
practices are perceived at the United Nations, in developing countries where China is expanding its
engagement at a rapid rate,10 and throughout Asia. Human rights standards (and the legal regimens that codify
them) have evolved over the last two centuries; what had been accepted as normative, such as slavery, is regarded today as abhorrent and
a violation of international law. But those standards can devolve as well, especially if powerful nations seek regressive
changes or instigate regressive norms—casting the entire human rights regimen into jeopardy. Conversely,
significant improvement in China’s human rights policies would reverberate widely around the world,
removing a model of authoritarianism for others to mimic or hide behind. Improving China’s human
rights record will pay enormous dividends for the United States as well. Americans have been far too easily swayed
by the notion that China’s economic advances have by necessity come at the expense of a sacrifice of civil and political rights. Businesses
especially have been persuaded that economic growth will be sufficient to usher in political change…eventually.11 And many Americans are
wary of the security issues implicated in competition with China, asking whether we should alienate such an important emerging power over
issues like democracy or religious freedom. But states that
allow themselves to be held to account by their own
citizens and respect the rule of law tend to be more reliable partners in their relations with other states.
Any authoritarian country is inherently brittle, caught up in needless preoccupation with controlling its
own population and warding off dissent. That makes for suspicion and resentment of outsiders. The absence of a viable
opposition or fully independent press makes a ruling party less wary of abrogating international agreements or alienating other nations for no
good reason. A
fickle approach to the rule of law jeopardizes everything from business contracts for
American corporations to enforcement of trade and environmental agreements. Cheap Chinese labor undercuts
American jobs; the higher the labor standards in a country, the slower the U.S. trade deficit grows.12 Moreover, if we accept the
commonly agreed proposition that democracies rarely, if ever, launch wars against other democracies,
then a more democratic China is likely to be a less belligerent China—at least in the long run. Finally, were China
to place a higher value on human rights, it might well be willing to bear a greater portion of the burden
for such things as U.N. human rights mechanisms and the resolution of international crises stemming
from injustice.
US leadership on Human rights is key to US Democracy promotion
Abrams 16 – MA in IR @ LSE, JD @ Harvard, former American diplomat, lawyer and political scientist
who served in foreign policy positions, first author of a letter signed by 139 signers, who are Democrats
and Repubicans and have served in numerous administrations, include one name that stands out and
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must be noted: former Secretary of State George P. Shultz (Elliott, “Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy,”
CFR, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2016/03/16/democracy-and-u-s-foreign-policy/)
Some argue that we can pursue either our democratic ideals or our national security, but not both. This
is a false choice. We recognize that we have other interests in the economic, energy, and security realms with other countries and
that democracy and human rights cannot be the only items on the foreign policy agenda. But all too often,
these issues get shortchanged or dropped entirely in order to smooth bilateral relationships in the short
run. The instability that has characterized the Middle East for decades is the direct result of generations of authoritarian repression, the lack of
accountable government, and the repression of civil society, not the demands that we witnessed during the Arab Spring of 2011 and since for
dignity and respect for basic human rights. In the longer run, we pay the price in instability and conflict when corrupt, autocratic regimes
collapse. Our
request is that you elevate democracy and human rights to a prominent place on your
foreign policy agenda. These are challenging times for freedom in many respects, as countries struggle to make
democracy work and powerful autocracies brutalize their own citizens while undermining their neighbors. But these autocracies are
also vulnerable. Around the world, ordinary people continue to show their preference for participatory
democracy and accountable government. Thus, there is real potential to renew global democratic
progress. For that to happen, the United States must exercise leadership, in league with our democratic allies, to
support homegrown efforts to make societies freer and governments more democratic. We ask you to commit
to providing that leadership and to embracing the cause of democracy and human rights if elected president of the United States.
Democracy key to solve for scenarios that risk extincton
Peiser 7 – social anthropologist @ Liverpool (Existential Risk and Democratic Peace,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7081804.stm)
In recent years, humankind has become aware of a number of global and existential risks that potentially threaten
our survival. These natural and man-made risks comprise cosmic disasters, volcanic super-eruptions and climatic disruption on
the one hand, and nuclear warfare, technological catastrophes and fully-fledged bioterrorism on the other. In order to
secure the future of civilisation, we are challenged to recognise and ward off these low-probability, but potentially destructive hazards. A new debate is gaining
momentum about how best to achieve a secure future for our planetary civilisation. The rise of neo-catastrophism The perception that disorder rather than
harmony held sway in the solar system gradually began to emerge during the 20th Century. The traditional concept of an essentially benign universe was replaced
by that of an unpredictable cosmos punctuated by global catastrophes. The emergence of scientific neo-catastrophism surfaced as a corollary of the space age.
Artist's impression of asteroid impact. Image: AFP/Getty There can be little doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm Images of impact
craters sent back by space missions in the 1960s and 1970s exposed the pock-marked, impact-covered surface of many planets. At the same time, the identification
of hyper-velocity impact craters on the Earth and empirical evidence of half a dozen mass extinction events generated a new view of our planet as a fundamentally
hazardous and catastrophic place in space. More recently, predictions of large-scale disasters and societal upheaval as a result of catastrophic climate change, as
well as growing apprehension about impending bioterrorism and nuclear warfare, have become almost routine issues of international concern. There can be little
doubt that we are living in an age of apocalyptic angst and alarm. The existential risk paradox At the core of today's collective anxieties lies what I call the existential
risk paradox. As advances in science, medical research, genetics and technology are accelerating, human vulnerability to global hazards such as cosmic impacts,
natural disasters, famine and pandemics has significantly decreased. Simultaneously, the
proliferation of democratic liberalism and free market
economies around the world has dramatically curtailed the death toll associated with natural disasters and diseases.
A recent study confirms that the annual percentage of people killed by natural disasters has decreased tenfold in the last 40 years, in spite of the fact that the
average annual number of recorded disasters increased fivefold. Evidently, open
and technological societies are becoming increasingly
resilient to the effects of natural disasters. Kari Marie Norgaard Read a view of the psychology of climate scepticism from US scholar Kari
Norgaard Inside the climate ostrich Yet the very same technologies that are serving us to analyse, predict and prevent potential disasters have reached such a level
of sophistication and potency that their misuse can transform vital survival tools into destructive forces, thus becoming existential risks in their own right. The
nuclear device that may protect us from a devastating asteroid impact can also be employed for belligerent purposes. Genetic engineering that offers the prospect
of infinite food supplies for the world's growing population can be turned into weapons of bioterrorism. And without the global utilisation of fossil fuels we would
lack all trappings of modern civilisation and social progress. Yet, fossil fuels are regarded as dangerous resources that are widely blamed for economic tensions, wars
and catastrophic climate change. Existential risk perception There seems to be some correlation between media exposure and existential risk perception. The more
people see, hear or read about the risks of Near Earth Object (NEO) impacts, nuclear terrorism or global climate catastrophes, the more concerned they have
become. The mere mention of catastrophic risks, regardless of its low probability, is enough to make the danger more urgent, thus increasing public estimates of
danger. Scientists who evaluate risks are often torn between employing level-headed risk communication and the temptation to overstate potential danger.
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Sunbather (BBC) Media called on 'climate porn' Chaotic world of climate truth The inclination to amplify a possible risk is only too understandable. Personal biases,
as well as grants and funding pressures, are considerable motivating factors to hype a probable hazard; ;n many cases, funding is allocated on the basis of intense
lobbying. This, in turn, can tempt researchers to aggressively promote their specific "danger warning" via the mass media. Behind many alarms lurk vested interests
of research institutions, campaign groups, political parties, charities, businesses or the news media, all of whom vie for attention, influence and funding in a
relentless war of words. Professional risk analysts disapprove of such scare tactics, and point out that the detrimental affects of apocalyptic-sounding alarms and
the rise of collective anxieties are much costlier than generally presumed. Whether individuals regard existential risks as a serious and pressing threat, or a remote
and long-term risk, often depends on their psychological traits. Nobody has appreciated this conundrum perhaps better than Sir Winston Churchill who famously
said: "An optimist sees an opportunity in every calamity; a pessimist sees a calamity in every opportunity." Doomsday argument In recent years, leading scientists in
the UK, such as Brandon Carter, Stephen Hawking and Sir Martin Rees, have advanced the so-called Doomsday Argument, a cosmological theory in which global
catastrophes due to low-probability mega-disasters play a considerable role. This speculative theory maintains that scientific risk assessments have systematically
underestimated existential hazards. Hence the probability is growing that humankind will be wiped out in the near future. I believe that the prophets of doom,
including those predicting climate doom, are wrong Nevertheless, there are many good and compelling reasons why human extinction is not predetermined or
unavoidable. According to a more optimistic view of the future, all existential risks can be tackled, eliminated or significantly reduced through the application of
human ingenuity, hyper-technologies and global democratisation. From this confident perspective of emergent risk reduction, the resilience of civilisation is no
longer restricted by the constraints of human biology. Instead, it is progressively shielded against natural and man-made disasters by hyper-complex devices and
information-crunching technologies that potentially comprise boundless technological solutions to existential risks. Current advances in developing an effective
planetary defence system, for example, will eventually lead to a protective shield that can safeguard life on the Earth from disastrous NEO impacts. The societal
response to the cosmic impact hazard is a prime example of how technology can ultimately eliminate an existential risk from the list of contemporary concerns. A
technology-based response to climate change impacts is equally feasible, and equally capable of solving the problem. Global
democracy as a solution
But while most natural extinction risks can be entirely eliminated by technological fixes, no such clean-cut solutions are available for the
inherent potential threats posed by super-technologies. After all, the principal threat to our long-term survival is the
destabilising and destructive violence committed by extremist groups and authoritarian regimes . Here, the solution
can only be political and cultural . Enola Gay. Image: Getty Effective democracy may prevent man-made catastrophes
Fortunately, there is compelling evidence that the global ascent of democratic liberalism is directly correlated
with a steep reduction of armed conflicts. A recent UN report found that the total number of wars and civil
conflicts has declined by 40% since the end of the Cold War, while the average number of deaths per conflict has dropped dramatically,
from 37,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. According to the field of democratic peace research, the growing number of democracies
is the foremost reason for the pacification of many international conflicts. Democracies have never gone to war
against each other, as democratic states adopt compromise solutions to both internal and external problems . As
Rudolph J Rummel, one of the world's most eminent peace researchers, has stated: " In democracy we have a cure for war and a way of
minimising political violence, genocide, and mass murder." On balance, therefore, I believe that the prophets of doom, including those
predicting climate doom, are wrong. Admittedly, there is no guarantee that we can avoid major mayhem and disruption during our risky transition to become a
hyper-technological, type 1 civilisation. Even so, societal evolution has now reached a level of complexity that renders the probability of human survival much higher
than at any hitherto stage of history.
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Net-Benefit – Chinese Revolt
Addressing Chinese human rights key to preventing Chinese internal political backlash.
Ripon May 2007 (The Ripon Forum “The Rise of China and the Interests of the U.S.”
http://www.cfr.org/china/rise-china-interests-us/p13455)
We should also directly address Chinese violations of human rights standards and denials of political
liberties, not through willful ignorance or high-pitched denunciations, but through careful and consistent
emphasis on the extent to which they fuel the social unrest Chinese officials so desperately wish to
avoid. The ability of the United States to remake any country in a democratic mold by compulsion is
limited, if not nonexistent. These efforts often result in a nationalist backlash and rejection of the very
democratic principles which the United States espouses, particularly when American officials themselves
are forced to compromise these principles for the sake of their geopolitical interests. But the concepts
of rule of law and representative government continue to hold appeal for many in China, particularly
those who appreciate the extent to which many of China’s internal troubles are rooted in a fossilized
political system that has failed to keep pace with the rapid economic and social changes of the past
three decades. We should support calls for positive reform, and in particular emphasize that citizen
experimentation with these concepts does not represent American efforts to impose a foreign ideology,
but rather an ongoing search by Chinese citizens themselves for means to resolve the core problems of
governance, social unrest, and violations of citizen rights that confront China.
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Impact Extensions – Moral Obligation
US has a moral obligation to Pressure China to improve human rights
Boozman, 15 (Source: http://www.boozman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/9/putpressureonchinatoendhumanrightsabuses (http://www.boozman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/9/putpressureonchinatoendhumanrightsabuses)
Journalists in China fight an uphill battle as well, facing obstacles with the visa process, including delays and
the constant threat of revocation. Access to reliable, impartial information in the country has always been an
issue for its citizens and has become more difficult in recent years. The so called "Great Firewall of China" is a
barrier between the world's largest market of Internet users and a range of social media sites and news
outlets. China's failing human rights record is not only a concern for the people of China, but for anyone who
values the fundamental principles from which our own nation was built. The freedoms of expression, press,
assembly and religion, to name just a few, are essential in any modern society. People around the globe should
live with these basic human rights. We have a moral obligation to highlight these injustices and use our
influence to change these policies. My colleagues recently launched the #FreeChinasHeroes Twitter campaign
to spotlight cases and raise awareness of this injustice during President Xi's visit. This, along with other efforts
to call attention to human rights abuses in China, will hopefully help to bring change. The juxtaposition of the
Pope's message to Congress pressing us to respect human life, with President Xi's record of abuse, can help
shine a light on a problem too important to ignore
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China Violates Human Rights in Squo
Chinese government is openly hostile against human rights activists – empirics prove
HRW 15 (Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch is an international non-governmental
organization that conducts research and advocacy on human rights. 2015 https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2015/country-chapters/china-and-tibet) Accessed 7/12/16
The Chinese government’s open hostility towards human rights activists was tragically illustrated by the
death of grassroots activist Cao Shunli in March. Cao was detained for trying to participate in the 2013 Universal Periodic Review of
China’s human rights record at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva . For several months, authorities denied her
access to adequate health care even though she was seriously ill, and she died in March 2014, just days
after authorities finally transferred her from detention to a hospital. The government continued its anticorruption campaign, taking aim at senior officials, including former security czar Zhou Yongkang, as well as lower-level officials. But the
campaign has been conducted in ways that further undermine the rule of law, with accused officials
held in an unlawful detention system, deprived of basic legal protections, and often coerced to confess.
The civic group known as the New Citizens Movement, best known for its campaign to combat corruption through public disclosure of officials’ assets, has endured
especially harsh reprisals. In
response to the Chinese government’s decision on August 31 denying genuine
democracy in Hong Kong, students boycotted classes and launched demonstrations. Police initially tried
to clear some demonstrators with pepper spray and tear gas, which prompted hundreds of thousands to
join the protests and block major roads in several locations. While senior Hong Kong government officials reluctantly met once
with student leaders, they proposed no changes to the electoral process. Hundreds remained in three “Occupy Central” zones through November, when courts
ruled some areas could be cleared and the government responded, using excessive force in arresting protest leaders and aggressively using pepper spray once
again. Protests continued in other areas, some student leaders embarked on a hunger strike with the aim of re-engaging the government in dialogue, while other
protest leaders turned themselves in to the police as a gesture underscoring their civil disobedience. Despite the waning of street protests, the underlying political
issues remained unresolved and combustible at time of writing. Human
Rights Defenders Activists increasingly face arbitrary
detention, imprisonment, commitment to psychiatric facilities, or house arrest. Physical abuse,
harassment, and intimidation are routine. The government has convicted and imprisoned nine people
for their involvement in the New Citizens Movement—including its founder, prominent legal scholar Xu
Zhiyong—mostly on vaguely worded public order charges. Well-known lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and journalist Gao Yu, among others,
were arrested around the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in June 2014. Many activists continue to be detained pending trial, and some, including
lawyers Chang Boyang and Guo Feixiong, have been repeatedly denied access to lawyers. Virtually all face sentences heavier than activists received for similar
activities in past years. The increased use of criminal detention may stem from the abolition of the RTL administrative detention system in late 2013. China has
500,000 registered nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), though many are effectively government-run. An estimated 1.5 million more NGOs operate without
proper registration because the criteria for doing so remain stringent despite gradual relaxation in recent years. The
government remains
suspicious of NGOs, and there are signs that authorities stepped up surveillance of some groups in 2014.
In June, a Chinese website posted an internal National Security Commission document that announced a nationwide investigation of foreign-based groups operating
in China and Chinese groups that work with them. Subsequently, a number of groups reportedly were made to answer detailed questionnaires about their
operations and funding, and were visited by the police. In June and July, Yirenping,
an anti-discrimination organization, had its
bank account frozen and its office searched by the police in connection with the activism of one of its
legal representatives.
Human rights in China bad – empirics prove
Ascough 16
(Katie, “Crackdown on human rights in China,” Vatican Radio. 5/17/2016.
http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/07/05/crackdown_on_human_rights_in_china/1242183)
A new report has been released by the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission entitled:
“The Darkest Moment: The Crackdown on Human Rights in China 2013-2016”. The report, published in June, covers topics from freedom
of religion to organ harvesting, and spans the presidency of Xi Jinping. Katie Ascough spoke with Ben Rodgers, Deputy Chairman of the
(Vatican Radio)
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Conservative Party Human Rights Commission, to find out more about the main concerns in this latest report on China. “The main concerns are that over the
last three years…we have seen a very significant crackdown on human rights in China across the board,”
explained Ben Rodgers. This includes the rounding up of more than 300 human rights lawyers in the past
year and the destruction of over 1500 crosses from churches in one province. According to Rodgers, China has seen
the erosion of freedom of expression and freedom of religion, as well as other forms of dissent. When asked what
he hopes the report can accomplish, Rodgers replied: “We’re calling for a total review and rethink of British policy toward China. In basically the same time as the crackdown [on human rights], the United Kingdom has developed a
much closer, much friendlier relationship with China which has been described with the term ‘a golden era’. Our report is titled ‘the darkest moment’ which is a phrase that comes from one of the people that gave evidence to us.”
After highlighting this dangerous irony, Rodgers commented: “We’re not saying that we shouldn’t engage with China or trade with China [but]…the British government should start to speak out much more strongly within the
context of that relationship, and to do so publicly as well as privately.” Though Rodgers welcomes the pope’s concern for the people of China, he says the current government is “quite hard-line” and it’s difficult to see who will
influence them at this stage.
Human Rights in China are worse than ever – since 1989
Lin 15 – Xin Lin is a reporter at the Radio Free Asia Organization. (“Human Rihts abusees in China ‘At Worst Since 1989”)
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hotan-02162015160611.html/humanrights-02162015165824.html
China's human rights situation is currently the worst that has been seen in a quarter-century, a Chinese rights
group said in an annual report released on Monday. The Hubei-based Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch group described a "worsening and
regressive human rights situation," and a domestic security regime that is more oppressive than
anything seen in the past 25 years. "The stability maintenance regime is getting stricter and stricter; you
could say it's getting more and more brutal, more and more inhuman," Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch founder Liu
Feiyue told RFA. "[Last year] was the cruelest we have since since 1989, which is cause for extreme concern," he said. During 2014, the
nationwide system for keeping track of critics of the ruling Chinese Communist Party was upgraded to the status of a national-level policy, Liu's
report said. This
nationwide surveillance system now actively targets civil society for control and
suppression, and has strengthened 'grid' surveillance to exert and maintain social control, it said. In March
2014, premier Li Keqiang announced a rise in the domestic security, or "stability maintenance," budget to 205 billion yuan (U.S. $33 billion) at
an annual parliamentary session inside the Great Hall of the People. Across the country, rights lawyers, writers, journalists, academics, NGO
activists, political dissidents and rights activists were targeted with often violent measures under the system, according to the report. It
documented 2,270 cases in which the authorities had implemented "stability maintenance" measures
against such targets, which can include house arrest, phone tapping, enforced 'holidays' and criminal
detention by state security police, 2,270 times during 2014, the report said.
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Solvency Extensions
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China Says Yes
US Pressure Key to Improvement of Human Rights in China
Felice Gaer 13, Director of AJC's Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights,
"CHINA IN THE WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES", April 23 2013,
www.ajc.org/site/c.7oJILSPwFfJSG/b.8745595/k.9748/China_in_the_World_Human_Rights_Challenges_
and_Opportunities.htm
China’s impact on International human rights standards and implementation Thank you, Mike. China's involvement with the United Nations
and with the world on issues of human rights has progressed. It really has changed. A country which once followed Deng Xiaoping's advice—
“calmly observe, cherish obscurity, never seek leadership”—is
now often taking an active role on international human
rights in the UN that no one ever imagined. This assertiveness is not necessarily positive for human
rights and the UN. Significantly, China has publicly acknowledged the universality of human rights. At the
same time, it actively attempts to redefine what that universality is, and contests the applicability of
human rights worldwide. It's a good political lesson. We have all witnessed how China contests human rights and its binding
application. Yet, when challenged, China doesn't want to be alone. China joined the world in the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human
Rights in affirming that universality is absolute, while acknowledging that historical and regional and cultural and religious factors have to be
taken into account. It affirmed that human rights are the first responsibility of governments, and universality must be followed. In itself, that's a
really important development. China has also ratified seven of the ten major human rights treaties. Those ratifications have often been
accompanied by China’s engagement to try to change, or substantially limit, the universal reach of the treaties and what are the standards
involved in each. Chinese officials at the UN have always emphasized a hierarchy of rights. Specifically, China emphasizes economic, social, and
cultural rights, and solidarity rights8, over civil and political rights. China argues that a country can only implement human rights when its level
of development is high enough. So this economic and social rights approach limits the relevance and impact of rights, and questions universal
standards of compliance. For
China, human rights are therefore aspirational, rather than legally binding rights.
Universal standards shift according to a state’s level of development. China thus downplays civil and
political rights issues for itself and globally. China is still not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
China signed it after tremendous efforts during the tenure of John Shattuck,9 your predecessor, some 15 or more years ago. But they have not
yet ratified it. They are still studying it, refining laws, and perhaps looking for somequid pro quo—when China signed the treaty, the U.S.
dropped a stand-alone resolution on China it had presented annually at the UN’s Commission on Human Rights. The Chinese also emphasize
collective rights over individual rights, and promote new solidarity rights as well. And in that process, they have tended not just to join with,
but, in some cases, to lead together with Cuba and a number of other countries in a way that suggests a preference for weak human rights
mechanisms, little or no country-specific scrutiny, and a strict limit on independent information sources used in the UN human rights system. If
I could turn the tables here a little bit, Mike, may I ask you to discuss events during your term as Assistant Secretary? China stepped up in front,
organized several joint statements, and led a coalition in the UN publicly identifying the limits on political protests (during the Arab Spring).
Another statement was on limiting the use of the Internet, declaring it shouldn't be used for nefarious purposes like terrorism. That kind of
leadership was something they didn't do previously, but they obviously felt obliged by the uncertainty of the Arab Spring, recalling Poland in
1989, to say proactively that they (China) are in this system: “We are in these treaty bodies, we are in the Human Rights Council, and we intend
to shape them in the way we want.” China’s emphasis was on maintaining public order and control. My question is: why
don’t more
countries stand up to China’s problematic leadership in these human rights bodies? Another of your
predecessors told me how the U.S.—the Bush Administration—would go forward with the China resolutions at the UN (attempts to
express concern on the human rights situation) that had been dropped at the end of the Clinton Administration. And he said
the Chinese would come to them and say, “If you raise this issue, you will be alone.” And your predecessor
said back, “We know that and we don't really care.” And he said that drove China’s diplomats crazy,
because one of their important approaches is to also work together with others, never be alone, and to build those coalitions. So what we
see is China’s tendency to do everything by consensus, a tendency in the Human Rights Council and other bodies to try to
build this kind of support, and a rather feeble response by what I would call the pro-human rights countries—the pro-civil
and political rights countries—in saying, “Wait a minute, we won't have that.” These rights-supporting countries are willing to
talk about rights abuses in private. That's what the Chinese want: to bilateralize comparisons about
compliance with rights, rather than universalize them. Chinese diplomats went around Geneva, meeting with
Ambassadors before the first Universal Periodic Review in 2009 (the second one's coming up in October) and said, “Please raise any
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issues you want to raise with us, but do it in private.” The rest of the world has basically said okay, and
has engaged in dialogues and private discussions. What we aren't seeing is public opposition to rights
abuses, and to weakening the human rights system, by rights-supporting governments in quite the
way we would hope. The result, it seems to me, is that rights-supporting countries look weak, and China
feels safe. It enables them to ignore human rights issues, ignore important cases—like Chen's nephew, like the
70 Arbitrary Detention Working Group cases that Sharon spoke about in the first panel, including cases where the Working
Group has found the detentions to be in violation of international standards and norms. There seems to be an
ability to just brush these things off. I think we are seeing a long-term strategy on the Chinese side of cherishing
obscurity, but using visibility to weaken or limit the UN’s human rights bodies whenever needed. And
we are seeing no strategy, or no visible strategy, on the other side. And you know, there is an old saying, “If you don't
know where you are going, any road will take you there.” Is the U.S. now in that phase? I hope not.
Be optimistic---China is undergoing progressive social change---the CP amplifies
millions of Chinese voices that want their government to change
Michael Posner 13, Professor of Business and Society, NYU Stern School of Business, and former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, "Roundtable: “China
in the World: Human Rights Challenges and Opportunities”", New York University School of Law &
Human Rights in China, April 23 2013, www.hrichina.org/en/crf/article/6747
I’m just going to offer one last word, in some ways summarizing, but some ways looking forward. Jerry mentioned earlier that there is an
agenda of things that perhaps are part of the future discussion of human rights, that haven’t been so much at the center. I know our own
experience. I
did three human rights dialogues with the Chinese. We did two legal experts dialogues—Ira and Jerry came to
of the things we did was to say we are going to operate on two tracks. We are going to look at
what I would call a traditional agenda. We’re going to look at political prisoner cases, we’re going to look at
religious freedom, we’re going to talk about Tibet and the situation with the Uyghurs. But we’re also going to have a
kind of contemporary discussion, which is reflective of what Chinese are saying to each other. So I would go into
those. One
those meetings, and I would have somebody on my staff look at weibo, look at Chinese social media, that morning. And I would add to the
agenda the case of the
labor dispute, the strike that was going on, dispute over wages, over working conditions or hours. We’d look at
Internet freedom issues, the lack of access to information. We’d look at the environmental issues, or food safety. Or we’d
look at these issues of abuse of power by local authorities, and the arbitrariness of the system. It seems to me that as we think about both the
challenges but also the opportunities for people here and elsewhere who are trying to figure out what is it that we can do, the mantra
ought to be: how do we identify those things the Chinese people are now vigorously debating within
their own society? How do we amplify their voices? How do we give them international connections? And how do we
reinforce the extent to which a rule-based, a law-based system, will help China, both government and Chinese
people, arbitrate and resolve those differences. I’m quite optimistic about China actually. In my conversations
with the government officials, they wanted to say, “Who are you to raise these issues?” And they’d say, “Oh, you’re only talking about 100
Chinese.” No. If
you look at the social media, you’d recognize this is a country absolutely in change, where
there is a huge amount of social churn. And I think for us to be opportunistic and to look at those areas
that are affecting tens or hundreds of millions of Chinese people and try to reinforce those elements
within the society, and there are many, they want to see a more rights respecting, rule-based system in
the future
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WMD norms proves that China will say yes to the counterplan
Jeffrey A. Bader 16, a Brookings senior fellow affiliated with the John L. Thornton China Center. He was
the first Director of the China Center, and was John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International
Diplomacy from 2012 to 2015. He served in the U.S. government for 30 years in various capacities
mostly dealing with U.S.-China relations, including as Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs from 2009-2011, "A Framework for U.S. Policy toward China", Order from Chaos Project,
Brookings, Asia Working Group, Paper 3, March 2016,
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/03/us-policy-toward-china-frameworkbader/us-china-policy-framework-bader.pdf
There is important historical precedent for affecting Chinese practices on similar issues. For example,
beginning in the 1980s, under pressure from the United States, China began to change its behavior in
the area of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transforming from one of the world’s chief
problem countries to one that respected international norms. Similarly, more recently, China has
altered its approach to climate change issues, aligning with the United States in bilateral and
multilateral settings in taking the issue much more seriously after years of resistance.
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Solvency – Trade
Chinese trade policy is a key area for opportunity for the US to condition Chinese
Human rights
Sanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN
RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52)
In recent times, the United States has seen its interest in increased economic strength
come into direct conflict with its interest in promoting human rights abroad. Those
arguing for increased economic ties with human rights violators have almost invariably
carried the day. Now, free trade agreements are once again on the table, as a priority of
President Obama’s final years in office. Driven by domestic political priorities, politicians
from both sides of the aisle will doubtless argue that U.S. economic interests must be
paramount. These arguments must not eclipse human rights imperatives this time around.
Human rights represent a core international and American value, and they deserve to be
recognized as such. Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that the spread of democracy,
rule of law, and respect for human rights promote political stability and economic growth
abroad, which inevitably yield economic benefits to the United States. In effect, the United
States will do well by doing good. Before Congress grants President Obama fast-track
authority with respect to any future trade deal, it should mandate that any such agreement
contain explicit, stringent, and enforceable requirements that counterparties respect the
rights of their citizens. If these requirements are put into effect, the United States can
stand, once more, as a global beacon of freedom.
Trade is an area where the US can gain leverage over the Chinese to motivate
improvements in human rights
HRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)
With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening,
two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero
sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are
often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and
the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to
avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary
Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They
retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous
Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the
country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall
relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a
certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China
is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not
without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of
American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for
dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how,
and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as
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a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage
which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human
rights, too.
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Solvency – Tech Transfer
The US should condition technology transfer on human rights
HRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)
With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening,
two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero
sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are
often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and
the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to
avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary
Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They
retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous
Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the
country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall
relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a
certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China
is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not
without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of
American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for
dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how,
and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as
a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage
which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human
rights, too.
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Solvency –TPP
TPP entry should be conditioned on human rights
Sanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN
RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52)
Policymakers claim time and time again that a commitment to human rights on the part of
American allies and trade partners is non-negotiable,2 only to bargain away human rights
commitments, in exchange for assurances of economic benefits, regional influence, or
political power.3 Especially in Congress, invocation of human rights is often used as a
rhetorical device to justify support for or opposition to certain policies, while rarely
carrying the weight of a true “game changer.” One of the areas in which this contradiction
is most evident is U.S. trade policy. As Congress debates and ultimately votes on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”),4 the United States has a singular opportunity to
reaffirm its commitment to human rights and to disavow misguided policies that mortgage
that commitment in exchange for empty promises of political and economic influence.
This Essay begins by discussing the United States’s past practices regarding human rights,
and, more specifically, regarding trade agreements. It then puts forth the United States–
Vietnam free trade agreement as one example of a free trade agreement that promised too
much improvement in human rights and delivered too little. Finally, this Essay concludes
with a call to action: congressional approval of the TPP must be conditioned on concrete
human rights commitments from our negotiating partners. The United States’s
fundamental national values demand that it makes human rights central to trade policy. If
prospective economic partners do not show a strong commitment to human rights, the
United States must not reward them with the economic and political benefits that
accompany free trade. The citizens of these countries and the American people deserve
better.
Prior conditioning is key
Sanchez 15 – Representative from CA (Loretta, “WHEN IT COMES TO FREE TRADE POLICY, HUMAN
RIGHTS SHOULD BE A GAME CHANGER,” Harvard Journal on Legislation, 52)
Opposition to free trade agreements such as the TPP is often bipartisan, and arguments against free trade are typically based
on a desire to protect American jobs.55 While there are, indeed, legitimate concerns about shipping American jobs abroad,
human rights concerns constitute an additional, independent reason to oppose participation in
the TPP. Before initiating or developing significant economic ties with other countries, the
United States must insist that universal standards of human rights are respected and
central to any agreement. Just as President Obama has for many of his second-term priorities, he must insist
that human rights commitments in the TPP are not a “nice-to-have—[they’re] a musthave.”56 Trade can be used as a powerful tool to exert influence, and require that other
countries take a positive position on human rights issues. This influence should be fully
exerted before the agreements are signed and enter into effect lest the United States repeat the failures
of the U.S.–Vietnam BTA. Trade advocates correctly argue that established trade agreements can function as an
enforcement mechanism for human rights in many of these countries. However, the United States must
learn
from the past and avoid the delusion that, if it enables countries like Vietnam to improve their
economic statuses, they will stop abusing and ignoring the rights of their citizens. History has
shown that increased exposure to international markets does not push countries to change their
behavior regarding human rights. The TPP is an opportunity for the United States to
return to its core values, uphold international human rights standards, and practice what
it preaches. The United States can no longer afford to ignore illegal and immoral behavior
on the part of its trading “partners” in the name of economic and political benefits .
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Solvency – Investment
The US condition future investment on human rights improvements
HRF 12 – nonprofit, nonpartisan human rights organization (HOW TO INTEGRATE HUMAN RIGHTS INTO
U.S. – CHINA RELATIONS—A HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST BLUEPRINT,
https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/24330/uploads)
With China’s power rising and the scope of the U.S. relationship with China broadening,
two assumptions have taken root among American policymakers. The first is that of a zero
sum game—that progress on human rights comes at the expense of other issues that are
often viewed as more critical. The Obama Administration’s experiences with China and
the Chen case suggest otherwise. The administration’s efforts in the first two years to
avoid antagonizing Chinese leaders did not result in progress on critical issues. Secretary
Clinton’s tough approach in the Chen case no doubt irritated Chinese leaders. They
retaliated by withholding written responses to the case list submitted in the previous
Human Rights Dialogue. But they did not walk out. They permitted Chen to leave the
country. Chinese leaders calculated the totality of their interests in the overall
relationship. The second assumption is that U.S. leverage over China has decreased. To a
certain extent this is true. The United States needs China more than in the past and China
is in a stronger position to control the relationship. However, the United States is not
without leverage. The U.S. economy and military remain stronger. Reassertion of
American power and presence in Asia can affect China’s interests and desire for
dominance in the region. China wants U.S. trade and investment, technological know-how,
and a stable relationship because they advance Chinese interests and China’s legitimacy as
a member of the international community. The relationship, in and of itself, is leverage
which can be used to advance all American interests, and should be used to do so on human
rights, too.
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Solvency – Foreign Assistance General
Prior to providing Foreign assistance the US should insist on improvement human
rights
Abrams 16 – MA in IR @ LSE, JD @ Harvard, former American diplomat, lawyer and political scientist
who served in foreign policy positions, first author of a letter signed by 139 signers, who are Democrats
and Repubicans and have served in numerous administrations, include one name that stands out and
must be noted: former Secretary of State George P. Shultz (Elliott, “Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy,”
CFR, http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2016/03/16/democracy-and-u-s-foreign-policy/)
In recent years, authoritarian
regimes such as Russia and China have become more repressive; they see the advance of
democracy not only within their borders but in neighboring states as a threat to their monopoly on political power. A regime’s
treatment of its own people often indicates how it will behave toward its neighbors and beyond. Thus, we
should not be surprised that so many of the political, economic and security challenges we face emanate from places like Moscow, Beijing,
Pyongyang, Tehran, and Damascus. Repressive
regimes are inherently unstable and must rely on suppressing democratic
also are the source and exporter of massive corruption, a
pervasive transnational danger to stable democratic governance throughout the world. The result is that
democracy is under attack. According to Freedom House, freedom around the world has declined every year for the past decade.
That heightens the imperative for the United States to work with fellow democracies to reinvigorate
support for democratic reformers everywhere. Supporting freedom around the world does not mean imposing
American values or staging military interventions. In non-democratic countries, it means peacefully and creatively aiding local
activists who seek democratic reform and look to the United States for moral, political, diplomatic, and
sometimes material support. These activists often risk prison, torture, and death struggling for a more democratic society, and
their resilience and courage amid such threats demand our support. Helping them upholds the principles upon which our
country was founded. Supporting democracy involves partnerships between the U.S. government and non-governmental organizations
movements and civil society to stay in power. They
that are struggling to bring freedom to their countries. Often, it means partnering as well with emerging democracies to strengthen their
representative and judicial institutions. This requires resources that Congress must continue to provide, and foreign
assistance must
be linked to positive performance with regard to human rights and the advancement of fundamental
freedoms.
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Solvency – Space Cooperation
The US should condition US/China Space cooperation on human rights improvements.
Whittington ’15 – published author, journalist
(Mark R., 10-6-2015, date accessed: 7.3.16, "Let’s Invite China to Become a Partner in Space – but with
Conditions," CapitalistReview, http://www.capitalistreview.com/lets-invite-china-to-become-a-partnerin-space-but-with-conditions/)
To test the theory that close cooperation in space will cause China to moderate its behavior, let
the United States
reach out to Beijing to propose just such a regime. China would be invited to become a
partner on the International Space Station, an arrangement that will include visits by
Chinese astronauts, perhaps conveyed on board the Shenzhou spacecraft. China would also
be invited to become a partner in future space projects, such as crewed expeditions back to the moon,
voyages to Mars, and the robotic exploration of the outer planets and their moons. In return, China must make the
following initiatives. First, it must negotiate and sign a treaty regarding the use of the oil and other resources in the disputed
East China Sea and South China Sea. It must also sign a nonaggression treaty with Taiwan, the island nation that it regards
as a breakaway province. China must also suspend the development of weapons systems designed to fight the United States
in a future conflict, especially anti-satellite weapons. It needs to stop cyber-attacks on American computer networks as well
as espionage operations. These measures would reduce significantly the threat of armed conflict along the eastern Pacific
Rim. Second, China needs to start
respecting human rights inside its own borders. It should stop
persecuting political and religious dissidents. It should take down the so-called “great firewall of
China” and allow its citizens free access to the Internet. By taking these initiatives, China will give the
international community confidence that it is prepared to be a good world citizen.
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Solvency – Relations
Counterplan is key to US-China relations
Columbia University 09 (Columbia University “Asia for Teachers”, 2009, accessed: 7/1/16
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_us_china.htm )
The Human Rights Issue One
of the most contentious issues in the U.S.-China relationship is human rights.
American N.G.O.’s, media, and the government are critical of Chinese government treatment of dissidents,
religious groups, ethnic minorities, workers, accused criminals, prisoners, and married people contemplating having more than one child, among other
issues. Many Americans claim that Chinese government policies in these areas violate internationally
recognized human rights. Ironically, this issue did not come to the fore during the Mao era, when China’s human rights situation was at its worst. It
took on saliency after China opened to the West, an event which happened more or less to coincide with the rise of the human rights movement and human rights
diplomacy in the West. The
event that fixed human rights as a core U.S.-China issue was the violent crackdown
against student demonstrators in Beijing on June 4, 1989 – the so-called Tiananmen Incident. Since then,
the United States has been on the offensive at both the non-governmental and governmental levels in
criticizing Chinese human rights violations. Policy instruments included public shaming (e.g., issuing reports), quiet diplomacy (intervention
on particular cases at high levels), threats of trade sanctions (such as the threat not to renew the annual tariff privileges known as Most Favored Nation privileges or
Normal Trading Relations), and efforts to have China criticized at the annual meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. China
has
countered energetically, arguing, first of all, that its domestic policies are no concern of other
governments and secondly, that its human rights record is admirable because of progress made in feeding,
clothing, educating, and giving medical care to its vast and previously poverty-stricken population. In 2000, the U.S. House (expected soon to be followed by the
Senate) approved Permanent Normal Trading Relations for China in order to allow China to enter the World Trade Organization. This for all practical purposes
removes the option of threatening trade sanctions in connection with human rights abuses. The same year, China
administered a strong defeat
to American diplomatic efforts at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, so it remains an open question whether the U.S. can
use that policy instrument in the future.
The US must insist on improvements in Chinese human rights. Failure to do so wreckis
relations in the long term. Even if China and the US squabble over the counterplan it
is better for relations in the long term
Friedberg 11 – PhD @ Harvard, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University
(Aaron, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” p. 57)
Today's Sino-American rivalry is rooted in deep ideological differences and in the stubborn realities
of power politics. At least for the moment, how- ever, these forces are counterbalanced and, to a degree, offset by othérs that
tend to promote cooperation and a measure of stability. Of these the presumed benefits of economic interdependence and
the likely costs of conflict are the most powerful. The supposed cooperation-inducing effects of institutions
and common threats appear, by contrast, to have been greatly overstated. For as long as they remain as strong as
they are today, the fear of war and the hope of continued gains from trade may be enough to make both the United States
and China extremely cautious about using force directly against one another, taking steps that could lead to the use of force,
or initiating policies that would greatly increase the risk of a breakdown in relations. Whether by themselves or in
combination with others, however, these factors will not be sufficient to fundamentally
transform the U.S.- China relationship. For that, a change in China's domestic regime will
be necessary. While they might induce some initial instability, liberalizing reforms would eventually ease
or eliminate ideology as a driver of competition, enhance the prospects for cooperation in
dealing with a variety of issues, from trade to proliferation, and reduce the risk that future
disputes might escalate to war. The balance that exists at present between the forces
favoring competi- tion and those tending toward cooperation is fragile. While it is possible to
imagine circumstances in which relations between China and America could move suddenly in a more positive direction
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(e.g., the emergence of a Gorbachev-style reformer in Beijing), sharp shifts toward more open rivalry (due to a clash over
Taiwan, or Korea, or events in South Asia or off the coasts of Japan) are also conceivable. Barring such dramatic events, if
China's power continues to grow while its regime remains essentially unchanged, the
competitive aspects of the Sino-American relationship will increase in importance and
intensity. Cooperation may persist, but it is likely to become more limited and more
difficult, while the relationship as a whole becomes increasingly brittle.
Cooperation is impossible without addressing human rights first
Schell 15 - Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society (Oliver, “How to Improve U.S.-China
Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/china/improve-us-china-relations/p37044)
As U.S. and Chinese heads of state gather for another summit, the vexing question
of human rights looms
larger than ever. The issue plagues the overall health of the bilateral relationship like a
low-grade infection. U.S. displeasure with China’s rights record is only matched by Beijing’s displeasure with
Washington’s judgmental attitude. This standoff has created an increasing sourness in relations that
have made it difficult leaders from both countries to feel at ease with one another. The
result is that the two countries have struggled to establish the élan and comfort level required
for solving problems where real common interest is shared. The United States and China have
fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. Disagreement over human rights grows
out of a more divisive problem that sits unacknowledged like the proverbial elephant in the room.
Because nobody quite knows what to do, we are hardly inclined to recognize, much less discuss it: the United States and
China have fundamentally irreconcilable political systems and antagonistic value systems. If we want to get anything done,
we must pretend that the elephant isn’t there. President Xi Jinping has made it abundantly clear that his China is not
heading in any teleological direction congruent with Western hopes. Xi seems to suggest that China has its own model of
development, one that might be described as “Leninist capitalism,” with rather limited protection of individual rights. This is
a model with so-called “Chinese characteristics,” which, in the world of human rights, means that China will emphasize
collective “welfare rights,” such as the right to a better standard of living, a job, and a freer lifestyle, rather than emphasizing
individual rights like freedom of speech, assembly, press, and religion. But if this is the model, then the United States
and China are heading in divergent historical directions. A host of new friction points now
center around the abridgement of individual rights in China: arrests of human rights lawyers, growing
restrictions on civil society activities, new controls on academic freedom, a more heavily censored media, more limited
public dialogue, visas denied to foreign press, and domestic journalists and foreign correspondents suffering more
burdensome forms of harassment. These trends grow out of differences in our systems of governance and values. Whether
we should confront these differences head on or seek some artful way to set them aside so the two countries can get on with
other serious issues of common interest is a question we have hardly dared even think about. The elephant is still in
the room, and the fact that no one knows quite how to address it lays at the root of our human
rights disagreements. These differences often gain such an antagonistic dimension that they
not only inhibit our ability to make progress on the rights front, but also undermine the
rest of the U.S.-China relationship.
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Hegemony
US consistency on human rights key to US International prestige and power.
Lagon 11 [Mark P. Lagon, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights October 2011, “Promoting Human
Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desirable or Possible?”, http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/promoting-humanrights-us-consistency-desirable-possible/p26228 ]
This seemingly serpentine path on human rights between and within presidencies actually reflects much
continuity and convergence. Presidents Carter and Reagan were both moralistic in tone and each pressed allies to reform. President Obama was no more willing or able proactively to shutter the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility than his predecessor. All recent presidents have been tough on Myanmar's leaders and cautious in pressuring China's. What kind of consistency would be desirable and achievable? Four precepts
despite how a human rights emphasis at times clashes with important priorities in bilateral
relationships (e.g., trade, counterterrorism, and military bases), it is important not to assume that human rights always intrinsically
contradict U.S. interests. For instance, repression of expression and real-time information may only retard economic growth and turn regimes into pressure cookers ready to blow. Second, it is
false to suggest that the greater a country's relative power, the less the U.S. can afford to confront its
human rights failings. Addressing liberties in Russia and China is all the more important due to their geopolitical weight. Indeed, if it is too inflexible in absorbing societal demands, China's autocracy could
would help. First,
face a rupture threatening global stability. Third, governments that regularly deny a large category of their citizens equal access to justice are not only violating universal rights, but also squandering assets. For example, the United
States could advance a quiet, sustained dialogue with India about the national government's role in transcending cultural practices of discrimination against broad social groups that relegate valuable human capital to squalid lives.
Persistent bonded labor of disadvantaged castes despite a 1976 ban and remedy law in India is not unlike segregation persisting in the American South until U.S. national authorities—in another federal system—pushed states to
implement laws. Most of all, countries that deny women and girls property and inheritance rights, free expression, and political participation are forsaking enormous assets for civic conciliation and economic dynamism—which is
neither in their interests nor those of the United States. Fourth, the Middle East should not be seen as an exception. It is a bigotry of low expectations to think Muslims and Arabs are incapable of exercising universal rights. That
said, there are those who would use newly won tools of freedom to institutionalize repression (as some elected Islamists might). Without covertly handpicking winners, the United States should offer a range of actors who appear
authentically committed to pluralism and peaceful contestation help to develop their capacity to compete for power and to govern. So where does this leave the United States in specific cases? Take Iran. Its pursuit of a nuclear
capability; its regional influence, particularly with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan; and its role in global terrorism are all issues of critical importance to the United States, but they do not call for downplaying human rights. Precisely
because Iran is such a heavyweight regional power, human rights are important. The Iranian government's treatment of women and religious minorities limits them as societal and economic assets. The Green Movement and the
teeming vitality of civil society show that Iranians long for fundamental freedoms. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is right to have joined the United Kingdom and Canada in imposing visa restrictions on Iranian officials
implicated in rights violations. Bahrain is a striking case of the appearance of inconsistency by the United States compared to the ultimate U.S. embrace of dissent and change in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia. A Human Rights
Watch report documented Bahrain's “punitive and vindictive campaign of violent repression” via arbitrary arrests, hidden detention, torture, biased military court trials, and the sacking of protest sympathizers from jobs. The
United States stood largely silent as Saudi Arabia supplied forces to help Bahrain put down dissent. The United States ought to view its important naval base in Bahrain as a reason to discourage repression, which could make that
The United States is capable of deftly asserting more
pressure on this small power to avoid counterproductive suppression of dissent (helped by the Saudis no less), without losing access to
a strategic base. While it is neither wise nor feasible to have identical policies for all nations, more consistency
based on these precepts will better serve U.S. and global interests.
nation less stable. Bahrain limits the freedom of women, foreign workers, and political opposition.
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AT: Permutations
Offering the plan without conditions ensures China will not modify Human Rights
Behavior
Schulz 9 - Senior Fellow in human rights policy at the Center for American Progress, served as
Executive Director of Amnesty International USA from 1994 to 2006 (William F., January 2009, Strategic
Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China, Center for American
Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issues/2009/01/pdf/china_human_rights.pdf)
The key to U.S. efforts to promote human rights in China is to take a pragmatic, non-ideological
approach that goes beyond easy rhetoric, taking advantage of strategic openings yet
recognizing the value of persistence. Ultimately, China must be persuaded that greater
democracy and human rights are in its own best interests, integral to its becoming the highly respected
global leader it aspires to be. Here, then, are a set of principles or operating assumptions that should guide U.S. human
rights policy toward China. Calibrate our strategy to China’s unique circumstances The same human rights standards apply
to every country in the world. Under international law, torture is torture whether it is committed in Lhasa or Abu Ghraib,
and it must be condemned. But smart strategists always take into account the relative strengths and weaknesses of their
targets and calibrate their strategies accordingly. It is savvy, not hypocritical, to take a different approach
to bringing about improved human rights in a nuclear power with worldwide economic clout such as China than we do in a
Belarus or Sudan. Saber-rattling or global economic sanctions are not feasible with China. Harsh
public attacks detached from concrete consequences have repeatedly proven counterproductive. And doing nothing while hoping for the best—relying upon economic growth to bring about human rights
enlightenment—has not gotten us very far. Whatever human rights strategy we pursue must be
sophisticated, not ham-handed, taking into account the host of other issues about which China and
the United States are engaged with one another.
The Permuation ensures Chinese backlash against those pushing for Human Rights
Reform.
Bequelin 13 – East Asia Director at Amnesty International (Nicholas, Can the U.S. Help Advance
Human Rights in China?, www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-help-advancehuman-rights-in-china/276841/)
But such progress comes at a high price, especially for activists, and the question that U.S. policy makers face is whether the
U.S. should stand by Chinese people who are pushing their government to pay more respect to fundamental rights and
freedoms, or whether it should ignore them. It seems to me, irrespective of the issue of moral imperatives, that it is
clearly in the U.S. national interest that China inches towards a more open and less
repressive system of government than it has at present. The other approach, a form of engagement
that mutes human rights, clearly has failed to yield any results in the past two and a half
decades. While this approach styled itself as being "realist" (as opposed to the supposed "idealism" of
human rights proponents) it is fairly clear today that the actual realists were those who predicted
that such a low level of human rights engagement would yield nothing and even encourage
the Chinese government in its repressive ways. The keys to effective promotion of the human
rights agenda in the U.S.-China relationship are relatively straightforward: First, what is most
important is for the United States to set the best possible example. The past few years have been problematic in this respect,
with issues ranging from the legality of the Iraq war to Abu Ghraib to the C.I.A. renditions. Second, the U.S. government
needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on human rights, and not be shy to use vocal
diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting
messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights norms, and the next
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stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues, including human rights.
This undermines the universality of human rights. Third, the U.S. must mainstream human
rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement with China. The compartmentalization
of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows
human rights have no bearings on other aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business
environment for U.S. companies operating in China is directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as
the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret
detention by the police.
China will view the perm as a hollow gesture and pocket the concession
Small 12 - Transatlantic Fellow, Asia Program, German Marshall Fund of the United States (Andrew,
"China's Response to the US 'Return to Asia' Tour," The EU-China Relationship, p. 131-132)
To describe the UIS as ‘returning to Asia therefore seems misplaced, and it is notable that it is a term most actively used by
commentators and officials in China, who are keen to imply that the US role is fickle, provisional and
unnatural. But the Obama administration was not above using a little of that rhetoric itself in dramatising some of its early
moves. Both the Secretary of State and the President made symbolic early trips to the region. Washington took steps to
address perceptions that the UIS was unwilling to put in summit face-time and unsupportive of the emerging multilateral
architecture, most importantly by signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and seeking membership of the
East Asian Summit (EAS). It consolidated initiatives such as the India partnership that some feared may prove to be a oneadministration shot. And it expanded the US focus on Southeast Asia, the source of most of the complaints about
Washington 'neglecting the region. Much of this was occluded in public perceptions, however, by the other major focus of
the Obama administration in Asia; upgrading bilateral relations with China. The view of some US policy
makers was that by forging consensus with Beijing on areas of global concern and taking a relatively
conciliatory stance on areas of Chinese sensitivity, it may be possible to erode the pervasive
mistrust in the relationship. Meetings with the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan appeared to be slow-pedalled,
attempts to find signature cooperation projects on climate change were launched, and US officials gave speeches
on the subject of 'strategic reassurance'. The highpoint was supposed to be President Obama's first visit to
China in November 2009, which saw the release of an unusually extensive joint statement spelling out an agenda for
bilateral cooperation. Speculation about a new 'G2' in global affairs reached its peak. Whether this approach would have
worked in other circumstances is a moot point. With the economic crisis as a backdrop, China, rather
than seeing
US gestures as farsighted and magnanimous, treated them as symptoms of weakness and
decline. Chinese assertiveness had already been fanned by the financial crisis, out of which it seemed to emerge as a
relative ‘winner'. The first year of the new administration confirmed an emerging view in Beijing
that its strengthened position entitled it to demand more of other countries. The final months of
2009 acted as the denouement for this period in the US-China relationship. President Obama's visit to China played poorly
in the US press, which contended that he had not been extended privileges that his predecessors received. Beijing
seemed to pocket concessions from Washington while offering almost nothing in return.
From bilateral economic issues to Iran sanctions, China rebuffed US requests virtually across the board. The culmination
was the COP15 talks in Copenhagen, where Beijing managed to raise hackles not just with the substance of its position at the
talks but with its almost insulting manner, which seemed to portend an ugly period of Chinese assertiveness ahead.
The permutation ignores the basic workings of international relations
Dueck 15 – PhD, Professor of Policy, Government and International Affairs @ GMU (Colin, “The Obama
Doctrine,” p. 105)
A similar problem exists in relation to Obama's deeply held assumption that international
cooperation will necessarily follow from American accommodation. As a general rule,
foreign governments or transnational actors do not feel obliged to alter their basic policy
preferences or to make unwanted concessions of their own simply because an American
president is accommodating, restrained, or articulate. This is not how international politics works.
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If the interests, goals, and priorities of other national governments align with those of the
United States on specific issues, then those governments will cooperate with Washington on those
issues, If not, they won't. Either way, whether we like it or not, the goals and priorities of foreign
governments are defined by those governments, and not by the president of the United States.
Any American president can alter the costs and benefits for other countries to cooperate with the United States on
specific matters, by offering specific incentives or disincentives, but he cannot literally redefine how other
governments view their own vital interests, and it is delusional to think that he can. If
Washington offers a particular policy concession to another government in exchange for
some concrete, reciprocal concession of real interest to the United States, then that is one thing.
Such negotiations are at the heart of international diplomacy, But to make the concession
beforehand—unilaterally, as it were—or to offer it up broadly to the entire planet as a whole
in the hopes of unspecified reciprocity from particular countries, is to ignore the normal
workings of international relations.
The perm doesn’t solve HR leadership or dissidents either---The perm would
undermine the US leadership. It would make the US look weak.
Friedberg 11 – PhD @ Harvard, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University
(Aaron, “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” p. 267-272)
Washington also needs to rethink what it says and does about the Chinese governments
continuing refusal to grant basic political freedoms and civil liberties to its citizens. In
place of the existing grab bag of initiatives, reports, and speeches, Washington needs a more
deliberate and well- integrated approach to this problem. The place to start, once again, is with a healthy dose
of reality. Despite the fond hopes of theorists and policy makers, economic growth has not yet led to political
reform in China, nor are there any signs that it is about to. What the world has learned over past two
decades is that in the face of determined and clever opposition, the link between economic change and
political progress is not as direct, nor as strong, as was once assumed. American officials should be candid in
acknowledging this fact, but they should present it as a challenge rather than an unalterable truth. The question is
not whether the United States should continue trying to encourage political reform in
China, but how it can do so more effectively. The answer must inevitably involve a mix of words and deeds.
Public hectoring may be useless or even counterproductive, but silence would send a resounding
signal of resignation and retreat. As its wealth and influ- ence have grown, Beijing has been
increasingly successful in using threats of economic retaliation to intimidate other
governments into toning down or abandoning their criticisms of its abysmal human rights
record. Chinese authorities would like nothing more than to bend Washington to their will
similar fashion. United States can be induced to back further away from its earlier, outspoken stance,
will only confirm what Beijing has said all along: that America's alleged concern for
democracy and personal liberties is a cynical sham, designed to serve its own selfish interests while humiliating
China and holding it down. The Americans talk a good game, but now that there is a price be paid for their
outspokenness, they turn out to be no different, and certainly not more principled, than anyone else. Questions
of sincerity aside, a shift in policy that is widely seen as a response to China's growing stature can only serve to weaken
America's long-term position in Asia. If
Washington has to trim its sails and watch its words, others
will be forced to draw the logical conclusions, not only regarding their own stance on human
rights, but also about the shifting balance of power. In the face of what it can only regard as a signal of dwin- dling
American strength, Beijing will no doubt do the same. Soft-pedaling talk of freedom will not reassure
China's leaders as much as it will embolden them, and it will be deeply demoralizing to those in China
(like the brave signatories of the recent "Charter 08" document) who continue to believe in, and to take risks
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for, real reform.2 Whatever it says publicly about general principles and specific abuses, the U.S. government
should be looking for ways to help these people. Most will not even have an explicitly political agenda.
Groups that campaign against corrup tion and the continued destruction of the natural environment, or forold- pensions,
improved health care, worker's rights, impartial courts, and freedom of worship will be able to do more in the near term to
push China toward responsive and accountable government than those who advocate a multiparty political system or a free
press. The U.S government, non- governmental organizations, universities, churches, and private founda- tions can
all play
a part in assisting these advocates of social change. To say, as some Western analysts do,
that reform is ultimately the responsibility of the Chinese people is both obvious and deeply
disingenuous. No outside power could impose alien and unwelcome institutions on a nation of 1.3 billion souls, nor is
any sane person advocating s.1Ch a policy. But the great bulk of China's population has few rights, little power, and no say in
their country's future. To suggest that when they are ready, these people can simply choose
democracy gravely understates the obstacles and dangers they face, while conveniently
absolving outsiders of any obligation to try to help them.
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Net-Benefit –Extensions
CS Lab
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Key to HR Cred
US must challenge human rights to maintain international human rights credibility
Nicholas Bequelin June 2013, ( Nicholas Bequelin “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human
Rights in China?” http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/06/can-the-us-helpadvance-human-rights-in-china/276841/)
Second,
the U.S. government needs to be consistent in the way it raises its concerns on
human rights, and not be shy to use vocal diplomacy when private diplomacy yields no
result. Too often, the U.S. is sending conflicting messages, one day stressing its attachment to universal human rights
norms, and the next stating that the U.S. and China "agree to disagree" on a range of issues,
including human rights. This undermines the universality of human rights. Third, the U.S.
must mainstream human rights perspectives across the full spectrum of its engagement
with China. The compartmentalization of human rights as a minor rubric of diplomacy is
bound to fail, because the Chinese side knows human rights have no bearings on other
aspects of the bilateral relationship. The business environment for U.S. companies operating in China is
directly linked to issues intimately connected to human rights, such as the elastic character of China's state secrecy laws or
the introduction of provisions in the criminal law that allows for secret detention by the police. Fourth, the U.S. must forge
partnerships and coordinate more effectively with other rights-respecting countries in their effort to press China on specific
issues and cases. There has been very little said by any head of state about the fact that China is the only country in the world
that holds a Nobel Peace Laureate in prison (while his wife is imprisoned at her home outside of any legal procedure.)
Finally, the U.S. must be ready to take steps when the situation demands it. For instance,
given China's absolute refusal to engage on any issue related to the situation in Tibetan
areas, the U.S. must be ready to upgrade its contacts with the Dalai Lama, and encourage
other countries to do so
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Impact Extensions
CS Lab
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Asia Conflict
Chinese human rights violations make Asian conflict inevitable
Brookings 9 (“China: Trumping Human Rights,”
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/02/28-china-ali)
For many environmental and social activists, the most remarkable statement to emanate from this visit was Secretary Clinton’s
acknowledgement that: “Human rights cannot interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis and the security crises.”
Embedded in this statement is perhaps an inherent contradiction that the Obama administration might not recognise. The structural
factors that lead to human rights concerns are indeed also responsible for many of the economic and
environmental concerns that the administration is so admirably trying to resolve in Asia. At the heart of the
matter is a lack of transparency and accountability that ultimately leads to an erosion of economic and
ecological institutions. Human rights abuses are the most acute manifestations of these structural
problems in autocratic societies that the administration must duly recognise. It is far more difficult to find
integrative policy solutions when civil society organisations have limited access to independently verifiable data
on environmental and social performance or economic institutions have marginal accountability to their constituents. Often it is tempting to be
captivated by autocracy because it may seem that under good leadership there will be a much faster road to salvation than the lumbering and
languid workings of a democracy. No doubt, China can “get the job done” very fast, when it comes to building Olympic stadiums, marvellous
airports and green cities. However, the perilous bargain that we make in ignoring the question of human rights is that all such achievements are
far more precariously reversible. Even
if we ignore the moral salience of human rights, there are many strategic
reasons to be concerned about these issues. For example, economic and environmental policy requires clear and credible data,
and without a free civil society, it becomes highly difficult to challenge official statistics and find scientifically verifiable information. At every
step of the policy-making process data is contested and deliberated in order to come up with the most effective outcome. However, in China, it
is exceedingly difficult to challenge any government data and the outcome can often lead to imprisonment, as experienced by Hu Jia, a 34-yearold activist who was imprisoned in April of last year for “inciting subversion of state power and the socialist system” by sharing independent
data on environmental and economic issues. The reliability of economic and energy data from China has been repeatedly questioned by US
researchers such as Thomas Rawski, an economist at the University of Pittsburgh and Jonathan Sinton,an energy analyst at the Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory. The Financial Times reported in January this year that Chinese economists even had a phrase for the
manipulation of official statistics — jiabao fukuafeng, or “wind of falsification and embellishment”. The
trumping of the human
rights narrative will also confound the Obama administration’s regional approach to conflict resolution.
Earlier last week, Secretary Clinton presented a clearly hawkish stance towards North Korea in alignment with
the new South Korean government. However, giving a pass to China on its human rights record will not
make the job any easier for Stephen Bosworth, the newly appointed envoy to the peninsula. China’s
support is pivotal to the North Korean regime’s survival and the appeasement of our friends in Beijing on human rights and
accountability will likely make them even more complacent when comes to policy changes on North Korea or
Burma. Policies of ‘quid pro quo’ have failed to gain much success in Asian politics during the past decade and are unlikely to succeed now.
Simple, determined, principled politics is far more likely to succeed.
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International Stability
Chinese respect for human rights defuses aggression---maintains international order
Inboden 15 - executive director of the Clements Center for History, Strategy, and Statecraft and
associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, with Dan
Blumenthal (William, “Toward a free and democratic China,” AEI,
https://www.aei.org/publication/toward-a-free-and-democratic-china/)
At the top of our next president’s task list will be rescuing American foreign policy from the wreckage of the Obama years. The prevailing
headlines detail a grim litany of new threats, each one emanating from an Obama administration policy failure. From the expansionist barbarity
of the Islamic State, to the collapse of Libya into warring factions, to Yemen’s degeneration into civil war and a terrorist safe haven, to
unprecedented concessions that have strengthened Iran, to Russian adventurism forcibly redrawing Europe’s borders, to the expansion of
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the threat environment that the Obama administration is preparing to hand over to its successor is grave. Not
since the end of World War II has the American-led international system been under such severe strain
from so many quarters. While the above threats all command attention, perhaps the greatest challenge to world order is the
resurgence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It is the only nation that has the size, wealth, and ambition
to credibly threaten U.S. global leadership and international stability. At stake is not only the national
security of the United States but the future of the international system our nation helped create and has led for
seven decades. In truth, they are almost inseparable. At the end of the Cold War, the late Samuel Huntington argued that only by
remaining the dominant world player could the United States ensure the continuation of a liberal order.
Thus, the challenge from China is not only geopolitical; Beijing is also ideologically hostile toward democratic capitalism and free societies. Our
next president’s China
policy needs to address the heart of the problem: The external assertiveness of the
from its internal repression. As Aaron Friedberg has pointed out, “the party’s
desire to retain power shapes every aspect of national policy. When it comes to external affairs, it means that
Beijing’s ultimate aim is to ‘make the world safe for authoritarianism,’ or at least for continued one-party rule in
China.” The CCP has thus far successfully maintained its monopoly on power and avoided any meaningful
political reform. American policy in recent years has conceded this monopoly to the CCP and done little
to support Chinese reformers, dissenters, and voices for liberty. There may have been short-term
rationales for this, but as a policy it has run its course.
Chinese Communist party (CCP) emanates
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Nuclear War
Lack of effective human rights protection leads to nuclear war
Burke-White 04—William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant
to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and
Ph.D. at Cambridge, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation”, The Harvard
Human Rights Journal, Spring, 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249, Lexis
This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be
given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights
practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national
security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-
indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those
most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records
decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly
Cold War period [*250]
enhance U.S. and global security . Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling
indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression . A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long
been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S.
policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between
national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those
countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states.
Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth,
it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the
institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it
addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining
weapons of mass destruction ( WMD ). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
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Extinction
Human rights solve extinction
Annas, Andres and Isasi 5 - *Prof. and Chair Health Law at Boston U. School of Public Health,
**Distinguished Prof. Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and
Technology at Illinois Institute Tech, ***Health Law and Biotethics Fellow at Health Law Dept. of Boston
U. School of Public Health (“Perspectives on Health and Human Rights,” p. 136-138)
That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most
important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that
followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and
equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human
Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference: Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong
to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly
fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently,
people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill,
torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the
recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5
Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights
is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a
milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the
welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that
required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In
fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the
essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and
directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like
cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example,
asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But
no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.
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Aff Answers
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AFF Answers – Say No
China will not agree to US human rights Conditions
Shannon Tiezzi April 15, 2016 (Tiezzi, Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat.Her main focus is on
China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously
served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly
television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The
College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing,“US Accuse Each
Other of Human Rights Violations”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-us-accuseeach-other-of-human-rights-violations/)
This may seem odd to Americans, but China’s
official definition of human rights has long been focused on economic
well-being – the “people’s livelihood,” as Chinese officials call it. Economic stability, after all, has been the primary
offering from Beijing to Chinese citizens for the past 30 years. Chinese officials point to their incredible
economic success story, which has lifted 800 million people of out poverty according to the World Bank,
as their primary contribution to human rights. In March, a Xinhua article complained of the West’s “selective amnesia” on
human rights, arguing that “one of the greatest human rights successes a country could hope for is the elimination of poverty.” China’s
leaders have long since decided – on behalf of every Chinese citizen – that the definition of human rights
delineated in the U.S. State Department report is not suitable for their country. The concept of “universal values”
– specifically, the idea that all people around the world are entitled to certain rights – was rejected as a threat to Party authority in the infamous
Document 9. “The goal [of championing universal values] is to obscure the essential differences between the West’s value system and the
value system we advocate,” the document warns.
China says no- US hypocrisy
Lum ’15 – Specialist in Asian Affairs
(Thomas, 9/17/15, date accessed: 7.2.16, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 114th
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43964.pdf)
Malinowski reportedly expressed concerns regarding the crackdown on human rights lawyers, referred to 16 PRC citizens who had been jailed,
detained, or denied freedom of movement, and presented a list of over 100 “cases of concern.”255 Other issues reportedly raised by the U.S.
side included the following: the new National Security law, draft foreign NGO law, and other legislative proposals; freedom of expression,
including press and Internet freedom; and the campaign to remove crosses from some Christian churches and demolish others in Zhejiang
province and elsewhere. The U.S. delegation “discussed the dangers” of conflating peaceful expressions of dissent and religious practices with
subversive and terrorist activities, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, and urged China to resume its dialogue with representatives of the Dalai
Lama. U.S. representatives raised the issues of restricted access for U.S. journalists, diplomats, and academics and the lack of “fair and
equitable treatment for U.S. news outlets” in China. They
pressed Chinese officials to release journalist and press
freedom advocate Gao Yu.256 In 2015, Gao, who is 71 years old and said to be suffering from a heart condition, was sentenced to
seven years in prison for “leaking state secrets” to the foreign media. The Chinese side publicly noted human rights
problems in the United States, including racial discrimination, excessive use of force by police, and the
“violation of the human rights of other countries through massive surveillance activities.” 257 The
Chinese government has become increasingly resistant to making concessions on human rights
through diplomatic engagement. Since 2013, the PRC rarely has accepted prisoner lists or requests for
information on cases of concern from foreign governments, although the U.S. government and NGOs continue to press
China for information and leniency related to key prisoners of conscience. Furthermore, Chinese delegations have responded to
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U.S. concerns by criticizing what they view as human rights abuses in the United States. Some experts
suggest that Chinese authorities remain relatively supportive of narrowly focused, governmental and nongovernmental rule-of-law exchanges,
which often are less politically sensitive, and which have had some success in promoting reforms, particularly in the area of criminal justice.258
Zero chance China shifts on core issues---and, say no wrecks Chinese soft power
Christopher B. Primiano, 5/23/2015, Ph.D. candidate (expected May 2016) in the Division of Global
Affairs at Rutgers University-Newark. Primiano’s broad research interests focus on international
relations and comparative politics. More specifically, he is interested in Chinese politics and
international relations. He has published refereed articles on Chinese politics and international relations.
From 2007 to 2009, Primiano served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Chongqing, China."The Impact of
International Perception on China’s Approach to Human Rights", East Asia December 2015, Volume 32,
Issue 4, pp 401–419
This article has put forward a theory regarding under what circumstances the
Chinese government is willing to
resist international pressure on human rights and, in the process of doing so, incur damage
to its international image. Generally speaking, the Chinese government seeks to advance its international image and
goes to significant length to do so, such as all the efforts that have gone into the 2008 Beijing Games and the 2010 Shanghai
Expo, establishing both Confucius Institutes and CCTV bureaus throughout the world, and donating foreign aid. Despite
such attempts by the Chinese government to advance its international image on the one hand, it is clear that, on the
other hand, there are circumstances in which the Chinese government calculates that
resisting international pressure, and thus inflicting damage to its international image, is a
better option than adhering to such international calls for action, as the Chinese
government’s reaction to the events in this article reveal. The efforts that the Chinese
government exerted in trying to advance its position with Tibet in 2008, Xinjiang in 2009,
and Liu Xiaobo in 2010 demonstrate how aggressive it is willing to be on issues that it
views as the most pressing core interests, specifically threatening to CCP rule or the loss of
territory. The four events presented here that illustrate this pattern were all significant events in which each event
received ample international attention. These four specific recent events have not been analyzed together to assess the
relationship between international image and the Chinese government changing policy due to international pressure.
Importantly, we do see variance with one of the cases, which allows for a theory regarding when we can expect cooperation
and when we can expect the Chinese government to reject international pressure. Moreover, with the case of Tibet in March
2008, the Chinese government’s staunch resistance to international pressure just a few months prior to the 2008 Beijing
Games demonstrates that with an event that should have been the most likely to result in change, we did not see any change.
Instead, the Chinese government is very concerned about both China breaking up and the
end of CCP rule. Thus, if anything may potentially lead to that, the Chinese government
will strongly resist. There is variance in the outcome (with the dependent variable) because
the first three are within china, with Tibet and Xinjiang involving the all-important issue
for the Chinese government of territory. With the case of Darfur, while oil is indeed essential for the Chinese
economy and thus a core interest, Darfur is, nonetheless, not on the same level of core interests as the other three events
examined here. In this article, we see significant variance with the Chinese government’s reaction to the events observed.
With the cases of Tibet and Xinjiang, the Chinese government aimed to set up macro economic development in those areas,
reflecting the view that economic development is the most important issue for calming all issues. This focus on economic
development does not serve as a change from the past, as the Chinese government has been focused on economic
development since the Reform and Opening. Simply spending more money on economic development in those provinces
was viewed as the solution. But with the case of Darfur, we see much more of a departure from China’s previous focus on
sovereignty regarding Sudan. Thus, with the case of Sudan, China was willing to rethink or change its policies. This article
has relevance for policy implications for both state and non-state actors aiming to exert international pressure on China to
improve human rights. We should not expect to see any change on China’s position regarding
the main core interests examined here, and thus INGOs looking to name and shame China
should be aware of this. But we should expect more cooperation on issues outside of China where there is not the
threat to loss of domestic territory or threat to CCP rule. Thus, instead of state or non-state actors, such as Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, or UNHRC, aiming to name and shame China regarding Tibet or Xinjiang, the focus should
be on working with both NGOs and activists inside of China, such as Weiquan lawyers (rights-protection lawyers), to find
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common ground on other issues involving civil society that are not viewed as such core interests by the Chinese government,
as such issues are non-starters for the Chinese government.
China says no---the CP is perceived as “western infiltration”---hope for reform is nearly
dead
Bochen Han 2/11/16, an editorial assistant at The Diplomat, interviewing Dr. Eva Pils, author of the
book "China's Human Rights Lawyers", who interviewed hundreds of rights lawyers in China, PhD in law
from University College London, Reader in Transnational Law at King's College London, "China's Human
Rights Lawyers: Political Resistance and the Law", The Diplomat, thediplomat.com/2016/02/chinashuman-rights-lawyers-political-resistance-and-the-law/
What are the dominant trends among the Chinese society’s reaction to the rights
lawyers? Does the concept of ‘human rights’ carry much traction with the average Chinese?
[Han:]
[Pils:] I think that like in other countries we would need to differentiate between citizens who have confronted government
abuse and rights violations, and those who have not. What rights lawyers have told me suggests that the people who form
their usual clientele have become more rights-conscious over the past one or two decades. Several narratives from the late
1990s were about clients who didn’t know what ‘torture’ (xingxun bigong 刑讯逼供 or kuxing 酷刑) meant, for example; who
might have no idea at all that the law prohibited beating criminal suspects. Today more ordinary people seem to be aware of
their rights.
With regard to the wider population, I am not sure. Perhaps ‘human rights’ today carries as much traction with the average
Chinese as it does with the average Briton or American; but how much is that? It is especially hard to tell in China,
not only because the opportunities for research that might help answer this question are
limited but also because of censorship and limited information available to Chinese citizens.
The government censors media reporting bad news about itself. It has also publicly
denounced rights lawyers and human rights themselves as tools of western infiltration under
the name of ‘so-called universal values.’ But then again it continues to use ‘human rights’ in a positive way on some
occasions. And, obviously the Internet has diversified the sources of information available to ordinary citizens. I imagine
that Chinese citizens have been receiving mixed messages and it is not easy to figure out how they
respond to that.
[Han:] How do you assess the progress of a top-down, controlled and incremental rule of
law reform in China today? Do you see any hope for the reduction of repression in light of
recent legislative reforms that have moved in the direction of increased liberalization? What about President Xi Jinping’s
announcement to establish a “rule of law” by 2020?
[Pils:] The hope of incremental liberalization through top-down legal reforms was extremely important in the
very nearly dead. Under Xi Jinping especially, the law has been changed to
is not seen as imposing limits on the power of the
government; rather, it is an expression of the power of the ruling Party, including ruthless
power to control its own bureaucracy. This is not to deny, of course, that there are occasional
welcome changes, for example, the decision to abolish the feared “re-education through labor” system in 2013. But
such changes generally look better on paper than in reality and do not address the central
challenge of power abuse. For example, the government continues to lock people up under
numerous forms of detention without due – or simply without any – legal process. The Party’s vision for
2020 is therefore Party rule by law, at best – legal rules used when it serves power-holders,
and disregarded when it does not.
And, the Party keeps widening the circles of people it targets. It has turned on itself through the ‘anticorruption’ campaign and it is going after more and more groups in civil society, treating human rights
advocates, especially, as enemies. Starting with the detention of Lawyer Wang Yu, her husband and sixteen-year old
son in the night of July 9, 2015, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on rights lawyers. Most recently, this
widening crackdown has also affected labor activists; and repression is now expanding
post-Mao era but today, in my view, it is
accommodate rather than curb power abuses. Law
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beyond China’s borders. It is a sad but apt illustration of the more repressive, dual-state
system the leadership wants to create.
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Aff- Answer Permutation
Engagement can be conditional
Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k - *Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings
Institution AND **a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard
and Meghan, “Terms of Engagement:Alternatives to PunitivePolicies” Survival,, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer
2000,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf
Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and
the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of
exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target
country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country
without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is
geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private
sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.
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AT: Human Rights Credibility
Credibility is decked for reasons unrelated to the CP
Carter, 2012
(Jimmy, 39th president, is the founder of the Carter Center and the recipient of the 2002 Nobel Peace
Prize, June 24, www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/opinion/americas-shameful-human-rights-record.html)
THE United States is
abandoning its role as the global champion of human rights. Revelations that
top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens,
are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights
has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has
been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent
from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these
critical issues. While the country has made mistakes in the past, the widespread abuse of human rights
over the last decade has been a dramatic change from the past. With leadership from the
United States, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948 as “the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world.” This was a bold and clear commitment that power would no longer serve as a cover
to oppress or injure people, and it established equal rights of all people to life, liberty, security of person, equal protection of
the law and freedom from torture, arbitrary detention or forced exile. The declaration has been invoked by human rights
activists and the international community to replace most of the world’s dictatorships with democracies and to promote the
rule of law in domestic and global affairs. It is disturbing that, instead of strengthening these
principles, our government’s counterterrorism policies are now clearly violating at least 10
of the declaration’s 30 articles, including the prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right
to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations or “associated forces,” a
broad, vague power that can be abused without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being
blocked by a federal judge). This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration. In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or
indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow
unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic
communications. Popular state laws permit detaining individuals because of their appearance, where they worship or with
whom they associate. Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy
terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable. After
more than 30 airstrikes on civilian homes this year in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has demanded that such attacks
end, but the practice continues in areas of Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen that are not in any war zone. We don’t know how
many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in
Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times. These policies clearly affect American
foreign policy. Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas,
affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations,
aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to
justify their own despotic behavior. Meanwhile, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, now
houses 169 prisoners. About half have been cleared for release, yet have little prospect of
ever obtaining their freedom. American authorities have revealed that, in order to obtain confessions, some of the
few being tried (only in military courts) have been tortured by waterboarding more than 100 times or intimidated with
semiautomatic weapons, power drills or threats to sexually assault their mothers. Astoundingly, these facts cannot be used
as a defense by the accused, because the government claims they occurred under the cover of “national security.” Most of the
other prisoners have no prospect of ever being charged or tried either. At a time when popular revolutions are
sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of
law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But
instead of making the world safer, America’s violation of international human rights abets
our enemies and alienates our friends. As concerned citizens, we must persuade Washington to reverse course
and regain moral leadership according to international human rights norms that we had officially adopted as our own and
cherished throughout the years.
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AT: Democracy Net-Benefit
Democratic peace theory is a farce---history proves---there were multiple major wars
between democracies, DPT supports severely restrict their definition of democracies
to support the theory
Rosato 11 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame
(Sebastian, PhD, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, “The Handbook on the
Political Economy of War” By Christopher J. Coyne, Rachel L. Mathers, Chapter 15, On the democratic
peace, p. 287-290)
Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As
Christopher Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to
be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as
democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the
Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do
three inter-democratic wars: the American Civil War, the Spanish American War
and the Boer War. This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions
of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of
inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim,
the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date,
- yields
Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is
defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections,
which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and
the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp.
216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the
citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy
as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections
involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature,
requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp.
14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace
cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the
democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and
the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement.
Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult
population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more
democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a
democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was
an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United
States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett
1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a state but a
union of states, and that this was therefore a war between states rather than within one.
Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as
the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and
Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's
upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to
Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War
was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy
during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a
democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders
of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application
of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by
virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United
States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren
(1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a
member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc
currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that
group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover,
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Doyle*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal
domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points
out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see
also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as
non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers
Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it
unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were
only a
dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to
fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that
democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50;
Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the
number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the
democratic bar rises. Ray*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently
predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate
a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and
1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing
that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between
the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace
phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely
statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would
make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks
of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of
wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting
restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their
central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have
unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that
democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit
that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive
definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of
democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war
between democracies trivial.
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AT: Politics Net-benefit
HR is definitely not the only concern – economics outweigh
Breslin and Taylor ‘8 – Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick,
Professor in International Relations and African Political Economy at University of St. Andrews
(Shaun Breslin and Ian Taylor, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 115, The 'New' Face of
China-African Co-operation Mar., 2008, pp. 59-71 date accessed: 03 July 2016, 2008, JSTOR)
Popular perceptions of China and its global role are often shaped by two words: ‘made in’. Yet this vision of China that
focuses primarily on Beijing as a coming economic superpower is relatively new, and it is not that long ago that two other
words tended to dominate debates on and discourses of China: ‘human rights’. To
be sure, real interest in human
rights in China was never the only issue in other states’ relations with China, nor consistently
pursued throughout the years (Nathan, 1994). Nor did human rights totally subsequently disappear from the
political agenda.1 Nevertheless, the rhetorical importance of human rights – perhaps best epitomised by the
narrow defeat of resolutions condemning Chinese policy in 1995 at the Human Rights Council in Geneva – stands in
stark contrast to the relative silence thereafter as the bottom line of most states’ relations
with Beijing took on ever greater economic dimensions.
Voters won’t switch – HR isn’t the controlling issue on China
Page et al ’10 – Gordon S. Fulcher professor of decision making at Northwestern University
(Benjamin I, June 25, 2010, date accessed: 7.7.16, Living with the Dragon: How the American Public
Views the Rise of China (Contemporary Asia in the World, page 70-71)
The answer lies in between those two extremes.
Americans are well aware of problems concerning
democracy and human rights in China and are unhappy about them – especially with respect to
human rights. They support critical records, diplomatic pressures, and activities by international human rights groups.
Barring unusual circumstances, however,
these matters are not highly salient to most Americans. Most
oppose the sorts of penalties or intrusive U.S. actions that could jeopardize economic or
diplomatic relations with China.
They don’t care
Page et al ’10 – Gordon S. Fulcher professor of decision making at Northwestern University
(Benjamin I, June 25, 2010, date accessed: 7.7.16, Living with the Dragon: How the American Public
Views the Rise of China (Contemporary Asia in the World, page 70-71)
By this measure,
the possible goal of “helping to bring a democratic form of government to
other nations” has not fared very well. It has regularly come out near the bottom of the rankings.
In the ten surveys between 1974 and 2008, only once (in 1986) did as many as 30% of
Americans say that democracy promotion should be “very important” goal. Indeed the already
modest proportion of Americans saying this in the 1990s dropped further before and after
the invasion of Iraq, to 2.4% in 2002 and just 17% in 2008. 20. In 2008, democracy
promotion ranked at the very bottom of the list of fourteen goals.
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Aff - Condition Counterplan Theory
Conditions Counterplan are illegitimate and a voting issue
a) Infinite number of conditions that could be attached to the plan – make it impossible to be
affirmative and predict the condition of the week counterplan
b) No one writes in the context of the condition with the specific mandates of the plan which
means it is impossible to get literature that answers the counterplan
c) Steals the affirmative and makes the debate about trivial net-benefits that are not central to
the core issues of the topic
d) Justify intrinsic perms – Perm do the plan and put the condition on other forms of
engagement. This intrinsic permutation is ok because it tests the necessity of this plan being
key to conditioning china.