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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS HOW IT BEGAN AND HOW IT WORKED The idea of the international cooperation had been operating at various levels before the League was set up. 1. THEORETICAL Many famous historical and philosophical writers had urged some type of international cooperation in the past - e.g. Rousseau and Kant. 2. PRACTICAL Since 1815 various bodies had tried to put this into practice in some way. The Concert of Europe (1815-25); the Red Cross (1864); the international Postal Union (1874); Disarmament conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 and an international Court set up. 3. RALLYING the idea of a League of Nations had been advocated since 1915 by League of Nations Societies in Great Britain, U.S.A. and France. In 1917 the Pope, General Smuts and Lloyd George all appreciated the idea while in 1918 Wilson included the idea in his 14 points. WHY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS WAS SET UP AFTER THE WAR 1. Reaction against the war “the war to end all wars”. As after the Napoleonic wars, some attempt had to be made to prevent future wars. 2. Feelings of Internationalism - This was again understandable after the general feeling that the ambitions of national states had led to war. The basic aim of the League, besides to coordinate efforts of its members along principles of COLLECTIVE SECURITY to preserve peace, was also to coordinate social work at international level to relieve some of the pressure on those nations in difficulties. 3. The Patronage of Key statesmen - wrong to say that President Wilson originated the idea. Indeed it could be argue that the main reason he supported the scheme was because his Republican rival Robert Taft was leading the U.S. society of the League. In 1918 President Wilson of the United States put forward his 14 Points as a basis for peace in order to end the First World War. The fourteenth of his points called for the setting up of an international organisation that would bring the nations of the world together to ensure peace. The League of Nations came into being in January 1920 and Geneva was chosen to be its headquarters. The basic aims of the League were: To protect nations from aggression (through “collective security”) and to preserve and maintain peace in order to avoid another world war. To further the cause of peace by tackling economic and social problems. To encourage disarmament. All members were to reduce arms production “to the lowest level consistent with national safety”. Drawing up of the Covenant Wilson, all along, stressed the importance of having a set of rules and regulations for the League. All the major powers had provided individual drafts already so progress was rapid. The text consisted of an introduction and 26 articles or a list of rules and regulations that members of the League had to stick by. Articles 1 to 7 dealt with the ORGANISATION of the League: MEMBERSHIP - open to all allied or neutral powers provided they signed the Covenant. There was no distinction made about the type of regime providing that the country could prove it was self governing. Ex enemy states could apply but would have to get the backing of two thirds of the members. Any state could withdraw but was expected to give two years notice. FRAMEWORK - the four main parts were to be: An Assembly: This met once a year and all members attended. Each member had one vote no matter how small or big the country. All decisions taken by the Assembly had to be unanimous. In theory this meant that one “no” vote would be enough to prevent any decision from being made but member states could “abstain” from voting rather than vote against a resolution (however this power of liberum veto which all members had was to have a paralysing effect upon the League in the Thirties). The Council: Real power within the League was vested in the Council. The Council was a small body and met every three months. It had four permanent members – Britain, France, Italy and Japan. Four other members were to be elected by the Assembly for a three-year period (by 1926 the number of non-permanent members had increased to nine). The Council had to deal with any crisis that arose and settle political disputes unanimously. The Secretariat: This was the civil service of the League that ran its day-to-day business. It drew up reports and resolutions for the League. The Commissions: Mandates Commissions (to hold former Turkish and German colonies in trust for the peoples until they were ready to govern themselves) were set up to supervise the Powers controlling these areas (e.g. Britain in Palestine).Other Commissions dealt with the control of drugs, the resettlement of refugees, health, the administration of Danzig, the Saar and disarmament. The International Labour Office (ILO) was set up to end social injustice and persuade nations to improve workers rights and working conditions. Permanent Court of International Justice: This was set up in The Hague and consisted of 15 judges. It dealt with legal, as opposed to political disputes between members. Before any case could be submitted to the court both sides had to accept the verdict in advance. (Refer to the chart.) The General Secretaries: Sir Eric Drummond, 1920-33, Jules Aversol 1933-41, Sean Lester 1941-45 Headquarters were to be in the Palace of nations in Geneva - required great preparations - building programmes, telephone facilities etc. Completed in 1936. AIMS OF THE LEAGUE (detail) 1. To REDUCE ARMAMENTS. Articles 8 and 9. Members had to recognise the need for a “reduction of national armaments to the lowest consistent with national safety “. The Council was to set up a commission to deal with this matter of reducing countries weapons. 2. TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF AGGRESSION. Articles 10-11. Members “undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.” For President Wilson this was the heart of the Covenant. Britain was not so keen on this open ended undertaking but France saw it as a means of keeping the USA and Britain committed to helping her against Germany. This rule meant that each country which was a member of the League guaranteed to help preserve the independence of all other member countries. On any threat of war the Secretary General could, on request of any member, summon a meeting of the Council. “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, it hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.” 3. Keep the peace by ARBITRATION. Articles 12- 15. Members were committed to put any dispute to the Council of the League - a report would then be produced within six months. The countries involved were to guarantee not to resort to war in the 3 months after the report - an assumption was made here that public opinion would be aroused. “The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months, after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the Council.” (Article 12) Articles 13 and 14-Judicial disputes to go before the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague. Article 15 Disputes to be raised to the Secretary General, then the Council and if necessary eventually the Assembly. 4. Keep the peace by taking ACTION AGAINST COUNTRIES WHICH BROKE IT: “Should any member resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12,13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the SEVERANCE OF ALL TRADE OR FINANCIAL RELATIONS (Sanctions), the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant breaking State (witness events over Italy and Abyssinia,1935) and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between nationals of the covenant breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.” “… support one another in the financial and economic measures taken under this Article”. It also included persuading non members to do the same. The League Members might also take part in military action - contributing forces recommended by the Council. The Council could also expel any member violating the Covenant. Article 17 dealt with non members. All members were to have similar guarantees against non members. Articles 18 to 21 dealt with the Treaties. Article 18 All treaties in future to be registered with the League. Article 19 Assembly could propose changes in the Treaties. Article 20 Any treaties inconsistent with the Covenant were unacceptable. Article 21 The Monroe Doctrine was not subject to the above proposals 5. Dealing with the MANDATES of former colonies which “as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them”. “The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.” Type A were Iraq, Palestine, Jordon, Syria and Lebanon (generally ex Turkish empire) Type B: German East Africa, Cameroon and Togoland (peoples still had to be looked after as such). Type C: German SW Africa, south Pacific Islands etc which “owing to their sparseness of population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation... .can best be administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory”. 6. TO IMPROVE PEOPLE’S LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS. (The League’s Social functions). General Smuts had especially urged that the League should not just be a political debating chamber, but also should take interest in matters of international social concern. Wide range of interest was envisaged - labour, trade, finance, “Trade in arms and ammunitions” transport, prevention and control of disease, “just treatment of the mandates native inhabitants” and social evils (e.g. drug traffic, prostitution). ASSESSMENT OF THE COVENANT: It contained some notable omissions - No military organization! France had been especially keen for including some sort of military force with contingents from members to be always at the disposal of the League, but Britain and the USA were against this. No statement was made on the equality of races. Japan had urged that this be included but there was opposition from powers like the USA and Australia who had laws restricting immigration from Eastern Asia. Neither was there any definite statement made on religious freedom. THE START OF THE LEAGUE JANUARY 1920 - The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris under the chairmanship of Leon Bourgeois (it should have been Wilson but his position in the USA was still not clarified). The Council held various meetings in 1920 in Paris, London, and Rome etc and set up commission to fix the frontier between the Saar and Germany. In November of 1920 the first meeting of the Assembly was held in Geneva attended by 42 founder members of the League. RECORD OF THE LEAGUE IN THE 1920’s Notable Omissions to the Membership Germany - had tried to join the League from the beginning but opinion was strongly against her. She eventually joined in 1926. USSR - The Soviet government in Moscow was for a time not recognised by the west who supported the Whites in the Russian Civil -war. Consequently the Russians had little time for the League until, by its efforts during the 20’s against poverty, disease, slavery etc it began to command even their respect. They joined in 1934. The USA Though Wilson had played a major role in setting up the League his signing of the Treat of Versailles and covenant was not enough. For Wilson it was a simple matter – ‘the question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership of the world”. Many in the USA, however, did not see it in these terms. They had been shocked by the losses in Europe, irritated by the Versailles squabbles and worried by Wilson’s determination to involve them in Europe. Congress objected particularly to Article 10 and Wilson did little to calm their fears. Despite touring the States and ruining his health Wilson failed and the USA took no part in the League largely due to the activities of Henry Cabot Lodge who hated Wilson and was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In November 1920 the Republican Harding won the Presidential election and reemphasized that the USA wanted no part of Europe. Despite this the USA did cooperative with the League in the 1920’s in agency work. By 1930 it had attended over 40 conferences arranged by the League. But this was not the same as full membership. THE LEAGUE’S RECORD IN THE 1920’s 1. INCREASING MEMBERSHIP In 1920’s Two states left - Costa Rica and Brazil but 14 states joined (including Austria, Hungary, Ireland and Germany). By 1930, 54 countries were members of the League. 2. MECHANISMS OF THE LEAGUE IN OPERATION 1. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL a) Economic and financial Committees - members of these two committees appointed by the Council. Secretary to both was Sir Arthur Salter; Gave technical advice to countries in financial difficulty and sometimes floated loans. Did this for Austria in 1922 and Hungary in 1923 but these two countries had in return to allow the League’s committees to overlook their economies. b) Communicating and Transit Organizations - reported on the standardization of markings and signals for shipping, railways and roads. c) Health Organization - one of the most successful subsidiary bodies. States like the USA, USSR; Germany and Brazil all contributed to it while outside of the League. Dealt with problems of acute deprivation: disease etc and collected information on standards of nutrition and drugs -particularly the trade in raw opium. It also had a sub committee investigating traffic in women and children. d)Refugee Organisation - war prisoners and refugees existed in their millions in Europe (e.g. 2 million Germans in Russian POW camps alone) and their repatriation and resettlement were largely due to the work of the Norwegian FRIDTJOF NANSEN. e)Slavery Commission - In 1924 this body was set up to stamp out the trade in slaves - particularly women and children. Despite its enquiries the existence of slavery was still mentioned in its report in 1937. f) lnternational Labour Organisation - not technically one of the subsidiary bodies in that it was brought into existence by the Treaty of Versailles not the Covenant. However, its budget was fixed by the League. Its director was the French socialist politician Albert Thomas and its range of activities included wage rates, conditions of work, safety, health hazards, employment of women and children and schemes to combat unemployment. It achieved some results, e.g. the international banning of while lead in paints and a minimum employment age for children. 2. POLITICAL a) Mandates Commission in operation by 1921 to supervise mandates system. Every year the ruling power had to report to them on its trust territory. b) Permanent advisory commissions - to examine the disarmament question and general military problems. c) Minorities Commission - concerned the 12 countries that had emerged from the peace settlements with minorities inside them. Meant to guarantee their rights but failed because few complained and all the countries concerned resented its interference. 3. LEGAL Permanent Court of International Justice set up in 1922 in the Hague with judges reflecting the world’s different legal systems. However, they could not compel a state to attend or enforce their verdicts - although in 1929 some states started to do this voluntarily and by 1930, 50 nations had signed the necessary agreement. SECTION THREE a) THE LEAGUE’S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THE 1920s Number of disputes were dealt with by the League - but often at first some were not formally raised with them, e.g. i) Greek-Turkish War 1920-22 Greek activities in Smyrna against the Turks united the Turks under a new leader, Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk), who eventually proclaimed a Turkish Republic. ii) Reparations Question The issue of the amount Germany had to pay and how she was going to do it. When she fell behind, France occupied the Ruhr industrial region, but this resulted in such a severe financial crisis in Germany that the value of the Mark was destroyed - it required a temporary new currency the ‘Rentenmark’ and eventually a permanent new system the ‘Reichsmark’ backed by an international loan to rescue Germany. Note that France refused to consider the suggestion by Lloyd George in 1922 that the League should consider the issue, insisting that it had nothing to do with the League. France argued that such matters should be dealt with by more appropriate bodies which rivalled the League in dealing with matters in dispute. These bodies were especially. a) The Supreme Court - this was a continuation of the allied war council. It continued to meet until 1923 and its main concern was how Germany should be treated - a question which led to different interpretations by France and Britain. b) Conference of Ambassadors - series of meetings in Paris between ambassadors of USA, Britain, Japan and Italy with French Foreign Secretary as Chairman. This was a discreet small body with the advantage of USA participation. It broke up also in 1923 due to disagreement over French occupation of Ruhr. Despite these rival concerns the League was concerned with a wide range of problems. DISPUTES ON AGENDA OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS - Seven examples from the 1920s 1) Enzeli Affair 1920 This was the first case raised before the Council by Iran after this port on the Caspian Sea had been bombarded by the USSR Navy. But the League was not asked to do anything because Iran immediately entered into direct negotiations with the USSR over the matter. 2) Aaland Islands 1920-21 At the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, these islands were disputed by Finland and Sweden. The Aalanders wanted union with Sweden but the League, considering their previous history, decided to leave them under Finnish control while safeguarding the minority interest. This proved successful. 3) Vilna Problem 1920-22 A city in northeastern Poland close to the Lithuanian border and formerly capital of an independent Lithuania, the Poles were dismayed when the Lithuanians claimed the city, pointing out that a very large majority of the people there now were Polish. Put before the League by Poland in 1920, a plan for the League of Nations force in the area came to nothing. Accordingly the Polish army moved in and occupied the city. The problem was referred to the Conference of Ambassadors who awarded the area to Poland in 1922. This was a failure for the League because really the problem was settled by a body outside the League itself. 4. Upper Silesia Plebiscite 1921 Area claimed by both Germany and Poland. It had been decided at the Peace Conference in 1919 to hold a plebiscite to decide its fate. This was held in 1921 and results were as follows: Union with Germany 700,000; Union with Poland 480,000. The League was asked to interpret this and decided to partition the area - this seemed fair, but although Germany received the largest share, the area given to Poland contained almost all the huge coalfield which supplied the wealth of the area. This resulted in constant German/Polish bickering for the next 17 years. A failure? 5. Corfu Affair 1923 An Italian General, Tellini, working on the instructions of the Conference of Ambassadors was marking out the boundary between Albania and Greece when he was assassinated; Mussolini blamed Greece and demanded a compensation payment, and Italian participation in the subsequent enquiry. Greeks agreed to 50m Lire possible compensation but refused the other demand. Italy then occupied Corfu as a guarantee that something would be done. The Conference of Ambassadors took the initiative away from the League (where Greece had raised the point!) and awarded money to Italy and persuaded them to evacuate Corfu. League’s status lowered as Conference had settled matter and showed that dealings with a big power would be difficult! 6. The Mosul Problem 1924 Should this area, on the River Tigris, belong to Turkey or Iraq. Inhabitants were mainly Kurds. The League investigated the problem under the Rapporteur Commission who decided that Iraq should get area - this had been advocated all along by the British. The decision suggested that major powers could call the tune! 7. Greek-Bulgarian Crisis 1925 A series of border incidents between the two countries resulted in this dispute starting when Bulgaria complained that Greek forces had advanced 10 kilometres over the frontier. The Council of the League meeting in Paris demanded fighting should stop. The Greeks had to pay £45,000 in compensation. Significance - showed that League of Nations was suited to dealing with small powers particularly when, as in this case, a loan from the League had just been given to Greece. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEAGUE’S ARBITRATION RECORD IN THE 1920s It had tended to deal with matters in dispute between minor powers or with specific problems allocated to it by the Supreme Council or the Conference of Ambassadors. The League was not helped by the feeling that there was in the last resort a major weakness in the Covenant - i.e. ‘gap in covenant’ in that powers in dispute might still go to war after going through nine months of arbitration procedure. As we have noted the setup of the League was not really all that secure. As we’ve seen the USA was not a member. Communist Russia was not either, staying suspicious of the rest of the world until she joined in 1934. Germany was not allowed to join until 1926 but as we’re about to see was taken back out again in 1933 after only 7 years of membership. Another very important weakness was of course the lack of any military forces which could have been sent in to try to make its decisions more effective. Obviously unless something was done to try to tighten up the organisation of the League then it would sooner or later run into trouble. There were several attempts during the twenties to try to provide more security for the world. b) ATTEMPTS TO TIGHTEN UP THE LEAGUE Attempt I - 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Defence This suggestion came from within the League of Nations itself and was put forward by the worried French. The idea was that if any country made an aggressive act against another country then the member countries could band together and take immediate military action against the guilty country. This sounded like a good idea but it came to nothing because some countries especially Britain (under Ramsay Macdonald) did not want to be too tied down to giving automatic military assistance whenever trouble broke out. Attempt 2 - 1924 Geneva Protocol After the failure of the attempt in 1923 to try to improve the system of world security the British and the French made strenuous efforts to find an alternative scheme. Herriot, the new French PM and Macdonald for Britain put forward this scheme which we call the Geneva Protocol. In it it was suggested that if any League member had a dispute with another member then it was to be compulsory for this dispute to be brought to the attention of the League. If either or any of the squabbling countries disagreed about this then military actions could be taken against them. However this scheme came to nothing also because many nations who were members of the League simply did not want to have to bring every domestic dispute which they might have to the attention of the League. For example, Australia objected to the idea because she feared that her dispute with Japan over her refusal to accept non-European immigrants might be brought before the League. The trouble was as we can see that while everyone thought that the idea of organising a system of world security through an organisation like the League was good, no countries were at the same time very willing to be told what to do by that organisation. As you can see from the Australian example, some League members would refuse to have the League discuss and make decisions about what Australia thought to be a purely domestic issue. Britain under a new conservative government in March 1925 also backed away from supporting the Geneva Protocol idea because of her large overseas colonies and empire, which she considered to be domestic too. After these failures by the League members to try to improve the world security, two other more successful attempts were made outside the League. The Locarno Treaties 1925 The town of Locarno in Switzerland was the meeting place for a conference on European security in 1925. Britain and France were represented as well as Germany by three outstanding Foreign Ministers - Briand for France, Austen Chamberlain for Britain and Gustav Stresemann for Germany. Belgium, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia were also represented. What the powers agreed upon at Locarno was this - that Germany’s western frontiers, i.e. with Belgium and France, which had been agreed upon at Versailles, should be permanent. This was accepted and agreed by all the powers. Germany’s eastern frontiers it was agreed could only be changed after consultation with the eastern countries and France as well. The French also guaranteed on their own to defend Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the time the Locarno agreement looked like being a really good advance towards better cooperation and world peace because at least some agreement had been reached and Germany had been allowed to take part in the meetings, as well as now being invited to become a member of the League of Nations. However the Locarno agreement did suggest that there was a difference between the western and eastern frontiers, i.e. that the eastern one could be altered in the future. Also the Locarno agreement ended up with France making promises to the eastern states which she could never honour on her own. But friendly relations were built up at the Locarno conference and it looked as though Europe was now going to settle down into some form of peaceful existence. In 1926 Germany was invited to join the League and accepted. This friendship between the countries led to a second attempt to improve the security of Europe. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact 1928 In this year the French suggested that the major countries of the world should promise never to fight each other. This was backed by the American Secretary of State Kellogg, who together with Briand the French Foreign Minister drew up the agreement which said that war should simply not be considered by countries as a policy at all. It was signed by 65 states altogether including Russia and America. However, in part of this agreement, it stated that exceptions could be made if a country could say that they were only fighting in ‘self-defence’. Now the definition of what exactly ‘self-defence’ was was never made clear so it really left again a wide gap through which any country could invade or attack any other and claim that their actions were airight because what they were doing was ‘self-defence’. However, again this Kellogg-Briand Pact did reflect the mood of the times - it was a generally peaceful period in European affairs on the surface anyway. This period, beginning with the signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1926 until 1929-30, is referred to as the ‘Locarno Honeymoon’. In the same year, 1928, the thorny problem of reparations seemed to have been solved too. A plan was worked out by the Americans known as the Young Plan which scaled the reparations down to a total of £2,000 million to be repaid by 1988. So were the European leaders of the day leading their countries towards a successful period of international peace? Not really By the end of the 1920s the international scene was growing very gloomy again. In 1929 both the Foreign Ministers who had been responsible for trying to achieve peace, Briand for France and Austen Chamberlain for Britain, were thrown out of office and in the same year the great German foreign leader Stresemann died. Within days of his death, the Wall Street Crash took place. This economic collapse beginning in America was to have a devastating effect on Europe in the months to come. The Great Depression hit every country and every country responded to it in different ways. In 1930 the French began building their great defensive system, the Maginot Line and the Nazis won 100 seats in the Reichstag elections. All of these events mark the end of the hopeful phase of European politics known as the Locarno Honeymoon. We often tend to say that with the beginning of the thirties so began a new age of violence in international affairs and that this was an entirely new phase. This is a bit misleading however. Locarno was just a pre-Hitler revision of the Versailles if you look at its terms carefully and the events of the 1920s showed that Britain and France were unwilling and unable to defend the status quo in Europe long before the age of ‘appeasement’. During the twenties there had been an improvement in the international relations between countries but this rested on no firmer basis than the 0 goodwill of the governments concerned. The rise of Hitler made the Kellogg-Briand pact almost totally meaningless, the same with the Locarno Treaty, and it became painfully clear that no international system had been developed to preserve peace. The League was as we shall see in the next section, beginning to run into serious trouble. Assessment of the League at the end of the 20s It had begun to show signs of difficulties. The ‘gaps’ in the arbitration method, i.e. the way in which it went about its business and the powers it had, had not given much feeling of security. Nor had the League made much progress in the disarmament field by the end of the 20s. However it could be said that it had gone through its ‘Golden Age’. It had dealt with some disputes and its subsidiary agencies were doing excellent work. . Perhaps the main reasons for this were: The Powers that disagreed with the League and wanted to expand (Germany, Italy, the USSR and Japan) were momentarily too weak to upset the new world order and None of the decisions of the League went against a major state (e.g. France, Britain or the USA), which might have challenged the verdict. Social and Economic achievements Many of the Commissions achieved valuable results and much was done to foster international cooperation. One of the most successful was the ILO because it persuaded many governments to: fix a maximum working day and week fix minimum wages introduce sickness and unemployment benefits introduce old age pensions The Refugee Organisation solved the problem of 500,000 prisoners of war marooned in Russia at the end of the war and after 1933 help was given to thousands of people fleeing Nazi Germany. The Health Organisation helped to halt the typhus epidemic in Russia (thus preventing it from spreading over Europe) while the Mandates Commissions successfully administered Iraq, Lebanon, Togo and the Cameroons etc (although they failed in Palestine). Political achievements Several disputes were referred to the League in the Twenties. In all but two cases the League’s decisions were accepted. For example: In a quarrel between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands, the verdict went in favour of Finland (1920) Over rival claims of Germany and Poland to Upper Silesia, the League decided that it should be partitioned between the two (1921) When the Greeks invaded Bulgaria the League swiftly intervened. Greek troops were withdrawn and damages paid to Bulgaria. When Turkey claimed the Iraqi province of Mosul, the League decided in favour of Iraq Squabbles were settled between Peru and Colombia and Bolivia and Paraguay. However, the notion of an international body such as the League regulating relations between nations was a very new concept and Great Powers were still not ready to follow all of its ideals. For example: France was not totally committed to the idea of collective security through the League and she set up a series of small alliances with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania (called the “Little Ententes”). Britain rejected the Geneva Protocol in 1924 (which was intended to strengthen the League) because she did not want to give up her right to act “unilaterally”. Many important international treaties and agreements were signed in the Twenties through bypassing the League: - The Washington Treaties (1921-22) between Japan, USA and Britain to establish warship ratios in the Pacific. The Rapallo Treaty (1922) between Germany and the USSR to develop their armaments The Locarno Treaties (1926) between continental European powers to fix Germany’s borders and The Dawes and Young’s Plans (1924 and 1928) to provide Germany with financial help. The Failure of the League 1929-1939 With the world economic depression after the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the rise of the aggressive foreign policies of Nazism, Italian Fascism and Japanese militarism, collective security collapsed. Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931 Trouble began in 1931 in the Far East when a Great Power faced the League with a direct violation of the Covenant. The economic effects of the Great Depression hit Japan hard. With a rapidly growing population in a limited space and a huge unemployment problem, the army advocated that these issues could be addressed by overseas expansion into the iron ore rich and fertile areas of Chinese Manchuria. In September 1931, Japanese troops, claiming to represent the interests of their local nationals in the South Manchurian Railway Zone, attacked and defeated the Chinese forces in Mukden and by the end of the December had overrun the whole of Manchuria. Soon afterwards the Japanese puppet state of Manchuria was created from their conquests. The Chinese government complained to the League that the Covenant had been broken whereupon the League set up a special commission under Lord Lytton that reported on the situation one year later. The results of the report were that: Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was upheld and Japanese troops were ordered to leave the province Inside the League the Assembly voted. There were 44 members present and 42 voted in favour. Thailand abstained and Japan voted against so the resolution failed. Japan was in a strong position because without the support of the other Great Powers the League was unable to act. The USA would not support military action against Japan while the USSR, who alone could have used land forces effectively, was not yet a member of the League. Moreover, the European powers were distracted by the economic crisis and were loath to use trade embargoes against Japan or undertake costly naval and military operations. In a final act of contempt for the League Japan resigned its membership in March 1933 (Hitler’s Germany also left in the same year) and in 1937 Japan began a full-scale invasion of China. The League again condemned Japan but was again ignored. Summary of Manchuria The Manchurian Crisis had sent a clear message to the dictators in Europe: the League and most importantly, Britain, was not willing to risk war over areas that did not concern them. The sense of pacifism and anti-war feeling was so strong that it appeared no-one was willing to risk war. Furthermore, military capability was so weak because of the depression that no-one was capable of waging war anyway! Appeasement had already begun in 1931. However, there was one major consequence of the crisis. The British Government accepted that rearmament was now essential and the 10-year rule was abandoned on 23rd March 1932. Japan’s action in 1931 was the first real step towards discrediting the League. Italy’s attack on Abyssinia 1935 The next successful act of aggression, which further undermined the League, was the fascist dictator Mussolini’s attack on a fellow member of the League, Abyssinia. Mussolini had for some time loudly declared the need for Italian overseas expansion. Italian Fascists saw in such acquisitions the means of reducing poverty and unemployment at home and encouraging emigration. Moreover, victory over Abyssinia would bring credit to the government by avenging the humiliating defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896, a defeat that had long rankled in Italian imperialist circles. Mussolini, confident that neither France nor Britain would take any effective action, attacked invaded Abyssinia in October 1935, using, beside the usual weapons of war, poison gas sprayed from aeroplanes. The Emperor of Abyssinia, Haile Selassie, appealed to the League. Under these circumstances, the League should have immediately imposed economic sanctions on Italy according to the Covenant. However, although the League declared Italy to be the aggressor, it only required members to impose a trade ban on a very restricted range of commodities that did not include oil, steel or coal. Nor was the British and French run Suez Canal closed to Italian shipping. The Great Powers deliberately limited the application of sanctions for fear of driving Mussolini into alliance with Hitler. Moreover, during the course of the war (in which the Abyssinians armed with outdated weapons were hopelessly outmatched if not outfought) the foreign secretaries of Britain and France, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, produced the Hoare-Laval Pact in December 1935 in which they proposed the division of Abyssinia between the Emperor and the Italians. This was a blatant disregard for the League and would have rewarded Italian aggression. However the proposal was leaked to the press (before Italy could respond) and created such a public outcry in Britain that Hoare had to resign. In 1936 the Italian army marched into Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie fled his country and in July the League declared all sanctions at an end. Mussolini’s contempt for the League was signalled by Italian withdrawal from it in 1937. The Abyssinian crisis had two important results. 1. It was a death blow to the League of Nations, which had again failed to deter or halt an aggressor. This was a great shock to British public opinion. Collective security and the League, those concepts which had seemingly guarded British and world peace without the necessity to spend vast sums on armaments, had failed. 2. The crisis had also caused a major split between Italy and Britain and France. Mussolini felt bitter at the way he had been treated by the western powers. Although he still regarded Hitler with some suspicion, he began to move closer to the German dictator who had consistently supported Italy's actions in Abyssinia. Conclusion Some historians have accepted Churchill's view, that the failure to check Mussolini in 1935-6 was an important step on the way to world war. They argue that Britain and the League should have been prepared to fight Mussolini. The assumption is that Italy would have been easily defeated and that this would have strengthened collective security and helped to deter later German aggression. But recently this argument has been questioned. Almost certainly Britain and France would have won a war against Italy; but victory would have left an embittered Italy and might not have been as easy as many have assumed. In the end nothing had been achieved. Britain and France had failed to uphold collective security and to appease Mussolini. To make matters worse, the Abyssinian crisis had revealed serious divisions between Britain and France. Britain and France had gained the worst of all worlds. They had alienated Italy and failed to deter future aggressors by using the League as an effective institution for enforcing collective security. The only Power to benefit immediately from the crisis was Germany. In this sense the Abyssinian crisis rather than the Manchurian crisis was indeed the crucial turning point in the 1930s. Not only did it irreparably weaken the League and provide Hitler with an ideal opportunity for the illegal remilitarisation of the Rhineland, but it also effectively destroyed the Franco-Italian rapprochement and ultimately replaced it with the Rome-Berlin 'Axis'. This eventually enabled Hitler in 1938 to absorb Austria without Italian opposition. The 'Axis' was also to threaten vital British and French lines of communication in the Mediterranean with the possibility of hostile naval action and thus seriously weaken their potential response to future German -or indeed Japanese- aggression. Hitler was not slow to appreciate this weakness and division. He was also able to use the Abyssinian crisis for his next great gamble. After 1936 the decline of the League became very rapid. For example: (1) During the Spanish Civil War 1936-9, the League, Germany and Italy all pledged non-intervention but the latter two states continued to send troops and supplies to the rebels. (2) Between 1936 and 1939 Germany tore up Versailles and ignored the League through the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the annexation of the Czech lands in 1939 and the attack upon Poland. Moreover, in 1937 Japan invaded China with impunity. By 1938 the League became so discredited that it was virtually ignored by the Great Powers who bypassed it and dealt directly with each other (e.g. the Munich Conference of 1938). . The fundamental reasons for the failure of the League There are two main categories of reasons for the failure of the League: (1) (2) Structural reasons and Political reasons (1) Structural Reasons (a) There were serious structural weaknesses in the Covenant which made it difficult for the League to act: It had no military force of its own and no power would provide it with troops if it felt that it was not in the interests of that power to do so (e.g. Manchuria and Abyssinia). Liberum veto meant that attempts to strengthen the Covenant (e.g. the Geneva Protocol) failed because a unanimous vote was needed to change it and this was never achieved. (b) The League was severely handicapped by the absence of the USA’s vast power and resources (in March 1920 an isolationist US Senate rejected both the League and the Versailles Settlement). Moreover, other important powers were absent for long periods of time: Germany was not allowed to join until 1926 while the USSR only became a member in 1934 when the League was declining. (2) Political Reasons (a) The League was seen as the creation of the Versailles Settlement and therefore regarded with hostility by Germany and Italy – both of which had grievances against the treaties. (b) The Great Depression of the Thirties led to Japan, Italy and Germany adopting expansionist and aggressive foreign policies (e.g. Manchuria and Abyssinia) that exposed a lack of support for the League. (c) The League’s major founders, Britain and France had no real confidence in the concept of collective security through the League and instead they continued to pursue their own security options (i.e. France’s Little Ententes and Britain’s unilateralism). The Hoare-Laval Pact underlines the faithless attitude of these two states towards the League. One observer remarked in the Thirties that “The League of Nations has not been tried and found wanting, it has been found inconvenient and not tried:” THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 1919 - 1939 All governments are concerned primarily with the maintaining of security because without this the continued existence of their country is called into question. The catastrophe of World War I had heightened this perception and the main concern of the victorious Allies was to ensure that it could never happen again. In 1919 their ‘search for security’ involved two areas: 1. The western frontiers (between Germany on the one hand and France, Belgium and Holland on the other). Here the main threat was felt to be the revival of German power. 2. Central and eastern Europe where the main threat was seen as coming from Bolshevik Russia - the spread of communism. Accordingly much of the diplomacy of the Allies during the inter war period was devoted to attempts to preserve and enhance their security. Below are the main measures taken in at attempt to bring this about: A. The Settlement in the West: (The Versailles Treaty) As soon as the negotiations began it became evident that there were very different views with regard to how security could best be ensured. These differences were to plague the Allies throughout the period. THE FRENCH VIEW: The French favoured the concept of ‘security in war’ or ‘security against defeat in war’. This meant taking whatever measures were deemed necessary to ensure that, in the event of future conflict, France would emerge victorious without the enormous costs that had accompanied victory in 1914- 1918. The French believed that German power and militarism had been the major cause of the First World War and that therefore this power had to be reduced and German militarism contained. In addition it was considered vital to maintain national defence in a state of preparedness and obtain reliable allies. Thus, much to the annoyance of Britain, French policy often seemed to be obstructive of proposals for general disarmament. France had twice been invaded within living memory (1870 and 1914) and nothing short of ‘concrete’ measures were deemed adequate. The British view was a view shared by the USA. Both countries felt that the arms race and rival alliances had been major causes of World War I and that French policy risked repeating the mistakes of the past. The British were in favour of ‘security from war’ which meant trying to take measures to ensure that war did not break out again. During the Versailles negotiations the British opposed French demands for a natural, defensible frontier on the Rhine because this would deny the right of self determination and place millions of Germans under French rule. This, the British felt, would provide a cause for war in the future. For the same reason Britain refused French requests for a firm alliance in the 1920s. These differences made it impossible for the Allies to cooperate fully on the issue of security and so compromised the security of all concerned. The differences were later to be exploited to the full by Hitler. The Main Provisions of the Versailles Treaty 1. Germany was stripped of large areas of territory. 2. Germany had to pay reparations. 3. German military strength was drastically reduced by the disarmament provisions: * Her army was limited to 100,000 men * Only 10% of these could be officers * Conscription was banned * The navy was limited to 25% that of Britain’s * No air force was allowed – * Certain categories of weapons were banned * The Rhineland was to be demilitarised. France had wanted permanent control of the main crossing points of the Rhine but Britain and the USA would not support this. France therefore agreed to reduce her demands on condition that the USA and Britain guarantee her in the event of any future attack by Germany. However when the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty, this guarantee became void and the French were left feeling that they had seriously compromised their security. This largely explains their harsh attitude towards Germany in the early 1920s and their determined attempts to seek security by other means. B. The Settlement in the East: Here the situation was confused and unstable because of the collapse of the defeated empires (Germany, AustroHungary and Russia) and the Bolshevik Revolution which had brought to power a communist government that was dedicated to spreading world revolution. Whilst the victorious Allies were meeting in Paris there were communist uprisings in both Germany and Hungary and this influenced the decisions of the Allied leaders who feared both a spread of communism and a revival of German power. This resulted in major departures from the principle of selfdetermination when the frontiers were decided: 1. The newly established state of Czechoslovakia was given the former Austro Hungarian region known as the Sudetenland which contained rich resources and was populated mainly by German speakers. 2. Poland was granted a corridor to allow her access to the Baltic (the Polish Corridor) even though this area contained a large German population because it was felt that this would reduce Polish dependency upon Germany. The German city of Danzig, located in the corridor, was placed under League of Nations control. 3. Union between Germany and Austria was forbidden. Similar measures were also taken with regard to Bolshevik Russia with the lands occupied by Germany during the final year of the war being allocated by the Allies to other states in an attempt to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe and prevent the spread of Bolshevism: 4. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were granted independence. 5. Poland and Rumania received large tracts of Russian territory thus pushing back her western frontier. These two measures (4 & 5) created an almost continuous strip of former Russian territory in eastern Europe that came to be known as the ‘Cordon Sanitaire’. C. France seeks a system of alliances: Feeling her security compromised, France began to construct a system of alliances to replace the lost guarantees of the USA and Britain. In the 1920s this involved agreements with: a. Poland. France hoped that this alliance would present Germany with the threat of a war on two fronts which had been a major plank of foreign policy before World War I. b. The ‘Little Entente’. This was an alliance between Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia who all feared a revival of German or Russian power. France now entered into an alliance with them. However these measures did little to improve France’s security because Poland was no substitute for Russia, France’s prewar ally, in the event of a major conflict and the Little Entente states were minor powers. The alliances France formed were thus more use to the small states that gained France as an ally but were of little use to France. D. Collective Security: For much of the inter war period attention was focused on the idea of ‘collective security’. The basic idea was that if all nations agreed to assist any victim of aggression then such aggression would be discouraged. This had been the intention of the US President Wilson when he promoted the establishment of the League of Nations and there were many attempts to bring about ‘collective security’ during the inter war period both inside and outside the League of Nations. If collective security was to be successful within the framework of the League of Nations there were four main conditions that had to be met: 1. States would for the most part have to have essentially peaceful desires. 2. Moral force, persuasion and public opinion would have to be sufficient to deter all but the most determined aggressor. 3. In the event of a state attempting to use force the other states would have to be willing to unite against it and take appropriate measures. 4. The European states would have to be satisfied with the frontiers as determined in 1919. Unfortunately these conditions were not realised. Not all states were members of the League and not even all of the major powers were members at the same time. At first Germany was excluded and the USSR regarded the League as a ‘capitalist club’. Germany was admitted in 1926 but resigned her membership when Hitler came to power by which time Japan had also resigned in protest against the League’s position with regard to her invasion of Manchuria. The USSR joined following the coming to power of Hitler. The USA, of course, was never a member, the Republicans in the Senate refusing President Wilson’s policies and refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. By 1920 the Republicans also controlled the Presidency and a policy of isolationism, although never total, influence US policy until the arrival in power of the Democrat Roosevelt in 1933. Nor had all states renounced the use of force in their foreign policy and this applied especially to those states who felt that the settlement of 1919 had not been in their favour. Germany and Italy are the two most obvious examples: in the case of the former it was not until Hitler secured power in 1933 that foreign policy became aggressive but Italy, under Mussolini from 1922, began to use armed force to settle disputes as early as 1923 when the island of Corfu was invaded following a disagreement with Greece. In the east Japan also proved increasingly aggressive as population began to outstrip resources and nationalist politicians and army leaders began to think in terms of expansion to obtain control of areas that contained resources vital to the Japanese economy. None of theses states were much influenced by moral arguments. - For much of the 1 920s the League was able to maintain some degree of respect for the international order as created by the peace treaties at the end of the First World War but lost ground rapidly in the 1930s and had ceased to be regarded as a serious guarantor of security long before the outbreak of the Second World War. Her failure to prevent Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935 spelt the end of the League’s influence. There were several attempts to strengthen the collective security provisions of the League of Nations but none of them proved to be really successful: 1. In 1923 a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was presented to the Council of the League by the Temporary Mixed Commission which had been asked to examine the question of multi-lateral disarmament. The Draft Treaty proposed to strengthen collective security arrangement by stating that within four days of any outbreak of hostilities the Council of the League was to decide which country was the aggressor. All League members would then be required to provide military assistance to the victim. The French favoured the proposal because under the rules of the League such assistance was not automatic and so the proposal was a reinforcement of collective security. However Britain refused to accept the idea and so nothing came of it. 2. This led to an attempt to find a compromise between the British and French positions through the Geneva Protocol. its main feature was a proposal that, in the event of a dispute, there should be compulsory arbitration enforced by the Council of the League. However the Labour government in Britain which had been willing to consider this felt and the Conservative government that replaced them was unwilling to consider compulsory arbitration. 3. In 1925, with improving economic conditions helping to create an international climate more favorable to agreements, the Locarno Treaties were signed. The treaties contained three key elements: a. Mutual recognition of the existing boundaries between Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the other. Britain and Italy also recognised the agreement. b. Arbitration Treaties were also signed between Germany - France - Belgium - Poland - Czechoslovakia to provide for the peaceful settlement of any disputes that might arise. c. Mutual guarantees between France and Czechoslovakia and France and Poland were reaffirmed. Negotiated in Locarno in Switzerland, these treaties were signed in London in December 1925. However although a ‘step in the right direction’ they did contain important weaknesses: a. Only certain frontiers were guaranteed, not all of those agreed at the end of the First World War, and this gave the impression that perhaps some frontiers were more sacred that others and thus, perhaps, undermined the settlement as a whole. b. The frontiers guaranteed at Locarno were those in the west and this left the impression, especially in Germany, that perhaps the eastern frontiers which she had never accepted willingly might be subject to change. This view was reinforced by comments from the British representative at the talks who said that “for the Polish Corridor, no British Government ever wilt risk the bones of a British Grenadier’. c. Selecting certain frontiers for further special guarantees tended to undermine the general guarantees given to all frontiers under the Covenant of the League of Nations. 4. In April 1927 the French Foreign Minister (Briand) proposed to the Secretary of State of the USA (Kellogg) that the two countries publicly renounce the use of war as an instrument of their national policy. Kellogg agreed but suggested that the Pact might be opened for the signature of other countries if they wished to abide by its terms. Thus in 1928 the Kellogg - Briand Pact was opened for signature and by August 65 countries had signed including all of the major powers except the USSR. This seemed a great success but many countries when signing added qualifications which left the Pact with little more than moral force. 5. The French made several concessions during the 1920s when it seemed as if the spirit of collective security was being accepted: a. In 1926 they withdrew their objections to German membership of the League. b. In 1927 they agreed to the ending of Allied military controls in Germany. c. In 1929 they accepted the Young Plan which ended Allied financial controls on Germany. d. In 1930 they agreed to the withdrawal of all Allied troops from the Rhineland. These concessions undermined the French ‘security in war’ and came to be very much resented when collective security collapsed but by that time it was too late for France to revert to her earlier system. 6. Between 1930 and 1933 the League sponsored a general disarmament conference in Geneva that was attended by most of the major powers. There were times when agreement seemed close but Britain and France hesitated and the opportunity was lost. In 1933 with the naming of Hitler as German Chancellor and his withdrawal both from the conference and the League there was no longer any hope of carrying out widespread disarmament. e) The Failure of Collective Security Despite the progress listed above, Collective Security did not survive long into the 1930s. The actions of Germany, Italy and Japan demonstrated that a reliance on collective security would not provide real security for any country. a). Between 1930-1932 Japan seized control of Manchuria from China and despite Chinese appeals to the League and the League’s eventual condemnation of Japan no action was taken to restore Manchuria to China. b). In 1933 Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany and one of his first actions was to announce Germany’s resignation from the League which he saw as an instrument for maintaining the settlement of 1919. He also disagreed with the most fundamental principle of the League - that all countries great and small had the right to territorial integrity. c). in 1935 Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia and the League, although condemning the invasion, failed to take any measures that were strong enough to force an Italian withdrawal. Britain and France saw Mussolini as a possible counterbalance to Hitler and so were unwilling to take any strong action against him. Thus League sanctions were half-hearted and served only to anger Mussolini without stopping him. d). In 1936 Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland demilitarised zone. This was a clear breach of both the Versailles Treaty and the undertakings accepted by Germany at Locarno but there was no response beyond verbal protest from Britain and France. As late as 1935 Britain, France and Italy had united at Stresa to condemn German breaches of the treaty but by 1936 Mussolini was coming under the influence of Hitler and the reoccupation of the Rhineland meant that collective security was dead because: * Germany was now able to fortify her western frontier and so obtain greater freedom of action in the east. If Britain and France had not intervened when Hitler had broken Germany’s agreements prior to 1936, it was unlikely that they would do so afterwards when this would involve a major war. * Once Germany reoccupied, and later fortified, the Rhineland France could no longer offer any real assistance to her allies in eastern Europe in the event of a German move against them. * Smaller states now began to question the value of collective security as the western democracies seemed unwilling to ‘stand up’ to Hitler. Belgium, for example, asked to be released from the Locarno obligations and opted for neutrality as offering greater security. The Reasons for the Failure of Collective Security 1. It depended too much upon personalities and the relationships that developed between them. This was especially true of Briand in France and Stresemann in Germany whose mutual respect and understanding had made the progress of the 1920s possible. However after 1929 neither man was to hold office again and Stresemann died in that year. 2. After 1929 economic conditions worsened because of the onset of the Great Depression. Leaders became increasingly concerned with the economic problems of their own countries and invested less time in the search for international security. Severe economic problems promoted narrow nationalist solutions and did much to destroy the spirit of cooperation that had begun to develop in the 1920s. 3. Even in the 1920s collective security suffered from the fact that neither the USA nor the USSR were involved. The former because it opted for a policy of isolation and the latter because it was deliberately isolated after the coming to power of the Bolsheviks. Thus two of the most powerful states in the world were outside the system. 4. At the end of the First World War both Germany and Russia lost large areas of territory and had severe terms imposed upon them. For much of the inter war period they remained weak and thus were not able to challenge the system set up by the victorious allies of World War One. However by the mid 1930s the reforms of Stalin in the USSR and the measures of Hitler in Germany meant that both countries were increasingly able to challenge the settlement of 1919. 5. Disagreements between Britain and France weakened collective security throughout the period. They had fundamentally different approaches to security and their inability to compromise effectively meant that the entire principle was undermined. Britain was not prepared to provide the really solid guarantees that France sought and so France was never willing to abandon her ‘security in war’ ideas - hence the Maginot Line and the system of alliances with east European states. Britain was willing to negotiate changes to Versailles, France was not and in 1935 signed an alliance with the USSR and practically abandoned the idea of collective security at least as envisaged through the League of Nations. 6. The failure of democracy to take roots in many of the new states created after 1919 was also a blow to collective security. The dictatorships which sprang up often had expansionist policies and the Fascists actually gloried in war believing that eternal peace was not in the interests of mankind. 7. The terrible costs of World War One also left Europe with a legacy of suspicion and made it difficult for leaders to make concessions which might be interpreted by political opponents as weakening their country’s defenses. 8. For collective security to be really effective it would have had to have operated through the League of Nations but until 1926 at least this was exclusively the preserve of the victorious Allies of the First World War and even afterwards it was still dominated by them and so viewed with some suspicion by those states that were dissatisfied with the 1919 settlement. Essay plans “Account for France’s policy to provide for her national security in the inter-war years”. F’s bitter experience in WW1 made her determined to remove any future threat to her security. The two potential sources of threat were G and (more remotely) the USSR. F adopted the policy of “security in war” (i.e. to strengthen herself sufficiently to be able to resist any future attack) that involved a two-pronged strategy... 1) To weaken G via the Tr of Vers (G lost territory, her army and had to pay reps) and strengthening new states to the east (Cz got the Sudets and Pol got W.Prussia and use of Danzig) which would also serve as a “cordon sanitaire” against USSR. 2) To strengthen F through Collective security (by attempting to give the L of N muscle thro’the Draft Tr of Mutual Assistance and the GE Protocol) Failed. Mso F tried to get a peacetime alliance with USA and GB. Failed. So signed Ententes with Cz, Rom, Yugo and Pol. However, F was bitter about the lack of support from her wartime allies and even with the Tr of V. (Clemencau said of it, “this is not a peace treaty, this is an armistice for 20 years”). 3) In the Late Twenties Late 20’s was a period of prosperity and goodwill in Europe (the “Locarno period”). F willing to promote Collective Security. For e.g. Locarno Treaty 26 , F-G guarantee of their common border, 26 G joined L of N, 28 G signed Kellogg-Briand Pact, 29 0 signed Young Plan reducing reps and 30 F withdrew troops from Rhineland but 1929 Turning Point Great Depression affected F’s foreign policy. Eg. (1) 1930-34 Maginot Line constructed (abandoning Little Ententes). A malaise of insecurity characterised F foreign policy that became one of appeasement e.g.... -F allowed Hitler to reintroduce conscription in 35 -F took no action over the Rhineland remilitarisation in 36. Hitler then fortified the Rhine border. -F estranged from GB when GB signed Anglo-German Naval Agreement 35 thus undermining Versailles. -F formally abandoned collective security by signing Treaty of Mutual Assistance with USSR in 35 (a paper tiger). -F lacked self-confidence and followed Chamberlain’s appeasement policies... a) F’s Little Entente ally, Cz, betrayed at Munich in 38 (b) August 39 F lost her new ally, R, to Germany via the Nazi-Soviet Pact. However, in August 39 F got her alliance with GB (through their guarantee to Poland) but this could not save her from defeat by G in 1940 Conclusion F’s policy of “security in war” had ultimately failed. F had failed to gravely weaken G in the long run and had also failed to strengthen herself (e.g. she abandoned collective security, the Little Ententes and she had lost her ally, Russia).