Download THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
HOW IT BEGAN AND HOW IT WORKED
The idea of the international cooperation had been operating at various levels before the League was set up.
1. THEORETICAL Many famous historical and philosophical writers had urged some type of international
cooperation in the past - e.g. Rousseau and Kant.
2. PRACTICAL Since 1815 various bodies had tried to put this into practice in some way. The Concert of Europe
(1815-25); the Red Cross (1864); the international Postal Union (1874); Disarmament conferences at the Hague in
1899 and 1907 and an international Court set up.
3. RALLYING the idea of a League of Nations had been advocated since 1915 by League of Nations Societies in
Great Britain, U.S.A. and France. In 1917 the Pope, General Smuts and Lloyd George all appreciated the idea while
in 1918 Wilson included the idea in his 14 points.
WHY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS WAS SET UP AFTER THE WAR
1. Reaction against the war “the war to end all wars”. As after the Napoleonic wars, some attempt had to be made to
prevent future wars.
2. Feelings of Internationalism - This was again understandable after the general feeling that the ambitions of
national states had led to war. The basic aim of the League, besides to coordinate efforts of its members along
principles of COLLECTIVE SECURITY to preserve peace, was also to coordinate social work at international level
to relieve some of the pressure on those nations in difficulties.
3. The Patronage of Key statesmen - wrong to say that President Wilson originated the idea. Indeed it could be argue
that the main reason he supported the scheme was because his Republican rival Robert Taft was leading the U.S.
society of the League.
In 1918 President Wilson of the United States put forward his 14 Points as a basis for peace in order to end the First
World War. The fourteenth of his points called for the setting up of an international organisation that would bring the
nations of the world together to ensure peace. The League of Nations came into being in January 1920 and Geneva
was chosen to be its headquarters.
The basic aims of the League were:
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To protect nations from aggression (through “collective security”) and to preserve and maintain peace in
order to avoid another world war.
To further the cause of peace by tackling economic and social problems.
To encourage disarmament. All members were to reduce arms production “to the lowest level consistent
with national safety”.
Drawing up of the Covenant
Wilson, all along, stressed the importance of having a set of rules and regulations for the League. All the major
powers had provided individual drafts already so progress was rapid. The text consisted of an introduction and 26
articles or a list of rules and regulations that members of the League had to stick by.
Articles 1 to 7 dealt with the ORGANISATION of the League:
MEMBERSHIP - open to all allied or neutral powers provided they signed the Covenant. There was no distinction
made about the type of regime providing that the country could prove it was self governing. Ex enemy states could
apply but would have to get the backing of two thirds of the members. Any state could withdraw but was expected to
give two years notice.
FRAMEWORK - the four main parts were to be:
An Assembly: This met once a year and all members attended. Each member had one vote no matter how small or
big the country. All decisions taken by the Assembly had to be unanimous. In theory this meant that one “no”
vote would be enough to prevent any decision from being made but member states could “abstain” from voting
rather than vote against a resolution (however this power of liberum veto which all members had was to have a
paralysing effect upon the League in the Thirties).
The Council: Real power within the League was vested in the Council. The Council was a small body and met every
three months. It had four permanent members – Britain, France, Italy and Japan. Four other members were to be
elected by the Assembly for a three-year period (by 1926 the number of non-permanent members had increased to
nine). The Council had to deal with any crisis that arose and settle political disputes unanimously.
The Secretariat: This was the civil service of the League that ran its day-to-day business. It drew up reports and
resolutions for the League.
The Commissions: Mandates Commissions (to hold former Turkish and German colonies in trust for the peoples
until they were ready to govern themselves) were set up to supervise the Powers controlling these areas (e.g. Britain
in Palestine).Other Commissions dealt with the control of drugs, the resettlement of refugees, health, the
administration of Danzig, the Saar and disarmament. The International Labour Office (ILO) was set up to end social
injustice and persuade nations to improve workers rights and working conditions.
Permanent Court of International Justice: This was set up in The Hague and consisted of 15 judges. It dealt with
legal, as opposed to political disputes between members. Before any case could be submitted to the court both sides
had to accept the verdict in advance.
(Refer to the chart.)
The General Secretaries: Sir Eric Drummond, 1920-33, Jules Aversol 1933-41, Sean Lester 1941-45 Headquarters
were to be in the Palace of nations in Geneva - required great preparations - building programmes, telephone
facilities etc. Completed in 1936.
AIMS OF THE LEAGUE (detail)
1. To REDUCE ARMAMENTS. Articles 8 and 9. Members had to recognise the need for a “reduction of national
armaments to the lowest consistent with national safety “. The Council was to set up a commission to deal with this
matter of reducing countries weapons.
2. TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF AGGRESSION. Articles 10-11. Members “undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of
the League.” For President Wilson this was the heart of the Covenant. Britain was not so keen on this open ended
undertaking but France saw it as a means of keeping the USA and Britain committed to helping her against Germany.
This rule meant that each country which was a member of the League guaranteed to help preserve the independence
of all other member countries. On any threat of war the Secretary General could, on request of any member, summon
a meeting of the Council. “Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the
League or not, it hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take any action that
may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”
3. Keep the peace by ARBITRATION. Articles 12- 15. Members were committed to put any dispute to the Council
of the League - a report would then be produced within six months. The countries involved were to guarantee not to
resort to war in the 3 months after the report - an assumption was made here that public opinion would be aroused.
“The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they
will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no
case to resort to war until three months, after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the
Council.” (Article 12) Articles 13 and 14-Judicial disputes to go before the Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague.
Article 15 Disputes to be raised to the Secretary General, then the Council and if necessary eventually the Assembly.
4. Keep the peace by taking ACTION AGAINST COUNTRIES WHICH BROKE IT: “Should any member resort
to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12,13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an
act of war against all other Members of the League which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the
SEVERANCE OF ALL TRADE OR FINANCIAL RELATIONS (Sanctions), the prohibition of all intercourse
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant breaking State (witness events over Italy and
Abyssinia,1935) and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between nationals of the
covenant breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.” “… support
one another in the financial and economic measures taken under this Article”. It also included persuading non
members to do the same. The League Members might also take part in military action - contributing forces
recommended by the Council. The Council could also expel any member violating the Covenant.
Article 17 dealt with non members. All members were to have similar guarantees against non members.
Articles 18 to 21 dealt with the Treaties.
Article 18 All treaties in future to be registered with the League.
Article 19 Assembly could propose changes in the Treaties.
Article 20 Any treaties inconsistent with the Covenant were unacceptable.
Article 21 The Monroe Doctrine was not subject to the above proposals
5. Dealing with the MANDATES of former colonies which “as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them”. “The character of the mandate must differ
according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic
conditions and other similar circumstances.” Type A were Iraq, Palestine, Jordon, Syria and Lebanon (generally ex
Turkish empire) Type B: German East Africa, Cameroon and Togoland (peoples still had to be looked after as such).
Type C: German SW Africa, south Pacific Islands etc which “owing to their sparseness of population, or their small
size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation... .can best be administered under the laws of the Mandatory
as integral portions of its territory”.
6. TO IMPROVE PEOPLE’S LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS. (The League’s Social functions).
General Smuts had especially urged that the League should not just be a political debating chamber, but also should
take interest in matters of international social concern. Wide range of interest was envisaged - labour, trade, finance,
“Trade in arms and ammunitions” transport, prevention and control of disease, “just treatment of the mandates native
inhabitants” and social evils (e.g. drug traffic, prostitution).
ASSESSMENT OF THE COVENANT:
It contained some notable omissions - No military organization! France had been especially keen for including
some sort of military force with contingents from members to be always at the disposal of the League, but Britain and
the USA were against this. No statement was made on the equality of races. Japan had urged that this be included but
there was opposition from powers like the USA and Australia who had laws restricting immigration from Eastern
Asia. Neither was there any definite statement made on religious freedom.
THE START OF THE LEAGUE
JANUARY 1920 - The first meeting of the Council was held in Paris under the chairmanship of Leon Bourgeois (it
should have been Wilson but his position in the USA was still not clarified). The Council held various meetings in
1920 in Paris, London, and Rome etc and set up commission to fix the frontier between the Saar and Germany. In
November of 1920 the first meeting of the Assembly was held in Geneva attended by 42 founder members of the
League.
RECORD OF THE LEAGUE IN THE 1920’s
Notable Omissions to the Membership
Germany - had tried to join the League from the beginning but opinion was strongly against her. She eventually
joined in 1926.
USSR - The Soviet government in Moscow was for a time not recognised by the west who supported the Whites in
the Russian Civil -war. Consequently the Russians had little time for the League until, by its efforts during the 20’s
against poverty, disease, slavery etc it began to command even their respect. They joined in 1934.
The USA Though Wilson had played a major role in setting up the League his signing of the Treat of Versailles and
covenant was not enough. For Wilson it was a simple matter – ‘the question is whether we can refuse the moral
leadership of the world”. Many in the USA, however, did not see it in these terms. They had been shocked by the
losses in Europe, irritated by the Versailles squabbles and worried by Wilson’s determination to involve them in
Europe. Congress objected particularly to Article 10 and Wilson did little to calm their fears. Despite touring the
States and ruining his health Wilson failed and the USA took no part in the League largely due to the activities of
Henry Cabot Lodge who hated Wilson and was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In November
1920 the Republican Harding won the Presidential election and reemphasized that the USA wanted no part of
Europe. Despite this the USA did cooperative with the League in the 1920’s in agency work. By 1930 it had attended
over 40 conferences arranged by the League. But this was not the same as full membership.
THE LEAGUE’S RECORD IN THE 1920’s
1. INCREASING MEMBERSHIP
In 1920’s Two states left - Costa Rica and Brazil but 14 states joined (including Austria, Hungary, Ireland and
Germany). By 1930, 54 countries were members of the League.
2. MECHANISMS OF THE LEAGUE IN OPERATION
1. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
a) Economic and financial Committees - members of these two committees appointed by the Council. Secretary to
both was Sir Arthur Salter; Gave technical advice to countries in financial difficulty and sometimes floated loans.
Did this for Austria in 1922 and Hungary in 1923 but these two countries had in return to allow the League’s
committees to overlook their economies.
b) Communicating and Transit Organizations - reported on the standardization of markings and signals for shipping,
railways and roads.
c) Health Organization - one of the most successful subsidiary bodies. States like the USA, USSR; Germany and
Brazil all contributed to it while outside of the League. Dealt with problems of acute deprivation: disease etc and
collected information on standards of nutrition and drugs -particularly the trade in raw opium. It also had a sub
committee investigating traffic in women and children.
d)Refugee Organisation - war prisoners and refugees existed in their millions in Europe (e.g. 2 million Germans in
Russian POW camps alone) and their repatriation and resettlement were largely due to the work of the Norwegian
FRIDTJOF NANSEN.
e)Slavery Commission - In 1924 this body was set up to stamp out the trade in slaves - particularly women and
children. Despite its enquiries the existence of slavery was still mentioned in its report in 1937.
f) lnternational Labour Organisation - not technically one of the subsidiary bodies in that it was brought into
existence by the Treaty of Versailles not the Covenant. However, its budget was fixed by the League. Its director was
the French socialist politician Albert Thomas and its range of activities included wage rates, conditions of work,
safety, health hazards, employment of women and children and schemes to combat unemployment. It achieved some
results, e.g. the international banning of while lead in paints and a minimum employment age for children.
2. POLITICAL
a) Mandates Commission in operation by 1921 to supervise mandates system. Every year the ruling power had to
report to them on its trust territory. b) Permanent advisory commissions - to examine the disarmament question and
general military problems.
c) Minorities Commission - concerned the 12 countries that had emerged from the peace settlements with minorities
inside them. Meant to guarantee their rights but failed because few complained and all the countries concerned
resented its interference.
3. LEGAL
Permanent Court of International Justice set up in 1922 in the Hague with judges reflecting the world’s different legal
systems. However, they could not compel a state to attend or enforce their verdicts - although in 1929 some states
started to do this voluntarily and by 1930, 50 nations had signed the necessary agreement.
SECTION THREE
a) THE LEAGUE’S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN THE 1920s
Number of disputes were dealt with by the League - but often at first some were not formally raised with them, e.g.
i) Greek-Turkish War 1920-22
Greek activities in Smyrna against the Turks united the Turks under a new leader, Mustapha Kemal (Ataturk), who
eventually proclaimed a Turkish Republic.
ii) Reparations Question
The issue of the amount Germany had to pay and how she was going to do it. When she fell behind, France occupied
the Ruhr industrial region, but this resulted in such a severe financial crisis in Germany that the value of the Mark
was destroyed - it required a temporary new currency the ‘Rentenmark’ and eventually a permanent new system the
‘Reichsmark’ backed by an international loan to rescue Germany. Note that France refused to consider the suggestion
by Lloyd George in 1922 that the League should consider the issue, insisting that it had nothing to do with the
League. France argued that such matters should be dealt with by more appropriate bodies which rivalled the League
in dealing with matters in dispute. These bodies were especially.
a) The Supreme Court - this was a continuation of the allied war council. It continued to meet until 1923 and its main
concern was how Germany should be treated - a question which led to different interpretations by France and Britain.
b) Conference of Ambassadors - series of meetings in Paris between ambassadors of USA, Britain, Japan and Italy
with French Foreign Secretary as Chairman. This was a discreet small body with the advantage of USA participation.
It broke up also in 1923 due to disagreement over French occupation of Ruhr. Despite these rival concerns the
League was concerned with a wide range of problems.
DISPUTES ON AGENDA OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS - Seven examples from the 1920s
1) Enzeli Affair 1920
This was the first case raised before the Council by Iran after this port on the Caspian Sea had been bombarded by
the USSR Navy. But the League was not asked to do anything because Iran immediately entered into direct
negotiations with the USSR over the matter.
2) Aaland Islands 1920-21
At the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, these islands were disputed by Finland and Sweden. The Aalanders wanted
union with Sweden but the League, considering their previous history, decided to leave them under Finnish control
while safeguarding the minority interest. This proved successful.
3) Vilna Problem 1920-22
A city in northeastern Poland close to the Lithuanian border and formerly capital of an independent Lithuania, the
Poles were dismayed when the Lithuanians claimed the city, pointing out that a very large majority of the people
there now were Polish. Put before the League by Poland in 1920, a plan for the League of Nations force in the area
came to nothing. Accordingly the Polish army moved in and occupied the city. The problem was referred to the
Conference of Ambassadors who awarded the area to Poland in 1922. This was a failure for the League because
really the problem was settled by a body outside the League itself.
4. Upper Silesia Plebiscite 1921
Area claimed by both Germany and Poland. It had been decided at the Peace Conference in 1919 to hold a plebiscite
to decide its fate. This was held in 1921 and results were as follows: Union with Germany 700,000; Union with
Poland 480,000. The League was asked to interpret this and decided to partition the area - this seemed fair, but
although Germany received the largest share, the area given to Poland contained almost all the huge coalfield which
supplied the wealth of the area. This resulted in constant German/Polish bickering for the next 17 years. A failure?
5. Corfu Affair 1923
An Italian General, Tellini, working on the instructions of the Conference of Ambassadors was marking out the
boundary between Albania and Greece when he was assassinated; Mussolini blamed Greece and demanded a
compensation payment, and Italian participation in the subsequent enquiry. Greeks agreed to 50m Lire possible
compensation but refused the other demand. Italy then occupied Corfu as a guarantee that something would be done.
The Conference of Ambassadors took the initiative away from the League (where Greece had raised the point!) and
awarded money to Italy and persuaded them to evacuate Corfu. League’s status lowered as Conference had settled
matter and showed that dealings with a big power would be difficult!
6. The Mosul Problem 1924
Should this area, on the River Tigris, belong to Turkey or Iraq. Inhabitants were mainly Kurds. The League
investigated the problem under the Rapporteur Commission who decided that Iraq should get area - this had been
advocated all along by the British. The decision suggested that major powers could call the tune!
7. Greek-Bulgarian Crisis 1925
A series of border incidents between the two countries resulted in this dispute starting when Bulgaria complained that
Greek forces had advanced 10 kilometres over the frontier. The Council of the League meeting in Paris demanded
fighting should stop. The Greeks had to pay £45,000 in compensation. Significance - showed that League of Nations
was suited to dealing with small powers particularly when, as in this case, a loan from the League had just been given
to Greece.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEAGUE’S ARBITRATION RECORD IN THE 1920s
It had tended to deal with matters in dispute between minor powers or with specific problems allocated to it by the
Supreme Council or the Conference of Ambassadors. The League was not helped by the feeling that there was in the
last resort a major weakness in the Covenant - i.e. ‘gap in covenant’ in that powers in dispute might still go to war
after going through nine months of arbitration procedure. As we have noted the setup of the League was not really all
that secure. As we’ve seen the USA was not a member. Communist Russia was not either, staying suspicious of the
rest of the world until she joined in 1934. Germany was not allowed to join until 1926 but as we’re about to see was
taken back out again in 1933 after only 7 years of membership. Another very important weakness was of course the
lack of any military forces which could have been sent in to try to make its decisions more effective. Obviously
unless something was done to try to tighten up the organisation of the League then it would sooner or later run into
trouble. There were several attempts during the twenties to try to provide more security for the world.
b) ATTEMPTS TO TIGHTEN UP THE LEAGUE
Attempt I - 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Defence
This suggestion came from within the League of Nations itself and was put forward by the worried French. The idea
was that if any country made an aggressive act against another country then the member countries could band
together and take immediate military action against the guilty country. This sounded like a good idea but it came to
nothing because some countries especially Britain (under Ramsay Macdonald) did not want to be too tied down to
giving automatic military assistance whenever trouble broke out.
Attempt 2 - 1924 Geneva Protocol
After the failure of the attempt in 1923 to try to improve the system of world security the British and the French
made strenuous efforts to find an alternative scheme. Herriot, the new French PM and Macdonald for Britain put
forward this scheme which we call the Geneva Protocol. In it it was suggested that if any League member had a
dispute with another member then it was to be compulsory for this dispute to be brought to the attention of the
League. If either or any of the squabbling countries disagreed about this then military actions could be taken against
them. However this scheme came to nothing also because many nations who were members of the League simply did
not want to have to bring every domestic dispute which they might have to the attention of the League. For example,
Australia objected to the idea because she feared that her dispute with Japan over her refusal to accept non-European
immigrants might be brought before the League. The trouble was as we can see that while everyone thought that the
idea of organising a system of world security through an organisation like the League was good, no countries were at
the same time very willing to be told what to do by that organisation. As you can see from the Australian example,
some League members would refuse to have the League discuss and make decisions about what Australia thought to
be a purely domestic issue. Britain under a new conservative government in March 1925 also backed away from
supporting the Geneva Protocol idea because of her large overseas colonies and empire, which she considered to be
domestic too.
After these failures by the League members to try to improve the world security, two other more successful attempts
were made outside the League.
The Locarno Treaties 1925
The town of Locarno in Switzerland was the meeting place for a conference on European security in 1925. Britain
and France were represented as well as Germany by three outstanding Foreign Ministers - Briand for France, Austen
Chamberlain for Britain and Gustav Stresemann for Germany. Belgium, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia were also
represented. What the powers agreed upon at Locarno was this - that Germany’s western frontiers, i.e. with Belgium
and France, which had been agreed upon at Versailles, should be permanent. This was accepted and agreed by all the
powers. Germany’s eastern frontiers it was agreed could only be changed after consultation with the eastern countries
and France as well. The French also guaranteed on their own to defend Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the time the
Locarno agreement looked like being a really good advance towards better cooperation and world peace because at
least some agreement had been reached and Germany had been allowed to take part in the meetings, as well as now
being invited to become a member of the League of Nations. However the Locarno agreement did suggest that there
was a difference between the western and eastern frontiers, i.e. that the eastern one could be altered in the future.
Also the Locarno agreement ended up with France making promises to the eastern states which she could never
honour on her own. But friendly relations were built up at the Locarno conference and it looked as though Europe
was now going to settle down into some form of peaceful existence. In 1926 Germany was invited to join the League
and accepted. This friendship between the countries led to a second attempt to improve the security of Europe.
The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact 1928
In this year the French suggested that the major countries of the world should promise never to fight each other. This
was backed by the American Secretary of State Kellogg, who together with Briand the French Foreign Minister drew
up the agreement which said that war should simply not be considered by countries as a policy at all. It was signed by
65 states altogether including Russia and America. However, in part of this agreement, it stated that exceptions could
be made if a country could say that they were only fighting in ‘self-defence’. Now the definition of what exactly
‘self-defence’ was was never made clear so it really left again a wide gap through which any country could invade or
attack any other and claim that their actions were airight because what they were doing was ‘self-defence’. However,
again this Kellogg-Briand Pact did reflect the mood of the times - it was a generally peaceful period in European
affairs on the surface anyway. This period, beginning with the signing of the Locarno Treaty in 1926 until 1929-30,
is referred to as the ‘Locarno Honeymoon’. In the same year, 1928, the thorny problem of reparations seemed to have
been solved too. A plan was worked out by the Americans known as the Young Plan which scaled the reparations
down to a total of £2,000 million to be repaid by 1988. So were the European leaders of the day leading their
countries towards a successful period of international peace? Not really
By the end of the 1920s the international scene was growing very gloomy again. In 1929 both the Foreign Ministers
who had been responsible for trying to achieve peace, Briand for France and Austen Chamberlain for Britain, were
thrown out of office and in the same year the great German foreign leader Stresemann died. Within days of his death,
the Wall Street Crash took place. This economic collapse beginning in America was to have a devastating effect on
Europe in the months to come. The Great Depression hit every country and every country responded to it in different
ways. In 1930 the French began building their great defensive system, the Maginot Line and the Nazis won 100 seats
in the Reichstag elections. All of these events mark the end of the hopeful phase of European politics known as the
Locarno Honeymoon. We often tend to say that with the beginning of the thirties so began a new age of violence in
international affairs and that this was an entirely new phase. This is a bit misleading however. Locarno was just a
pre-Hitler revision of the Versailles if you look at its terms carefully and the events of the 1920s showed that Britain
and France were unwilling and unable to defend the status quo in Europe long before the age of ‘appeasement’.
During the twenties there had been an improvement in the international relations between countries but this rested on
no firmer basis than the 0 goodwill of the governments concerned. The rise of Hitler made the Kellogg-Briand pact
almost totally meaningless, the same with the Locarno Treaty, and it became painfully clear that no international
system had been developed to preserve peace. The League was as we shall see in the next section, beginning to run
into serious trouble.
Assessment of the League at the end of the 20s
It had begun to show signs of difficulties. The ‘gaps’ in the arbitration method, i.e. the way in which it went about its
business and the powers it had, had not given much feeling of security. Nor had the League made much progress in
the disarmament field by the end of the 20s. However it could be said that it had gone through its ‘Golden Age’. It
had dealt with some disputes and its subsidiary agencies were doing excellent work. . Perhaps the main reasons for
this were:
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The Powers that disagreed with the League and wanted to expand (Germany, Italy, the USSR and Japan)
were momentarily too weak to upset the new world order and
None of the decisions of the League went against a major state (e.g. France, Britain or the USA), which
might have challenged the verdict.
Social and Economic achievements
Many of the Commissions achieved valuable results and much was done to foster international cooperation. One of
the most successful was the ILO because it persuaded many governments to:
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fix a maximum working day and week

fix minimum wages

introduce sickness and unemployment benefits

introduce old age pensions
The Refugee Organisation solved the problem of 500,000 prisoners of war marooned in Russia at the end of the war
and after 1933 help was given to thousands of people fleeing Nazi Germany.
The Health Organisation helped to halt the typhus epidemic in Russia (thus preventing it from spreading over
Europe) while the Mandates Commissions successfully administered Iraq, Lebanon, Togo and the Cameroons etc
(although they failed in Palestine).
Political achievements
Several disputes were referred to the League in the Twenties. In all but two cases the League’s decisions were
accepted. For example:

In a quarrel between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands, the verdict went in favour of Finland
(1920)

Over rival claims of Germany and Poland to Upper Silesia, the League decided that it should be
partitioned between the two (1921)

When the Greeks invaded Bulgaria the League swiftly intervened. Greek troops were withdrawn and
damages paid to Bulgaria.

When Turkey claimed the Iraqi province of Mosul, the League decided in favour of Iraq

Squabbles were settled between Peru and Colombia and Bolivia and Paraguay.
However, the notion of an international body such as the League regulating relations between nations was a very
new concept and Great Powers were still not ready to follow all of its ideals. For example:
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France was not totally committed to the idea of collective security through the League and she set up a
series of small alliances with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania (called the “Little
Ententes”).
Britain rejected the Geneva Protocol in 1924 (which was intended to strengthen the League) because she
did not want to give up her right to act “unilaterally”.
Many important international treaties and agreements were signed in the Twenties through
bypassing the League:
-
The Washington Treaties (1921-22) between Japan, USA and Britain to establish warship ratios in
the Pacific.
The Rapallo Treaty (1922) between Germany and the USSR to develop their armaments
The Locarno Treaties (1926) between continental European powers to fix Germany’s borders and
The Dawes and Young’s Plans (1924 and 1928) to provide Germany with financial help.
The Failure of the League 1929-1939
With the world economic depression after the Wall Street crash of 1929 and the rise of the aggressive foreign
policies of Nazism, Italian Fascism and Japanese militarism, collective security collapsed.
Japan’s seizure of Manchuria in 1931
Trouble began in 1931 in the Far East when a Great Power faced the League with a direct violation of the Covenant.
The economic effects of the Great Depression hit Japan hard. With a rapidly growing population in a limited space
and a huge unemployment problem, the army advocated that these issues could be addressed by overseas expansion
into the iron ore rich and fertile areas of Chinese Manchuria. In September 1931, Japanese troops, claiming to
represent the interests of their local nationals in the South Manchurian Railway Zone, attacked and defeated the
Chinese forces in Mukden and by the end of the December had overrun the whole of Manchuria. Soon afterwards the
Japanese puppet state of Manchuria was created from their conquests.
The Chinese government complained to the League that the Covenant had been broken whereupon the
League set up a special commission under Lord Lytton that reported on the situation one year later. The
results of the report were that:

Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was upheld and

Japanese troops were ordered to leave the province
Inside the League the Assembly voted. There were 44 members present and 42 voted in favour. Thailand abstained
and Japan voted against so the resolution failed.
Japan was in a strong position because without the support of the other Great Powers the League was unable to act.
The USA would not support military action against Japan while the USSR, who alone could have used land forces
effectively, was not yet a member of the League. Moreover, the European powers were distracted by the economic
crisis and were loath to use trade embargoes against Japan or undertake costly naval and military operations. In a
final act of contempt for the League Japan resigned its membership in March 1933 (Hitler’s Germany also left in the
same year) and in 1937 Japan began a full-scale invasion of China. The League again condemned Japan but was
again ignored.
Summary of Manchuria
The Manchurian Crisis had sent a clear message to the dictators in Europe: the League and most importantly, Britain,
was not willing to risk war over areas that did not concern them. The sense of pacifism and anti-war feeling was so
strong that it appeared no-one was willing to risk war. Furthermore, military capability was so weak because of the
depression that no-one was capable of waging war anyway! Appeasement had already begun in 1931. However, there
was one major consequence of the crisis. The British Government accepted that rearmament was now essential and
the 10-year rule was abandoned on 23rd March 1932. Japan’s action in 1931 was the first real step towards
discrediting the League.
Italy’s attack on Abyssinia 1935
The next successful act of aggression, which further undermined the League, was the fascist dictator Mussolini’s
attack on a fellow member of the League, Abyssinia. Mussolini had for some time loudly declared the need for
Italian overseas expansion. Italian Fascists saw in such acquisitions the means of reducing poverty and
unemployment at home and encouraging emigration. Moreover, victory over Abyssinia would bring credit to the
government by avenging the humiliating defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896, a defeat that had long rankled in
Italian imperialist circles. Mussolini, confident that neither France nor Britain would take any effective action,
attacked invaded Abyssinia in October 1935, using, beside the usual weapons of war, poison gas sprayed from
aeroplanes.
The Emperor of Abyssinia, Haile Selassie, appealed to the League. Under these circumstances, the League should
have immediately imposed economic sanctions on Italy according to the Covenant. However, although the League
declared Italy to be the aggressor, it only required members to impose a trade ban on a very restricted range of
commodities that did not include oil, steel or coal. Nor was the British and French run Suez Canal closed to Italian
shipping. The Great Powers deliberately limited the application of sanctions for fear of driving Mussolini into
alliance with Hitler.
Moreover, during the course of the war (in which the Abyssinians armed with outdated weapons were hopelessly
outmatched if not outfought) the foreign secretaries of Britain and France, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval, produced
the Hoare-Laval Pact in December 1935 in which they proposed the division of Abyssinia between the Emperor and
the Italians. This was a blatant disregard for the League and would have rewarded Italian aggression. However the
proposal was leaked to the press (before Italy could respond) and created such a public outcry in Britain that Hoare
had to resign.
In 1936 the Italian army marched into Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie fled his country and in July the League declared
all sanctions at an end. Mussolini’s contempt for the League was signalled by Italian withdrawal from it in 1937.
The Abyssinian crisis had two important results.
1. It was a death blow to the League of Nations, which had again failed to deter or halt an aggressor. This was a
great shock to British public opinion. Collective security and the League, those concepts which had
seemingly guarded British and world peace without the necessity to spend vast sums on armaments, had
failed.
2. The crisis had also caused a major split between Italy and Britain and France. Mussolini felt bitter at the way
he had been treated by the western powers. Although he still regarded Hitler with some suspicion, he began
to move closer to the German dictator who had consistently supported Italy's actions in Abyssinia.
Conclusion
Some historians have accepted Churchill's view, that the failure to check Mussolini in 1935-6 was an important step
on the way to world war. They argue that Britain and the League should have been prepared to fight Mussolini. The
assumption is that Italy would have been easily defeated and that this would have strengthened collective security
and helped to deter later German aggression. But recently this argument has been questioned. Almost certainly
Britain and France would have won a war against Italy; but victory would have left an embittered Italy and might not
have been as easy as many have assumed. In the end nothing had been achieved. Britain and France had failed to
uphold collective security and to appease Mussolini. To make matters worse, the Abyssinian crisis had revealed
serious divisions between Britain and France. Britain and France had gained the worst of all worlds. They had
alienated Italy and failed to deter future aggressors by using the League as an effective institution for enforcing
collective security. The only Power to benefit immediately from the crisis was Germany. In this sense the Abyssinian
crisis rather than the Manchurian crisis was indeed the crucial turning point in the 1930s. Not only did it irreparably
weaken the League and provide Hitler with an ideal opportunity for the illegal remilitarisation of the Rhineland, but it
also effectively destroyed the Franco-Italian rapprochement and ultimately replaced it with the Rome-Berlin 'Axis'.
This eventually enabled Hitler in 1938 to absorb Austria without Italian opposition. The 'Axis' was also to threaten
vital British and French lines of communication in the Mediterranean with the possibility of hostile naval action and
thus seriously weaken their potential response to future German -or indeed Japanese- aggression. Hitler was not slow
to appreciate this weakness and division. He was also able to use the Abyssinian crisis for his next great gamble.
After 1936 the decline of the League became very rapid. For example:
(1)
During the Spanish Civil War 1936-9, the League, Germany and Italy all pledged non-intervention but the
latter two states continued to send troops and supplies to the rebels.
(2)
Between 1936 and 1939 Germany tore up Versailles and ignored the League through the remilitarisation
of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the annexation of the Czech lands in 1939 and the attack upon
Poland. Moreover, in 1937 Japan invaded China with impunity.
By 1938 the League became so discredited that it was virtually ignored by the Great Powers who
bypassed it and dealt directly with each other (e.g. the Munich Conference of 1938).
.
The fundamental reasons for the failure of the League
There are two main categories of reasons for the failure of the League:
(1)
(2)
Structural reasons and
Political reasons
(1)
Structural Reasons
(a)


There were serious structural weaknesses in the Covenant which made it difficult for the
League to act:
It had no military force of its own and no power would provide it with troops if it felt that it was not in
the interests of that power to do so (e.g. Manchuria and Abyssinia).
Liberum veto meant that attempts to strengthen the Covenant (e.g. the Geneva Protocol) failed because a
unanimous vote was needed to change it and this was never achieved.
(b)
The League was severely handicapped by the absence of the USA’s vast power and
resources (in March 1920 an isolationist US Senate rejected both the League and the
Versailles Settlement). Moreover, other important powers were absent for long periods of
time: Germany was not allowed to join until 1926 while the USSR only became a member in
1934 when the League was declining.
(2)
Political Reasons
(a)
The League was seen as the creation of the Versailles Settlement and therefore regarded with
hostility by Germany and Italy – both of which had grievances against the treaties.
(b)
The Great Depression of the Thirties led to Japan, Italy and Germany adopting expansionist
and aggressive foreign policies (e.g. Manchuria and Abyssinia) that exposed a lack of
support for the League.
(c)
The League’s major founders, Britain and France had no real confidence in the
concept of collective security through the League and instead they continued to pursue
their own security options (i.e. France’s Little Ententes and Britain’s unilateralism). The
Hoare-Laval Pact underlines the faithless attitude of these two states towards the League.
One observer remarked in the Thirties that “The League of Nations has not been tried and
found wanting, it has been found inconvenient and not tried:”
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 1919 - 1939
All governments are concerned primarily with the maintaining of security because without this the continued
existence of their country is called into question. The catastrophe of World War I had heightened this perception and
the main concern of the victorious Allies was to ensure that it could never happen again. In 1919 their ‘search for
security’ involved two areas:
1. The western frontiers (between Germany on the one hand and France, Belgium and Holland on the other). Here the
main threat was felt to be the revival of German power.
2. Central and eastern Europe where the main threat was seen as coming from Bolshevik Russia - the spread of
communism. Accordingly much of the diplomacy of the Allies during the inter war period was devoted to attempts to
preserve and enhance their security. Below are the main measures taken in at attempt to bring this about:
A. The Settlement in the West: (The Versailles Treaty)
As soon as the negotiations began it became evident that there were very different views with regard to how security
could best be ensured. These differences were to plague the Allies throughout the period. THE FRENCH VIEW: The
French favoured the concept of ‘security in war’ or ‘security against defeat in war’. This meant taking whatever
measures were deemed necessary to ensure that, in the event of future conflict, France would emerge victorious
without the enormous costs that had accompanied victory in 1914- 1918. The French believed that German power
and militarism had been the major cause of the First World War and that therefore this power had to be reduced and
German militarism contained. In addition it was considered vital to maintain national defence in a state of
preparedness and obtain reliable allies. Thus, much to the annoyance of Britain, French policy often seemed to be
obstructive of proposals for general disarmament. France had twice been invaded within living memory (1870 and
1914) and nothing short of ‘concrete’ measures were deemed adequate. The British view was a view shared by the
USA. Both countries felt that the arms race and rival alliances had been major causes of World War I and that French
policy risked repeating the mistakes of the past. The British were in favour of ‘security from war’ which meant trying
to take measures to ensure that war did not break out again. During the Versailles negotiations the British opposed
French demands for a natural, defensible frontier on the Rhine because this would deny the right of self
determination and place millions of Germans under French rule. This, the British felt, would provide a cause for war
in the future. For the same reason Britain refused French requests for a firm alliance in the 1920s.
These differences made it impossible for the Allies to cooperate fully on the issue of security and so compromised
the security of all concerned. The differences were later to be exploited to the full by Hitler.
The Main Provisions of the Versailles Treaty
1. Germany was stripped of large areas of territory.
2. Germany had to pay reparations.
3. German military strength was drastically reduced by the disarmament provisions:
* Her army was limited to 100,000 men
* Only 10% of these could be officers
* Conscription was banned
* The navy was limited to 25% that of Britain’s
* No air force was allowed –
* Certain categories of weapons were banned
* The Rhineland was to be demilitarised.
France had wanted permanent control of the main crossing points of the Rhine but Britain and the USA would not
support this. France therefore agreed to reduce her demands on condition that the USA and Britain guarantee her in
the event of any future attack by Germany. However when the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty, this guarantee
became void and the French were left feeling that they had seriously compromised their security. This largely
explains their harsh attitude towards Germany in the early 1920s and their determined attempts to seek security by
other means.
B. The Settlement in the East:
Here the situation was confused and unstable because of the collapse of the defeated empires (Germany, AustroHungary and Russia) and the Bolshevik Revolution which had brought to power a communist government that was
dedicated to spreading world revolution. Whilst the victorious Allies were meeting in Paris there were communist
uprisings in both Germany and Hungary and this influenced the decisions of the Allied leaders who feared both a
spread of communism and a revival of German power. This resulted in major departures from the principle of selfdetermination when the frontiers were decided:
1. The newly established state of Czechoslovakia was given the former Austro Hungarian region known as the
Sudetenland which contained rich resources and was populated mainly by German speakers.
2. Poland was granted a corridor to allow her access to the Baltic (the Polish Corridor) even though this area
contained a large German population because it was felt that this would reduce Polish dependency upon Germany.
The German city of Danzig, located in the corridor, was placed under League of Nations control.
3. Union between Germany and Austria was forbidden. Similar measures were also taken with regard to Bolshevik
Russia with the lands occupied by Germany during the final year of the war being allocated by the Allies to other
states in an attempt to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe and prevent the spread of Bolshevism:
4. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were granted independence.
5. Poland and Rumania received large tracts of Russian territory thus pushing back her western frontier. These two
measures (4 & 5) created an almost continuous strip of former Russian territory in eastern Europe that came to be
known as the ‘Cordon Sanitaire’.
C. France seeks a system of alliances:
Feeling her security compromised, France began to construct a system of alliances to replace the lost guarantees of
the USA and Britain. In the 1920s this involved agreements with:
a. Poland. France hoped that this alliance would present Germany with the threat of a war on two fronts which had
been a major plank of foreign policy before World War I.
b. The ‘Little Entente’. This was an alliance between Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia who all feared a
revival of German or Russian power. France now entered into an alliance with them.
However these measures did little to improve France’s security because Poland was no substitute for Russia, France’s
prewar ally, in the event of a major conflict and the Little Entente states were minor powers. The alliances France
formed were thus more use to the small states that gained France as an ally but were of little use to France.
D. Collective Security:
For much of the inter war period attention was focused on the idea of ‘collective security’. The basic idea was that if
all nations agreed to assist any victim of aggression then such aggression would be discouraged. This had been the
intention of the US President Wilson when he promoted the establishment of the League of Nations and there were
many attempts to bring about ‘collective security’ during the inter war period both inside and outside the League of
Nations. If collective security was to be successful within the framework of the League of Nations there were four
main conditions that had to be met:
1. States would for the most part have to have essentially peaceful desires.
2. Moral force, persuasion and public opinion would have to be sufficient to deter all but the most determined
aggressor.
3. In the event of a state attempting to use force the other states would have to be willing to unite against it and take
appropriate measures.
4. The European states would have to be satisfied with the frontiers as determined in 1919.
Unfortunately these conditions were not realised. Not all states were members of the League and not even all of the
major powers were members at the same time. At first Germany was excluded and the USSR regarded the League as
a ‘capitalist club’. Germany was admitted in 1926 but resigned her membership when Hitler came to power by which
time Japan had also resigned in protest against the League’s position with regard to her invasion of Manchuria. The
USSR joined following the coming to power of Hitler. The USA, of course, was never a member, the Republicans in
the Senate refusing President Wilson’s policies and refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. By 1920 the
Republicans also controlled the Presidency and a policy of isolationism, although never total, influence US policy
until the arrival in power of the Democrat Roosevelt in 1933. Nor had all states renounced the use of force in their
foreign policy and this applied especially to those states who felt that the settlement of 1919 had not been in their
favour. Germany and Italy are the two most obvious examples: in the case of the former it was not until Hitler
secured power in 1933 that foreign policy became aggressive but Italy, under Mussolini from 1922, began to use
armed force to settle disputes as early as 1923 when the island of Corfu was invaded following a disagreement with
Greece. In the east Japan also proved increasingly aggressive as population began to outstrip resources and
nationalist politicians and army leaders began to think in terms of expansion to obtain control of areas that contained
resources vital to the Japanese economy. None of theses states were much influenced by moral arguments. - For
much of the 1 920s the League was able to maintain some degree of respect for the international order as created by
the peace treaties at the end of the First World War but lost ground rapidly in the 1930s and had ceased to be
regarded as a serious guarantor of security long before the outbreak of the Second World War. Her failure to prevent
Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931 and Italian aggression in Ethiopia in 1935 spelt the end of the League’s
influence. There were several attempts to strengthen the collective security provisions of the League of Nations but
none of them proved to be really successful:
1. In 1923 a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was presented to the Council of the League by the Temporary Mixed
Commission which had been asked to examine the question of multi-lateral disarmament. The Draft Treaty proposed
to strengthen collective security arrangement by stating that within four days of any outbreak of hostilities the
Council of the League was to decide which country was the aggressor. All League members would then be required
to provide military assistance to the victim. The French favoured the proposal because under the rules of the League
such assistance was not automatic and so the proposal was a reinforcement of collective security. However Britain
refused to accept the idea and so nothing came of it.
2. This led to an attempt to find a compromise between the British and French positions through the Geneva Protocol.
its main feature was a proposal that, in the event of a dispute, there should be compulsory arbitration enforced by the
Council of the League. However the Labour government in Britain which had been willing to consider this felt and
the Conservative government that replaced them was unwilling to consider compulsory arbitration.
3. In 1925, with improving economic conditions helping to create an international climate more favorable to
agreements, the Locarno Treaties were signed. The treaties contained three key elements:
a. Mutual recognition of the existing boundaries between Germany on the one hand and France and Belgium on the
other. Britain and Italy also recognised the agreement.
b. Arbitration Treaties were also signed between Germany - France - Belgium - Poland - Czechoslovakia to provide
for the peaceful settlement of any disputes that might arise.
c. Mutual guarantees between France and Czechoslovakia and France and Poland were reaffirmed. Negotiated in
Locarno in Switzerland, these treaties were signed in London in December 1925. However although a ‘step in the
right direction’ they did contain important weaknesses:
a. Only certain frontiers were guaranteed, not all of those agreed at the end of the First World War, and this gave the
impression that perhaps some frontiers were more sacred that others and thus, perhaps, undermined the settlement as
a whole.
b. The frontiers guaranteed at Locarno were those in the west and this left the impression, especially in Germany, that
perhaps the eastern frontiers which she had never accepted willingly might be subject to change. This view was
reinforced by comments from the British representative at the talks who said that “for the Polish Corridor, no British
Government ever wilt risk the bones of a British Grenadier’.
c. Selecting certain frontiers for further special guarantees tended to undermine the general guarantees given to all
frontiers under the Covenant of the League of Nations.
4. In April 1927 the French Foreign Minister (Briand) proposed to the Secretary of State of the USA (Kellogg) that
the two countries publicly renounce the use of war as an instrument of their national policy. Kellogg agreed but
suggested that the Pact might be opened for the signature of other countries if they wished to abide by its terms. Thus
in 1928 the Kellogg - Briand Pact was opened for signature and by August 65 countries had signed including all of
the major powers except the USSR. This seemed a great success but many countries when signing added
qualifications which left the Pact with little more than moral force.
5. The French made several concessions during the 1920s when it seemed as if the spirit of collective security was
being accepted:
a. In 1926 they withdrew their objections to German membership of the League.
b. In 1927 they agreed to the ending of Allied military controls in Germany.
c. In 1929 they accepted the Young Plan which ended Allied financial controls on Germany.
d. In 1930 they agreed to the withdrawal of all Allied troops from the Rhineland. These concessions undermined the
French ‘security in war’ and came to be very much resented when collective security collapsed but by that time it
was too late for France to revert to her earlier system.
6. Between 1930 and 1933 the League sponsored a general disarmament conference in Geneva that was attended by
most of the major powers. There were times when agreement seemed close but Britain and France hesitated and the
opportunity was lost. In 1933 with the naming of Hitler as German Chancellor and his withdrawal both from the
conference and the League there was no longer any hope of carrying out widespread disarmament.
e) The Failure of Collective Security
Despite the progress listed above, Collective Security did not survive long into the 1930s. The actions of Germany,
Italy and Japan demonstrated that a reliance on collective security would not provide real security for any country.
a). Between 1930-1932 Japan seized control of Manchuria from China and despite Chinese appeals to the League and
the League’s eventual condemnation of Japan no action was taken to restore Manchuria to China.
b). In 1933 Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany and one of his first actions was to announce Germany’s
resignation from the League which he saw as an instrument for maintaining the settlement of 1919. He also disagreed
with the most fundamental principle of the League - that all countries great and small had the right to territorial
integrity.
c). in 1935 Mussolini ordered the invasion of Ethiopia and the League, although condemning the invasion, failed to
take any measures that were strong enough to force an Italian withdrawal. Britain and France saw Mussolini as a
possible counterbalance to Hitler and so were unwilling to take any strong action against him. Thus League sanctions
were half-hearted and served only to anger Mussolini without stopping him.
d). In 1936 Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland demilitarised zone. This was a clear breach of both the
Versailles Treaty and the undertakings accepted by Germany at Locarno but there was no response beyond verbal
protest from Britain and France. As late as 1935 Britain, France and Italy had united at Stresa to condemn German
breaches of the treaty but by 1936 Mussolini was coming under the influence of Hitler and the reoccupation of the
Rhineland meant that collective security was dead because:
* Germany was now able to fortify her western frontier and so obtain greater freedom of action in the east. If Britain
and France had not intervened when Hitler had broken Germany’s agreements prior to 1936, it was unlikely that they
would do so afterwards when this would involve a major war.
* Once Germany reoccupied, and later fortified, the Rhineland France could no longer offer any real assistance to her
allies in eastern Europe in the event of a German move against them.
* Smaller states now began to question the value of collective security as the western democracies seemed unwilling
to ‘stand up’ to Hitler. Belgium, for example, asked to be released from the Locarno obligations and opted for
neutrality as offering greater security.
The Reasons for the Failure of Collective Security
1. It depended too much upon personalities and the relationships that developed between them. This was especially
true of Briand in France and Stresemann in Germany whose mutual respect and understanding had made the progress
of the 1920s possible. However after 1929 neither man was to hold office again and Stresemann died in that year.
2. After 1929 economic conditions worsened because of the onset of the Great Depression. Leaders became
increasingly concerned with the economic problems of their own countries and invested less time in the search for
international security. Severe economic problems promoted narrow nationalist solutions and did much to destroy the
spirit of cooperation that had begun to develop in the 1920s.
3. Even in the 1920s collective security suffered from the fact that neither the USA nor the USSR were involved. The
former because it opted for a policy of isolation and the latter because it was deliberately isolated after the coming to
power of the Bolsheviks. Thus two of the most powerful states in the world were outside the system.
4. At the end of the First World War both Germany and Russia lost large areas of territory and had severe terms
imposed upon them. For much of the inter war period they remained weak and thus were not able to challenge the
system set up by the victorious allies of World War One. However by the mid 1930s the reforms of Stalin in the
USSR and the measures of Hitler in Germany meant that both countries were increasingly able to challenge the
settlement of 1919.
5. Disagreements between Britain and France weakened collective security throughout the period. They had
fundamentally different approaches to security and their inability to compromise effectively meant that the entire
principle was undermined. Britain was not prepared to provide the really solid guarantees that France sought and so
France was never willing to abandon her ‘security in war’ ideas - hence the Maginot Line and the system of alliances
with east European states. Britain was willing to negotiate changes to Versailles, France was not and in 1935 signed
an alliance with the USSR and practically abandoned the idea of collective security at least as envisaged through the
League of Nations.
6. The failure of democracy to take roots in many of the new states created after 1919 was also a blow to collective
security. The dictatorships which sprang up often had expansionist policies and the Fascists actually gloried in war
believing that eternal peace was not in the interests of mankind.
7. The terrible costs of World War One also left Europe with a legacy of suspicion and made it difficult for leaders to
make concessions which might be interpreted by political opponents as weakening their country’s defenses.
8. For collective security to be really effective it would have had to have operated through the League of Nations but
until 1926 at least this was exclusively the preserve of the victorious Allies of the First World War and even
afterwards it was still dominated by them and so viewed with some suspicion by those states that were dissatisfied
with the 1919 settlement.
Essay plans
“Account for France’s policy to provide for her national security in the inter-war years”.
F’s bitter experience in WW1 made her determined to remove any future threat to her security. The two potential
sources of threat were G and (more remotely) the USSR. F adopted the policy of “security in war” (i.e. to strengthen
herself sufficiently to be able to resist any future attack) that involved a two-pronged strategy...
1) To weaken G via the Tr of Vers (G lost territory, her army and had to pay reps) and strengthening new states
to the east (Cz got the Sudets and Pol got W.Prussia and use of Danzig) which would also serve as a “cordon
sanitaire” against USSR.
2) To strengthen F through Collective security (by attempting to give the L of N muscle thro’the Draft Tr of
Mutual Assistance and the GE Protocol) Failed. Mso F tried to get a peacetime alliance with USA and GB.
Failed. So signed Ententes with Cz, Rom, Yugo and Pol. However, F was bitter about the lack of support
from her wartime allies and even with the Tr of V. (Clemencau said of it, “this is not a peace treaty, this is
an armistice for 20 years”).
3) In the Late Twenties
Late 20’s was a period of prosperity and goodwill in Europe (the “Locarno period”). F willing to promote Collective
Security. For e.g. Locarno Treaty 26 , F-G guarantee of their common border, 26 G joined L of N, 28 G signed
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 29 0 signed Young Plan reducing reps and 30 F withdrew troops from Rhineland but
1929 Turning Point
Great Depression affected F’s foreign policy. Eg.
(1) 1930-34 Maginot Line constructed (abandoning Little Ententes).
A malaise of insecurity characterised F foreign policy that became one of appeasement e.g....
-F allowed Hitler to reintroduce conscription in 35
-F took no action over the Rhineland remilitarisation in 36. Hitler then fortified the Rhine border.
-F estranged from GB when GB signed Anglo-German Naval Agreement 35 thus undermining Versailles.
-F formally abandoned collective security by signing Treaty of Mutual Assistance with USSR in 35 (a paper tiger).
-F lacked self-confidence and followed Chamberlain’s appeasement policies...
a) F’s Little Entente ally, Cz, betrayed at Munich in 38
(b) August 39 F lost her new ally, R, to Germany via the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
However, in August 39 F got her alliance with GB (through their guarantee to Poland) but this could not save her
from defeat by G in 1940
Conclusion
F’s policy of “security in war” had ultimately failed. F had failed to gravely weaken G in the long run and had also
failed to strengthen herself (e.g. she abandoned collective security, the Little Ententes and she had lost her ally,
Russia).