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DRAFT
Presidential Doctrines
Presidents do not publish an official doctrine under their names. Outside observers,
often journalists, identify and name presidential doctrine. Doctrines can sometimes be
traced to a specific piece of declaratory policy, e.g., a prominent speech. At other times,
doctrines emerge from an observed pattern of declaratory and employment policy.
Because they represent the judgment of observers, they are open to interpretation and
rebuttal. These doctrines often contain the elements of strategy in crystallized form.
Monroe Doctrine
James Monroe stated in his 7th State of the Union Address of 1823.
European powers should no longer colonize in the Western Hemisphere. And in
exchange, the United States would (1) remain neutral in wars between the European
powers, and (2) remain neutral in wars within the European colonies. Should European
powers engage in colonial wars in the Western Hemisphere, however, the United States
would interpret that as an act hostile to the United States.
The Roosevelt Corollary was a significant adjustment to the Monroe Doctrine. By
acting as the international police power in the hemisphere, by aggressively pursuing its
commercial interests, and by exercising “big stick” and Dollar Diplomacy, the United
States asserted hemispheric hegemony and established its own version of colonialism.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt would later renounce the right to unilaterally intervene
in the internal affairs of sovereign states by announcing a Good Neighbor Policy.
Truman Doctrine 1947-1953 [done]
The United States would provide economic and military aid to states threatened by
communism. “the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.” Policy announced 12
March 1947.
The primary act was granting $400 million in aid to Turkey and Greece as the
United States stepped in to replace the aid the British were no longer able to provide. Aid
was also provided to assist the governments of Italy and France to resist the growth of the
communist party, including coalition governments including communists.
Truman’s speech declared the United States to be the leader of the free world and
that it would support capitalism and oppose communism.
The Doctrine was driven by events in Greece and Turkey but was intended to be a
general guide to global action. The domino theory was at work. It was thought that if
either Turkey or Greece fell, the other would follow. Both were geographically
positioned to be critical in the event of a world war between East and West.
Greece, governed by a military junta with a record of human rights abuses, was
given $300 million. Turkey was given $100 million and supported with US naval
presence including an aircraft carrier and battleship.
Eisenhower Doctrine 1953-1961 [done]
The Eisenhower Doctrine followed directly from the resolution of the Suez Crisis.
Nasser was the big winner and pan-Arabism was ascendant. The U.S. left the crisis with
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DRAFT
some positive influence as evenhanded after opposing Israel and the colonial powers.
British and French withdrawal left vacuum of Western power, and the possibility of the
Soviets filling that vacuum. Eisenhower’s choices were to build on the positive outcome
of the Suez or to recast Middle Eastern issues into the context of the Cold War. Cold War
thinking would prove irresistible.
Announced to Congress on 5 January 1957 following the Suez Crisis. “as vital to
the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity
of the nations of the Middle East.” Submitted to Congress on 5 January, subjected to
debate, and was approved by Joint Resolution on 9 March 1957.
By late 1958, the Doctrine was moderated to rely less on military backing and to
give greater emphasis to accommodation with Arab nationalists to improve U.S.
influence in the Middle East. Carter would later revive the military emphasis.
Economic and military assistance by request.
Acts included Jordanian April 1957; Soviet-Syrian rapprochement of August 1957,
Military coup against pro-Western government in Iraq 14 July 1958, Lebanon
deployment internal Syria-Egypt destabilization.
Kennedy Doctrine 1961-1963
The Kennedy Doctrine was directed more toward Latin America. It continued the
containment of communism globally, but also asserted offensive rollback of communism
in the Western Hemisphere.
In his inaugural address of 20 January 1961, Kennedy called upon Americans to
enter into “a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and
war itself.”
Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in
order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.
The Kennedy Doctrine was essentially an expansion of the foreign policy
prerogatives of the previous administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S.
Truman. The foreign policies of these presidents all revolved around the threat of
communism and the means by which the United States would attempt to contain its
spread. The Truman Doctrine focused on the containment of communism by providing
assistance to countries resisting communism in Europe while the Eisenhower Doctrine
was focused upon providing both military and economic assistance to nations resisting
communism in the Middle East and by increasing the flow of trade from the United
States into Latin America. The Kennedy Doctrine was based on these same objectives but
was more concerned with the spread of communism and Soviet influence in Latin
America following the Cuban revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power under
Eisenhower during the 1950s.
In his inaugural address, Kennedy talks of an alliance for progress with countries in
Latin America. In his Alliance for Progress address for Latin American Diplomats and
Members of Congress on March 13th 1961 he expanded on his promises from his
inaugural speech. “I have called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a new
Alliance for Progress – alianza para el Progreso – a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled
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in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people
for homes, work and land, health and schools – techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela.”
In the address, Kennedy reaffirmed the United State’s pledge of coming to the
defence of any nation whose independence was endangered, promised to increase the
food-for-peace emergency program and to provide economic aid to nations in need. He
requested that Latin American countries promote social change within their borders and
called upon all American nations to move towards increased economic integration. “To
achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. Our Alliance for
Progress is an alliance of free governments – and it must work to eliminate tyranny from
a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place. Therefore let us express our special
friendship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican Republic – and the hope they will
soon rejoin the society of free men, uniting with us in our common effort.”
Bay of Pigs
[origins of Batista’s rule. $16 million/year in U.S. military assistance.] Fidel
Castro, with a force of 9,000, entered Havana and overthrew the Batista dictatorship. The
U.S. implements a trade embargo the next year. 1960 to 1965 was a period of U.S.
attempts to overthrow Castro, including a series of personal attempts and the abortive
Bay of Pigs. 1500 Cuban exiles, trained by the United States in Central America landed.
JFK refused to provide the necessary air support and the invasion failed … cost of lives.
Kennedy said that the use of air power would have removed any plausible deniability.
Eisenhower responded to Kennedy’s naiveté by saying there was no plausible deniability
for an overt action of that scale with or without air support.
Cuban Missile Crisis 15 October 1962 – 28 October 1962
The Cuban Missile crisis, part of the strategic arms race, brought the world to the
brink of nuclear war. U.S. intercontinental missiles were capable of blanketing the Soviet
Union, while Soviet missiles could only reach Europe. After the botched Bay of Pigs
attempt, Castro was looking for a deterrent against the next U.S. invasion that he was sure
would come. Soviet missiles in Cuba met both Castro’s and Khrushchev’s needs.
Seven days after reconnaissance photos revealed construction of missile sites on 15
October, Kennedy ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba to prevent arrival of additional
components (a quarantine rather than a blockade because the latter is an act of war under
international law). The situation was made public on 22 October. On the 26th Khrushchev
offered to withdraw with a U.S. guarantee not to invade Cuba. A U-2 spy plane was shot
down over Cuba on the 27th, and Khrushchev demanded removal of U.S. missiles from
Turkey in exchange for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. On the 28th, Kennedy
and Khrushchev agreed on the basis of the first of Khrushchev’s offers.
Johnson Doctrine 1963-1969
Domestic revolution in the Western Hemisphere would no longer be a local matter
when “the object is the establishment of a Communist dictatorship.” 1965.
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DRAFT
Dominican Republic [Done]
For 31 years (1930-1961), Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, a brutal, rightwing
dictator, ruled the Dominican Republic. Trujillo had been trained and installed by U.S.
Marines during the small wars era in Latin America. Trujillo was assassinated on 1961.
Juan Bosch was elected president in December 1962 defeating Trujillo’s heir apparent,
Joaquin Balaquer. Bosch began implementing liberal economic and social reforms
opposed by the oligarchy. He was anti-communist, but he allowed their political activity.
A military coup on 25 September 1963 ousted Bosch and abolished the
constitution. A popular revolt to reinstate Bosch was opposed by a small military force
from the United States. Military presence grew quickly from 500 to 4500 and eventually
to 23,000. U.S. forces left in September 1966 after supervising elections to install
Balaquer.
Nixon Doctrine 1969-1975/1977
Nixon returned to Eisenhower’s international engagement through regional
alliances rather than the earlier Republican isolationism. Realism was asserted over
idealism and Kennedy’s anywhere, anytime, at any cost rhetoric. Given Nixon and
Kissinger’s strategic predilections, a return to realism was predictable. The accumulating
budget deficits and debt associated with the Vietnam War applied additional pressure, as
did the financial effects of an energy crisis.
The Nixon Doctrine emphasized international alliance structures. The new burden
sharing arrangement required protectorates to become more self sufficient allies. The
Doctrine manifested itself in Vietnamization—shifting combat responsibilities to the
Republic of South Vietnam and U.S. forces into a training and supporting role. It also
manifested itself in the Persian Gulf as a dramatic increase in direct military sales to
Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Initially announced on 25 July 1969 during a press conference in Guam, and
reinforced in an Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam on 3 November 1969.
Carter Doctrine 1977-1981
The Carter administration came into office believing that the Cold War had or was
coming to a close. The East-West power struggle would no longer serve as an organizing
principle for U.S. foreign policy. Instead, modernization of social and governmental
structures cast in the disparities between North and South would be elevated.
Iranian nationalism asserted itself—significantly induced by U.S. intervention in its
internal affairs—and erupted in the 1970 Iranian Revolution that deposed the proWestern Shah Pahlavi and resulted in a drawn out hostage situation. In the same year, the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
Rather than interpret the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan as a response to turmoil
on its periphery, Carter interpreted it as increasing the potential for Soviet hegemony in
the Persian Gulf region. “The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic
position.” “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.” “a grave
threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.”
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State of the Union address on 23 January 1980. National energy crisis July 1979.
“Crisis of Confidence” speech, “malaise” urged public action to reduce the use of energy
to reduce dependence on foreign oil. Both military and economic strategy.
To make the declaratory policy credible, Carter had to match it with force
development policy. He initiated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force that grew into
the U.S. Central Command. He also increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the
Persian Gulf region.
Reagan Doctrine 1981-1989
The Reagan Doctrine was to support anti-communist insurgencies wherever, a
return to JFK-like idealism more anti-communist than prodemocracy.
Abandoned containment and adopted the language of “rollback” from Nitze’s NSC
68. In the language of JFK’s secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, HIC, MIC, and
LIC, Reagan would take greater risks of HIC, make major resource investments in MIC,
but use primarily a LIC focus for proinsurgency against communist countries and
counterinsurgency to support pro-Western countries, often right-wing dictators.
Supported Nicaraguan contras to overthrow the Sandinista government.
Supported mujahidin to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan.
Continued and expanded Carter’s covert aid to the mujahidin. Continued and
expanded Carter’s military force build up.
Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine
The Carter Doctrine rested on the use of military force to keep the Soviets out of
the Persian Gulf region. The Reagan Corollary extended the Carter Doctrine to include
military intervention into the internal affairs of the region without reference to the Soviet
Union. The Corollary was announced in October 1981 in response to the Iran-Iraq War
(19xx-19xx). The United States would intervene to protect Saudi Arabia’s independence,
which was perceived to be threatened by the Iran-Iraq War.
Kirkpatrick Doctrine
Based on an article written late in the Carter administration, the Kirkpatrick
Doctrine provided the intellectual justification for the Reagan Doctrine that followed.
According to Kirkpatrick, the Carter administration’s policy of human rights that opposed
right-wing dictators was deeply flawed.1 She concluded that right-wing dictatorships are
authoritarian and easier to overturn than are left-wing totalitarian communist
dictatorships. The article attracted Reagan’s attention and led directly to her appointment
as U.S. Ambassador to the UN (after she converted to the Republican Party, as had
Reagan).
Right-wing autocrats were authoritarian, allowing existing hierarchies, great
disparity in wealth, and traditional practices. Left-wing autocrats, created by Marxist
revolutionaries, were totalitarian, destroying social hierarchies, redistributing wealth,
disallowing social traditions, and creating refugees as a result. Right-wing dictators who
were staunch opponents of communist challengers and friendly to the United States were
1
Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary 68, n 5, 1979: 34-45.
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DRAFT
preferable to communist dictators. Furthermore, right-wing dictatorships were more
likely than left-wing dictatorships to transition to liberal democracies precisely because
they had preserved some form of traditional society.
Weinberger Doctrine
The Weinberger Doctrine, announced in late 1984,2 followed from the events of
Reagan’s deployment of marines to Lebanon. It constituted an attempt to state a policy
for the use of military force to fill the vacuum that followed Vietnam.
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national
interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
2. U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention
of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
3. U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and
military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
4. The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces
committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a “reasonable assurance” of
the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.
Nicaragua, Somoza, and the Sandinistas
1979 Anastosio Samoza Debayle overthrown and succeeded by the Sandinistas
who implemented social reforms.
In 1983, the CIA collects old Somoza National Guardsmen into Contras. Sabotage
and terrorism. 1984 Reagan announces the end of support in response to congressional
pressure. In 1984, the Sandinistas win election monitored by international observers. On
27 June 1986, The World Court orders the United States to cease and desist and to pay
reparations. The United States rejects the order. The UN General Assembly directs the
United States to comply with the World Court order. In 1990, the Sandinistas lose to the
U.S.-backed candidate, Violeta Barros de Chamorro.
Iran-Contra
The Iran-Contra scandal developed as the administration attempted to solve two
disparate problems. The first problem was providing assistance to the guerrilla forces
opposing the Marxist Sandinista government of Nicaragua after Congress expressly
prohibited such support. The second problem was resolving a hostage crisis that Reagan,
like Carter before him, had in the Middle East.
The Iran-Contra episode took place in 1986 to 1987.
The Sandinistas came to power in xxxx. They were supporting leftist guerrillas
opposing the rightwing government in neighboring El Salvador. On 4 January 1982,
Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” 28 November 1984, National Press Club,
Washington, D.C.
2
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DRAFT
Reagan signed NSDD-17 authorizing the CIA to organize the disparate factions into a
more coherent counterrevolutionary movement, the Contras, and to provide them with
$19 million in aid. The same year, the Boland Amendment specifically prohibited
expenditure of funds to support the Contras.
Somoza overthrown in 1979. In 1983, CIA collects old Somoza National
Guardsmen into Contras. Sabotage and terrorism. 1984 Reagan announces the end of
support in response to congressional pressure. In 1984, the Sandinistas win election
monitored by international observers. On 27 June 1986, The World Court orders the
United States to cease and desist and to pay reparations. The United States rejects the
order. The UN General Assembly directs the United States to comply with the World
Court order. In 1990, the Sandinistas lose to the U.S.-backed candidate, Violeta Barros de
Chamorro.
The hostages were held in Lebanon while the Iran-Iraq war dragged on. Iran was
the subject of a U.S. arms embargo. Nevertheless, Reagan authorized the transfer of
weapons from Israel to Iran in exchange for Iran’s intervention with the terrorists holding
hostages in Lebanon. The United States would later replenish Israel’s arms inventory.
Proceeds from the sale would be used to fund the Contras.
In 1984, the Sandinistas filed suit in the International Court of Justice against the
United States. A ruling in their favor was handed down in 1986 holding the United States
responsible for the Contras’ human rights violations and ordered the United States to pay
reparations. The U.S. vetoed the related UN Security Council resolution. The General
Assembly voted 94 to 3 in favor of the related resolution. On 3 February 1988, the House
rejected a White House request for $36 million in support to the Contras.
Bush 41 Doctrine 1989-1993
The elder Bush made no farewell speech, but his speech at West Point serves that
purpose.3 In that speech, the president gave a guide to the use of force that was pretty
restrictive, consistent with his NSS, and consistent with Powell’s NMS.
The New World Order
Presents a post-Cold War liberal view. “transforming this new world into a new
world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at
home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the
threat or use of force.” “one more compatible with our values and congenial to our
interests.”
Presents a progressive view, “You will also be entering a new world, one far better
than the one I came to know [upon entering the World War II Navy], a world with the
potential to be far better yet.”
The Use of Force
Selective engagement. “bear witness to the wisdom of selected use of force for
selective purposes.” Force structure should be capable of peacekeeping. Leadership is not
3
George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point,” 5 January
1993.
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DRAFT
the same as unilateralism or universalism. “We need not respond to every act of violence.
Idealism need not be at odds with our interests, and principle need not displace
prudence.” “No, the United States should not seek to be the world’s policeman. There is
no support abroad or at home for us to play this role, nor should there be. We would
exhaust ourselves in the process, wasting precious resources needed to address those
problems at home and abroad that we cannot afford to ignore.”
“The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the
best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to
protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital.”
“Using military force makes sense as a policy where the stakes warrant, where and
when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where
its application can be limited in scope and time, and where potential benefits justify the
potential costs are sacrifice.”
“But in every case involving the use of force, it will be essential to have a clear and
available mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less
realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete.”
Avoiding “entangling alliances” was the right policy in Washington’s time. But the
“folly of isolationism” today. We must remain involved in world affairs today.
“Leadership requires formulating worthy goals, persuading others of their virtue, and
contributing one’s share of the common effort and then some.” “Leadership takes time. It
takes patience. It takes work.”
“Once we are satisfied that force makes sense, we must act with the maximum
possible support. The United States can and should lead, but we will want to act in
concert, where possible involving the United Nations or other multinational grouping.”
“A desire for international support must not become a prerequisite for acting.”
Powell Doctrine
The Weinberger Doctrine resonated with senior military officers, particularly in the
Army, whose formative years included service in the Vietnam War. Powell built on the
Weinberger Doctrine.
“I knew that Weinberger, for all his outward self-possession, had been deeply
troubled by the tragic bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. I did not realize how
deeply until a singular draft document came out of his office.” … “After Reagan’s
reelection, Weinberger addressed the National Press Club on November 28. I went with
him to hear him describe the tests he recommended “when we are weighing the use of
U.S. combat forces abroad.”
(1) Commit only if our or our allies’ vital interests are at stake.
(2) If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.
(3) Go in only with clear political and military objectives.
(4) Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely
stand still.
(5) Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American people
and the congress.
(6) Commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.”4
4
Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995): 303.
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DRAFT
“The lessons I absorbed from Panama confirmed all my convictions over the
preceding twenty years, since the days of doubt over Vietnam.”
(1) Have a clear political objective and stick to it.
(2) Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is
what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives.
“Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these rules the
bedrock of my military counsel.”5
As the secretary of state nominee, Power testified “Our armed forces are stretched
rather thin and there is a limit to how many of these deployments we can sustain. So we
are going to take a look at that, talk to our allies, consult and make on-the-ground
assessments of what we are doing now, what is needed now, but also what is going to be
needed in the future.”6
Clinton Doctrine 1993-2001
The Clinton Doctrine asserted that peace is indivisible and the necessity of
interventionism as a matter of policy. “Genocide is a national interest wherever and
requires intervention.” It was used to justify the interventions into Bosnia and Kosovo
that stressed the NATO alliance structure and was opposed by a Republican Congress. It
was used to justify an intervention into Somalia, considered by most to be a prominent
failure of the administration. It was not used to justify an intervention into the largest
genocide in Rwanda.
Cruise missile diplomacy. After Somalia, Clinton demonstrated a preference for
standoff warfare through air power over the use of ground forces.
“It’s easy … to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that
valley in Bosnia or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of
parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how
small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names.
The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting
conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be
everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make
a difference, we must be prepared to do so.”7
Clinton paid particular attention to Genocide. “Genocide is in and of itself a
national interest where we should act.” and “we can say to the people of the world” and if
“it’s in our power to stop it, we will stop it.”8
5
Powell, p. 434.
Powell to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on January 17, 2001 when asked about the Bush
administration’s plans for U.S. international military involvement.
7
Bill Clinton, speech given 26 February 1999 in San Francisco.
8
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Skopje, Macedonia), “Remarks by the President
to the KFOR Troops,” June 22, 1999.
6
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Bush 43 Doctrine 2001-2009
Wolfowitz Doctrine
Based on the Defense Planning Guidance produced under Bush 41 and later
withdrawn.
Maintaining sole superpower status by preventing the rise of a peer global or
regional competitor, even the rise of our traditional allies, and by acting to guarantee
international security so that other states will feel no need to arm themselves.
Unilateralism and ad hoc coalitions of the willing rather than reliance on
international institutions.
Preventive intervention.
Primacy in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. “In the Middle East and
Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the
region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil.”
Khrushchev Thaw 1953-1964/66/68
The Khrushchev Thaw spanned the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations. It began soon after Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953. And by various
accounts, the thaw ended somewhere between 1964 and 1968.
Nikita Khrushchev became general secretary of the Communist Party. In a secret
speech9 given on 25 February 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s totalitarianism and
announced the end of the “Long winter of sacrifice and persecution.” He introduced a
“new era of socialism” where private lives would be valued. He announced the “peaceful
coexistence” of the United States and the USSR despite their ideological differences. The
speech was disseminated publicly beginning 5 March.
Khrushchev liberalized the arts, including literature, theater, and poetry. He
liberalized international trade, sports, and educational and cultural exchanges. He
released millions of political prisoners from the Gulag camps. He liberated millions of
peasants allowing them to travel and settle in urban centers. His reforms received broad
support from the people. Alexi Kosygin led Khrushchev’s economic reforms.
Khrushchev’s liberalization had its limits. Demonstrations took place in Georgia,
Stalin’s homeland, demanding independence. The revolt was met with a Russian military
intervention. Democratic reform movements were crushed in Hungary and suppressed in
Poland in October and November of 1956.
Stalin’s death exposed a deep schism between the conservative, pro-Stalinist wing
and those backing Khrushchev’s liberalization. The conservatives plotted a failed attempt
to overthrow Khrushchev in May 1957. Khrushchev became premier in 1958 and
announced cuts in military spending.
Eisenhower gave no apology for the U2 spy plane overflights in 1960.
Khrushchev approved erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
Khrushchev had Stalin’s corpse removed from Lenin’s mausoleum in 1961.
9
Nikita Khrushchev, “On the Personality Cult and its Consequences,” given to the 20th Party
Congress.
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DRAFT
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 further weakened Khrushchev’s political
position.
Brezhnev Doctrine 1968-1989
Brezhnev ousted Khrushchev and put him under house arrest in 1964. The
conservative wing of the Party considered Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence” with the
United States to be an expression of weakness. Return toward Stalin’s totalitarianism.
Khrushchev’s liberalization was reversed under Brezhnev. The Alexei Kosygin led
economic reforms under Khrushchev were overturned and replaced with increased
military-industrial development. Reversed the Khrushchev/Kosygin economic reforms
that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Toward the end of the
Johnson administration, the Brezhnev Doctrine was announced in a speech given in
Warsaw on 13 November 1968 in response to international condemnation of the Soviet
intervention into Czechoslovakia.10 The Soviets saw Eastern Europe as a defensive buffer
from attack from Western European powers. Under the Doctrine, the USSR had the right
to intervene in satellites’ internal political affairs if communist rule was challenged. It
was a restatement of past positions. But it was defensive in nature without the
expansionist language of old. The Doctrine would remain in place until the invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979 but was in full decline when the Soviet Union failed to
invade Poland in December 1989.
The Politburo debated asserting national interests over socialist ideology.
Gorbachev Glasnost and Perestroika 1985-1991
The Sinatra Doctrine was announced 25 October 1989. Allowed self determination
with reference to Frank Sinatra’s song, I did it my way. Gorbachev refused to intervene
in Poland in 1989 after the Solidarity Party soundly defeated the Communist Party in free
elections. This officially marked the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine. General Secretary
from 1985-1991. Premier 1988-1991.
Hungary opened borders with Austria.
Leonid Brezhnev, “title,” Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers’ Party,” 13 November
1968. The Doctrine was previously articulated by S Kovalo in Pravda on 26 September 1968. S Kovaleo,
“Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries,” Pravda, 26 September 1968.
10
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