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PH130 Meaning & Communication Lecture 02: open can, find widget Then you understand the FOL sentence A B. Terminology. sentence connective -- an operator that joints zero or more sentences to produce a new sentence; in FOL sentential connectives include , and . But we have functionally characterised the meaning of a sentence as whatever it is knowledge of which enables language users to understand utterances of that sentence (that is, to know which proposition the utterer expresses). What are meanings? Case study: FOL So possibly (T) gives the meaning of ‘AB’ in FOL. Our abilities to use and understand sentences of FOL are systematic and productive. What are the meanings of words (i.e. symbols)? Systematic. If you understand: AB then you can probably also understand: BA We have functionally characterised the meaning of a word as whatever it is knowledge of which, together with knowledge of rules for composition, enables language users to know the meanings of sentences containing the word. Productive. If you understand: A then you can probably also understand: A and also: A and so on … What are the meanings of sentences? If you know that: (T) ‘A B’ can be translated as ‘Ayesha is tall and Mo is rich’ So the question, What does ‘’ mean? is the question, What do you know about ‘’ that enables you to understand the meanings of sentences containing ‘’? Answer: the truth table for ‘’. Why? Because knowing the truth table for a sentential connective is sufficient, together with knowledge of the syntax of FOL, to work out the truth table of any complex sentence containing that connective. Names and predicates. Consider: What could you know that would enable you to translate this into English? Consider an interpretation which assigns an extension to the predicate and an object to the name: F : the set of tall things a : Ayesha We can write these more fully thus: The extension of ‘F’ is the set of tall things The referent of ‘a’ is Ayesha These statements could give the meanings of ‘F’ and ‘a’. Why? Because knowledge of these statements would enable you to translate the sentence ‘F(a)’ into English and to translate any sentences of FOL involving ‘F’ and ‘a’ into English. From FOL to natural language Davidson’s (1967 [1984]; 1973 [1984]) insight: knowledge of statement (W) is be sufficient for understanding utterances of ‘Ida rocks’: (W) ‘Ida rocks’ is true if and only if Ida rocks. If knowledge of this statement would be sufficient for knowing the meanings of utterances of ‘Ida rocks’, we can say that (W) gives the meaning of this sentence. F(a) What are the meanings of words? Consider: 1 The referent of ‘Ida’ is Ida The extension of ‘rocks’ is the set of things which rock. These statements could give the meanings of ‘Ida’ and ‘rocks’. Why? Because knowledge of these statements, together with knowledge that an English sentence consisting of a name followed by a predicate is true if and only if the referent of the name is in the extension of the predicate, is sufficient for knowing (W). Similarly, the meanings of the connectives ‘and’ and ‘or’ may be given by these statements: ‘A and B’ is true if and only if A is true and B is true ‘A or B’ is true if and only if A is true or B is true Deriving the meanings of sentences Consider: ‘Ida rocks or Louie rocks’ From the meaning of ‘and’ we have: (1) ‘Ida rocks or Louie rocks’ is true if and only if ‘Ida rocks’ is true or ‘Louie rocks’ is true. From the rules of composition for English we have: (2) ‘Ida rocks’ is true if and only if the referent of ‘Ida’ is in the extension of ‘rocks’ From the meanings of ‘Ida’ and ‘rocks’ we have: (3) ‘Ida rocks’ is true if and only if Ida rocks And similarly: (4) ‘Louie rocks’ is true if and only if Louie rocks Putting (3) and (4) into (1) we get: (5) ‘Ida rocks or Louie rocks’ is true if and only if Ida rocks or Louie rocks. Overview 1. functional characterisation: the meaning of a sentence is whatever it is knowledge of which enables language users to understand utterances of that sentence. 2. Davidson’s insight: Knowing the conditions under which a sentence is true is sufficient for understanding utterances containing that sentence. Therefore: 3. The meaning of a sentence is given by a statement identifying the conditions under which it would be true. 4. functional characterisation: the meaning of a word is whatever it is knowledge of which, together with knowledge of rules for composition, enables language users to know the meanings of sentences containing the word. of names, about the extensions of predicates, and about the truth conditions of statements containing connectives it is possible, together with rules of composition for English, to derive statements about the conditions under which any sentence containing those words is true. Therefore: 6. The meanings of words are given by statements about the referents of names, extensions of extensions of predicates, and so on. This theory of meaning, together with Hypotheses 1 & 2 from Lecture 1, explains productivity and systematicity. References (not recommended reading) Davidson, Donald (1967 [1984]), "Truth and Meaning", in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. --- (1973 [1984]), "Radical Interpretation", in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tarski, Alfred (1935 [1956]), "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages", in J. H. Woodger (ed.) Logic, semantics, metamathematics : papers from 1923 to 1938. Oxford: Clarendon Press. --- (1936 [1956]), "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics", in J. H. Woodger (ed.) Logic, semantics, metamathematics : papers from 1923 to 1938. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 5. Tarski’s (1935 [1956]; 1936 [1956]) insight: From statements about the referents 2