Simple Formulas for Stationary Distributions and Stochastically
... view that economic agents make mistakes at nonnegligible rates. One reason for the common focus on vanishingly small mutation rates in evolutionary models is tractability: for instance, by taking noise levels to zero, one can take advantage of Freidlin and Wentzell’s (1998) methods for computing lim ...
... view that economic agents make mistakes at nonnegligible rates. One reason for the common focus on vanishingly small mutation rates in evolutionary models is tractability: for instance, by taking noise levels to zero, one can take advantage of Freidlin and Wentzell’s (1998) methods for computing lim ...
The Extent of the Market and the Optimal Degree of Specialization∗
... to which a society can induce socially desirable trades. The meeting technology emphasized by previous authors clearly limits the society’s ability to induce socially desirable trades, but so does the society’s imperfect ability to update the transaction record. Even if agents can meet with each oth ...
... to which a society can induce socially desirable trades. The meeting technology emphasized by previous authors clearly limits the society’s ability to induce socially desirable trades, but so does the society’s imperfect ability to update the transaction record. Even if agents can meet with each oth ...
Comparing the Notions of Optimality in Strategic Games and Soft... Krzysztof R. Apt F. Rossi and K. B. Venable
... Soft constraints, see e.g. (Bistarelli, Montanari, & Rossi 1997), model problems with preferences using c-semirings. A c-semiring is a tuple hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, where: • A is a set, called the carrier of the semiring, and 0, 1 ∈ A; • + is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and ...
... Soft constraints, see e.g. (Bistarelli, Montanari, & Rossi 1997), model problems with preferences using c-semirings. A c-semiring is a tuple hA, +, ×, 0, 1i, where: • A is a set, called the carrier of the semiring, and 0, 1 ∈ A; • + is commutative, associative, idempotent, 0 is its unit element, and ...
ps2solution 2013
... between two stores selling the same product; they can choose on of two location, which di↵er in profitability: (D,R) corresponds to the more profitable, while (U,L) correspond to the less profitable. When the two firms choose the same location, however, they get zero profit because competition at th ...
... between two stores selling the same product; they can choose on of two location, which di↵er in profitability: (D,R) corresponds to the more profitable, while (U,L) correspond to the less profitable. When the two firms choose the same location, however, they get zero profit because competition at th ...
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior
... To examine this broad array of issues, we develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individuals’ degrees of altruism and greed with a concern for social reputation or self-respect. The key property of the model is that agents’ pro- or anti-social behavior reflects an endo ...
... To examine this broad array of issues, we develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individuals’ degrees of altruism and greed with a concern for social reputation or self-respect. The key property of the model is that agents’ pro- or anti-social behavior reflects an endo ...
Postwar game and decision theory: a historical perspective
... probabilistically and act so as to maximize their own subjective expected utility. • Three central features of Bayesian decision theory: 1) Represent uncertainty in terms of probabilistic beliefs: uncertainty can always be probabilized → subjectivist view of probability. 2) Beliefs are constrained b ...
... probabilistically and act so as to maximize their own subjective expected utility. • Three central features of Bayesian decision theory: 1) Represent uncertainty in terms of probabilistic beliefs: uncertainty can always be probabilized → subjectivist view of probability. 2) Beliefs are constrained b ...
An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium
... maximum salary), with any increase above the minimum depending on the successful applicant’s experience, how personable he is, his performance at the interview and on aptitude tests, reference letters, etc. Let R A 5 b y a and R B 5 w x a , where w $0, b $0 and 0, a ,1. Suppose that there is some bi ...
... maximum salary), with any increase above the minimum depending on the successful applicant’s experience, how personable he is, his performance at the interview and on aptitude tests, reference letters, etc. Let R A 5 b y a and R B 5 w x a , where w $0, b $0 and 0, a ,1. Suppose that there is some bi ...
Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated
... the bidder and external signal where the probability of type and signal (θ, ω) is π(θ, ω). The probability distribution can be represented in many possible ways, but we will represent it as a matrix. Specifically, the distribution is a matrix of dimension |Θ| × |Ω| whose elements are all positive an ...
... the bidder and external signal where the probability of type and signal (θ, ω) is π(θ, ω). The probability distribution can be represented in many possible ways, but we will represent it as a matrix. Specifically, the distribution is a matrix of dimension |Θ| × |Ω| whose elements are all positive an ...
The Law of Supply in Games, Markets and Matching
... There is no result in general equilibrium theory that says that the price of a commodity will rise if its supply falls. That is, there is no \law of supply." Such a result is elusive for several reasons, including that all prices may change when the aggregate supply of one commodity falls, that the ...
... There is no result in general equilibrium theory that says that the price of a commodity will rise if its supply falls. That is, there is no \law of supply." Such a result is elusive for several reasons, including that all prices may change when the aggregate supply of one commodity falls, that the ...
Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply C -
... (1998) has shown, the argument there was flawed. In this note, I present a modification of the ‘‘mixed’’ prospective-reimbursement mechanism, and conditions for the implementation of efficient incentives. I begin by setting up the model. A health-care provider can expend effort to lower its treatmen ...
... (1998) has shown, the argument there was flawed. In this note, I present a modification of the ‘‘mixed’’ prospective-reimbursement mechanism, and conditions for the implementation of efficient incentives. I begin by setting up the model. A health-care provider can expend effort to lower its treatmen ...
Existence and computation of equilibria of first
... Next, we consider the case of independent, identically distributed, private valuations (we call these p.i.i.d. auctions). These fit in the general framework as follows: The states of the world are M = V n where n is the number of bidders and V the set of valuations; the probability distribution on M ...
... Next, we consider the case of independent, identically distributed, private valuations (we call these p.i.i.d. auctions). These fit in the general framework as follows: The states of the world are M = V n where n is the number of bidders and V the set of valuations; the probability distribution on M ...
Noncooperative Convex Games: Computing
... Xi n C. Obviously, normalized equilibria are X;. Nash equlibria, but the converse is not true in general, unless C > Points of this particular sort are available under reasonable conditions. Indeed, supposing throughout that Xi and C are convex with nonempty intersection X, we have - slightly genera ...
... Xi n C. Obviously, normalized equilibria are X;. Nash equlibria, but the converse is not true in general, unless C > Points of this particular sort are available under reasonable conditions. Indeed, supposing throughout that Xi and C are convex with nonempty intersection X, we have - slightly genera ...
On the Formal Semantics of IF-like Logics
... a prenex normal form theorem for slash logic (called Lii in their paper). Instead of n-tuples, they used valuations to account for arbitrary formulas where variables occur in any order and may even get rebound. This extension seemed so natural that in later papers (e.g. [10, 14, 16]) it was taken as ...
... a prenex normal form theorem for slash logic (called Lii in their paper). Instead of n-tuples, they used valuations to account for arbitrary formulas where variables occur in any order and may even get rebound. This extension seemed so natural that in later papers (e.g. [10, 14, 16]) it was taken as ...
Public goods with costly access
... financial constraints are relevant). Along the way, we examine whether the optimal policy involves a (positive or negative) tax on access and/or usage. Furthermore, we study the allocation that emerges if the good is provided by a profit maximizing monopoly.5 Section 2 presents the model and charact ...
... financial constraints are relevant). Along the way, we examine whether the optimal policy involves a (positive or negative) tax on access and/or usage. Furthermore, we study the allocation that emerges if the good is provided by a profit maximizing monopoly.5 Section 2 presents the model and charact ...
Graduate School of Economics Waseda University Waseda University
... 3. A choice function f satisfies (PC), (PE), and (CSP). 4. A choice function f satisfies (NC), and (CA). Proof: It is easy to confirm that 1.=⇒ 2. Indeed, if a given choice function is ordinal potential rationalizable, then f coincides with the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of some ordina ...
... 3. A choice function f satisfies (PC), (PE), and (CSP). 4. A choice function f satisfies (NC), and (CA). Proof: It is easy to confirm that 1.=⇒ 2. Indeed, if a given choice function is ordinal potential rationalizable, then f coincides with the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria of some ordina ...
lec06_03
... a time tree, it is true of atleast one path emanating from that point. – Inevitable: a path formula is said to be inevitable if it is true of all paths emanating from that point. ...
... a time tree, it is true of atleast one path emanating from that point. – Inevitable: a path formula is said to be inevitable if it is true of all paths emanating from that point. ...
STABILITY AND STRATEGIC TIME
... interaction of software agents (or simply, programs) with themselves, other humans, and a given environment. In this context, there is an ever increasing need for MAS: 1. able to perform temporal inferences and 2. capable of strategic reasoning. As concerns point 1. it implies that agents can store ...
... interaction of software agents (or simply, programs) with themselves, other humans, and a given environment. In this context, there is an ever increasing need for MAS: 1. able to perform temporal inferences and 2. capable of strategic reasoning. As concerns point 1. it implies that agents can store ...
DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC
... Relative to the existing literature, our necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementing Lindahl or Walrasian allocations (ignoring stability concerns) provide a new understanding about the types of mechanisms that can be used in general equilibrium (or ‘economic’) environments.1 With one- ...
... Relative to the existing literature, our necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementing Lindahl or Walrasian allocations (ignoring stability concerns) provide a new understanding about the types of mechanisms that can be used in general equilibrium (or ‘economic’) environments.1 With one- ...
Output Agreement Mechanisms and Common Knowledge
... With this, we show that output agreement games elicit common knowledge: There is a strict equilibrium where players report the correct answer according to the common knowledge they possess; and this holds for any query we ask and any information structure agents have. We note that most prior mechani ...
... With this, we show that output agreement games elicit common knowledge: There is a strict equilibrium where players report the correct answer according to the common knowledge they possess; and this holds for any query we ask and any information structure agents have. We note that most prior mechani ...
On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players∗
... strategies is evidenced by numerous papers in the literatures of game theory and economics (from, for example, Rosenthal 1973 to Cripps, Keller and Rady 2002). In this paper we demonstrate that strategy profiles can be ‘purified’ in a wide class of games with a large but finite player set. Informall ...
... strategies is evidenced by numerous papers in the literatures of game theory and economics (from, for example, Rosenthal 1973 to Cripps, Keller and Rady 2002). In this paper we demonstrate that strategy profiles can be ‘purified’ in a wide class of games with a large but finite player set. Informall ...
Satisfaction Equilibrium Learning
... We also use a limited history of our previous satisfaction states and thresholds for each action to bound the value of the satisfaction threshold Canadian AI 2006 ...
... We also use a limited history of our previous satisfaction states and thresholds for each action to bound the value of the satisfaction threshold Canadian AI 2006 ...
Example John Strategy Box Ballet Box (2, 1) ← (0, 0) Marry
... Theorem. Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution is the only solution satisfying the conditions of pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of linear transformations and individual monotonicity (n = 2). ...
... Theorem. Kalai-Smorodinsky’s solution is the only solution satisfying the conditions of pareto optimality, symmetry, independence of linear transformations and individual monotonicity (n = 2). ...
The Complexity of Independence
... independence is the reason for saying that IF logic is natural in mathematical English: statements such as “For every x, and for all ǫ > 0, there exists δ, depending only on ǫ . . .” can be transparently written as ∀x, ǫ > 0. ∃δ/x. . . . in IF logic. If one then plays the Hintikka evaluation game (o ...
... independence is the reason for saying that IF logic is natural in mathematical English: statements such as “For every x, and for all ǫ > 0, there exists δ, depending only on ǫ . . .” can be transparently written as ∀x, ǫ > 0. ∃δ/x. . . . in IF logic. If one then plays the Hintikka evaluation game (o ...
Game theory - Carnegie Mellon School of Computer Science
... • Sometimes an agent’s best response depends on others’ strategies: a dominant strategy does not exist • A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy given that others do not deviate: for every agent i, ui(si*,s-i) ≥ ui(si’,s-i) for all si’ – Domin ...
... • Sometimes an agent’s best response depends on others’ strategies: a dominant strategy does not exist • A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player has incentive to deviate from his strategy given that others do not deviate: for every agent i, ui(si*,s-i) ≥ ui(si’,s-i) for all si’ – Domin ...
The Nash Equilibrium in Multy
... others establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium based on the two above-mentioned properties of the prot function. A starting paper on mathematical models of inventory management was Harris (1915). Parlar (Parlar, 1988)was the first to analyse the inventory problem in game theory frameworks. The ...
... others establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium based on the two above-mentioned properties of the prot function. A starting paper on mathematical models of inventory management was Harris (1915). Parlar (Parlar, 1988)was the first to analyse the inventory problem in game theory frameworks. The ...