DYCOM: A Dynamic Truthful Budget Balanced - EXPLORE-2017
... Recent years have brought increased attention to the problems that arise in two-sided markets, in which the set of agents is composed of buying and selling agents. As opposed to one-sided auctions where the auctioneer initially holds the commodity or the commodities and is not considered strategic, ...
... Recent years have brought increased attention to the problems that arise in two-sided markets, in which the set of agents is composed of buying and selling agents. As opposed to one-sided auctions where the auctioneer initially holds the commodity or the commodities and is not considered strategic, ...
... compensation in that state to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint. If g2/f2 ~ 93/^3' compensation can be spread across states; otherwise a linear payment schedule is not optimal. both Effort and Choice We modify this model by assuming that expending effort generates a set of possible dist ...
Four Resale Formulas - Comparisons
... 2. These formulas require difficult-todescribe and difficult-to-quantify distinctions between improvements vs. repairs, useful improvements vs. luxury improvements, the value of materials vs. the value of labor. 3. The CLT's oversight role in reviewing and approving proposed improvements – and in ca ...
... 2. These formulas require difficult-todescribe and difficult-to-quantify distinctions between improvements vs. repairs, useful improvements vs. luxury improvements, the value of materials vs. the value of labor. 3. The CLT's oversight role in reviewing and approving proposed improvements – and in ca ...
Strategy Logic
... computation trees that result from fixing a strategy of one player (module checking [14]). All of these logics treat strategies implicitly through modalities. This is convenient for zero-sum games, but awkward for nonzero-sum games. Indeed, it was not known if Nash equilibria, one of the most fundam ...
... computation trees that result from fixing a strategy of one player (module checking [14]). All of these logics treat strategies implicitly through modalities. This is convenient for zero-sum games, but awkward for nonzero-sum games. Indeed, it was not known if Nash equilibria, one of the most fundam ...
Solution Concepts
... play. They argued that even if rationality was common knowledge, this should not generally be expected. Their account takes a view of strategic behavior that is deeply rooted in single-agent decision theory. To discuss these ideas, it’s useful to explicitly define rationality. Definition 8 A player ...
... play. They argued that even if rationality was common knowledge, this should not generally be expected. Their account takes a view of strategic behavior that is deeply rooted in single-agent decision theory. To discuss these ideas, it’s useful to explicitly define rationality. Definition 8 A player ...
Language-based Games - Cornell Computer Science
... an underlying language that contains only terms refering to players’ strategies. With this language, players’ preferences can depend only on the outcome of the game, as is the case classically. Thus, classical game theory can be viewed as a special case of the language-based approach of this paper ( ...
... an underlying language that contains only terms refering to players’ strategies. With this language, players’ preferences can depend only on the outcome of the game, as is the case classically. Thus, classical game theory can be viewed as a special case of the language-based approach of this paper ( ...
Computing the Optimal Strategy to Commit to
... strategic setting is modeled in the framework of game theory, it is assumed that players choose their strategies simultaneously. This is especially true when the setting is modeled as a normal-form game, which only specifies each agent’s utility as a function of the vector of strategies that the age ...
... strategic setting is modeled in the framework of game theory, it is assumed that players choose their strategies simultaneously. This is especially true when the setting is modeled as a normal-form game, which only specifies each agent’s utility as a function of the vector of strategies that the age ...
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
... choice of the prices of goods dependent on locations. There has been made a lot of works on the general equilibrium model so far. Among them we find some platform researches with a rigid and strict framework: Arrow and Hahn [2], Debreu [3] and Hildenbrand [3]. On the other hand we encounter some pap ...
... choice of the prices of goods dependent on locations. There has been made a lot of works on the general equilibrium model so far. Among them we find some platform researches with a rigid and strict framework: Arrow and Hahn [2], Debreu [3] and Hildenbrand [3]. On the other hand we encounter some pap ...
Toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation
... Since the work of Owen (1975), it has been well-known that the core of an LPG is generally not empty and that a purely competitive allocation scheme, called the Owen set, is contained in the core. This set is constructed from the optimal solution of the dual linear program, which defines the shadow ...
... Since the work of Owen (1975), it has been well-known that the core of an LPG is generally not empty and that a purely competitive allocation scheme, called the Owen set, is contained in the core. This set is constructed from the optimal solution of the dual linear program, which defines the shadow ...
Agent-Based Modeling of Coporate Takeover
... adopt strategies that induce such failures. Refinements of the set of Nash equilibria tend to support the robustness of pure strategy efficient-Nash equilibria featuring high raider profits,even when the number of shareholders is large. ...
... adopt strategies that induce such failures. Refinements of the set of Nash equilibria tend to support the robustness of pure strategy efficient-Nash equilibria featuring high raider profits,even when the number of shareholders is large. ...
A Payment Rules through Discriminant
... zero expected regret (which would imply strategyproofness, and therefore BIC.) Another distinction is that our approach can accommodate objectives that are non-separable across agents, such as in the egalitarian assignment problem. In addition, in determining the outcome and payments for a given ins ...
... zero expected regret (which would imply strategyproofness, and therefore BIC.) Another distinction is that our approach can accommodate objectives that are non-separable across agents, such as in the egalitarian assignment problem. In addition, in determining the outcome and payments for a given ins ...
Management Accounting Research Variance analysis and linear
... of nature that he observes before choosing his action, leading to a state-contingent action. If the principal’s objective and the performance measure are influenced by the state of nature in different ways, a misallocation problem similar to that under multi-tasking arises from the agent’s private in ...
... of nature that he observes before choosing his action, leading to a state-contingent action. If the principal’s objective and the performance measure are influenced by the state of nature in different ways, a misallocation problem similar to that under multi-tasking arises from the agent’s private in ...
Game Theory Problem Set 4 Solutions
... III) Proof that iii. is a necessary condition. Let (b1’, … , bn’) be a vector for which conditions i. and ii. hold, but condition iii. does not. That is b1’ > bS’ ≥ bi’ for all i>1. Then (b1’, … , bn’) cannot be a Nash Equilibrium, because 1 can profitably deviate to b1’’ = bS’. He will still win t ...
... III) Proof that iii. is a necessary condition. Let (b1’, … , bn’) be a vector for which conditions i. and ii. hold, but condition iii. does not. That is b1’ > bS’ ≥ bi’ for all i>1. Then (b1’, … , bn’) cannot be a Nash Equilibrium, because 1 can profitably deviate to b1’’ = bS’. He will still win t ...
TRUTHFUL IMPLEMENTATION AND PREFERENCE
... then it is truthfully implementable if and only if it is a lexicographic affine maximizer. The main contribution of Robert’s theorem is that truthful implementability implies affine maximization, and the key technical result supporting our generalization of this part of the argument is that if the d ...
... then it is truthfully implementable if and only if it is a lexicographic affine maximizer. The main contribution of Robert’s theorem is that truthful implementability implies affine maximization, and the key technical result supporting our generalization of this part of the argument is that if the d ...
A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive
... © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility; Minimal Unanimity ...
... © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. Keywords: Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility; Minimal Unanimity ...
A Logic of Knowledge and Strategies with Imperfect Information
... by exploring the theoretical properties of ESL in contexts of imperfect information. Specifically, we analyse and compare the expressive power of ESL as a specification language for games, both of perfect and imperfect information. It is well-known that in logics of strategies the latter assumption ...
... by exploring the theoretical properties of ESL in contexts of imperfect information. Specifically, we analyse and compare the expressive power of ESL as a specification language for games, both of perfect and imperfect information. It is well-known that in logics of strategies the latter assumption ...
Coordination Mechanisms∗
... for each player are the paths from s to t. In the more general class of multi-commodity games, each player may have its own source and destination. Finally, in the most general class there is no network. It is well-known that every congestion game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. To define th ...
... for each player are the paths from s to t. In the more general class of multi-commodity games, each player may have its own source and destination. Finally, in the most general class there is no network. It is well-known that every congestion game has at least one pure Nash equilibrium. To define th ...
The Problem with Blondes
... as Nash equilibrium, the basis of his Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. I didn’t know what a Nash equilibrium was, but after seeing that scene I had to look it up. I found that a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies (one for each player) expressed as probabilities that each of a number of choices ...
... as Nash equilibrium, the basis of his Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. I didn’t know what a Nash equilibrium was, but after seeing that scene I had to look it up. I found that a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies (one for each player) expressed as probabilities that each of a number of choices ...
Verifiable Equilibria in Boolean Games
... would be a reason for selecting A rather than B. For, if we chose B, then some players would be unsure whether the actual outcome chosen was indeed an equilibrium. We say that A is a verifiable equilibrium. For a more concrete example, consider the following. Two nations have agreed to eliminate the ...
... would be a reason for selecting A rather than B. For, if we chose B, then some players would be unsure whether the actual outcome chosen was indeed an equilibrium. We say that A is a verifiable equilibrium. For a more concrete example, consider the following. Two nations have agreed to eliminate the ...
14.126 Spring 2016 Bayesian Games Slides Lecture Slides
... Type t ≥ 0 knows that θ = 2/5, that the other player knows this, and so on, up to order t. For high t, beliefs about θ approach the common knowledge case with θ = 2/5, where both actions are rationalizable. Contagion: far away types lead to different behavior for similar types. Mihai Manea (MIT) ...
... Type t ≥ 0 knows that θ = 2/5, that the other player knows this, and so on, up to order t. For high t, beliefs about θ approach the common knowledge case with θ = 2/5, where both actions are rationalizable. Contagion: far away types lead to different behavior for similar types. Mihai Manea (MIT) ...
Exchange Markets: Strategy meets Supply
... the outcome allocation: the one maximizing social welfare of agents. We say that a strategy profile is conflict-free, if there exists an allocation preferred by all the agents, among all the equilibrium allocations of the played market. Clearly if there is such an allocation, then it will be chosen ...
... the outcome allocation: the one maximizing social welfare of agents. We say that a strategy profile is conflict-free, if there exists an allocation preferred by all the agents, among all the equilibrium allocations of the played market. Clearly if there is such an allocation, then it will be chosen ...
Existence, Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency of the Rational
... By now it is well known that in a finite agent economy with asymmetric information, a rational expectations equilibrium, may not exist1 (see [13]), may not be incentive compatible, may not be Pareto optimal and may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (see ...
... By now it is well known that in a finite agent economy with asymmetric information, a rational expectations equilibrium, may not exist1 (see [13]), may not be incentive compatible, may not be Pareto optimal and may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (see ...
The communication cost of selfishness
... second-price sealed-bid auction). We can try to reduce the communication cost by first asking Agent 1 report his value and then asking Agent 2 to say whether his valuation exceeds Agent 1’s report. (Since Agent 2 sends only one bit, the communication cost is reduced from full revelation roughly by h ...
... second-price sealed-bid auction). We can try to reduce the communication cost by first asking Agent 1 report his value and then asking Agent 2 to say whether his valuation exceeds Agent 1’s report. (Since Agent 2 sends only one bit, the communication cost is reduced from full revelation roughly by h ...
McColm`s Conjecture
... Vianu [?] showed that P = PSPACE if and only if, (FO+LFP) = (FO + ITER) on all sets of nite structures. In light of this, another interesting consequence of the deterministic construction is Corollary ?? which says that if P is not equal to PSPACE, then there is a set of nite structures on which F ...
... Vianu [?] showed that P = PSPACE if and only if, (FO+LFP) = (FO + ITER) on all sets of nite structures. In light of this, another interesting consequence of the deterministic construction is Corollary ?? which says that if P is not equal to PSPACE, then there is a set of nite structures on which F ...
Anonymizing Web Services Through a Club Mechanism
... If a defector does not pay the fine, his club membership will be revoked, and he can no more avail the service. Thus, his payoff will be 0 in all future transactions. His present payoff will be (Pt+lt) (from Figure 1). If his total payoff from not paying the fine exceeds his payoff from paying the f ...
... If a defector does not pay the fine, his club membership will be revoked, and he can no more avail the service. Thus, his payoff will be 0 in all future transactions. His present payoff will be (Pt+lt) (from Figure 1). If his total payoff from not paying the fine exceeds his payoff from paying the f ...