Modal Languages and Bounded Fragments of Predicate Logic
... What precisely are fragments of classical first-order logic showing “modal” behaviour? Perhaps the most influential answer is that of Gabbay 1981, which identifies them with so-called “finite-variable fragments”, using only some fixed finite number of variables (free or bound). This view-point has b ...
... What precisely are fragments of classical first-order logic showing “modal” behaviour? Perhaps the most influential answer is that of Gabbay 1981, which identifies them with so-called “finite-variable fragments”, using only some fixed finite number of variables (free or bound). This view-point has b ...
Bounded Proofs and Step Frames - Università degli Studi di Milano
... a kind of an analytic subformula property limiting the proof search space. This property holds for proof systems enjoying the subformula property (the latter is a property that usually follows from cut elimination). The bounded proof property depends on an axiomatization of a logical system. That is ...
... a kind of an analytic subformula property limiting the proof search space. This property holds for proof systems enjoying the subformula property (the latter is a property that usually follows from cut elimination). The bounded proof property depends on an axiomatization of a logical system. That is ...
Truth-Functional Propositional Logic
... why the rules work or not. The uniformity, simplicity, and regularity of these arithmetical rules, and their applicability with minimal understanding, is shown by the existence of extremely simple artificial devices for effective arithmetical calculation such as the ancient abacus. Before any system ...
... why the rules work or not. The uniformity, simplicity, and regularity of these arithmetical rules, and their applicability with minimal understanding, is shown by the existence of extremely simple artificial devices for effective arithmetical calculation such as the ancient abacus. Before any system ...
Boolean Connectives and Formal Proofs - FB3
... them for a few predicates, but certainly not all of th encounter in first-order languages. There is one rule that is not technically necessary, some proofs look more natural. This rule is called Rei allows you to repeat an earlier step, if you so desire. ...
... them for a few predicates, but certainly not all of th encounter in first-order languages. There is one rule that is not technically necessary, some proofs look more natural. This rule is called Rei allows you to repeat an earlier step, if you so desire. ...
Reasoning about Action and Change
... To our knowledge, nobody so far tried to cope with the combinatorial problem and the overcommitment problem in a dynamic logic framework. A notable exception is the paper of Stephan & Biundo (1993) (see also Kautz, 1982; Morreau, 1992). In the language of firstorder dynamic logic they propose frame ...
... To our knowledge, nobody so far tried to cope with the combinatorial problem and the overcommitment problem in a dynamic logic framework. A notable exception is the paper of Stephan & Biundo (1993) (see also Kautz, 1982; Morreau, 1992). In the language of firstorder dynamic logic they propose frame ...
The Foundations
... => The proposition:” It_is_raining” is true iff the condition (or fact) that the sentence is intended to state really occurs(happens, exists) in the situation which the proposition is intended to describe. =>Example: Since it is not raining now(the current situation), the statement It_is_raining is ...
... => The proposition:” It_is_raining” is true iff the condition (or fact) that the sentence is intended to state really occurs(happens, exists) in the situation which the proposition is intended to describe. =>Example: Since it is not raining now(the current situation), the statement It_is_raining is ...
Belief Revision in non
... Standard familiar systems such as classical logic, modal logic and intuitionistic logic have in common the principle that contradicting information entails any arbitrary sentence. This principle, known as ex falsum quod libet, is, however, not always appropriate to describe real application deductio ...
... Standard familiar systems such as classical logic, modal logic and intuitionistic logic have in common the principle that contradicting information entails any arbitrary sentence. This principle, known as ex falsum quod libet, is, however, not always appropriate to describe real application deductio ...
The Emergence of First
... a logician used first-order logic and where, as more frequently occurred, he employed some richer form of logic. I have distinguished between a logician's use of first-order logic (where quantifiers range only over individuals), second-order logic (where quantifiers can also range over sets or relat ...
... a logician used first-order logic and where, as more frequently occurred, he employed some richer form of logic. I have distinguished between a logician's use of first-order logic (where quantifiers range only over individuals), second-order logic (where quantifiers can also range over sets or relat ...
