1 CCER Working Paper Series Not for circulation or quotation
... that she noticed animated conflicts. When Bush and Folger came out with The Promise of Mediation6, Picard thought—yes, empowerment and recognition are what transform conflict interactions. And when Winslade and Monk published their book on narrative mediation7, she thought, this must be it. But the ...
... that she noticed animated conflicts. When Bush and Folger came out with The Promise of Mediation6, Picard thought—yes, empowerment and recognition are what transform conflict interactions. And when Winslade and Monk published their book on narrative mediation7, she thought, this must be it. But the ...
Travel and Home: Conceiving Transnational Communities through
... The paradox of the individual emerges for Royce in ethical situations because, on the one hand, “I and only I, whenever I come to my own, can morally justify to myself my own life plan. No outer authority can ever give me the true reason for my duty” (1995, 16). In forming one’s life’s plans, choice ...
... The paradox of the individual emerges for Royce in ethical situations because, on the one hand, “I and only I, whenever I come to my own, can morally justify to myself my own life plan. No outer authority can ever give me the true reason for my duty” (1995, 16). In forming one’s life’s plans, choice ...
dubos and hume on the paradox of tragedy
... health and avert us from what is bad for our health. This is not to say, of course, that our feelings of pleasure (or of displeasure) are altogether reliable indicators of what is good (or bad) for our health, nor is it to suggest that such feelings reveal what is good (or bad) for us, all things co ...
... health and avert us from what is bad for our health. This is not to say, of course, that our feelings of pleasure (or of displeasure) are altogether reliable indicators of what is good (or bad) for our health, nor is it to suggest that such feelings reveal what is good (or bad) for us, all things co ...
A unified account of causal relata
... causal relata. Condition (ii) says no more than the identity of indiscernibles: entities of any kind which differ in some way are distinct. Furthermore, condition (i) is as likely to be true of Jaegwon Kim's events, soon to be discussed, as it is of Davidson's events. The point here is that conditio ...
... causal relata. Condition (ii) says no more than the identity of indiscernibles: entities of any kind which differ in some way are distinct. Furthermore, condition (i) is as likely to be true of Jaegwon Kim's events, soon to be discussed, as it is of Davidson's events. The point here is that conditio ...
Coleridge, Wordsworth and the Buddha on Imagination
... Coleridge’s idea of imagination is related to German idealist philosophy, so let us briefly characterise this way of thinking about human experience. In the thought of Kant, Schopenhauer and so on, our experience is characterised in terms of ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen). When we see a mug, what ...
... Coleridge’s idea of imagination is related to German idealist philosophy, so let us briefly characterise this way of thinking about human experience. In the thought of Kant, Schopenhauer and so on, our experience is characterised in terms of ‘representations’ (Vorstellungen). When we see a mug, what ...
Foundationalism
... the required sort, I dispositionally believe them since I am disposed to believe infinitely many propositions of that sort, just as I am disposed to believe that one and one is two, one and two is three, two and two is four, and so on ad infinitum. Reply: Dispositional belief is not the disposition ...
... the required sort, I dispositionally believe them since I am disposed to believe infinitely many propositions of that sort, just as I am disposed to believe that one and one is two, one and two is three, two and two is four, and so on ad infinitum. Reply: Dispositional belief is not the disposition ...
Scholars Portal PDF Export
... forwards in the dialectically developing system of critical realism. While this must of course be the case up to a point in respect of any moment other than the first and last in such a system, in which the later moments are implicit in and constellationally contain the earlier, Scientific Realism, ...
... forwards in the dialectically developing system of critical realism. While this must of course be the case up to a point in respect of any moment other than the first and last in such a system, in which the later moments are implicit in and constellationally contain the earlier, Scientific Realism, ...
Moral Supervenience - University of Hull
... occurs. But if Q describes some fact quite distinct from and unrelated to X ’ S being G* and F, then why would we fix so certainly on this truth? (Presumably it is not that by induction we have established that there is a causal law to this effect.) Thus even the moderate Quinean can feel Blackbum’s ...
... occurs. But if Q describes some fact quite distinct from and unrelated to X ’ S being G* and F, then why would we fix so certainly on this truth? (Presumably it is not that by induction we have established that there is a causal law to this effect.) Thus even the moderate Quinean can feel Blackbum’s ...
Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology, and Quine`s Holism
... Assuming that normative ethical sentences do express beliefs, I want first of all to present an example of ethical reasoning (that I have used elsewhere) ...
... Assuming that normative ethical sentences do express beliefs, I want first of all to present an example of ethical reasoning (that I have used elsewhere) ...
Hope and Moral Motivation in Leibniz
... suffering itself which Locke discusses.5 The nuance in meaning proves to be of great importance when Leibniz argues that inquiétude fits fairly well with “the nature of the thing itself”, but uneasiness (signifying suffering which is understood as displeasure) does not. This is because desire is not ...
... suffering itself which Locke discusses.5 The nuance in meaning proves to be of great importance when Leibniz argues that inquiétude fits fairly well with “the nature of the thing itself”, but uneasiness (signifying suffering which is understood as displeasure) does not. This is because desire is not ...
The Moral Value of Literature: Defending a Diamondian
... As we will see, the particularly stinging critique Blackburn delivers is that the supposed normalcy of realist positions can be accounted for within the prevalent view. This is the case since we are trained to respond to certain facts in the world in a certain manner and then over time this develops ...
... As we will see, the particularly stinging critique Blackburn delivers is that the supposed normalcy of realist positions can be accounted for within the prevalent view. This is the case since we are trained to respond to certain facts in the world in a certain manner and then over time this develops ...
Qualitative Spatial Reasoning: Framework and Frontiers
... Diagrams and models seem inextricably linked with human spatial reasoning. Why? The wealth of concrete detail in such analog spatial representations at first might seem more than necessary for most spatial questions. Perhaps there are more abstract representations of shape and space which by themsel ...
... Diagrams and models seem inextricably linked with human spatial reasoning. Why? The wealth of concrete detail in such analog spatial representations at first might seem more than necessary for most spatial questions. Perhaps there are more abstract representations of shape and space which by themsel ...
actions-products
... In fact, it is not clear why the relation between H and John should be understood in any way at all, so as to allow assigning a truth value to the ordered pair. The problem of the unity of propositions, like the problem of the truth-directedness of propositions, is a problem of the interpretation of ...
... In fact, it is not clear why the relation between H and John should be understood in any way at all, so as to allow assigning a truth value to the ordered pair. The problem of the unity of propositions, like the problem of the truth-directedness of propositions, is a problem of the interpretation of ...
Univocity and Analogy: A Comparative Study of Gilbert
... which I will develop later on in this study, begins (and remains) with the meaning of sum. His attempt to give primacy to this question “clears the way” 7 for his holistic project of phenomenological ontology. It is Heidegger's contention that a robust understanding of the meaning of being in genera ...
... which I will develop later on in this study, begins (and remains) with the meaning of sum. His attempt to give primacy to this question “clears the way” 7 for his holistic project of phenomenological ontology. It is Heidegger's contention that a robust understanding of the meaning of being in genera ...
The Explanation of Social Action
... involve theory, and the reader will always be able to bring exceptions to mind. But, few people defend the idea that the enterprise of social science could get very far without any theory. Instead, we may debate what makes for a better or a worse theory. Even as we implicitly evaluate theories, howe ...
... involve theory, and the reader will always be able to bring exceptions to mind. But, few people defend the idea that the enterprise of social science could get very far without any theory. Instead, we may debate what makes for a better or a worse theory. Even as we implicitly evaluate theories, howe ...
Merleau-Ponty`s transcendental theory of perception - SAS
... tradition to analytic philosophy of mind. On the one hand it would seem that, whatever else it may comprehend, phenomenology is concerned in the first instance with the same topic as philosophy of mind: the phenomenologist is interested, it would seem, in mental states or phenomena and is engaged, l ...
... tradition to analytic philosophy of mind. On the one hand it would seem that, whatever else it may comprehend, phenomenology is concerned in the first instance with the same topic as philosophy of mind: the phenomenologist is interested, it would seem, in mental states or phenomena and is engaged, l ...
Mitrovic - Unitec Research Bank
... beliefs (knowledge) that the author attributes to the reader, contribute to the content as well. The total sum of the propositions that a historical narrative expresses also includes the propositions that are implied by the style and the rhetoric the historian uses—for instance, the author may use i ...
... beliefs (knowledge) that the author attributes to the reader, contribute to the content as well. The total sum of the propositions that a historical narrative expresses also includes the propositions that are implied by the style and the rhetoric the historian uses—for instance, the author may use i ...
FIRst-PeRson MoRALIty AnD tHe RoLe oF ConsCIenCe
... The Western philosophical and theological tradition has an apt word to capture this specifically first-personal character of moral experience: this word is ‘conscience’. Conscience is perhaps no longer a fashionable word in philosophical language; nonetheless, we can say that morality depends on hav ...
... The Western philosophical and theological tradition has an apt word to capture this specifically first-personal character of moral experience: this word is ‘conscience’. Conscience is perhaps no longer a fashionable word in philosophical language; nonetheless, we can say that morality depends on hav ...
The Argument from Moral Experience
... moral objectivism either reflects a commonsense commitment or is needed in order to validate common sense, then it might be very disturbing to find out that it is wrong. But that it would be disturbing to learn that common sense is misguided, in itself gives us no reason to believe that common sense ...
... moral objectivism either reflects a commonsense commitment or is needed in order to validate common sense, then it might be very disturbing to find out that it is wrong. But that it would be disturbing to learn that common sense is misguided, in itself gives us no reason to believe that common sense ...
Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism
... are no moral facts. The analog of moral nihilism in the debate about perceptual skepticism is something like idealism, which let’s just stipulate is the view that there are no mind-independent objects. Of course, idealists might not put it this way. They would likely maintain that we do have hands b ...
... are no moral facts. The analog of moral nihilism in the debate about perceptual skepticism is something like idealism, which let’s just stipulate is the view that there are no mind-independent objects. Of course, idealists might not put it this way. They would likely maintain that we do have hands b ...
Imagination in the Deliberation Process
... Dewey’s theory helps us to understand better the formation of our instrumental cognitions and value-orientations. It also accounts for the position of means and ends within our unfolding processes of human agency. In particular it identifies the functional character of all ends and value proposition ...
... Dewey’s theory helps us to understand better the formation of our instrumental cognitions and value-orientations. It also accounts for the position of means and ends within our unfolding processes of human agency. In particular it identifies the functional character of all ends and value proposition ...
Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability
... agents sometimes come to believe that p is false (for instance by learning the proof that it is) while still having the intuition that p. But this does not yet constitute a counterexample to Entailment. Coming to believe that a proposition is false is not the same as shedding a belief that it is tru ...
... agents sometimes come to believe that p is false (for instance by learning the proof that it is) while still having the intuition that p. But this does not yet constitute a counterexample to Entailment. Coming to believe that a proposition is false is not the same as shedding a belief that it is tru ...
Persons in time - The Open University
... experiencing subject, then an impersonal description is not a real possibility, and reductionism about the subject is false. So if reductionism about the person is worth further discussion– as I think it is– it had better not entail reductionism about the subject. I shall come back to the relation b ...
... experiencing subject, then an impersonal description is not a real possibility, and reductionism about the subject is false. So if reductionism about the person is worth further discussion– as I think it is– it had better not entail reductionism about the subject. I shall come back to the relation b ...
Radical Enactivism, Wittgenstein and the cognitive gap
... Roberts (2013) objects that the REC claim entails that, “the distinction between veridical and illusory experience is hard for the radical enactivist to draw…[On the REC proposal, not] only are creatures with basic minds, who are without fully-formed conceptual abilities, thus unable to undergo perc ...
... Roberts (2013) objects that the REC claim entails that, “the distinction between veridical and illusory experience is hard for the radical enactivist to draw…[On the REC proposal, not] only are creatures with basic minds, who are without fully-formed conceptual abilities, thus unable to undergo perc ...
Direct and indirect realism
The question of direct or ""naïve"" realism, as opposed to indirect or ""representational"" realism, arises in the philosophy of perception and of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience; the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain. Naïve realism is known as direct realism when developed to counter indirect or representative realism, also known as epistemological dualism, the philosophical position that our conscious experience is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world. Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the accepted view of perception in natural science that states that we do not and cannot perceive the external world as it really is but know only our ideas and interpretations of the way the world is. Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of cognitivism in psychology. The representational realist would deny that 'first-hand knowledge' is a coherent concept, since knowledge is always via some means. Our ideas of the world are interpretations of sensory input derived from an external world that is real (unlike the standpoint of idealism). The alternative, that we have knowledge of the outside world that is unconstrained by our sense organs and does not require interpretation, would appear to be inconsistent with everyday observation.