Download The Finnish Exploitation of Détente from the US Perspective in the

The Finnish Exploitation of
Détente
From the US Perspective
in the Early 1970s:
The Case of the CSCE
Minna Starck
April 4, 2005
University of Helsinki
Email: [email protected]
The topics that this lecture will
cover are:
Détente in the early 1970s
American-Soviet relations during détente
European détente
Finland and the United States
Kekkonen’s visit to the White House in July 1970
Historical background to the CSCE
American attitude towards the CSCE
Outcomes from the CSCE
2
History of Détente
A possible end to a post-war
adjustment to the division of Europe.
The beginning of a new phase in the
Cold War characterized by ongoing
dialogue e. g. SALT and CSCE.
It accelerated the process of
exchanges between East and West.
3
The Rise of Détente
SALT I
Nixon-Brezhnev Summits
Opening to China
German Question
Four-Power agreement
4
What was this man thinking?
Czechoslovak crisis?
Finnish ‘active neutrality policy’?
East-West détente?
CSCE ?
5
Finnish Neutrality
After the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union ceased to
refer to Finland as a neutral country in its official
texts.
It insisted on giving the 1948 Finnish-Soviet
treaty priority.
What followed was a long drawn-out battle of
words.
Finally a compromise was reached and both the
1948 treaty and Finland’s policy of neutrality
were mentioned in a single paragraph.
6
President Kekkonen’s trip to
Washington in July 1970
“We respect you
in the field of
foreign policy, a
policy of
independence,
and a policy of
neutrality”
7
Finland and the United States
Much as from the 1940s onwards, in 1970 the
U.S. policy formulation towards Finland
consisted of three main elements:
1. To maintain an independent and democratic
Finland with the truly neutral foreign policy
2. the strengthening of Finland’s ties with the
West
3. Reduction of Finnish vulnerability to Soviet
political and economic pressures
8
America’s foreign policy
Richard Nixon came to
power in January 1969
“era of negotiations”
Henry
Kissinger
was his
closest
advisor
Nixon and his successor
Gerald Ford
9
The American Conception of
Détente
Nixon in 1968: The United States “must
move away from confrontations in this
nuclear age into a new era – the era of
negotiation”
10
American–Soviet Relations
During Détente
A turning point
American domestic problems – Watergate
etc..
Soviet view of American recognition of
parity – SALT etc…
11
Superpower relations
continued…
Carrots and sticks?
Unexpected outcomes?
Misconceptions of strengths and
weaknesses?
12
European Détente
Differences between European and
superpower détente
European détente – dynamic process
Independent European initiatives
Peoples interest – human rights agenda in
the CSCE
13
Historical Background of the
CSCE
Original proposals for a pan-European
security conference
Development of Warsaw Pact and NATO
1960s – renewed interest in a multilateral
security conference
Inclusion of the North Americans
Kekkonen’s invitation
14
Facts about CSCE
Ostpolitik
Acceptance of the status quo
Getting something back
Low level of expectations
15
Kissinger worked closely with Dobrynin from Helsinki meeting Nov. 17,
1969 to Moscow summit May 22-29, 1972
16
American attitude towards the
CSCE
United States considers CSCE as a
peripheral affair
Focus of US diplomatic efforts elsewhere
Mechanics of US diplomacy and CSCE
A pragmatic approach
17
Soviet interests in the CSCE
To gain general acceptance of the territorial and
political status quo in central and eastern
Europe
Enlarging on the bilateral West German
agreements with the Soviet Union, Poland and
East Europe
To support reduction of interstate barriers to
increased economic relations and to further the
general process of East-West detente
18
CSCE was a part of a broader
diplomatic strategy
CSCE- a diplomatic strategy to be used in
dealing with the USSR
-and a political necessity when viewed from the
perspective of transatlantic relations
But still – the “real” decisions were made in
bilateral context with the leaders of the Soviet
Union
A key point in this regard was the May 1972
Moscow summit where Nixon and Brezhnev
agreed on a linkage between CSCE and the
Multilateral Balanced Forces Reduction talks
(MBFR)
19
Outcome of the CSCE
Lack of interest but concessions made
Soviet triumph????
Implications of the Final Act
20
Friends forever!...
21
Soviet reaction to the Final Act
Great deal, major triumph
Highlight of European détente
The existence of the two German states
had finally been recognized by the whole
world
The Soviet leaders clearly believed ”the
correlation of forces” in the world had
shifted decisively in their favour
22
The Reaction to the Final Act in
the United States
Different from that in the SU and Western
Europe
Unknown to most Americans’
The growing disenchantment with détente
and politicking in the upcoming
presidential election in 1976 led to
criticism of the CSCE and of President
Ford’s journey to Helsinki to sign it
23
European reaction
CSCE Final Act was positive.
Perception of a real relaxation of tensions
Cynical commentators as well as those
carried away by euphoria
24
Effects for Finland
Urho Kekkonen’s
’project’
Significance for
Finnish neutrality and
foreign policy
Kekkonen’s moment
in the sun
25
Outcomes from the CSCE
A shift in American attitudes – the
significance of human rights in
criticism of the Soviet union
Post-Helsinki popular action Czechoslovakia, Poland and the
Soviet Union itself.
Legitimacy for dissidents
The Helsinki review conferences
26
Irony of the Soviet-American
detente
The Nixon-Kissinger détente doctrine
promoted the eventual collapse of the
USSR?
Soviet over-stretch in the belief that the
U.S. was weaker?
27
Conclusion
“The Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they
got it and it laid the foundations for the end of
their empire. We resisted it for years, went
grudgingly, Ford paid a terrible price for going –
perhaps re-election itself – only to discover
years later that CSCE had yielded benefits
beyond our wildest imagination. Go figure.”
Robert Gates The Former Director of the CIA. In his book From the Shadows:
The Ultimate insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Helped Win the Cold
War, 1996.
28
Some faces that mattered…
29
Henry Kissinger, Leonid Brezhnev, Gerald Ford, and Andrei Gromyko
during the Helsinki summit, July 1975
30
Further reading:
Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy 1994.
Raymond L.Garthoff: Détente and
Confrontation, American-Soviet Relations
from Nixon to Reagan 1985.
Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches,
Interpretations, Theory. Ed. Odd Arne
Westad 2000.
Johan Lewis Gaddis: We Know Now.
Rethinking Cold War History 1997.
31