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Transcript
Masking, conscious access, and the blind spot of introspection
Stanislas Dehaene
INSERM, Cognitive Neuro-imaging Unit, IFR 49
Gif sur Yvette, France
For many years, introspection and consciousness were rejected from scientific psychology. In my talk,
I will show that introspection is often a valid source of information that, combined with neuroimaging
methods, can provide a window into the architecture underlying conscious processing. A first series of
masking experiments probed introspective reports of target visibility. Visibility reports provided an
accurate picture of the objective threshold for perceiving masked stimuli, and correlated with
electrophysiological markers of late cortical activation (P300). I argue that conscious perception
corresponds to a state of ignition of the conscious workspace, a distributed set of neurons with long
axons capable of distributing incoming information to many processors and therefore making it
reportable. A second series of experiments probed introspection of reaction time (RT). After each trial of
an RT task, subjects reported how long they thought it took them to take their decision. In a single-task
setting, this subjective RT was highly correlated with objective RT, but in a dual-task setting,
introspection was strikingly blind to the psychological refractory period (PRP) cost – a massive delay of
the second task. My colleagues and I suggest that introspection is only accurate for mental objects that
are currently active in the workspace – and that both masking and dual-task limitations can prevent or
delay workspace access.
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