Download Paper 1 Term Paper 2 John Choo 11A01B 3. The Cold War ended

Paper 1 Term Paper 2
John Choo 11A01B
3. The Cold War ended because of the political and military assertiveness of Ronald Reagan. Discuss.
The end of hostilities, whether through rhetoric or policy, between the United States and the Soviet
Union, happened far sooner than anyone had expected. Formally declared at the Malta Summit in 1989, the
end of the Cold War was, in the words of Deudney and Ikenberry, “a baby that arrived unexpectedly” with “a
long line of those claiming paternity”. The Reagan victory school, for one, claimed it for Ronald Reagan and in
particular, his political and military assertiveness towards the Soviet Union. It is my opinion that this view is
flawed, and does not fully explain the situation of the time. Instead, I believe that the Cold War ended mainly
because of Mikhail Gorbachev’s desire to change the Soviet Union, in terms of both domestic and foreign
policy.
Reagan’s assertiveness can be summarised in the NSC National Security Decision Directive 75,
released in 1983, which states that one of the goals of the administration was to “contain and over time
reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all
international arenas”. This was done through an extensive military build-up programme, which included the
basing of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe, international confrontations in places such as Grenada,
Angola, and Afghanistan amongst others, and rhetoric like the 1983 “evil empire” speech to the National
Association of Evangelicals; all of which supposedly, Nichols writes, “forced the Kremlin… to justify and
defend itself… before the world”. The thing is, there is very little evidence to show that this assertiveness had
any direct impact on ending the Cold War. In fact, it very nearly brought the world into a “hot war” in 1983,
where Andropov and other Soviet officials mistakenly thought that Exercise Able Archer carried out by NATO
meant that “a nuclear attack was imminent”, and prepared Soviet troops to launch a counterattack, This
happened because Reagan’s aggressive tendencies made Soviet leaders feel that “Reagan [was] unpredictable,”
and that one “should expect anything from him” as expressed by Andropov. Reagan’s hostile attitude also
made his later peacemaking efforts more difficult. According to Dobrynin in response to Reagan’s 1984 “Ivan
and Anya” meets “Jim and Sally” speech in which he expressed a desire for Russians and Americans to come
to common ground, Reagan’s antagonism made it “hard to believe in [his] sincerity”. This probably delayed
the diplomatic engagements which led to the thawing of relations between the two countries.
However, indirectly, Reagan’s assertiveness was perhaps somewhat more important. For one, in
Brown’s words, “the American willingness to outspend the Soviet Union in the search for new weapons
systems” could be seen as “one of the stimuli to Gorbachev’s policy innovations.” In 1986, Gorbachev told
Chernyaev his worries about “be[ing] drawn into an arms race [they] cannot manage”, and his belief that they
were “at the end of [their] tether”. It is possible that Reagan’s continual increase of the stakes in the Cold War
through military spending and armed conflict, which required an equal increase on the part of the Soviet
Union, created such a burden on the Soviet system that Gorbachev decided to take steps to end the Cold War.
Secondly, Reagan’s assertiveness gave him a Cold Warrior status, which allowed him to push for
more dovish policies in his second term. As stated by Mann, “his willingness to enter into an arms-control
agreement with the Soviet Union carried considerably greater weight because of his own reputation and his
unimpeachable credentials with the right wing of the Republican Party.” As a tried and tested anticommunist
in his first term, Reagan could hardly be described as “soft” in his approach with the Soviet Union later. This
meant that he was in a position where he could have warmer relations with the Soviet Union without
appearing as a sycophant.
Yet, I would argue that it was Reagan’s accommodative approach to the Soviet Union, mainly during
his second term, which was of more importance with regards to ending the Cold War. In four years, he met
Gorbachev four times, and signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as well. This openness to
discussion and willingness to reduce arms had two main influences on the course of the Cold War. Firstly, it
directly reduced the tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. During Reagan’s re-election
run, opposition candidate Walter Mondale had pointed out that Reagan “might leave office as the first
American president since Herbert Hoover to have failed to sit down with the leader of the Soviet Union.” This
lack of communication allowed for suspicions on both sides to take root, as observed through the Soviet
response to Able Archer mentioned above. Meeting with Gorbachev dissipated much of the bad feeling
between the two sides. According to Chernyaev, “[a]fter Reykjavik, [Gorbachev] never again spoke about
Reagan in his inner circle as he had before… Never again did I hear statements such as, ‘The US
administration is political scum that is liable to do anything.’”.
Secondly, Reagan’s attitude made Gorbachev’s domestic reforms possible, allowing for change to take
place within the Soviet Union, which removed fundamental points of conflict between the two systems. Mann
states, “Gorbachev was able to show ‘the power ministries’ in Moscow… that as Soviet leader, he could handle
the Americans and win compromises from Reagan” which in turn, “strengthened Gorbachev in Moscow as he
launched his domestic reforms”. If Reagan kept with his antagonistic approach, it would have been difficult
for Gorbachev to justify the changes that he wanted to make to the Soviet system.
At this point, I believe that Gorbachev’s dual roles as change-maker and peace-maker would have to
be considered. The introduction of new policies, namely glasnost and perestroika, allowed for the Iron Curtain
to be torn down, because it stirred up dissent amongst Eastern Europeans, who were “demoralis[ed] to see
that even the Soviet Union was opening up”, “their own government[s] [were] not,” leading them to chant
Gorbachev’s name during their protest marches. The implementation of the so-called Sinatra Doctrine, in
which “every country decides on its own which road to take,” made the Eastern European revolutions of 1989
possible. When Poland elected the non-Communist party Solidarity into power, the Soviet response was that
“this [was] entirely a matter to be decided by Poland.” When the Berlin Wall came down, Soviet ambassador
to East Berlin Kochemasov, “congratulate[d] [Egon Krenz] on the courageous step [he had] taken”. Basically,
the 1989 revolutions happened smoothly “chiefly because Mikhail Gorbachev chose not to act, but rather to
be acted upon,” in the words of Gaddis.
Gorbachev was also instrumental in initiating the reconciliation process between the Soviet Union
and the West. Brown states that “[t]he idea of holding a summit devoted primarily to disarmament measures
and to convene it in either London or Reykjavik was Gorbachev’s”. It was Gorbachev who decided to end the
conflict in Afghanistan as well, first proposing “that a peaceful withdrawal should be effected” at the start of
his leadership. He told Shultz in 1987 about this and that, “the United States kept putting ‘sticks in the
spokes’”, indicating that the withdrawal was completely a Soviet initiative. Furthermore, he took pains to
build ties with West Germany, the United Kingdom, and their Western European counterparts, famously
causing Margaret Thatcher to say, “We can do business together.” This push for peace inevitably caused the
Cold War to be over.
One may also want to briefly look at the Eastern European people themselves. Gaddis places
emphasis on them, calling them “ordinary people with simple priorities” who “caused a collapse no one could
stop” which gave their leaders “little choice but to follow”. In some senses, he is right. The United States and
the Soviet Union had no influence on the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. Bush told Gorbachev at Malta,
that he was “shaken by the rapidity of the unfolding changes” in Eastern Europe, being caught off-guard.
Gorbachev wrote in his book Perestroika to “[l]et everyone make his own choice”, and so did not intervene.
The Eastern European people wanted to connect with the Western European people of their own accord, and
in that way, contributed to the end of the Cold War.
To conclude, the end of the Cold War was very much a result of “the leaders of the United States and
the Soviet Union [finding] that they shared an interest… in the principle of nuclear abolition”, or rather the
want for peace, and so, leaves very little room for the assertiveness of Reagan to take credit. In this peacefinding process, it was Gorbachev who took the lead on the issues of the day, and it was Gorbachev who
ensured that peace happened, although Reagan’s assent must be acknowledged. While the Eastern Europeans
had decided to tear down the Iron Curtain on their own, it was Gorbachev who allowed it to happen; and it
was the same man who decided to build bridges with the West. It is unlikely that any other Soviet leader
would have done likewise, which makes him, in my view, the main reason for the end of the Cold War.
Bibliography
Gaddis, J.L. (2005). The Cold war. L, England: Penguin Books Ltd.
Mann, J. (2009). The Rebellion of ronald reagan: a history of the end of the cold war. N.Y., N.Y., USA: Penguin Group (USA)
Inc..
Brown, A. (1996). The Gorbachev factor. N.Y., N.Y., USA: Oxford University Press Inc..
Nichols, T.M. (1998). Lessons from the new history of the cold war. International Journal, 53(4), 661-686.