Download Irreparable Global Spread of Pathogens and International Trade

DOI: 10.1515/ats-2015-0006 AGRICULTURA TROPICA ET SUBTROPICA, 48/1-2, 37-43, 2015
Review article
Irreparable global spread of pathogens and international trade – facilitating factors
Václav Kouba
Department of Animal Science and Food Processing in Tropics and Subtropics,
Faculty of Tropical AgriSciences, Czech University of Life sciences Prague, Czech Republic
Former Chief, Animal Health Service, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy
Abstract
The worldwide trade in non-pathogen-free animals and their products has led to irreparable global spread of animal infections.
Among factors supporting this spread belong: countless pathogen species able to reproduce and spread horizontally and to the
next generations causing immense number of sufferings and premature deaths of affected animals and humans; increasing long
distance export of animals and their products due also to not requiring by relevant international organizations healthy and innocuous
pathogen-free commodities; illegal export/import of animals and their products; deficiencies related to diagnosis of pathogen-free
status; inability to discover all imported infections, to control and eradicate them; international sanitary certificates without pathogenfree guarantee; inability of public animal health services to control on the spot the international trade with animal commodities;
minimum of successfull animal infection eradications and absence of information about global spreading of pathogens to alert the
countries in question. Huge daily flow of exported non-pathogen-free animal commodities conduces to permanent deterioration of
global epizootiological situation. Irreparable man-made global spread of invisible pathogens with continuous multiplying sanitary,
economic, social and ecological consequences represents a worldwide ecological disaster contributing to shortening life on Earth and
survival of species, including self-destruction of humankind. Extraordinary existential significance requires international control of
epizootics to be dealt with at the highest decision-making level of the United Nations Organization.
Keywords: diagnosis deficiency; planet ecological disaster; humankind survival; global bioterror; global pathogenic microflora;
eradications, innocuous commodity, pathogen-free status, sanitary certificates.
INTRODUCTION
is getting worse as never. The analysis is based on official
data related to legal trade as reported by the governments
to international organizations such as Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International
Office of Epizootics (OIE) and World Trade Organization
(WTO). Other sources are represented by several selected
publications such as that of Blancou et al. (1995).
Experience of the author as former United Nations officer
and Editor, FAO/WHO/OIE Animal Health Yearbook has
been considered as well.
The global spread of pathogens through international
trade is due to mass export of animals that are not
pathogen-free and their products. This difficult-to-solve
problem is arising from the peculiarities of pathogens
as biological dynamic phenomena and human activities
giving priority to economic profit at the expense of health
in importing countries. The introduction of pathogens
is easy (even in a moment) but their eradication is
very difficult if not impossible. The imported invisible
pathogens are able to reproduce and spread horizontally
and vertically causing to actual and future generations of
animals and humans incalculable numbers of sufferings
and premature deaths with sanitary, economic, social and
ecologic serious to catastrophic consequences. Imported
pathogens signify in a specific disease free country longdistance spread (possibly also inter-continental) or posteradication reappearance thus depreciating the work of
previous generations of experts, and in specific affected
territories worsening of the epizootiological situation.
Imported pathogen spread represents multiplying and
continuing consequences unknown in any other trade
commodity. Thus, paradoxically, in spite of rapidly
increasing scientific knowledge, the situation in the world
The term “pathogen” used in the text means an infectious agent - a
microorganism such a virus, bacterium, prion, fungus and protozoan as well
as parasite, causing transmissible disease in its host – animal or human.
Enormous number of uncontrolled pathogen and animal
species
Nobody knows how many species of pathogens exist,
and a vast number of them are uncontrollable. Some
pathogens are on the list of biological weapons (e.g.
Bacillus anthracis). The pathogens are extremely complex
dynamic biological phenomena with infinite variability
and in permanent unpredictable development. About one
thousand pathogen species causing infections in animals
have been described, including almost two hundred
transmissible to humans. Many of them have a series of
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subtypes which differ from one another. All pathogens are
able to change their characteristics, e.g. through passages
in susceptible populations increasing their virulence
(e.g. becoming reproduction interrupters or even killers),
creating new serotypes through mutation, etc. Thus
different strains continue to emerge. Particular problems
are related to conditionally pathogenic agents and new
emerging diseases, i.e. unknown pathogens being not
detected before the export of specifically infected animal
commodities. Pathogens as living organisms have their
origin and extinction.
instruments, etc.), chained, branched, radial, from very
slow up to very fast, from local up to territorial, short-term
or in phases or continuous, with arithmetic to exponential
progression etc. Some pathogens are able to cause a specific
disease in more animal species creating very complex postimport problems. The control and eradication of imported
pathogens in wild animals is much more difficult than in the
domestic ones, if feasible at all. Even worse situation can
occur when imported pathogens create a long-lasting natural
reservoir.
Examples: Salmonella enterica has more than one thousand serovars;
1978 penetrated from domestic pigs in wild boar population creating natural
foot and mouth disease virus has 7 immunologically distinct types: O, A, C,
reservoir and the virus is still circulating there threatening mainly European
SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3 and Asia-1 (with more than 60 subtypes).
countries. In spite of this Italy increased pork export many times (e.g. 1980 –
The imported pathogens spread due to human interventions
or naturally (e.g. through wild animals). The pathogens
spread at different speed and extent, often unnoticed thanks
to sub-clinical “carriers”. Communicable diseases outside
of animal health control can be exported and spread almost
freely (unnoticed). The grade of spread can be measured by
the “post-import ratio primary/secondary outbreaks”. Some
pathogens are able to penetrate even the barriers of the best
isolated and controlled laboratories.
1,221 MT; 2000 – 50,179 MT).
Example: Imported African swine fever (ASF) virus in Sardinia, Italy in
The presently known occurrence of transmissible
diseases represents only a “tip of the iceberg”. The real
epizootiological situation in the whole world is unknown.
No one knows how many species of animals exist on
Earth. This paper deals only with a few vertebrate terrestrial
species (from a total of known 5,416 mammals and 9,956
birds). The number of described species of amphibians has
reached 6,199 and of reptiles 8,240 (IUCN 2007). When
considering the enormous number of pathogens and of
animal species, then it can be understood that their polyetiological interactions are uncontrollable.
Examples: In Taiwan in 1997 imported foot and mouth disease (FMD)
virus stormed the whole island during four months; the post-import ratio
reached 1: 6,147. FMD virus escaped from Plum Island Animal Disease
Research Center, New York, USA on September 15, 1978 and from FMD
Increasing international trade in animal commodities
Increasing spread of pathogens follows the size of
international trade in animal commodities. Between 1990
and 2010 the reported number of exported cattle increased
1.3 times, that of exported pigs 2.8 times (Figure 1) and
Word Reference Laboratory - Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright
Laboratory, United Kingdom in 2007.
Imported pathogens can spread via different forms
of transmission such as direct (contact), indirect via
contaminated inanimate objects (e.g. water, feedstuff,
Table 1. Global numbers of selected domestic animals exported in 1990, 2000 and 2010 in the world, FAOSTAT 2014
Species
1990
2000
2010
Ratio 2010/1990
Cattle
Buffaloes
Camels
Sheep+goats
Pigs
Chickens
7,971,806
33,381
59,530
21,046,663
12,902,228
433,130,000
9,383,254 56,615 96,764 19,785,636
15,747,091 702,976,000
10,686,530
39,969
273,798
20,452,972
37,321,920
1,383,744,000
1.3405
1.1973
4.5993
0.9717
2.8926
3.1948
2010
daily
29,278
110
750
50,036
102,252
3,791,079
Table 2. Quantity and value of exported fresh meat in 2000 and 2010 in the world, FAOSTAT 2014
20002010
Meat2010
Tonnes
USD
Tonnes
USD
2010/2000
daily
tonnes
Beef+Veal
1 858 327
3 845 812 000
5 061 898
23 388 989 000
2,7239
13 868
Pork
2 300 211
3 578 863 000
4 733 033
15 450 011 000
2,0576
12 967
Chickens
5 915 086
6 069 528 000
10 430 348 18 011 632 000
1,7633
28 576
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10 M
Head
30 M
20 M
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
10 M
M = Million, k = Thousand
World
Figure 1. Pig export in the world during 1990-2011. FAOSTAT Gateway 2014.
of exported chickens 3.2 times. In 2010, the daily average
number of exported animals reached 29,278 heads of cattle,
102,252 pigs, 3,791,000 chickens, 13,868 tons of beef and
veal, 12,967 tons of pork and 28,576 tons of poultry meat
(Tables 1 and 2). A similar export increase was reported
also in several other species of animals and their products.
The increase has been also due to relevant international
organizations not requiring pathogen-free export. Illegal
export of animal commodities must be added to these
numbers.
Example: “The magnitude of the global movement of animals is
staggering. In terms of sheer numbers, 37,858,179 individually counted
live amphibians, birds, mammals, and reptiles were legally imported to
the United States from 163 countries in 2000–2004. For the most of these
animals, there are no requirements for zoonotic disease screening either
before or after arrival into the United States. ” (Marano et al. 2007)
Over time, animal transport has changed: from slow
(time for clinical manifestation of pathogen carriers after
incubation period) and controlled by public services to
speedy (even in one day) almost uncontrollable by these
Figure 2. Intercontinental spread of African swine fever during 1957-1995. The outbreaks in American and European continents were
eradicated except of the Island of Sardinia, where the disease remains enzootic since 1978. (L. Mur Gil and J,M. Sanchez Viscaíno,
Reference Centre for African Swine Fever, Madrid, Spain, 2010).
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services; from limited to enormous numbers of animal
commodity origin, destination and distribution localities
and territories very difficult to control; from limited up
to inter-continental distances – anywhere on the planet
etc. (see Figure 2). The trade used to have much more
demanding import sanitary conditions and was under
much stricter control by much better staffed, equipped
and organized public services. The present huge global
international trade in animal commodities, without strict
uncompromising public animal health service control
not admitting export of pathogens, is causing mass
introduction of animal communicable diseases into
importing countries.
Example: Professor Caporale, former President, OIE Scientific Commission
for Animal Diseases wrote in 1994: “The need to remove technical obstacles
to the free circulation of animals and their products”; “It is no longer possible
to apply the old system under which animals and animal products had to
come from specific free zones, and were subjected to isolation, quarantine,
inspection and diagnostic testing before and after export.”
Hazard analysis and critical control points (HACCP),
hygienic control method, cannot discover invisible
pathogens in animal products. Therefore, the knowledge
of epizootiological situation in the herd/flock of origin is of
extraordinary importance.
International animal health certificates without
pathogen-free guarantee
OIE certificates are only informative documents without
any written guarantee as is usual for any other items. Thus the
exporter cannot be responsible for non-pathogen-free export.
The investigating and certificating officer can sign anything
while not being supervised by public service inspection on
the spot. There have been many cases when specific diseases
have been introduced into a (disease) “free country” in spite of
certification according to OIE Code (not requiring guarantee
of full sanitary innocuousness, i.e. pathogen-free status). This
type of “certificate” does not inform the importers what is
guaranteed sanitary and what is not. This complicates any
claims concerning import of pathogens. In spite of this,
they must pay as for a pathogen-free commodity. Different
pathogens have different importance. But in 1998, the
OIE abolished classification of internationally notifiable
animal diseases according to their importance (e.g. Group A
included killing diseases).
OIE texts supporting trade without pathogen-free guarantee
mention: “facilitate international trade by unimpeded flow
of trade of animals and animal products” (Code 2001, Art.
1.2.1.1); “...to ensure unimpeded trade...” (Code 2007, Art.
1.2.1.1) and “Certifying veterinarians should only certify
matters that are within their own knowledge at the time of
signing the certificate, ...; have no conflict of interest in the
commercial aspects of the animals or animal products being
certified...” (Code 2007, Art. 1.2.2.3). In OIE documents,
many other texts can be found, unilaterally favouring
exporting countries, such as: “The international veterinary
certificate should not include requirements for the exclusion
of pathogens or animal diseases ...”;“International
veterinary certificates are intended to facilitate trade and
should not be used to impede it by imposing unjustified
health conditions”; “It would be irresponsible and contrary
to the principles of encouraging international trade to insist
on guarantee as to the absence of commonly found infections
that are present in the importing country.”; “inadmissible
health protection measures”; “irresponsible behaviour of
importing countries” etc. Requiring full sanitary quality, i.e.
healthy animals and innocuous products without pathogens,
Deficiencies related to diagnosis of pathogen-free status
of animal commodities
There are not any fully reliable indirect diagnostic methods
for etiological diagnosis such as clinical, serological, allergy,
etc. They have certain error grade not being able to detect all
animals – pathogen carriers or all animal products containing
pathogens. The grade of false negative results can be estimated
when knowing the values of sensitivity and specificity. Their
knowledge is of paramount importance for international
trade in animal commodities. Animals – pathogen carriers,
considered as specifically healthy due to false negative results,
are the most dangerous for pathogen spread.
Note: Dr J. Blancou, DG OIE in a letter dated 18 September 1998 refused
this author’s proposal to include sensitivity/specificity values in all indirect
diagnostic methods described in the otherwise excellent “OIE Manual of
Standards for Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines”.
The possibility of human errors and diagnosis errors
should be also considered when using: non-standard (nonuniform) methods and tools (objective errors), when different
investigators using the same methods report different results
in the same animals or samples (subjective errors), when
methods with low sensitivity and specificity are used, when
logical interpretation of the results in missing, etc. Postimport infection discovery delay due to incubation periods
can be of several days, weeks, months or even years. The
importing country specialists have often more demanding
criteria than the exporting country ones when interpreting
diagnostic test results.
Example: In the 1960s, atrophic rhinitis was detected by X-ray examination
among breeder boars imported from Sweden to Czechoslovakia. Swedish
authorities refused to take the animals back and sent Professor Swan who
did not agree with the diagnosis; autopsies (attended also by this author)
confirmed the disease and the Sweden returned the money paid.
Etiological diagnosis usually requires expensive laboratory
investigations. The diagnosis confirming wholesomeness of
the exported commodity (pathogen-free status) is much more
demanding than the discovery of specific diseases. Due to
economic reasons the frequency of etiological investigations
has been significantly reduced instead of being extended.
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is according to OIE “unjustified sanitary barrier”. Sanitary
barriers of importing country against pathogen introductions
are targeted at exporting country diseases, not at pathogenfree commodities. Every case is different and therefore the
certification should be based on bilateral agreement without
any external interference or dictate. The importing countries
need commodities free of organisms causing diseases. The
OIE Code and its Glossary in 2014 (135 terms) does not even
contain basic terms for trade conditions such as “healthy
animal”, “innocuous animal product” or “pathogen-free”.
infections. On one hand mass spreading of the pathogens
through international trade and on the other hand minimum
or zero eradication programmes against imported diseases
at first due to difficulties to detect and isolate them on time.
Example: European Union has not any time-bounded programme for the
eradication of ASF imported in 1978 in Sardinia (only 12 km distance from
France). “Doing nothing” policy (except papers) was in this case applied
also by the OIE. This author was visiting the island and did not find any
measures against ASF virus escape that happened in 2007 into Georgia
(most probable hypothesis) continuing in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Lithuania and Poland.
Examples: Between the years 1990 and 1996, among 326 shipments of
Only one animal disease has been globally eradicated
so far – rinderpest in 2010 after one century of very
intensive, difficult and extraordinary costly international
programme.
cattle (19,350 heads) imported to Czech Republic from western European
countries were 181 (55.52%) found affected by infectious diseases
including those not previously existing in the importing country such as
paratuberculosis, bovine tuberculosis and hypodermosis. Simultaneously
imported sheep introduced maedi-visna and scrapie (never diagnosed in the
Weak public animal health services
During the 1990s, under the pressure from the World Bank
(WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in almost all
countries the role of governments and their services was
substantially reduced. The OIE, being the international
organization for epizootic control, accepted the abovementioned policy minimizing public animal health services
without any reaction. As a result, the epizootiological
situation in the world has been deteriorating and the intensity
of the global spread of pathogens has increased.
country before) also in spite of “international certificates”.
New Zealand managed to agree with European Union the
following “Health attestation”: “I the undersigned hereby
certify that the animal products herein described, comply
with the relevant New Zealand public health standards and
requirements which have been recognized as equivalent to
the European Community standards and requirements as
prescribed in Council Decision 97/132/EC, specifically,
in accordance with the Animal Products Act 1999.” (i.e.
guaranteeing nothing). OIE WAHID website dated 3 February
2007: Animal Health Situation - “New Zealand, Year 2005:
No information”. How the risk of pathogen introduction can
be assessed? (MacDiarmid, actual Secretary General, OIE
Commission for the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, wrote
in 1992: “Salmonellae are already widespread and common
in New Zealand. … between 1 and 5% of sheep and cattle
are unapparent carriers).”
According to OIE Code 2007, Article 1.2.1 “The Head of
the Veterinary Service of the exporting country is ultimately
accountable for veterinary certification used in international
trade.” This is just a theory when the certifications are
carried out by private veterinarians who are not employees
of government animal health service.
Example: “... the privatization of veterinary services, thus aiming at
drastically diminishing the role of the state in these activities. Surveillance,
early warning, laboratory diagnostic services, planning, regulation and
management of disease control programme, as well as ensuring the quality
and safety of animal products were secondary considerations. The chain of
veterinary command that required notification of disease outbreaks enabling
a response to disease emergency and which also ensured the management
of national disease control programme, was often dismantled.” as stated
by Rweyemamu and Astudillo (2003). Similar opinion was published by
Ozawa et al. (2003).
Private veterinarians have been entrusted with a number
of public service official activities. Compared with public
service mission of responsibility for animal health protection
(Griffiths et al. 1974), they are largely dependent on the
breeder, producer and trader, who provide them with work.
Therefore, they are easier to be corrupt, especially if they
are not under direct public service control. The selection
of private veterinarians for the “accreditation” is often not
sufficiently demanding and based on proof of very good
practical knowledge and skills.
Absence of animal infection eradication programmes
Unfavourable epizootiological situation in exporting
countries due to lack of eradication programmes is making
it more difficult to find pathogen-free animal commodities to
be exported. Among the reasons belong mainly: the lost of
motivation owing to very benevolent WTO and OIE animal
commodity trade conditions, lack of suitable and feasible
eradication methods, difficulties of eradication programmes,
lack of necessary resources such as staff, money and
facilities, lack of public support, weak public animal health
services etc. The international benevolent trade policy
facilitating export of pathogens has allowed preferring the
cheapest and easiest “doing nothing” strategy against animal
Example: USA reported in OIE World Animal Health 1998, page
340: “The National Veterinary Accreditation Programme has almost 50
000 qualified veterinary practitioners who carry out official tests and
vaccinations; conduct herd and flock health programmes; and prepare
animal health certification.” The USA in the same year reported 42,825
private veterinarians and 5,783 veterinarians in laboratories, universities
and training institutions.
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again documented by: “Import risk analysis is preferable to a
zero risk approach” (Code Special Edition, 1997, art. 1.4.1.1).
This principle not requiring full quality is unknown in any
other trade commodity.
Inability to control effectively animal commodity export
represents the major gap in anti-pathogen-export filter.
Certifying veterinarians practically have no any criminal or
financial liability for false certificate. It is very difficult to
detect invisible pathogens in imported commodities and to
convince exporters when claiming this fault. Illegal export is
difficult to control when government authorities and public
services are unable to discover it.
CONCLUSION
Global consequences of two decades of officially admitting
pathogen export by WTO and OIE are irreparable. Critical
analysis of global poly-etiological pathogen spread through
legal international trade is obviously not of interest of any
international organization. Even in the OIE monographic
publication “The spread of pathogens through international
trade” (2011) is missing any word critically evaluating the
impact of WTO and OIE trade policy. Illegal export/import
of animal commodities outside of international information
system cannot be the object of anti-epizootic control. Very
few successful eradication programmes are far from being
able to compensate the huge daily flow of exported nonpathogen-free animal commodities conducing to continuous
deterioration of animal population health situation in the
world. It is obvious that the global epizootiological situation
covering full spectrum of pathogen species is getting worse
as never before.
There is an urgent need for the world to be truthfully
informed about pathogen spreading through international
trade and about its consequences for the global health and
life. The world should be alerted not to admit continuation
of actual international policy conducing to conscious manmade spread of pathogens. Continuous deterioration of
global epizootiological situation requires a review of actual
international trade policy. Firstly, it is necessary to abolish
without any delay all documents and provisions of relevant
international organizations admitting or supporting spread
of pathogens through trade and start applying fair trade
policy requiring full sanitary quality of exported animal
commodities, i.e. innocuous. Secondly, there is a need to
transfer as quickly as possible the mandate of international
epizootic control (including problems of pathogen spread
through trade) into executive system of the United Nations
Organization to be dealt at the highest decision-making level
as one of the key problems of life on Earth and survival
of humanity. Public animal health services need to be
significantly strengthened to be able to effectively control
international trade as well as epizootiological situation.
Example: “A large United Kingdom rendering company continued
and expanded its export of meat and bone meal, which may have been
contaminated with BSE, for 8 years after EU ban in 1988, to 70 countries
in the Middle and Far East.” (Hodges, 2001).
Not respecting a natural conflict of interest between
government and private services the OIE in its documents
does not distinguish this phenomenon equalling both services
and thus contributing to degradation of already weak public
services instead of strengthening them. The amount of their
legislative and administrative work significantly limits the
time left for their practical control activities. Only strong
public services are able to organize national eradication
programmes and effectively control the international trade.
Notes: Evaluation of global animal health workforce was not possible
due to missing data in OIE WAHID (e.g. in 2013 from France, the key
country dominating OIE since its foundation in 1924). The author initiated
and edited a 141-page publication “Guidelines for Strengthening of Animal
Health Services in Developing Countries”, FAO, 1991 (translated to
Spanish and French) supporting veterinary workforce development.
International organization admitting legal export of
pathogens
The OIE as inter-governmental organizations outside the
United Nations Organization played an important role before
the era of globalization. Unfortunately, in the mid-nineties
when it became dominated by major exporting countries, it
changed its programme. It became a sort of WTO servicing
agency admitting export of pathogens leading to deterioration
of the epizootiological situation in the world, i.e. in breach of
its original and only mission for which it is responsible. The
OIE, instead of consistently implementing its only duty as
“international office of epizootics for the control of infectious
animal diseases”, self-decided in May 2003, without any
official clearances by all member country governments, to
significantly expand its activities arguing that “the scope of
the OIE’s missions has evolved beyond the prevention and
control of epizootic diseases to include all animal health
issues”. Countless “other animal health issues” are not of
OIE international responsibility. They are in competence of
individual governments. Distracting global activities and
attention from the epizootic control in time of world-wide
epizootiological emergency, instead of concentrating them on
OIE main duty, is hardly acceptable. The OIE main policy
during last two decades has been to facilitate trade also at the
expense of health in importing countries. This can be once
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More information in http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/tradeinfo.htm
and http://vaclavkouba.byl.cz/orgglobalization.htm.
Received: September 2, 2014
Accepted after revisions: June 19, 2015
Corresponding author:
Václav Kouba
Czech University of Life Sciences Prague
Faculty of Tropical AgroSciences
Kamýcká 129
165 21 Prague 6
Czech Republic
e-mail: [email protected]
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