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A "Feudal Mutation"? Conceptual Tools and Historical Patterns in World History
Author(s): Stephen Morillo
Source: Journal of World History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 531-550
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A
"Feudal Mutation77?
Conceptual Tools and Historical
Patterns inWorld History
STEPHEN
MORILLO
Wabash College
as
W
in world history, a common
there a "feudal mutation"
pro
cess that affected much of the Eurasian "ethnosphere"
between
900 and 1200? R. J. Barendse
says there was, and argues
approximately
in addition
is a useful term for world historical
that "feudalism"
analy
sis. I argue, first, that "feudalism"
is not a useful term and concept
in
analyzing
Barendse
any aspect of world history,
we call
describes, whatever
and, second, that the mutation
it, did not actually happen.
"Feudalism"
Barendse
s Claims
Barendse makes
three sets of broad claims about what he variously
or "feudalism as a process": claims about
calls the "feudal mutation"
warriors
about
and horses, and about the results
peasant production,
structures. First, the feudal mutation
was an internal
for sociopolitical
transformation
caused by an upsurge in agricultural
col
productivity,
a "warhorse rev
and trade between
onization,
900 and 1200. Second,
a
new
olution" brought
class of rural warrior aristocrats, bound together
by oaths, to power across Eurasia at the expense of both peasant free
doms and central authority. The result? He claims that "The feudal
as a specific world historic
process can be perceived
juncture in which
peasant
societies
were
subjugated
by an aristocracy
of mounted
Journal ofWorld History, Vol. 14, No. 4
? 2003 by University
of Hawai'i Press
531
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war
532
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
that became more powerful
institution
than any central
and
over the peasants,
the jurisdiction
and thus
increasingly
appropriated
the land revenue." Thus,
"the feudal mutation"
consisted
of changes
in peasant production
and in warhorses
and warrior roles, the combi
nation producing
societies
economic
that had "certain common
[and
riors
characteristic
that makes
them different
by inference
sociopolitical]
from capitalist
from hunter-gatherer
societies,
bands, or, indeed, from
or
in late antiquity,
the societies
such as the Roman,
Sassanid, Harsha,
the Gupta
empires."1
Two questions
in
stand out from this summary. First, did changes
create
the
"horse
revolution"
and
the
peasant
resulting
production
of warriors over peasant
dominance
society? If so, how? This question
is particularly
the central role of steppe
pressing when one considers
in
of the areas Barendse
discusses. How did changes
motives
actions
of
affect
the
and
these
nonagrar
peasant production
ian societies? Second, what exactly was the result, and can we describe
it as "feudal societies,"
the linguistic
implicand of the "feudal muta
tion" as a process?
nomads
in many
"Feudalism"
inMedieval
Historiography
is especially
since the term is in rapid
This
last question
pressing
in medieval
decline
among
European
history,
specialists
especially
is a term that is paradoxically
because "feudalism"
military historians,2
both too vague and too precise. Though
based on the medieval
word
Latin
the
for "fief," the word "feudalism" was coined
"feudum"
by
1 R.
"The Feudal Mutation:
and Economic
of
Transformations
J. Barendse,
Military
to Thirteenth
in the Tenth
the Ethnosphere
this vol
Centuries,"
Journal ofWorld
History,
ume, (pp. 511, 518).
2 Elizabeth A. R.
"The Tyranny
of a Construct:
and Historians
of
Feudalism
Brown,
first raised the problems
with
this term;
79 (1974):
1063-1088,
Europe," AHR
is still vital. Constance
her critique
Bouchard,
Strong of Body, Brave and Noble: Chivalry and
summarizes
France (Ithaca: Cornell
Press, 1998), pp. 35-38,
University
Society inMedieval
of significant
the historiography
of the term nicely and re-urges its abandonment.
Examples
works of medieval
that manage
the term include Frank Bar
history
perfectly well without
"feudal monarch," William
low's biography
of an erstwhile
Rufus (London: Methuen,
1983),
Medieval
The Leper King and His Heirs: Baldwin IV and theCrusader Kingdom
and Bernard Hamilton's
Press, 2000). John France's
survey of west
University
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
of Jerusalem
some form of the term only three
1000 and 1300 mentions
ern European warfare between
times. Two of these imply the term's growing obsolescence:
"This military-tenurial
system,
the best soldiers of the age" and "the bonds that tied
which we often call 'feudal,' provided
third discusses
"feudal
these mouvances
together were what we call feudal oaths." The
adjustments,"
rior aristocrats.
N.Y.:
Cornell
in minor ways the landholdings
and ties of war
that affected
is, warfare
in theAge of theCrusades,
1000-1300
(Ithaca,
John France, Western Warfare
Press, 1999), pp. 7, 47, 56.
University
that
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
533
the sys
reformers in the eighteenth
century to describe
(unfavorably)
tem of rights and privileges
the
French
espe
aristocracy,
enjoyed by
tenants. This
and their peasant
regard to landholding
cially with
was taken up and extended
broad socioeconomic
meaning
by Marxist
the
for
whom
the
"feudal
mode
of
succeeded
historians,
production"
classical mode and preceded
the capitalist mode.3 For military histori
for if a privileged
ans, this has always been far too broad a definition,
constitutes
then
class and a subject peasantry
feudalism,
landholding
most civilizations
before the industrial revolution were feudal and the
term loses any real analytic usefulness.
taken a more
historians
have usually
restricted view of
Military
a lord
feudalism. For them, it is the system of raising troops in which
a
a
a
vassal (Latin vassus) in
grants
piece of land?to
fief?typically
return for a defined
term of military
service.4 But these conceptions
of
as they always contained
a specious
tended to be misleading,
In the period 900-1100,
precision.
"feudum" and "vassus" were vague
to the four
and mutable
terms, while military
systems from the ninth
teenth centuries were far more varied, flexible, and rational than con
"feudalism" has long
have allowed.5
Since
ventional
interpretations
since became
shorthand
for these conventional
the
interpretations,
sense is as misleading
as in its broad
term in its restricted military
feudalism
Marxist
sense.
we then define feudalism more generally
as a landed sup
are several problems
service? There
port system for unpaid military
with this. First, in western Europe
individuals
and groups also served
economic
it pos
for pay from an early date, wherever
conditions made
service.
service
sible and even when
owed
"feudal"
Paid
became
they
common
in the period after 1050. Second,
in a global
increasingly
context
there have been many
forms of "soldiers' lands" in different
Should
3 See the references
notes
1-8. A good example
cited by Barendse,
of this use of "feu
to Capitalism
is Robert
in Early Modern
S. Duplessis,
Transitions
Europe
(Cambridge:
"feudal" describes
the rights to income exaction
Press, 1997), where
Cambridge
University
over tenants:
that landlords exercised
"most [lordly estates] had feudal (seignorial)
rights
as well"
attached
(p. 15).
4 This
is the "military-tenurial
system" referred to by John France; see note 2. Barendse
in order to show that it doesn't work. My
this definition
(Barendse,
p. 506)
appropriates
point exactly, and one reason the term is now out of favor.
5 See
Susan Reynolds,
Evidence Reinterpreted
especially
Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval
of this
Press,
(Oxford: Oxford
University
1994). For a case study and further discussion
see Stephen Morillo, Warfare
under theAnglo-Norman
(Wood
problem,
Kings,
1066-1135
In that study I used the term "feudalism"
in a restricted
and care
bridge: Boydell,
1994).
dal"
fully defined
caused more
way, but have since decided
confusion
than it was worth
that even this carefully
in terms of convenience.
circumscribed
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usage has
534
OF WORLD
JOURNAL
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
in combination
times and places,
with paid service and not. To call all
feudal is to arrive at a uselessly broad definition
again. To try and
as
some
feudal
has
involved
the
of
distinguish
inevitably
privileging
the European model,
for no reason than that it was studied first. Many
medieval
historians
have therefore decided
that the term is
military
to
best
be
functional
of the
avoided,
probably
replaced by
descriptions
these
world's
(and Europe's) varied military
tia service, and the social hierarchies
systems of landed support, mili
that accompanied
them.6
Given
this historiography,
will Barendse's
definition
clear up the
that every other definition
confusion
has simply added to? Such defi
nitions
include Marc Bloch's,
Barendse
upon which
depends most,
even though he never explains why this definition
is
among many
correct. But even his reliance on Bloch
is qualified,
for he is
it significantly.
The sec
forced in the course of his analysis to modify
is "wide
features" of European
feudalism
ond of Bloch's "fundamental
use
a salary,
tenement
service
of
the
the
instead
of
(i.e.,
fief)
spread
which was out of the question."7
Yet Barendse must claim that "The
act of entrusting
oneself was thus critical to feudalism
rather than the
on funda
enfeoffment
of land per se,"8 indicating
that agreement
most
mental
features
of anything
called
"feudalism"
is well
nigh
impossible.
6
of Europe have of course come to a different
In the more
conclusion.
Legal historians
of the twelfth century and later, the informal arrangements
settled European
conditions
o?
an earlier age tended to crystallize
terms of ser
into formal legal arrangements
with defined
vice and defined
inheritance
the emer
rights on the part of the vassal. This process marked
in the narrow meaning
of "fief holding"
gence of feudalism
(Bouchard,
Strong of Body, p.
cru
tie of landholding
became
36) as a fundamental
legal system. Indeed, the lord-vassal
it resembled)
aris
cial as one of two key bonds
which
(with marriage,
among the European
the basis of most
later Eng
tocracy. The twelfth century English
system o? fief law became
lish estate law and thence of modern American
law. See S.EC. Milsom,
The Legal
property
Framework
Press,
1976) and the
of English Feudalism
University
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
review by Robert C. Palmer, "The Feudal Framework
of English Law," Michigan
Law Review
in England,"
"The Origins
also Palmer's
of Property
Law and His
79 (1981):
1130-1155;
on the developments
1-50; and more recently
tory Review 3 (1985):
(with greater emphasis
in the Anglo-Norman
in Anglo-Norman
Land, Law, and Lordship
John Hudson,
period),
law has a defi
"feudal" property
Press,
(Oxford: Oxford University
1994). Thus,
England
is to read this very European
nite history. The mistake
legal history back into the military
the rest of the world.
sphere of Europe or, even more,
7 Marc
of Chicago
Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon
Bloch,
University
(Chicago:
II, p. 446. Bouchard,
Press, 1961),
Strong of Body (p. 39), points out that "it is now clear
'first [feudal] age,' was not in any defin
that the period before the eleventh
century, Bloch's
able sense 'feudal.'"
8
Barendse,
p. 515. Cf. France, Western Warfare,
p. 56: "But the oath in itself did lit
was who had real power
in a relationship."
And
cf. Hamilton,
mattered
tle?what
Leper
on bundles
of rights, that many
of the
King, p. 46, who notes, pace Barendse's
emphasis
tenures under Baldwin
conferred no juris
holders of military
fiefs, which
"only held money
diction."
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
535
construction
itself suf
Dr. Barendse's
of the concept
Furthermore,
flaws. First, it leads us right back
theoretical
fers from two significant
to nineteenth
with Europe as the model
for
century historiography,
started with
analyzing the rest of the world. The very problem Barendse
in Europe
is "a case of mistaken
what feudalism
identity" concerning
was.9 In other words, getting European
feudalism right allows us to see
more broadly. The result is shoehorning:
the "feudal mutation"
fitting
into a preexisting
of other societies
model
derived from
the evidence
argument, we should first
European history. To paraphrase Barendse's
in Europe. Then, we should see if it happened
look at what happened
are broad enough and our comparisons
in India. And
if our definitions
are loose enough,
so as to take account
of the variations
that will
as
an
a
we
to
in
exist
"real"
"ideal"
find
that
type,
inevitably
opposed
in India, too. This,
I would
the same "feudal mutation"
happened
are about.10
forms of Eurocentrism
argue, is what the most damaging
The second is that, despite his attempt to distance himself from the
con
of the Marxist
of feudalism, Barendse's
teleology
historiography
notion
Marxist
of
"feudalization"
of
the
of
cept
partakes heavily
not just over "feu
"modes of production,"
which promotes
confusion
it leads
itsMarxist
dalism" but over explaining
sequel. In other words,
to the question
"If there was no feudalism, how do we explain the rise
of capitalism?"11
is twofold. First,
The problem with the formulation
of this question
not capitalism
it asks for an explanation
it
is
of the wrong
for
thing,
across
in
in
various
has
societies
existed
forms
different
(which
many
both the traditional
the
modern
but
indus
and, obviously,
worlds12)
trialization
has
that
needs
this
Second?and
(which
not)
explaining.
in the term "feudalism"?it
in
is the problem
embedded
asks,
effect,
or industrialism)
arose
how an economic
system (whether capitalism
a
center
is
from a political
if
for
there
of
around
which
system,
gravity
9
Barendse,
10 I outline
p. 503.
an alternative
method
and explore
the historiographical
with
problems
in S. Morillo,
further
"Guns and Government:
A Comparative
terminology
Study
6 (1995):
of Europe and Japan," Journal ofWorld History
75-106.
11 This was
to me forcefully when Barendse
our papers
and I delivered
brought home
in a session of the World
in Boston
in June 2000. One
conference
of
History Association
the first questions
I received was this very question.
12 For
in Janet Abu-Lughod,
the evidence
the traditional world see, for example,
Before
The World
(Oxford: Oxford University
Press,
European Hegemony.
System A.D. 1250-1350
in the context
overview
of world-systems
1989). For a general
theory, see Christopher
feudal
and Thomas
Chase-Dunn
Westview
Press, 1997).
D. Hall,
Rise
and Demise:
Comparing
World
Systems
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(Boulder:
JOURNAL
536
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
the non-Marxist
of medieval
feudalism
conceptions
European
it is that feudalism was a set of political
and military
arrange
that tied together the warrior aristocracy
and their dependants.
It was, in other words, a political
system separate from the economic
all
orbit,
ments
that supported
systems (usually but certainly not always manorialism)
it.13 Clearly,
the political,
and social spheres are linked in
economic,
even if linked.
in all societies,
but they are distinct
important ways
term
it
contains
the
if
elements
of the
"feudalism,"
Using
especially
"modes
of production"
idea complex,
clear analysis.14
elides
the distinctions
in ways
that hinder
"Feudalism": Conclusion
is a useful term
of whether
"feudalism"
Thus,
regarding the question
in analyzing world history, I remain inclined to reject it on
and concept
and theoretical
linguistic,
historiographical,
grounds alone. Neither
the term nor the concept help Barendse's
analysis, because he has to
so
own
time
much
his
definition
of it afloat in the his
spend
keeping
it as a "real" rather
whitewater
(including
defending
toriographical
than an "ideal" type)
he wants to describe.
Horses,
Warriors,
that he can't
and
focus fully on the historical
process
Peasants
a transformation
What
about that process? In order to assess whether
we
as
must
took
such
Barendse describes
actually
place,
analyze three
of warrior elites
the relationship
warhorse
revolution,
major topics?a
to their states and societies,
and peasant
the
production?across
states
centuries.
and
nomadic
several
powers through
major sedentary
an article of this length can only sketch the outlines
of
Obviously,
such a survey. Still,
to be untenable.
a survey even
at this level shows Barendse's
claims
13
economic
that supported
the
for example
the nonmanorial
Note,
arrangements
warrior elite of the Crusader
of Jerusalem: Hamilton,
Leper King, p. 51-54.
Kingdom
14
is that there are many ways to explain
the
the answer to this question
Ultimately,
to Capitalism,
rise of industry or industrial capitalism
Transitions
and, for an
(see Duplessis,
world-historical
The Great Divergence:
Pomeranz,
comparative
analysis, Kenneth
[Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton
of the Modern World
Economy
Europe, and theMaking
nor are
Press, 2000]), but that isn't the project of this article (nor of Barendse's),
University
the topics even closely connected.
excellent
China,
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Morillo:
Conceptual
A Warhorse
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
537
Revolution?
in the period
is no real evidence
revolution
for a warhorse
or
of horses themselves
either in terms of the capabilities
900-1200,
in terms of tactics.
did not produce
Selective
bigger horses across Eurasia.
breeding
have
been bred in part for size,
Northwestern
destriers
may
European
Fine Spanish
horses were
but even there size varied considerably.15
There
of the Crusades
cousins, and the evidence
also remained
and
faster
than Cru
lighter
in the Palestinian
cli
sader steeds that furthermore
did not prosper
mate.16 Above
of
nomads
remained
smaller
than
the
horses
all,
steppe
as references
to Mongol
those of sedentary warriors,
"ponies" in the
show.17
thirteenth
century
Nor did medieval
horses have genetically
better combat capabili
or modern
ties than ancient
horses: only training and conditioning
as Barendse
over the first few years of a horse's
life (not "decades,"
lighter than their northern
is that near-eastern
horses
to claim, as the useful span of a warhorse's
life is less than a
to
can
inure
horses
the
and
sounds
of
the battlefield,
decade)
sights
on a
to impale themselves
and medieval
horses were just as unwilling
seems
solid line of spears as any other horses ever were.18 To claim that they
were misunderstands
tactics. The heavy
of medieval
the dynamics
was
a
to intimidate
that
had
the
weapon
cavalry charge
psychological
15 R.H.C.
of the Normans,"
"The Warhorses
Studies 10 (1987):
Davis,
Anglo-Norman
selective
could affect the quality of war
80, who also points out that minimal
breeding
of selection were not necessary.
horses very rapidly (pp. 71-73)?centuries
See also Ann
to theCrusades
Penn.: Com
The Medieval Warhorse
(Conshokoken,
Hyland,
from Byzantium
bined Books,
destriers were of a
and, for example,
p. 146: "early medieval
1994), passim,
size."
very moderate
16 R. C.
Smail, Crusading Warfare
1097-1193
Press,
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University
1956), p. 77?
17
David Morgan,
The Mongols
pp. 125-139;
Hyland, Medieval Warhorse,
(Cambridge:
Blackwell
Publishers,
1990).
18
and the Somme (Lon
John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo
to understanding
is fundamental
don: Penguin,
the dynamics
o?
1976), pp. 154-160,
in Napoleonic
warfare
study shows that horses
infantry versus cavalry combat. Keegan's
I were
of withstanding
noise
and in World War
and terror as medieval
just as capable
must have been more noisy
ones.
battlefields
than medieval
horses?indeed,
gunpowder
See also Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern Europe,
(London: Rout
1495-1715
to early modern war
outlined
the principles
ledge, 1992), pp. 30-31,
by Keegan
extending
fare. And
the history of Alexander
the Great's
that the basic capa
cavalry tactics proves
since classical
times: Robin
bilities of heavy
Lane Fox, Alexander
the
cavalry had existed
in
Barendse's
claim (p. 514), Carroll Gillmor,
1974), pp. 72-80. Regarding
at the International
at Kalamazoo
in
Medieval
paper delivered
Congress
was about 3 to 10 or
out that the usual age range o? active warhorses
pointed
Great
(London,
an unpublished
May
12.
2002,
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538
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
in other
ranks to succeed.19 Success,
opposing
infantry into breaking
on the quality of the opposing
words, depended
infantry and cavalry
as horses
in the latter case), as a steady mass of
(men as crucially
to hold off shock cavalry, and continued
been
able
had
infantry
always
to be able to do so in this period.20 As a result, almost all medieval
armies outside purely steppe forces contained
significant
infantry com
rare for unsupported
and it was in fact extremely
ponents,
heavy cav
to
to
be
able
defeat
alry
infantry. European-style
heavy cavalry were,
both a tactical anomaly21
and far less numerous
than
furthermore,
most
for
forces
from
the
elsewhere,22
forces,
cavalry
cavalry
especially
more
contained
horse
archers
than
shock
tradition,
steppe
cavalry.
on the size of horses for its effec
Horse archery was neither dependent
tiveness nor was it newly effective
after 900; it had been and contin
to be effective
in the right circum
armies
against
sedentary
ued
stances.23
Thus,
Steppe
there was no pattern of rising cavalry dominance
militarily.
for a millenium
had been formidable
already. Their
nomads
around
cyclical pattern of activity may have waxed
not
had
fundamental
Elsewhere,
capabilities
changed.
1000,
good
but
their
infantry
19 For
an extended
see Morillo,
of this problem
under the Anglo analysis
Warfare
in tenth-century
the tactics described
Byzantine
Kings, pp. 150?162;
military man
uals support this analysis,
and not breaking
ranks for the infantry and a
stressing steadiness
slow, controlled
against enemy heavy
approach
infantry, during which
by the kataphraktoi
the cavalry "must not be afraid": Eric McGeer,
Sewing theDragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare
Norman
in the Tenth Century
D.C.: Dumbarton
Oaks,
103, and
(Washington,
1995), pp. 104-105,
a battle of wills between
passim; a cavalry charge was in essence
cavalry and infantry that
genetic horse quality had little effect on, though
training of horses and men did matter.
20 See
on the effec
under theAnglo-Norman
Morillo, Warfare
Kings, pp. 156, 169-174,
in
tiveness
of Anglo-Norman
the frequent
of knights
infantry,
including
dismounting
in
battles. Examples
of successful medieval
infantry stands, as at Legnano
Anglo-Norman
assume
1176, could be multiplied
Byzantine military manuals
endlessly; while
tenth-century
a central
role for infantry that can resist cavalry charges
and explain
(McGeer,
Sewing the
in both Byzantine
and Arab
See Smail, Crusading Warfare,
pp.
practice.
Dragon's Teeth)
on the crucial role of infantry in Crusader
armies against horse archers.
202-203,
21 Their
to Byzantines
and Muslims
alike: Anna
Com
charges caused astonishment
trans. E.R.A.
Sewter
nena, Alexiad,
(London: Penguin
Books,
1969), p. 416, says famously
"A mounted
is irresistible;
Kelt
numerous
ways
she also details
which
had
where),
22 The western
to succeed
he would bore his way through
the walls of Babylon."
But
such charges
and else
of stopping
415-416,
(pp. 164-165,
at first go or not at all.
climate
could support only limited numbers
and geography
European
to the steppes of Asia: Davis,
The
"Warhorses,"
p. 75; Mark Whittow,
compared
of California
Press, 1996), pp. 19-25.
600-1025
(Berkeley: University
of Byzantium,
Making
23
horsemen
the battle of Carrhae
Note,
just as an example,
(53 b.c.) where Parthian
an army of Roman
and annihilated
surrounded
legions: R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy,
of horses
The
Enclyclopedia
and Row,
Harper
of Military
1986), p.
History
117.
from 3500
B.C.
to the Present,
2nd edition
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(New York:
Morillo:
and Historical
Tools
Conceptual
Patterns
inWorld
to be able to hold its own against good
continued
of combat and the capabilities
damental mechanics
what
they had been and would continue
essentially
more.
There
was
no
"horse
revolution"
between
History
539
cavalry, as the fun
of horses remained
to be for centuries
and
900
1200.
to a newly prominent
warrior aris
from a horse revolution
Arguing
the distinct military
and social roles of
conflates
tocracy, furthermore,
act as cavalry, for
did not necessarily
horsemen:
knights
European
was
dominance
and
their
socially based, not vice
military
example,
between
social and mili
versa.24 And only by eliding the distinction
as
can
the equivalent
be
treated
nomadic
roles
conquerors
tary
steppe
a "horse
to
who
ride
horses.
of a home-grown
Thus,
aristocracy
happen
a
slides
toward
revolution"
determinist
argument
simple technological
with horses as the technol
social phenomenon,
of a complex
an
of
"feudalism"
has
been tried before in Euro
Such
ogy.
explanation
a
narrower
on the stirrup, and
with
focus
medieval
pean
history,
on a global scale.
failed.25 It is even more problematic
account
Warriors,
States, and Societies
a nonexistent
also explains
argument
technological
phenome
was
no
across Eurasia
rise
warrior
aristocracies
of
for
there
non,
general
between
900 and 1200, as a survey of warrior roles and whether
they
changed during this period will show. For the purposes of this survey,
can be thought of as elites acting
I will distinguish
the "state," which
institutions
formal
of
includes
power, from "society," which
through
elites as social groups acting outside
of formal institu
the confines
across
tions.26 The relationship
of state to society varied significantly
The
"warriors" from "soldiers."
Eurasia in this period. Iwill also distinguish
The former are fighting men who are part of a social elite, whose pro
to their social prestige.
fession of arms either creates or contributes
24 See note 20.
25
and Social Change
Medieval
(Oxford: Oxford
Technology
Lynn White,
University
a theory of the origins of feudalism
based on the intro
1, popularized
Press, 1962), chapter
duction
of the stirrup; see Kelly DeVries,
Medieval
N.Y.:
(Lewiston
Military
Technology
Broadview
of the "stirrup thesis,"
Press,
1992) for a good summary of the historiography
See also Morillo,
toward its dismissal.
under the Anglo-Norman
tending
Kings, pp.
Warfare
in DeVries
noted
that the stirrup was widely
150-162. The general consensus
long
adopted
to a vaguer "horse revolution"
before 900 forces recourse
for a technological
determinist
of feudalism.
explanation
26 I
caveats
fully accept Barendse's
states anywhere were not modern
states.
tion of some of them;
such states.
indeed,
itmakes
the definition
regarding
But this does not make
a clear,
more problematic
of
the
"feudal"
"state": medieval
a useful descrip
functional
description
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of
540
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2003
are fighting men who are not socially elite and do not
prestige from bearing arms, such as conscript
infantry.27
in 900. As
By global standards, western Europe was underorganized
a result, social structures tended to determine
arrangements.
political
warrior
A
elite already dominated
the
this society;
tiny mounted
a
aristoc
of
of
the
castle
this
reorganization
private
spread
prompted
in local castles and estates.28
racy toward patrilineal
lineages based
The
latter
derive
of kinship and lordship held this class together
relationships
state structures
blocks of the rudimentary
formed the building
as
to
build
after
the
leaders
1000,
economy
began
regional
expanded
came to occupy
invasions
ended. Warriors
therefore
and external
more of the power structure, at the expense of the Church,
partly by a
in
investi
the
exclusive
self-definition
embodied
of
process
mutually
came
ture controversy.
to
values
and
dominate
this
prestige
Military
on
as
on
their
showed
themselves
conquerors
coinage
society: kings
Informal
and
and the Church
horseback,
justified its claims to power with a "two
that in a sense they'd already
swords" theory of legitimacy,
indicating
Note
also
that
the high points of Church
lost the symbolic
struggle.
a
from
of
derived
the Cru
venture,
prestige
military
papal leadership
even
more
became
the aristocracy,
sades. Underneath
society
widely
than it had before 900. Urban
militarized
troops, drawn from largely
formed the third part, with cas
and communes,
self-organized militias
an
of
tles and knights,
system that proved
emerging
sociomilitary
and
contentious,
expansive,
subject only with
externally
internally
to
In
central
control.29
the
transformation
short,
large-scale
difficulty
1100
was
in
social
character
and
and
of western Europe between
950
saw a significant
rise in warrior prestige and dominance.
27 The
in which
I survey various
the fact that western
order
societies?especially
no particular
is not the model
for other
Europe
significance.
Europe comes first?carries
areas.
28 Robert
and Cultural Change
Colonization
Bartlett, The Making
of Europe. Conquest,
Press, 1993), p. 66; C. Warren
Hollister,
(Princeton,
950-1300
N.J.: Princeton
University
in Chinese
and Fall of the Middle
"The Decline
History"
Ages: Reperiodizing
European
Lun Lecture Series, ed. Amy K. Y. Leung
Bulletin Supplement, Wei
(Hong Kong:
University
of Hong Kong,
Duby, The Chivalrous
1996), p. 34. See also Georges
of California
Postan
Press, 1979), pp. 59-80,
(Berkeley: University
134-157;
Bouchard,
Strong of Body, p. 39.
29 Cf.
sometimes
does not suffi
who, however,
Bartlett, Making
of Europe, pp. 60-84,
as cavalry. On
as a social and military
elite and knights
between
ciently distinguish
knights
and Samurai: Military
this terminological
"Milites, Knights
point, cf. Morillo,
Terminology,
at War: Essays
in
in The Normans
of Translation,"
and the Problem
History,
Comparative
The Chinese
University
Society, trans. Cynthia
Honor
dell,
ofC. Warren Hollister,
2001), pp. 167-184.
eds. Richard
Abels
and Bernard
Bachrach
(Woodbridge:
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Boy
Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
541
institu
In Byzantium,
the stronger survival of Roman
by contrast,
state shaped soci
that a centrally organized
tional frameworks meant
and pres
ety rather than the other way around: Court appointments
a
of
of
focused
the
circulation
with
tige, along
cycle
gold coinage,
of
all
of
and
ambitions
types, including
loyalties
Byzantine
provincials
into the Byzantine
the soldiers recruited
army, on the state.30 Two
this structure, the civil aristocracy of the capital and
groups dominated
the military
of the provinces;
their interests were held
aristocracy
invasions
of
Arab
until 900. But the
the
external
pressure
together by
ten
end of that threat and subsequent Byzantine
introduced
expansion
sions that were only resolved in the civil wars at the beginning
of Basil
IPs independent
rule in the 990s. Despite his martial
Basil
reputation,
in favor of the civil aristocracy. The mili
actually settled this tension
both the
tary families lost power and influence thereafter. Meanwhile,
demands
of offensive warfare after 900 and the dynamics
of internal
units the aristocracy
that the indigenous Byzantine
led
politics meant
were
increasingly
replaced after 900 by foreign mercenaries?partly
heavy cavalry but even more heavy infantry such as Basil IPsVarangian
more politically
were (theoretically)
Guard?who
loyal to the emper
ors who hired them.31 Military
values were therefore
steadily parti
tioned off from society, and society
itself was widely demilitarized.32
The
transformation
of Byzantium
between
900 and 1050, therefore,
was a political one that reduced both the role and prestige of warriors.
a military
led the revival of Byzantium
Though
family, the Komnenoi,
after the disasters of 1071-1081,
their rule remained
state-centered,
their military
from
and
separate
largely foreign
society.33 There was no
revival of the role or prestige of a native warrior aristocracy after 1081.
state and society appears in the
Yet a third relationship
between
Islamic world: radical separation. Born of sudden conquest,
the Umay
its
armies
in
enclaves.
conqueror
yad caliphate
garrisoned
Though
consciously
separated from the old elites of the areas they conquered,
to the lower strata of the
the Arab tribes gradually became connected
societies
that often led to conversion
of
conquered
through patronage
the clients. The unity, cultural identity, and even religious doctrine of
this
scattered
ruling
army of tribal, nomadic
Arabs
emerged
from a
30
Whittow,
pp. 104-134.
Making
of Byzantium,
31
Whittow,
pp. 310-390.
Making
of Byzantium,
32
Lands, and the Status of Soldiers: Current
John Haldon,
"Military Service, Military
Problems
and Interpretations,"
Dumbarton
Oaks Papers 47 (1992): 66.
33 Paul
1Komnenos,
The Empire of Manuel
Cam
1143-1180
Magdalino,
(Cambridge:
Press, 1993).
bridge University
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542
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
that is, in effect, a dialogue with
process of definition
by distinction;
their surroundings whose
"we are not
starting point was the assertion
or
are
"we
and
wanderers
from the
Persian)"
(or
Jewish,
Byzantine
in the emergent
desert." This
attitude
became
enshrined
religion
the influence
of the ulema, the urban-based
through
scholar-priests
who increasingly
acted as the arbiters of Muslim
history and doctrine.
of imperial states that
The result was a deep distrust of the mechanisms
down the Umayyad
The new Abbasid
caliphate.
to
seize
control
of
Islam
from
the
ulema, but lost.
caliphate
attempted
on
meant
Persian
based
the
loss
that the
models,
government
Having
a
Abbasid
suffered
from
critical
lack
of
within
the
caliphate
legitimacy
most
it
ruled.
The
swift
and
immediate
and
the
very society
result,
key
eventually
brought
transformation
of Islam after 900: the appearance
of slave soldiers at
As
the heart of the Abbasid
both
slaves
and
(almost always) for
polity.
armies were doubly
Turkish
servile
steppe nomads),
eigners (especially
outside the structures of mainstream
Islamic society. Slave armies gave
to the Abbasid
the appearance
and function
of a conquest
caliphate
as
state: an occupier
native
well
be
(who though
sepa
foreign)
might
rate from the society
use of slave soldiers,
it ruled. The taint of illegitimacy,
the consequent
nature of Islamic state-society
and the conquest
to be central features of the various pieces of the
relations continued
and of almost every Islamic polity
Abbasid
caliphate after it fragmented
in the traditional world.34 Military
values and prestige
lost out to the
vision of Islam; warriors,
either slaves or tribal ghazis,
uiema-created
were marginalized;
and society was almost completely
demilitarized.
in that a powerful state dominated
China
and
resembled Byzantium
The Tang dynasty, under the leadership of
shaped social arrangements.
a strong,
an
and
elite
strong emperors
aristocracy,
military
operated
state staffed by a trained Confucian
But the
centralized
bureaucracy.
wars
in
civil
the
that
the
self-destructed
aristocracy
brought
military
an
to
in
them
Nomadic
the
end
around
900.
conquerors
Tang
replaced
new
in
rulers
civilian
the south, the
north;
Song
adopted aggressively
to curb any resurgence of independent
lead
military
policies designed
ers. The result was a total eclipse of warrior prestige as Song emperors
designed
tiveness.
forces built
armed
Confucian-inspired
34 Patricia
for political
reliability more than for effec
antimilitarist?values
civilian?indeed,
Slaves on Horses:
The Evolution of the Islamic Polity (Cambridge: Cam
in Kurt Raaflaub
"The Early Islamic World,"
and
1980); Crone,
and Medieval Worlds,
eds., War and Society in theAncient
pp. 309-332,
of state and society and the nonfeudal
for separation
("lord and vas
pp. 326-327
especially
sal") nature of the settlement.
Crone,
bridge University
Nathan
Rosenstein,
Press,
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
543
on horseback,
Chi
if European
rulers showed themselves
triumphed:
nese emperors heeded
the old saying that you can conquer a kingdom
on horseback,
them
but you can't rule it from there, and so presented
as
at
in
warrior
the
the
decline
selves
scholars. Reinforcing
prestige
to
a
recruitment
of
the
under
shift from conscription
top,
long
Tang
term professionals
drawn from the dregs of society under the Song
further into disrepute even if society was
pushed the military profession
not
demilitarized.35
completely
a close congruence
of Indian
had produced
Long development
a
a
in
states.
class and
had
Warriors
society and
relatively high place
caste system that was becoming
But warfare
elaborated.
increasingly
was characterized
than conquest,
and
for prestige more
by contests
or combi
conquests
large-scale political
shifting alliances made many
the impact of war on society and
rest of society.36 Muslim
raids,
a new ele
after 900, introduced
one.37 Mil
socially revolutionary
shift from Arab lancers to nomadic horse archers did
itarily, the Muslim
is this shift that some scholars
make the raiders far more effective?it
it depended
in Indian military history38?but
call a "horse revolution"
on new tactics, not new horses, and most crucially had little effect on
nations
limited both
unstable, which
to the
the spread of warrior values
in scale and effectiveness
increasing
ment
into this world, but it was not a
come under for
Hindu
arrangements.
kingdoms might
sociomilitary
nor
in prestige or
warriors
neither
but
Hindu
lost
rule,
eign
gained
as a general result of Muslim
war
social position
raids, while Muslim
remained outside the Indian social
raiders or conquerors,
riors, whether
It is possible, however,
that the failure of the
system in this period.
to an
native warrior class to deal effectively with the raids contributed
so
from
of
Indian
values
and
religious
increasing distancing
politics
from
warrior
activity.
35 The
Arthur Wright
Cambridge History of China, vol. 3 :Sui and T'ang China 589-906,
is a good gen
and Denis Twitchett,
eds. (Cambridge:
Press, 1979),
University
Cambridge
on Chinese
eral survey of these two dynasties with a great deal of specific information
mil
see also E. G. Pulleyblank,
to the Rebel
and their evolution;
The Background
itary institutions
lion of An Lu-shan
Press, 1955); John Haeger,
(London: Oxford University
ed., Crisis and
in Sung China
of Arizona
Press, 1975).
(Tucson: University
Prosperity
36
A New History of India, 5th edition
(Oxford,
Stanley Wolpert,
1997). The divergent
are
Indian and medieval
of state formation
processes
European
paths taken by precolonial
in the papers of the first section of Martin
Doornbos
and Sudipta Kaviraj,
eds.,
explored
(London: Sage Press, 1998).
Dymanics
Europe and India Compared
of State Formation:
37 Peter
Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History
(Cambridge,
1999).
38
in India c. 1000-1850"
in Jeremy Black, ed.,
"Warhorse
and Warfare
Jos Gommans,
War
in the Early Modern
World
1450-1815
(Boulder: Westview
Press,
1999),
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pp.
109-112.
544
JOURNAL
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
To borrow a Buddhist phrase, state and society evolved
in Japan in
a state of dependent
each affecting
the other. After
co-origination,
1150, warriors asserted an increasing role in society, state, and culture.
it is this late date that leads to Barendse's
odd avoidance
of
Perhaps
the rich comparative
literature on Japanese feudalism,
for it was only
in Japanese civilization
the end of his period that the elements
to develop.
I have
have
called
feudal began
analyzed
in detail elsewhere; my basic conclusion
comparisons
Japan-Europe
is that it has been a damaging
in Japanese history
about "feudalism"
construct
of shoehorning.39
because
Briefly for this survey, warriors
from
that
others
and military
val
gained in authority at the expense of civil aristocrats,
ues became
to
central
this
civilization,
increasingly
though legitimacy
to derive from the nonmilitary
continued
figure of the emperor. At
a wide gulf separated warriors and the
least until after 1477, however,
was the near exclusive
rest of society. Warfare
preserve of a particular
"warrior class" and though
class: bushi means
the
they rode horses,
tactics of the bushi were even more flexible
than those of European
soldiers, meant not
knights. Similarly, ashigaru, the word for non-bushi
not
but
"lower-class
Thus
tactics, marked
class,
"infantry"
fighter."
a
as
reminder
elsewhere
that
serving
Japanese military
terminology,
"horse revolutions"
(even if they existed) and warrior social roles need
not be linked.40
this survey shows is that there is no discernable
What
pattern that
a "feudal mutation."
is no general
characterize
There
could possibly
rise in warrior prestige?indeed,
of warriors and their
the separation
do not
values from society seems to be a more general trend. Warriors
a
or
states
in
in
societies
role
1050 (or 1200)
greater
consistently
play
than they did in 900. Nor
or
societies
no pattern
in response
is there any consistent
to warrior
roles
or
restructuring
actions?certainly
of states
there
is
of decentralization.41
39
is when
A good example
of shoehorning
"Guns and Government."
Morillo,
J. R.
more
more
feudalism
had to be more
structured,
Strayer wrote,
impersonal,
"Japanese
from the mid
than European
feudalism. At least it had to have these qualities
bureaucratic
of huge armies and large numbers
of
dle of the sixteenth
century, when we have evidence
retainers under a single lord." J. R. Strayer,
"The Tokugawa
Period and Japanese Feudal
and Marius
ism," in John W Hall
Jensen, eds., Studies in the Institutional History
of Early
in "Guns
Modern
Press, 1968), p. 6. As I noted
N.J.: Princeton
Japan (Princeton,
University
is hardly worth
the conceptual
"bureaucratic
feudalism"
and Government,"
effort, and
to the bankruptcy
in Japan?
"Feudalism
of the term. See also John Whitney
Hall,
points
Studies in Society and History
A Reassessment,"
5 (1962).
Comparative
40
and Samurai."
Morillo,
"Mi?ites, Knights
41 There were of course broad similarities
in the social and political
of
organizations
to all
extends
this is an important
these societies.
But?and
similarity
qualification?this
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
545
of horse
and negative,
There
is, perhaps, greater impact, positive
in this period, but in almost every case,
warriors on a range of societies
mercenaries
and allies to Islamic slave
and Chinese
from Byzantine
are
involved
the warriors
soldiers and raiders of Hindu
kingdoms,
no
or
to
connection
the
social
little
nomads
with
steppe
they
peoples
in Barendse's argument between
confusion
impacted. The fundamental
an
in the evolution
factor
of these soci
external
nomadic
horsemen,
to
warrior
who
ride
classes
and
eties,
horses, an
sedentary
happened
is
the
fact
that
the
internal factor,
only two
by
vividly highlighted
in which warrior prestige rose in this period (and the only two
societies
as "feudal"), western
drawn attention
that have consistently
Europe
were
two
least affected by nomadic
contact.42
the
and Japan,
Warriors,
Peasants,
and Economics
are an even larger topic than warrior roles,
transformations
even
less space to consider
them here. But as with warrior
and there is
even
a
any picture of a consistent
survey undermines
roles,
telegraphic
"mutation" between
Eurasian socioeconomic
900 and 1200.
Economic
I doubt whether
of the organi
To begin with,
any transformation
zation or productivity
of agricultural
could have effected a
production
as significant
as Barendse portrays, a point illustrated by the
mutation
over time on a log
in
which
1,
Figure
plots human population
graph
scale so as to equalize scales of change.43
arithmic
As every society in this period lies along the relatively flat section
increases of the agricultural
and
of the graph between
the dramatic
I take that to mean
in "modes of
that variations
industrial revolutions,
see Patricia Crone,
societies:
Pre-Industrial
Societies (Oxford: Blackwell,
1989).
preindustrial
in this period,
is the problem with Barendse's
This
emphasis on oaths among horse warriors
as well as with notions
do not distinguish
of honor
and so forth: these characteristics
the
from any earlier or later period. They are well-nigh
universal
among war
period 900-1200
rior societies. Achilles
into fighting
would
oaths binding men
groups;
recognize
certainly
is nothing
in Dr. Barendse's
of the
he lived and died by notions
of honor. There
description
in ear
societies of the "feudal mutation"
that would distinguish
them from similar societies
in terms of the role and status of warriors.
lier or later periods,
especially
42 On
see Thomas
the roles and impact of nomads
D. Hall,
"Civilizational
generally,
Review 24 (1991): 34-57; Thomas
The Role of Nomads,"
Civilizations
Comparative
Change:
The Making
Barfield, The Perilous Frontier
(Oxford: Blackwell,
of
1992); Mark Whittow,
The Mongols.
pp. 19-25; Morgan,
Byzantium,
43 Modified
from Edward S. Deevey
Jr., "The Human
Population,"
Scientific American
262 (Sept. i960):
and Richard
194-204,
using Colin McEvedy
Jones, Atlas ofWorld Popu
at
website
lation History
(New York: Penguin,
1978) and the World
Population
<http://metalab.unc.edu/lunarbin/worldpop>.
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JOURNAL
546
I i
Cu
TOOLS
and
FIRE
1.8M
years
ago
o
OF WORLD
MESOLITHIC
CULTURAL
REVOLUTION
90K-70K years ago
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION
1750-1900
CU
AGRICULTURAL
REVOLUTION
-8000 to -3000
si
*. /
p
>.
Homo ?
Sapiens
i
2M
/
.-
/
IM
Homo Erectus,
Neanderthals
100K
YEARS AGO
Figure
i.
were fairly insignificant.44
between
those two revolutions
production"
of
"mode
any
Furthermore,
argument must
ignore the
production"
ones
over
economic
in
of political
the pre in
dominance
arrangements
dustrial world.45 Even taken on its own terms, however,
the evidence
its connection
economic
for Barendse's
transformation,
especially
is highly
inconsistent.
with warrior activity,
It got con
Western
Europe began this period poor and disorganized.
over the next three centuries,
in
siderably richer and more organized
warrior
Because
their
wealth
and
social
because
of
the
part
aristocracy.
on intensive
estate management
of person
rested ultimately
position
as
in
acted
held
land, they
agri
private entrepreneurs
encouraging
ally
cultural and commercial
expansion.46 The end of a period of invasions
eco
and Saracens,
around 950, further facilitated
by Vikings, Magyars,
nomic
of landed estates
(some of which
possession
growth. Warrior
over
was thus
were fiefs) that carried
farmers
peasant
jurisdiction
44 The
that there have been three basic "modes
graph is the basis for my contention
in human history: hunter-gatherer,
and industrial, with nomadic
of production"
agricultural,
as a dependent
pastoralism
subtype of agricultural.
45
Pre-Industrial
Societies, pp. 13-35.
Crone,
46
trans. Howard
B. Clarke
of the European Economy,
Duby, The Early Growth
Georges
1, 2, and
Press, 1974); Bartlett, Making
(Ithaca: Cornell
University
of Europe, esp. chapters
5-7
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
547
central to a system of warrior economic
socially (though not militarily)
was
social first and governmental
support that
only second. But it
should be noted that as Europe got richer and its economy more mon
as classically understood
etized, "feudal" forms of military
organization
actually declined:
paid service increasingly
replaced unpaid service in
contracts
for land, and formal financial
(or at least
exchange
replaced
runs
ties of vassalage.47
of course,
This,
customary
supplemented)
counter
to Barendse's basic causal argument.
It
before 900 was also poor but was centrally organized.
Byzantium
too got somewhat
richer after 900, largely as a result of a shift in the
and Islam. Byzan
tide of success in the border wars between Byzantium
tine strategy had previously
for security.48 The
sacrificed prosperity
to go on
of the caliphate
the chance
gave Byzantium
fragmentation
to the benefit of Anatolian
In
the offensive,
agricultural
production.
a
circumstances
in
other words, external military
role
major
played
as
was
western
in
economic
but
the
response
fostering
growth,
Europe,
as opposed
to the free enterprise nature of western
in the Byzantine
is
This
reflected
system of mil
expansion.
European
on
economic
which
remained
centered
support,
government
itary
salaries. There was growth in "soldiers lands," but such lands were cen
centrally
directed
did not provide jurisdiction over cultivators,
and thus
trally controlled,
cannot be equated toWestern
Later
eleventhand
twelfth
practices.49
were
more
influenced
Western
fiefs, but as
century grants ofpronoia
by
to
the grants carried little legal jurisdiction
and were made primarily
foreign mercenaries,
they reflect
the increasing
separation
of Byzantine
47 A classic
Mass.: Harvard
(Cambridge,
study is B. D. Lyon, From Fief to Indenture
under the Anglo-Norman
Press,
University
Warfare
1957); see also, for example, Morillo,
and twelfth centuries
Kings, chapter 3, on the role of paid service as early as the eleventh
in rich England.
Iwon't even get into the vast and now somewhat
dated literature on "bas
tard feudalism."
It is also not at all clear that economic
led to a leveling of peasant
growth
across many
claims
studies show the opposite
cultures:
status, as Barendse
(p. 523). Many
economics
into peasant
societies
that the penetration
of market
leads to greater stratifica
tion of village
to take advantage
families show differing abilities
society, as different peasant
of market
See for example
and Mar
Peasants, Merchants
opportunities.
James Masschaele,
kets: Inland Trade inMedieval
1150-1350
(New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1997), esp.
England,
c. 1295-1344
A Medieval
pp. 33-55;
Judith M. Bennett,
Life: Cecilia Penifader ofBrigstock,
Transi
(Boston: McGraw-Hill,
7 and 8; in early modern
1999), chapters
Europe, Duplessis,
tions toCapitalism,
passim.; and inMuromachi
Japan, Nagahara
Keiji with Kozo Yamamura,
in John W. Hall
and Daimyo
and Toyoda Takeshi,
Power,"
eds.,
"Village Communities
of California
Press, 1977), pp. 107-124.
Japan in theMuromachi
Age (Berkeley, University
48
Whittow,
pp. 310-357.
Making
of Byzantium,
49Warren
A History
State and Society
Calif.:
(Stanford,
Treadgold,
of the Byzantine
Stanford University
denies any Byzantine
"feudalism."
Press, 1997), p. 680, who specifically
See also Haldon,
"Military Service."
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JOURNAL
548
OF WORLD
HISTORY,
DECEMBER
2OO3
so sharply with the organic connection
army and society that contrasts
in western Europe.50
of military
force and social organization
Islam, by contrast with the Christian
world, was already rich and
had even spread the wealth,
prosperous before 900. Islamic expansion
as diffusion
to what has been
of agricultural
contributed
techniques
But this was offset to some extent by
called a "Green Revolution."51
the dynamics
of Islamization
of the peasantry, which
tended to draw
from the countryside
dominated
elites to the
peasants
by pre-Islamic
cities where Arab garrisons were stationed.52 And
the story after 900
one of decline
to the increased activity
is increasingly
related directly
both as invaders and as slave soldiers within
horsemen,
areas reverted from cultivation
to pasture,
Islamic polities. Significant
as reflected
in grants of iqta to warriors
that contained
pasture rights,
not agricultural
estates. The division between
pastoralist warriors and
an agricultural peasantry
the gap between
Islamic state
simply widened
of nomadic
of agri
and society noted above, and acted to the long-term detriment
in the Islamic world.
cultural production
before 900, but unlike
Islam
too, was rich and prosperous
China,
to gain in productivity.
In fact, the agricultural
continued
improve
ments
strain of
introduced under the Song, including a faster-ripening
a
two plantings
rice that virtually doubled cereal harvests by allowing
trade, made
year, not to mention
thriving Song industry and overseas
in Eurasia in terms of peasant production.53
China
the biggest winner
on Barendse's
Here above all one should expect a "feudal mutation"
is undoubtedly
the least feudal area on the continent.
terms, yet China
nor was anything
Warriors
expansion,
played no role in the economic
to
even remotely
estates
warrior
used
support military
resembling
forces, which were instead raised, paid, and supported out of centrally
tax revenues.
in prosperity,
this period
and seems to have
also began
save for the damage done by Islamic
so with
little change
remained
raiders.54 It is, in other words, hard to see much
impact of warriors
or
on
economic
of developments
the
Hindu
base,
warriors)
(especially
in the economic
base upon warriors. Warriors may have held lands that
controlled
India
50Mark
Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453
(Philadelphia:
of Pennsylvania
Press, 1992).
University
51 Andrew
in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion
Innovation
Watson,
of
Agricultural
Press, 1983).
700-1100
Crops and Farming Techniques,
University
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
52
Slaves on Horses.
Crone,
53
in Sung China.
Haeger, Crisis and Prosperity
54 Such raids foreshadow
disaster
that was the Delhi
the economic
sultanate,
starting
just after 1200: Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, pp. 238-255.
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Morillo:
Conceptual
Tools and Historical
Patterns
inWorld
History
549
but it is not clear that
gave them "bundles of rights" over cultivators,
in such arrangements
there was any significant
change
dating to the
period in question.
Finally, Japan, like western Europe, was relatively poor in 900.55 It
gained slowly in productivity
through this period, though not as dra
as Europe did, in part because
land for expansion was much
matically
more
limited. But the highly
indirect relationship
between
the agri
cultural base of this society and the warrior class that came to rule it
in either direction.
any influence
Shoen, the estates granted
mitigated
to warriors and civil aristocrats alike by the central authority,
illustrate
a superficial resemblance
toWestern
this. Despite
fiefs, what Japanese
come from a
warriors
that might
got were grants of shoen income
estates
warriors
of
whose
also
other
and civil
output
variety
supported
was
officials. Neither
"bundles
of rights" nor estate management
involved.56
as those con
results of this survey are as easily summarized
no
warrior
is
roles:
there
conditions
varied
Initial
pattern.
cerning
across
con
the
direction
of
also
and
the
Eurasia,
varied,
widely
change
to warriors and their horses and social roles varied even more.
nection
it is hard to see what direct causal connection
could have
Indeed,
in
existed between
and the
peasant
agricultural
changes
production
The
activities
of pastoral nomads who formed the bulk of cavalry warriors
across Eurasia in this period. That "population
in
pressure and changes
were
in
within
rural
the
agrarian production
society
inducing changes
in any consistent
way that can be
superstructure"57
military/fiscal
in
to
called "feudal" is not only unproven
but,
my opinion,
impossible
prove.
Conclusion
should be obvious from the results of these sur
My overall conclusions
as
no pattern
I
have
veys. If,
shown, there was no warhorse
revolution,
no
of increasing warrior dominance
and
of
pattern
socially,
changing
across Eurasia between
peasant production
900 and 1200, never mind
55 Contra
in 900 was
less developed,
io), Japan
though
perhaps
more organized,
in every way he mentions:
than Europe
etc."
"trade, agricultural
urbanization,
productivity,
56
"Guns and Government,"
and
Morillo,
pp. 86-87;
Hall, Government
John Whitney
to 1700 (Princeton:
in Japan, 500
Local Power
Princeton
Press,
University
1966), pp.
(because
99-128.
57
smaller
Barendse,
Barendse
and more
(note
unified)
p. 521.
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55o
any
JOURNAL
consistent
connection
among
OF WORLD
these
HISTORY,
elements,
then
DECEMBER
there
was
2OO3
no
or process
that can be called "feudal," or
mutation,
transformation,
and so no such thing
else for that matter,
that can be called anything
as "feudalism"
in world history between
900 and 1200. Such a conclu
reasons
sion simply reinforces
and historiographical
the philosophical
as a tool for the
the term "feudalism"
adduced
earlier for rejecting
analysis of world history.
is of course emotionally
A negative
less satisfying than
conclusion
a positive one. The reader may be tempted to ask, if there wasn't feu
is a legitimate
and my
then what was there? This
dalism,
question,
as
a
case
not
in
should
be
taken
this
conclusion
negative
precluding
The way forward for world
for larger patterns and connections.
in
the recycling of an out
other
directions
than
lies
history, however,
no
one can agree on.
whose
dated Eurocentric
concept
meaning
search
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