Download The Mithridatic Wars

Anti-Roman Insurgency and the Significance of Popular Support during
the Mithridatic Wars, 88-63 BCE
Aidan Sheerin
Dr. Jesse Hingson
HIST 300WI: The Techniques of History
9 December 2009
By 120 BCE, the Roman Republic was quickly becoming the most dominant state of the
Western world since Alexander the Great‟s empire. Since the Punic wars, Rome had added
Mediterranean islands, most of Spain and territory in Northern Africa. Rome also had conquered
provinces and protectorates in Gaul, Greece, and Macedonia. The Republic held some territory
and had minor interests in Asia Minor and the Middle East as well, but Roman attention and
commitment to these regions would only take true form through the Mithridatic Wars.
Mithridates VI Eupator Dionysus (134-63 BCE), whom the wars are named for, was an
ambitious king of Pontus in Asia Minor. Mithridates was one of Rome‟s greatest adversaries and
ardently opposed the Republic for nearly his entire life. Mithridates was able to put up a
formidable opposition to Rome, but ultimately lost because he failed to keep the allegiance and
support of both those he ruled directly and the populations allied to him. Brian McGing, who
has researched Mithridates extensively and written multiple works on the subject, acknowledges
the shortcomings of Mithridates in dealing with his people, but would ultimately attribute his
loss to the superiority of Roman military. In studying the foreign policies and actions of
Mithridates as ruler, liberator, protector and general, it is clear his fate was determined by the
gain and lose his greatest asset: the support of the population.
Roman domination of the Near East has had a profound effect on Western culture and
history. As the catalyst for the Mithridatic Wars, Mithridates holds substantial historical
significance. Mithridates was the last fully autonomous Hellenic king of the East. This was
mainly because of his staunch resistance that Rome truly came to dominate and administer Asia
Minor and the Middle East. For the most part, Mithridates feigned philhellenism to resist Rome.
He claimed that he cared more about his kingdom and sovereignty than promoting Greek culture
and protecting the various Greek populations. The actions and might of Mithridates made Rome
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decide it needed to dominate the Near East to prevent another ruler like Mithridates from
emerging. Thus, Rome would dominate and annex Judea and surrounding lands just before the
birth of Jesus Christ.
The sources we have on Mithridates and the Mithridatic Wars are few and somewhat
unreliable. The only primary sources available are written by Roman historians such as Appian
of Alexandria, Plutarch, and Cassius Dio. These accounts have to be considered biased because
they were writing about a war between their nation and that of an enemy. Indeed, all three refer
to Mithridates as a “barbarian.” Appian‟s Mithridatica is the only thorough account of the war
and is very valuable. It is, however, full of errors and contains minimal chronology. Plutarch‟s
bibliographies of Lucullus and Sulla are intended to show them in very favorable terms. Ancient
historian Frank Burr Marsh wrote in his history of Rome that we “only know Mithridates
through his enemies.”1 Furthermore, all were born in the common era, over one hundred years
after the end of Mithridates‟s life. They used memoirs from Roman generals and legislation as
their main sources of information. Finally, these sources disagree on many key details. The
sources record different numbers of strength for armies and navies, different numbers of
casualties, and varying terms of treaties. Some of the sources leave parts of the history out and
other sections have not been preserved.
The kingdom, Pontus, was located on the southern shore of the Black Sea, in modern day
Turkey. Greek colonies, remnants of the Persian Achaemenid Empire and Alexander the Great‟s
Macedonian Empire dominated the culture of the kingdom. Pontic kings championed the Greek
roots of many of their cities and took pride in the Greek tradition. Mithridates VI Eupator was
1
Frank Burr Marsh, A History of the Roman World: From 146 to 30 BC. 3rd edition, volume 5 (London: Methuan
and Company Ltd., 1967), 107.
king of Pontus between 119 and 63 BCE. Mithridates‟s situation, however, was different.
Unlike kings before him who aligned themselves with Rome to expand, Mithridates‟s expansion
forced him into conflict with the Republic.
Mithridates Eupator portrayed himself as both Persian and Greek to win support over all
people in his kingdoms and beyond. He shares his surname Dionysus with a Greek god. He told
his troops that his father was a descendant of Cyrus and Darius, the founders of the great Persian
Empire and that his mother was descended from Alexander the Great and Seleucus of Greece.
Mithridates also claimed relation to Perseus, who was also of Persian descent and was “the hero
of integration between the East and West.”2 This was precisely how Mithridates wanted to
represent himself. Mithridates issued royal coins with both Greek and Persian representations
depicting Perseus and other Greek heroes and gods. He combined these images on other coins
with portraits of himself and Greek and Persian symbols of power and values.3
In 120 BCE, Mithridates‟s father was assassinated, bequeathing the throne to his wife, the
Seleucid princess Laodice and two sons. Mithridates lived in the wild for several years,
accustoming himself to hardship and learning to use all available resources to survive. When he
returned, his mother, according to historian Brian McGing, was “no longer in the picture”. At
age eighteen had his younger brother killed, attaining sole control of the Kingdom of Pontus in
116 BCE Laodice‟s Seleucid Kingdom was involved with civil war, and it did not contest the
Pontic throne. Thus, the able and ambitious Mithridates VI Eupator was sole ruler of Pontus.4
2
Brian McGing, “Subjection and Resistance to the Death of Mithridates,” A Companion to the Hellenistic World.
Edited by Andrew Erskine. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2003), 95.
3
Ibid., 95-97.
4
Ibid., 84-85; Jona Lendering, “Mithridates VI Eupator (132-63): King of Pontus (120-63), Enemy of Rome in first
century BCE,” Livius: Articles on Ancient History, http://www.livius.org/mi-mn/mithridates/mithridates.htm.
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Early in his reign, Mithridates was invited by the Bosporan Kingdom to lead it against the
Scythians, who had sacked the key city of Chersoneses.5 The ever-ambitious king took the
chance and proclaimed himself protector of Greek culture against non-Greeks, or „barbarians‟.6
The Scythians had been able to pressure the Greek cities of the northern Black Sea into paying
tribute and giving them stores of food. The small Greek cities had to rely on each other for what
little protection they could provide against the ever present threat. The presence and fear of the
barbarians created a unique opportunity for Mithridates to expand his kingdom and prestige.
Mithridates‟ General Diophantos, son of Mithares, successfully defeated over fifty
thousand Scythians with only his six thousand well trained troops. Afterward, he defeated the
barbarian Tauri and a number of other tribes that were threatening Greek cities. The sources we
have do not document the chronology of these events very well. We do know, however, that
through these campaigns, Mithridates annexed nearly the entire northern shore of the Black Sea
and soon came into control of nearly the entire coastline of the Black Sea, as far west as the
Danube River.7 Mithridates, however, first showed signs that his ambitions would get in the way
of his Greek ideals. He allied himself with the barbarian tribes Bastarnae and Thracians. With
this circuit around the Black Sea, Mithridates had rich stores of manpower, food, ship building
materials and a monopoly of the luxury trade.8
Next, he turned his ambitions to Asia Minor. Mithridates split the kingdom of
Paphlagonia with King Nicomedes II Epiphanes of Bithynia. Next, between 104 and 103 BCE,
he conquered Colchis (modern Georgia), parts of Armenia and looked south to Cappadocia and
Galatia. This caught the attention of Rome. Rome had not paid much attention to, nor cared
5
This kingdom was located in present day Crimea on the opposite side of the Black Sea.
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 85.
7
Arthur E.R. Boak, A History of Rome to 565 AD. 3rd Edition. (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 197.
8
Brian McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus. (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1986), 57-58).
6
about, Mithridates‟s conquests on the northern Black Sea, for it was much too concerned with its
campaigns in North Africa and defending against Germanic tribes to its north. However, the
Senate would not tolerate Mithridates and Nicomedes in Paphlagonia, and it ordered both kings
to evacuate Cappadocia.9 After doing so, the powerful Roman consul, Gaius Marius, told him in
96 BCE either to “be stronger than the Romans or obey their commands in silence.”10 The
following year, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, the praetor of Rome, put Ariobarzanes on the
Cappodocian throne. Thus, Ariarathes IX, Mithridates‟s son, was removed as rule and
Mithridates‟s indirect control negated.11 Rome was beginning to see that Mithridates could
possibly become a very powerful adversary to the east. Thus, they sought to adopt a policy that
would either prevent Pontus‟s further expansion or crush Pontus in a seemingly inevitable
conflict. Mithridates also recognized that war with Rome was only a matter of time. He began
preparing his army and navy for an impending conflict and attempted to align himself with any
nations he could to help Pontus against Rome.
The ambition of Mithridates more than caught the attention of Rome. The king and
Rome were engaged in political intrigue within Asia Minor, a key outpost of the eastern part of
the empire. Rome ruled through a series of puppet kings throughout the region. However, the
ever-ambitious Mithridates attempted to maneuver his allies into leadership positions in several
strategically important kingdoms. In 94 BCE, King Nicomedes II, the ruler of Bithynia, a
Roman province located in what is present day northern Turkey, died, and this left a power
vacuum in the region. Mithridates presented Socrates Chrestus, an upstart who coveted the
Bithynian throne, as a legitimate heir. In addition, Mithridates tried to restore his son, Ariarathes
9
Lendering.
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 85.
11
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 77.
10
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IX, in Cappadocia within the heart of Asia Minor. In both cases, however, Rome had other
ideas: Nicomedes III Euergetes, son of Nicomedes II, was established in Bithynia and
Ariobarzanes was restored in Cappadocia by Manius Aquilius around 90 BCE.12 Although
ultimately outmaneuvered by Rome, Mithridates successfully caused political instability in the
region. Moreover, his intrigues hurt Rome‟s political ambitions. In 89 BCE, Aquilius, Rome‟s
consular legate in Asia Minor, persuaded Nicomedes III Euergetes to raid Pontus. This
presented Mithridates with a legitimate cause to make war with Bithynia. He appealed to Rome
asking them to either do something about the aggression or to let him react. Aquilius, acting on
his own, refused to mediate or hear the king‟s complaints. For many in Asia Minor, Mithridates
had adhered to Roman terms and was the aggrieved party. This allowed the peoples of Asia
Minor to view the Roman Empire as the aggressor and tiny Pontus as the victim. He could now
proclaim himself as liberator from Roman oppression and greed in Asia.
Still, Mithridates moved cautiously in Asia Minor overall because he wanted to take
Rome (Aquilius, in particular) by surprise. Rome had been engulfed in a war with its allies on
Italy, known as the Social War. The last thing the Senate wanted was a full scale confrontation
in Asia. Acting mostly on his own, however, Aquilius instigated Mithridates. Nicomedes
invaded Pontus while Aquilius and his forces held defensive positions. Pontic generals
Neoptolemus and Archelaus forced the Bithynians and Romans into flight. Mithridates occupied
Bithynia in 89 BCE. He treated the conquered people with great compassion and endeared them
with his kindness.13 Many cities submitted willingly and the inadequate Roman forces fled
again. Other cities like Rhodes and Magnesia resisted and were besieged. The inhabitants of
Mytilene, a city of the isle Lesbos, handed over Aquilius willingly and invited Mithridates in.
12
13
Lendering.
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 108-109.
Mithridates had Aquilius killed by pouring molten gold down his throat, symbolizing the greed
of the Roman oppressors.
Mithridates quickly annexed Cappadocia and Bithynia and easily defeated Roman
opposition in Asia Minor in 89 BCE, as his fleet of three hundred ships took control of the
Aegean.14 Mithridates assumed control of all but a couple of cities in Asia Minor, as most of the
inhabitants saw him as a liberator from oppressive Roman rule and welcomed him. In 88 BCE,
he had at least 80,000 Romans and Italians living in Asia Minor massacred by the populations of
his newly acquired cities. The Asiatic Vespers, as it is known, proved both the peoples‟ hatred
for Rome and allegiance to their new king. Mithridates believed that these cities were now
“married to him”, forever viewed as enemies of Rome.15 Furthermore, it eliminated a large
Italian presence in Asia and provided vast amounts of property for Mithridates to usurp. So great
was the government‟s gains that Mithridates allowed participating cities a five year tax
exemption.16 This was a much welcomed change from Roman tax laws. Mithridates had
support in the Greek world due to the work of his ancestors. In 115 BCE, Dionysus, (not to be
confused with Mithridates‟s surname) son of Neon, erected a statue of Mithridates and his
brother on Delos. In Athens, Rhodes and Delos there were herons, coins and statues dedicated to
Eupator.17 Mithridates filled his court with Greek philosophers, doctors, poets and historians. He
was regarded in the Greek world as a great and civilized king.
Mithridates not only strongly promoted Hellenism in his court; he used Greek
propaganda to enhance his image. A famous bust of Mithridates as Hercules was created to
honor him. Similar statues such as another of him as Hercules saving Prometheus from the eagle
14
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 86.
Boak, 197.
16
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 113.
17
Ibid., 89-90. A „heroon‟ is a small shrine filled with busts of Eupator and those close or important to him.
15
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were created. This one in particular is a clear example of anti-Roman propaganda. Mithridates
(Hercules) is depicted saving Prometheus (the Greek World) from the eagle (Rome/torture).
Greek oracles foretold that a great king from the East would unite Europe and Asia and conquer
and oppress Rome. His propaganda also focused heavily on Roman greed. The heavy taxes that
Rome imposed angered her populations. When Mithridates promised to overthrow this
subjugation, the people listened.18
Mithridates offered to free some slaves and cancel debts to Rome. This made most of the
population love him. He was welcomed especially by the lower classes, but did not do as much
to help the upper classes. The upper and ruling classes often cooperated with Rome in
administering their domain and were rewarded substantially. They went along with their
populations at first but represented a growing opposition from within to Mithridates. They knew
that if Rome gained control again, supporters would be again rewarded, but dissenters would
face the wrath of the Roman military.19
Mithridates‟s propaganda was based on protecting Hellenism and Greek peoples from
tyranny and barbarians. As he had done at Chersoneses, Mithridates fought and ruled under the
title of liberator of Greece and Greek people. Mithridates referred to the Romans as “barbarians”
and likened the situation of Roman dominance of Greece to the Scythian takeover of
Chersoneses in the Bosporus. Greece, eager to be rid of Roman taxes and foreign rule bought
into Mithridates‟s claim. The Athenian populace took over the pro-Roman provincial
government and gave control over to Mithridates.20 Other mainland Greeks took note of this.
The populace of Athens aligned themselves with Mithridates and invited him to lead them. In 88
18
Ibid., 100, 116-117.
Ibid.
20
Boak, 197.
19
BCE, Mithridates assumed control of the island Euboea and sent his general, Archelaus, into
Greece. He destroyed the Roman eastern center Delos on his way to take control of Athens and
much of southern Greece, while Mithridates sent another army from the north, into Hellas.
Similar to his overrunning of Asia Minor, many willingly invited the king, the others were taken
by force and few resisted the Pontic military.21
Meanwhile, in Rome, newly selected consul Sulla was selected to combat Mithridates in
the east. Marius opposed Sulla and vied for control. When Sulla left to join his forces, Marius‟s
supporters seized control of Rome and passed a law instituting Marius as commander in the
east.22 Subsequently, Sulla marched on Rome and took control. The Marian, or “populares,”
leaders were outlawed and Sulla replaced their legislation with some of his own, giving much
power to the Senate. Finally, in 87 BCE, Sulla began his march on Greece.23 During this
tumultuous period, Mithridates was basically running free on mainland Greece, gaining immense
support. His greatest asset was that he had many recent victories and seemed invincible. Sulla
and his five legions landed at Epirus, Greece, intent to change Mithridates‟s fortune. As he
marched through Greece, the cities quickly sided with him to avoid harsh treatment. Both Pontic
strongholds, Piraeus and Athens, fell to Sulla, but Archelaus managed to escape and joined the
northern army at Thessaly. Sulla spared the buildings of Athens, but a large number of citizens
were massacred. Sulla met Mithridates‟s army and won victories at Chaeronea and Orchomenus.
He was anxious to start negotiations so he could return to Rome and restore order.24 Meanwhile,
to Sulla‟s dismay, advocates of Marius‟s successor, Cinna, were taking control in Rome. They
21
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 119-123.
Boak, 198.
23
Richard E. Sullivan, Dennis Sherman, and John B. Harrison, A Short History of Western Civilization (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1994), 114.
24
Appian, “History of Rome: The Mithradatic Wars,” Livius: Articles on Ancient History. http://www.livius.org/apark/appian/appian_mithridatic_01.html.
22
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sent an army of their own, under Lucius Valerius Flaccus to combat Mithridates.25 Flaccus,
however, was afraid to face Sulla and marched on the Hellespont. Gaius Flavius Fimbra led a
mutiny and killed Flaccus. He assumed command of the army and captured Pergamum,
Mithridates‟s capital.
Discontent among the upper classes continued to grow in Mithridates‟s new territories.
Mithridates‟s losses in Greece only added to this feeling. He had set up tyrants, or “satraps”, to
rule over his new possessions, and this had aggravated the people from all classes as well. As
Sulla methodically took back Greece, Mithridates was losing support in his Asian conquests to a
combination of the military losses and his oppressive policies. He had all but three of sixty
Galatian nobles executed when he found they were conspiring to assassinate him and side with
Sulla. He appointed a satrap in Galatia, but he was run out by the remaining three nobles.26
Mithridates confiscated the property of all Chians (of the Asian city Chios) who fled to
join Sulla. He imposed an immediate fine of two thousand talents on the city. Chios was unable
to pay and the entire population was deported to the Euxine. He redistributed the property to
loyal subjects. The king also discovered conspirators in Lesbos, Smyrna and Pergamum. He had
over sixteen hundred suspects executed. He also usurped all wealth from his new provinces that
he could, realizing that loss in the struggle was imminent.27
Mithridates still held the Aegean Sea and forced Sulla into winter quarters in Greece. In
85 BCE, naval commander Lucius Licinius Lucullus, defeated the Pontic navy and secured
Sulla‟s passage to Asia. Many Greek and Asian cities recognized the dire position of Mithridates
and abandoned supporting him. The cities were ultimately looking to be liberated from Roman
25
Marsh, 111.
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 127.
27
Ibid., 129. The term “Euxine” refers to the Black Sea.
26
imperialism but, sought the most favorable treatment when retaken by Rome. Concerned with
matters in Rome, Sulla did not destroy Mithridates. Instead, he gave the king rather favorable
terms: Mithridates relinquished command in Greater Cappadocia and Bithynia to their former
kings, gave up Paphlagonia and his other recent conquests, gave Sulla eighty warships,
surrendered all prisoners of war and deserters, and paid modest reparations.28 Thus, the First
Mithridatic War ended in 85 BCE, and Sulla spent that winter stabilizing the area and imposing a
harsh settlement by confiscating lands and resources.29 Sulla illegally marched on Rome, again
seized power, proscribed much of the populares‟ property, and became dictator while Mithridates
was left to himself to rebuild and prepare.
The aftermath of the First Mithradatic War included neither the total defeat of
Mithridates, nor the acquisition of any new territory by Rome. The retaken eastern provinces
were, however, for the first time made tributary; vastly increasing Roman interest and presence
in the area. Perhaps the greatest effect of the first war was the damage that Eupator‟s reputation
took. It was easy to see the superiority of the Roman military. Greek cities could not rely on this
“protector/liberator of Hellenism” if he could not defeat the Romans. Worse still, Mithridates
treated the cities that came under his control worse than the Romans had prior to him. He levied
massive amounts of taxes to finance the war and demanded sacrifice from the people in order to
win, which he did not. Finally, he fought mostly on mainland Greece, bringing the destruction of
war to the very area he was supposed to be protecting and liberating. Mithridates lost the support
of most of the Greek and Asian cities he once controlled. They recognized the might of Rome
and would be reluctant to invite the harsh policies they experienced under Mithridates again.
28
A talent was a measure of mass in the ancient world that varied from region to region. Talents were used to
measure amounts of precious metals such as gold and silver for currency.
29
Lendering.
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Mithridates began rebuilding his army and recruiting soldiers soon after the peace. Sulla
left his legate and general, Lucius Lucinius Murena, in charge of the Roman province Asia.
Murena raided Mithridates‟s territory, then moved his army into Pontus under the claims that
Mithridates was preparing for war and posed a direct threat to Asia. The king, however, fully
complied with Sulla‟s terms and was only using his military to put down uprisings in Colchis and
the Bosporan Kingdom.30 After appealing to the Senate with no success, he was forced to act.
Mithridates won a decisive victory and forced Murena out of Pontus. Sulla ordered that peace be
made. The only change from the terms of the first Mithradatic War was that Mithridates
annexed a small part of Cappadocia. Mithridates gained some of his prestige back with this win,
but the massive defeat was still fresh in the minds of many. After this short second war (82
BCE), Mithridates again prepared his military.31
In preparation for yet another inevitable conflict, Mithridates enlisted the help of another
Roman enemy, Quintus Sertorius. Sertorius was proconsul and a Roman general. He sided with
Marius and opposed Sulla. Sertorius and his army opposed Rome in the province of Hispania,
present day Spain. Mithridates offered to give Sertorius forty warships and three thousand
talents if he would recognize Mithridates‟s rights to Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Galatia
and Asia. Sertorius disagreed on the rights to Asia and did not include that in the treaty. In 74
BCE, Mithridates and Sertorius finalized a treaty. Sertorius sent some troops to aid Mithridates
under M. Marius. Next, Mithridates appealed to Ptolemy Auletes of Egypt for support. He
would not get any from Egypt but did find sufficient help from the pirates of the Mediterranean
and Black Seas. The pirates were largely autonomous and sought after their own material gains
rather than hampering the Romans for Mithridates‟s cause. Nonetheless, they did provide some
30
31
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 133.
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 187.
opposition to Roman naval forces and greatly helped the king. They were also a means by which
Mithridates could keep in touch with Sertorius.32
Mithridates sought help from anyone he thought might be able to lend it. Based on this
fact, we can infer that he would do anything to help his cause against Rome. He did not care so
much about protecting or liberating the Greek people as he did his kingdom and expansion. He
did, however, skillfully use his stance as great protector of Hellenism to enlist Greek help. The
opportunity in Asia Minor was again ripe for Mithridates to gain influence. Sulla cruelly
punished the cities that turned on Rome and instituted huge taxes and war reparations. The cities
were forced to borrow money. When they could not pay the interest, many people were sold or
enslaved Rome did nothing when the people of Asia appealed for help.33
Conflict was again initiated in 75 BCE, when King Nicomedes IV of Bithynia died and
left his kingdom to Rome.34 Mithridates, immediately wished to contest this territory, and
invaded, instigating the Third, and final, Mithradatic War. Mithridates‟s fleet quickly won a
victory at Chalcedon. His army, however, was defeated on land at Kyzikos (or Cyzicus), near
the Hellespont by Lucullus. From the outset of war, the cities of Asia Minor and the Black Sea
did not submit easily, as they had in the first war. Mithridates was, therefore, forced to withdraw
with heavy losses. Lucullus pursued Mithridates with no major conflicts for almost the next five
years through Bithynia, Pontus and into Armenia.35 In Armenia, Mithridates was taken in and
protected by his son-in-law King Tigranes. In 69 BCE, Lucullus demanded Tigranes turn
Mithridates over, to which the latter refused. Machares, Mithridates‟s son who now was in
32
McGing, The Foreign Policy of Mithridates, 138-139.
Plutarch, Agesilaus and Pompey; Pelopidas and Marcellus. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. Plutarch‟s Lives.
Volume 5. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917), 1-2.
34
Boak, 207.
35
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88.
33
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charge of the Bosporan Kingdom, appealed to Lucullus and became “friend and ally of the
Roman people.”36 Lucullus invaded Armenia and took its capital Tigranocerta, but had to stop
because of his mutinous soldiers and a large number of deserters. When Rome withdrew support
for Lucullus‟s campaign in 68 BCE, Mithridates slipped back into Pontus and defeated the
Romans under Cotta in his country.3739 Mithridates and Tigranes were left to themselves in their
respective countries. Rome had failed once again to capture or kill Mithridates.
Shortly after, in 66 BCE, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, known as Pompey, took command
in the east. He sent an envoy with peaceful offerings to Mithridates. The king would not make
peace because he believed he could get support from Phraaces, the powerful king of Parthia.
Phraaces, however, sided with Pompey. Pompey defeated Mithridates easily in their first
combat. Mithridates fled, using a scorched Earth tactic against Pompey. Pompey was far from
home, in unfamiliar land and unable to acquire sufficient provisions for his army. Mithridates
felt he was winning and Pompey‟s men would soon lose motivation and turn back. He had
witnessed two mutinies and many desertions by Roman soldiers before and believed it was only
a matter of time until it happened again. On his way to Armenia, Mithridates made camp atop a
high hill in a great defensive position. Pompey dared not attack the impregnable position but
baited Mithridates instead. He set up camp in a wooded area off the base of the hill and lined up
his troops in a horseshoe shape. He sent some of his light cavalry out to the base of the hill,
baiting Mithridates‟s far superior cavalry to attack them. They did just that. Pompey‟s cavalry
retreated into the woods, where his men fell upon Mithridates‟s men from all sides, executing a
36
Dio. Dio’s Roman History. Translated by Earnest Cary. Volume 3. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1954), 3.
37
Appian, 66.
double envelopment. Some escaped, but the many killed took away Pontus‟s upper hand in
cavalry: one of Mithridates‟s only advantages.38
Pompey surrounded the hill and wanted force Mithridates‟s army into direct conflict.
Mithridates, however, fooled Pompey and slipped out at night into Armenia. Mithridates
marched for some time and lost sight of Pompey‟s army. He believed he had lost them or they
gave up and turned around, so he continued on his way nonchalantly. Pompey had, in fact,
wheeled around and gotten ahead of Mithridates. Mithridates took his army through a pass with
high ground on both sides. At night, Pompey surrounded his enemy, taking the high ground.
The Romans descended on the confused and frightened soldiers in the valley. The majority of
Mithridates‟s army was killed or captured, but he was able to escape with some of his forces.
Mithridates made his way toward Tigranes but found no help from him. Tigranes had been at
war with Parthia and his son, who sought the Armenian throne, had no help or protection to
offer.39
Mithridates turned north and marched to Colchis, which is located on the eastern coast of
the Black Sea, in modern day Georgia. Pompey sent a pursuing party to find out where
Mithridates was going but mostly focused on Armenia and the surrounding areas. Mithridates
slipped away up to the Bosporan Kingdom on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Mithridates
marched in with his dwindling` army had Machares killed and took over. Thus, again, he was
left alone and began recruiting, publicizing anti-Roman propaganda and making preparations for
conflict with Rome. Pompey attempted to follow Mithridates‟s route between the Caspian and
Black Seas up to the Bosporus. The terrain and people were hostile and Pompey deemed it not
38
39
Dio, 75-79.
Ibid., 199-203.
Sheerin 17
worth the risk to march through the dangerous and unfamiliar land. He sent his prefect Servilius,
admiral of the Euxine Fleet, to blockade Mithridates‟s kingdom. Pompey turned around and
marched south to bring Syria and the other nations of the area under control. Along the way,
Mithridates‟s rich fortresses surrendered to Pompey.40
Pompey stated that Mithridates was easier to deal with in battle than in flight. He knew
Mithridates was forming another army but did not care.41 The beleaguered king had to lay down
huge taxes on the Bosporan people. He planned for lofty and farfetched goals, such as a land
invasion of Italy, similar to Hannibal‟s. The people had once loved the inventive, energetic king
who embodied the ideals of the people, but they no longer identified with the tyrant who seemed
bent on destruction. Dio states that, Mithridates “preferred to perish along with his kingdom,
with pride undiminished, rather than live deprived of it in humility and disgrace.”42 He no longer
cared for his philhellenism, which he showcased earlier in his reign and cared not for the well
being of his subjects. He was bent on victory over Rome or glory in defeat. He would allow his
Greek and Persian kingdom to perish along with him rather than submit to Roman oppressors.
The public was incensed with rage at Mithridates‟s taxation and seizure of property to
finance his new army. Phanagoreia and other neighboring cities revolted. Along with the public,
many of his armed forces did not share the zeal and passion to fight Rome. Nearly none believed
that the king would lead an invasion of the Italian peninsula. In 63 BCE, Pharnaces, son of
Eupator and apparent heir, recognized the dire situation the remains of the kingdom was in. He
knew total defeat at Roman hands was ultimately inevitable. He conspired with some of the
king‟s officers against his father in the city of Phanagoreia, just across the Bosporus from the
40
Peter Greenhalgh, Pompey: The Roman Alexander. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press), 114-115, 126, and
131.
41
Ibid., 133.
42
Dio, 119.
king‟s new capital at Panticapaeum. The king learned of this and sent some of his bodyguards to
seize Pharnaces. Pharnaces easily persuaded these men to his cause, and together, they marched
on Panticapaeum and his father. Mithridates was locked up in his citadel with his wives and
other children. First, he administered poison to them and then drank all that remained.
Mithridates survived due to immunity he built up and remained alive in a weakened state. He
attempted again to commit suicide by stabbing himself with his sword, but could not finish
himself off. Dio states that Pharnaces‟s troops came in and killed the dying king.43 Appian and
Plutarch hold that his compassionate guard, Bituitus, ended the king‟s life upon his request.44
Either way, it does not matter. For the purpose of the argument, the subjects of Mithridates were
dissatisfied and wanted him dead.
After the death of Eupator, Pompey established firm Roman control in Asia Minor as far
east as Armenia and south along the coast into Palestine.45 He combined Bithynia and Pontus to
make one new Roman province, established Syria and set up tribute collections.46 Also, he made
many kingdoms, such as Judea and Armenia dependant allies, to act as buffers on the Roman
frontier. Pompey believed that strong Roman presence in places like the east would prevent
another enemy like Mithridates from emerging. Pharnaces was allowed to rule the Bosporan
Kingdom as Rome‟s ally. Thus, Mithridates was the final autonomous Greek king in the East.
Mithridates attempted to take Asia Minor and Greece from Rome, becoming a
mechanism by which Rome would truly administer and dominate those regions for hundreds of
years to come (including Byzantine rule). He used the title of protector/liberator of Greece and
Hellenism effectively to gain support, recruit allies and tie people emotionally to his noble cause.
43
Dio, 123; McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88; Boak, 214.
Appian, 455; Plutarch, 207.
45
McGing, “Subjection and Resistance”, 88.
46
Sullivan, 119.
44
Sheerin 19
Mithridates Eupator was an adept politician, a good general and a great inspirer. He used all
resources and means available to him to combat his arch enemy Rome and enlisted the support of
people from widespread territories. Mithridates used his ripe opportunity in time to get this great
support. He aligned himself with anyone who may have helped him, even Sertorius who was
himself Roman. The king‟s inability to recognize that the best chance he had against Rome was
to reverse Roman oppression and keep the support of the people ultimately was the deciding
factor in his defeat.
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