Download Winter 2010 Mr. Strong, Ms Paula Jacobson, Mr. John Lejeune, Mr

Winter 2010
Mr. Strong, Ms Paula Jacobson, Mr. John Lejeune, Mr. Matt Childers, Ms Molly Bauer
POLITICAL SCIENCE 13
POWER AND JUSTICE
This is a model answer to the first midterm. It is an amalgamation of two overlapping essays
each of which got an “A” – you did not have to do all of this to get an “A.” Nevertheless it
shows what an excellent essay would consist of. Note however that other conclusions and
arguments can be made and still be excellent (one might disagree with the point about Socrates
and procedural justice on page 2, for instance). But there is an argument here; there are
reasons advanced: the author is not simply recounting the text. Most important points are in bold.
"Socrates was a fool, in fact an arrogant fool, not to have taken
the opportunity to escape. Likewise, Rubashov is despicable for
having acquiesced to the judgment of the court by acknowledging
his guilt."
Inherent in both of these accusations is the idea of obligation, and more specifically, the
assertion that both men misperceived what their obligations to their governments were,
and acted under the influence of those misperceptions. The harsher condemnation of
Rubashov stems from the additional assertion that in misinterpreting his political obligation, he
failed to meet a higher obligation. He could have stood by his beliefs (and died with honor);
indeed, perhaps the failure to act on his beliefs seemed to endorse policies that resulted in
millions killed etc...
As a result of the complexity of the concept of obligation in general and political obligation in
particular, however, the logical counter arguments to these accusations also rest upon the
idea of obligation. They assert, however, that each man in fact correctly perceived and acted in
accordance with their perceived political obligations.
In order to evaluate the aforementioned accusations, we must determine more exactly what
Socrates and Rubashov were, or what anyone is, obligated to do, and why. Hanna Pitkin's
article "Obligation and Consent II" explores at quite some length the intricacies of political
obligation, and is thus useful for our purpose. The value of Pitkin's analysis is not in dictating
when it is appropriate or obligatory to obey or resist; in fact, she dismisses the possibility of
issuing such a dictate altogether, going so far as to say "perhaps it is even a mistake to assume
that a theory is supposed to tell a man what to do in particular cases" and concluding that "no
one has the last word because there is no last word" (Pitkin 17, 29). The utility of the article
to our discussion lies instead in illuminating the considerations that are relevant to the
decisions of whether or not to obey, in effect giving us not a rule applicable to all
obligation but a template with which to structure any particular inquiry concerning
obligation. Thus Pitkin's theory of hypothetical consent specifies the relevant criteria for
persons to use in deciding whether or not to resist government and those same criteria are now
our framework for evaluating the actions of Socrates and Rubashov when each was faced with
such a decision.
Pitkin’s theory of hypothetical consent rests, as do all theories of obligation, on the
assumption that there is an obligation to obey legitimate authority. The author justifies
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using ordinary language theory, asserting that inherent in the meaning of the terms “legitimate"
and "authority" is the concept of “obligation to obey.” Thus, according to theory we are
(politically) obligated to obey if the government acts in such a way that we ought to consent to
its decisions. Obligation then, stems from the practices of (a) government and not (directly)
from the consent of the governed. Though there is the possibility of an aberration of unjust
behavior from a just government which could justify specific and limited resistance, when faced
with a question of whether or not to obey, the main problem is to determine whether or not the
authority is legitimate.
Pitkin offers two considerations for determining the legitimacy of governmental
authority: procedural and substantive justice. No actual authority can completely satisfy
both criteria, neither can any legitimate authority completely ignore either one. They must both
be relevant to a degree determined by the particular situation. The paradox of obligation,
however, is such that "men are both superior to their government and subject to it" and Pitkin
must not only provide the considerations for deciding whether an agent is obligated but must
also provide considerations for determining whether that agent has an obligation.
Before making use of our framework, however, it is necessary to understand what is
meant by the accusations made, and possible reasons for making such accusations.
Calling someone a fool, if the statement can be judged to have deeper meaning than mere
rhetoric, implies that the person makes poor decisions. It is, in effect, to find fault with the
person's process of reasoning. Thus, to call Socrates a fool, in this case, is to dispute his
perception of an obligation to stay in Athens, which was his rationale for not escaping. Calling,
him arrogant further implies that the problem with his reasoning lies in his overestimation of his
own importance or ability.
The different ways of approaching such a criticism correspond to the different possible
rationales for his perception of obligation. It is possible that Socrates perceived his
obligation to Athens based on his past consent to its governance, an idea supported in the Crito
by the dream sequence in which Socrates loses an argument with the laws of Athens. In that
case to call Socrates a fool would be to reject the proposition that past consent to government,
or at least past consent alone, engenders political obligation. It is entirely logical to reject
that position as Pitkin showed through her example of a minor Nazi part official whose past
consent to serve to government of the Third Reich did not obligate him to follow the genocidal
dictates of that government. In light of this misperceiving obligation as based on past consent,
that Socrates might correctly conceive his obligation as based on that criterion is a dubious
proposition.
The question remains, however, why if Socrates refused to carry out an injustice when ordered
by the tyrants, even under threat of death, he passively accepts an injustice to himself in case.
It might seem that he must not consider the sentence to be an injustice. This is possible,
however, because he maintains throughout that his action were not merely not wrong, but were
in fact necessary to the city. A better explanation for Socrates' perception of obligation is
the procedural justice of the Athenian government. He can find nothing wrong with
Athenian laws nor even with their administration, and though his own case might be a
substantial injustice, he judges that the procedural justice of the system outweighs that
aberration, and that his escape might do more harm to the system than it would do good for
him. It is much harder to attack the logic of this rationale; at best one can dispute that
procedural justice is in this case more important or reject Pitkin's relevant considerations
altogether.
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But at the same time this rationale fails to address why proposing and accepting a lesser
punishment than death would not also fulfill his political obligation. The reason is that
Socrates sees an aspect of citizenship to be that "wherever a man has taken a position he
believes to be the best ... there he must I think remain and face danger, without a thought for
death or anything else, rather than face disgrace." (Plato 28d). He further sees it as his duty to
impress upon his fellow Athenians the importance of such behavior. Thus if he did not accept
the sentence, whatever it may be would be contradict the lesson he was trying to teach, and
were he to accept exile (the other practical option), he would no longer be qualified to teach
about Athenian citizenship, having lost it himself. Thus the procedural justice of the Athenian
government compels Socrates to comply with his sentence, while his idea of citizenship, and his
desire or even duty to teach Athenians about it ensures that he can accept no punishment other
than death. Thus upon examination of Socrates' situation using Pitkin's relevant considerations, it appears that one would not be justified in calling Socrates a fool.
Our evaluation of the accusation of Rubashov begins with why he acquiesced. He did so
in order to fulfill what he saw as his political obligation to the Party. There is in fact, not
even a dispute on that issue as Rubashov eventually fulfills Ivanov's prophecy that "When he
has thought out everything to its logical conclusion..." he will see being the scapegoat or
sacrificial lamb of the Party as the logical extension of a lifetime of service to that same Party.
Thus in calling Rubashov despicable for having acquiesced one asserts that he is despicable
precisely for fulfilling his political obligation.. Someone could only make this statement if they
conceived that there were some circumstances under which it is not desirable, indeed
despicable, to fulfill one's political obligation. These circumstances could either be a higher
moral obligation to which political obligation is subordinate, or they could suggest (as Pitkin
does) an inherent contradiction in the conceived reasons to disobey government.
Rubashov has only two possible courses for action: submit and die, or die in silence, by
either of which Rubashov is condemned morally. The first alternative is stated explicitly by
No. 402 “"Honor is to live and die for one's belief '. If Rubashov's true beliefs lay in the precepts
of Communist idealism upon which the revolution was founded, and he believed, as Gletkin
showed in the third hearing, that No. I abandoned those beliefs, then the only acceptable course
of action would be to die in silence. However, if he abandons his faith in the Party in that way,
Rubashov loses the justification for his actions in the service of the Party, many of which, such
as allowing Arlova to die, were of themselves morally condemnable. This catch-22 can perhaps
be circumvented by defining Rubashov's true belief as service to his Party, in which case he
eventually fulfills no. 402s requirement of both living and dying for his beliefs. Another possible
defense is the adoption of an extreme utilitarian morality by which the collective end justifies any
means. This defense loses much of its effectiveness, however, because the end to which
Rubashov must appeal for justification of his actions is seemingly no closer than it was before
those actions, thus the justification is tenuous.
A much clearer resolution of the issue is forthcoming from the second possibility
mentioned above; namely that the concept of political obligation contains the inherent
contradiction that one can be obligated both to obey and disobey. This is Pitkin's position
and it asserts not that there is a consideration which overrides Rubashov's political obligation to
obey but that some action of the Party absolved him of any such obligation and in fact saddled
him with the contradictory obligation to disobey. The theory of hypothetical consent tells us
that the relevant considerations in evaluating this assertion are the procedural and substantive
justice of the government. Pitkin seemingly has Stalinism in mind when she states "A
government that systematically harms its subjects, whether out of misguided good intentions, or
simply for the selfish gain of the rulers, is to that extent illegitimate." Stalinism is then entirely
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illegitimate, having neither procedural nor substantive justice, and being instead entirely
dependent on a supposedly benevolent end to justify awful means. There is no adequate
response to condemnations of Rubashov which take this form. Seemingly his only
justification left for acquiescing, for not recognizing his obligation to resist the Party is a
form of arrogance, of not wanting to render his life's service to that Party meaningless.
That sentiment is certainly understandable much as kicking one's dog after a bad day is,
but it is unjustifiable. Thus while on moral grounds Rubashov can at least defend his actions,
it is clear from Pitkin's analysis that those actions violate a political obligation from which "no
theory or God or Party can get [him] off the hook"(Pitkin 29). Thus it would seem that a
condemnation of Rubashov as despicable would be justified if it were based upon his failure; to
recognize his political obligation to resist the Party.
Thus using Pitkin's theory of hypothetical consent to provide the guidelines of relevant
considerations we evaluate the condemnations of Socrates and Rubashov in such a way that
Socrates did not in fact misapprehend his political obligation and thus cannot be considered a
fool. Rubashov, meanwhile, in acquiescing, performed an obligation from which he had been
absolved by the unjust behavior of the Party, at the same time failing to recognize a new
political obligation to resist the Party, and consequently can be considered despicable.
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