Download United States History - Professor Vanden Bosch

DBQ #2: Cold War
Directions: The following question requires you to construct a coherent essay that
integrates your interpretation of Documents A-M and your knowledge of the period
referred to in the question. High scores will be earned only by essays that both cite key
pieces of evidence from the documents and draw on outside knowledge of the period.
Prompt: “The Cold War was induced by the rigid policies of President Truman towards
the Soviet Union, rather than the actions of the Soviet Union itself.” Assess the validity
of this statement.
Document A
“Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten,
fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist
leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists
were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free
world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger
Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war,
just as similar incidents had brought in the second world war. Source: Truman’s Memoirs
Document B
The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic
faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.
Conflict has, therefore, become endemic, and is waged on dictates of expediency. With the
development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the
ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war….A more
rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world is
recommended, with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations
without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked….
On the basis of current programs, the United States has a large potential military capability
but an actual capability which, though improving, is declining relative to the U.S.S.R., particularly
in light of its probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability. The
same holds true for the free world as a whole relative to the Soviet world as a whole. . . .A frank
evaluation of the requirements, to defend the United States and its vital interests and to support a
vigorous initiative in the cold war, on the one hand, and of present capabilities, on the other,
indicates that there is a sharp and growing disparity between them. . . .” Source: NSC-68 (1950)
Document C
“Stalin aimed above all to guarantee the security of the Soviet Union. Russia had twice in
the twentieth century been stabbed in its heartland by attacks across the windswept plains of
Eastern Europe. Stalin made it clear from the outset of the war that he was determined to have
friendly governments along the Soviet western border, especially in Poland. By maintaining an
extensive Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, Moscow could protect Mother
Russia and consolidate its revolutionary base as the world’s leading Communist country.
To many Americans, that “sphere of influence” looked like an ill-gained “empire.”
Doubting that Soviet goals were purely defensive, they remembered the earlier Bolshevik call for
world revolution.” Source: The American Pageant
Document D
“The American capitalists want to use the help of the Marshall Plan to overwhelm Europe
and bring it into subjection to themselves. The government of the Soviet Union at once
recognized the real meaning of the Marshall Plan, and definitely refused to take part in setting it
up. So also did the governments of the other democratic lands—Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Hungary, and also Finland. But sixteen European states adopted
the Marshall Plan against the wishes of their peoples….
Their purpose there, too, is quite understandable: clearly, the U.S.A. considers Western
Germany as its colony….
The American capitalists counted on using the Marshall Plan to stir up trouble between the
peoples of the democratic countries and the Soviet Union. The Americans proposed to these
countries as follows: ‘We will give you dollars if only you will abandon your friendship with the
Soviet Union. But if you don’t, we won’t give you anything.’ But the peoples of these countries
did not fall for the American capitalists’ trick. They answered the Americans: ‘We will not
exchange our freedom and independence for dollars…’
But this isn’t all. The American capitalists have still another dastardly aim. After using the
Marshall Plan to reduce the European countries, they want to unite them in a military alliance for
a future war against the democratic states.
The Marshall Plan is highly profitable to the United States. For the European countries it
brings only poverty.” Source: Description of Marshall Plan by Soviet propagandists
Document E
“Mr. Truman made as cold a war speech yesterday against Russia as any president has ever
made except on the occasion of going before Congress to ask for a declaration of war...The
outcome will inevitably be war. It probably will not come this year or next year, but the issue is
already drawn. The declaration of implacable hostility between this country and Russia is one
which cannot be tempered or withdrawn…
Mr. Truman’s statement constituted a complete confession of the bankruptcy of American
policy as formulated by Mr. Roosevelt and pursued by himself. We have just emerged from a
great war which was dedicated to the extinction of three nations [Germany, Italy, Japan] which
were as vocally opposed to Russia as Mr. Truman proclaims himself to be now. If communism
was the real danger all along, why did Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman adopt Russia as an ally, and
why, at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, did they build up Russia’s power by making her one
concession after another?” Source: The Chicago Tribune (1947)
Document F
With Germany now split in two, there remained the problem of the rubble heap known as
Berlin. Lying deep within the Soviet zone, this beleaguered isle in a red sea had been broken , like
Germany as a whole, into sectors occupied by troops of each of the four victorious powers. In
1948, following angry controversies over German currency reform and four-power control, the
Russians abruptly choked off all rail and highway access to Berlin. They evidently reasoned that
the Allies would be starved out.
Berlin became a hugely symbolic issue for both sides. At stake was not only the fate of the
city but a test of wills between Moscow and Washington. The Americans organized a gigantic
airlift in the midst of hair-trigger tension. . . .The Russians, their bluff dramatically called, finally
lifted their blockade in May 1949. Source: The America Pageant
Document G
Document H
“I am fully aware of the broad implications involved in the United States extends assistance
to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time….
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has
taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations...We shall not realize our objectives,
however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian
regimes. [Applause.] This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed
upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international
peace and hence the security of the United States….
The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and
intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also
state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments….
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is
essential to economic stability and orderly political processes….
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely
endanger the welfare of our own Nation.” Source: Truman’s Speech in Congress in 1947
Document I
“National Security Action Memorandum No.273 makes clear the resolve of the President to
ensure victory over the externally directed and supported communist insurgency in South
Vietnam. In order to achieve that victory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the
United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions which now
limit our efforts, and to undertake bolder actions which may embody greater risks….
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly mindful that our fortunes in South Vietnam are an
accurate barometer of our fortunes in all of Southeast Asia. It is our view that if the U.S. program
succeeds in South Vietnam it will go far toward stabilizing the total Southeast Asia situation.
Conversely, a loss of South Vietnam to the communists will presage an early erosion of the
remainder of out position in that subcontinent….
Finally, this being the first real test of our determination to defeat the communist wars of
national liberation formula, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there would be a
corresponding unfavorable effect upon our image in Africa and in Latin America.” Source:
Memorandum from General Maxwell D. Taylor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara, Proposing intensified U.S. military actions in Vietnam, November 26, 1963
Document I
“A final fateful conference of the Big Three had taken place in February 1945 at Yalta. At
this former czarist resort on the relatively warm shores of the Black Sea, Stalin, Churchill, and the
fast-failing Roosevelt reached momentous agreements, after pledging their faith with
vodka…Stalin agreed that Poland, with revised boundaries, should have a representative
government based on free elections…Bulgaria and Rumania were likewise to have free elections.
Defenders of the departed Roosevelt countered that if Stalin had kept his promise to
support free elections in Poland and the liberated Balkans, the sorry sequel would have been
different. Actually, Russian troops had then occupied much of Eastern Europe, and a war to
throw them out was unthinkable.” Source: The American Pageant
Document J
“In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US
there can be no permanent modus vivendi (agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist
peacefully), that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be
broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over
energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and
is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an
elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of
amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground
methods are presumably without parallel in history. . . .Problem of how to cope with this force is
undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to
face. . . .It should be Approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic
problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort….
Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It
does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason,
and it is highly sensitive to logic of force….
We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. . . .Press cannot do
this alone. It must be done mainly by government, which is necessarily more experienced and
better informed on practical problems involved. . . .I am convinced that there would be far less
hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood
by our people. . . .It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with
Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian American relations. . . .
World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. . . .
We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and
constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is
not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign
peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested
in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We
should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.”
Source: Kennan’s “Long Telegram” to the State Department in 1946