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The Evolution of Language
According to Noam Chomsky
Bachelor Eindwerkstuk
Willemijn van de Riet (3342476)
Engelse Taal en Cultuur – Universiteit Utrecht
Begeleider: Dr. William Philip
Tweede Lezer: Prof. Dr. Martin Everaert
Juni 2014
2
Verklaring: Intellectueel Eigendom
De Universiteit Utrecht definieert het verschijnsel “plagiaat” als volgt:
Van plagiaat is sprake bij het in een scriptie of ander werkstuk gegevens of
tekstgedeelten van anderen overnemen zonder bronvermelding. Onder plagiaat
valt onder meer:
het knippen en plakken van tekst van digitale bronnen zoals encyclopedieën of
digitale tijdschriften zonder aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
het knippen en plakken van teksten van het internet zonder aanhalingstekens en
verwijzing;
het overnemen van gedrukt materiaal zoals boeken, tijdschriften of
encyclopedieën zonder aanhalingstekens of verwijzing;
het opnemen van een vertaling van bovengenoemde teksten zonder
aanhalingstekens en verwijzing;
het parafraseren van bovengenoemde teksten zonder verwijzing. Een parafrase
mag nooit bestaan uit louter vervangen van enkele woorden door synoniemen;
het overnemen van beeld-, geluids- of testmateriaal van anderen zonder
verwijzing en zodoende laten doorgaan voor eigen werk;
het overnemen van werk van andere studenten en dit laten doorgaan voor eigen
werk. Indien dit gebeurt met toestemming van de andere student is de laatste
medeplichtig aan plagiaat;
ook wanneer in een gezamenlijk werkstuk door een van de auteurs plagiaat wordt
gepleegd, zijn de andere auteurs medeplichtig aan plagiaat, indien zij hadden
kunnen of moeten weten dat de ander plagiaat pleegde;
het indienen van werkstukken die verworven zijn van een commerciële instelling
(zoals een internetsite met uittreksels of papers) of die tegen betaling door
iemand anders zijn geschreven.
Ik heb de bovenstaande definitie van het verschijnsel “plagiaat” zorgvuldig
gelezen, en verklaar hierbij dat ik mij in het aangehechte essay / werkstuk niet
schuldig heb gemaakt aan plagiaat.
Titel BA-eindwerkstuk: The Evolution of Language - According to Noam
Chomsky
Naam: Willemijn van de Riet
Studentnummer: 3342476
Plaats: Utrecht
Datum: 13-06-2014
Image: (n.p., n.d.)
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Table of Contents
Verklaring: Intellectueel Eigendom ............................................................................................2
Introduction ................................................................................................................................4
Theoretical framework ...............................................................................................................5
Chomskyan Linguistics ............................................................................................................5
The Language Faculty: Existence ............................................................. 6
The Chomskyan Language Faculty: Nature and Composition ....................... 7
The Chomskyan Language Faculty: Evolution ............................................ 8
Main question...................................................................................................................... 10
Method .................................................................................................................................... 10
Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 11
Chomsky´s Critics ................................................................................................................. 12
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 16
Works Cited ............................................................................................................................. 19
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Introduction
Finding out how language evolved has been called “the hardest problem in
science”. In fact, at one point the subject inspired such fanciful theories that the
leading ‘Société de Linguistique de Paris’ felt it necessary to impose a ban on all
scientific reasoning on language origin and evolution (Christiansen and Kirby
2003, 300-307). Even if such a ban is of course no longer called for, it is argued
that language can still not be fully comprehended until “we (…) get language
evolution right” (Bickerton 2014, 9). This has proven a tricky task. After all,
language does not fossilize (Fitch, Hauser, and Chomsky 2005, 185), which
makes reliable evidence hard to come by. Additionally, it has been shown that
some aspects of language have, at best, analogues in other species, which means
that the comparative method cannot be fully engaged for the analysis of its
evolution (Berwick et al. 2013, 89, 93). Thanks to recent advancements in
linguistics, neurology, biology, and technology, however, our understanding of
language has improved considerably.
From a linguistic point of view, perhaps the most important development
of the last century was the birth of modern linguistics associated with the
beginning of Noam Chomsky’s scientific career (Dennett 1995, 384). As of such,
Noam Chomsky’s views form a likely starting point for an inquiry into the
evolution of language. This thesis, then, aims to investigate Chomskyan claims on
language evolution.
It will do so as follows: first, Chomsky’s views on the matter will be
introduced. They will form the theoretical framework for later analysis. After
briefly explaining the research method used, the thesis will then move on to
discuss criticism of Chomskyan evolutionary theory. The final chapter will present
a conclusion.
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Theoretical framework
This chapter reviews ‘Chomskyan linguistics’ and its views on the nature and
evolution of the language faculty. In doing so, it establishes a framework for later
investigation on Chomsky’s evolutionary views. First, a definition for ‘Chomskyan
linguistics’ will be provided, after which it will be shown to have had a significant
impact on much linguistic study. The part that follows investigates Universal
Grammar theory from a Chomskyan perspective, after briefly establishing the
existence of an innate language faculty, outlining its nature and providing a short
explanation of the general evolutionary process. The views set out will then be
used to formulate the main question.
Chomskyan Linguistics
Firstly, it might be useful to specify what is meant when using ‘Chomskyan
linguistics’ or ‘Chomskyan theory’ for a framework. As proposed by Hutton,
“Chomskyan linguistics is defined by its commitment to universalism and to belief
in the existence of a shared species-wide language faculty grounded in human
biology” (Hutton 2010, 337). The ‘language faculty’ or ‘Universal Grammar’ are
names for the changeable linguistic theory about what the innate structure of
language is. Firstly, as to the definition of ´language´, there are many. When this
thesis refers to the evolution of ‘language’, it speaks of the evolution of the innate
language faculty in the general sense, without adhering to any specific theory
about what it may contain. The thesis follows Chomsky in assuming that the LF is
made up of FLN and FLB, noting that whatever FLN contains is human and
language-specific while whatever FLB contains is the ‘rest of language’, as
explained later on.
Chomsky interprets the UG concept with a theory about the nature of the
initial state of language, which is innate and thus shared across the human
species, and is exclusively designed to explain for first language acquisition in
terms of grammar (Chomsky 2006, 1). This latter definition will be examined in
more detail later in this chapter. First, it is established why in this thesis,
Chomsky’s views have been chosen to form the starting point of inquiry into the
evolution of human language.
Perhaps the most potent justification for using Chomskyan theory as a
framework is that much research already seems to have done so: Chomsky was
personally responsible for an “explosion of empirical inquiry” (Chomsky 2006, xii)
into the nature and evolution of language. Some scholars even go as far as to link
the beginning of Chomsky’s scientific career to the birth of modern linguistics: “in
much the way there was biology before Darwin … there was linguistics before
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Chomsky” (Dennett 1995, 384-385). Terrace adds that Chomsky is arguably the
most important linguist of the twentieth century (Terrace 2011, 5). Additionally,
Chomsky has been the most consistent in his views about the language faculty
(Bickerton 2014, 16).
Of course, the above by no means suggests that Chomskyan linguistics are
universally accepted. To the contrary, his theories have been subjected to a great
deal of criticism (and sometimes to “outright abuse” (Bickerton 2014, 37)). It
cannot be denied, however, that Chomskyan theory constitutes a valuable
contribution to linguistic knowledge, nor that it provides a useful framework
through which to deepen our understanding of language (Bickerton 2014, 37).
Even Chomsky-critics have been known to admit that “we can now be sure that
the truth lies much closer to Chomsky’s end of the table than to that of his
opponents” (Dennett 1995, 388).
Before starting the analysis, the next sections will elaborate further on
Chomsky´s views on the language faculty and its evolution. Firstly, however, it is
important to explain why this thesis presupposes the existence of a Chomskyan
language faculty.
The Language Faculty: Existence
In this part of the thesis, it is briefly explained why in this thesis it is accepted
that there is an innate structure to language, known by many names, such as the
‘language faculty’, ‘language acquisition device’ or LAD, ‘language organ’, and
‘built in language competence’.
Chomsky himself commented that “no one can rationally question that
there is a genetic component to the language faculty” (Chomsky 2013, 34).
Perhaps the most well-known argument in favor of such a claim is known as the
‘poverty of the stimulus’ or POS argument, with Deacon (2010, 9005) arguing
that “language is too complex and systematic and our capacity to acquire it too
facile, to be adequately explained by cultural use and general learning alone”. In
other words, it is doubtful that children would be able to acquire language as
speedily and efficiently as they (generally) do, if there were no innate linguistic
mechanisms at work to aid the process.
Additionally, evidence for a neural basis of the computational abilities
necessary for language is beginning to become identifiable (Berwick et al. 2013,
89, 93), even if it is tricky to pinpoint any given capacity to specific areas of the
brain. In other words, neural links for language have been shown to exist, but
elements of the language faculty do not ‘live’ in one region or the other
(MacMahon and MacMahon 2013, 129). This is evident, for example, from the fact
that brain damage to a given area results in aphasic symptoms in some
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individuals but not in others (Dick et al. 2001, 759-788). At any rate, the fact
that a damaged or not yet fully matured brain (may, in the former case,) cause
‘deficient’ linguistic behavior provides another argument in favor of the existence
of a neural component for language (Berwick et al. 2013, 94).
If such a neural component existed, it would be an expression of genes. If
these ‘language genetics’ were to be successfully characterized, they would
present a most convincing argument in favor of an innate component to
language. Indeed, “one of the major aims of biolinguistics is to arrive at a genetic
characterization of language” (Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco 2014, 9). This study
has proven difficult, yet recently researchers have claimed to find a possible
genetic association for linguistic performance - e.g. (Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco,
2014; Zhou, 2013). It seems, then, that some researchers are edging towards
support of the existence of a genetic basis for language.
Summarizing, in this thesis it is accepted that an innate language
component exists for three reasons: first, it provides an adequate solution to the
POS argument, second, evidence for a neural basis of the computational abilities
necessary for language is beginning to be identifiable, and third, researchers
claim to begin to find a genetic basis that may be associated with language
performance.
Next, it is necessary to briefly examine what, according to Chomsky, such
an innate language faculty would look like.
The Chomskyan Language Faculty: Nature and Composition
According to (Jackendoff and Pinker 2005, 218), Chomsky’s general views on
language play a great role in evolutionary arguments. Therefore, before moving
on to the discussion on language evolution, this section will provide an
introduction to Chomsky’s current UG theory.
When elaborating on the nature of the language organ, a minimalist
framework is adopted, for reasons of it being Chomsky’s current scheme of
inquiry. According to the most recent Chomsky publication, then, the LAD in a
general sense is "a shared species and domain-specific computational ability with
identifiable correlates in the brain, that has remained fixed since the origin of
language approximately 100 thousand years ago and from which the unified
nature of human language arises" (Berwick et al. 2013, 89).
In accordance with the minimalist program, the language faculty in the
narrow sense, or FLN, is made up of what is human and language-specific. In this
framework, the rest of language is “either specific to humans but not to language
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(e.g.words and concepts) or not specific to humans (e.g. speech perception 1)”
(Pinker and Jackendoff 2005, 201). This ‘rest of language’ forms the faculty in a
broad sense, or FLB, which additionally consists of mechanisms that support the
production (externalization) and perception of externalized internal components,
as well as of mechanisms to support internal language activities, such as planning
and reasoning (Berwick et al. 2013, 90).
The distinction between FLN and FLB explains why UG theory “recognizes
that some aspects of language are unconnected to UG” (Cook and Newson 2006,
25), as UG is connected only to FLN. The core of language is made up of an
internal syntactic factory that gives shape to concept-thought relations (Bickerton
2014, 12-13). Cook and Newson claim that Evidence from children in the
acquisition process supports the hypothesis that the learning of surface variety
forms is not aided by innate mechanisms, by the simple fact that the irregular
forms are acquired more slowly (Cook and Newson 2006, 25).
For this thesis, it would be too complex and spacious an issue to research
and describe what ecaxtly the language faculty might contain, or which parts of it
belong to FLN and which to FLB. Of course, this poses problems for an inquiry into
the evolution of language: after all, your evolutionary theory of language would
depend on your theory of the language faculty. As the framework here only
assumes, after Chomsky, that an innate component to language exists and does
not go into its exact composition except for subscribing to the FLN-FLB
distinction, the inquiry will probably remain abstract and incomplete. It can,
however, look at Chomsky´s views on how the language faculty evolved.
The Chomskyan Language Faculty: Evolution
Firstly, as to the general workings of mutation and natural selection: when a
mutation occurs, resulting from external pressures or some ecological problem,
but more often from random sequence copying mistakes, this mutation can set a
selectional process in motion. If one or several mutations cause a difference
between two ‘versions’ of organisms, and if the ‘new version’ is not negative for
that organism’s survival, it is possible that the mutation survives. If the mutation
has positive effects and favors survival, organisms with the mutation may
produce more viable offspring, and thus more and more organisms through
subsequent generations will have the mutation (MacMahon and MacMahon 2013,
8-9). With this in mind, this section will examine Chomsky’s ideas on the
evolution of the language faculty.
Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch suggest that parts of the faculty might be
‘spandrels’, meaning that they may not have been adaptations in themselves
1
This view is contested.
9
(Hutton 2010, 343) but may be by-products of greater intellectual capacity
(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002, 1574). To explain for the emergence of this
greater capacity, Chomsky hypothesizes that “the simplest account of the ‘Great
Leap Forward’ in the evolution of humans would be that the brain was rewired”,
and that it was “effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was
instantly endowed with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others,
transmitted to offspring and coming to predominate” (Chomsky 2005, 12).
This “effectively instantaneous” scenario applies at least to the core
properties of language, because its human and language-specific nature leaves
little room for a gradualist history. However, Chomsky does seem to think it
possible that some aspects of FLB came about by gradual natural selection.
(Berwick et al. 2013, 89) concludes with some arguments that support an
evolutionary view of FLB, namely that apes, monkeys, songbirds and humans
share analogous genes and brain regions that are involved in communicative
comprehension and production. It also argues that on these latter two points,
songbirds show a comparable learning process to human children. Finally, it notes
the possibility that the biological structures and acquisition processes evolved in
songbirds and apes contributed to human language, even if the latter’s
“combinatorial complexity” is human-specific (Berwick et al. 2013, 96). It seems,
then, that at least parts of the language faculty in the broad sense came into
existence in humans after having gone through a gradual evolutionary process.
Chomsky remains firm in one aspect, however: at least the core properties of
language must have evolved suddenly.
Another point Chomsky makes about the evolution of those aspects of
language that may have evolved gradually, is that the selectional pressures may
not have necessarily been targeted at communication (Hauser, Chomsky, and
Fitch 2002, 1574). Of course, natural selection cannot be said to be ´targeted´ at
anything: mutations are more often than not random copying mistakes, and even
if natural selection favors traits because they are beneficial for an organism’s
survival, evolution cannot be seen to work towards some sort of final goal. Yet
Chomsky´s claim only refers again to the spandrel-theory: it is possible that
some aspects useful for language were shaped by selectional pressures for
something else. To support this claim of selectional pressures possibly not having
been targeted at communication, Chomsky argues that when there is conflict
between functional demands: the demand of minimal computational complexity
prevails over that of communicative efficiency (Berwick et al. 2013, 91-92). This
basically means that when producing a phrase, the brain is not primarily
concerned about how effectively a listener would be able to process this
10
information. It favors computational simplicity over communicative efficiency.
Bickerton (2014, 13) effectively sums up this argument, noting that
“the automated algorithms that assemble both words and thoughts are
perfectly adequate for thinking with. In both thought and language you
need to know the precise relations between the things you’re talking or
thinking about (…) But if you’re talking, someone is usually listening, and
that someone doesn’t know and can’t know [about these relations] unless
they are overtly spelled out”.
He then goes on to claim that the brain does not concern itself with this problem
(Bickerton 2014, 13).
Summarizing, even if Chomsky accepts the possibility of an adaptationist
scenario for some aspects of the language faculty (those modules that are not
species- and domain-specific), the selectional pressures may not have been
´targeted´ at language. FLN (if assumed to be Merge, a combination principle
that is responsible for the human- and language-specific capacity to form
innumerable utterances from a finite set of building blocks (Chomsky 1995, 56))
can only have evolved saltationally.
Main question
This chapter has illustrated that Chomsky’s explanation for how humans acquire
language, and how he takes that as central to modern linguistics. His views on
how this capacity evolved, however, are “greatly controversial” (Glackin 2011,
202). To recall, Chomsky believes that an instantaneous scenario would be the
most plausible explanation for the emergence of greater human cognitive
capacities that allow for human language. For some aspects of language that are
not human- and domain-specific, he suggests that an adaptationist account would
be possible, whereas FLN could only have emerged saltationally. The next chapter
will look at some of the criticism on Chomskyan evolutionary theory. This way,
the following question can hopefully be answered in the conclusion:
Is Chomsky´s view on how language evolved a plausible one?
Method
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The previous chapter examined Chomsky’s theory on the evolution of language.
The following chapter exhibits criticism of these views. The analysis will mainly be
based on literature that specifically targets Chomskyan evolutionary views, by
way of a review or with titles such as “Chomsky Contra Darwin” (Dennett 1995,
384), “Chomsky’s Problem” (Bickerton 2014, 37), or “On Chomsky's Fable of
Instantaneous Language Evolution” (Botha 1999, 243). These views will be
considered in comparison with Chomskyan theory, to see if any conclusion can be
drawn. In the conclusion, there will hopefully be an answer to the following
question: Is Chomsky´s view on how language evolved a plausible one?
Literature was retrieved from the SCOPUS and Web of Science databases,
for reasons of reliability and to be sure that articles were peer-reviewed and
appeared in prominent journals. For books, a selection was made on the basis of
publishing houses. Additionally, this thesis used recent works wherever possible,
so as to be better adapted to topical issues and recent advancements.
Analysis
As seen in the theoretical framework, Chomskyan theory on language evolution
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ties together with his general views on the composition and nature of the
language faculty. One part of the language organ is made up of FLB, which
contains mechanisms to support speech production and perception, as well as
internal language activities, such as planning and reasoning (Berwick et al. 2013,
90). According to Chomsky, aspects of FLB have precursors in other species so
may have evolved gradually, but not necessarily because of selectional pressures
for language. The other part of the language organ is, unlike FLB, both language
and human specific, and contains the core properties of language. The human
specific property of Merge leaves little room for a gradualist scenario (either it is
there, or it is not) and as of such must be believed to have emerged
instantaneously, possibly as a spandrel of a general advancement in cognitive
capacity. This chapter aims to present some of the arguments against Chomsky’s
interpretation of language evolution.
Chomsky´s Critics
For those who have followed Chomsky’s theorising since his early career, it might
seem strange to see his views united under a thesis on evolution. Since his earlier
publications, there has been some debate as regarding Chomsky’s opinion on the
evolution of a genetic component for language. As affirmed here by (Pinker 1994,
355), it seems that at least at some point Chomsky was doubtful whether such a
component could have come about by evolutionary processes:
“Chomsky, one might think, would have everything to gain by grounding
his controversial theory about a language organ in the firm foundation of
evolutionary theory, and in some writings he has hinted at a connection.
But more often he is skeptical.”
Dennett, too, remarks that “There have long been signs, then, of Chomsky’s
agnosticism – or even antagonism – towards Darwinism”, noting that Chomsky
was of the opinion that the core properties of language (assumed by Chomskyan
theory to be Merge, a combination principle that is responsible for the humanand language-specific capacity to form innumerable utterances from a finite set of
building blocks (Chomsky 1995, 56)) did not evolve but appeared suddenly, as if
a gift or consequence of the enlargement of the neocortex (Dennett 1995, 390).
More signs of this early Chomskyan view can be found in the work of
Gould. Gould admitted to following Chomsky’s evolutionary reading of UG theory
when stating that language must have originated as a by-product of the enlarged
brain. He goes on to support this claim by arguing that language universals are
unlike anything else that can be found in nature (Gould 1988, 14). Indeed,
Chomsky himself asserted that “there is no substance” to the belief that the
development of built in language capacities can be attributed to natural selection
(Chomsky 1972, 97). Indeed, it is likely that when subscribing to the theory of
13
Merge a saltational scenario must be adopted for its evolution; yet Chomsky´s
peers seem to suggest that, in the past, the former seems to have done so
without placing his theories in a Darwinian framework. However, Chomsky´s
claim of sudden appearance for some aspects of the language faculty does not
necessarily rule out a Darwinian scenario, as saltatational mutation(s) are
perfectly plausible. As to Chomsky’s supposed antagonism towards Darwin, at
least for his later work this is simply not true. He has demonstrably been busying
himself with finding out how the language faculty evolved (Hauser, Chomsky, and
Fitch 2002, 1572), and recently co-authored a journal article that regards human
language as being an evolutionary development (Berwick et al. 2013, 89).
As may be recalled from the theoretical framework, Chomsky believes that
aspects of the language organ possibly came into being as by-products of the
‘Great Leap Forward’, which involved the rewiring of a single individual’s brain, its
transmittance to offspring and finally its predomination in humans (Chomsky
2005, 12). On this, Dennett notes that even if parts of the language organ would
have emerged as side consequences of an advancement in brain capacity, these
traits must still have been subject to natural selection (Dennett 1995, 390-391).
These two positions, however, are not contradictory, but rather can be
consecutive to each other: once the mutation(s) occurred and any spandrels
came into being, the spandrels may not have an adaptationist history but it would
still depend on natural selection whether the spandrels survive or not. This
survival may have to do with positive effects on language, or it may not.
Correlated, for Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco the Chomskyan explanation of
the Great Leap Forward is not sufficient proof on which to base conclusions about
the LAD. They note that
“both brain size and laterality have long been thought to underlie our
language-ready brain. But if we are right, language-readiness cannot be
understood in the absence of a detailed characterization of the shape of
the human head” (Boeckx and Benítez-Burraco 2014, 9).
Such a detailed characterization is not yet available in full, and Boeckx and
Benítez-Burraco might well be right in claiming that, until it is, it is complicated to
draw conclusions about the nature and emergence of language. Yet Chomsky only
provides a framework and a theory that awaits contradictory evidence, and to
hold back evolutionary debate until “a detailed characterization of the shape of
the human head” is available may, at least, not be the most productive of
approaches.
Scholars have also objected to the Chomskyan argument of instantaneity.
Glackin, for example, subscribes to an adaptationist view and argues that the LF
14
evolved via the Baldwin effect2. According to the same author, this position is
supported by Pinker and Bloom. This thesis will not go into this possibility, as
“empirically confirmed cases of evolution via the Baldwin Effect remain decidedly
elusive” (Glackin 2011, 208). Additionally, as seen in the theoretical framework,
Chomsky only denies a gradual adaptationist scenario for (at least) the core
aspects of language.
Botha, then, argues that assuming an instantaneous scenario for language
evolution is a barrier for linguistic research. After all, if language did indeed
evolve instantaneously, research would still have to be aimed at uncovering the
adaptations and the role of natural selection in language evolution: this because a
claim for instantaneous evolution would only become more plausible when no
evidence for an adaptationist view could be found (Botha 1999, 255). This claim,
however, relates more to philosophy of science than to Chomsky´s particular
point of view on the evolution of FLN: if, for example, researchers were to see if
Chomskyan evolutionary theory was falsifiable3, this would accomplish
exactly what Botha argues for.
Additionally, Jackendoff and Pinker express criticism about the
inconsistency of Chomsky’s evolutionary views (e.g. Jackendoff and Steven 2005,
213-221). By ways of an example, they comment that in 2000, Chomsky asserted
that research into adaptive mechanisms is pointless, whereas in 2002 Fitch,
Hauser and Chomsky argue that FLB is shaped by natural selection (e.g.
Jackendoff and Steven 2005, 213). Yet, Chomsky´s position is not inconsistent,
but these seemingly contradictive statements relate to two different issues.
Research into adaptive mechanisms for FLN is pointless, whereas features of FLB
may receive a gradualist explanation.
It also has been argued that it is possible to adopt a Darwinian framework
for the evolution of FLN. As hypothesized by Hurford, animals show combining
skills that may be precursory to to the combinatorial aspect of human language:
“it is indeed possible that an animal could privately solve some simple problem,
remember the solution, and apply this learned knowledge later in solving some
more complex task” (Hurford 2011, 168). It is doubtful, however, that combining
skills can be seen as a precursor to the combinatorial complexity of human
language. Combinations have a limited number of options, whereas linguistic
utterances are indefinite. Definite systems and indefinite systems are two
Via the Baldwin mechanism, it is possible for “previously learned behaviour to
enter and be progressively encoded in the genome (…) by radically altering
selection pressures according to cultural norms” (Glackin 208, 2011).
3
In this case, by trying to find ´the black swan´: proof that FLN did evolve via
adaptations.
2
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different things, which is why a definite system cannot serve as an evolutionary
precursor to FLN.
According to Derek Bickerton, language evolution must be split into three
stages. In the first stage, human language evolved beyond the boundaries of
animal communication. It did so when an ancestor to humans ‘responded’
adventitiously to some external problem that called for referential displacement
capacities4 (Bickerton 2014, 10-11). To support this claim, Bickerton notes that
according to Odling-Smee, Laland and Feldman, it is common for a new niche to
develop as a result of some ecological problem.
The second stage consisted of acquiring basic solutions to deal with the
results that the first process generated. The need for referential displacement
capacities caused the brain to allot, re-allocate and/or rewire to adapt itself better
to the presence and use of these symbolic unit representations. This rewiring
process, it is argued, is not the result of external selection but of internal
demands of economy, and works to efficiently organize ‘newly acquired’ senses in
the respective animal’s brain (Bickerton 2014, 11-12). The following citation
illustrates this process better:
“Since its owners made blundering efforts to string both proto-words and
concepts together for its utterances and thoughts respectively, [the brain]
was obliged to develop simple stereotypical and fully automated routines
to reduce the effort of assembling them each time on the fly. It had done
no less for other repeated behaviors: throwing, picking up, striking, etc.”
(Bickerton 2014, 12).
In the third part of the process, the basic structures described above
evolved into the language we know today (Bickerton 2014, 10-11). This process
involved human use of language for speech and perception, through which
language change took place, sometimes making perception easier but also
causing surface variations (Bickerton 2014, 12-13).
Bickerton´s account then, aligns with Chomksy in noting that a rewiring
process played a part in language evolution, and works towards giving an
evolutionary explanation of a Chomskyan LAD. His description of the first process
in which an ancestor responded adventitiously to some problem, however, is
merely a theory on why the survival of mutation(s) allowing for referential
displacement capacities may have been advantageous: because they aid problem
solving skills. In Bickerton´s description, the rewiring process following the
mutation(s) then yields assembled routines and basic structures, which evolved
“The capacity to transfer information about entities and events that lay outside
the immediate sensory range of the animals concerned,” following (Bickerton
2014, 11).
4
16
to become modern language. This latter evolving is either a description of
language change (as opposed to language evolution), or presupposes that at
some point evolution worked directly on language itself. It is beyond this thesis to
comment on that possibility, yet it may be noted that Chomsky considers that
parts of the language faculty emerged from pressures not necessarily ´directed
at´ language. Additionally, it is unclear what according to Bickerton exactly
caused a new niche to develop and what exactly was yielded by this first stage.
The latter is also true for the second stage: it is unclear what these basic
structures and assembled routines that emerged from the rewiring would look
like.
Summarizing, this section has presented different views and some of the
criticism on Chomskyan evolutionary theory. The criticism here discussed,
however, does not provide evidence against Chomsky´s position of gradual
evolution for some aspects of FLB and instant emergence of FLN, with the
possibility of parts of the LF being spandrels. In the conclusion, it will be
discussed whether our main question (Is Chomsky´s view on how language
evolved a plausible one?) can be answered.
Conclusion
Firstly, it must be noted that in the process of putting together this thesis, it
17
became clear that, for several reasons, it cannot provide an answer to the main
question. Chomskyan linguistic theory is complex, and understanding it in its
entirety, let alone being able to explain it, presents a challenge that would take
up more time than alotted for a Bachelor thesis. Secondly, because of this, the
theoretical framework is a rocky basis for further discussion. Every view
presented in the analysis is equally complex in its comments on Chomskyan
evolutionary theory. Additionally, the analysis performed here is incomplete, as it
discusses only part of the criticism directed at Chomskyan theory. Quite a
different matter but equally important: the question of language evolution has not
yet been settled, so Chomsky´s views on it cannot be finally contradicted or
confirmed. As put by Glackin, the debate is still a bit of a “speculative pen-andpaper affair, awaiting empirical support” (Glackin 216, 2011). Finally, it would
have been necessary to elaborate further on Chomsky´s theory of FLN, because
that eventually is the distinguishing factor that any evolutionary account of
human language would have to account for. In other words, your evolutionary
story depends on your theory of FLN. Yet this thesis did not research whether
there are any objections to Chomskyan UG theory in general, which must be
presupposed when speaking of his evolutionary views.
What can be concluded from the literature discussed above, however, is
the criticism on Chomsky presented in the analysis does not succeed in providing
any definite evidence against his ideas on the evolution of language.
Summarizing, then, all that came before: the theoretical framework
started with establishing that Chomsky’s explanation for how humans acquire
language is central to modern language theory. Then, it claimed that Chomskyan
linguistics may be defined by “its commitment to universalism and to belief in the
existence of a shared species-wide language faculty grounded in human biology”
(Hutton 2010, 337). The ‘language faculty’ or ‘Universal Grammar’ are names for
the changeable linguistic theory about what the innate structure of language is.
Chomsky’s interprets the UG concept with a theory about the nature of the initial
state of language, which is innate and thus shared across the human species, and
is exclusively designed to explain for first language acquisition in terms of
grammar. This thesis accepts that such an innate language organ exists, because
of the POS argument and because of the first scraps of neural and genetic
evidence are beginning to become available. Chomsky believes that the language
faculty is made up of two parts: FLN, containing what is human and languagespecific, and FLB, containing the rest of language that is “either specific to
humans but not to language or not specific to humans” (Pinker and Jackendoff
2005, 201). This faculty evolved, according to Chomsky, saltationally in the case
18
of FLN, and (possibly) gradually in the case of FLB, not necessarily under the
influence of pressures directed at language and possibly having emerged as
spandrels. Naturally, the human and language-specific nature of FLN leaves little
room for a gradualist scenario, and that adaptations may have played a role in
the evolution of FLB cannot reasonably be denied. The criticism discussed in the
analysis does not provide any evidence to contradict the Chomskyan position on
language evolution.
It would, however, require research that is beyond the power of this thesis
to be able to determine whether Chomsky´s view on how language evolved is a
plausible one. Maybe the answer to such a question is even beyond current
knowledge, needing a better understanding of human cognition and genetics.
Still, Chomskyan theory has long constituted a useful framework through which to
deepen our understanding of language (Bickerton 2014, 37), and judging by the
ongoing debate surrounding Chomskyan linguistics and evolutionary theory, he
inspires researchers to this day to do exactly that.
19
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