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Korematsu v. United States:
The U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Internment
America fought World War II to preserve freedom and democracy, yet that same
war featured the greatest suppression of civil liberties in the nation’s history. In an
atmosphere of hysteria, President Roosevelt, encouraged by officials at all levels of
the federal government, authorized the internment of tens of thousands of American
citizens of Japanese ancestry and resident aliens from Japan. One of the most
important of the legal challenges to the internment policy was Korematsu v. United
States, a case brought by Fred T. Korematsu, a Nisei (an American-born person
whose parents were born in Japan). Korematsu had been arrested by the FBI for
failing to report for relocation and was convicted in federal court in September
1942. The U.S. Supreme Court, in a sharply divided 6–3 decision, upheld
Korematsu’s conviction in late 1944. The majority opinion, written by Justice Hugo
Black, rejected the plaintiff’s discrimination argument and upheld the government’s
right to relocate citizens in the face of wartime emergency.
The excerpt is as follows: (spaces represent text edited due to time constraints)
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to
the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can. . . .
Executive Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 . . . issued after we were at war with
Japan, declared that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material,
national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities. . . .”
Here, as in the Hirabayashi case, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that
population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly
ascertained. ….Like curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed
necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members
of the group, most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country. It was
because we could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was
impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal
that we sustained the validity of the curfew order as applying to the whole group. In
the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military
on the same ground. . . .
We uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made and when the petitioner
violated it. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes,
except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our
basic governmental institutions. BUT when under conditions of modern warfare our
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.
Source: Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)