Download Casey Young HST 581: Middle East Dr. Wilgus November 29, 2012

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Casey Young
HST 581: Middle East
Dr. Wilgus
November 29, 2012
June 1967: Israel’s Preemptive Strike in the Six-Day War
In the matter of one week, from June 5-June 10 1967, the Middle East was changed.
Israel, having been created by and relying on western societies for their entire existence,
proved for the first time that they were not only capable of winning a war on their own, but
they could win without much of a struggle and in quick fashion. Israel also proved to the
Middle Eastern world that if they were provoked for long enough, they would be willing to
strike without help from the United States, Britain, or any other world ally. With the threat
of extinction being spewed from the lips of neighboring countries, and actions of mobilizing
armies creeping ever closer to their borders, Israel proved that national security and state
survival was of uttermost importance, even if that meant they had to preemptively strike
first. Preemptive strikes leave a sour taste in people’s mouths, always wondering if
something could have been done to prevent that conflict from escalating. History has
proven that Israel tried in every way to diplomatically persuade their Arab neighbors from
mounting an attack against their country, and when diplomacy was exhausted, Israel was
justified in striking first against what appeared to be a formable enemy.
Many people believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict dates back to the biblical accounts
found in the Old Testament book of Genesis, when Abraham and Sarah became impatient
with God and decided to take matters into their own hands. Since Sarah was barren, she
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convinced Abraham to sleep with his handmaid Hagar, who would have a son Ishmael, the
father of the Arab nations. Sarah would also become pregnant with her son Isaac, from
whom the Israelite nation would come. God had promised this new land and new people to
Abraham through his wife Sarah, not through the handmaid Hagar. Since Ishmael was the
oldest, the Arab people believe that the land should rightfully be theirs, but the Israelites,
believing that the land belongs to them because they were chosen by God (Yahweh), see the
situation differently.
New developments in the early 20th century have shaped the new resurgence of
conflict between the Arabs and the Israelites. King Abdullah II believes that the conflict is
not centuries old, but “It is a relatively recent conflict, rooted in Jewish immigration into
Palestine in the early twentieth century.”1 From June 1915-January 1916, one of the Arab
leaders, Husayn, “the sharif and amir of Mecca,”2 was in correspondence with Britain’s high
commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon. Through a series of letters known as the
Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, the British were hoping to use the Arabs to revolt
against their enemy, the Ottoman Empire, during World War 1 in exchange for, what
Husayn thought was laid out by the British in the McMahon correspondence on October 24,
1915, “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in
all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.”3 Husayn was
lead to believe by the correspondence with McMahon that by working with the British,
Husayn had convinced the British that the revolt they wanted was worth not only an
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King Abdulla II, Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril (New York: Viking Penguin,
2011), xi.
2 Lawrence Davidson and Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East Ninth Edition,
(Colorado: West View Press, 2010), 204.
3 Sir Henry McMahon, “Sir Henry McMahon’s second note to the Sharif of Husain,” In Palestine and the ArabIsraeli Conflict Seventh Edition, ed. Charles D. Smith (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 93-94.
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Arabian state and independence, but he also, as described in the letter, the province of
Palestine. McMahon was very vague about what lands he would allow the Arabians to have
in their newly independent state should they revolt, but “Even McMahon himself, believed
that he had never promised Palestine to the Arabs.”4 At this particular time, the British
were not worried about a Jewish Palestinian homeland; they were looking for help and
thought they had found it in Husayn. Husayn would follow through on his end of the deal,
however, the British, following after a more public and widespread correspondence, would
not uphold their end of the bargain.
In what became known as the Balfour Declaration, the British Cabinet formally
announced on November 2, 1917 that they would help to establish a Jewish national state
within the territory of Palestine, from what Husayn had thought would be part of the
Arabian independently recognized state. When a private letter from British foreign
secretary Lord Balfour to the British Zionist Federation’s leader Lord Rothschild was made
public, the British found themselves having promised the same land to two different
groups. The nation of England was where the World Zionist Organization’s headquarters
were located (London), as well as some of the Zionist’s major contributors and supporters,
including the newly elected Prime Minister David Lloyd George. The British had decided
that this original homeland of the Jewish people would become a newly recognized Jewish
state once the war was over, even thought it was highly contested by the Arabs. “The
Arabs’ main objection to the Balfour Declaration was that they made up over nine-tenths of
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Lawrence Davidson and Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East Ninth Edition,
(Colorado: West View Press, 2010), 205.
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what would later become Palestine.”5 The British were hoping to gain support from their
American, Russian, and European Jewish allies when they released the official statement on
November 2:
“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a
national home for the Jewish people…it being clearly understood that nothing shall
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine.”6
However they quickly alienated the Arabian countries that they had went to first and had
revolted in accordance with their agreement. With similar feelings that Hagar and Ishmael
felt when Abraham sent them away and chose Sarah and Isaac, the Arab countries felt
betrayed by the British, who felt they were first promised an independent state and the
territory of Palestine as in agreement with the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. The
British, and the rest of the world, did not feel the same way, regarding the Balfour
Declaration as the binding agreement. These contradicting documents, along with the
creation of the state of Israel in 1948, would leave the Arab nation feeling betrayed,
threatened, and enormously angered. The newly found Jewish state would continuously
have to keep its guard up and military ready, as the Arab nations and refugees were eager
to reclaim their land.
As the heads of three prominent Middle Eastern states, three leaders found
themselves at the brink of yet another Arab-Israeli War: King Hussein of Jordan, President
Gamal Abdul Nasser or Egypt, and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel. Each leader
brought a new and different perspective to the Arab-Israeli conflict, helping to eventually
lead their respective countries down the path to the Six Day War.
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Lawrence Davidson and Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East Ninth Edition,
(Colorado: West View Press, 2010), 208.
6 Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, (London, 1961), 664.
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Before the Six Day War, Jordan controlled the important and holy city of Palestine,
Jerusalem. It was on a trip to Jerusalem that young Hussein witnessed the assassination of
his grandfather and king of Jordan, Abdullah. Hussein attacked the assailant, who shot him
in the chest but was saved because his grandfather had ordered him to wear some of his
medals along with his military uniform.7 His father, Talal, succeeded the throne for a short
period of time but battles with schizophrenia saw him quickly removed. At the age of
seventeen, Hussein would become the new King of Jordan, and subsequently the “Last King
of Jerusalem.”8
Hussein was the leader of a Muslim country, but his financial assets and natural
resources did not allow him the luxury to be a self-autonomous state. He was the ruler of a
smaller population state that was underdeveloped, and his country did not boost the
natural resources of oil or minerals of the other Middle Easter states. “This meant that for
the bulk of his reign one of the dominating facts of Hussein’s political life was the search for
foreign benefactors to support his country,”9 using countries such as Britain, the United
States, and Russia. Hussein understood the value of being a true political leader in the Arab
world; figure out a way of getting money, resources and weapons from the West and try
not to let your people know where it is coming from by making political alliances with
other Middle Eastern countries, such as Egypt. Hussein was not opposed to working with
the Israeli’s, as some of his Middle Eastern counterparts were, but he would never, “be the
first to settle with Israel.”10 Hussein quickly realized that Gamal Nasser, the new President
7
Simon Sebag Montefiore, Israel: The Biography (New York: Random House, Inc. 2011), 505-506.
Simon Sebag Montefiore, Israel: The Biography (New York: Random House, Inc. 2011), 506.
9 Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) 3.
10 Lawrence Davidson and Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East Ninth Edition,
(Colorado: West View Press, 2010), 300.
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of Egypt, could not be trusted, as sources found on more than one occasion that Nasser had
tried to assassinate or overthrow Hussein’s government.11 However, Nasser was trying to
unite the Middle Eastern countries under the banner of Pan-Islam once again, and with his
constituents being of Islamic faith, Hussein knew that he had to support and follow Nasser.
Even against his better judgment this will lead Hussein to send troops to fight against Israel
when called upon by Nasser during the Six Day War. Hussein found leadership difficult as
the leader of a Muslim country that borders Israel to the North and controls the West Bank,
which includes the holy city of Jerusalem.
Gamal Abdul Nasser would become the most formable foe for the Israelis during the
1967 Six Day War because he would become the leader of the most powerful Arab nation.
Egypt became a part of several Middle Eastern countries that went through a period of civil
and governmental unrest, as with the creation of Israel in 1948, the young Arabs believed
“the corruption of their governments and the backwardness of their societies rendered
their states both unwilling and incapable of standing up to imperialism.”12 Nasser was a
military commander in Egypt and was a part of a military coup in 1952 that ousted King
Faruq from power, and eventually consolidated his powers and became the leader of Egypt
in 1954. At first, this was a man the Israelis thought they could actually talk and do
business with, but they soon found out that Nasser had a vision of restoring glory to the
Arab world by renewing the idea of Pan-Arabism. 13
11
David A. Rausch, The Middle East Maze: Israel and Her Neighbors (Chicago: Moody Press, 1991), 94.
James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 170.
13 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 8.
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Realizing that if he wanted to rally support from the Western world he would need
newer and better military equipment, he went to Britain and the United States to try and
agree on an arms deal. Each country was reluctant to send weapons unless he promised to
sign statements saying Egypt was anti-communist and would not attack Israel. Nasser
decided that the terms were unacceptable for his vision of the Islamic world and found an
alternative source for his weapons, the USSR. This will lead to the Soviet Union switching
sides from their allegiance of Jewish Israel to Islamic Egypt, ushering the Cold War Era into
the Middle East.14 Nasser sponsored and supported guerilla raids into the country of Israel,
hoping that it would ignite the country into war with the other Middle Eastern nations.
Nasser tried to dominate the Arab world as its new charismatic leader, believing he could
set up a long desired Palestinian state, and with new found military supplies from the
Soviet Union being distributed throughout the Islamic Middle East, could finally see the
Jewish state of Israel given back to the rightful owners. As the new leader of the Arab
world, the rest of the countries were expected to follow his lead, especially when it came to
fighting against their common enemy of Israel. Nasser and his Palestinian allies had little
desire for peace, leaving Israel few options when provoked.
When David Ben-Gurion, one of Israeli’s most famous politicians, resigned from
office in 1963, the man to follow him, as Prime Minister was Gurion’s self-appointed
successor, Levi Eshkol. Eshkol worked his way up the political ranks, starting as a DirectorGeneral of the Ministry of Defense, then being elected to the Jewish Knesset, serving from
1951 until his appointment as Prime Minister.
14
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 8.
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Eshkol and Hussein both believed that war was necessary and at time unavoidable,
but that ultimately peace was more prosperous. Just before the beginnings of the Six Day
War, “Eshkol’s government avoided antagonizing Nasser in the hope that a diplomatic
solution to the crisis could be found.”15 Even if Eshkol had decided to take a different route
as Prime Minister, Israel had been founded in the middle of Islamic nations who hoped for
nothing less than to retain the lands that rightfully belonged to them. Besides, “Any leader
suggesting diplomacy and concessions—allowing Arab refugees to return to their homes in
Israel—was committing political suicide,”16 and Eshkol made his living being a politician.
Eshkol believed and supported the buildup of the military and weapons that had
been coming in from the west, especially since the Arab world was being funded and
supported by the Soviets.17 However, Eshkol served only very briefly in combat, and since
the prime minister and defense minister were practically the same in Israel, people
speculated that he “was either too quick or too hesitant on the trigger.”18 Eshkol was
practical, but at times indecisive. He believed that he had proven himself by helping to
build up the Israel Defense Forces into a modern force with tanks and jets, and even
authorized raids when attacked by surrounding nations.19 Lingering in the minds of the
Israeli politicians and people were the questions on whether he was ready to lead the
15
Colin Shindler, A History of Modern Israel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 124.
Patrick Tyler, Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite who Run the Country—and Why they can’t
make Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012), 141.
17 Patrick Tyler, Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite who Run the Country—and Why they can’t
make Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012), 140.
18 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 50.
19 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 50.
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Israeli nation during his first Arab-Israel War in June 1967. His reaction and leadership
would boldly and effectively answer these questions.
Conflicts, skirmishes, raids and wars between the Arabs and Israeli’s are never
simple, rarely have a single incidence that causes them, and are always based on previous
engagements that have gone wrong. The Six-Day, June 1967 War proved to be no different.
Ties can be linked ranging back to the 1956 Suez War between Egypt and Israel.
President Nasser realized that during and after the war, the West (USA, Britain, France)
could not longer be trusted and began to legitimately pursue his other Arabian
counterparts. He soon realized that Pan-Arabism may be difficult to actually form into a
single state, but they could at least begin to coordinate on policies and alliances to help
support one another.20 This pursuance and initiative gave Nasser what he felt was his right
as the unofficial Arab leader the ability to pursue what was best for each Arab country in
the Middle East, especially when it came their dealings with the country of Israel. Nasser
also hoped to erase and eradicate any weaknesses that may have been left by his
embarrassing defeat in 1956 and chart a new course for Arab leaders and the Arab world.
Water plays a crucial factor of survival for any nation, especially one with as few
fresh water supplies as Israel. The Jordan River, whose “headwaters originated in Lebanon,
Syria, and Israel”21 and the Sea of Galilee (Tiberius) are the two main sources of fresh water
for the nation of Israel. Israel has no control over their major fresh water source, and in
1964, Nasser called a meeting together of the Arab league and decided that Syria would
begin to dig canals to divert the Jordan River. Israel had previously tried to do something
20
James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 172-173.
21 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 267.
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of a similar nature, and it resulted in a condemnation from the U.N. and a truce between
Jordan and Israel. This new project, if implemented correctly, could divert up to two-thirds
of freshwater that entered Israel from the Jordan River.22 For Israel, two issues were of
upmost importance because of their scarcity: land and water. Prime Minister Eshkol had
made it drastically clear when speaking to the government, “Water is the basis for Jewish
existence in the Land of Israel.”23 Israel had stated that closing the Straits of Tiran (which
was proved by the 1956 Suez War and also by the upcoming 1967 Six Day War) or
diverting water from the Jordan River would both be considered acts of war.24
Once again the nation was divided, as the generals wanted to send a statement to
the Arab nation and Eshkol was looking for a way to stay out of an all-out war. Eventually,
as Syria began to use its position from the Golan Heights to bomb tractors and fishermen in
the Sea of Galilee, Israel decided it was time to attack. Their objectives would be not only
protection of their northern villages, but also to attack water diversion construction sites
located in Syria. Syria quickly realized during these skirmishes that their air force was no
match for the strength and might of the Israeli air force, and even though the construction
sites would continue in small number, it could never be fully implemented because Israel
owned the skies. If Syria were to be a major contender against Israel in the future, they
would need to beef up their air force in a hurry. They would turn to the Soviet Union, via
Egypt, for their assistance.
22
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
147.
23 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 23.
24 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
147.
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The short skirmish between the Israeli army and Jordanian military in the small
village of Samu (5,000 people) in November 1966 turned out to be of bigger importance
that originally intended. Israel was continuously being attacked by guerilla raids through
the West Bank, which was owned by the country of Jordan, and they hoped that by
attacking the villages that were harboring these guerillas, the villagers would appeal to
King Hussein.25 Circumstances and situations did not turn out as originally intended. This
quick strike, in-and-out operation turned from a small skirmish rapidly into small battle
with the Jordanian army, resulting in “fifteen Legionnaires were killed and fifty-four
wounded…Three Arab civilians had been killed, ninety-six wounded.”26 Not only was
Israel’s worldwide reputation dented because of their carelessness, their original intention
of having the Jordanian people turn against the guerilla terrorists and to their King for help
with them also failed. The people revolted against King Hussein, asking for him to be
overthrown because he did not retaliate against Israel. Even if Israel’s intentions were
pure, their actions displayed a country that was ready to strike at any moment for any
reason. King Hussein, looking weak to his Arab brothers, would be looking and waiting for
a chance to strike back at Israel, hoping to quite the riots of his people. Israel would need
to be weary of their eastern neighbors.
The northern border between Israel and Syria was a hotbed of trouble and very
rarely, if ever, quite. Problems began again early 1967, with the country still under control
of a Ba’thist regime bent of the destruction and annihilation of Israel, as “A candid Radio
Damascus revealed on January 16 that “Syria has changed its strategy, moving from
25
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 33.
26 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 34.
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defense to attack…We will carry on operations until Israel has been eliminated.”27 As Egypt
had been for a few years, accompanied in May 1967 by Iraq, and third Middle Eastern
country was now calling for the destruction of Israel. Syrian terrorist and guerrilla, along
with the Syrian Army from the Golan Heights, began to send more and more raids into the
country and shell more and more villages. The Syrian President, Nureddin al-Attassi,
supported the rebel groups, as Prime Minister Eshkol once asked for the Syrian
government to help deter the raids and bombings within their country or face the
consequences of an Israeli retaliation.28
The small raids and skirmishes continued and eventually turned into a small war on
April 7, 1967, started by the Syrian bombing of two Israel tractors. Israel fired back at the
Syrian guns, and the Syrians fired back at Israeli settlements. Things quickly escalated and
the United Nations tried to coerce a cease-fire between the two countries, which Syria
accepted only if Israel would stop building in its northern territories. Israel rejected this
cease-fire, and eventually the Syrian air force began to arrive. As Israel had displayed when
Syria attempted to divert their water supply in 1964, they once again reiterated that the
Israel air force was far superior to that of the Syrians. Two Syrian planes were quickly shot
down, and when the Syrians began to retreat, Israel’s air force followed them all the way
back to their capital at Damascus. A massive dogfight ensued, “involving as many as 130
planes,”29 resulting in the loss of another 4-6 Syrian planes. In a mere 30 seconds, Israel
once again showed their dominance over the Syrian air force, securing the skies and
27
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 42.
28 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 279-280.
29 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 46.
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embarrassing the Syrians by quickly flying a victory lap around Damascus before leaving
for home. What started as relatively small encounters in early 1967, supported by the
Syrian government, escalated into a turning point leading to the upcoming 1967 Six Day
War. Israel, while trying to protect their people, were forced to retaliate and, by showing
their strength and military superiority, hoped to deter Syria in the future. Those hopes
quickly evaporated.
With the April skirmish over, the Israel-Syrian border tensions would lead to Nasser
and the Arab community committing a serious miscalculation on the road to war: trusting
the Soviet Union. When the United States and Great Britain turned their back on Egypt and
quitting supporting them financially and militarily, they decided to take their business east
and allow the Soviet Union to begin their infiltration in the Middle East. On the weekend of
May 12-13, during the Israel’s independence day, the Soviet Union falsely sent information
to Nasser that Israel was amassing troops along their northern border with Syria,
potentially wanting to rekindle the border wars. This quickly sent a shockwave not only
through Egypt but also through the Middle East. Israel was preparing for war with Syria,
and their brethren needed to come to the rescue. Prime Minister Eshkol sent word to the
Soviet Ambassador that he could personally accompany him to the northern border to see
for himself that Israel had not mobilized troops to their northern borders.30 The Soviet
Ambassador declined the invitation. Nasser either took this as his way of quickly
progressing the war forward or was just careless in the decision he would make, as he
“apparently accepted the information at face value, although he was later told it was
30
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
148.
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inaccurate,”31 by both the United States and Israel.32 Nevertheless, Nasser began to
mobilize his troops into the demilitarized zone of the Sinai Peninsula, located on the
southwest border of Israel.
Even when given false information by the Russians, and at the cry of the Israeli
Prime Minister on May 15th that, “Israel wants to make it clear to the government of Egypt
that it has no aggressive intentions whatsoever against any Arab state at all,”33 Nasser
decided he was done with diplomacy and the time for war was swiftly approaching. His
next move would be to mobilize and send Egyptian troops into the Sinai Peninsula and he
could only do so if the United Nations Emergency Force were to leave first. The UNEF force
numbered somewhere around 3500-4500 troops and had been stationed in the Sinai
Peninsula along the Israel-Egypt border since the Suez War of 1956. Israel, when giving
back the Sinai Peninsula that it took from Egypt during the war, asked the United Nations
to supply a peace keeping force on the border to help detract Egypt from guerilla raids or
sneak attacks.
Nasser sent a letter to United Nations asking for the partial removal of the UNEF
forces, the reluctant Secretary General U Thant asked for an unnecessary and fateful all-ornothing proposal, and with the world (especially the Arab world) watching, Nasser asked
for a full removal of the UNEF forces, fearing he had come to far to look back. U Thant,
seeing the quick progression and Nasser’s intent, reluctantly approved. On May 20, 1967
when speaking to the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary General would say, “I
31
Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 280.
Wolf Blitzer, edit, Myths and Facts 1976: A Concise Record of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Washington D.C.: Near
East Research, 1976), 31.
33 Six Day War Comprehensive Timeline, “Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on May 15, 1967.” Six Day War
http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/crucial_quotes.htm (accessed November 26, 2012).
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do not wish to be alarmist but I cannot avoid the warning to the Council that in my view the
current situation in the Near East is more disturbing, indeed, I may say more menacing,
than at any time since the fall of 1956.”34 Thant would regret this decision for the
remainder of his United Nations days, and one of the last remaining glimmers of a peace
negotiation with it.
Between the dates of May 15th-May 20th, Egypt mobilized, to the joy and prestige of
the Arabian world, “some 100,000 troops organized in seven divisions (with over 1,000
tanks) had been concentrated along Israel’s south-western border.”35 With Nasser making
the first move and flaunting the banner of Pro-Arabism once again, several Middle Eastern
states were quick to offer moral, financial, and military support. Countries pledging
allegiance and military support to a leader seeking revenge for a prior war were quickly
surrounding Israel, and some had land within the country they were hoping to maintain,
such as the Syria and the Golan Heights, Jordan and the West Bank, and Egypt with the Gaza
Strip. Nasser also hoped these would prove to be strategically vital areas for those
countries to enter and attack Israel from multiple different directions. With war on the
horizon, Israel would be fighting on multiple fronts.
Israel realized that the troop buildups around their borders were not carrying
diplomatic peace offerings. They became divided within their country about whether they
should continue to try diplomatic measures or a pre-emptive strike conversation was the
necessary road to consider. Military leaders were ready for battle and began preparing a
“strong argument that delay in a preemptive strike would jeopardize the safety of the
34
Jewish Virtual Library, “Withdrawal of the UNEF from the United Arab Republic on May 20, 1967”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nasser1.html (accessed November 26, 2012).
35 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
149.
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Israeli state.”36 Others, such as Prime Minister Eshkol, wanted to exhaust all diplomatic
strategies first. Even during the counter mobilization of Israel’s troop movement from May
16th-27th, Eshkol was urging his Arab neighbors for a troop withdrawal, and even called on
the great Powers of France, United States, Britain, and the United Nations to intervene in
the situation.37 His plea for help fell on undesired or deaf ears, and realizing that war was
becoming more and more inevitable, decided to change his direction from chief diplomat to
chief commander.
Nasser, deciding to mobilize his troops in mid May 1967 to the Sinai Peninsula,
brought his troops to the border of a neighboring enemy, Israel. Countries mobilize troops
when at odds with other countries to display power, aggression, or signs of war. Some
believe that Nasser had no intention of attacking Israel, as he stated, “In fact…three of our
best divisions were in Yemen at the time, and if we had been preparing for an attack, it
would have been logical to bring them home first.”38 However, his actions speak otherwise.
Maybe he wanted to prove a point that the Arab world could mobilize together against a
common enemy. Israel certainly felt threatened by this mobilization, not to mention that
Nasser had already asked the UNEF forces to leave Sinai and then proceeded to create the
most influential cause of the 1967 Six Day War: He shutdown the Strait of Tiran.
After removal of the UNEF forces and the mobilization of Egyptian troops, Nasser
assured the Middle East of another Arab-Israeli War by shutting down the important Strait
of Tiran on May 22, 1967. Not only important to Egypt, the Strait of Tiran was a major
importing/exporting venue for Israeli shipping, access to their city of Eilat, and an
36
Dana Adams Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East (New York: John Day Company, 1974), 141.
Dana Adams Schmidt, Armageddon in the Middle East (New York: John Day Company, 1974), 141.
38 Harry B. Ellis, The Dilemma of Israel (Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1970), 34.
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international waterway. There is speculation that Nasser, when he shutdown the Strait,
was not looking or asking for a war, he was just merely wanting to deter the Israel and let
them know he was on the horizon. Nasser realized that mobilizing troops into Sinai was a
big deal, but shutting down the Strait without any chance of reopening it was an
irrevocable move on the road to war. He understood the ramifications of his actions, as he
had done the same thing 11 years early, causing the 1956 Suez War, in which he lost the
Sinai Peninsula, only to get it back from Israel if UNEF forces could stay along the borders.
War was no longer a question of if, but when. When news of closing finally broke,
mass elation went through the streets of many Middle Eastern countries in support of the
Egyptian government and their President. They realized the importance of this strategic
Strait and what it meant in current relations with the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the UNEF
forces removed from the Sinai Peninsula, Nasser was told that the prospect of war had
increased to around 20%. Now with the closing of the Strait of Tiran, that percentage
jumped to a staggering 50%. Nasser had been preparing himself for this moment since the
humiliating defeat in the 1956 Suez War. He had been preparing his country by using
extreme Anti-Semantic rhetoric and propaganda techniques to rally his people behind the
cause of eliminating their Jewish neighbors. He had been preparing the Arab world by
gaining Middle Eastern allies, Soviet weapons, and by championing the Pan-Arab
movement, with its creation of a Palestinian state and destruction of Israel. There was only
one question that remained for Nasser after the closing of the Straits: Was the army
ready?39
39
Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 83.
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18
Nasser’s intentions could have been misunderstood, except for his actions coincided
with his words. On May 26th, Nasser, speaking to the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions, states about the upcoming Arab-Israeli conflict, “The battle will be a general
one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.”40 Nasser would reiterate his desire
for war with his speech before the Egyptian National Assembly on May 29th, making it very
clear the intentions of the Egyptian and Arabian forces surrounding the country of Israel:
“Preparations have already been made. We are now ready to confront Israel.”41 Not only
was Nasser ready for war and the destruction of Israel, but also another of Israel’s enemies,
Iraq, was ready for the forthcoming war. President Aref of Iraq was quoted on May 31st,
1967, “The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to
wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel
off the map.”42 The Arab world was ready for war, and the Israelis had very little they
could do to stop it.
Nasser and the Arab nations were looking for revenge against the nation of Israel,
but while they were deciding how to coordinate the attack, Israel decided that it was time
to go on the offensive. The total Arab population being 38 times the size of Israel,43 with
the Jewish population around 750,000 and the Arab countries population around 30
million, lead Israel early in its existence and throughout its history to make national
40
Jewish Virtual Library, “Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists,”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nasser1.html (accessed November 26, 2012).
41 Gamal Abd Al-Nasser, “Speech to the Members of the Egyptian National Assembly May 29, 1967” In
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Seventh Edition, ed. Charles D. Smith (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2010), 296-297
42 Six Day War Comprehensive Timeline, “President Aref of Iraq: May 31, 1967.” Six Day War
http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/crucial_quotes.htm (accessed November 26, 2012).
43 James Chace, Conflict in the Middle East Volume 40, Number 6 (New York, H.W. Wilson Company, 1969), 61.
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defense and security two of its main priorities.44 Israel had the capability of mobilizing
around 250,000 troops if necessary, which matched that of the Arab forces. They were
sorely outnumbered when it came to military equipment, with the Arab nations having
over 2000 tanks and 700 front-line fighter and bomber aircraft,45 with Egypt’s Air Force
alone outnumbering that of the Israelis by a margin of 2½ -1.46 Israel was once again
divided on whether they should wait and continue to hold off for a miracle diplomatic
agreement, wait till the Arab countries, which were surrounding them on all sides, made
the first move, or strike first, fast, and with complete and total destruction. The decision
was tough, but hindsight has proved that the decision was the correct and only one to be
made.
While the Arab countries continued to decide their game plan for an attack, Israel
decided it was time for them to move. There decision was made final on June 5, 1967 when
early in the morning Israeli fighter jets left Israel for their intended destinations in the Sinai
and Egypt. Around 8:15 in the morning, while Egyptian pilots, thinking the fighting would
start around noon, were eating breakfast, Israel, using the element of surprise, delivered a
crucial and crippling blow to the Egyptian air force.47 After the initial three hour
preemptive air strike, targeting the Egyptian air force, Israeli planes were able to destroy,
“309 out of the 340 serviceable combat aircraft including all 30 long-range Tu-16 bombers,
27 medium-range Illyushin II-28 bombers, 12 Sukhoi Su-7 fighter bombers, some 90 MiG21 fighters, 20 MiG-19 fighters, 25 MiG-17 fighters, and a further 32 transport aircraft and
44
Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), 222, 225
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
149.
46 Harry B. Ellis, The Dilema of Israel (Washington D.C.: American Interprise Institute, 1970), 34.
47 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 170.
45
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20
helicopters.”48 By evening of the first day, the Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraq Air Forces had
been destroyed, with a total of 416 Arab craft being destroyed on the ground or in battle by
nightfall of the second day.49 Israel had once again shown the superiority of their air force
and had total control of the skies. The battle would continue for another 4 days, but after
the initial strike on day one and the destruction of most of the Arab air force by end of the
day two, the war was basically over. The fighting would finally end on June 10, 1967, once
again with a humiliated Arab force in retreat and Israel occupying new territories that it
had taken from the Arab nations. The only Arab nation around Israel that did not lose any
territory was Israel’s northern neighbor of Lebanon. In this short battle, Israel would only
lose around 800 men, while the Arab nations are estimated between 10,000-15,000. Egypt
lost the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, and “all but 15 percent of Egypt’s military hardware, $2
billion worth, was destroyed…including 85 percent of Egypt’s combat aircraft and all of its
bombers.”50 Jordan would lose its prize possession of Jerusalem with its lose of the West
Bank, and Syria lost the least amount militarily, but lost the naturally strategic northern
Golan Heights. Israel not only gained these strategic areas, but its power over the sky came
at a price as “Thirty-six planes and eighteen pilots, roughly 20 percent of Israel’s air power,
had been lost.”51 War is never cheap; winning and losing always come with a price.
After exhausting all of its diplomatic resources and trying every possible way to
keep from fighting another Arab-Israeli War, Israel proved not only to itself, but also to the
48
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
152
49 Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982),
153
50 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 305,306.
51 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 306.
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world, that when provoked by outside forces, it was very easily capable of rising up and
defending its national security. This tiny nation, created by western civilizations as a
Jewish state within the heart of the Islamic Middle East, effectively and correctly used
preemptive measures to secure its national safety and existence. Along the way, Israel was
also successful in picking up Arabian territories that it desired merely as the spoils of
winning the war, not as the reason for the war itself. Abba Eban, giving a speech before the
U.N. Security Council on June 6 to give Israel’s reasons for going to war, stated “An army,
greater than any force ever assembled in history in Sinai, had massed against Israel’s
southern frontier…There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril. And Israel faced this
danger alone.”52 Israel, as any nation would do when if it was undersized, undermanned,
and feeling threatened, decided that its best and only move was to strike first. In this
instance, it proved to be the right choice.
52
Abba Eban, “Speech to the U.N. Security Council on Israel’s Reasons for going to War: Juner 6, 1967” In
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Seventh Edition, ed. Charles D. Smith (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2010), 298,299.
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Selected Bibliography
Abdulla II, King. Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril. New York:
Viking Penguin, 2011.
Al-Nasser, Gamal Abd “Speech to the Members of the Egyptian National Assembly May 29,
1967.” In Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Seventh Edition, edited by Charles D.
Smith, 296-297. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010.
Ashton, Nigel. King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008.
Blitzer, Wolf edit. Myths and Facts 1976: A Concise Record of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Washington D.C.: Near East Research, 1976.
Chace, James. Conflict in the Middle East Volume 40, Number 6. New York, H.W. Wilson
Company, 1969.
Davidson, Lawrence and Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. A Concise History of the Middle East Ninth
Edition. Colorado: West View Press, 2010.
Eban, Abba. “Speech to the U.N. Security Council on Israel’s Reasons for going to War:
June6, 1967.” In Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Seventh Edition, edited by
Charles D. Smith, 298-299. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010.
Ellis, Harry B. The Dilemma of Israel. Washington D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 1970.
Gelvin, James L. The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East. New York: Random
House, 1982.
Jewish Virtual Library. “Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists,”
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nasser1.html (accessed
November 26, 2012).
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23
______________________. “Withdrawal of the UNEF from the United Arab Republic on May 20,
1967.” http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/nasser1.html
(accessed November 26, 2012).
McMahon, Sir Henry. “Sir Henry McMahon’s second note to the Sharif of Husain.” In
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Seventh Edition, edited by Charles D. Smith 9394. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010.
Montefiore, Simon Sebag. Israel: The Biography. New York: Random House, Inc. 2011.
Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Rausch, David A. The Middle East Maze: Israel and Her Neighbors. Chicago: Moody Press,
1991.
Safran, Nadav. Israel: The Embattled Ally. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978.
Schmidt, Dana Adams. Armageddon in the Middle East. New York: John Day Company, 1974.
Shindler, Colin. A History of Modern Israel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Six Day War Comprehensive Timeline. “Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on May 15, 1967.”
Six Day War. http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/crucial_quotes.htm (accessed November
26, 2012).
____________________. “President Aref of Iraq: May 31, 1967.” Six Day War.
http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/crucial_quotes.htm (accessed November 26, 2012).
Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2010.
Stein, Leonard. The Balfour Declaration. London: ACLS History E-Book Project, 1961.
Tyler, Patrick. Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite who Run the Country—
and Why they can’t make Peace. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012.
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