Download Florida`s Long War by sfcdan (Formatted Word

Florida’s Long War
SFC Daniel O’Connell
Introduction
While most historical attention paid to the Civil War is focused on the major battleground
states, no Confederate state suffered war longer than Florida. The small population and
extended coastline coupled with the presence of some important Federal installations made
the state both a secondary strategic objective and a military flashpoint. As gigantic clashes of
opposing forces rumbled through Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi, actions in Florida quickly
became a distant sideshow. Nevertheless the state maintained an important status as a
supplier of valuable foodstuffs to the Confederacy throughout the war. Actions in Florida also
included a virtual who’s who of Civil War notables. Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, Henry Hunt,
Montgomery Meigs, David Porter and many others saw service in the early going.
Florida’s entry into the Confederacy was not without some controversy among its tiny
population. Although rightly considered a slave state the distribution of slaves and wealth
fluctuated wildly across the northern counties (the southern half of Florida contained less than
2 people per square mile according to the 1860 census). The bulk of the slave holders resided in
the north central portion of the state. The plantation economy in the centrally located counties
allowed the planters there to gain wealth and political power in
excess to their proportion of the overall population. Fearing the
possibility of increased abolitionist sentiment in a Lincoln
administration the planter elite exercised that power when it
came time to decide the issue of secession. This did not go
unnoticed by residents of the less affluent population. A large
minority of Floridians in the outlying counties held Unionist
attitudes or apathy to the idea of secession.
The spokesman for this population was former territorial
governor Richard K. Call who gave voice to their concerns in a
letter to the Tallahassee Sentinel on 22 December 1860. In his
referendum. He also warned;
Richard K. Call
“That any attempt to surprise the people into disunion, contrary to their wishes, to destroy this
free and glorious government, will be met with a rebuke corresponding in sternness and energy
with the audacity of the design to precipitate them into revolution, rebellion and treason
against the government to which they owe allegiance and for which they are ready to die.”
Call’s plea for a cautious approach in regards to secession went unheeded and the Ordinance of
Secession was pushed through a hastily called convention. The reaction to the outcome was as
expected. The New York Times quoting a recently arrived Florida gentleman on 4 February
1861;
“Secession in Florida was not affected by a vote of the people.”
The speed of the process seemed at the heart of the matter. Only five days elapsed between
the call for a convention by the state legislature and the election of delegates. This effectively
disenfranchised many Floridians as “country people who were opposed to secession had no
opportunity to vote.” As events elsewhere removed the bulk of the Confederate troops from
the area this disaffected population would prove to be a thorn in the side of the Confederate
government in Florida. With a core that was solidly Confederate and an outer crust that
contained elements that were Unionist or disinterested in the issue the state took on the
appearance of a giant pie. The filling of staunch Confederates surrounded by a crust that was
willing, and sometimes most eager to assist the Federal authorities that occupied and patrolled
portions of the state throughout the war. Nevertheless, the geographic majority of Florida
remained under Confederate control until very late in the war.
Pensacola – January 1861
As the tension over the secessionist movement grew LT Adam Slemmer, Company G 1 st US
Artillery, found himself in a difficult position. His commander, CPT John Winder (later a BG in
the CSA) and senior LT A. R. Eddy were on leave placing him in command at this critical time.
Slemmer sought guidance from his chain of command but events overtook the communication
process and put the full burden of responsibility on his
shoulders.
It was widely believed that state authorities would attempt to
seize United States property if secession became a reality.
Indeed an incident on the 8th of January at Fort Barrancas
pointed out just how serious the situation had become. About
midnight “party of twenty men came to the fort, evidently to
take possession”, however Slemmer has anticipated such a
move and placed an armed guard there to protect the powder
stores. The party was ordered to halt and indentify
themselves by the guard on duty but failed to do so. The
LT Adam Slemmer
sentry assuming their purpose to be hostile fired on the party
driving them away.
On January 9th Slemmer received the instructions he had been waiting for:
“The General-in-Chief directs that you take measures to do the utmost in your power to prevent
the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola Harbor.”
With only 51 soldiers at his disposal Slemmer realized that his “utmost” might only save one of
the forts. Slemmer selected Fort Pickens as the object of his efforts. It was an excellent choice.
Unlike the other Federal facilities in Pensacola (Fort McRee, Barrancas Barracks, and the
Pensacola Navy Yard) Fort Pickens was located off the mainland on Santa Rosa Island. The fort
had been unused since the Mexican War and was in disrepair but it offered the best hope of a
successful defense and more importantly controlled the entry point of the excellent harbor.
Slemmer made the necessary preparations for the move to Fort Pickens but cooperation of the
Navy proved more difficult to get than expected. It took three visits to the Navy Yard before
aged Commodore Armstrong, who was believed to be heavily under the influence of CPT
Ebnezer Farrand, a southerner, would supply transportation. While they awaited movement to
the island fortress Union troops destroyed the 20,000 pounds of powder at Fort McRee and
spiked the guns at Barrancas. At 0800 on 10 January, the same day that the Florida Ordinance
of Secession was approved, the steamer Wyandotte finally arrived to take the Union soldiers to
the fort. During the trip across 30 loyal seamen from the Navy yard were turned over to
Slemmer’s command raising the total to 81 men. Only two days later the Navy yard was
surrendered but the stores ship Supply was towed away by the Wyandotte and both vessels fell
under the protection of the forts guns. An attack on the fort was now expected at any moment
and all the necessary preparations for its defense were being made. On the evening of the 12 th
four men arrived at the fort and demanded that the corporal of the guard let them in. They
were denied admission and Slemmer and 2LT Gilman spoke with them at the gate. When
Captain Randolph demanded “the peaceable surrender of this fort by the governors of Florida
and Alabama” Slemmer replied that he did not recognize the authority of any governor to
demand the surrender United States property. The party went away disappointed. The
following night a small group of armed men was discovered near the fort but was driven away
by fire from a Union patrol.
Two more demands for the surrender of the fort were refused by Slemmer. On the 15 th COL W.
H. Chase (original engineer of the fort) and Capt Farrand presented a letter that threatened
military action if the fort was not given over. Slemmer called the Colonel’s bluff by telling him
that he would lose half his men in the attempt. A formal response was delivered the next day
stating that “it is our duty to hold our position.”
A final letter from Chase, who warned that he had been reinforced, asked for the fort. Slemmer
tersely referred him to his letter of the 16th for his reply. A tense but amiable truce was
established that would remain in effect until April.
The Reinforcement of Fort Pickens
The last months of James Buchanan’s presidency saw the continuance of an informal truce. The
inauguration of Abraham Lincoln brought on a change in policy. The new administration
decided that Federal property would be defended and determined that reinforcement of those
installations was the means to that end. To counter the Confederate strength in Pensacola,
estimated at 1700 troops under Braxton Bragg, about 200 troops, Company A 1st US Artillery
plus 35 attached soldiers from other federal batteries, were dispatched to Fort Pickens in late
January aboard the Brooklyn.
Upon arrival at the fort CPT Israel Vogdes sought the assistance of the naval commander, CPT
Adams, to land his men. Adams steadfastly refused on the grounds that an act would violate his
instructions not to reinforce the fort unless an aggressive move was made by the Confederate
garrison. CPT Vogdes returned to the Brooklyn and sent word of the impasse to Washington. LT
John Worden, later commander of the Monitor, was sent to Pensacola by train to deliver a
message of a “pacific nature.” After being granted safe passage through the South and access
to Vogdes on the Brooklyn Worden delivered his message on April 11th and departed. The next
night Vogdes’ men were brought ashore under the cover of darkness. Bragg, thinking he had
been duped by Worden, had him apprehended in Montgomery, Alabama. He was held under
arrest for seven months until exchanged.
With the war officially on after the shelling of Fort Sumter on April 12th and 13th there was no
further need for restraint in preparations for the inevitable conflict. The Confederates built up
their strength on the mainland. Troops from Georgia (1,000), Alabama (1,000), Louisiana
(1,000), Mississippi (1,500) and Florida (500) were rushed to the scene. Union reinforcements
also continued to arrive. On April 17th the steamer Atlantic sailed in with Company M 2nd US
Artillery; Company A 2nd US Artillery; Companies C and E 3rd US Infantry; and the sole company
of US Army Engineers accompanied by 20 contracted carpenters.
The engineers immediately went to work repairing the dilapidated fort in expectation of a
Confederate attack. Accordingly all of the wooden buildings were razed to reduce the fire
hazard and more protective “bomb proofs and traverses” were built. Additional heavy guns
were mounted and a small field hospital was constructed outside the fort walls for the many
sick men.
Troops continued to arrive on both sides. Eventually Bragg could
boast 7,000 men in his command. On 25 April Montgomery Meigs
reported that CPT Vogdes had 2017 soldiers, sailors, marines and
other assorted personnel at Fort Pickens with the anticipated arrival
of the Minnesota with an additional 600 troops. Arriving Union
troops soon overwhelmed the ability of the fort to house them and
campsite sites were established “four miles from the west end of the
island”. These troops were housed in tents carried to Florida by the
Illinois and protected by naval guns and “natural epaulments” made
by sand ridges along the edge of the island. The engineers were put
to work constructing a road capable of supporting supply
Montgomery Meigs
operations. With the preparations well in hand and the firepower of
the US Navy supporting them Meigs predicted that “Fort Pickens can be held with little loss of
life.” Despite the buildup both sides remained inactive into the spring and summer of 1861.
Only the bloodless capture of a Union vessel off Cedar Keys by the Confederate steamer Spray
gave any indication of hostilities. That would change on September 14 th.
The Judah Affair
The tense atmosphere at Pensacola finally erupted in the early morning hours of September 14,
1861. At 0330 about 100 sailors and marines from the USS Colorado boarded four of the ship’s
boats and rowed quietly across the harbor toward the schooner Judah. The Confederate vessel
was moored to a wharf at the navy yard and had been under surveillance for several days. The
ship had been fitted out with five guns and it was firmly believed that she was going to slip out
of the harbor and make a dash for privateer duty in the Gulf. To prevent the escape of the
Judah LT J. H. Russell devised the daring raid. The operation was comprised of two elements. To
prevent the raiding party from being raked by fire from a nearby field piece two cutters, under
the command of LT J. G. Sproston and Midshipmen J. Steece, took 35 men to silence the gun.
Following an unopposed landing LT Sproston and Gunner Borton found the gun guarded by a
lone sentinel, who was shot down by Borton as he “leveled his piece” at the lieutenant. The gun
was disabled within 15 minutes allowing Steece’s boat to go the assistance of the boarding
party. The extra help was greatly appreciated.
LT Russell, leading the other half of the operation, took a third cutter and the ship’s launch
toward the Judah. As they approached the ship they began taking fire from “the crosstrees of
the schooner”. The crew of the Judah was found “prepared to receive our forces” and put up a
spirited defense. A wild melee ensued on the deck as the two groups fought for control of the
ship. The raiders had taken the precaution of marking themselves for identification purposes
but in the fight Marine John Smith lost his markings. He was shot and killed by one of his own in
the confusion. The crew was finally driven from the vessel by the raiding party but maintained a
fire into the ship from the wharf with the assistance of the alerted guard.
Now in possession of the ship the raiders could get on with their destructive purpose. While the
remainder of the boarders engaged the men on the wharf, two men raced into the bowels of
the ship and set fires that would burn her to the waterline. Unable to control the blaze the ship
was cut loose from her moorings to prevent damage to the wharf. She drifted away and
eventually sank opposite Fort Barrancas. The retreating raiding party fired a farewell barrage
from their boat howitzers and rowed off. They arrived back at the Colorado at sunrise.
The first bloodshed in Florida left 3 Federals dead and 13 wounded. The Confederate loss was
unreported but estimated by the attackers at least 3 dead but the “officers are confident the
number is much larger.” The Navy personnel involved were commended for their “brilliancy
and gallantry” in a letter from Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy. The Marines “sustained
the reputation borne by their branch of the service” according to Commodore Mervine,
Commander of the Gulf Blockading Squadron. The Confederate commander saw dark forces
involved in the episode and with good cause. In his short report on the fight for the Judah Bragg
mentioned that on the 8th a harbor patrol of nine soldiers failed to return to their post and
noted the “gross neglect” of not sending an officer on the patrol. Bragg assumed that the patrol
had deserted en masse and had lent material assistance to the raiders. While there is no record
of any of the deserters actually accompanying the raid, Mervine noted in his report that some
of the information used to plan the raid was “reported by deserters.” This would become a
recurring problem for the Confederate command structure throughout the war.
The Battle of Santa Rosa Island
The loss of the Judah thoroughly upset Braxton Bragg, who set out to avenge her loss. He still
believed he lacked the necessary strength to challenge the fort directly but saw an opportunity
in the outlying camps. He singled out Colonel William Wilson’s 6th New York Zouaves as the
target for a hit and run operation. He ordered BG Richard Anderson to gather a force capable of
launching the counter strike onto Santa Rosa Island.
It wasn’t until October 8th that all the preparations were
completed. Anderson separated the 1100 men he had
gathered into three battalions that would operate
independently until contact with the enemy was achieved.
The first battalion, commanded by COL James Chalmers,
contained 350 men from the 9th and 10th Mississippi and 1st
Alabama regiments. Second battalion, under Col J. Patton
Anderson, was the largest of the three with 400 troops. It
was comprised of detachments from the 7th Alabama, 1st
Florida, and two companies of Louisiana troops. The third
battalion was an all Georgia affair, under COL John Jackson,
with 260 troops from the 5th Georgia and the Georgia
J. Patton Anderson
Battalion. Additionally a small 53 man detail was assembled for the purpose of spiking the guns
at the outside batteries and setting fire to the tents. The final piece of the task force was five
doctors and 20 detailed men to act as orderlies.
The troops were assembled at the Navy yard and boarded the steamer Time at 2200 for the
short trip to Pensacola. There they were distributed into two additional steamers, Neaffie and
Ewing, and some barges for the cross channel trip to Santa Rosa Island. At 0200 they made an
unopposed landing about four miles east of Fort Pickens. The concept of the operation had
Chalmers marching up the north beach followed closely by Jackson and then LT Hallonquist’s
destructive detachment while COL Anderson’s column would march up the south beach. At the
first contact Jackson would break off to the center of the island to present a continuous line as
they proceeded through the Union camp to the exterior batteries. Hallonquist would destroy
the camp and spike the guns of the batteries after the main body had pushed through.
The movement went as planned despite a small delay created by the march through the deep
sand. After a move of “3 or 4 miles” Chalmers’ column was detected by a solitary Union picket
who managed to get a shot away before being shot down. Realizing the gunplay had destroyed
any further hope of surprise COL Anderson began the deployment of Jackson’s men and the
push for the Federal camp. The commander of the Union guard, LT Hanham, had personally
brought back a warning and reported that his men were conducting a fighting withdraw to join
the main body. Their actions in reality barely slowed the Confederate advance on the camp
(Camp Brown). The Zouave commander, Wilson, immediately sent a courier to the fort with
news of the attack. The 6th New York was gathered in the parade ground of the camp to make
a stand. As the pickets and guards fell back to join the regiment COL Jackson’s middle column
arrived at the edge of the camp.
Jackson did not wait for the flanking columns to come on line. He ordered his men to fix
bayonets and attack into the camp. One look at the charging mob was enough to cause the illtrained Volunteers to break into a mad rush for the beach and
the nearby batteries. Wilson attempted to gloss over the fact
that the camp was surrendered without a fight in his report but
it did not go unnoticed by his commander. COL Harvey Brown,
commanding the Department of Florida from the fort, noted of
the regiment that he had the “desire to spare it the stigma of
cowardice” but blamed the leaders who were “in every respect
unfit for officers.” MAJ Zealous Towers, working on Brown’s
staff as an engineer, had an equally harsh opinion of the New
Yorkers stating “The Zouaves proved of little account. They are
badly commanded.”
The ease of their victory at Camp Brown had a devastating
effect on the momentum of the Confederate attack. Jackson
lost control of his men as they began looting the empty tents.
They were shortly joined by some of the men from the other
Colonel Harvey Brown
columns who Anderson stated joined “in the work of
destroying the camp.” Once the camp had been thoroughly looted the Confederates “applied
the torch to the tents, store-houses, and sheds.” However the lost time destroyed all possibility
of reaching the exterior batteries to spike the guns. Anderson wrote that “but daylight
appearing and there being no longer a possibility of a surprise to the batteries, I directed the
signal for retiring to be sounded and the troops to be put in march for the boats.”
The Federal reaction to the Confederate incursion on the island was swift. No fewer than three
relief efforts were sent to Camp Brown after word was received from Wilson’s messenger that
the enemy “1200 to 1500 strong” were attacking. At 0330 the roll was sounded to alert the
garrison of the fort. The first relief column, commanded by Major Israel Vogdes, consisted of 62
men from Company E 3rd US Infantry , Captain John Hildt commanding, and 31 men from
Company A 1st US Artillery, under LT F. E. Taylor. The relief column marched quickly up the
north beach. As they passed Battery Lincoln they were joined by Company G of the 6 th New
York Volunteers who were on duty at that station.
The reinforced column continued down the beach until they made contact with “a large force
on our right flank and rear.” In the darkness Vogdes men had become completely intermixed
with Chalmers column moving up the same beach from their landing point. In the resulting
confusion Major Vogdes was made prisoner and command fell to CPT Hildt. The new
commander was immediately approached by a Confederate officer who demanded his
surrender. The answer to his request was two shots that opened the firing between the two
intermingled groups. In the resulting confusion Hildt managed to move his command to a small
rise about 20 yards away where they were placed into position by 1LT F. W. Seeley of the 4th US
Artillery, a volunteer participant in the expedition. Company G of the 6 th New York had been
sent to cover the right flank but disappeared from the scene, probably retreating to the nearby
battery.
Meanwhile Brown had dispatched LT Chauncey Reese, of the Engineers, with further
instructions for Major Vogdes. In his ride down the beach Reese ran into a portion of Chalmers
men and retreated hastily to Battery Lincoln. Here he left the message with
LT Richard Duryea, Company E 3rd US Infantry who was trying to catch up
with his company that had somehow left the fort without him. Duryea
pushed forward but also met the same Confederate troops that had halted
Reese. He attempted to work his way around the fighting that had broken
out between Chalmers men and Hildt’s command. During this maneuver
the Confederates began their retreat and he chanced upon LT Loomis
Langdon, of the 1st US Artillery. The two men gathered up about 14 men
from mixed commands and proceeded down the beach in search of Hildt’s
command. They found a group of men in the dark and called out for
Chauncey Reese
identification. The answer came back as “Second Alabama”. Supposing that
they could not penetrate the enemy force there they continued down the beach and by sheer
circumstance stumbled on the Confederate landing site.
Reese had meantime returned to the fort to report the location of the enemy confronting
Vogdes. Brown immediately sent additional reinforcements to his assistance. The second
column was made up of Company H 2nd Artillery, CPT James Robertson commanding, and
Company C 3rd US Infantry under LT Alexander Shipley. Reese was also dispatched to seek help
from the Navy. He was ordered to get the McClellan moving toward the landing area with
additional troops taken from the nearby Potomac. Unfortunately this was misinterpreted and
the McClellan took the Potomac under tow and the resulting loss of speed did not allow them
to arrive before the Confederates had left the area. Had the McClellan moved to the landing
site alone the Confederate troops might have been stranded when their transportation was
sunk or driven away.
The growing Union strength and the disorder at Camp Brown left the Confederate commander
no choice but to withdraw. The retreat proved much more difficult than the approach. Much of
the medical detachment was left behind to care for the wounded and was captured. The
retreating men were ambushed by “two companies of United States Regulars which had passed
us under cover of darkness” (probably a portion of Hildt’s command). At the shore LT Duryea’s
small band took up a fire into the boats as they launched.
Confederate difficulties were not over when they reached the safety of the steamers for the
trip back. The propeller of the Neaffie had become fouled on a hawser and would not move.
The Ewing made an effort to tow the disabled vessel to safety but the burden made the boat
unmanageable. After some delay while the boat crews attempted to change the manner of the
towing the propeller was finally cut free of the impediment and the two steamers moved off to
safety.
The battle was over and each side issued congratulatory messages over their victories. In reality
the raid accomplished almost nothing. The Confederates achieved only a small portion of their
objectives and the Union forces had been caught flatfooted and embarrassed by the episode.
The butcher’s bill (k, w, and m) for this carnival of errors was 87 for the Confederates and 67 for
the Federals.
Thunder Over the Water – November 22 & 23, 1861
After the incursion onto Santa Rosa Island the situation once again settled back into an uneasy
status quo. The Federal forces in control of the fort denying use of the port thereby making
Confederate possession of Pensacola and the Navy Yard militarily irrelevant. However, Colonel
Brown held a particular resentment over the
outcome of the fight. He considered the attack
“an insult so gross to the flag of my country
(that it) could not by me be passed unnoticed.”
With insufficient strength to conduct a like
operation he determined to use the power he
had at hand to exact a measure of revenge.
Brown sought out the cooperation of the Navy
to execute his plan to attack the Confederates
with his artillery assets. Flag-Officer McKean
USS Richmond
“gave a ready and cordial assent” to the plan
and pledged the assistance of the Richmond and Niagara to the effort.
To get within gun range of the assigned target, Fort McRee, the ships needed to be lightened to
reduce the draft. McKean reported that the two ships reduced their weight by “sending down
and landing the topgallant masts, together with all spare spars, hoisting out all boats…” and
removing any unnecessary equipment and provisions. The draft of the Niagara was reduced to
21 feet 10 inches and the Richmond slightly less. On the night of the 21st the ships maneuvered
into position south of Fort McRee. The Niagara dropped anchor, whose cable had been fitted
out with springs to reduce the stress of the recoil of the guns, standing off at a range of about
two miles and the Richmond somewhat closer as a result of the lesser draft. There they
awaited the prearranged signal to begin the bombardment.
At 1000 on the morning of the 22nd a signal gun located at the flagstaff of Fort Pickens was fired
to open one of the biggest artillery bombardments of the war. The guns in the fort were divided
into seven individual batteries each with its own commander and targeting priorities. The
exterior batteries were also given their own commanders. Batteries Lincoln, Totten, and
Cameron were to concentrate on the Navy Yard while Battery Scott would focus its attention on
Fort McRee. The Federal guns began belting out a tremendous amount of fire. All totaled 55
individual guns and mortars roared out from Santa Rosa Island. These were shortly joined by 33
guns on the Richmond and Niagara.
Momentarily stunned by the suddenness and intensity of the Federal barrage the Confederate
batteries took about a half hour to gather themselves for a response. About 1045 Confederate
Battery No. 2, commanded by CPT J. T. Wheat, was the first to respond followed quickly by
batteries that stretched from the Navy Yard around the harbor to Fort McRee. The energetic
fire of the Confederate guns finally had to be moderated by an order from Bragg to preserve
ammunition. The battery at the wharf, commanded by CPT A. C. Van Benthuysen, of the
Confederate Marine Corps, was ordered to stop firing after two rounds. The belief was that his
battery would draw fire in the vicinity of the steamer Time that was tied up at the wharf. It
mattered little as two Union batteries had already targeted the ship. She would be hit several
times but was able to limp away to safety after dark. Van Benthuysen’s guns rejoined the fray.
The incredible display of fire power lasted until darkness settled in. Only a few mortar rounds
directed on burning buildings at the shipyard punctuated the night.
The firing on the second day started off at the same time but at a slower pace. The Niagara
could not gain a firing position because the wind had changed the tide reducing the available
water. The Richmond also could not get in range but came under fire from a rifled gun and was
badly damaged below the water line. Both ships moved away to safety.
The batteries at Fort McRee had been devastated by the iron storm on the first day but the
Louisianans and Mississippians remained manfully at their posts. Overnight repairs were
attempted but the condition of the batteries left them incapable of contributing much on the
second day. Firing at batteries in front of Warrington ignited several buildings and the church
located in the vicinity. BG Anderson reported that these fires consumed “about 50 of the
buildings in Warrington and Woolsey”. Despite the enormous amount of ordinance expended
there were relatively few casualties. Bragg reported 21 wounded, one who later died, and 6
men killed when a magazine collapsed crushing them. The Navy reported 1 sailor killed and 7
wounded on the Richmond. Her damaged hull was temporarily repaired by stretching “a piece
of canvas covered with felt and saturated with tar” over the outside of the damaged area. The
planking was pushed back into place and caulked making her capable of sailing to Key West for
repairs. COL Brown’s command lost 1 killed and 6 wounded with the Colonel giving great credit
to the work done by the engineers to “bombproof” the fort. The entire affair amounted to a
great sound and fury representing nothing.
The Blockade Begins
The order to blockade the Southern coast was little more than a paper decree when first issued
on 19 April 1861. To command the 3500 miles of Confederate coastline the United States Navy
could muster only 76 vessels, of these only 42 of these were commissioned. Thirty of these
ships were away at foreign harbors and only 4 of the remaining 12 were in Northern ports.
These four blockades totaled 25 guns and 280 sailors. The lack of available resources to execute
the designed strategy led to an energetic building and acquisition program. By the end of the
first year of the blockade an additional 52 vessels had been built and 136 purchased. The
distribution of these resources was determined by the Blockade Strategy Board.
To adequately manage the huge task at hand the board decided to break the Confederate coast
into two regions; the Atlantic Blockading Squadron and the Gulf Blockading Squadron. This
organization was further divided in September of 1861 into two sub areas in each primary zone.
The Atlantic coast blockade was split into the North and South Blockading Squadrons while the
Gulf region was similarly divided along the other axis of the compass; The East Gulf Blockading
Squadron (EGBS) and the West Gulf Blockading Squadron (WGBS). The coast of Florida from St
Andrew Bay on the western edge to Cape Florida on the east was the responsibility of the EGBS.
Although the area contained three excellent natural harbors it was very thinly populated and
had no well established ports. Two small ports, St. Marks and Apalachicola, were active but
considered of only minor importance. Accordingly few assets were dedicated to this area.
Decisions on the distribution of the steadily growing fleet were made by the Strategy Board
based on a system of priorities. The Gulf Coast was divided into six zones that were assigned an
order of importance in relation to the overall Federal strategy. The top priorities were New
Orleans and the outlet of the Mississippi River followed by Mobile Harbor. Third, fourth and
fifth priorities fell to the EGBS and the Florida coast. The final priority went to the western
Louisiana coast into Texas. With such low priorities the allocation for the Florida blockade was
small. In July of 1861 the entire Gulf was blockaded by fifteen ships, of these only four were
dedicated to the Florida coast outside the Pensacola area. The Crusader at Key West, the
Montgomery at Apalachicola, the Mohawk at St. Marks, and the R. R. Cuyler at Tampa Bay.
The first of these vessels to exercise the new authority was the Montgomery when she moved
into Apalachicola Bay on June 11, 1861. Lacking any charts the ship inched its way into the
harbor constantly taking depth readings to avoid grounding. The following day a boat carrying
four men under a flag of truce came along side of the Montgomery. The men demanded to
know what the purpose of the ship was and Commander T. D. Shaw announced the blockade
and asked them to post the notification in appropriate places in the town. Shaw also notified
his superiors that the port could be entered at two points and he was able to cover just the
primary entrance. The Montgomery was not entirely well suited for the duty she had been
assigned. The shallow waters prevented her from moving more deeply into the harbor or
chasing shallow draft boats that could easily escape her by
using the secondary entrance. Nevertheless, Apalachicola, one
of Florida’s most important cotton ports, was cut off except for
operations of independent blockade runners. The blockade
runners, most operating for personal profit, used this
advantage for some early success against the blockade. The
shallow draft boats required to avoid the Federal vessels
necessitated small cargoes so the overall impact of the
blockade runners was minimal. Shaw understood the
limitations and asked for a shallow draft steamer to protect
the other entrance but there were no boats to send until
November when the Montgomery was relieved by the
Governor John Milton
Hatteras. The early Blockaders in other Florida waters
experienced similar difficulties. The Mohawk stationed off St. Marks could not approach the
small Confederate works that were constructed near the lighthouse at the entry to the harbor,
although the commander commented that a shallow draft boat could take the fort “easily”.
Despite the problems the Union seamen had a few successes. The burning of the Finland, the
capture of the George B. Sloat, and the seizure of the Forest King were notable exceptions to
the otherwise frustrating early efforts of the blockade.
The blockade, however, would eventually capture 283 boats and have consequences far greater
than just the denial of access to Floridian ports. In the course of their duties the blockaders
made and maintained relationships with dissident Floridians that would pay great dividends as
the war progressed. Contact with the blockades gave unhappy residents an outlet for their
dissatisfaction. Those seeking an escape from the mainland were taken aboard and resettled.
Camps for those seeking refuge were established on outlying islands. A constant flow of
refugees, contraband slaves, and deserters into these havens would increase as the war moved
on to a new phase.
1862 – A Year of Decisions
The year of 1862 was more one of choices than military action in Florida. In the spring two
important decisions were made by the Confederate government that would have far reaching
effects in Florida. The reversal of fortune on the battlefields of Tennessee created a desperate
need for troops. The loss of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson forced the Confederate military
authorities to prioritize the allocation of available troops. Unfortunately, Florida was very low
on the scale of importance and the first decision stripped nearly all Confederate troops from
the state. The immediate impact of the order was to leave the coastal towns undefended.
When Governor Milton complained about the state of affairs in Florida under the new order he
was told that the State would have to defend itself. There were few arms or men available to
make this defense a reality. Some units came near mutiny at the thought of leaving their home
state and their loved ones to the care of a Confederate government that they did not trust.
Some took to the swamps rather than leave home. Otherwise there was little in the way of
important military activity in the state.
The Union forces did not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity to bloodlessly occupy
the abandoned towns. In early March the important port and railroad city of Fernandia on
Florida’s east coast was taken followed by St. Augustine on the 12 th. Apalachicola and
Jacksonville were also occupied by Federal troops in March. Pensacola was ceded in May giving
the Union Navy an important replenishment and repair facility for the ships on Gulf duty. The
abandonment of these cities created a flood of Confederate sympathizers fleeing into central
Florida. Most of these towns would remain under Union control for the remainder of the war.
Jacksonville, however, was abandoned by Federal forces on April 12th. With few troops
available to commit to holding the city and the threat of Confederate forces gathering to
challenge for control BG Horatio Wright had no choice but to leave. Confederate forces
reentered the city. Because most Confederate sympathizers had fled inland at the Union
occupation and most Union sympathizers departed with the retreating Federals the city was
mostly deserted. The Federal troops would return to Jacksonville in October of 1862.
The second decision to affect Florida was the
implementation of the Conscription Act in April. The
new law involuntarily extended the terms of service for
the one year men already in service to three years and
called for mandatory military service of all white males
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. The
unpopular act created more problems for the
Confederate military than it solved. The one year men
felt that they had done their share and wanted to be
replaced by those who had not yet seen duty and for
those facing involuntary service the situation was
considered equally unfair. Apathetic citizens and
Unionists alike resisted the enrollment process. In
some communities armed resisters defied the
BG Horatio Wright
conscription authorities. In an effort to beat the
deadline for volunteer service men rushed to volunteer to avoid the stigma of being a forced
soldier only to desert at the first opportunity. Thousands of Confederate troops disappeared
from the ranks. Some estimates place the number of deserters as high as 136,000 men by the
summer of 1863. Union presence in Florida provided a safe atmosphere for the growing
discontent over harsh Confederate policies of conscription and impressments. The vast
unpopulated tracts of southern Florida and the panhandle provided an excellent place to
escape the enrollment officers or the harsh punishment of a military trial for desertion.
Deserters and draft dodgers flocked into the Florida wilderness to escape. Cattle were herded
there to avoid being taken by the government authorities. Men banded together for collective
safety, they opposed local Confederate authority, and supported Union Army and Navy
operations with intelligence reports and as guides. For their assistance they were actively
supported by the blockading force with food and ammunition. This interaction between the
troops and this population provided ground for fruitful recruiting.
St John’s Bluff – October 18, 1862
In September 1862 the informal truce protecting Jacksonville from being shelled by the Union
gunboats that patrolled the mouth of the St Johns River fell apart. The Confederate commander
in the area, BG Joseph Finegan, decided to reinforce the works at St John’s Bluff. Although his
troops managed to fortify the works there with six heavy artillery pieces undetected they could
not remain that way for long. On the afternoon of the 10th a contraband was taken aboard the
USS Patroon and informed Acting Master Urann that the Confederates had placed cannon and a
force of 500 on the bluff. This information was relayed to Acting Master Crane on the USS
Uncas. Crane was skeptical and decided to have a look for himself. In the darkness he moved
up to within 500 yards and fired nine shots in a reconnaissance by fire effort. The tactic failed to
elicit any response and Crane thought the report another false bit of information. The
following morning however, Confederate batteries took him under fire in the daylight. Crane
was forced to cut away an anchor kedge to get underway but suffered five shots into the boat.
Once the boat was moving the Uncas responded until all the five second fuses had been
expended. A total of 156 rounds were fired by Crane’s boat. The Patroon joined the four and a
half hour fight late and managed to shoot 60 rounds into the bluff. Neither boat reported any
casualties. The Confederate gunners were temporarily driven away from their guns after
suffering 1 killed and 8 wounded. They returned to their positions at the departure of the two
vessels and added four additional pieces to their arsenal.
In a second effort to drive the Confederates off the bluff the USS Paul Jones and the USS
Cimarron and three other gunboats attacked the position on the 17th. The two primary vessels
kept up “a constant cannonade” on the Confederate works from 1600 yards for several hours.
The remaining boats “by some misunderstanding” failed to execute their portion of the plan
correctly and “their firing was of little, if any, service.” After firing half their ammunition load
Commander Steedman, on the Jones, ordered the boats back to their anchorage. Steedman
realized that the enemy gunners could be driven away from their guns for a time but that it
would take a land force to gain control of the bluff. He dispatched the USS Uncas to Port Royal
with this estimate of the situation and to “bring down ammunition to fill up our expenditure.”
This report was the impetus for the new plan to clear the bluff.
On September 30 BG John Brannan departed Hilton Head with nearly 1600 troops on board
four steamers headed for the St Johns River. Brannan’s forces included 825 men of the 47 th
Pennsylvania, 647 from the 7th Connecticut, 41 manning a section of guns from the 1st
Connecticut Light Artillery, and a 60 man detachment from the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry. The
transports rendezvoused with a fleet of six gunboats on the afternoon of the 1 st. Three of the
gunboats (Cimarron, Water Witch, and Uncas) were sent up the river to “feel the batteries”
while the infantry was landed at Mayport Mills. After a ninety minute shelling the boats were
recalled. After a brief reconnaissance the initial landing site was found unsatisfactory. The
swampy ground and numerous streams would have required a 40 mile march to the objective.
During the night the troops were moved to a landing site at Buckhorn Creek. After a short
pause to rebuild a burnt bridge the column moved toward Mount Pleasant Creek to cover the
landing of the cavalry and artillery. During the march they came across a Confederate camp
that had been evacuated in such great haste that “their arms, and even a great portion of their
wearing apparel…” were left behind. The haul here included 18 Hall’s breech loading rifles, 12
double barreled shotguns, 8 Maynard breech loading rifles, 11 Enfield’s, 96 knapsacks, 16 tents
and a small quantity of commissary stores.
On the night of the 3rd Brannan acting on a report from a local
that the Confederate strength was more than 1200 men
requested additional reinforcements from the Fernandia
garrison. The commander there immediately sent forward 300
members of the 9th Maine to bolster Brannan’s task force. They
would prove to be unnecessary. On the 4th the gunboats again
went up the river to test the enemy position and found the
works at the bluff deserted. The Confederate commander LTC
Hopkins working under an exaggerated report of Union strength
from his cavalry of 3000 men determined that with his 500 men
“it would be impossible to successfully, or with any hope of
success, make a stand against them”. He ordered the
BG John Brannan
abandonment of the works. BG Joseph Finegan disagreed with
Hopkins assessment and called the decision “a gross military blunder.” Upon occupying the
fortifications the Union troops found ten heavy artillery pieces abandoned in the works. The
47th was left to recover the guns while Brannan and 785 troops moved up river to the
secondary Confederate works at Yellow Bluff. These works were also found empty and the way
was clear to move into Jacksonville. On the 6th reports of Confederate steamers up river
prompted an expedition of 100 members of the 47th Pennsylvania accompanied by two artillery
pieces and 25 gunners. The troops boarded the Darlington and found the steamer Governor
Milton run into a small stream near Hawkinsville. A boarding party found the boat empty but
for the engineer and first mate who were asleep. The captured crew reported that boiler
problems led to the boat being left behind. Nevertheless, the boat was hauled back to
Jacksonville were repairs were made and the boat used in support operations for two weeks
before it was sent off to South Carolina for quartermaster duty. On return of the successful
river patrol the Union troops once again left Jacksonville. When Confederate troops returned to
the city they complained bitterly about plundering in the city. After a short stay the
Confederate troops departed for winter camp a short distance west of the city.
Recruiting the Force
During 1863 a great desire to push the fight inland developed at the top of the Union chains of
command. The battle for coastal access was gaining steady success as the number of vessels
available grew but the leaders of the Union forces felt they had been relegated to a backwater
fight that would leave them without the accolades necessary for promotion. The growing
reliance on Florida for foodstuffs for the Confederate armies, particularly beef and salt, offered
an opportunity to impact the war and gain notice for the fight in Florida. Unfortunately there
were few troops available to make these plans a reality.
The idea of forming units from the population of the various colonies of refugees was first
presented by Enoch Daniels. Daniels had led a company in the Third Seminole War and thought
his knowledge of the area could be helpful to the Union war effort.
He approached Chief Master Henry Crane, the ranking Federal official
in Port Charlotte, with a proposal to raise a volunteer force of
Floridians for that purpose. Intrigued by the concept Crane
forwarded the suggestion to BG Daniel Woodbury at Key West.
Daniels was then sent to discuss the matter personally with the
Union leaders. His first encounter was not with Woodbury but with
Admiral Theodorus Bailey. Bailey led the East Gulf Blockading
Squadron and was eager to assist the project. Daniels also found a
willing participant in Woodbury, who jumped at the opportunity to
get more heavily involved in the war he saw as passing him by at this
BG Daniel Woodbury
remote outpost. Woodbury encouraged Daniels and detached a
Lieutenant, one sergeant, and six privates from the 47th Pennsylvania to assist him. Daniels
began his enlistment drive on Key West where he was able to enlist 22 refugees for his new
endeavor from the displaced population there. Daniels and his small group departed for the
Useppa Island colony, on the Sunflower just before Christmas of 1863, with the promise of a
captain’s commission if he could fill the unit, the Florida Rangers, to eighty soldiers. Admiral
Bailey also contributed the Dale and the Gem of the Sea to provide transportation back and
forth to the mainland. After a slow start and some minor confrontations with Confederate
forces the trips to the mainland began to pay dividends. Recruits came in slowly at first but
after the addition of James D. Green to the recruiting details the unit grew steadily. In less than
ninety days the unit grew to 170 men. Green was rewarded with a 1st Lieutenant commission
for his work. Crane, Daniels, Green, and Woodbury worked feverishly to enlist the roving bands
of dissidents and deserters. The recruiting tour moved on to other areas near the refugee
colonies and steadily built the unit, now designated as the 2nd Florida Cavalry. After a
Confederate sweep through Taylor and Lafayette counties in which loyalist homes were burned
and many of the residents pushed into Union protection. The reaction among the dissident
bands was predictable. The well established William Strickland, Coker Brothers, and William
White bands came in to swell the ranks. Continued efforts at the smaller refugee communities
operated by the US Navy continued to bring in recruits. By the war’s end 739 men were enlisted
into the ranks of the 2nd. A similar recruiting drive in the Pensacola area raised the 1st Florida
Cavalry (US) that saw service in Western Florida and Alabama.
The next addition to Woodbury’s force was the 2nd Regiment of the USCT. The regiment
finished training in November 1863 and was assigned to the Department of the Gulf. Their first
duty was on Ship Island as guards and fatigue labor but in February they arrived at Key West to
relieve the 47th Pennsylvania. Although intended as garrison troops it was not long before
Henry Crane requested some of the troops to replace the departed 47 th soldiers that had
bolstered his command at Fort Meyers. Woodbury sent him two companies, under CPT
Jonathan Childs. The combat partnership between the 2nd USCT and the 2nd Florida Cavalry that
would last for the remainder of the war was begun. By June the 2nd USCT was spread along the
west coast of the state. Small scale combat operations were now possible in the interior.
Capt J.J. Dickison
Events in Florida took on a new look in 1863. The Confederate
defeat at Vicksburg cut off the Trans-Mississippi meat supply
from the bulk of the Confederacy. The cattle ranges of central
and south central Florida were eyed by Confederate authorities
as replacement source. Also several of the important southern
salt works had fallen into Federal hands and the remaining
supplier, southwest Virginia, was having a difficult time keeping
pace with demand and faced military threat as well.
Manufacturing salt from seawater became a lucrative cottage
industry along the Florida coast. Having grown the force in
Florida the Union commanders now felt capable of military
operations on the mainland to slow the flow of this staple
northward. Attempts to interdict the production and
transportation these two staples led to increased on shore
Captain J. J. Dickison
activity by Union forces. A secondary goal of these raids was the recruitment of slaves into the
newly formed USCT regiments. These raids often led to confrontations between the meager
Confederate forces in the area and the raiding parties. Defending against many of these
expeditions was CPT J. J. Dickison of the 2nd Florida Cavalry. His efforts made him the foremost
Confederate military leader in Florida.
Many of the largest skirmishes centered on the central part of the state. On March 27 th, 1863 a
Federal force of about 500 soldiers aboard the Mary Benton steamed south on the St John’s
River for a landing near the town. Pickets from CPT J. J. Dickison’s Company H, 2 nd Florida
Cavalry, reported the approach of the boat and a trap was set at the suspected landing site.
When the Union troops attempted to disembark the vessels Dickison’s, positioned behind a
fence and crude works, initiated the ambush. Caught in the open on the wharf at the landing
site the Union troops were easy targets for the Confederate troopers. The surprised Federals
beat a hasty retreat to the boat dragging their dead and wounded with them. Dickison
estimated from “the considerable quantity of blood in several places and also many fragments
of bone, pronounced by the surgeon of the post here pieces of cranium” that the enemy
casualties at “not less than from 20 to 30.” Dickison’s men suffered only one slightly wounded
man in the affair. Lack of success encouraged the Union commanders to abandon the area and
move back towards Jacksonville on April 16th.
Another significant event occurred near Palatka in March, 1864. Federal troops occupied the
town but their scouting party was driven back “by a considerable cavalry force” into the
fortifications on the 16th Discouraged by their lack of success the Union troops abandoned the
town on April 16th. Several more expeditions were made into the area but were defeated by
Dickison’s troops. On May 19th the small Federal garrison at Waleka was taken by surprise as
they ate breakfast and was captured. Another Union outpost at Camp Butler was captured by
Dickison on the 21st. The most serious and successful of Dickison’s exploits occurred at Horse
Landing near Palatka on the 23rd.
In his report of the March 16th skirmish with Dickison’s troopers COL William Barton mentioned
that the steamer Columbine had not yet arrived but he did not “feel any anxiety in regard to
her.” COL Barton’s faith in the “good hands “of the crew was admirable but he under rated the
possible threat to the vessel by Dickison’s ever vigilant troopers. Notified of the boats trip
down the river by his mounted pickets Dickison again plotted a surprise welcome. The Milton
Artillery, commanded by LT Mortimer Bates, disabled the boat with its second firing and for the
next 45 minutes the helpless craft was showered with canister and small arms fire from “20
picked riflemen”. The boat finally raised a white flag and was boarded by the Confederate
troopers. Fearing the worst many of the surviving black troops on board tried to swim to safety
after the boat’s surrender. Dickison reported that the “deck presented a horrible scene, the
dead and wounded lay weltering in blood.” The tally of Union casualties “killed or drowned”
was given at 25 with 6 wounded and 63 captured. The boat was burned to prevent it from
being recovered by the nearby Union gunboat, Ottawa.
In February, 1865, near Braddock’s Farm, Volusia County, another spectacular performance was
turned in by Dickison and his men. With intelligence gained from captured pickets Dickison
planned the demise of a Federal raiding party. Col Wilcoxson and about 75 men of the 17 th
Connecticut appeared as expected leading ten wagons of captured goods. The initial attack,
although sprung prematurely, pushed the wagon train guards back. A wild mounted melee
broke out between LT McEaddy’s detachment and COL Wilcoxson’s staff and 20 man escort.
The Union troops scattered but fell directly into a trap set by Dickison. SGT William Cox and ten
dismounted men killed or captured all of the party but Wilcoxson himself. The Federal Colonel
refused to surrender. When he had expended all of his pistol rounds he drew his saber and
made a desperate charge at Dickison who had arrived on the scene. The two made three
passes at each other and Dickison finally unhorsed the saber wielding man with his third shot.
When Dickison asked the badly wounded man why he had persisted in the unequal battle that
would surely cost him his life the game adversary calmly answered
“Do not blame yourself. You are only doing your duty as a soldier. I alone am to blame.”
The Confederate ambuscade killed 4, including Wilcoxson, and captured all the remaining force
and the ten wagons with 60 horses and mules as well as the cavalry mounts of the escort.
Dickison’s men experienced no casualties during the encounter.
Dickison and his small group of men became omnipresent in the minds of the Union
commanders in Florida. He was everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Several attempts at
destroying his force either met with defeat or grasping at air. Dickison issued orders to his men
that were very similar to those of another great Confederate cavalry commander, Nathan
Bedford Forrest. His “strike the enemy whenever you have to opportunity to do so” edict made
his small force immense in the minds of the enemy. His force was often credited with being
many times its actual size. Similar exploits at Green Cove Springs, Marianna and elsewhere are
indicative of the kind of service that made him a minor legend in Confederate military history.
Salt Wars
One of the first impacts of the Union blockade was to cut the Confederate salt supply in half.
Prior to the war the South was using approximately six million bushels of salt annually. Just over
3 million bushels were imported, the bulk of that through New Orleans. The domestic
production of salt in the Confederacy also suffered from the early loss of production areas. This
need for this valuable preservative became acute. By October 1862 the price of a sack salt had
risen from $25 to $140.The long coastline
of Florida offered the possibility of
replacing the lost supply through
distillation of seawater. Urged on by
newspaper headlines to “MAKE SALT!”,
Confederate loyalist and profiteers alike
had turned the Florida coast in a massive
salt works. It did not take long for the US
Navy to take note and begin operations
to slow the production and shipment of
the important commodity.
While most of these actions were small
Depiction of the destruction of a salt factory
hit and run affairs that were described in one or two sentence reports, two sustained actions
highlight the importance placed on these types of operations. In the first week of October,
1862, Lieutenant Commander English, commanding the USS Somerset, reported from Cedar
Keys that “reliable information” led him to believe that most of the Confederate forces were
away from Station No. 4 on the Fernandia Railroad. He took the opportunity to mount a raiding
party against the “extensive salt works there.” The Somerset was brought as close as the depth
of water would allow and fired “some dozen shells” at the works. When a white flag was
hoisted English sent Master Dennison with a landing party of 15 to begin the destruction of the
works. At first the work went without resistance but when the landing party approached the
larger works, where the white flag was flying they were fired upon “by some 25 persons
concealed in the rear.” The surprise attack wounded eight, two very seriously, and the party
made a fighting withdraw to the safety of the ship.
Two days later a much larger party from the USS Tahoma “was fitted out” to ensure the
destruction of the works. Commander Howell, of the Tahoma, also admitted that “the rebels
needed a lesson.” On the morning of the 6th Lieutenant Commander Crosman, with four boats
from the Tahoma and four from the Somerset, filled with 111 men landed. Two of the boats
carried small howitzers that put 20 to 30 “armed guerillas” to flight and the destructive parties
went to work. Twenty-eight boilers were destroyed, two large enough to require shots from the
howitzers to complete the act, and all but two buildings burned without injury to the raiders.
In December, 1863, an even more intense effort was made against the works at Lake Ocala and
in St Andrew’s Bay. Acting Master W. R. Browne, commanding the Restless, sent a boat under
the command of Acting Ensign James Russell to Lake Ocala. After a five mile march inland the
party destroyed the works there. Russell claimed 6 large boilers, 7 kettles, a large quantity of
salt, 2 flatboats, and 6 ox carts “were demolished.”
Eight days later Browne, with the assistance of the steamer Bloomer and her tender Caroline,
mad an attack on the government works at West Bay. Browne claimed that27 buildings holding
22 boilers and 200 kettles were destroyed. Continuing the mission to the private concerns that
extended a total of seven miles along the shore nearly 300 buildings, 27 wagons, and 5
flatboats were ruined. Shelling of the town, believed to hold a Confederate force of
undetermined size, started a fire that consumed 32 additional buildings. Browne, however, was
forced to concede that his work was not yet half done.
On December 17th another effort was made at St Andrew’s Bay. Captain Crissey on the
Bloomer, despite a leaky boiler and a strong wind and tide managed to get a landing party of 56
officers and men to their destination. The raiders went ashore and destroyed 90 salt works
“with a large number of kettles and boilers and 30 building or salt sheds.
In under two weeks of vigorous operations Browne claimed 290 salt works, 33 wagons, 12 flat
boats, 2 sloops, 6 ox carts, 4000 bushels of salt, 268 buildings, 529 kettles, and 105 boilers
wrecked. Additionally 48 contrabands and 5 deserters “enter(ed) our service.” It was not
enough to stop the salt makers. At least three more raids were made into the area but the
production was never completely shut down.
The Olustee Campaign
The first major land campaign in Florida had its roots not in the state but in South Carolina.
Stalled outside of Charleston MG Quincy Gillmore was looking for a way to revive his sinking
reputation. In early December he proposed a strike into northern Florida to check the flow of
supplies into South Carolina. At the same time a political mission, led by Lyman Stickney, was
raising the possibility of an early political reversal in Florida. As a means of supporting his
planned campaign Gillmore included the “speedy restoration of
Florida to her allegiance” as a goal for the proposed action. With
an election year coming up President Lincoln saw promise in the
plan and dispatched John Hay, with a provisional commission to
major, to Gillmore with instructions that “the thing be done.” Not
surprisingly military approval soon followed with the details of
the campaign left to Gillmore on 22 December. Halleck informed
Gillmore that he was “at liberty to undertake such operations in
your department as you deem best.” The only restrictions placed
on Gillmore were that his position in front of Charleston had to be
maintained and that no reinforcements would be available.
Gillmore did not hesitate to put his plan in motion. BG Truman
BG Quincy Gillmore
Seymour was ordered to depart from Hilton Head, SC with his
troops on 4 February, 1864. They landed in Jacksonville on 7 February and quickly dispersed the
few Confederate troops in the area to claim the city once again. The departing Confederates
rushed word to BG Joseph Finegan, commander of the district of East Florida, of the Union
expedition. Finegan had but 1500 troops available to meet the Federal advance. He
immediately sent an appeal for reinforcements to P.G.T. Beauregard. Beauregard directed
Finegan to conduct delaying operations while troops could be gathered in South Carolina,
Georgia, and elsewhere in Florida to come to his assistance.
On the evening of the 8th the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry and the 1st Massachusetts
Cavalry headed west from Jacksonville with “Union men” as guides. In the darkness the column
lost the road several times but managed to skirt the main Confederate camp and came upon
the camp of the Milton Light Artillery. A lone mounted picket detected the approach of the
Federal column and raised the alarm at the camp. CPT Dunham described what happened next
in just three words; “my command fled.” They left behind 4 cannon, 6 wagons, 45 horses and
mules, and 18 prisoners. The Union troopers pushed on to the railroad town of Baldwin, about
20 miles west of Jacksonville. Arriving at 0700 the found the town empty of Confederate troops
who had retreated leaving an additional 8 artillery pieces behind as well as 40 horses and mule
and a small stock of commissary supplies.
The successful early going left the Union troops confident and they marched out of Baldwin the
next morning on a reconnaissance toward Lake City expecting more of the same. The column
was formed by the 40th Massachusetts Mounted infantry and 1st Massachusetts Cavalry
Battalion, roughly 1000 strong. Unbeknownst to the Union commanders MAJ Robert Harrison’s
portion of the 2nd Florida Cavalry was traveling to Lake City to link up with the Confederate
forces that were being gathered there to confront the Federal expedition. Harrison’s men
arrived at the crossing before the Union column and planned a surprise greeting. As the
Federal troopers made an approach to the plank bridge over the St. Mary’s River a fusillade of
shots rang out from across the river. Three of the four men riding in advance were unhorsed.
The ambush had been expertly planned and the location well chosen. The stream was wide
enough and swift enough to make fording difficult and the nearby foliage provided excellent
cover and concealment for the Confederate troopers waiting at the bridge. The stream acted as
a barrier to the more numerous Union troops and the bridge, which had been partially
destroyed, was a focal point to enemy movement allowing them to concentrate their fire there.
The startled Union column broke into the brush on either side of the road and dismounted.
After seeing to the safe removal of their mounts the Federal troopers began laying down return
fire on their attackers with their Spencer carbines. With the initial shock of the ambush gone
COL Henry ordered up artillery and sent Co. E of the 1st Massachusetts Cavalry to attack the
bridge hoping to gain some knowledge of the enemy strength. CPT Webster led his troopers on
a mounted dash for the bridge but they were quickly pinned down after discovering that the
bridge was ruined. The attack helped discover the disposition of the Confederate troops and a
dismounted company of the 40th was sent forward in an effort to gain the far side of the river.
The volume of fire coming at them was too great and they were pulled back after discovering
that the bridge was in ruins. A second company was committed to attempt to ford the river but
they too had to give way to the fire from the Confederate troopers.
By this time Elder’s battery had come on line and began to pour fire into the Confederate
position. The barrage significantly slowed the Confederate fire and Henry decided to attempt to
ford the river with mounted troops while a dismounted force attempted another crossing near
the bridge. Once it was clear that the Union troopers would gain the near side of the river the
Confederates began pulling back. However the mounted attackers overtook some of the late
movers and secured about 70 prisoners. The losses were 5 killed for the Union and 2 killed for
the Confederate forces. A total of about 30 wounded soldiers from both sides were left to the
care of the Federal medical staff. The column moved on to Sanderson where they established
camp.
Following the ambush at St. Mary’s River the Confederate forces withdrew to consolidate at
Olustee Station. Here Finegan used his cavalry to retard the Federal probes while he
constructed earthworks that were bordered on one side by a swamp and the other by Ocean
Pond. While he waited for reinforcements there a cloud of uncertainty fell over the Union
command. The unexpected tenacity of the Confederate defenders in the area began to raise
doubts in the mind of BG Seymour. Writing to Gillmore on the 11 th BG Seymour announced that
“I am convinced that the movement upon Lake City is not …admissible.”
He also recommended that his forces withdraw from their advanced positions and fall back to
Jacksonville and Palatka. Gillmore thought the idea of withdraw a good idea and responded to
Seymour
“Don’t risk a repulse in advancing on Lake City”
However he ordered Seymour to fall back only as far as Baldwin. Seymour moved back and
called back the Henry’s cavalry advance as well. Once in Baldwin he started to regain some
confidence. In a reply to Gillmore he stated that “this is the place to fortify”. The two men met
in Jacksonville on the 14th to discuss the situation and it was determined, at least in Gillmore’s
mind,
“…that no advance would be made…”
Gillmore detailed CPT Reese of the engineers to Seymour to help lay out the planned defenses
“capable of resisting a coup de main” at Jacksonville, Baldwin, Palatka, and the crossing of the
St. Mary’s River. Gillmore then departed for South Carolina. While Seymour was meeting with
Gillmore a small operation departed for Gainesville to attack the Florida Railroad depot and
Confederate Quartermaster operations there. CPT G. E. Marshall leading details from
Companies C, G, and H of the 40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry arrived in Gainesville on the
morning of the 14th. They found
“Immense stores of cotton, of turpentine and rosin, sugar, tobacco, and supplies of all kinds…”
The supplies were broken open and the captured rations were distributed among the local
population “who were suffering for want of them.” The brief occupation of Gainesville was
interrupted that evening by the appearance of two companies of the 2 nd Florida Cavalry. The
Union troopers erected a barricade of cotton bales and awaited an attack. The Confederate
leaders seemed to have some misgivings about challenging the barricaded streets and
eventually called for volunteers. According one participant (PVT Lawrence Jackson) about two
dozen men stepped forward to follow LT Samuel Reddick into town. The attack was short lived.
The men charged down Liberty Street as two platoons and made it to the barricade where
some “of the horses jumped on the bales.” They were greeted by the rapid fire of the Union
Spencer’s and quickly fell back when the attack was not supported by the remainder of the
Confederate troops. They left behind one man killed. Jackson felt that “the outcome was
anything but creditable to the officers in command of the Confederate forces.” The next
morning the Confederate troopers found the Union cavalrymen
gone.
On the 17th Seymour sent a dispatch announcing a move to the
Suwannee River to destroy the railroad bridge there to a shocked
and confused Gillmore, who responded;
“You have forgotten my last instructions... Your project distinctly
and avowedly ignores these operations and substitutes a plan
which not only involves your command in a distant movement
without provisions, far beyond a point from which you once
withdrew on account of precisely the same necessity, but
presupposes a simultaneous demonstration of “great
importance” to you elsewhere over which you have no control
and which requires the co-operation of the navy.”
BG Joseph Finegan
But the harsh reminder of the agreed upon course of action would not arrive in time. Seymour
had his command on the move westward without waiting for authorization.
The end of the first days march brought the Federal advance to the St Mary’s River. At Barber’s
Station the troops were ordered to cook several days of rations and prepare for the hard march
ahead. On the morning of the 20th the infantry advanced up the Lake City Road and the railroad
preceded by COL Henry’s cavalry. The march stopped briefly in Sanderson and then continued
westward in the afternoon. About three miles west of town the Union troopers ran into the
Confederate cavalry pickets and began a lively skirmish that continued on for several miles. The
skirmishing grew in intensity until BG Joseph Finegan ordered the deployment of the 64 th
Georgia and two companies of the 32nd Georgia to assists his thin line of cavalry. With the
appearance of infantry to his front Seymour deployed the 7th Connecticut and Elder’s Horse
Artillery (Battery B 1st US Artillery) to help push back the
stubborn Confederate line. As both sides added troops to the
fight a general engagement resulted.
The growing number of forces at this line east of the Confederate
entrenchments stabilized the fight and Finegan realized that his
hope of a fight at his prepared defense was not going to be
forthcoming. In anticipation of a call for reinforcements Finegan
ordered more of Colquitt’s Georgians (6th, 19th, and 28th and the
remaining companies of the 32nd) out of the works to reinforce
the advanced position. The Union forces likewise began to
deploy for battle in the flat open terrain. Trailing the 7 th
Connecticut was the remainder of COL J. R. Hawley’s Brigade
BG Truman Seymour
(7th New Hampshire and the 8th Regiment USCT) which Seymour
ordered to each side of Elder’s battery as the 7th Connecticut cleared the field. In an attempt
to bring the 7th New Hampshire into position only 250 yards from the Confederate line COL
Hawley issued a confusing set of orders that left the regiment badly scrambled under intense
fire. Coming in on the right of a Union battery Hawley ordered the regiment “By company into
line” which was promptly obeyed. He then had the order relayed down the line to deploy on
the fifth company. As the regiment reacted to the order Hawley realized a mistake had been
made and tried to correct it. In quick fashion he changed the order to “on the eighth company”
and again realizing his error to “on the tenth company”. The result was complete disorder. The
several minutes under fire waiting for the correct orders resulted in “a faltering on the part of
some of the men and finally in almost a complete break.” The regiment dissolved. Hawley
would later claim that the regiment pulled itself back together and rendered good service but
BG Seymour wrote that “this regiment counted as nothing during the remainder of the
engagement.” The 7th for all intents and purposes was out of the fight.
The departure of the 7th New Hampshire allowed the Confederate line to concentrate its fire on
the 8th USCT who had formed on the other side of the battery. The poorly trained men of the
8th took an incredible pounding, suffering 310 casualties (of about 550 present) before finally
falling back. The retreat of the 8th presented COL Colquitt with the opportunity to seize the
initiative. The Confederate commander ordered an advance on the sole remaining enemy units
on the field, the Union artillery. The unsupported gunners began to feel the brunt of the
Confederate fire but they continued to resist the advance “with perfect tenacity and coolness”
until COL Barton’s Brigade of New Yorkers rushed to the scene.
The infusion of fresh troops momentarily reversed the tide of
battle. The Confederate attack was stalled and in some places
actually pushed back. Again reserves from the original
Confederate line pushed the fight the other way. Another
Confederate advance captured several Union artillery pieces.
The battle fell into a bloody stalemate until the attackers began
to run low on ammunition and it appeared that they would
have to concede the hard earned ground. At the critical
moment BG Finegan arrived with the last available Confederate
troops (1st Florida Battalion and Bonaud’s Battalion) and a
resupply of ammunition. When the reenergized Confederate
attack threatened to overwhelm the Union line near dusk
Seymour called for a retreat.
Colonel Alfred Colquitt
The final uncommitted Union brigade was called forward. COL
James Montgomery’s 54th Massachusetts and 35th USCT (1st North Carolina) left their duty
protecting the supply train and assumed a blocking position to cover the retreat of the main
body. The successful but costly delaying action allowed the retreat of the badly mauled
brigades of Barton and Hawley. A Confederate pursuit never materialized and the Union
column returned to Barber’s Station and by the 22nd all the way to Jacksonville. The Federal
losses at Olustee were enormous for the number of troops involved. Nearly 40% of the Union
force was counted as casualties (203k, 1,152w, and 506m) while the Confederates suffered
about half that total. In a decidedly brief statement on the outcome of the battle sent by
Seymour on the night of the 20th he called the result “a devilish hard rub.” The plan for the
grand Union strategy was foiled and they remained content to use Jacksonville for a base of
operations for the remainder of the war.
Gainesville – August 1864
The failure of the Olustee Campaign returned the military situation in Florida to one of minor
raiding and skirmishing. Union expeditions reaching out from Jacksonville, Fort Myers, and
Pensacola supplied the impetus for some of the more dramatic, if smaller, actions of the war.
The first of these was a raid to Gainesville conducted by COL Andrew Harris, 75 th Ohio Infantry
(Mounted) and COL William Noble, of the 17th Connecticut Infantry.
The two pronged raid left Baldwin at dawn on 15 August. The mounted element ,led by Harris,
was comprised of 173 men from the 75th Ohio, 12 men and one 12lb piece from Company A, 3rd
Rhode Island Artillery, and 15 teamsters, cooks , and smiths. The infantry column contained the
34th, 35th, and 102nd USCT, a 20 man mounted detachment from the 75th Ohio, and a three gun
detachment of the 3rd Rhode Island Artillery. Although the Official Reports do not make it clear
exactly how the two groups were to cooperate but it is believed that the cavalry troopers were
to seize the city and hold it until the infantrymen arrived to act as an occupation force. The two
columns met at Trail Ridge were Harris reported the capture of a picket post at New River. After
a short rest the troopers headed out for a 0230 rendezvous with the 4th Massachusetts Cavalry
at Starke. The Bay State horseman numbered 89 officers and enlisted men, commanded by CPT
Morton. They were accompanied by “some 12 or 15 loyal Floridians” including a Mr. Sykes who
acted as the guide. The united column left Starke the next morning at 0730 “after destroying a
lot of Confederate commissary stores” and
six railroad cars. They entered Gainesville on
the morning of the 17th.
The town was held by about 70 militiamen
who were easily driven off by Company B, 4th
Massachusetts Cavalry. Thinking they had
won the town from the only enemy force
available Harris ordered his men to unbridle
their horses and had coffee put on. Rather
than tend to the business of preparing to
defend their prize the Union troopers started
milling about and possibly even pillaging the
Members of the 75th Ohio in Jacksonville
town. They were caught totally unprepared
by a well coordinated attack by CPT J. J. Dickison and about 175 men from the 2nd and 5th
Florida Cavalry. Desperately trying to organize a last minute defense Harris managed to blunt
the main attack but found himself “immediately surrounded” by a flanking party of Confederate
troopers. Harris frantically threw men in every direction trying to address the rapidly
developing trouble spots. He estimated that the attack was being made by an enemy that
numbered “not less than 600.” At 0900 Harris received reports that his only piece was “nearly
out of ammunition” and to half his horses were disabled. With his troubles seemingly
compounded by the moment Harris decided to make a run for it. He called his commanders in
and planned an escape by cutting their way out on the Waldo Road.
On the order of execution a large part of his command started out on the wrong road. COL
Harris made a dash to inform the wayward column of their mistake. He caught up with them
but they were forced to abandon their artillery piece when “the enemy again surrounded me.”
The retreat suddenly became an everyman for himself rout. Harris and 42 men still lucky
enough to have horses bolted to the east in hopes of finding COL Noble’s infantry column. LTC
Benjamin Morgan and another group were broken up near Magnolia and were forced to “take
to the swamps.” The expedition that may have been intended to secure Gainesville for
permanent occupation had held the town for less than three hours.
The Harris party reunited with the infantry column in the late afternoon of the 17 th at their
camp. With hopes that more of the destroyed cavalry column would come in Noble maintained
his camp until late on the morning of the 18th. That night they made camp near Lake George
and the following day completed their march at Magnolia late in the afternoon of the 19 th. An
accounting of Harris’ command told the true story of the failed expedition. BG John Hatch
reported on the 23rd that the total loss to Harris’ command was 14 officers and 171 enlisted
men. Stragglers continued to come in from the swamps and forests until the 25 th but there
could be no denying the extent of the disaster. Dickison’s total loss was reported as 1 killed and
5 wounded.
A month later a 55 man detachment of the 4th Massachusetts Cavalry made an expedition form
Magnolia and met a similar fate at the hands of Dickison’s troopers. After a 40 minute gunfight
that ended when the Union troopers again “took to swamps” Dickison reported taking 23
prisoners (including 8 wounded men) and killing 10-12. No loss other than a couple of wounded
horses was reported from the Confederate forces involved.
Marianna
On September 12th, 1864, BG Alexander Asboth announced his intent to conduct a raid into the
northwest corner of Florida. The purpose of the operation was fourfold. Asboth believed that
Union prisoners were being held in the vicinity of Marianna and that the Confederate forces
there were isolated and well dispersed. Along with freeing the reported POW’s and destroying
the Confederate troops Asboth hoped to inspire recruits, both white and black, and gather
horses and mules.
On the evening of the 18th Asboth and 700 men, 3 Battalions of 2nd Maine cavalry, 1 Battalion
1st Florida Cavalry (US), and 79 mounted infantrymen from the 82nd and 86th USCT, crossed
Pensacola Harbor on the Lizzie Davis and began a march inland. After a march of 50 miles they
made contact with the boat again and conducted resupply operations near East Pass. The
march began anew on the 20th and after 134 miles in mostly rainy weather the column arrived
at Euchee Anna Courthouse where they surprised a small garrison. Taken prisoner were COL W.
H. Terrence of the State militia and 1LT Francis Gordon of the 15 th Cavalry who was home on
leave. The Union troopers destroyed the local ferry, secured “a large number of beef cattle”,
and recruited 16 contraband recruits that were sent back to link up with the Lizzie Davis at La
Grange with an escort of 2 companies of the 1st Florida cavalry (US). After the affair at Euchee
Anna the column made their “advance speedily via Campbell town to Marianna.” The route
through Campbellton represented a change from the originally intended line of march but it
was anticipated the approach from the northwest would not be expected. What caused Asboth
to make the change is not mentioned in his report.
The expected surprise did not materialize. The Federal
column was met about three miles outside of town at
Hopkins Branch. The Confederate forces there, believed
to be CPT Alexander Godwin’s company of local militia
(about 25-30 men), attempted a very brief delaying
action. They were easily driven back but certainly the
alarm was raised in Marianna. Pushing forward to the
western edge of town Asboth’s men ran into COL A. B.
Montgomery’s troopers at Ely Corner. A haphazard and ill
advised frontal assault on the position, led by MAJ
Nathaniel Cutler, brought down several Maine troopers
killing LT Ayer of Company I. Apparently upset or
impatient about the delay caused by this small group of
enemy forces Asboth rushed to the front of the column
and ordered a charge. The outnumbered Confederates
gave way and dispersed “like a flock of sheep.” The
BG Alexander Asboth
Union attack rolled into town and directly into a
barricade erected from wagons on Lafayette Street.
Gradually the defenders were pushed back but the attackers continued to come under a serious
fire from the building on each side of the road. The troopers used the superior firepower of
their Spencer’s to finally gain the advantage and pushed the defenders back. On the southern
side of the street the defenders were driven up against Stage Creek and overcome in a bitter
struggle. On the northern side of the road the Confederate militiamen were pushed into the
courtyard of St. Luke’s Church. Using the fence there for cover the battle continued.
Asboth was wounded in the face and command passed to COL Ladislas Zulavsky of the 82 nd
USCT. The new commander immediately brought up the soldiers of the USCT contingent for a
dismounted attack into the churchyard. With fixed bayonets the infantrymen attacked the
position from 30 yards away. The ferocity of the attack forced Norwood’s men to surrender. In
the aftermath of the successful assault the USCT soldiers allegedly murdered several men who
had surrendered before the officers could regain control. Despite the surrender of Norwood’s
men several men inside the church refused to surrender and Zulavsky ordered the church and
two adjoining building burned. The resulting inferno ended resistance in the town.
The final phase of the battle was fought at Courthouse Square. COL Montgomery and his
remaining men attempting to get to the bridge over the Chipola River ran into a portion of the
Union column that had worked around the fighting on the north end of town and now blocked
their escape route. The Confederate troopers charged right at them in a desperate attempt to
reach the bridge. The fight here was equally as intense as the churchyard with the two sides
locked in the “closest possible contact.” COL Montgomery and his adjutant LT William
McPherson were unhorsed and captured during the fight here. The bridge itself was being held
by CPT Robert Chisolm’s Cavalry who fought off several attempts by the Federal troopers to
seize the escape route.
The battle ended with a complete Union victory, however the unexpected fierceness of the
fight and resulting casualties caused Asboth to call off the continuation of the mission. After a
night of pillaging the town the column moved to link up with water transportation. The Union
column gained one more small victory at Vernon when CPT W.B. Jones and his company of local
scouts ran directly into them in their rush to aid the Marianna men. The small unit was put to
flight after several were killed and wounded and more prisoners were added to the already
impressive haul. Asboth returned with “ 81 prisoners, 95 stand of arms, quantities of
commissary and quartermaster’s stores, over 200 fine horses and excellent mules, 17 wagons,
and over 400 head of cattle, already brought within our lines ,
besides over 600 contrabands who followed us with great
enthusiasm.” No prisoners were liberated during the raid.
The Battle of Natural Bridge
The ease of the Union advance into Marianna exposed the
weakness of the Confederate position around the capital. BG
William Miller ordered an enhancement to the defenses on
the approaches to Tallahassee. The works were commenced
immediately and included entrenchments covering the bridge
over the St. Marks River at Newport. These improvements
were completed just in time to pay immediate dividends.
Actions in the central part of the state encouraged BG John
Newton to consider a strike into the area of the St. Marks
BG William Miller
River. With CPT Dickison’s cavalry vigorously opposing operations in the Fort Myers and Cedar
Keys area Newton thought that the defense in the northern portion of the state would be
stripped of troops. Accordingly he sought out and received the cooperation of Admiral C. K.
Stribling for an expedition into the area. Newton gathered a force of about one thousand men
for the implementation of his plan. The troops included the 99th USCT, the 2 nd USCT, and
portions of the 2nd Florida Cavalry (US). The Navy originally contributed eleven vessels
(Mahaska, Fort Henry, Spirea, Stars and Stripes, Hibiscus, Honduras, Magnolia, Britannia,
Matthew Vassar, O. H. Lee, and Two Sisters) to the operation. Eventually four additional
vessels were added (Proteus, Iuka, Isonomia, and Hendrick Hudson).
BG Newton developed a five phase plan in conjunction with his naval support commanders. The
operation would begin on the night of March 3rd with the insertion of a small command to seize
the bridge over the East River. The following morning the main
body would be landed and begin a march inland toward
Newport. The bridge at Newport was the key to the primary
objective of the plan. It was here that Newton hoped to cross
the ST Marks River giving him two options. Once across the
natural barrier he could either strike the railroad leading to the
capital or move to the rear of St Marks and attempt to capture
the city. The assistance of the armada, that was to move up
the river and neutralize the batteries there and land 500-600
men to challenge the front of the city. Finally secondary
parties were to destroy the railroad bridges over the
Ocklockonee and Aucilla Rivers.
It was a complicated and ambitious plan that probably had too
many moving parts not to encounter problems. Immediately
things started going contrary to the design of the operation.
BG John Newton
The operation began on the night of March 2nd with the
landing of two groups of six men, guided by local citizens, to burn the bridges on the
Ocklockonee and Aucilla. Shortly after putting MAJ Weeks with 60 men from the 2nd Florida
Cavalry and 30 seamen, under the command of Acting Ensign Whitman, ashore on the 3 rd the
weather closed in and ruined the timetable. A thick fog settled in on the area of operations
followed by a “heavy gale.” The landings for the main force on the morning of the 4th were
seriously delayed. Weeks, failing the link up with his reinforcements, gave up at the East River
Bridge after being attacked “by a cavalry force of about sixty men” and returned to the
lighthouse. When the fleet finally returned the lead vessels, Spirea and Honduras, ran aground.
Freeing the grounded vessels took considerable time and the landings scheduled for first light
did not occur until 1600. The small artillery compliment, made up of two boat howitzers
manned by navy personnel, was not put ashore until 0800 the next morning. All chance at
surprise was lost. The Confederate commanders understood the threat posed by Newton’s
force and used the delay to their advantage. A train was commandeered and a warning
message sent to the capital. All available troops and home guard units were mustered.
Meanwhile, LTC G. W. Scott and about 60 men still held the East River Bridge.
On the morning of the 5th Newton’s main force approached the bridge. For some reason Scott
refused to engage the column at long range with his sole artillery piece and allowed the Union
forces to gain the far side of the bridge unmolested. When it became apparent that the bridge
would be stormed Scott retreated after a single round of canister. In the confusion of the
hurried retreat Scott’s men left their sole artillery piece behind. Newton’s men swarmed across
the stringers of the bridge to seize the first objective. The bridge was rapidly repaired and the
column moved on to the next objective, Newport, but 24 hours behind schedule. It would be a
lost day that the Federal forces would come to seriously regret.
After putting the East River behind him, Newton moved immediately for his next objective, the
bridge over the St Marks River at Newport. LTC Scott’s men, reinforced by some home guard
militia and a small detachment of sailors from the CSS Spray , had occupied the newly
constructed entrenchments to defend there. One bay of the bridge was burned to further
complicate any attempted crossing. When the Union advance approached the bridge a firefight
erupted across the river. The damaged bridge and the vigorous defense convinced Newton that
no headway could be made at this crossing. He satisfied himself by throwing a brief barrage
into the town before heading north to the next available crossing site, at Natural Bridge. MAJ
Weeks and the dismounted men of the 2nd Florida Cavalry (US) were left to prevent the
Confederate defenders from crossing behind them and cutting their escape route.
About eight miles north of Newport the St Marks River sinks below the limestone crust of the
earth for a few hundred yards before reappearing on the surface again to form, quite literally, a
natural crossing. It was no difficult matter to discern the Federal course of action once the
column was spotted heading north. The primary concern was beating Newton there. At dawn
on the 6th a mismatched collection of Confederate units including the 1st Florida Infantry
Reserve, local militias, a portion of the 2nd Florida Cavalry (CS), and six artillery pieces were dug
in and waiting for the Union troops to attempt a crossing.
The first units to test the defense were Companies B and C of the 2 nd USCT. The well situated
Confederates drove them back with a fusillade of artillery and musket fire. After a brief pause
to explore the possibility of side steeping the defense (despite reports of a secondary crossing
point nothing was found that would avoid the defense) it was decided to assaults the works in
hopes of driving the defenders away. The plan of action had Companies A,B, and H of the 2 nd
USCT testing the enemy right flank and Companies E, G, and K driving toward the heart of the
defense. The 99th USCT was held to support which ever attack gained a measure of success.
The attacks “advanced gallantly” but a combination of the intense fire from the Confederate
works and “a wide and deep slough impassable to troops” stopped them and they “reluctantly
returned.” The failure of the assault made Newton realized the strength of the Confederate
position made success doubtful. He pulled the troops back to an “open pine barrens” about a
quarter mile back. The Confederate commander sent the 2nd Florida Cavalry (CS) out to
determine if the Union force had retreated out of the area. The dismounted reconnaissance
was “easily repulsed with heavy loss” but Newton saw the futility on any further efforts and
ordered withdraw to the lighthouse. As the Union column fell back they blocked the road with
felled trees hampering the Confederate pursuit. The retreat was conducted in such haste that a
small party of men guarding a minor crossing about a mile away were forgotten and were
eventually made prisoners. The Union column faced no significant opposition and eventually
re-crossed the East River Bridge. The bridge was destroyed behind them marking the end of the
failed expedition.
Newton did his best to cover up the failure of the operation with an embarrassing list of
excuses, exaggerations, and false claims of success. According to Newton, the expedition “was
far from being unfruitful in its results.” The successes Newton gave himself credit for were the
destruction of two important bridges (he fails to mention that both were originally destroyed
by the enemy) and that St Marks was “thoroughly blockaded” (he fails to mention that this
could have been accomplished without his inland adventure). Other important results were not
had, according to Newton, because:
-
The raiding parties sent to the Ocklockonee and Aucilla bridges failed to complete their
mission.
-
The Navy was “unable to perform the part assigned” in the operation. Low water
stopped the fleet from reaching St Marks but since Newton’s column never made it
there to perform their part this seems a bit unimportant.
-
A Confederate force of “between 1500 and 2000” (Estimated at no more than 1000)
Union casualties for the effort totaled 21 Killed, 89 wounded, and 38 captured. Confederate
losses were exceptionally light by comparison, 3 killed and 22 wounded. The fight at Natural
Bridge was one of the last significant Confederate victories of the war.
Florida’s Long War – Conclusion
Florida was the weakest of the Confederate states and portions of the state remained in
Federal hands throughout the war. The presence of troops with a firm foothold already
established and the naval blockade could have offered opportunities. At first glance the state
would appear easy pickings for the Union but no real plan was ever developed to see this
through to conclusion. The individual commanders attempted to implement operations, mostly
for professional development, but underestimated the resiliency of the defenders. Furthermore
there were never enough troops available to execute these plans, despite recruiting efforts.
Many of the troops that were available were poorly trained and even more poorly led. Not
surprisingly a dedicated and resourceful enemy sent them back in defeat at each turn.
The Civil War in Florida was a side show at best. This is not meant to ridicule the efforts of those
that fought there but the overall lack of interest by both sides, indicated by the number of
dedicated troops, never allowed for anything close to a real campaign for control of the state.
An uneasy status quo was maintained throughout the war. The inevitable contact between the
Union crust and the Confederate filling led to many small unit actions that changed almost
nothing. Some reduction in salt production and the beef supply may have been felt but neither
of these logistical operations was ever completely halted. The only real military success from
the Union stand point was the reduction of ocean going commerce that resulted from the
blockade.
The Confederate defense of the state maintained a reliance on the small and mobile available
force. The Federal forays into the core of the state were tracked by a native intelligence
network and effectively reported by a well developed communication system to the
Confederate commanders. Using this superior intelligence the defenders could concentrate
where and when they were needed. Skillful leadership and unfailing courage in the face of
daunting odds allowed them to proudly declare at the end of the war that Tallahassee was the
only Confederate capital east of the Mississippi River not to fall into Union hands.
Bibliography
The War of Rebellion; A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies
Vol. I
Powell, E.; Douglas, H.; Slemmer, A.; Brannan, J.; Arnold, L.G.; Yuell, E.
Vol. VI
Brown, H.; Tower, Z.; Arnold, L.; Wilson, W.; Hildt, J.; Reese, C.; Robertson, J.; Duryea, R.; Shipley, A.;
Langdon, L.; Seely, F.; Jackson, R.; McClellan, G.; Bragg, B.; Anderson, R.; Blunt, M.; McFarland, W.; Allen,
H.; Pennington, A.; Chalfin, S.
Vol. XIV
Good, T. H.; Brannan, J. M.; Bacon, G. W.; Finegan, J.; Hopkins, C. F.
Vol. XXVIII
Lincoln, A.; Halleck, H.; Townsend, E.
Vol. XXXV
Abbot, J.; Bailey, R.; Barton, W.; Beauregard, P. G. T.; Buckman, T.; Colquitt, A.; Dunham, J.; Ely, A.;
Finegan, J.; Gamble, R.; Gillmore, Q.; Grant, M.; Guerard, J.; Hallowell, E.; Harrison, G.; Hawley, J.;
Langdon, L.; Lewis, E.; Majer, A.; Metcalf, H.; Mills, C.; Myrick, J.; Rambo, D.; Seymour, T.; Skinner, B.;
Smith, C.; Wheaton, J.; Hatch, J. P.; Noble, W. H.; Harris, A. L.; Jackson, J. K.; McCormick, A. H.; Dickison,
J. J.;
Vol. XLIX
Newton, J.; Weeks, E.
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion
Vol.13
Crane, L. G.; DuPont, S. F.; Finegan, J.; Godon, S. W.; Steedman, C.; Woodhull, M.
Vol.16
Mervine, M.; Brown, H.; Bailey, T.; Bragg, B.; Brown, H.; McKean, W.; Ellison, F.; DeKrafft, J.; Browne, W.;
Craven, T. A.; Shaw, T. D.; Strong, J. H.
Vol. 17
Browne, W. R..; Draper, L. J.; English, E.; Howell, J. C.; Crosman, A. F.; Bailey, T.; Howell, J. C.; Stribling, C.
K.;
Books
Confederate Military History of Florida, J.J. Dickison
Discovering the Civil War in Florida- A Reader and Guide, Paul Taylor
Blockaders, Refugees, and Contrabands – Civil War on Florida’s Gulf Coast 1861-1865, George E. Buker
Florida in the Civil War, Lewis Wynne and Robert Taylor
Articles
With Slemmer in Pensacola Harbor, J.H. Gilman, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, USA
The Battle of Olustee, or Ocean Pond, Florida, Samuel Jones, Major General, CSA
Taken from the Battles and Leaders Series
The Battle of Natural Bridge, Florida: The Confederate Defense of Tallahassee, Dale Cox
Online Resources
http://www.floridamemory.com/onlineclassroom/floridacivilwar/
http://www.researchonline.net/flcw/index.htm
http://www.littletownmart.com/fdh/st-marks_civil_war.htm
http://www.flheritage.com/facts/reports/civilwar/02.cfm
http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-santa-rosa-island.htm
http://mailer.fsu.edu/~rthompso/csa-page.html
http://battleofolustee.org/battle.html
http://www.battleofmarianna.net/index.html
http://www.exploresouthernhistory.com/nbattleone.html