Download A preliminary distinction: Ethics of Justice and Ethics of Care

Today’s Lecture
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Grade spreadsheet
Turnitin.com
Study session on Monday 18th
Final Exam and office hours
Finishing Mill
Virginia Held
Grade spreadsheet
• I have place an undated grade spreadsheet on the
course website. Please check to ensure that the data
matches what you have (this will be the last chance
to do so before the exam).
• If there are any discrepancies, come and see me.
Turnitin.com
• Remember that if your assignments are not
in Turnitin.com by Friday you will receive a
zero on the relevant assignment.
• There is no negotiation on this one, so don’t
leave this task to the last minute.
• If your days of grace are giving you until
Monday to hand in your paper, come and
see me. Any paper handed in after Friday at
4:00 will NOT be marked by the exam.
Study session on Monday 18th
• There will be a study session on Monday the 18th,
from 1100-1300 (or 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.). This
will be held in Talbot College room 305 (NOT 310
… they are removing asbestos from the room). You
don’t have to stay for the whole period, if you come
at all. Attendance is strictly voluntary. But you may
be able to help each other out.
• Bring ideas and talk stuff over. I won’t be able to
give you any substantive answers, as that would
defeat the purpose of the exam. But I can referee
your discussion (i.e. if you need a referee).
Final Exam and office hours
• Don’t forget that the final exam is on Tuesday, the 19th, at
9:00 a.m.
• The location, remember, is TC 343.
• Also, I will choose the exam questions from the first fifteen
questions on your original handout of possible exam
questions (unfortunately we will not be getting to either
Rawls or hooks - so drop questions 16 and 17).
• My final office hours for this course are this week. I will be
submitting your final grades on Friday the 22nd, so if you
have any questions about grades (or you want to challenge
grades), seek me out before the 22nd.
Utilitarianism: Chapter Two
• Note also that Mill does judge types or classes
of action, and the feelings giving rise to them,
relative to the Greatest Happiness Principle.
One cannot appropriately use an appeal to utility
for one’s own benefit if one’s action is clearly
tied to the diminishment of the aggregate
happiness of the whole ... or the relevant part of
the moral community. Utility is not mere
expediency (FP, p.691).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Two
• To the objection that we don’t have enough time to judge
the merits (i.e. the consequence to the aggregate happiness
of the moral community) of each action we take Mill offers
two important responses (FP, p.692).
• (1) The Utilitarian is reasonably supposing that given the
already extensive experience of humanity, we have a rich
repository of knowledge about what types of actions are
conducive to happiness and what are not (FP, p.692).
• (2) The Utilitarian need not commit themselves to first
testing each individual action against the Greatest
Happiness Principle before acting (FP, p.692).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Two
• This second response generates a distinction, important to
subsequent discussions of Utilitarianism, between Rule and
Act Utilitarians.
• Act Utilitarians advocate the view that each individual
action should be tested against the Greatest Happiness
Principle (or some such supreme Utilitarian principle)
before we can responsibly embark on that action.
• Rule Utilitarians recognize the need for, what Mill calls,
secondary principles which can themselves be deduced from
the supreme Utilitarian principle. These ‘intermediate
generalizations’ highlight what types or classes of action
conform, or do not conform, to the supreme Utilitarian
principle (FP, p.692).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Two
• Rule Utilitarianism allows for the
development of rules in one context which
can be used to decide the right and the
wrong in relevantly similar moral contexts,
thus avoiding worries about the time
available to the moral agent to decide what
is, or is not, the right thing to do (FP,
pp.692-93).
• Mill was undoubtedly a Rule Utilitarian.
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three
• In this chapter Mill raises a question about
the sanction for the greatest happiness
principle, or Utilitarian ethics more
generally.
• By sanction Mill means something like
either the motives for obeying a given moral
principle, or the source (legal, social or
biological) for the perceived obligation to
obey it (FP, p.693).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three
• Again this is not, strictly speaking, a defense of
Utilitarianism. It is rather a way of circumventing
an objection which would use criteria like selfevidency, or the obviousness of moral principles,
as grounds for rejecting Utilitarianism.
• Or, alternatively, circumventing a rejection of
Utilitarianism on the grounds that no sanction
could possibly be used to inculcate it (i.e.
Utilitarianism) in the general populace (FP,
p.694).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three
• Mill suggests that the inner experience of evidency, or the
intrinsic worth of a rule, principle, or moral outlook, now
enjoyed by proscriptions against theft or murder, is more
often than not grounded in custom or socialization.
• The evidence for such a claim partially lies in what those
with differing backgrounds hold to be evident or obviously
obligatory.
• Also, almost any principle of action or moral principle can
be inculcated with the right external sanctions and
educational regimen.
• For Utilitarianism to enjoy such sanctions there is merely a
need for changes in education and those social institutions
causally responsible for our socialization (FP, p.694).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• ‘External sanction’ refers to those social,
legal or physical factors which generate
pressure on a given moral agent to act in
accordance with certain rules of conduct or
behavior.
• Examples of external sanctions include the
fear of God’s wrath in certain religious
traditions, or the fear of punishment under
the law (FP, p.694).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• For Mill, there is no good reason to doubt that
such sanctions couldn’t work in favor of the
Greatest Happiness Principle (FP, p.694).
• Indeed, that many understand their own happiness,
or interests, to be importantly salient in the
decision making processes of others when acting
against or towards them speaks to the extent that
social pressures may already be influencing how
moral agents consider the happiness or interests of
others (FP, p.694).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three - External and Internal sanctions
• ‘Internal sanction’ refers to those feelings which arise in
contexts where one is about to violate, or already has
violated, one’s moral duty (FP, p.694).
• These inner feelings can find their source in our religious
traditions, from our sympathy with others, our love of
another, et cetera (FP, pp.694-95).
• The ultimate inner sanction, for Mill, is our conscience (FP,
p.694).
• Conscience is “a feeling in our own mind; a pain ...
attendant on violation of duty” (FP, p.694). It is also
“disinterested, and .... [connected] with the pure idea of
duty” (FP, p.694).
• By ‘pain’ Mill means something akin to remorse or guilt
(FP, p.694).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three - External and Internal sanctions
Will Mill’s emphasis on feeling as a sanction relevant to
moral living undermine, rather than strengthen, an
individual’s propensity to obey moral principles or laws?
Mill answers this question in the negative for the following
reasons.
(1) Such a subjective feeling as he has highlighted (e.g.
conscience) motivates even those moral agents who believe in
a transcendental ground of morality (he has folks like Kant in
mind here).
After all, a mere belief in a transcendental ground of morality
is causally ineffectual in moving someone to action, or to
alternative actions than the one under consideration. What
gives such a belief causal efficacy is the accompanying
feeling regarding its moral worth (FP, p.695).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• (2) A belief in moral facts, moral truth or a
transcendental ground for morality does not
prevent even the best intended agent from
transgressing from time to time. In fact there is no
evidence that they transgress any less than those
who would emphasize conscience. So even such a
purportedly objective ground for ethics does not
guarantee moral behavior, or make it more likely
(FP, p.695).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• It is to be expected, suggests Mill, that (i)
when the principles inculcated are too
‘foreign’ (i.e. appear too arbitrary) to the
relevant individual, or (ii) when the culture
advances beyond the need of them, the
efficacy of inculcation will weaken, perhaps
substantially, over time, or under the
pressure of philosophical scrutiny (FP,
p.696).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three - External and Internal
sanctions
• Mill believes that Utilitarianism will not fall victim to either
of these factors because of, among other things, the
importance of social feeling to humans living in society
(FP, p.696).
• By ‘social feeling’ Mill means something like the regard we
give to the interests (or happiness) of others and the
importance we attach to such a regard.
• “The social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so
habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances
or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives
of himself otherwise than as a member of a body” (FP,
p.696).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• Mill believes that such a social feeling only undergoes
extension over time as long as the relevant societies
progress towards greater equality and less oppression (FP,
pp.696-97).
• “Now, society between human beings, except in the relation
of master and slave, is manifestly impossible on any other
footing than that the interests of all are to be consulted.
Society between equals can only exist on the understanding
that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. ... [I]n
every age some advance is made towards a state in which it
will be impossible to live permanently on other terms with
anybody” (FP, p.697).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Three External and Internal sanctions
• Such a happenstance, maintains Mill, will
only work in favor of Utilitarianism, or any
system of morality which emphasizes the
importance of maximizing the aggregate
good of the relevant populace (FP, p.697).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four
• It is in the fourth chapter that Mill finally offers a
‘proof’ of Utilitarianism or, more particularly, the
Greatest Happiness Principle (FP, p.698).
• A question to keep in mind is the one he raises in the
second paragraph: “What ought to be required of
this doctrine - what conditions is it requisite that the
doctrine should fulfill - to make good its claim to be
believed?” (FP, p.698).
• This is a question applicable to any theory of
morality.
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four
• Do note something of importance in the opening
paragraph of this chapter.
• I have mentioned that Mill is an Epistemological
Foundationalist.
• Note also that he is a Naturalized Epistemologist.
This means, in part, that he denies that our “first
premises of knowledge” (FP, p.698) are self-evident
or true a priori. They are grounded in our
observations, experience and reflection on
experience (FP, p.698).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four - A Defense
• (1) An object can be proved visible if and only if it is seen.
• (2) A sound can be proved audible if and only if it is heard.
• (3) In like fashion, something is proved desirable if and only
if it is desired.
• (4) Each person, so far as she thinks it is possible, desires
her own happiness
• (5) It is a general fact about the desirability of happiness
that everyone desires their happiness.
• (6) Given (4) and (5), it is the case that general happiness is
desired by the aggregate of persons.
• (7) Given (3) and (6), it is the case that general happiness is
desirable.
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four - A
Defense
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(8) If something is desirable it is a good.
(9) Given (7) and (8), general happiness is a good.
(10) If x is a good, then it is an end of conduct.
(11) If x is an end of conduct, it is one of the criteria
of morality.
• (12) Given (9) through (11), happiness is one of the
criteria of morality (FP, pp.698-99).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four - A
Defense
• Is this argument convincing?
• Is there a distinction between being desirable and being
morally desirable? Is something morally desirable if it is
desired? Does the moral desirability of something imply
that it is desired? Does it instead imply that it ought to be
desired, and if so, can we distinguish an object that is
desired from an object that is morally desirable? (See FP,
p.675 for Bailey’s discussion of this point.)
• Is this a misunderstanding of Mill’s argument? Does he
mean by ‘desirable’ ‘morally desirable’?
• If not, what does he mean by desirable when he speaks of
the desirability of happiness? (See FP pages 698-99).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four
• Note Mill’s discussion of the intrinsic desirability of various
objects or properties. His version of Utilitarianism does not
exclude valuing other things, such as virtue, in themselves.
He does contend that they will, over time, become
constitutive of what we mean by happiness (FP, p.699).
• What was extrinsically desirable, because it is a means to
something intrinsically desirable, can become, over time,
intrinsically desirable. What’s more, as something
intrinsically desirable, it can become a part of our
conception of happiness, and not merely a means to it (if,
that is, it was originally desired as a means to happiness)
(FP, p.699).
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four - Another Defense
• (1) It is the case that we order our objects of desire relative
to whether they promote pleasure and freedom from pain, or
vice versa.
• (2) It is the case that we favor or prefer those objects of
desire which promote pleasure and freedom from pain.
• (3) It is the case that, all things being equal, we act in
accordance with what we favor or prefer.
• (4) Given (2) and (3), we act in accordance with what
promotes pleasure and freedom from pain.
• (5) Pleasure and freedom from pain is properly described as
happiness.
• (6) Given (4) and (5), it is the case that we act in accordance
with what promotes happiness.
Utilitarianism: Chapter Four - Another
Defense
• (7) Given (6), happiness is the ultimate end of our
(i.e. human) conduct.
• (8) Under the class of human conduct there is the set
of actions which constitute human moral conduct.
• (9) Given (7) and (8) happiness is the ultimate end
of human moral conduct (FP, pp.699-700).
• Mill notes that this final argument depends, when all
is said and done, on questions of fact and
observation (FP, pp.700-701).
A preliminary distinction: Ethics of
Justice and Ethics of Care
• An Ethic of Justice is any normative ethical theory
which understands moral problems as involving the
competing interests of ‘isolated selves’ (this term
will be explained later) and requiring highly abstract
principles to settle moral disputes or issues (e.g.
Kantianism or Utilitarianism) (see FP, pp.720, 724).
• An Ethic of Care is any normative ethical theory
which prioritizes moral emotions such as sympathy
or care in settling moral disputes, issues or problems
(many Feminist moral theories, perhaps even
Confucian moral theory) (see FP, p.722, 724).
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• (1) There is a decided emphasis on a competition
of interests in the moral paradigms of the received
canon of moral philosophy. As we enter and exit
the Enlightenment period the moral paradigms are
greatly affected by market or economic models of
competition. Before that, more political models of
social interaction prevailed. Either way, the
‘backdrop’ for moral discourse is decidedly public
rather than private (FP, pp.718-20).
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• A question to consider as we go: What
would happen to our moral discourse if our
moral paradigm was the family instead of
the market place ... or a state of nature? (FP,
p.718)
Held on Feminist concerns with the
discussion thus far
• (2) Essentialist views of men and women in the West have
portrayed men as naturally rational or analytical, while
women have been portrayed as naturally emotional and
intuitive. What’s more, the rational or analytical has
generally been valued over the emotional or intuitive (FP,
pp.717-19).
• Does this sound familiar?
• These essentialist views complement the view that men are
best suited for the public sphere while women are best
suited for the private. Given (1), this has effectively
excluded a female voice from moral philosophy (up until
recently) (FP, p.718-19).
Held on Feminist concerns with the discussion thus far
Some of Held’s points (not directly dealing with what
philosophers have said about maleness and reason [Aristotle
and Rousseau and good sources for these associations]) are
easily made.
When attempting to distinguish humanity from nonhumanity,
philosophers and others will often dwell on various cultural
products like language, art, or religion. These, note, are
primarily manifest, or are pervasive, in the public sphere.
What we share with nonhumanity is often related to the
private sphere, things like reproduction, sexual behavior
(including sexual orientation/preference) and the so-called
family structure.
Guess who has been traditionally associated with each sphere?
Held on Feminist concerns with the
discussion thus far
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Are these essentialist views still at work?
What’s a chick flik? Why is a movie a chick flik?
Strong men don’t ...?
What’s being ‘pussy-whipped’? (Excuse the
language for the sake of the argument.) What does
this imply about who should lead in a relationship?
• Are women still thought to be best suited to the
private sphere? Who are often thought to be the
natural nurturers?
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• Feminist ethicists have directed a challenge
at a number of these features of the historic
discussion in Western moral philosophy.
They dispute the lesser value of the
emotions. Emotions such as sympathy,
kindness, compassion and even self-love
seem to be integral to moral living (Mill and
Hume seem to agree with Feminist moral
philosophers on this one) (FP, p.721).
Held on Feminist concerns with the
discussion thus far
• Challenge has been directed at the view that women are
naturally suited to child rearing while men are not. Good
parenting skills are not, after all, hard-wired. Nor are
women more naturally loving than men...how could such a
claim be defended anyway? (see FP, p.727)
• This is confirmed in studies of parenting outside of
humanity.
• Indeed this is why are there nurseries in Zoos and primate
research facilities.
• Do note Held herself would be uncomfortable with this
claim.
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• The liberal self, and the idea of a human
essence, have also come under fire from
Feminist theorists. If the self is viewed as a
product of social, as well as biological
factors, what does this do to the idea of selfinterest? (FP, pp.720-21)
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• There is a methodological point at the heart
of Feminist criticisms of Western moral
philosophy. Imagine you have to develop an
analysis of a given human evaluative
concept...like ‘knowledge’. It seems
reasonable to believe that you must ensure
that your sample pool, from which you will
derive your analysis, contains representative
cases of knowledge and also cases which
are clearly not knowledge.
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• There is a worry that by not ensuring that you
have a representative pool of cases of knowledge
and non-knowledge you may mistake certain
accidental features of some cases of knowledge as
necessary. A biased sample (a sample pool which
lacks the appropriate scope) will yield a faulty
analysis of knowledge (FP, p.721).
• Imagine, for example, if your sample pool only
included cases of legal knowledge, or scientific
knowledge.
Held on Feminist concerns with
the discussion thus far
• It is this type of concern that fuels the call
to make sure the representative sample from
which we develop our moral analyses of
‘good’ or ‘right’ has the appropriate scope.
That is, we must take care to include all the
spheres where moral issues arise and
judgments are made.
• We must, then, redirect our focus to include
the private sphere (FP, pp.721-22).
Held: Reason and Emotion
• According to Held the priority of reason in Modern moral
theory has taken two forms: Kantian and Utilitarian.
• They have four features in common:
(i) there is a reliance on a highly abstract principle for
moral decision making,
(ii) moral problems are to be solved by applying that
principle, or secondary principles deduced from the
ultimate/supreme principle,
(iii) the rules of reason are admired or prioritized,
(iv) and emotions are denigrated or judged to be
problematic in moral decision making (i.e. they need to
be first shaped or molded) (FP, pp.722-23).
Held: Reason and Emotion
• Feminist moral theorists typically take a more context
sensitive approach.
• That is, instead of favoring the highly abstract over the
concrete/particular, Feminist ethicists tend to favor the
concrete/particular over the highly abstract (FP, p.723).
• What’s more, when women’s experiences are included in
our sample pool of good or right actions concerns for (i) the
nature of the actual relationships between embodied
subjects, (ii) the particularities of the problem cases and (iii)
the feelings of empathy and caring that emerge in such
relationships, stand out as morally salient (FP, pp.723-24).
Held: Reason and Emotion
• Feminist ethicists are, according to Held, reconsidering the
place of emotion in morality in at least two ways:
• (1) Instead of merely recommending the development of
skills in suppressing or controlling emotions, Feminist
ethicists are beginning to call for the cultivation of moral
emotions. If good parenting is one moral paradigm we need
to better accommodate in moral theory, then we need to
recognize the necessity of healthy and positive emotive
responses in certain moral contexts (FP, p.724).
Held: Reason and Emotion
• (2) Moral subjects within a Feminist moral theory
are embodied, culturally situated individuals within
a web of social relationships. Certain emotions (e.g.
care), or affective responses (e.g. trust), are integral
to understanding good (or just) relationships and to
settling conflicts within or between relationships.
Moral emotions, then, may be necessary for moral
knowledge or understanding (FP, pp.724-25).
Held: Reason and Emotion
• “Caring, empathy, feeling with others, being
sensitive to each other’s feelings, all may be
better guides to what morality requires in
actual contexts than may abstract rules of
reason, or rational calculation, or at least
they may be necessary components of an
adequate morality” (FP, p.725).
• Is she right?
Held: Reason and Emotion
• Held rejects the potential objection that such an approach
would be too relativist on the grounds that certain emotions
or feelings may “be as widely shared as rational beliefs”
(FP, p.725).
• Held also makes a point of stating that a Feminist analysis
of a moral problem cannot omit the political framework or
outlook that informs the interactions of the subjects in the
relevant moral context (FP, p.725).
• Such matters as the autonomy or freedom of the individuals
involved, particularly when those individuals are females in
patriarchal contexts, ought to inform the judgments we
make on the relevant issue (FP, p.725).
• How might this affect discussions of abortion?
Held: Reason and Emotion
• Held suggests that minimal justice requirements of
liberal societies may require “relational feelings” as
much as rational abstract principles (FP, pp.725-26).
• Held suggests the following areas where care, or
other relational feelings, may be integral to a proper
moral stance:
• (1) Suffering of distant others (e.g. children).
• (2) Our responsibilities to future generations.
• (3) Our obligations to the planet’s well-being (FP,
p.725).