Download The American Civil War (1861–1865) was a separatist conflict

The American Civil War (1861–1865) was a separatist conflict between the
United States Federal government (the "Union") and eleven Southern slave
states that declared their secession and formed the Confederate States of
America, led by President Jefferson Davis. The Union, led by President Abraham
Lincoln and the Republican Party, opposed the expansion of slavery and rejected
any right of secession. Fighting commenced on April 12, 1861, when
Confederate forces attacked a Federal military installation at Fort Sumter in
South Carolina.[1]
During the first year, the Union asserted control of the border states and
established a naval blockade as both sides raised large armies. In 1862 large,
bloody battles began, causing massive casualties as a result of new weapons
and old battlefield tactics. In September 1862, Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation[2] made the freeing of the slaves a war goal, despite opposition
from northern Copperheads who tolerated secession and slavery. Emancipation
ensured that Britain and France would not intervene to help the Confederacy. In
addition, the goal also allowed the Union to recruit African-Americans for
reinforcements, a resource that the Confederacy did not dare exploit until it was
too late. War Democrats reluctantly accepted emancipation as part of total war
needed to save the Union. In the East, Robert Edward Lee rolled up a series of
Confederate victories over the Army of the Potomac, but his best general,
Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson, was killed at the Battle of
Chancellorsville in May 1863.[3] Lee's invasion of the North was repulsed at the
Battle of Gettysburg in Pennsylvania in July 1863;[4] he barely managed to
escape back to Virginia. In the West, the Union Navy captured the port of New
Orleans in 1862, and Ulysses S. Grant seized control of the Mississippi River by
capturing Vicksburg, Mississippi in July 1863,[5] thus splitting the Confederacy.
By 1864, long-term Union advantages in geography, manpower, industry,
finance, political organization and transportation were overwhelming the
Confederacy. Grant fought a number of bloody battles with Lee in Virginia in the
summer of 1864. Lee won most of the battles in a tactical sense but on the whole
lost strategically, as he could not replace his casualties and was forced to retreat
into trenches around his capital, Richmond, Virginia. Meanwhile, William
Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta, Georgia.[6] Sherman's March to the Sea
destroyed a hundred-mile-wide swath of Georgia. In 1865, the Confederacy
collapsed after Lee surrendered to Grant at Appomattox Court House and the
slaves were freed.
The full restoration of the Union was the work of a highly contentious postwar era
known as Reconstruction. The war produced about 970,000 casualties (3% of
the population), including approximately 620,000 soldier deaths—two-thirds by
disease.[7] The causes of the war, the reasons for its outcome, and even the
name of the war itself are subjects of lingering controversy even today. The main
results of the war were the restoration and strengthening of the Union, and the
end of slavery in the United States.
-Information from Wikipedia.com
Civil war battles
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A civil war is a war in which parties within the same culture, society or nationality
fight against each other for the control of political power. Political scientists use
two criteria: the warring groups must be from the same country and fighting for
control of the political center, control over a separatist state or to force a major
change in policy. The second criterion is that at least 1,000 people must have
been killed in total, with at least 100 from each side..[1]
Some civil wars are categorized as revolutions when major societal restructuring
is a possible outcome of the conflict. An insurgency, whether successful or not, is
likely to be classified as a civil war by some historians if, and only if, organized
armies fight conventional battles. Other historians state the criterion for a civil war
is that there must be prolonged violence between organized factions or defined
regions of a country (conventionally fought or not).
Ultimately the distinction between a "civil war" and a "revolution" or any other
name may be arbitrary, and is determined by usage. However the distinction
between a "civil war" and "revolution" can be recognizable. The successful civil
war of the 1640s in England which led to the (temporary) overthrow of the
monarchy became known as the English Civil War, which can be described, by
Marxists and some historians, as the English Revolution. The successful
insurgency of the 1770s in British colonies in America, with organized armies
fighting battles, came to be known as the American Revolution. In the United
States, and in American-dominated sources, the term 'the civil war' usually
means the American Civil War, with other civil wars noted or inferred from
context.
Factors such as nationalism, religion, and ideology played little role in premodern civil wars. Modern nationalists have commonly read past revolts (such as
Scotland against England or Catalonia against Spain) as early stirrings of
nationalism, the truth is that these conflicts were in fact feudal or dynastic rather
than national. There are some pre-modern civil wars that can be seen as fueled
by religion (the Jewish Revolts against Rome), but these can also be seen as
revolts by a servile people against their oppressors or uprisings by local notables
in an attempt to gain independence.
-Information from Wikipedia.com
http://www.teacheroz.com/Civil_War_Weapons.htm
Civil war soldier
Civil war cannon
Civil war cannon 2
firing a cannon
Lincoln speech
Civil War Weapons
Infantry tactics at the time of the Civil War were based on the
use of the smoothbore musket, a weapon of limited range and
accuracy. Firing lines that were much more than a hundred yards
apart could not inflict very much damage on each other, and so
troops which were to make an attack would be massed together,
elbow to elbow, and would make a run for it; if there were enough
of them, and they ran fast enough, the defensive line could not hurt
them seriously, and when they got to close quarters the advantage
of numbers and the use of the bayonet would settle things. But the
Civil War musket was rifled, which made an enormous difference. It
was still a muzzle-loader, but it had much more accuracy and a far
longer range than the old smoothbore, and it completely changed
the conditions under which soldiers fought. An advancing line could
be brought under killing fire at a distance of half a mile, now, and
the massed charge of Napoleonic tradition was miserably out of
date. When a defensive line occupied field entrenchments-which
the soldiers learned to dig fairly early in the game-a direct frontal
assault became almost impossible. The hideous casualty lists of
Civil War battles owed much of their size to the fact that soldiers
were fighting with rifles but were using tactics suited to
smoothbores. It took the generals a long time to learn that a new
approach was needed.
Much the same development was taking place in the artillery,
although the full effect was not yet evident. The Civil War cannon,
almost without exception, was a muzzle-loader, but the rifled gun
was coming into service. It could reach farther and hit harder than
the smoothbore, and for counterbattery fire it was highly effective-a
rifled battery could hit a battery of smoothbores without being hit in
return, and the new 3-inch iron rifles, firing a 10-pound conical shot,
had a flat trajectory and immense Penetrating power. But the old
smoothbore-a brass gun of 4.62-inch caliber, firing a 12-pound
spherical shot-remained popular to the end of the war; in the
wooded, hilly country where so many Civil War battles were fought,
its range of slightly less than a mile was about all that was needed,
and for close-range work against infantry the smoothbore was
better than the rifle. For such work the artillerist fired canisters tin
can full of iron balls, with a propellant at one end and a wooden
disk at the other-and the can disintegrated when the gun was fired,
letting the iron balls be sprayed all over the landscape. In effect, the
cannon became a huge sawed-off shotgun, and at ranges of 250
yards or less it was in the highest degree murderous.
This portion of the "Home of the American Civil War" website
attempts to explain a little about the various weapons used in the
Civil War and while you will find few images here, you will find a lot
of good material on "the weapons of war".
In 1862, President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation opened the door for
African Americans to enlist in the Union Army. Although many had wanted to join
the war effort earlier, they were prohibited from enlisting by a federal law dating
back to 1792. President Lincoln had also feared that if he authorized their
recruitment, border states would secede from the Union. By the end of the war,
approximately 180,000 African-American soldiers had joined the fight.
In addition to the problems of war faced by all soldiers, African-American soldiers
faced additional difficulties created by racial prejudice. Although many served in
the infantry and artillery, discriminatory practices resulted in large numbers of
African-American soldiers being assigned to perform non-combat, support duties
as cooks, laborers, and teamsters. African-American soldiers were paid $10 per
month, from which $3 was deducted for clothing. White soldiers were paid $13
per month, from which no clothing allowance was deducted. If captured by the
Confederate Army, African-American soldiers confronted a much greater threat
than did their white counterparts.
In spite of their many hardships, African-American soldiers served the Union
Army well and distinguished themselves in many battles. Of their service to the
nation Frederick Douglass said, "Once let the black man get upon his person the
brass letters U.S., let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his
shoulder and bullets in his pockets, and there is no power on earth which can
deny that he has earned the right of citizenship in the United States." AfricanAmerican soldiers comprised about 10 percent of the Union Army. It is estimated
that one-third of all African Americans who enlisted lost their lives.
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Tactics is the military art of maneuvering troops on the field of battle to
achieve victory in combat. 'Offensive tactics" seek success through
attacking; "defensive tactics" aim at defeating enemy attacks.
In Civil War tactics, the principal combat arm was infantry. Its most
common deployment was a long "line of battle," 2 ranks deep. More
massed was the "column," varying from 1 to 10 or more companies wide
and from 8 to 20 or more ranks deep. Less compact than column or line
was "open-order" deployment: a strung-out, irregular single line.
Battle lines delivered the most firepower defensively and offensively.
Offensive firepower alone would not ensure success. Attackers had to
charge, and massed columns, with their greater depth, were often
preferable to battle lines for making frontal assaults. Better yet were flank
attacks, to "roll up" thin battle lines lengthwise. Offensive tacticians sought
opportunity for such effective flank attacks; defensive tacticians countered
by "refusing" these flanks on impassable barriers. In either posture,
tacticians attempted to coordinate all their troops to deliver maximum force
and firepower and to avoid being beaten "in detail" (piecemeal).
Throughout, they relied on open-order deployment to cover their front and
flanks with skirmishers, who developed the enemy position and screened
their own troops.
Open order, moreover, was best suited for moving through the
wooded countryside of America. That wooded terrain, so different from
Europe's open fields, for which tactical doctrine was aimed, also affected
tactical control. Army commanders, even corps commanders, could not
control large, far-flung forces. Instead, army commanders concentrated on
strategy. And corps commanders handled "grand tactics": the medium for
translating theater strategy into battlefield tactics, the art of maneuvering
large forces just outside the battlefield and bringing them onto that field.
Once on the field, corps commanders provided overall tactical direction,
but their largest practical units of tactical maneuver were divisions. More
often, brigades, even regiments, formed those maneuver elements.
Essentially, brigades did the fighting in the Civil War.
Besides affecting organization, difficult terrain helped relegate cavalry
and artillery to lesser tactical roles. More influential there was the
widespread use of long-range rifled shoulder arms. As recently as the
Mexican War, when most infantry fired smoothbore muskets, cavalry and
artillery had been key attacking arms. Attempting to continue such tactics
in the Civil War proved disastrous, as infantry rifle power soon drove
horsemen virtually off the battlefield and relegated artillery to defensive
support. Rifle power devastated offensive infantry assaults, too, but senior
commanders, who were so quick to understand its. impact on cannon and
cavalry, rarely grasped its effect on infantry. By 1864, infantry customarily
did erect light field fortifications to strengthen its defensive battlefield
positions and protect itself from enemy rifle power; but when attacking,
whether against battle lines or fortifications, infantry continued suffering
heavy casualties through clinging to tactical formations outmoded by
technology.
But if infantry was slow to learn, other arms swiftly found new tactical
roles. The new mission of the artillery was to bolster the defensive,
sometimes with 1 battery assigned to each infantry brigade, but more
often with I battalion assigned to a Confederate infantry division and 1
brigade to a Federal infantry corps. With long-range shells and close-in
canister, artillery became crucial in repulsing enemy attacks. But longrange shelling to support ones own attack had minimal effect, and artillery
assaults were soon abandoned as suicidal. Throughout, artillery depended
almost entirely on direct fire against visible targets.
Cavalry, in the meantime, served most usefully in scouting for tactical
intelligence and in screening such intelligence from the foe. By midwar,
moreover, cavalry was using its mobility to seize key spots, where it
dismounted and fought afoot. Armed with breech-loading carbines,
including Federal repeaters by 1864-65, these foot cavalry fought well
even against infantry. Only rarely did mounted cavalry battle with saber
and pistol. Rarer still were mounted pursuits of routed enemies.
Cavalry so infrequently undertook such pursuits chiefly because
defeated armies were rarely routed. Size of armies, commitment to their
respective causes by individual citizen-soldiers, difficult terrain, and impact
of fortifications and technology all militated against the Napoleonic
triumph, which could destroy an enemy army--and an enemy country--in
just 1 battle. Raised in the aura of Napoleon, most Civil War commanders
sought the Napoleonic victory, but few came close to achieving it. 60
years after Marengo and Austerlitz, warfare had so changed that victory in
the Civil War would instead come through strategy. Yet within that domain
of strategy, not just 1 battle but series of them--and the tactics through
which they were fought--were the crucial elements in deciding the
outcome of the Civil War.
Source: "Historical Times Encyclopedia of the Civil War" Editor, Patricia L.
Faust
AmericanCivilwar.com
www.civilwar.org
"If there is any place on God's fair earth where wickedness 'stalketh
abroad in daylight' it is in the army," wrote a Confederate soldier in a letter
to his family back home. Indeed, life in the army camps of the Civil War
was fraught with boredom, mischief, fear, disease, and death.
Army regulations called for the camps to be laid out in a fixed grid
pattern, with officers' quarters at the front end of each street and enlisted
men's quarters aligned to the rear. The camp was set up roughly along the
lines the unit would draw up in a line of battle and each company
displayed its colors on the outside of its tents. Regulations also defined
where the mess tents, medical cabins, and baggage trains should be
located. Often, however, lack of time or a particularly hilly or narrow terrain
made it impossible to meet army regulations. The campgrounds
themselves were often abysmal, especially in the South where wet
weather produced thick mud for extended periods in the spring and
summer; in the winter and fall, the mud turned to dust.
In summer, troops slept in canvas tents. At the beginning of the war,
both sides used the Sibley tent, named for its inventor, Henry H. Sibley,
who later became a Confederate brigadier general. A large cone of
canvas, 18 feet in diameter, 12 feet tall, and supported by a center pole,
the tent had a circular opening at the top for ventilation, and a coneshaped stove for heat. Although designed to fit a dozen men comfortably,
army regulations assigned about 20 men to each tent, leading to cramped,
uncomfortable quarters. When ventilation flaps were closed on cold or
rainy days, the air inside the tent became fetid with the odors of men who
had scarce access to clean water in which to bathe.
As the war dragged on, the Sibley was replaced with smaller tents.
The Federal armies favored the wedge tent, a six-foot length of canvas
draped over a horizontal ridgepole and staked to the ground at the sides
with flaps that closed. off one end. When canvas became scarce in the
South, many Confederates were forced to rig open-air beds by heaping
straw or leaves between two logs. In autumn and winter, those units that
were able to find wood built crude huts, laying split logs on the earth floor
and fashioning bunks with mattresses of pine needles.
When not in battle, which was at least three quarters of the time, the
average soldier's day began at 5 A.M. in the summer and 6 A.M. in the
winter, when he was awakened by reveille. After the first sergeant took the
roll call, the men ate breakfast then prepared for their first of as many as
five drill sessions during the day. Here the men would learn how to shoot
their weapons and perform various maneuvers. Drill sessions lasted
approximately two hours each and, for most men, were exceptional
exercises in tedium. One soldier described his days in the army like this:
"The first thing in the morning is drill. Then drill, then drill again. Then drill,
drill, a little more drill. Then drill, and lastly drill."
In the few intervals between drill, soldiers cleaned the camp, built
roads, dug trenches for latrines, and gathered wood for cooking and
heating. Finding clean water was a constant goal: the lack of potable
water was a problem that led to widespread disease in both armies. At the
outset of the war, the soldiers on both sides were relatively well-fed: the
mandated daily ration for a Federal soldier in 1861 included at least 20
ounces of fresh or salt beef, or 12 ounces of salt pork; more than a pound
of flour, and a vegetable, usually beans. Coffee, salt, vinegar, and sugar
were provided as well. Supplies became limited when armies were moving
fast and supply trains could not reach them in the field.
When in the field, soldiers saw little beef and few vegetables; they
subsisted for the most part on salt pork, dried beans, corn bread, and
hardtack-a flour-and-water biscuit often infested with maggots and weevils
after storage. Outbreaks of scurvy were common due to a frequent lack of
fresh fruits and vegetables.
By far, the most important staple in the minds of the soldiers was
coffee. Men pounded the beans between rocks or crushed them with the
butts of their rifles to obtain grounds with which to brew the strong drink.
Although most Federals were well-supplied with coffee, the Confederates
were often forced to make do with substitutes made from peanuts,
potatoes, peas, and chicory.
Most armies were forced at some point to live off the land. The
Confederates, who fought mostly on home ground, tried harder to curb
pillaging, preferring to request donations from townspeople rather than
steal supplies or take them by force. Attached to most armies was the
sutler, a purveyor of all goods not issued by the army, including tobacco,
candy, tinned meats, shoelaces, patent medicines, fried pies, and
newspapers. Sutlers were known for their steep prices and shoddy goods,
but soldiers desperate for cigarettes, sweets, and news from home were
willing to use their pay for these treats.
Boredom stalked both armies almost as often as did hunger. When
not faced with the sheer terror of battle, the days in camp tended to drag
endlessly. The sheer tedium of camp life led the men to find recreational
outlets. "There is some of the onerest men here that I ever saw," wrote a
new recruit, "and the most swearing and card playing and fitin [fighting]
and drunkenness that I ever saw at any place."
When not drilling or standing guard, the troops read, wrote letters to
their loved ones, and played any game they could devise, including
baseball, cards, boxing matches, and cockfights. One competition
involved racing lice or cockroaches across a strip of canvas. As hard as
most commanders attempted to control vice in camp, both gambling and
drinking were rampant, especially after payday. Confederate General
Braxton Bragg concurred: "We have lost more valuable lives at the hands
of whiskey sellers than by the balls of our enemies."
Army regulations prohibited the purchase of alcohol by enlisted men,
and soldiers who violated the rule were punished, but men on both sides
found ways around it. Members of a Mississippi company got a half a
gallon of whisky past the camp guards by concealing it in a hollowed-out
watermelon; they then buried the melon beneath the floor of their tent and
drank from it with a long straw. If they could not buy liquor, they made it.
One Union recipe called for "bark juice, tar-water, turpentine, brown sugar,
lamp oil, and alcohol."
When not drinking or gambling, some men escaped the tedium of
daily army life by enjoying "horizontal refreshments," as visiting prostitutes
became known. Thousands of prostitutes thronged the cities in the war
zones and clustered about the camps. By 1862, for instance, Washington,
D.C., had 450 bordellos and at least 7,500 full-time prostitutes; Richmond,
as the center of prostitution in the Confederacy, had about an equal
number. Venereal disease among soldiers was prevalent and largely
uncontrolled. About eight percent of the soldiers in the Union army were
treated for venereal disease during the war and a great many cases were
unreported; figures for the Confederacy are unavailable, but assumed to
be about equal in proportion. With the invention of penicillin more than 70
years away, treating venereal disease with herbs and minerals such as
pokeweed, elderberries, mercury, and zinc sulfate may have eased
symptoms but did nothing to cure the disease.
Even more pervasive than boredom, gambling, or venereal disease
was homesickness. Men spent more time writing letters and hoping to
receive them than any other leisure activity. Furloughs were rarely
granted, and most soldiers had few opportunities to spend extended
periods of time away from the army. Federal troops were often stationed
too far from home to have time to get home, while Southern armies, short
of manpower, needed every available soldier to fight. For better or worse,
Civil War soldiers were forced to call camp home for the duration of their
terms of service
Part 1
Slave Life
Statewide by early 1862 more than 3,000 free African Americans had
formed military organizations, called Native Guards, and offered their
services to the Confederacy. Their duties were similar to those of white
home guards--protecting their areas of residence from internal and
external threat. They provided their own uniforms, horses, and arms and
ammunition. Some were large land- and slaveowners, who, like white
plantera, opposed the end of slavery and the loss of their possessions.
Many free blacks recognized and wanted to maintain distinctions between
themselves and slaves or the newly freed. Only a few blacks actually
served alongside whites in Confederate units and received Confederate
pensions.
As Union forces swept through a particular region, they attracted a large
number of runaway and abandoned slaves, some of whom joined the
federal army. Labeled "contraband" early in the war, former slave men and
women labored for the Union as domestics, nurses, hospital orderlies, and
cooks. Union officers also organized freedmen into military units, generally
known as the Corps d'Afrique. Other former slave soldiers used their
considerable skills to build roads, fortifications, dams, and canals, repair
levees, herd cattle, shoe horses, and act as scouts and guards, in addition
to fighting battles.
[edit] Slavery during the war
Main article: History of slavery in the United States
Lincoln initially declared his official purpose to be the preservation of the Union,
not emancipation. He had no wish to alienate the thousands of slaveholders in
the Union border states.
The issue of what to do with Southern slaves, however, would not go away: As
early as May 1861, some slaves working on Confederate fortifications escaped to
the Union lines, and their owner, a Confederate colonel, demanded their return
under the Fugitive Slave Act. The response was to declare them "contraband of
war"—effectively freeing them. Congress eventually approved this for slaves
used by the Confederate military.
By 1862, when it became clear that this would be a long war, the question
became more general. The Southern economy and military effort depended on
slave labor; was it reasonable to protect slavery while blockading Southern
commerce and destroying Southern production? As one Congressman put it, the
slaves "…cannot be neutral. As laborers, if not as soldiers, they will be allies of
the rebels, or of the Union."[100]
There was a range of positions on the final settlement of slavery; the same
Congressman—and his fellow radicals—felt the victory would be profitless if the
Slave Power continued. Conservative Republicans still hoped that the states
could end slavery and send the freedmen abroad. Lincoln, and many others,
agreed with both the aversion to slavery and to colonization; but all factions came
rapidly to agree that the slaves of Confederates must be freed.[101]
At first, Lincoln reversed attempts at emancipation by Secretary of War Cameron
and Generals Fremont and Hunter in order to keep the loyalty of the border
states and the War Democrats. Lincoln then tried to persuade the border states
to accept his plan of gradual, compensated emancipation and voluntary
colonization, while warning them that stronger measures would be needed if the
moderate approach was rejected. Only the District of Columbia accepted
Lincoln's gradual plan, and Lincoln issued his final Emancipation Proclamation on
January 1 of 1863. In his letter to Hodges, Lincoln explained his belief that "If
slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong … And yet I have never understood that
the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this
judgment and feeling ... I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly
that events have controlled me."[102]
The Emancipation Proclamation,[103] announced in September 1862 and put
into effect four months later, ended the Confederacy's hope of getting aid from
Britain or France. Lincoln's moderate approach succeeded in getting border
states, War Democrats and emancipated slaves fighting on the same side for the
Union.
The Union-controlled border states (Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Delaware and
West Virginia) were not covered by the Emancipation Proclamation. All abolished
slavery on their own, except Kentucky. The great majority of the 4 million slaves
were freed by the Emancipation Proclamation, as Union armies moved South.
The 13th amendment,[104] ratified December 6, 1865, finally freed the remaining
40,000 slaves in Kentucky, as well as 1,000 or so in Delaware.
The Draft
The civil war the first American war in which soldiers were drafted. The South
was first to employ the draft, followed by the North. In March of 1863, the
National conscription act was passed. Draftees would be called by lottery. Once
called, a draftee had the opportunity to either pay a commutation fee of $300 to
be exempt from a particular battle, or to hire a replacement that would exempt
him from the entire war.
Economics
Battle has always found its focus where roads converge. Like so many of the
significant points of conflict marking the quarrel between North and South,
Manassas, Virginia, was the center of a network of transportation and commerce.
Here vital arteries of communication and logistics bisected and connected on
what twice became a battlefield on the plains of Manassas, Virginia, near the
banks of Bull Run Creek. The iron rails of the Orange, Alexandria and Manassas
Gap railroads joined at Manassas Junction, a mere 27 miles from Washington,
while the macadam pavement of the Warrenton Turnpike traversed the pastoral
fields and woods that soon became a battlefield.
These routes of transportation and communication were rooted in the agricultural
economy of Virginia: the turnpike was constructed to transport grain harvests by
wagon from the Shenandoah Valley to the markets of Alexandria. The railroads
supplanted the turnpike with steam locomotive transportation. The Shenandoah
became the "breadbasket of the Confederacy," serving Richmond, the
Confederate political and industrial capital.
[edit] Long-term economic factors
Both sides had long-term advantages but the Union had more. To win the Union
had to use its long-term resources to accomplish multiple goals, including control
of the entire coastline, control of most of the population centers, control of the
main rivers (especially the Mississippi and Tennessee), defeat of all the main
Confederate armies, and finally seizure of Richmond. As the occupying force
they had to station hundreds of thousands of soldiers to control railroads, supply
lines, and major towns and cities. The long-term advantages widely credited by
historians to have contributed to the Union's success include:
USA economic advantages; graph shows USA value with CSA = 100
The more industrialized economy of the North aided in the production of arms,
munitions and supplies, as well as finances, and transportation. The graph shows
the relative advantage of the USA over the Confederate States of America (CSA)
at the start of the war. The advantages widened rapidly during the war, as the
Northern economy grew, and Confederate territory shrank and its economy
weakened. The Union population was 22 million and the South 9 million in 1861;
the Southern population included more than 3.5 million slaves thus leaving the
South's white population outnumbered by a ratio of more than four to one. The
disparity grew as the Union controlled more and more southern territory with
garrisons, and cut off the trans-Mississippi part of the Confederacy. The Union at
the start controlled over 80% of the shipyards, steamships, river boats, and the
Navy. It augmented these by a massive shipbuilding program. This enabled the
Union to control the river systems and to blockade the entire southern
coastline.[108] Excellent railroad links between Union cities allowed for the quick
and cheap movement of troops and supplies. Transportation was much slower
and more difficult in the South which was unable to augment its much smaller rail
system, repair damage, or even perform routine maintenance
Civil Life
Life for a civilian during the civil war was greatly changed. Although daily things
weren’t changed many men were forced to leave for war, when the draft came
into place, first used by the confederacy. Women often stayed home and ran the
house and farm/plantation although some wanted to join the war as a nurse and
occasionally as soldier. Often crops in small farms failed, losing many men who
used to tend to them to the war. This caused many families to lose everything
they own.
Part 2
Bull run 1st
On the morning of July 21, divisions under David Hunter and Samuel P.
Heintzelman crossed Sudley Springs and struck the Confederate left. All that
stood in the path of the 6,000 Union soldiers were Confederate Col. Nathan
Evans and his reduced brigade of 900 men. Evans had been informed of the
Union flanking movement, and had hastily led most of his men from their position
fronting the Stone Bridge to a new location on the slopes of Matthews Hill, a low
rise to the northwest of his previous position.
Evans soon received reinforcement from two other brigades under Barnard Bee
and Francis S. Bartow, but the Confederate line slowly crumbled, then broke
completely. In a full run from their Matthews Hill position, the remainder of
Evans's, Bee's, and Bartow's commands ran into a solid line of reinforcement on
Henry House Hill. This was Thomas J. Jackson's Virginia brigade. "The Enemy
are driving us," Bee exclaimed to Jackson. Jackson, a former U.S. Army officer
and professor at the Virginia Military Institute, is said to have replied "Sir, we will
give them the bayonet."[2] Bee exhorted his own troops to re-form by shouting,
"There is Jackson standing like a stone wall. Let us determine to die here, and
we will conquer. Follow me."[3]
There is some controversy over Bee's statement and intent, which could not be
clarified because he was killed almost immediately after speaking and none of
his subordinate officers wrote reports of the battle. Major Burnett Rhett, chief of
staff to General Joseph E. Johnston, claimed that Bee was angry at Jackson's
failure to come immediately to the relief of Bee's and Bartow's brigades while
they were under heavy pressure. Those who subscribe to this opinion believe
that Bee's statement was meant to be pejorative: "Look at Jackson standing
there like a damned stone wall!"[4]
Scattered units began to rally around the Virginia brigade, and the fighting
continued as the Union tide rolled onward, up the face of Henry House Hill. As
soon as the Federal troops crested the hill, they were face to face with the rifles
of Jackson's men and they took a full volley with devastating effect. They broke,
and began to fall back in what was called the "Great Skedaddle". Eventually,
more fresh Confederate brigades entered the fray and turned the tide of battle
completely in favor of Beauregard's army. McDowell's flanking column was
blunted, then crumbled and broke. In the disorder that followed, hundreds of
Union troops were scooped up as prisoners. A Union wagon overturned on a
bridge spanning Bull Run and incited panic in McDowell's force. Beauregard and
Johnston decided not to press their advantage, since their combined army had
been left highly disorganized as well.
The wealthy elite of nearby Washington, expecting an easy Union victory, had
come to picnic and watch the battle. When the Union army was driven back in a
running disorder, the roads back to Washington were blocked by panicked
civilians attempting to flee in their carriages. Further confusion ensued when an
artillery shell fell on a carriage, blocking the main road to the north.
Union forces and civilian alike feared that Confederate forces would now
advance on Washington D.C. with very little standing in their way. On July 24,
Prof. Lowe ascended in Enterprise to observe the Confederates moving in and
about Manassas Junction and Fairfax and ascertained that there was no
evidence of massing Rebel forces, but was forced to land in enemy territory. It
was overnight before he was rescued and could report to headquarters. He
reported that his observations "restored confidence" to the Union commanders.
[edit] Aftermath
Union casualties were 460 killed, 1,124 wounded, and 1,312 missing or captured;
Confederate casualties were 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing.[5]
Among the latter was Col. Francis S. Bartow, who was the first Confederate
brigade commander to be killed in the Civil War. General Bee was mortally
wounded, dying the following day.
Irvin McDowell bore the brunt of the blame for the Union defeat at Bull Run and
was soon replaced by George B. McClellan, who was named general-in-chief of
all the Union armies. McDowell was also present to bear significant blame for the
defeat of John Pope's Army of Virginia by Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern
Virginia just thirteen months later, at the Second Battle of Bull Run.
Battlefield confusion relating to battle flags, especially the similarity of the
Confederacy's "Stars and Bars" and the Union's "Stars and Stripes", led to the
adoption of the Confederate Battle Flag, which eventually became the most
popular symbol of the Confederacy and the South in general.
Shiloh
The Battle of Shiloh, also known as the Battle of Pittsburg Landing, was a major
battle in the Western Theater of the American Civil War, fought on April 6 and
April 7, 1862, in southwestern Tennessee. Confederate forces under Generals
Albert Sidney Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard launched a surprise attack
against the Union army of Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and came close to
defeating his army.
On the first day of battle, the Confederates struck with the intention of driving the
Union defenders away from the Tennessee River and into the swamps of Owl
Creek to the west, hoping to defeat Grant's Army of the Tennessee before it
could link up with Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio. The
Confederate battle lines became confused during the fierce fighting and Grant's
men instead fell back in the direction of Pittsburg Landing to the northeast. A
position on a slightly sunken road, nicknamed the Hornet's Nest, defended by the
men of Brig. Gens. Benjamin M. Prentiss's and W.H.L. Wallace's divisions,
provided critical time for the rest of the Union line to stabilize under the protection
of numerous artillery batteries. Gen. Johnston was killed during the first day's
fighting and Beauregard, his second in command, decided against assaulting the
final Union position that night.
Reinforcements from Gen. Buell arrived in the evening and turned the tide the
next morning, when he and Grant launched a counterattack along the entire line.
The Confederates were forced to retreat from the bloodiest battle in United
States history up to that time, ending their hopes that they could block the Union
invasion of northern Mississippi.
New Orleans
In the early morning of January 8, Pakenham ordered a two pronged assault on
the American position: one attacking the west flank across the Mississippi, and
one directly against the main American line.
The attack began under a heavy fog, but as the British neared the main enemy
line, the fog suddenly lifted, exposing them to withering artillery fire. The British,
armed only with muskets effective at close range, tried to close the gap, but
discovered that the ladders needed to cross a canal and scale the earthworks
had been forgotten. As a result, most of their senior officers were killed or
wounded, and the British infantry could do nothing but stand out in the open and
be mown down by a combination of muskets and grapeshot from the Americans.
There were three large, direct assaults on the American positions, but all were
repulsed. Pakenham was fatally wounded in the third attack when he was hit by
grapeshot on horseback while 500 yards from the earthworks. General John
Lambert assumed command upon Pakenham's death and ordered a withdrawal,
despite the fact that Pakenham had ordered Lambert to continue the battle.
The British had suffered a loss of nearly 2,000 dead, wounded or taken prisoner;
while the Americans only had 13 dead, with 58 wounded. The only British
success was across the Mississippi, where a 700-man detachment attacked and
overwhelmed the American line on the west bank of the river. But when they saw
the defeat and withdrawal of their main army on the east back, they decided to
withdraw also, taking some American prisoners and a few cannon with them.
United States forces at the time of the battle were between 3,500 and 4,500. This
detachment was composed of U.S. Army troops (Tennessee, Kentucky,
Mississippi, and Louisiana Militia), U.S. Marines, U.S. Navy sailors, Barataria
pirates, Choctaw Indian warriors, and free black soldiers. Major Gabriel Villeré
commanded the Louisiana Militia, and Major Jean-Baptiste Plauché headed the
New Orleans uniformed militia companies.
Throughout the battle, the Americans were greatly aided by the famed Jean
Lafitte and his group of pirates. Lafitte's men joined the Americans because the
pirating in the seas south of Louisiana had largely been ignored by the U.S.
government since the pirates mostly attacked the Spanish and other pirates.
Lafitte's men wore red shirts as their uniform, which caused much confusion in
the British ranks, who were also clothed in red. Some pirates came down from
General Jackson's ramparts and merged with the British ranks, thus allowing
them to kill small pockets of isolated British troops before the British would
realize that there was an intruder.
[edit] Aftermath
Andrew Jackson commanding American troops. Engraving by H. B. Hall after W.
Momberger.
Unknown to both armies, the end of the war had been negotiated with the signing
of the Treaty of Ghent on December 24, 1814. However, by the terms of the
treaty, the war was not officially over until the treaty was ratified on February 17,
1815, and proclaimed the following day. In some circles it is postulated that the
battle may not have been completely pointless. This is because it has been
speculated that had the British been in control of the key port of New Orleans,
they would have attempted to use this to seek additional concessions from the
United States. However this is a somewhat fallacious argument since the British
government had already ratified the treaty. A comparison is with the Battle of the
Saintes in the American Revolutionary War, which did have an effect, since it
actually affected peace negotiations.
With the defeat of the British Army and the death of Pakenham, Lambert decided
that despite reinforcements and the arrival of a siege train to besiege New
Orleans, continuing the battle would be too costly. Within a week, all of the British
troops had redeployed onto the ships and sailed away to Biloxi, Mississippi,
where the fleet captured Fort Bowyer on February 12. But the next day, the
frigate Brazen arrived with the news of the peace treaty that had been signed
which ended the war nearly two months earlier. The British fleet then abandoned
Biloxi and sailed back to its base in the West Indies.
The victory was celebrated with great enthusiasm in the United States and gave
Andrew Jackson the reputation of a hero, which later propelled him to the
Presidency.
Vicksburg
Grant wanted a quick end and prepared for an immediate assault, performing
only a cursory reconnaissance. His troops prepared a position in front of the town
and on May 19 Sherman's corps conducted a frontal assault against the
Confederate works, marching from the north along Graveyard Road into
murderous fire from Stockade Redan. Many of the Federals found something
under which to hide, sneaking back to Union lines after dark. Grant inflicted
under 200 casualties at a cost of 942. The Confederates, assumed to be
demoralized, had regained their fighting edge.
True to his aggressive nature, Grant planned his next assault, but this time with
greater care; they would first reconnoiter thoroughly and soften up the rebels with
artillery fire. The attack was set for May 22. Grant did not want a long siege, and
this attack was to be by the entire army.
Despite their bloody repulse, Union troops were in high spirits, now well-fed with
provisions they had foraged. On seeing Grant pass by, a soldier commented,
"Hardtack." Soon all Union troops in the vicinity were yelling, "Hardtack!
Hardtack!" The Union served hardtack, beans, and coffee that night. Everyone
expected that Vicksburg would fall the next day.
Union forces bombarded the city all night, including naval gunfire from the river,
and while causing little property damage, they damaged Confederate morale. On
the morning of May 22, the defenders were bombarded again for four hours
before the Union attacked once more along a three-mile front. Sherman attacked
once again down the Graveyard Road, James B. McPherson in the center along
the Jackson Road, and John A. McClernand on the south along the Baldwin
Ferry Road and astride the Southern Railroad of Mississippi. They broke through
a few times, but were beaten back by the Confederates, who could move
reinforcements easily on their shorter interior lines. McClernand's corps achieved
a small breakthrough at the Railroad Redoubt and requested reinforcements.
Grant ordered a diversionary attack, first by Sherman's corps, then James B.
McPherson's, both bloodily repulsed. McClernand attacked again, reinforced by
one of McPherson's divisions, but with no success. The day saw over 3,000
Union casualties. Enraged, Grant blamed McClernand for misleading dispatches.
[edit] Siege
Grant's optimism grew as he realized he had the city invested. With their backs
against the Mississippi and Union gunboats firing from the river, Confederate
soldiers and citizens alike were trapped. Grant's troops dug in and started a
siege. Pemberton was determined to hold his few miles of the Mississippi as long
as possible, hoping for relief from Johnston or elsewhere.
A new problem confronted the Confederates. The dead and wounded of Grant's
army lay in the heat of Mississippi summer, the odor of the deceased men and
horses fouling the air, the wounded crying for medical help and water. Grant first
refused a request of truce, thinking it a show of weakness. Finally he relented,
and the Confederates held their fire while the Union recovered the wounded and
dead, soldiers from both sides mingling and trading as if no hostilities existed for
the moment.
In an effort to cut Grant's supply line, the Confederates attacked Milliken's Bend
up the Mississippi on June 7. This was mainly defended by untrained colored
troops, who fought bravely with inferior weaponry and finally fought off the rebels
with help from gunboats, although at horrible cost; the defenders lost 652 to the
Confederate 185. The loss at Milliken's Bend left the rebels with no hope for relief
but from the cautious Johnston. Opinion within Vicksburg passed from "Johnston
is coming!" to "Where is Johnston?"
All through June, the Union dug lines parallel to and approaching the rebel lines.
Soldiers could not poke their heads up above their works for fear of snipers. It
was a sport for Union troops to poke a hat above the works on a rod, betting on
how many rebel bullets would pierce it in a given time. Union troops set off
explosions below Confederate lines, such as the attacks against the 3rd
Louisiana Redan on June 25 and July 1. But these attacks were unsuccessful.
The Confederates always healed the breaches, but were pulling tighter.
Pemberton was boxed in with lots of inedible munitions and little food. The poor
diet was showing on the Confederate soldiers. By the end of June, half were out
sick or hospitalized. Scurvy, malaria, dysentery, diarrhea, and other diseases cut
their ranks. At least one city resident had to stay up at night to keep starving
soldiers out of his vegetable garden. The constant shelling did not bother him as
much as the loss of his food. As the siege wore on, fewer and fewer horses,
mules, and dogs were seen wandering about Vicksburg. Shoe leather became a
last resort of sustenance for many adults.
As the bombing continued, suitable housing in Vicksburg was reduced to a
minimum. A ridge, located between the main town and the rebel defense line,
provided a diverse citizenry with lodging for the duration. Whether houses were
structurally sound or not, it was deemed safer to occupy these dugouts. People
did their best to make them comfortable, with rugs, furniture, and pictures. They
tried to time their movements and foraging with the rhythm of the cannonade,
sometimes unsuccessfully. Since the fighting line was fairly close, soldiers made
their way rearward to visit family and friends, a boost to morale.
[edit] Surrender and aftermath
Joseph E. Johnston, the only possibility for a Confederate rescue, felt his force at
Jackson was too small to attack Grant's huge army. While Johnston's force was
growing (at cost to the rest of the hard-pressed Confederacy), Grant's was
growing faster, supplied via the now-open Yazoo River. Johnston, lacking in
supplies, stated, "I consider saving Vicksburg hopeless." The Confederate
government felt otherwise, asking the cautious Johnston to attack, requests he
resisted. Robert E. Lee had remarked that the Mississippi climate in June would
be sufficient to defeat the Union attack and he resisted calls to ride to the city's
rescue from the Eastern Theater; his Army of Northern Virginia instead invaded
the North in the Gettysburg Campaign with the partial objective of relieving
pressure on Vicksburg. Finally on July 1, Johnston's relief column began
cautiously advancing due west toward Union lines. On July 3 he was ready for
his attack, but on July 4, Independence Day, the Union guns were oddly quiet.
On July 3, Pemberton sent a note to Grant, who, as at Fort Donelson, first
demanded unconditional surrender. But Grant reconsidered, not wanting to feed
30,000 hungry Confederates in Union prison camps, and offered to parole all
prisoners. Considering their destitute state, dejected and starving, he never
expected them to fight again; he hoped they would carry home the stigma of
defeat to the rest of the Confederacy. In any event, it would have occupied his
army and taken months to ship that many troops north.
Surrender was formalized by an old oak tree, "made historical by the event." In
his Personal Memoirs, Grant described the fate of this luckless tree:
It was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had
disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the same tree
has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as the
"True Cross."
Although there was more action to come in the Vicksburg Campaign, the fortress
city had fallen and, with the capture of Port Hudson on July 8, the Mississippi
River was firmly in Union hands and the Confederacy split in two.
The fourth of July holiday was not celebrated by most of the citizens of Vicksburg
until World War II, because of the surrender of the city on July 4.
Ft. Henry
On February 4 and February 5, Grant landed his divisions in two different
locations, McClernand's three miles north on the east bank of the Tennessee
River to prevent the garrison's escape and C.F. Smith's to occupy Fort Heiman
on the Kentucky side, which would ensure the fort’s fall. But the battle would turn
out to be primarily naval and would conclude before the infantry saw action.[12]
Tilghman realized that it was only a matter of time before Fort Henry fell. Only
nine guns remained above the water to mount a defense. While leaving artillery
in the fort to hold off the Union fleet, he escorted the rest of his force out of the
area and sent them off on the overland route to Fort Donelson, twelve miles
away. Fort Heiman was abandoned on February 4, and all but a handful of
artillerymen left Fort Henry on February 5. (Union cavalry pursued the retreating
Confederates, but the poor conditions of the roads prevented any serious
confrontation and only a few captures occurred.)[13]
Foote's seven gunboats began bombarding the fort on February 6. This was the
first engagement for the Western Flotilla, using newly designed and hastily
constructed ironclads. Foote deployed the four ironclads in a line abreast,
followed by the three wooden ships, which held back for long-range, but less
effective, fire against the fort. It was primarily the low elevation of Fort Henry's
guns that allowed Foote's fleet to escape serious destruction; the Confederate
fire was able to hit the ships only where their thin armor was strongest. One ship
was a serious casualty, however. A chance 32-pound shot penetrated USS
Essex and hit her middle boiler, sending scalding steam throughout half of the
ship. Thirty-two men were killed or wounded, including her commander, William
D. Porter, and she was out of action for the remainder of the campaign.[14]
[edit] Aftermath and the timberclad raid
After the battle had lasted 75 minutes, Tilghman surrendered to the fleet, which
had engaged the fort and closed within 400 yards. A small boat from the fleet
was able to sail directly through the sally port of the fort and pick up Tilghman for
the surrender ceremony on Cincinnati, demonstrating the extent of flooding.
Twelve officers and 82 men surrendered; other casualties are estimated to be 15
men killed and 20 wounded. The evacuating force left all of its artillery and
equipment behind. Tilghman was imprisoned, but exchanged on August 15.[15]
Tilghman wrote bitterly in his report that Fort Henry was in a "wretched military
position. ... The history of military engineering records no parallel to this case."
Grant sent a brief dispatch to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. ... I shall take and
destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry." Halleck wired to
Washington: "Fort Henry is ours. The flag is reestablished on the soil of
Tennessee. It will never be removed."[16]
The ironic fact is that if Grant had been as cautious as other generals in the
Union Army and had delayed his departure by two days, the battle would have
never occurred, since by February 8, Fort Henry was completely underwater.
Nevertheless, the population of the Union treated Fort Henry as a glorious
victory. On February 7, the gunboats Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Essex returned to
Cairo with whistles blowing, flying Confederate flags upside down. The Chicago
Tribune wrote that the battle was "one of the most complete and signal victories
in the annals of the world's warfare."[17]
Fort Henry's fall opened the Tennessee River to Union gunboats and shipping
past the Alabama border. This was quickly demonstrated. Immediately after the
surrender, Foote sent Lieutenant Phelps with the three timberclads, the Tyler,
Conestoga, and Lexington, on a mission up river to destroy installations and
supplies of military value. (The ironclads of the flotilla had sustained damage in
the bombardment and were slower and less maneuverable for the mission at
hand, which would include pursuit of Confederate ships.) The raid reached as far
as Muscle Shoals, just past Florence, Alabama, the limit of navigability. The
Union ships and their raiding parties destroyed numerous supplies and the
important bridge of the Memphis & Ohio Railroad, 25 miles upriver. They also
captured a variety of Southern ships, including the Sallie Wood, the Muscle, and
an ironclad under construction, the Eastport. The Union ships returned safely to
Fort Henry on February 12. However, Phelps made a major blunder during his
otherwise successful raid. The citizens of the town of Florence asked him to
spare their town and its railroad bridge, of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
Phelps told them that he would, seeing no military importance to the bridge. Yet
the loss of the bridge would have essentially split the Confederate theater in half.
It was this bridge that Johnston's army would ride across on their journey to
Corinth, Mississippi, in preparation for the Battle of Shiloh.[18]
After the fall of Fort Donelson to Grant's army on February 16, the two major
water transportation routes in the Confederate west became Union highways for
movement of troops and material. And as Grant suspected, this action flanked
the Confederate forces at Columbus, causing them to withdraw from that city and
Western Kentucky soon thereafter
Antietam
Near the town of Sharpsburg, Lee deployed his available forces behind Antietam
Creek along a low ridge, starting on September 15. It was an effective defensive
position, although not an impregnable one. The terrain provided excellent cover
for infantrymen, with rail and stone fences, outcroppings of limestone, and little
hollows and swales. The creek to their front was only a minor barrier, ranging
from 60 to 100 feet in width, and was fordable in places and crossed by three
stone bridges each a mile apart. It was also a precarious position because the
Confederate rear was blocked by the Potomac River and only a single crossing
point, Boteler's Ford, was available should retreat be necessary. And on
September 15, the force under Lee's immediate command consisted of no more
than 18,000 men, only a third the size of the Federal army.[5]
The first two Union divisions arrived on the afternoon of September 15 and the
bulk of the remainder of the army late that evening. Although an immediate Union
attack on the morning of September 16 would have had an overwhelming
advantage in numbers, McClellan's trademark caution and his belief that Lee had
over 100,000 men, caused him to delay his attack for a day. This gave the
Confederates more time to prepare defensive positions and allowed Longstreet's
corps to arrive from Hagerstown and Jackson's corps, minus A.P. Hill's division,
to arrive from Harpers Ferry. Jackson defended the left (northern) flank,
anchored on the Potomac, Longstreet the right (southern) flank, anchored on the
Antietam, a line that was about 4 miles long. (As the battle progressed and Lee
shifted units, these corps boundaries overlapped considerably.)
On the evening of September 16, McClellan ordered Hooker's I Corps to cross
Antietam Creek and probe the enemy positions. Meade's division cautiously
attacked the Confederates under Hood near the East Woods. After darkness,
artillery fire continued as McClellan continued to position his troops. McClellan's
plan was to overwhelm the enemy's left flank. He arrived at this decision due to
the configuration of bridges over the Antietam. The lower bridge (which would
soon be named Burnside Bridge) was dominated by Confederate positions on
the bluffs overlooking it. The middle bridge, on the road from Boonsboro, was
subject to artillery fire from the heights near Sharpsburg. But the upper bridge
was 2 miles east of the Confederate guns and could be crossed safely.
McClellan planned to commit more than half his army to the assault, starting with
two corps, supported by a third, and if necessary a fourth. Simultaneously, he
intended to launch a diversionary attack against the Confederate right with a fifth
corps, and was prepared to strike the center with his reserves if either attack
succeeded.[6] The skirmish in the East Woods served to signal McClellan's
intentions to Lee, who prepared his defenses accordingly. He shifted men to his
left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet
arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with
one division.
Unfortunately for McClellan, his plans were ill-coordinated and would be
executed poorly. He issued to each of his subordinate commanders only the
orders for his own corps, not general orders describing the entire battle plan. The
terrain of the battlefield made it difficult for those commanders to monitor events
outside of their sectors and McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in
the rear (at the Philip Pry house, east of the creek), making it difficult for him to
control the separate corps. Therefore, the battle progressed the next day as
essentially three separate, mostly uncoordinated battles: morning in the northern
end of the battlefield, mid-day in the center, and afternoon in the south. This lack
of coordination and concentration of McClellan's forces almost completely
nullified the two-to-one advantage the Union enjoyed and allowed Lee to shift his
defensive forces to parry each thrust.
2ND Bull Run
[edit] Battle
[edit] August 28
The engagement began as a Federal column, under Jackson's observation near
Brawner Farm, moved along the Warrenton Turnpike. In an effort to prevent
Pope from moving into a strong defensive position around Centreville, Jackson
risked being overwhelmed before James Longstreet could join him. Jackson
ordered an attack on the exposed left flank of the column and, in his words, "The
conflict here was fierce and sanguinary." The fighting continued until
approximately 9 p.m. (some sources say midnight), at which point the Union
withdrew from the field. Losses were heavy on both sides.
Pope believed he had "bagged" Jackson and sought to capture him before he
could be reinforced by Longstreet. Pope's dispatch sent on the evening of the
28th to Major General Philip Kearny stated, in part, "General McDowell has
intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front … Unless he can
escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured."
[edit] August 29
Jackson had initiated the battle on August 28 with the intent of holding Pope until
Longstreet arrived with the remainder of the Army of Northern Virginia. August 29
would test if his men were able to hold their positions in the face of a numerically
superior enemy, long enough to be reinforced.
Beginning about 10:15 a.m., Union forces launched a series of disjointed
assaults against Jackson's position. The fighting was intense, and casualties
were heavy on both sides. The battle continued until Federal forces ceased the
offensive in late afternoon.
Longstreet's corps arrived on the field at approximately 11 a.m. and took up
positions on Jackson's right. His arrival apparently went unnoticed by Pope until
late in the afternoon when a portion of Longstreet's command repulsed a Union
advance. In the wake of Longstreet's arrival, the Confederate line was extended
by more than a mile southward. Pope's left flank was unprotected, beckoning
Longstreet's fresh troops to attack it.
[edit] August 30
Early in the morning, Jackson's troops pulled back from forward positions gained
while repulsing the assaults. Pope viewed this as evidence of a retreat and,
although he was now aware that Longstreet had joined Jackson, was determined
to push forward. His order was, "The ... forces will be immediately thrown forward
in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day ..."
Following skirmishing throughout the day, Pope moved against Jackson's
position in force at about 3 p.m. Jackson described the assault, "In a few
moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the
enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if
determined by force of numbers and fury of assault to drive us from our
positions."
While the Union forces were engaged with Jackson, Lee ordered Longstreet
forward. Longstreet's forces, consisting of 28,000 troops led by John B. Hood's
brigades, drove forward and crushed the Union left flank as Jackson held it in
place. As Longstreet's men pushed forward, the Army of Virginia was rolled up
and sent reeling from the field.
In Jackson's words, "As Longstreet pressed upon the right the Federal advance
was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered.
Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the
field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the
turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder,
and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field."
Elements of Pope's army made a stand on Henry House Hill—ironically, where
Stonewall Jackson's Virginia brigade had made its own stand during the First
Battle of Bull Run—and held off determined attacks until darkness brought a final
close to the battle. The Union forces withdrew from the field, in a generally
organized manner compared to the aftermath of First Bull Run.
Unable to escape blame for this debacle, Pope was relieved of command. On the
contrary, the hopes of the Confederacy were gleaming brighter than ever. Within
one week, the vanguard of the Army of Northern Virginia would cross the
Potomac River in the Maryland Campaign, marching toward a fateful encounter
with the Army of the Potomac at a creek called Antietam\
Fredricksburg
The battle opened south of the city at 8:30 a.m. on December 13, when Franklin
sent two divisions from the Left Grand Division into a previously unseen gap in
Jackson's defenses on the right. By 10 a.m., a thick fog began to lift and the
initially sluggish movements picked up speed. Meade's division formed the main
attack, supported by the divisions of Doubleday and Gibbon. The attack was
stalled by the Virginia Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham and an artillery
duel lasted for about an hour. General Lee observed the action and commented
about Pelham, age 24, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young." As
Meade finally made traction, he ran into Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade,
scattering it. Gregg himself was shot and mortally wounded, dying two days later.
To Meade's right, Gibbon's attack against the brigades of Brig. Gens. William
Dorsey Pender and Edward L. Thomas made good progress, but Meade's and
Gibbon's men became separated; by 1:30 p.m., a heavy Confederate
counterattack pushed them back. Due to the foggy conditions, Federal artillery
could not provide much assistance. The Union men were driven back and
chased by the Confederate infantry, raising concerns that they might be trapped
at the river. Eventually the divisions of Sickles and Birney were brought up to
strengthen the Federal line and Stonewall Jackson's counterattack ground to a
halt. The focus of action moved north to Marye's Heights.
The initial assaults west of Fredericksburg began at 11 a.m. as French's division
moved along the Plank Road, facing a steep-banked drainage ditch and a wide,
open plain of 400 yards, dominated by Confederate infantry and artillery behind a
sunken road and stone wall. Earlier, Longstreet had been assured by artillerist
Edward Porter Alexander, "A chicken could not live on that field when we open
on it." The Union men attacking had to file in columns over two small bridges
across the drainage ditch, making them a massed target. Attempts to shift the
attack farther to the right failed due to swampy ground. As in the south, Union
artillery was prevented by fog from effectively silencing the Confederate guns.
Burnside had anticipated this attack on the right would be merely supportive of
his main effort on the left, but Franklin had stalled and resisted entreaties to
continue, so Burnside shifted his emphasis. After French's division was repulsed
with heavy losses, Burnside sent in the divisions of Hancock and Howard, which
met a similar fate. By this time, Pickett's division and one of Hood's brigades had
marched north to reinforce Marye's Heights. Griffin's division renewed the attack
at 3:30 p.m., followed by Humphrey's division at 4 p.m. At dusk, Getty's division
assaulted from the east and was also repulsed.
Six Union divisions had been sent in, generally one brigade at a time, for a total
of sixteen individual charges, all of which failed, costing them from 6,000 to 8,000
casualties.[3] Watching the carnage from the center of his line, a position now
known as Lee's Hill, General Lee was quoted as saying, "It is well that war is so
terrible, or we should grow too fond of it." The action on the heights also included
the charge of the Irish Brigade, which lost 50 percent of its strength in the battle,
but advanced further up the heights than any other Union Brigade. Confederate
losses at Marye's Heights totaled around 1,200.[4] The falling of darkness and
the pleas of Burnside's subordinates were enough to put an end to the attacks.
Longstreet later wrote, "The charges had been desperate and bloody, but utterly
hopeless."[4] Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the
fields leading to the Heights, unable to move or assist the wounded due to
Confederate fire.
The armies remained in position throughout the day on December 14, when
Burnside briefly considered leading his old IX Corps in one final attack on
Marye's Heights, but reconsidered. That afternoon, Burnside asked Lee for a
truce to attend to his wounded, which Lee graciously granted. The next day the
Federal forces retreated across the river and the campaign came to an end.
[edit] Aftermath
The casualties sustained by each army showed clearly how disastrous the Union
army's tactics were, and Burnside was relieved of command a month later
(following the humiliating failure of his "Mud March"). The Union army suffered
12,653 casualties (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured/missing).[5] Two
Union generals were mortally wounded: Brig. Gens. George D. Bayard and
Conrad F. Jackson. The Confederate army lost 5,377 (608 killed, 4,116
wounded, 653 captured/missing),[5][6] most of them in the early fighting on
Jackson's front. Confederate Brig. Gen. T. R. R. Cobb was killed.
The South erupted in jubilation over their great victory. The Richmond Examiner
described it as a "stunning defeat to the invader, a splendid victory to the
defender of the sacred soil." General Lee, normally reserved, was described by
the Charleston Mercury as "jubilant, almost off-balance, and seemingly desirous
of embracing everyone who calls on him." The newspaper also exclaimed that,
"General Lee knows his business and the army has yet known no such word as
fail."[7]
Reactions were opposite in the North, and both the Army and President Lincoln
came under strong attacks from politicians and the press. The Cincinnati
Commercial wrote, "It can hardly be in human nature for men to show more valor
or generals to manifest less judgment, than were perceptible on our side that
day." Senator Zachariah Chandler, a Radical Republican, wrote that, "The
President is a weak man, too weak for the occasion, and those fool or traitor
generals are wasting time and yet more precious blood in indecisive battles and
delays." Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin visited the White House after a
trip to the battlefield. He told the president, "It was not a battle, it was a butchery."
Curtin reported that the president was "heart-broken at the recital, and soon
reached a state of nervous excitement bordering on insanity." Lincoln himself
wrote, "If there is a worse place than hell, I am in it."[
Gettysburg
General Buford realized the importance of the high ground directly to the south of
Gettysburg, knowing that if the Confederates could gain control of the heights,
Meade's army would have a hard time dislodging them. He decided to utilize
three ridges west of Gettysburg: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary
Ridge (proceeding west to east toward the town). These were appropriate terrain
for a delaying action by his small division against superior Confederate infantry
forces, meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could
occupy the strong defensive positions south of town, Cemetery Hill, Cemetery
Ridge, and Culp's Hill.[16]
Heth's division advanced with two brigades forward, commanded by Brig. Gens.
James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis. They proceeded easterly in columns
along the Chambersburg Pike. Three miles (5 km) west of town, about 7:30 a.m.
on July 1, Heth's two brigades met light resistance from cavalry vedettes and
deployed into line. Eventually, they reached dismounted troopers from Col.
William Gamble's cavalry brigade, who raised determined resistance and
delaying tactics from behind fence posts with fire from their breechloading
carbines.[17] By 10:20 a.m., the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen
east to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I Corps (Maj. Gen. John F.
Reynolds) finally arrived.[18]
North of the Pike, Davis gained a temporary success against Brig. Gen. Lysander
Cutler's brigade, but was repulsed with heavy losses in an action around an
unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge. South of the Pike, Archer's brigade
assaulted through Herbst (also know as McPherson's) Woods. The Federal Iron
Brigade under Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith enjoyed initial success against
Archer, capturing several hundred men, including Archer himself.[19]
Early in the fighting, while General Reynolds was directing troop and artillery
placements just to the east of the woods, he fell from his horse, killed instantly by
a bullet striking him behind the left ear. Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday assumed
command. Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike area lasted until about 12:30 p.m.
It resumed around 2:30 p.m., when Heth's entire division engaged, adding the
brigades of Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough.[20]
As Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade came on line they flanked the 19th Indiana
and drove the Iron Brigade back. The 26th North Carolina (the largest regiment in
the army with 839 men) lost heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212
men. By the end of the three-day battle, they would have about 152 men
standing, the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any other regiment,
north or south.[21] Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward
Seminary Ridge. Hill added Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's division to the
assault and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds of the Lutheran
Seminary and Gettysburg streets.[22]
As the fighting to the west proceeded, two divisions of Ewell's Second Corps,
marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with Lee's order for the army to
concentrate in that vicinity, turned south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg Roads
toward Gettysburg, while the Union XI Corps (Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard) raced
north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. By early afternoon, the
Federal line ran in a semi-circle west, north, and northeast of Gettysburg.[23]
However, the Federals did not have enough troops; Cutler, who was deployed
north of the Chambersburg Pike, had his right flank in the air. The leftmost
division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy in time to strengthen the line, so
Doubleday was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage his line.[24]
Around 2:00 p.m., the Second Corps divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes
and Jubal Early assaulted and out-flanked the Union I and XI Corps positions
north and northwest of town. The brigades of Col. Edward A. O'Neal and Brig.
Gen. Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses assaulting the I Corps division of Brig.
Gen. John C. Robinson south of Oak Hill. Early's division profited from a blunder
made by Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, when he advanced his XI Corps division
to Blocher's Knoll (directly north of town and now known as Barlow's Knoll); this
represented a salient[25] in the corps line, susceptible to attack from multiple
sides, and Early's troops overran his division, which constituted the right flank of
the Union Army's position. Barlow was wounded and captured in the attack.[26]
As Federal positions collapsed both north and west of town, Gen. Howard
ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town, Cemetery Hill, where he had
left the division of Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr as a reserve.[27]
Gen. Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high
ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable." Ewell
chose not to attempt the assault, considered by historians to be a great missed
opportunity.[28]
The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody
second and third days, ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of
troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third
of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[29]
[edit] Second day of battle
Lee's Plan for July 2.
Further information: Second Day, Little Round Top, Culp's Hill, and
Cemetery Hill
[edit] Plans and movement to battle
Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining
infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and
XII Corps. Longstreet's third division, commanded by George Pickett, had begun
the march from Chambersburg early in the morning; it would not arrive until late
on July 2.[30]
The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery
Hill just south of town, then south for nearly two miles (3 km) along Cemetery
Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top. Most of the XII Corps was on
Culp's Hill, the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill, II Corps
covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge, and III Corps was ordered
to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly
described as a "fishhook" formation. The Confederate line paralleled the Union
line about a mile (1600 m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the
town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Federal
army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five miles (8 km) in
length.[31]
Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for Longstreet's First Corps to position itself
stealthily to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg
Road, and to roll up the Federal line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj.
Gens. John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed by Maj. Gen.
Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill's Third Corps. The progressive en echelon
sequence of this attack would prevent Meade from shifting troops from his center
to bolster his left. At the same time, Maj. Gen. Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's and
Jubal Early's Second Corps divisions were to make a "demonstration" against
Culp's and Cemetery Hills (again, to prevent the shifting of Federal troops), and
to turn the demonstration into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity
presented itself.[32]
Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's
continued absence from the battlefield. Instead of moving beyond the Federals'
left and attacking their flank, Longstreet's left division, under McLaws, would face
Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles's III Corps directly in their path. Sickles, dissatisfied with
the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge, and seeing
higher ground more favorable to artillery positions a half mile (800 m) to the west,
had advanced his corps—without orders—to the slightly higher ground along the
Emmitsburg Road. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to the Sherfy
farm's Peach Orchard, then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the
Codori farm. This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brig. Gen.
Andrew A. Humphreys's division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road) and
Maj. Gen. David B. Birney's division (to the south) were subject to attacks from
two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could
defend effectively.[33]
Longstreet's attack was to be made as early as practicable; however, Longstreet
got permission from Lee to await the arrival of one of his brigades, and, while
marching to the assigned position, his men came within sight of a Union signal
station on Little Round Top. Countermarching to avoid detection wasted much
time, and Hood's and McLaws's divisions did not launch their attacks until just
after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.[34]
[edit] Attacks on the Union left flank
Map of battle, July 2.
As Longstreet's divisions slammed into the Union III Corps, Meade had to send
20,000 reinforcements[35] in the form of the entire V Corps, Brig. Gen. John C.
Caldwell's division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and small portions of
the newly arrived VI Corps. The Confederate assault deviated from Lee's plan as
Hood's division moved more easterly than intended, losing its alignment with the
Emmitsburg Road,[36] attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws,
coming in on Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps
in the Wheatfield and overwhelmed them in Sherfy's Peach Orchard. McLaws's
attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of Death") before being
beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, moving down
from Little Round Top. The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in
this battle and Sickles's leg was amputated after it was shattered by a
cannonball. Caldwell's division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield.
Anderson's division assault on McLaws's left, starting around 6 p.m., reached the
crest of Cemetery Ridge, but they could not hold the position in the face of
counterattacks from the II Corps.[37]
As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Col. Strong Vincent of V
Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important hill at the extreme
left of the Union line. His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to
resist repeated assaults by Brig. Gen. Evander Law's brigade of Hood's division.
Meade's chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, had realized the
importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade, an artillery battery,
and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood's
troops arrived. The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the
20th Maine was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled
Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain into prominence after the war.[38]
[edit] Attacks on the Union right flank
About 7:00 p.m., the Second Corps' attack by Johnson's division on Culp's Hill
got off to a late start. Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been
sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, and the only portion of the
corps remaining on the hill was a brigade of New Yorkers under Brig. Gen.
George S. Greene. Due to Greene's insistence on constructing strong defensive
works, and with reinforcements from the I and XI Corps, Greene's men held off
the Confederate attackers, although the Southerners did capture a portion of the
abandoned Federal works on the lower part of Culp's Hill.[39]
Just at dark, two of Jubal Early's brigades attacked the Union XI Corps positions
on East Cemetery Hill where Col. Andrew L. Harris of the 2nd Brigade, 1st
Division, came under a withering attack, losing half his men; however, Early
failed to support his brigades in their attack, and Ewell's remaining division, that
of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, failed to aid Early's attack by moving against
Cemetery Hill from the west. The Union army's interior lines enabled its
commanders to shift troops quickly to critical areas, and with reinforcements from
II Corps, the Federal troops retained possession of East Cemetery Hill, and
Early's brigades were forced to withdraw.[40]
Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon, but
had no role in the second day's battle. Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton's brigade
fought a minor engagement with George Armstrong Custer's Michigan cavalry
near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg.[41]
[edit] Third day of battle
Further information: Culp's Hill, Pickett's Charge, and Third Day cavalry
battles
Map of battle, July 3.
General Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic
plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the Federal left, while Ewell
attacked Culp's Hill.[42] However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps
troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's
Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked
and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m., after some seven
hours of bitter combat.[43]
Lee was forced to change his plans. Now Longstreet would command Pickett's
Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an
attack on the Federal II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on
Cemetery Ridge. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring
to bear on the Federal positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's
line.[44]
The "High Water Mark" on Cemetery Ridge as it appears today. The monument
to the 72nd Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment ("Baxter's Philadelphia
Fire Zouaves") appears at right, the Copse of Trees to the left.
Around 1:00 p.m., from 150 to 170 Confederate guns[45] began an artillery
bombardment that was probably the largest of the war. In order to save valuable
ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew must follow, the Army of the
Potomac's artillery at first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15
minutes, 80 or so Federal cannon added to the din. The Army of Northern
Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and the cannonade did not
significantly affect the Union position. Around 3:00 p.m, the cannon fire subsided,
and 12,500 Southern soldiers stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the
three-quarters of a mile (1200 m) to Cemetery Ridge in what is known to history
as "Pickett's Charge". Due to fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on
Cemetery Hill and north of Little Round Top, and musket and canister fire from
the II Corps as the Confederates approached, nearly one half of the attackers
would not return to their own lines. Although the Federal line wavered and broke
temporarily at a jog in a low stone fence called the "Angle", just north of a patch
of vegetation called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach
and the Confederate attack was repulsed.[46]
There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. Stuart was sent to
guard the Confederate left flank and was to be prepared to exploit any success
the infantry might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Federal right and
hitting their trains and lines of communications. Three miles (5 km) east of
Gettysburg, in what is now called "East Cavalry Field" (not shown on the
accompanying map, but between the York and Hanover Roads), Stuart's forces
collided with Federal cavalry: Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg's division and
George A. Custer's brigade. A lengthy mounted battle, including hand-to-hand
sabre combat, ensued. Custer's charge, leading the 1st Michigan Cavalry,
blunted the attack by Wade Hampton's brigade, blocking Stuart from achieving
his objectives in the Federal rear. After Pickett's Charge, Meade ordered Brig.
Gen. Judson Kilpatrick to launch a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of
Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. Brig. Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth
protested against the futility of such a move, but obeyed orders; Farnsworth was
killed in the attack and his brigade suffered significant losses.[47]
[edit] Aftermath
Gettysburg Campaign (July 5 – July 14).
The armies stared at one another across the bloody fields on July 4, the same
day that the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Lee
reformed his lines into a defensive position, hoping that Meade would attack. The
cautious Union commander, however, decided against the risk, a decision for
which he would later be criticized. He did order a series of small probing actions,
including sending the U.S. Regulars over a mile towards the right of the
Confederate lines, but they withdrew under artillery fire and Meade decided not
to press an attack. A series of sharp exchanges between the opposing skirmish
lines merely added more names to the casualty lists. By mid-afternoon, the firing
at Gettysburg had essentially stopped and both armies began to collect their
remaining wounded and bury some of the dead. A proposal by Lee for a prisoner
exchange was rejected by Meade.[48]
On July 5, in a driving rain, the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia left
Gettysburg on the Hagerstown Road; the Battle of Gettysburg was over, and the
Confederates headed back to Virginia. Meade's army followed, although the
pursuit was half-spirited at best. The recently rain-swollen Potomac trapped Lee's
army on the north bank of the river, but by the time the Federals caught up, the
Confederates were ready to cross back to Virginia. The rear-guard action at
Falling Waters on July 14 ended the Gettysburg Campaign and added some
more names to the long casualty lists, including General Pettigrew, mortally
wounded.[49]
Throughout the campaign, General Lee seemed to have entertained the belief
that his men were invincible; most of Lee's experiences with the army had
convinced him of this, including the great victory at Chancellorsville in early May
and the rout of the Federals at Gettysburg on July 1.[50] Although high morale
plays an important role in military victory when other factors are equal, Lee could
not refuse his army's desire to fight. To the detrimental effects of their collective
blind faith was added the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia had many new
and inexperienced commanders. (Neither Hill nor Ewell, for instance, though
capable division commanders, had commanded a corps before.) It had lost its
most competent offensive general, Stonewall Jackson. Also, Lee's habit of giving
generalized orders and leaving it up to his lieutenants to work out the details
contributed to his defeat. Although this method may have worked with Jackson, it
proved inadequate when dealing with corps commanders unused to Lee's loose
style of command. Lee faced dramatic differences in going from defender to
invader—long supply lines, a hostile local population, and an imperative to force
the enemy from its position. Lastly, after July 1, the Confederates were simply
not able to coordinate their attacks. Lee faced a new and very dangerous
opponent in George Meade, and the Army of the Potomac stood to the task and
fought well on its home territory
Pettersburg
The first Battle of Petersburg was a minor, unsuccessful Union assault against
the city of Petersburg, Virginia, June 9, 1864. Due to the rag-tag group of
defenders involved, it is sometimes known as the Battle of Old Men and Young
Boys.
On June 9, Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee were engaged in the Overland
Campaign, facing each other in their trenches after the bloody Battle of Cold
Harbor. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler was bottled up in the Bermuda
Hundred area to the east of Richmond, Virginia, attempting to distract Lee by
attacking Richmond. Butler realized that Richmond was supplied by railroads that
converged in the city of Petersburg, to the south, and that taking Petersburg
would cripple Lee's supply lines.
Butler dispatched about 4,500 cavalry and infantry against the 2,500 Confederate
defenders of Petersburg. While Butler’s infantry demonstrated against the outer
line of entrenchments east of Petersburg, Brig. Gen. A. V. Kautz’s cavalry
division attempted to enter the city from the south via the Jerusalem Plank Road,
but was repulsed by Home Guards, manned almost exclusively by teenagers and
elderly men. Afterwards, Butler withdrew. On June 14–17, Grant and the Army of
the Potomac slipped away from Lee and crossed the James River. They began
moving towards Petersburg to support and renew Butler’s assaults. The second
Battle of Petersburg and the Siege of Petersburg would soon follow.
Part 3
Civil war medicine/medical
When the war began, the United States Army medical staff consisted of only the
surgeon general, thirty surgeons, and eighty-three assistant surgeons. Of these,
twenty-four resigned to "go South," and three other assistant surgeons were
promptly dropped for "disloyalty." Thus the medical corps began its war service
with only eighty seven men. When the war ended in 1865, more than eleven
thousand doctors had served or were serving, many of these as acting assistant
surgeons, uncommissioned and working under contract, often on a part-time
basis. They could wear uniforms if they wished and were usually restricted to
general hospitals away from the fighting front.
The Confederate Army began by taking the several state militias into service,
each regiment equipped with a surgeon and an assistant surgeon, appointed by
the state governors. The Confederate Medical Department started with the
appointment on May 4 of Daniel De Leon, one of three resigned United States
surgeons, as acting surgeon general. After a few weeks he was replaced by
another acting surgeon general, who on July 1,1861, was succeeded by Samuel
Preston Moore. He took the rank of colonel and stayed on duty until the collapse
of the Confederacy.
Dr. Moore, originally a Charlestonian, had served twenty seven years in the
United States Army. He has been described as brusque and autocratic, a
martinet. He was also very hard working and determined, and he was
progressive in his military-medical thinking. Dissatisfied with the quality of many
of the surgeons of the state troops, he insisted that to hold a Confederate
commission, every medical officer must pass examinations set by one of his
examining boards. He disliked filthy camps and hospitals. He believed in
"pavilion" hospitals-long, wooden buildings with ample ventilation and sufficient
bed space for eighty to one hundred patients. Moore, with the compliance of the
Confederate Congress and President Jefferson Davis, began the construction of
many such hospitals when field activities demonstrated that the casualties would
be high and the war long. Dr. Moore maintained a cooperative relationship with
Congress, successive secretaries of war, and President Davis, always subject to
the availability of funds from the Confederate Treasury.
In that era of "heroic dosing" Moore foresaw shortages in drugs, surgical
instruments, and hospital supplies. He established laboratories for drug
manufacture and took prompt steps to purchase needed supplies from Europe. In
the course of time, capture of Union warehouses and hospitals played an
increasing role in the Confederate supply. As an additional precaution he
procured and distributed widely a book on native herbs and other plants that
grew wild in the South and were believed to possess curative qualities. As a
result, despite frequent shortages of some drugs, the Confederate record was a
good one.
Meanwhile, in the old Union, Surgeon General Thomas Lawson, an
octogenarian, obligingly died only weeks after Fort Sumter. He was replaced by
Clement A. Finley, the sexagenarian senior surgeon who had served since 1818
and was thoroughly imbued with Lawson's parsimonious values. Lawson had
wanted to keep the Army Medical Department much as it had been throughout
his career, which meant that the eighty-seven surviving members of the medical
corps had not had the kind of experience that would be needed in a major war.
Yet now they were the senior surgeons of a rapidly expanding army.
Fortunately, immediately after the outbreak of war there was a swarming of
humanitarians of both sexes who wanted to be of help to the citizen soldiers.
Among the most clamorous was the Women's Central Association for Relief, of
New York, all of whose officers were men. Soon there was a strong demand for
the creation of a United States sanitary commission, patterned on the British
Sanitary Commission, which had been formed to clean up the filth of the Crimean
War. The tentative United States commission elected officers; the two most
important were the president, Henry W. Bellows, a prominent Unitarian minister,
and the executive secretary, Frederick Law Olmsted, superintendent of Central
Park. The commission asked for official recognition by the War Department
stating that its purpose was to "advise and assist" that department.
Surgeon General Finley, just beginning his incumbency, had no desire for a
sanitary commission, but when that body promised to confine its activities to the
volunteer regiments and to leave the regular army alone, he withdrew his
objections, Secretary of War Simon Cameron then named a commission of
twelve members, of whom three were army doctors.
The United States Sanitary Commission quickly extended itself to 2,500
communities throughout the North, the Chicago branch being especially
proficient. The St. Louis people accomplished great things but insisted on
remaining independent under the name of the Western Sanitary Commission.
The women of the local branches kept busy making bandages, scraping lint, and
sending culinary delicacies to army hospitals. The national organization
maintained a traveling outpost with the Army of the Potomac to speed sanitary
supplies to the field hospitals of that army. In 1862 and again in 1864 the
commission provided and manned hospital ships to evacuate Army of the
Potomac sick and wounded to general hospitals as far from the front as New
York City.
Early in the war, and later when it seemed appropriate, the commission
persuaded highly respected doctors to write pamphlets on sanitation and
hygiene. These were widely circulated among both medical and line officers.
Although often erroneous, these pamphlets presented the best thought of that
pre-bacteriological era and did some good where surgeons could persuade their
colonels to take the advice. In the absence of any medical inspectors, the
commission induced a number of esteemed doctors to examine recruit camps
and to report on cleanliness and on the professional adequacy of surgeons to
hold their commissions.
Although the Southerners had some local and state relief organizations, they
enjoyed nothing similar to the Sanitary Commission in scope or efficiency; yet in
the effects of camp disease and unsanitary conditions, the Confederacy and the
Union shared common experiences indeed. The two armies had similar
experiences as their forces were being trained, usually in an instruction camp as
a gathering place for the troops of each state. Medical officers did not know how
to requisition drugs and medical supplies. Commissaries did not know how to
requisition rations. It has been said that "the Americans are a warlike but
unmilitary people," and the first months of the Civil War proved the adage. Too
many men, when entering the army after a lifetime of being cared for by mothers
and wives, had a tendency to "go native" to ignore washing themselves or their
clothing and, worst of all, to ignore all regulations about camp sanitation, Each
company was supposed to have a sink, a trench eight feet deep and two feet
wide, onto which six inches of earth were to be put each evening. Some
regiments, at first, dug no sinks. In other cases the men, disgusted by the sights
and odors around the sinks, went off into open spaces around the edge of the
camp. The infestation of flies that followed was inevitable, as were the diseases
and bacteria they spread to the men and their rations.
Soon long lines of soldiers began coming to sick call with complaints of loose
bowels accompanied by various kinds and varying degrees of internal discomfort.
The medical officer would make a slapdash diagnosis of diarrhea or dysentery an
prescribe an astringent. He usually ascribed this sickness to the eating of bad or
badly cooked food. Union Army surgeons were to come to use the term
"diarrhea-dysentery," lumping all the cases together as one disease. In fact, in
many cases it was only a symptom of tuberculosis or malaria, though amoebic
and bacillary dysentery, introduced into the South by slaves brought from Africa,
was certainly present as well. It caused enormous sickness and many deaths.
The Union Army alone blamed the disease for 50,000 deaths, a sum larger than
that ascribed to "killed in action." It was even more lethal in the Confederate
Army.
The diets of both armies did not help and were deplorably high in calories
and low in vitamins. Fruits and fresh vegetables were notable by their absence,
and especially so when the army was in the field. The food part of the ration was
fresh or preserved beef, salt pork, navy beans, coffee, and hardtack, large, thick
crackers, usually stale and often inhabited by weevils. When troops were not
fighting, many created funds to buy fruits and vegetables in the open market.
More often they foraged in the countryside, with fresh food a valuable part of the
booty. In late 1864, when Major General W. T. Sherman made foraging his
official policy on his march from Atlanta to Savannah, his army was never
healthier. As the war went on, Confederate soldiers were increasingly asked to
subsist on field corn and peas. And the preparation of the food was as bad as the
food itself, hasty, undercooked, and almost always fried.
No wonder, then, that at sick call, shortly after reveille, many men who
claimed to be sick were marched by the first sergeant to the regimental hospital,
usually a wall tent. There the assistant surgeon examined them, then assigned
some to cots in the hospital tent, instructed others to be sick in quarters, and
restored a few to light duty or to full duty. The less sick and slightly wounded
would be expected to nurse, clean, and feed the patients and to see to the
disposal of bedpans and urinals.
In the event of an engagement, the assistant surgeon and one or more
detailed men, laden with lint, bandages, opium pills and morphine, whiskey and
brandy, would establish an "advance" or dressing station just beyond musket fire
from the battle. Stretcher-bearers went forward to find the wounded and, if the
latter could not walk, to carry them to the dressing station. The assistant surgeon
gave the wounded man a stout drink of liquor, expecting it to counteract shock,
and then perhaps gave him an opium pill or dust or rubbed morphine into the
wound. Later in the war the advantages of a syringe to inject morphine became
apparent. The assistant surgeon examined the wound, with special attention to
staunching or diminishing bleeding. After removing foreign bodies, he packed the
wound with lint, bandaged it, and applied a splint if it seemed advisable. The
walking wounded then started for the field hospital, officially the regiment hospital
tent, although in 1862 and onward there was an increasing tendency to take over
a farmhouse, school, or church if such was available. The recumbent went by
ambulances, if there were any, for the ride to the field hospital, usually anywhere
from three to five miles from enemy artillery and sometimes much farther.
There, lying on clumps of hay or bare ground, the wounded awaited their
turn on the operating table. There was usually little shouting, groaning, or clamor
because the wounded were quieted by shock and the combination of liquor and
opiate. It was an eerie scene, with a mounting pile of amputated limbs, perhaps
five feet high, the surgeon and the assistant surgeon-after a few months both
Union and Confederate authorities decided that two assistant surgeons were
necessary in a regiment -cutting, sawing, making repairs, and tying ligatures on
arteries. The scene was especially awesome at night, with the surgeons working
by candlelight on an assignment that might sometimes go on for three or four
days with hardly a respite. And there was always the smell of gore.
The surgeons tried to ignore both the slightly wounded and the mortally
wounded in the interest of saving as many lives as possible. This meant special
attention to arm and leg wounds. Union statistics showed that 71 percent of all
gunshot wounds were in the extremities, probably because of fighting from cover
behind trees and breastworks. Wounds of the head, neck, chest, and abdomen
were most likely to be mortal, so the amputation cases went first on the operating
table. The bullet or piece of shell had to be removed, often with the operator
using his fingers for a probe. Between the extensive damage done by the Minnie
bullets used to inflict wounds, and the haste and frequent ignorance in treating
them, amputation was all too often the "treatment" prescribed.
Everything about the operation was septic. The surgeon operated in a bloodand often pus-stained coat. He might hold his lancet in his mouth. If he dropped
an instrument or sponge, he picked it up, rinsed it in cold water, and continue
work. When loose pieces of bone and tissue had been removed, the wound
would be packed with moist lint or raw cotton, unsterilized, and bandaged with
wet, unsterilized bandages. The bandages were to be kept wet, the patient was
to be kept as quiet as possible, and he was to be given small but frequent doses
of whiskey and possibly quinine. This was a supportive regime.
The urgency of operating during the primary period--the first twenty-four
hours was to avoid the irritative period--when infection showed itself. The
surgeon seldom had to wait more than three or four days for "laudable pus" to
appear. This was believed to be the lining of the wound, being expelled so that
clean tissue could replace it and the wound could heal. In the rare cases when
no pus appeared, it was called "healing by first intention" and was a complete
mystery. Actually the pus was the sign that Staphylococcus aureus had invaded
and was destroying tissue.
As to technique, the amputating surgeons had a choice of the "flap"
operation or the "circular," both quite old. The former was quicker but enlarged
the wound; the latter, when properly done, opened up a small area to infection.
By the end of the war a small majority preferred the flap. The frequency of
amputations was much questioned at the time. Yet, considering the condition of
the patients, the difficulties of transportation, and the septic condition of the
hospitals, amputations probably saved lives rather than limbs.
Men wounded in the abdomen by gunshot frequently died of peritonitis if
they had not already bled to death from serious arterial injuries. Wounds of the
head and the neck were frequently mortal. Some surgeons in both armies
experimented for a while in sealing chest wounds. They would plug the wound
with collodion, relieving the dreadful dyspnea, breathlessness, of the patient, but
sealing in such infections as entered with the bullet. These cases were likely to
be mortal, but the operator seldom knew because the patient was soon
evacuated to a general hospital. As for the frightful looking sabers and bayonets,
they inflicted barely 2 percent of the wounds, most of which usually healed.
Surgical fevers disheartened the doctors. Four or five days after a wound
operation, the patient would be recovering well, producing copious pus. Then
suddenly the pus stopped, the wound dried, and the patient ran a terrific fever.
Despite drugs, the patient would very likely be dead in three or four days. The
diagnosis was blood poisoning. Erysipelas also affected both armies. With a case
mortality of 40 percent, it received serious attention. It was recognized by a
characteristic rash, and it was thought by some to be airborne, with the result that
both Unionists and Confederates took steps to isolate erysipelas patients in
separated tents or wards. The surgeons were in the dark as to how to treat this
affliction, but it was noted that if iodine was painted on the edges of a wound, its
further extension was stopped.
Civil War surgeons had not only iodine but carbolic acid as well, and a long
list of "disinfectants" such as bichloride of mercury, sodium hypochlorite, and
other agents. The trouble was that the wound was allowed to become a raging
inferno before disinfectants were tried. However, one of the good features of Civil
War surgery was that anesthetics were almost always used in operations or the
dressing of painful wounds. It was practically universal in the Union, and despite
mythology, anesthetics were very seldom unavailable in the Confederacy. The
almost universal favorite was chloroform, probably because ether's explosive
quality made it dangerous at a field hospital operating table, where there was
always the possibility of enemy gunfire.
With the coming of the big battles of 1862, both armies more or less
simultaneously evolved larger and better field hospitals. First, regimental
hospitals clustered together as brigade hospitals with some differentiation of duty
for the various medical officers and with the chief surgeon of the brigade in
charge. Soon brigade hospitals clustered into division hospitals, and by 1864 in
most field armies there were corps hospitals. There the best surgeons would
operate; one surgeon would be in charge of records, another of drugs, another of
supplies, and yet another would direct and treat the sick and lightly wounded who
were the nurses.
In time for Antietam, the Army of the Potomac, under its medical director
Jonathan Letterman, developed the Letterman Ambulance Plan. In this system
the ambulances of a division moved together, under a mounted line sergeant,
with two stretcher-bearers and one driver per ambulance, to collect the wounded
from the field, bring them to the dressing stations, and then take them to the field
hospital. It was a vast improvement over the earlier "system," wherein bandsmen
in the Union command, and men randomly specified in the Confederacy, were
simply appointed to drive the ambulances and carry the litters. Frequently the
most unfit soldiers were detailed, which often meant that, not being good fighters,
they were little better as medical assistants. Often in the first year of the war they
got drunk on medicinal liquor and ignored their wounded comrades in order to
hide themselves from enemy fire.
Such improved organization was copied or approximated in the other field
armies despite loud opposition from the Quartermaster Corps, which wanted to
keep control of ambulances and drivers, and from some field commanders, of
whom Major General Don Carlos Buell of the Army of the Ohio was notable for
non-cooperation.
In general, the Union forces in the West were spared battlefield relief
scandals by the fact that major battles were fought on the banks of rivers,
whence wounded arid sick could be evacuated by river boats to Mound City,
Illinois, St. Louis, and other cities with general hospitals in the safety and secure
supply of the North. After the relatively prompt fall of Memphis, that city became
the site of several general hospitals. The evacuating boats, however, might I be
maintained by individual states or by the United States Sanitary Commission or
the Western Sanitary Commission, which led to confusion. The state boats,
especially those from Ohio and Indiana, were so persistent in their "raiding" the
evacuation hospitals for Buckeyes and Hoosiers that General Grant had to forbid
their removing any patients.
After losing control of their rivers, the Confederates made considerable use
of railroads in evacuating men from field hospitals to general hospitals. They had
no special hospital cars and felt fortunate when they could use passenger rather
than freight cars. They became adept at maintaining dressing and supply stations
where wounds could be tended and the patients fed. The Union Army, too,
increasingly used railroads for evacuating men north. After the Battle of
Chattanooga, a real hospital train was regularly used to move the sick and
wounded from Chattanooga to Louisville. Some of the cars were equipped with
two tiers of bunks, suspended on hard-rubber tugs. At the ends of such cars
would be a room for supplies and food preparation. The locomotive assigned to
this train was painted scarlet, and at night a string of three red lanterns burned on
the front. Confederate cavalrymen never bothered this train.
The truth was that the military commanders, both Confederate and Union,
hated to see fighting soldiers separated from the army; the fear was they would
never return. The South was well aware it was fighting a much larger people. The
Union generals were well aware that as the invaders, on the offensive, they
needed a majority of the men on the battlefield. They also realized that the
deeper they penetrated the South, the greater the number of men needed to
garrison important points and to guard ever-longer supply lines. And so there
was never an actual separately enlisted and separately trained hospital corps in
either army.
When Edwin M. Stanton took over as Lincoln's Secretary of War early in
1862, he realized that Dr. Finley, now a brevet brigadier general, would have to
be replaced as surgeon general. Taking the advice of the Sanitary Commission,
he appointed William A. Hammond, then a junior assistant surgeon. A
Marylander, Hammond had served eleven years as an assistant surgeon before
he resigned and became a professor in the University of Maryland Medical
School. He was to accomplish many good things and to make many good
suggestions during the fourteen months he served as surgeon general. It was
obvious to him and to his supporters in the Sanitary Commission that the army
needed a group of medical inspectors, chosen for merit and possessing enough
rank to give orders to hospital commanders. It was obvious that the makeshift
general hospitals--hotels, warehouses, schools, churches--should be rapidly
replaced by pavilion hospitals designed for their function. It was obvious that
corps and division hospitals should become official and that something like the
Letterman Ambulance Plan should be extended throughout the army. It was
obvious that the quartermaster should not be able to remove ambulances nor line
officers be able to remove experienced attendants from the medical field details.
Eager to educate his department in the best ideas of the time, General
Hammond wrote a full length textbook on military hygiene. He brought about the
writing of Joseph J. Woodward's admirable The Hospital Steward's Manual. He
gave every encouragement to the many medical societies that had sprung up in
the army, ordering that interesting scientific specimens should be forwarded to
Washington for inclusion in an Army Medical Museum. He began the collection of
what has become the world's largest medical library.
Finley and Hammond secured Congressional authority to augment the
regular Army Medical Department by several hundred men, first called brigade
surgeons, later surgeons of volunteers, a group that contained unusually
prestigious doctors. They were used chiefly as staff assistants. As for the
increase in regimental surgeons and assistant surgeons, the Medical Department
was to have little say. Higher authority had found it desirable to increase the
army by a persistent raising of new regiments rather than by filling up the
depleted ranks of the old ones. This maintained the state governors in their
unfortunate practices of selecting and commissioning the surgeons and assistant
surgeons. The surgeon general could only attempt to reject unfit professionals by
extensive use of reexaminations and "plucking" boards.
General Hammond felt frustrated. Secretary Stanton leaned heavily on
General Henry Halleck for military advice, and this usually supported the ideas of
the old regular army medics who were jealous of Hammond, the interloper who
had been promoted over their heads from captain to brigadier general. In
addition, Hammond won the enmity of a large proportion of the American medical
profession through his banning of the two mercurials, calomel and tartar emetic,
from the army drug table. He may have been correct in his idea that these drugs
were being overused, but this seemingly arrogant action lost him the sympathy of
many medical colleagues.
As a result, Hammond was effectively replaced by Joseph K. Barnes, of the
surgeon general's office, in September 1863. It was almost a year before a
court-martial of docile surgeons, although finding him "not guilty" on other counts,
did vote Hammond guilty of, "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman."
He had to leave the army.
Even where successful, Hammond was only partially so. After the medical
inspector bill passed, Secretary Stanton decreed that half the inspectors were to
be "political" appointees. When the ambulance corps bill of 1864 became law,
what was essentially the Letterman Ambulance Plan was extended to all the
armies. The Army Medical Department was to have the privilege of choosing the
enlisted men to be put on ambulance and stretcher-bearer detail, and they could
not be withdrawn, but there was still no ambulance corps per se.
Confederate Medical Department organization was very much what Surgeon
General Moore thought it should be. Congress gave him a considerable body of
medical inspectors and hospital inspectors, the former operating within the field
armies and the latter in the general hospitals of each state, with the medical
director of each state responsible for its hospitals. There was some debate with
the quartermaster general about ambulances, but this was generally over the
lack of them. Farm wagons most often constituted the ambulances of the
Confederacy. Although Moore had much the same "arrogant" personality traits as
did Hammond, he usually obtained prompt obedience to orders rather than
conflict.
Both armies experimented with "special" hospitals, with admission limited to
patients with the same disorders. The Confederates established several venereal
hospitals and some ophthalmic hospitals. The Unionists began a venereal
hospital at Nashville and the famed neurological hospital, Turner's Lane, at
Philadelphia, where W. W. Keen is believed by some to have founded neurology
in America.
In contrast, a "general" hospital did not limit its admissions. The sick and the
wounded were evacuated to general hospitals so that empty beds could be made
available in field installations when a new rush of wounded was expected.
Buildings adapted for use as general hospitals were usually considered
unsatisfactory because of the inadequate plumbing, the bad ventilation, and the
"crowd poisoning" and "mephfluvia" which that generation thought bred and
spread disease. Moore and Hammond believed a large building program of
pavilion hospitals in 1862 was the answer. To the best of their abilities both sides
carried this out, and followed it by still bigger construction programs in 1863 and
1864. The Union pavilions were longer than their Confederate counterparts.
Some were as long as 120 feet, with a width of 14 or 15 feet, with a longitudinal
ventilator along the 12- to 14-foot roof. This, along with floor ventilation, made the
patients too cold and was later closed by wooden slats.
At the inner end, each pavilion, North and South, had toilets, sometimes
flush and sometimes, seats over a sloping zinc trough in which water was
supposed to run continuously. Reports show that often the water supply was
insufficient and that toilets were flushed only after many usings.
Frequently the pavilions were built as though they were spokes spreading
from a hub. The buildings at the hub were operating rooms, kitchens, offices,
pharmacies and supplies, "dead house," ice house, and other services. The
grounds were usually joined by a wooden roadway on which food could be
hauled or the wash taken up and delivered by a steam-powered vehicle.
The staff, aside from the medical officers and hospital stewards, was mostly
made up of the convalescents. They were frequently weak and weary, often
snappish and irritable. They did not like the dirty work they performed. They
wanted to go home. The surgeon-in-charge, as the hospital commander was
titled, was often in a dilemma. If he returned the patient to his regiment too soon,
the man might relapse or die on the road to his unit. If he tried to hold on to the
man too long, he might be forcibly returned to his regiment; and if he prevailed
upon an inspector to give a medical discharge, he would be losing an attendant
who had learned something about his work, and would be forced to rely on a new
man who knew nothing. Union and Confederate surgeons-in-charge faced the
same problem, although occasionally in Southern hospitals there were hired
blacks of both sexes. These people were considered only marginally successful.
Some attempts in the North to use cheap male labor as hospital attendants
proved unsatisfactory, the men being undisciplined, a "saucy lot" who even stole
from the patients.
The brilliant results of Florence Nightingale in cleaning up the Crimean
hospitals had been widely noted, with the result that early on it was decided that
a corps of female nurses should be added to the army, with Dorothea Dix their
superintendent. Miss Dix was widely known as a reformer of jails and as the
"founder" of several state mental hospitals. Devoted and hard working, she was
disorganized, unyielding in controversy, and deeply in the grip of Victorian ideals
of propriety. Allowed to choose the nurses and to set the rules, she announced
that her appointees must be at least thirty and plain in appearance, and must
always dress in plain, drab dresses and never wear bright-colored ribbons. They
could not associate with either surgeons or patients socially, and they must
always insist upon their rights as the senior attendants in the wards.
It was not long before outraged surgeons virtually went to war with Miss Dix's
nurses, frustrating them, insulting them, trying to drive them from the hospitals.
These were strong-minded middle-class American women, accustomed to ruling
within the home and to receiving the respectful attention of their husbands and
male acquaintances. For the most part they had no nursing training. The
surgeons complained that they often substituted their own nostrums for the drugs
prescribed and that they sometimes were loud and interfering when attempting to
prevent amputations.
As time passed, younger and less self-righteous nurses began to appear in
the army, furnished by the Western Sanitary Commission or some other relief
agency. Some surgeons learned to suppress their male-chauvinist behavior. In
September 1863, the War Department approved a new nurse policy that,
although ostensibly a victory for Miss Dix, really defeated her. Under this edict,
hospital commanders could send away Dix appointed nurses but were forced to
accept Dix appointed replacements unless the surgeon general authorized the
appointment of someone the surgeon-in-charge preferred. The surgeon general
was always willing.
In fact, the female nurses were much liked by the patients and were not so
much nurses as mother-substitutes. They wrote letters for their "boys," read to
them, decorated the wards with handsome garlands, and sometimes sang. Both
armies used small contingents of Catholic nuns in certain general hospitals. They
came from the Sisters of Charity, the Sisters of St. Joseph, the Sisters of Mercy,
and the Sisters of the Holy Cross. Having been teachers, some lacked previous
hospital experience, but surgeons liked them because they had been bred to
discipline. The patients liked them too, but called them all Sisters of Charity.
Hospital food improved perceptively when women matrons took over the
supervision of kitchens. These women came from various sources, many
supplied by the United States Christian Commission, a large organization that
donated delicacies to hospitals but considered the saving of souls, by passing
out religious tracts, its principal mission.
Because of the great fame of Clara Barton, and some women like her, an
impression prevailed that women functioned in hospitals in the field. This was
seldom the case. Miss Barton might best be described as a one-woman relief
agency. However, the strong-minded but winning "Mother" Mary Ann Bickerdyke
became so popular that in 1864 General W. T. Sherman officially appointed her
to his own corps hospital.
Women could be found serving in various ways in Confederate hospitals,
too, but the bulk of them were hired black cooks and washerwomen. In the
conservative South there was a widespread feeling that a military hospital was no
place for a lady, Only in Richmond were there significant numbers of women
working in the city's many hospitals.
Richmond was indeed the hospital center of the Confederacy, with twenty
hospitals in 1864 after many of the makeshift type had been closed and replaced
by pavilion structures. The queen of them was Chimborazo, which had beds for
8,000 men and was often called the largest hospital on the continent. It was
organized into four divisions, each with thirty pavilions. There were also five soup
houses, five ice houses, "Russian" baths, a 10,000-loaf per day bakery, and a
400-keg brewery. On an adjacent farm the hospital grew food and grazed three
hundred cows and several hundred goats. Almost as amazing was Jackson
Hospital, which could care for 6,000 patients in similar ways. Elsewhere than
Richmond, general hospitals were neither so large nor so grand, but there were
many of which the Confederates were proud. By late 1864 there was a total of
154 hospitals, most located close to the southern Atlantic coast. They began to
close down, often because of enemy action, early in 1865.
Washington and its environs was the natural hospital center of the Union
Army because of its proximity to major battlefields. This proved unfortunate
because the city had always been considered a sickly place, chiefly because of
the large open canal that stretched across town and into which much sewage
was dumped. Also, the metropolitan community had many standing pools in
which anopheles mosquitoes bred. The intestinal disease and malarial rate of the
hospitals were a natural result.
At the end of 1861 Washington had only 2,000 general hospital beds. The
great slaughters of the Peninsular campaign, with the Second Battle of Bull Run
immediately after, followed shortly by Antietam, flooded the hospitals of the
Washington area and Baltimore and Philadelphia as well. Adaptation went so far
as converting the halls of the Pension Office, with cots among the exhibitions, the
Georgetown jail, and the House and Senate in the Capitol. From August 31 to the
end of 1862, 56,050 cases were treated in Washington. Many of these
adaptations were closed in 1863, replaced by modern pavilion hospitals. At the
end of 1864 the city contained sixteen hospitals, many of them large and fine.
There were seven at nearby Alexandria and one each at Georgetown and Point
Lookout, Maryland. Outstanding was Harewood, said to resemble an English
nobleman's estate, with professionally landscaped grounds, flower gardens, and
a large vegetable garden. Its building consisted of fifteen large pavilions with
appropriate service buildings and some tents.
The Western showpiece was Jefferson Hospital at Jeffersonville, Indiana,
just across the river from Louisville. Built in the winter of 1863-64 with 2,000
beds, later increased to 2,600, at war's end it had plans for 5,000 beds. Its most
interesting architectural feature was a circular corridor 2,000 feet long from which
projected twenty-four pavilions, each 175 feet long.
By the last year of the war there were 204 Union general hospitals with beds
for 136,894 patients. This proved to be the maximum. In February 1865 the
United States began closing down its hospitals.
The many men and women, North and South, who served in the hospital and
sanitary services during the war were justly proud of their achievements. The
morbidity and mortality rates of both armies showed marked improvement over
those of other nineteenth-century wars, particularly America's last conflict, the
war with Mexico. In that war go percent of the deaths were from nonbattle
causes. In contrast, in the Civil War some 600,000 soldiers died, but in the Union
Army 30.5 percent of them died in or from battle, and in the Confederate Army
the percentage ran to 36-4. Clearly, the physicians and sanitarians had held
down the disease mortalities to levels that their generation considered more than
reasonable. Better, they made some few halting strides in treatment and
medication, and considerable leaps in the organization of dealing with masses of
wounded and ailing soldiers. It was a ghastly business for doctors and patients
alike; yet without the medicos in blue and gray, much of the young manhood of
America at mid century might not have survived for the work of rebuilding.
Source: The National Historical Society's The Image of War: 1861-1865 Volume
IV "Fighting For Time" article by George W. Adams
Civil War food
Feeding the troops was the responsibility of the Commissary Department, and
both the Union and Confederacy had one. The job of this organization was to
purchase food for the armies, store it until it could be used, and then supply the
soldiers. It was difficult to supply so many men in so many places and the North
had a greater advantage in their commissary system was already established at
the outbreak of the war, while the Confederacy struggled for many years to
obtain food and then get it to their armies. Choices of what to give the troops was
limited as they did not have the conveniences to preserve food like we have
today. Meats were salted or smoked while other items such as fruits and
vegetables were dried or canned. They did not understand proper nutrition so
often there was a lack of certain foods necessary for good health. Each side did
what they could to provide the basics for the soldiers to survive. Because it was
so difficult to store for any length of time, the food soldiers received during the
Civil War was not very fancy and they did not get a great variety of items.
This photograph shows what a
temporary Union commissary depot
looked like during the war. Large
wooden barrels containing salted meat,
coffee beans, and sugar are stacked
next to crates of hardtack. It took a lot of
food to feed the army even for one day!
(photo courtesy of the Library of
Congress)
The daily allowance of food issued to soldiers was called rations. Everything was
given out uncooked so the soldiers were left up to their own ingenuity to prepare
their meals. Small groups would often gather together to cook and share their
rations and they called the group a "mess", referring to each other as
"messmates". Others prided themselves in their individual taste and prepared
their meals alone. If a march was imminent, the men would cook everything at
once and store it in their haversack, a canvas bag made with a sling to hang over
the shoulder. Haversacks had a inner cloth bag that could be removed and
washed, though it did not prevent the bag from becoming a greasy, foul-smelling
container after several weeks of use. The soldier's diet was very simple- meat,
coffee, sugar, and a dried biscuit called hardtack. Of all the items soldiers
received, it was this hard bread that they remembered and joked about the most.
"'Tis the song that is uttered in camp by night and day,
'Tis the wail that is mingled with each snore;
'Tis the sighing of the soul for spring chickens far away,
'Oh hard crackers, come again no more!'
'Tis the song of the soldier, weary, hungry and faint,
Hard crackers, hard crackers, come again no more;
Many days have I chewed you and uttered no complaint,
Hard crackers, hard crackers, come again no more!"
-from a soldiers' parable called "Hard Times"
Hardtack was a biscuit made of flour with other
simple ingredients, and issued to Union soldiers
throughout the war. Hardtack crackers made up a
large portion of a soldier's daily ration. It was square
or sometimes rectangular in shape with small holes
baked into it, similar to a large soda cracker. Large
factories in the north baked hundreds of hardtack
crackers every day, packed them in wooden crates and shipped them out by
wagon or rail. If the hardtack was received soon after leaving the factory, they
were quite tasty and satisfying. Usually, the hardtack did not get to the soldiers
until months after it had been made. By that time, they were very hard, so hard
that soldiers called them "tooth dullers" and "sheet iron crackers". Sometimes
they were infested with small bugs the soldiers called weevils, so they referred to
the hardtack as "worm castles" because of the many holes bored through the
crackers by these pests. The wooden crates were stacked outside of tents and
warehouses until it was time to issue them. Soldiers were usually allowed six to
eight crackers for a three-day ration. There were a number of ways to eat themplain or prepared with other ration items. Soldiers would crumble them into coffee
or soften them in water and fry the hardtack with some bacon grease. One
favorite soldier dish was salted pork fried with hardtack crumbled into the
mixture. Soldiers called this "skillygallee", and it was a common and easily
prepared meal
Civil war weapons
The Colt Army Model 1860 was a streamlined version of the earlier 1848
dragoon (used in the Mexican War). It became the most popular sidearm in the
Union army (the Colt Navy Model 1861 .36 calibre was preferred in the South)
and was renowned for its interchangeability of parts. The Colt Model 1860 was a
.44 calibre six shot weapon which weighed 2 lbs 11 ounces. At $13.75, the Colt
Army Revolver was much more expensive than those made by Remington or
Starr. Government orders ceased in November 1863.
The Starr Revolver was a .44 calibre, six-shot,
double action weapon weighing in at almost 3
lbs. It fired a combustible cartridge, but could
also be loaded with loose powder and ball.
Initially the double action Starr was used by
Union soldiers in the western theater of the Civil War, but in 1863 the US
Ordinance Dept urged the Starr Arms Co. to replace the double action revolver
with a cheaper, single action model. Starr complied and sold the Union 25,000
weapons at $12 each.
This very unique military revolver was
especially produced for Civil War use. It was
designed from the pre-war Savage "figure
eight" revolver. Instead of being thumb
cocked, the middle finger of the hand was used to draw back the lever and then
push it forward which cocked the hammer and rotated the cylinder.
Approximately 12,000 of the 20,000 made were sold to the U.S. government
early in the war and although in .36 Caliber (.44 was the desired standard of the
U.S. army) it was issued to Cavalry Troopers in the Western Theater, mostly but
not exclusively to Missouri troopers. The remaining 8,000 saw service as privatepurchase weapons by officers. As this was an early war production weapon,
there is some evidence that quite a few were smuggled South and used in the
Central Confederacy. As always, Confederate officers and Cavalry, chronically
short of handguns, made use of all the captured guns they could obtain,
regardless of make or appearance. However, it was mechanically reliable, not
prone to excessive fouling, and was durable.
(Photo & caption courtesy of Al Sumrall)
The Le Mat Revolver was the most famous
foreign pistol in service during the Civil War.
It was invented by a French-born New
Orleans doctor in 1856. The 'cap and ball'
weapon is unique in that it has two barrels. A
cylinder which held nine .40 calibre rounds fired through the upper barrel and
revolved around the lower .63 calibre barrel which held a charge of buck-shot. By
merely flicking his thumb, the shooter could re-align the hammer to fall on the
lower barrel which acted as a small shotgun -- deadly at close range. Dr (or
sometimes colonel) Jean Alexander Francois Le Mat produced about 300 of his
weapon in New Orleans prior to the outbreak of the war. The weapons were
noted as reliable and became well liked, so when the war began, Le Mat moved
to France to set up mass production for the Confederacy. The French made
(manufactured by G. Girard & Co) revolvers, however, were found to be of poor
quality, whole lots the pistol were condemned as unserviceable by Southern
buyers in Europe. Le Mat moved his production and contracted through Belgian
and English companies. As many as 3,000 of the pistol eventually found their
way to the South. The handgun came with either a 18 or 20-guage shot barrel
and one version could be fitted with a full length barrel. The Le Mat was carried
by such famous Southern Generals as P.G.T. Beauregard and J.E.B. Stuart.
The Model
1861
Springfield
Musket was the most widely used shoulder arm of the Civil war and saw service
in every major battle. It was made in the North at a cost of $15 to $20 to the
federal government at the Springfield Armory in Mass. as well as 32 other private
manufacturers and was a very modern weapon for its time. Its rifled bore,
interchangeable parts and percussion cap ignition system incorporated the major
innovations of the prewar years into an accurate, dependable rifle. It weighed in
at 9.25 lbs, was 58.5 inches overall, came with a triangular 21 inch socket
bayonet and fired a .58 calibre conical minie ball at a muzzle velocity of 950
ft/sec. A later "improved" 1863 model was also produced, but the 1861 remained
the basic combat weapon of the war.
The rifled
muskets
generally
referred to as Enfields got their name from the British government's Royal Small
Arms Factory in Enfield, England. An Enfield had a bore diameter of .577 inches
and weighed 9 lbs 3 ounces with bayonet. It fired a bullet similar to the minie ball
and was very accurate at 800 yards and fairly accurate at 1,100 yards. Although
called Enfields, they were not made in Enfield since the British government, as
owner of the factory, was sensitive about maintaining neutrality and could never
sanction such sales to either North or South. Instead, the rifled muskets used in
the Civil War were made in England by private contractors in London and
Birmingham. A few other models, primarily two-banded rifled equipped with a
sword bayonet were also imported from England. Each side imported
approximately 400,000 of these weapons during the course of the war -- making
them second only to the Springfield in popularity.
The Whitworth rifle
shown here was of
British manufacture and
was used primarily by the Confederate army. It was a muzzle-loading weapon
with a 33 inch barrel (49 inches overall) and a .451 inch bore. What made this
rifle so popular in the South was it's remarkable accuracy. It's long range
precision was the best of all weapons used in the war. When the telescopic sight
was used, the rifle had an effective range of about 1,800 yards. This rifle, as with
the cannon which the English company also made, had a hexagonal bore which
required a hexagonal bullet. Both sides called this bullet a "bolt". In fact, it was a
six-sided bolt from a Rebel sharpshooter that killed Union General "Uncle John"
Sedgwick during the fighting at Spotsylvania Court House just after he had
remarked to a frightened soldier that Confederate sharpshooters could not hit an
elephant.
The Austrian Model 1854
rifle-musket was imported in
large numbers during the
Civil War. The South
received approximately 100,000 in .54 caliber, mostly with fixed sights, from
early 1862 through 1863. They were apparently purchased from existing Austrian
stocks as the Austrian government was converting from black powder to gun
cotton and found these rifle muskets surplus to their needs. The type was
primarily used by the Army of Tennessee and by other units in the Central and
Trans-Mississippi theaters. The Lorenz was often referred to as "Enfields" as
some had blued metal parts however most were natural metal without finish. This
weapon was very serviceable and saw considerable use. It was the second only
to the P1853 Enfield (400,000) as the most used Confederate type but it never
has seen the recognition of the Enfield. The Confederates would issue
ammunition for this weapon that could also fire in the Confederate "Mississippi"
rifles.
The North imported 225,000 of these rifle-muskets, mainly to pre-empt additional
purchases as the Confederates had approached the Austrians first, most with
long-range adjustable sights. However, as they proved well made and reliable
they were issued in 1863-64 to over one hundred federal regiments. The North
used the Lorenz in .54 caliber but some were re-bored to .58 so that they could
utilize standard .58 cal. ammunition. Many of the Lorenz's shipped to the United
States for the federals were newly manufactured in 1861, 1862, and 1863 and
like all Lorenz's were dated with a three digit number on the side plate, 861, 862,
863. A quadrangular socket bayonet was used with both the Federal and
Confederate Lorenz.
The Lorenz was somewhat shorter and lighter than the Springfield or Enfield but
was longer than the two-band Enfield and the Mississippi-style rifles. It is one of
the most undeservedly ignored rifles of the period. The rifle-musket
photographed for this page is dated 1858, "858".
(Photo & caption courtesy of Al Sumrall)
Benchrest Rifles and Telescopic Sights
With the
development of
more modern
weapons came
the advent of the sharpshooter or sniper. Now armed with a rifle which could fire
a round accurately up to 1,800 yards long range riflemen became a real threat.
Benchrest rifles, the sniper rifle of the Civil War, were so named because they
were so heavy that they were easiest to fire with the barrel resting on a bench or
other support. Prior to the war, these specialty muzzle-loaded rifles had been
owned primarily by target shooters and sport hunters. With an average length of
about 50 inches, a benchrest rifle weighed up to 40 pounds, making it an
impractical choice for standard infantry duty. The very tight fit of the bullet and
the bore needed for range and accuracy made the weapon very slow to load and
put the user at a disadvantage on the battlefield.
In 1848 Morgan
James of Utica,
N.Y. invented
the long-tube telescopic sight that would be used by Civil War marksmen just 13
years later. Priced at about $20, these telescopes were no more than four power.
But in the hands of a skilled soldier with a sharp wit and keen eye, these devices
offered sufficient magnification for aiming a rifle with deadly, long-distance
accuracy.
The long-tube sight mounted on a heavy benchrest rifle gave the marksman who
was selected to carry it prestige among his fellow soldiers. The sharpshooter
thus armed was considered an independent character, used only for special
service, with the privilege of going to any part of the line where in his own
judgement he could do the most good. The weapon indicated that the man
carrying it was among the most trusted soldiers and best shots.
Some of the prewar American-made benchrest rifles found their way into the
Confederate army, however the preferred weapon of the Southern sharpshooter
was the Whitworth rifle imported from England. Shortly after the Civil War, the
army replaced these ponderous weapons and their long telescopic sights with
more modern, faster-firing rifles, and the benchrest was no longer used by the
military.
Spencer rifles
contributed substantially
to the ultimate success
of the Union. The weapon used an all metallic cartridge with a built in primer, by
itself a great advancement.
Additionally, the magazine on the
Spencers allowed soldiers rapid fire by
means of moving a lever and cocking the trigger. This allowed Northern troops to
fire about 14 rounds per minute to the 3 rounds per minute allowed by a muzzleloader. The South was unable to use any captured Spencers due to the lack of
available ammunition. About 200,000 Spencer rifles and carbines were sold to
the Federals during the course of the war but a large quantity of those never saw
service (Burnsides and Model 1865 Spencers, roughly 60,000 of which were
produced in 1865 and never saw action.) There were two types of Spencer
Rifles, Model 1860 Navy (about 1000 produced in 1862 and the Model 1860
Army (1862-1864).
(Spencer Carbine pictured at left; rifle pictured above)
The Colt repeating rifle (Colt-Root Model 1855 percussion
repeating rifle) was a large version of the Colt revolver, but it
never operated as well nor became as popular. It was initially
produced in 1855 and came in calibres ranging from .40 to
.64. It fired a conical bullet that came with a paper cartridge
attached which had to be firmly seated into its cylinder by
means of a lever-action ramrod. Cylinders came in five and
six shot models and all rounds could be fired as quickly as
the soldier could cock the hammer and pull the trigger.
During the Civil War the War Dept purchased only 4,712
weapons -- a relatively small number. Though the rifle could
be fired rapidly, it was much slower to load than other breech-loading weapons
and it had the unfortunate tendency to fire all of its cylinders at one time, often
removing fingers from the rifleman's forward hand. Although a few Southern
units were equipped with this weapon at the beginning of the war, it is best
remembered for its use by Union troops. The first weapon issued to Berdan's
Sharpshooters were Colt Repeaters, but were soon replaced with Sharps rifles.
The Starr carbine rifle,
equipped with a 21 inch,
.54 calibre barrel, was
the 4th most popular
rifle used by the Union soldiers. It incorporated many features from the Sharps,
Smith and Burnside rifles, but its most remarkable feature was its zero misfire
rate and its high degree of accuracy.
Carbines, such as this
Sharps New Model
1859, were developed
primarily for mounted
troops since with their shorter barrel they were much easier to handle on
horseback than their longer brethren. Breech loaders were preferred because
they could be loaded on a moving horse -- something virtually impossible with a
muzzle-loader. Additionally, breech-loading carbines which fired moisture-proof
metallic cartridges were more reliable than rifles that fired paper cartridges. At
the beginning of the war, Southern cavalry was as well armed as its Northern
counterpart, if not better. Carbines were in short supply in both armies. The
rebels favorite weapon was a sawed-off shotgun loaded with buckshot, a
formidable weapon throughout the war. As the war progressed, the Union
outstripped the South in production and by 1864/65, well-led divisions of
experienced Yankee horse soldiers, armed with rapid-firing Spencer carbines
were using their superior firepower to great advantage in the closing campaigns.
Repeating rifles had been invented prior to the beginning of
hostilities, but the US Army's Ordinance Dept dismissed the
new inventions because it was thought that troops would
waste ammunition and the operating mechanisms might be a
maintenance problem. Instead, the Ordinance Dept put its
faith in the single-shot muzzle-loading rifled musket -- with
which a good soldier could fire 3 rounds a minute. It was not
until late 1863 that many federal soldiers received army
issued repeating rifles...and then only the cavalry, not the infantry got the new
weapons. Repeaters, such as this Henry rifle, were breech-loading and fired a
metallic cartridges. The bullets were loaded into tubular magazines that fed them
into the breech, operated by a lever mechanism. A soldier with a repeater could
fire 14 rounds to the 3 rounds a minute a soldier with a muzzle-loader was
capable of.
Although the American Civil War saw
the development of modern weapons
such as breech-loaders, repeating
rifles and machine guns primitive
edged weapons were still wielded with deadly effect on the battlefield. The most
widely used of these weapons was the sword, which was present in many
different styles. Only in the cavalry, and generally at the beginning of the war,
were swords used regularly to their full potential. Sabres became marks of rank
and in the later years were abandoned in favor of more efficient weapons. Sabre
charges had little chance of success in the last years of the war against veteran
soldiers armed with modern weapons fighting from concealed positions. Col
Mosby once remarked that the only real use for a sword was to hold a piece of
meat over a fire for frying.
The first machine-gun type
weapon ever used in combat
was built for the Confederate
War Dept in Sept 1861. The
Williams breech-loading rapidfire gun was first used at the
Battle of Seven Pines and
worked so well that the War
Dept ordered 42 more of them. The gun was actually a crank-operated, very light
artillery piece that fired a one-pound (1.57 calibre) projectile with a range of
2,000 yards. It was operated by a crew of three and could fire at a rate of 65
rounds per minute. One operator aimed and fired the weapon by turning the
crank, the second placed a paper cartridge into the breech, and the third placed
the percussion cap. The major problem with this gun was overheating, which
made the breech jam due to heat expansion.
As many as 50 of the .52 calibre breech-loading
Billinghurst-Requa batteries, as they were called,
were produced for the Union. Some were used in
battles, though with limited effect. This gun used a
light carriage to mount 25 rifled barrels side by side.
When loaded and primed, the gun was set off by use
of a lanyard -- firing the barrels in sequence with a
rippling sound. Several different types of rapid-firing
weapons were designed and produced during the war, although few saw much
actual service.
While this is
more of a
fortification than
a weapon,
these devices
took their toll of
life on the battlefield. The Chevaux-de-frise pictured here consisted of 10 to 12
foot logs to which were attached sharpened wooden stakes. These were
commonly used in defense of a fortified position, 50 or 100 feet to the front.
Designed to be used more as a barrier than an actual defense, much as the
barbed wire of the world wars and our concertina of today, their purpose was to
hold off or slow down an attacking enemy so the defending infantry could deal
with him more effectively. Occasionally these devices claimed the lives of the
unlucky or unwary.
Civil war hygiene
Civil War medicine was in a time before the doctors even knew about
bacteriology and were ignorant of what caused disease. Doctors during the Civil
War for the most part had two years of medical school, though some pursued
higher amounts. We were woefully behind Europe. Harvard Medical School didn't
even own a single stethoscope or microscope until after the war. Most Civil War
surgeons had never treated a gun shot wound, many had never performed
surgery. Medical boards let in many "quacks" who were not qualified. Yet, for the
most part the Civil War doctor, as understaffed, sometimes underqualified, and
very usually under supplied as he was, did the best he could, exploring through
the so-called "medical middle ages." Some 10,000 surgeons served in the Union
and about 4,000 served the Southern Confederacy. Each year, medicine
advanced a little more. However, it was the tragedy of the era that medical
knowledge of the 1860s had not yet encompassed the use of sterile dressings,
antiseptics and antiseptic surgery, and the recognition of sanitation and hygiene
was still inadequate and many died as a result from diseases such as typhoid or
dysentery.
The deadliest thing that faced the Civil War soldier was disease. For every
soldier who died in battle, two died of disease. In particular, intestinal complaints
such as dysentery and diarrhea claimed many lives. Diarrhea and dysentery
alone claimed more men than did battle wounds. The Civil War soldier also faced
outbreaks of measles, small pox, malaria, pneumonia, or camp itch. Malaria was
brought on by usually camping in damp areas (that were conductive to breeding
mosquitos) while camp itch was caused by insects or a skin disease. In brief the
large amount of disease was caused by a) inadequate physicals before entering
the Army; b) plain old ignorance; c) the fact many troops came from rural areas;
d) neglect of camp hygiene; e) insects and vermin; f) exposure; g) lack of clothing
and shoes; h) poor food and water. Many unqualified recruits entered the Army
and diseases cruelly weeded out those who should have been excluded by
physcial exams. There was no knowledge of the causes of disease, no Koch's
postulates. Rural area troops were crowded together for the first time with large
numbers of other individuals and got diseases they had no immunity to. Neglect
of camp hygeine was a common problem as well. Ignorance of camp sanitation
and scanty knowledge about how disease was carried led to a sort of "trial and
error" system.You can read Surgeon Charles Tripler's report on sanitation that is
included in this web site for a Civil War period view. An inspector who visited the
camps of one Federal Army found that they were, "littered with refuse, food, and
other rubbish, sometimes in an offensive state of decomposition; slops deposited
in pits within the camp limits or thrown out of broadcast; heaps of manure and
offal close to the camp." There was formed a Sanitary Commision in the North
even because things were so bad in Army camps. Mary Livermore, a nurse,
wrote that... "The object of the Sanitary Commission was to do what the
Government could not. The Government undertook, of course, to provide all that
was necessary for the soldier, . . . but, from the very nature of things, this was not
possible. . . . The methods of the commission were so elastic, and so arranged to
meet every emergency, that it was able to make provision for any need, seeking
always to supplement, and never to supplant, the Government." Both Armies
faced problems with mosquitos and lice. Exposure turned many a cold into a
case of pneumonia, and complicated other ailments. Pneumonia, was the third
leading killer disease of the war, after typhoid and dysentery. Lack of shoes and
proper clothing further complicated the problem, especially in the Confederacy as
the War progressed. The diet of the Civil War soldier was somewhere between
barely paltable to absoultely awful. It was a wonder they did not all die of acute
indigestion. It was estimated that 995 of 1000 Union troops eventually contracted
chronic diarrhea or dysentery; his Confederate brother suffered similarly. Disease
particularly ran rampant in the prisons of course as many of these conditions that
led to disease were very much present.
To halt disease, doctors used many cures. For bowel complaints, open bowels
were treated with a plug of opium. Closed bowels were treated with the infamous
"blue mass"... a mixture of mercury and chalk. For scurvy, doctors prescribed
green vegetables. Respiratory problems, such as pneumonia and bronchitis were
treated with dosing of opium or sometimes quinine and muster plasters.
Sometimes bleeding was also used. Malaria could be treated with quinine, or
sometimes even turpentine if quinine was not available. Camp itch could be
treated by ridding the body of the pests or with poke-root solution. Whiskey and
other forms of alcohol also were used to treat wounds and disease ... though
questionable medical valuably, whiskey did relieve some pain. As this site
focuses on medicine of the battlefield more than medicine in general, this is
pretty much all the information you will find on disease here. Disease, of course,
was a huge killer... perhaps at a later date I will gather some more information on
it, but for now this is all I have. The medicines brought in to try and halt diseases
were manufactured in the north for the most part; the southerners had to deal
with running the Union blockade. On occasion, vital medicines were smuggled
into the South, sewn into the petticoats of ladies sympathetic to the Southern
cause. The South also had some manufacturing capabilites and worked with
herbal remedies. However, many of the Southern medical supplies came from
captured Union stores. Dr. Hunter McGuire, the medical director of Jackson's
corps, commented after the War on the safeness of anethesia, saying that in part
the Confederacy's good record was due in part from the supplies requisitoned
from the North.
Battlefield surgery (see separate web page describing an amputation) was also
at best archaic. Doctors often took over houses, churches, schools, even barns
for hospitals.
The field hospital was located near the front lines -- sometimes only a mile
behind the lines -- and was marked with (in the Federal Army from 1862 on) with
a yellow flag with a green "H". Though anesthesia was usually used, the Civil
War period operation was still not pretty. Anesthesia's first recorded use was in
1846, making it still in its infancy at the time of the Civil War. Anesthesia was
almost always, as a rule, used in surgery, in fact, there were 800,000 cases of its
use. Chloroform was used about 75% of the time. Of 8,900 cases of use of
anesthesia, only 43 deaths were attributed to the anethestic, a remarkable
mortality rate of 0.4%. Anesthesia was usually administered by the open-drop
technique.
The anethestic was applied to a cloth held over the patient's mouth and nose and
was withdrawn after the patient was unconscious. A good capable surgeon could
amputate a limb in 10 minutes. Surgeons worked all night, with piles of limbs
reaching four or five feet. Lack of water and time meant they did not wash off
hands or instruments
Bloody fingers often were used as probes. Bloody knives were used as scalpels.
Doctors operated in pus stained coats. Everything about Civil War surgery was
septic. The antiseptic era, and Lister's pioneering works in this field were in 1865,
right as the war was ending. Blood poisoning, sepsis or Pyemia (Pyemia
meaning literally pus in the blood) were common and often very deadly. Surgical
fevers also could develop, as could gangrene. One witness described surgery as
such: "Tables about breast high had been erected upon which the screaming
victims were having legs and arms cut off. The surgeons and their assistants,
stripped to the waist and bespattered with blood, stood around, some holding the
poor fellows while others, armed with long, bloody knives and saws, cut and
sawed away with frightful rapidity, throwing the mangled limbs on a pile nearby
as soon as removed." If a soldier survived the table, he faced the awful surgical
fevers. However, about 75% of amputees did survive.
The numbers killed and wounded in the Civil War were far more than any
previous American war. As the lists of the maimed grew, both North and South
built "general" military hospitals. These hospitals were usually located in big
cities. They were usually single storied, of wood construction, and wellventialated and heated. The largest of these hospitals was Chimbarazo in
Richmond, Virginia. By the end of the War, Chimbarazo had 150 wards and was
capable of housing a total of 4,500 patients. Some 76,000 soldiers were treated
at this hospital.
There were some advances, mainly in the field of military medicine. Jonathan
Letterman, who you will read about later in this site, revolutionized the
Ambulance Corps system. With the use of anethesia, more complicated surgerys
could be performed. Better and more complete records were kept during this
period than they had been before. The Union even set up a medical museum
where visitors can still see the shattered leg of flamboyant General Daniel
Sickles who lost his leg at the Trostle Farm at the battle of Gettysburg when a
cannon ball litterally left it hanging by shreds of flesh.
The Civil War "sawbones" was doing the best he could. Sadly when American
decided to kill American from 1861 to 1865, the medical field was not yet capable
of dealing with the disease and the massive injuries caused by the minie bullet.