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Chapter 12 1 Final Candidate Chapter 12: The Phillips Curve and Expectations J. Bradford DeLong http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/ [email protected] 12,657 words Questions What is Okun’s law? What is the Phillips curve? What determines the position of the Phillips curve? What determines the slope of the Phillips curve? How has the natural rate of unemployment changed in the U.S. over the past two generations? What significant supply shocks have affected the rate of inflation in the U.S. over the past two generations? What determines the expected rate of inflation? Chapter 12 2 Final Candidate How can anyone tell how expectations of inflation are formed--whether they are static, adaptive, or rational? What difference does it make whether expectations of inflation are static, adaptive, or rational? How useful is the aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework--the IS-LM model and the Phillips curve--for understanding macroeconomic events in the U.S. over the past two generations? How do we connect up the sticky-price model of this section, section IV, with the flexible-price model of section III? This chapter has two major goals: to complete the construction of the sticky-price model begun in chapter 9, and to link up the sticky-price model analysis begun in chapter 9 with the flexible-price model analysis of chapters 6 through 8. The key tool in both of these is the Phillips curve: the relationship between inflation and unemployment according to which a higher rate of unemployment is associated with a lower rate of inflation. The Phillips curve is a way of looking at aggregate supply that happens to be the most convenient way most of the time. Understand the Phillips curve—what it is, and how and why it shifts—and there will be little in the short- and medium-run behavior of the macroeconomy that you cannot analyze and understand. Chapter 12 3 Final Candidate 12.1 Output and Unemployment: Okun’s Law First, however, we need to spend a little more time on the relationship between aggregate demand, real GDP, and the unemployment rate.So far in this book one of our key variables, the unemployment rate, has been largely absent. In the long-run growth chapters unemployment was not a significant factor. In the flexible-price model there were no fluctuations in unemployment: wages and prices were flexible and labor supply balanced labor demand. But it is time to bring unemployment to center stage. What the unemployment rate is is very simple. With real GDP Y and potential output Y*, the unemployment rate u is: u u * 0.4 Y Y * Y * where u* is the natural rate of unemployment: the rate of unemployment when production is equal to potential output, and when the expectations of inflation rate are correct. This equation has a name: Okun’s law. Arthur Okun was the economist who first recognized how very strong this relationship was. Take the proportional gap between potential output and real GDP: (Y*-Y)/Y*. Multiply it by 0.4. Add to it the natural rate of unemployment. The result is the current rate of unemployment. Conversely, take the unemployment rate, subtract the natural rate of unemployment, and multiply by –2.5. The result the output gap, the proportional gap between real GDP and potential output: Chapter 12 4 Final Candidate Y Y* 2.5 u u * Y* It can be more useful to write Okun’s law in “change” form. If real GDP grows faster than potential output, unemployment falls. If real GDP grows slower than potential output, unemployment rises. Once again using the Greek letter capital delta as a symbol for “change”: Y u 0.4 (n g) Y * Y (n g) 2.5 u Y* where u is the year-to-year change in the unemployment rate, Y/Y* is annual growth in real GDP (as a proportion of potential output), and n+g is the rate of growth of potential output from chapter 4. The strength of Okun's law allows economists to switch back and forth between talking about business cycles as fluctuations in unemployment relative to the natural rate of unemployment, and talking about business cycles as fluctuations in total production relative to potential output. There is no significant distinction between the two: there is no point in distinguishing “unemployment business cycles” in any way from “real GDP business cycles.” Box 12.1—Example: Calculating Unemployment from Output Suppose that you know that the current level of potential output is $10 trillion and that the current natural rate of unemployment is 5%. If someone asked you what Chapter 12 5 Final Candidate the rate of unemployment would be if current real GDP were equal $10.5 trillion, you could quickly calculate the answer from Okun’s law: u u * 0.4 Y Y * Y * Start by calculating the output gap, the proportional difference (Y-Y*)/Y* between real GDP and the economy’s level of potential output. The output gap is 5%: Y Y * $10.5 $10 5% Y * $10 Substituting this value of the output gap and the current natural rate of unemployment into the Okun’s law equation for unemployment gives us the current unemployment rate of 2.5 percent: 4.5% 0.4 5% 2.5% We could equally well have started from the current unemployment rate of 2.5% and the natural unemployment rate of 4.5% to calculate the output gap, and then the current level of real GDP from the alternative form of Okun’s law: Y Y* 2.5 u u * Y* by substituting in and obtaining a value of 5% for the output gap: 2.5 2.5% 4.5% 5% Y Y * Y* Which for a level of potential output Y* of $10 trillion corresponds to a value of real GDP of $10.5 trillion. Chapter 12 6 Final Candidate Box 12.2—Details: The Strength of Okun’s Law The close association between the growth of real GDP (relative to the growth of potential output) and changes in the unemployment rate makes Okun’s law one of the strongest and most reliable of macroeconomic relationships. It means that we can talk about fluctuations in unemployment and know that we are also talking about fluctuations in real GDP relative to potential output. It means that we can talk about fluctuations in real GDP relative to potential output and know that we are also talking about fluctuations in unemployment. Chapter 12 7 Final Candidate Figure Legend: Before 1974 the rate of real GDP growth that kept the unemployment rate constant was about 4 percent per year. Between 1974 and 1995 or so the unemployment rate was constant when real GDP growth was about 2.8 percent per year. Since 1995 the old, pre-1974 relationship has reemerged. The rate of output growth at which the unemployment rate is constant is the rate of growth of potential output. Source: 1999 edition of the Economic Report of the President (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). Chapter 12 8 Final Candidate Box 12.3—Economic Policy: Costs of High Unemployment In a typical post-World War II U.S. recession, unemployment rises by two percentage points—from around 5 percent to around 7 percent. Okun's law predicts that, in such a case, total production relative to potential output falls by about 5%. That's about four years' worth of growth in output per worker. And recessions are not permanent: they are quickly over, and are followed by periods of rapid growth that usually serve to return total output to its pre-recession growth trend. Even the steepest recession—that of 1982—raised the unemployment rate by only four percentage points, and lowered output relative to potential by ten percent at most—about seven years’ worth of economic growth. And within three years of 1982 unemployment had fallen back to what people then considered “normal” levels. Yet people fear a typical recession much more than they value an extra four years' worth of economic growth. The memory of the 1982 recession has substantially altered Americans’ perceptions of how the economy works, how much they dare risk in the search for higher wages, and how confident they can be that their jobs are secure. Why do episodes of high recessionary unemployment have such a psychological impact? The most likely answer is that recessions are feared because recessions Chapter 12 9 Final Candidate do not distribute their impact equally. Workers who keep their jobs are only lightly affected, while those who lose their jobs suffer a near-total loss of income. People fear a 2% chance of losing half their income much more than they fear a certain loss of 1%. Thus it is much worse for 2% of the people each to lose half of their income than for everyone to lose 1%. It is the unequal distribution of the costs of recessions that makes them so feared—and that makes voters so anxious to elect economic policymakers who will successfully avoid them. 12.2 Inflation, Aggregate Supply, and the Phillips Curve 12.2.1 Three Faces of Aggregate Supply When real GDP is greater than potential output, inflation is likely to be higher than people had previously expected. Economists interpret this correlation between the deviation of real GDP from potential output and the rate of inflation relative to its previously-expected value using the idea of aggregate supply. We can see this correlation as a relationship between the price level (relative to the previously-expected price level) and the level of real GDP (relative to potential output): P P e Y Y* P e Y* We can see this correlation as a relationship between the inflation rate (relative to the previously-expected inflation rate) and the level of real GDP (relative to potential output). Inflation this year minus what inflation had been expected to be is the same as the Chapter 12 10 Final Candidate proportional difference between the price level and what the price level had been expected to be: Y Y* e Y* Or can use Okun’s law to write down yet a third form for short-run aggregate supply. Real GDP relative to potential output is proportional to the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment. Substitute the unemployment rate in on the left-hand side oft the equation above to come up with a relationship between unemployment (relative to the natural rate of unemployment) and inflation (relative to the previously-expected inflation rate): 1 u u* e where the parameter (1/) is equal to (/2.5), and with u* standing for the natural rate of unemployment—the unemployment rate when real GDP equals potential output. Rewrite this formula with the inflation rate on the left-hand side as: (u u*) e This is the Phillips curve (after the New Zealand economist A.W. Phillips who first wrote back in the 1950s of the relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of prices). Chapter 12 11 Final Candidate Figure 12.1: The Phillips Curve Inflation Rate Expected Inflation Unemployment Relative to Its Natural Rate Natural Rate Legend: When inflation is higher than expected inflation and production is higher than potential output, the unemployment rate will be lower than the natural rate of unemployment. There is thus an inverse relationship in the short run between inflation and unemployment: the lower unemployment, the higher inflation. The Phillips curve tells you that if unemployment is below its natural rate, inflation π will be higher than the previously-anticipated expected rate of inflation πe. The Phillips curve turns out to be the most convenient of the three forms in which to look at aggregate supply. But no matter which of the forms of the aggregate supply relationship you look at, the underlying concepts are the same. Chapter 12 12 Final Candidate Figure 12.2: Three Faces of Aggregate Supply Aggregate Supply--Price Level Form ...subtract off the price level to get the.... Price Level Aggregate Supply--Inflation Form Inflation Rate Expected price level Expected inflation Potential output Real GDP Relative to Potential Output Potential output Real GDP Relative to Potential Output ...use Okun's law to get the... Phillips Curve Inflation Rate Expected inflation Natural rate of unemployment Unemployment Rate Legend: You can think of aggregate supply either as a relationship between production (relative to potential output) and the price level, between production (relative to potential output) and the inflation rate, or between unemployment (relative to the natural rate of unemployment) and the inflation rate. These are three Chapter 12 13 Final Candidate different views of what remains the same single relationship. Box 12.4—Details: From Aggregate Supply to the Phillips Curve Suppose that we start from an aggregate supply curve: P P e Y Y* P e Y* for which the parameter q equals 5: a one percentage-point rise in the price level (relative to what was previously expected) is associated with a 5 percent increase in real GDP relative to potential output: P P e Y Y* 5 e P Y* How do we translate this into a slope for the Phillips curve? First, we recognize that the proportional difference between the price level P and the previouslyexpected price level Pe is the same as the difference between the inflation rate π and the previously-expected inflation rate πe: Y Y* e 5 Y* Second, we recognize that the proportional deviation between real GDP Y and potential output Y* is –2.5 times the difference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment: u * u 5 e 2.5 Rewrite this to put the current inflation rate by itself on the left-hand side: Chapter 12 14 Final Candidate e 0.5 u u * and we are done 12.2.2 The Timing of the Phillips Curve The Phillips curve relates this year's inflation to last year's unemployment. The typical firm responds to stronger demand first by hiring workers (reducing unemployment) and by working more hours. Only later do firms raise prices more rapidly. Quantities adjust first. Prices adjust later. Figure 12.3: The Timing of the Phillips Curve Change in real interest rate Change in real GDP ...12 to 18 months later... ...12 to 18 months later... Change in the inflation rate Legend: In our diagrams and equations, we implicitly assume that everything happens at the same time. But in the real world that is not the case. Changes in interest rates affect real GDP with a substantial lag as well. It takes time for changes in interest rates to change the minds of business investment committees. It takes more time for investment spending to change. And it takes still more time for changes in investment spending to have their full effect on aggregate demand through the multiplier. Chapter 12 15 Final Candidate Timing is important for making policy and making forecasts. Timing is less important for understanding the structure of the economy. So often, to keep things simpler, we will neglect these timing considerations. 12.2.3 The Working of the Phillips Curve The slope of the Phillips curve depends on how sticky wages and prices are. The stickier are wages and prices, the smaller is the parameter and the flatter is the Phillips curve. The position of the Phillips curve is determined by the natural rate of unemployment and the expected rate of inflation. Whenever unemployment is equal to its natural rate, inflation is equal to expected inflation as long as there are no current supply shocks. For adverse supply shocks--the kind of real shocks discussed in the last section of chapter 7-can and do spill over and affect aggregate supply. Thus the final, complete form of the Phillips curve equation is: e (u u*) s The rate of inflation π is equal to expected inflation πe, minus times the difference between actual and the natural rate of unemployment, plus a term s for supply shocks. The parameter varies widely. In the U.S. today it is about 0.5. The current natural rate of unemployment u* is between 4.5 and 5 percent. A higher natural rate moves the Phillips curve right. Higher expected inflation moves the Phillips curve up. Adverse supply shocks (like the 1973 tripling of world oil prices) move Chapter 12 16 Final Candidate the Phillips curve up. Favorable supply shocks (like the 1986 worldwide declines in oil prices) move the Phillips curve down. Figure 12.4: Shifts in the Phillips Curve Phillips Curve Phillips Curve Inflation Rate Inflation Rate Expected inflation Expected inflation Unemployment Rate Natural rate of unemployment Natural rate of unemployment Unemployment Rate Legend: When expected inflation changes, the position of the Phillips Curve changes too. If the past forty years have made anything clear, it is that the Phillips curve shifts around substantially both as expected inflation changes and as the natural rate changes. Neither is a constant. Both are variables whose behavior must be explained. 12.3 Aggregate Demand and Inflation Chapter 12 17 Final Candidate The previous chapters of section IV set out those pieces of the sticky-price model that determined real GDP. This chapter so far has detailed the Okun’s law relationship between real GDP and unemployment and has set out the key aggregate supply relationship that is the Phillips curve. So it is now time to bring these two pieces together: to show, quantitatively and explicitly, how the sticky-price model allows you to calculate not just real GDP but the unemployment rate and the inflation rate as well. The most straightforward way to accomplish this is to draw on the Taylor-rule monetary policy reaction function of the previous chapter: Stanford economist John Taylor’s observation that modern central banks set the real interest rate according to: r r * '' ( ' ) The central bank has a target value for what it would like inflation to be π’, and an estimate of the normal real interest rate r*. It raises interest rates above r* if inflation is higher than its target value. If we combine the IS curve with this Taylor rule and define Y0 to be the level of real GDP when the real interest rate is at its long-run normal value r*, then as we saw in the last chapter this monetary policy reaction function relationship between output and inflation is the simple-looking: Y Y0 ' ( ' ) where the parameter ’ is: ' "Ir X r 1 MPE the product of the slope of the IS curve and the amount by which the central bank raises interest rates when inflation rises. Chapter 12 18 Final Candidate But what we really want is an equation with the unemployment rate on the left-hand side. The Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and inflation is our most convenient way of looking at aggregate supply. So define u0 to be the unemployment rate when real GDP is equal to Y0, and use Okun’s law to substitute the unemployment rate on the left-hand side: u u0 ( ' ) of the monetary policy reaction function equation. The new parameter is equal to the old parameter ’/2.5. This together with the Phillips curve equation: e (u u*) s enables you to solve for the inflation and unemployment rates in the economy. Simply substitute the Phillips curve equation into the monetary policy reaction function equation for the inflation rate, and substitute the monetary policy reaction function into the Phillips curve for the unemployment rate: e ' u0 u u* s 1 1 1 1 u * u0 e s ' 1 1 1 1 The unemployment rate depends on: u0, which is Okun’s law combined with the position of the IS curve: what the unemployment rate would be if the real interest rate were equal to its long-run normal value r*. Think of u0 as the index of the normal interest rate level of aggregate demand. Chapter 12 19 Final Candidate The difference between the expected rate of inflation πe and the central bank’s target rate of inflation π’. The current natural rate of unemployment u*. Supply shocks. The parameters and : the product of the slope of the IS curve with the central bank’s propensity to raise interest rates when inflation rises, and the slope of the Phillips curve. If the central bank lowers its target rate of inflation or if expected inflation rises, the unemployment rate would rise. If changes in the economic environment or in economic policy raise the unemployment rate u0 corresponding to the “normal” interest rate r*, the unemployment rate would rise. If the natural rate of unemployment u* rises, unemployment will rise. And adverse supply shocks will also cause higher unemployment. The inflation rate depends on: Expected inflation. The difference between the natural rate of unemployment u* and what unemployment would be if the interest rate were equal to r*. The central bank’s target for inflation. Supply shocks. The parameters and : the product of the slope of the IS curve with the central bank’s propensity to raise interest rates when inflation rises, and the slope of the Phillips curve. Chapter 12 20 Final Candidate If expected inflation rises, the inflation rate will rise. If the difference between the natural rate of unemployment and the unemployment rate corresponding to the normal interest rate r* rises, inflation will rise. If the central bank raises its target rate of inflation π’, inflation will rise. And adverse supply shocks will also cause higher inflation. Note that here we have examined only one of our three ways of looking at aggregate supply (albeit our preferred way, the Phillips curve way). We could also have looked, instead, for the analogous formulas determining inflation and the level of real GDP, or for the analogous formulas determining the price level and the level of real GDP. Figure 12.5: Aggregate Demand and Supply When Demand Depends on the Inflation Rate Aggregate Supply--Price Level Form Aggregate Supply--Inflation Form Price Level Expected price level Expected inflation Potential output Real GDP Relative to Potential Output Phillips Curve Inflation Rate Inflation Rate Expected inflation Potential output Real GDP Relative to Potential Output Unemployment Rate Natural rate of unemployment Aggregate Demand Legend: This section only showed explicitly how to calculate the equililbrium inflation rate and unemployment rate produced by the interaction of the Phillips curve and the monetary policy reaction function. But this was only one of our three Chapter 12 21 Final Candidate ways of looking at aggregate supply. Similar analyses would allow you to calculate the equilibrium inflation rate and level of real GDP, or the equilibrium price level and level of real GDP. Box 12.5—Details: From Income-Expenditure to Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply The slope of the Phillips curve parameter, , has little lying “underneath” it. We can say little about the deeper parameters and functions that determine it. The most we can say is that = 0.4/, where is the proportional amount of extra productive effort called forth by a surprise one percent rise in the price level. Each of the competing theories of aggregate supply mentioned in chapter 11 hopes someday to account for why this parameter is what it is. But none would claim to be able to do so yet By contrast, an enormous amount of detail—four chapters’ worth—underpins the parameter , the slope of the monetary policy reaction function. u u0 ( ' ) We can see this by simply writing out and expanding our equation for what is: 1 1 "Ir X r 2.5 1 Cy (1 t) IMy This equation has four distinct terms, each of which has taken up considerable space in the past four chapters. Chapter 12 22 Final Candidate The first term: 1 2.5 comes from the Okun’s law section at the start of this chapter. It is the change in the unemployment rate produced by a one percent change in real GDP relative to potential output. The second term: " comes from the discussion of central banker aversion to inflation in chapter 11. It is the amount by which central bankers raise the real interest rate when inflation turns out to be one percent per year higher. The third term: Ir X r comes from chapter 10. It is the amount by which autonomous spending changes when the real interest rate changes. It incorporates both the effect of interest rates on investment spending, and the effect of interest rates on the exchange rate and hence on exports spending too. The fourth and last term: 1 1 Cy (1 t) IMy Comes from chapter 9. It is the multiplier—one divided by one minus the MPE, the marginal propensity to expend extra income on domestically-produced goods. Chapter 12 23 Final Candidate There is a sense in which most of the work of the preceding three chapters (and of this one) is encapsulated in this single parameter , the slope of the monetary policy reaction function. 12.4 The Natural Rate of Unemployment The natural rate of unemployment shifts over time as the demography of the labor force, the institutions that govern job search and wage bargaining, and other frictions and factors in the economy change. Today, most estimates of the current U.S. "natural" rate lie between 4.5 and 5.0 percent. All economists, however, agree that the uncertainty about the level of the natural rate of unemployment is great. Chapter 12 24 Final Candidate Figure 12.6: Fluctuations in Unemployment and the Natural Rate [to be updated every year] Legend: The natural rate of unemployment is not fixed. It varies substantially from decade to decade. Moreover, variations in the natural rate in the United States have been much smaller than variations in the natural rate in other countries. Chapter 12 25 Final Candidate "Natural" normally carries strong positive connotations of normal and desirable. But a high natural rate of unemployment--a rate below which unemployment cannot be reduced without accelerating inflation--is a bad thing. A high natural rate means that expansionary fiscal and monetary policy are largely ineffective as tools to permanently reduce unemployment. 12.4.1 Demography and the Natural Rate Even without changes in how the labor market operates, the economy's natural rate of unemployment will change as changing demography changes the relative age and educational distribution of the labor force. Teenagers have higher unemployment rates than adults. Thus an economy with a lot of teenagers will have a higher natural rate. More experienced and more skilled workers find looking for a job an easier experience. They take less time to find a new job when they leave an old one. Thus the natural rate of unemployment will fall when the labor force becomes more experienced and more skilled. Women used to have higher unemployment rates than men--although this is no longer true in the U.S. The more educated tend to have lower rates of unemployment than the less well educated. And African-Americans have higher unemployment rates than whites. Some part of the rise in the natural rate from 5 percent or so in the 1960s to 6 to 7 percent at the end of the 1970s was due to changing demography. Some of the decline in the natural rate since was due to the increasing experience at searching for jobs of the very Chapter 12 26 Final Candidate large baby-boom cohort. But the exact, quantitative relationship between demography and the natural rate is not well understood. 12.4.2 Institutions and the Natural Rate Some economies have strong labor unions; other economies have weak ones. Some unions sacrifice employment in their industry for higher wages; others settle for lower wages in return for employment guarantees. Some economies lack apprenticeship programs that make the transition from education to employment relatively straightforward; others make the school-to-work transition easy. Of each pair, the first increases and the second reduces the natural rate of unemployment. Barriers to worker mobility raise the natural rate, whether the barrier be subsidized housing that workers lose if they move (as in Britain in the 1970s and the 1980s), or high taxes that a firm must pay to hire a worker (as in France from the 1970s to today). However, the link between economic institutions and the natural rate is neither simple nor straightforward. The institutional features many observers today point to as a source of high European unemployment now were also present in the European economies in the 1970s--when European unemployment was low. Once again the quantitative relationships are not well understood. 12.4.3 Productivity Growth and the Natural Rate Chapter 12 27 Final Candidate In recent years it has become more and more likely that a major determinant of the natural rate is the rate of productivity growth. The era of slow productivity growth from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s saw a relatively high natural rate. By contrast, rapid productivity growth before 1973 and after 1975 seems to have generated a low natural rate. Why should a productivity growth slowdown generate a high natural rate? A higher rate of productivity growth allows firms to pay higher real wage increases and still remain possible. If workers' aspirations for real wage growth themselves depend on the rate of unemployment, then a slowdown in productivity growth will increase the natural rate. If real wages grow faster than productivity for an extended period of time, profits will disappear. Long before that point is reached businesses will begin to fire workers, and unemployment will rise. Thus if productivity growth slows unemployment will rise. Unemployment will keep rising until workers' real wage aspirations fall to a rate consistent with current productivity growth. Chapter 12 28 Final Candidate Figure 12.7: Real Wage Growth Aspirations and Productivity Real wage growth "Warranted" real wage growth imposed by rate of productivity growth Workers ' as pirations for real wage growth Unemployment rate Natural rate of unemployment Legend: Workers aspire to earn higher real wages. How much workers demand in the way of increases in the average real wage is a function of unemployment: the higher is unemployment, the lower are workers' aspirations for real wage growth. But in the long run real wages can grow no faster than productivity. Hence the natural rate of unemployment is whatever rate of unemployment curbs real wage demands so that they are consistent with productivity growth. 12.4.4 The Past Level of Unemployment and the Natural Rate Last, the natural rate will be high if unemployment has been high. Before 1980 Western European economies had unemployment rates lower than the 5% to 6% that the U.S. averaged back then. But the mid-1970s brought recessions. European unemployment rose, but did not fall back much in subsequent recoveries. Cyclical unemployment had Chapter 12 29 Final Candidate been allowed to persist until it turned into structural unemployment: Workers left unemployed for two or three years had lost their skills, lost their willingness to show up on time, and lost their interest in even looking for new jobs. Thus the natural rate rose sharply in Europe with each business cycle. In the 1960s stable inflation was accompanied by a mere 2% unemployment rate in Europe; by the mid-1990s European unemployment averaged 8% and inflation was stable. Figure 12.8: The Rise in European Unemployment Legend: The growth of unemployment in fifteen western European countries, 19601995. (ESP = Spain; FIN = Finland; BEL = Belgium, IRE = Ireland; ITA = Italy; FRA = France; DEU = Germany; NLD = Netherlands; NOR = Norway; AUT = Austria; SWE = Sweden; CHE = Switzerland.) Chapter 12 30 Final Candidate Source: Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers (2000), “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment” (Cambridge: NBER Working Paper 7282). Why does high unemployment lead to a high natural rate? The most important reason is that high unemployment generates long-term unemployment. By the late 1990s perhaps half of the unemployed in Europe had been unemployed for more than a year. The human cost of long-term unemployment is much greater than the cost of short-term unemployment. It is painful and depressing to be unemployed for more than a year. The long-term unemployed lose their attachment to the labor force, their work habits, and their skills. Thus employers become unwilling to hire the long-term unemployed. And as their skills and attachment to the labor force continue to deteriorate, the downward spiral continues. When the long-term unemployed become completely unemployable in the eyes of managers, they might as well not be there as far as the process of wage and price determination is concerned. To the extent that the long-term unemployed lack skills and employability, each addition to the stock of the long-term unemployed becomes an addition to the natural rate. This laundry list of factors affecting the natural rate is incomplete. Do not think that economists' understand much about why the natural rate is what it is. Almost every economist was surprised by the large rise in the natural rate in western Europe over the past quarter century. Almost every economist was surprised by the sharp fall in Chapter 12 31 Final Candidate America’s natural rate in the 1990s. And economists cannot confidently account for these shifts even in retrospect. 12.5 Expected Inflation The natural rate of unemployment and expected inflation determine the location of the Phillips curve--whether it is high or low, whether it is shifted to the left or to the right. The Phillips curve passes through the point on the graph where inflation is equal to expected inflation and unemployment is equal to its natural rate of unemployment. A higher natural rate of unemployment moves the Phillips curve to the right. Higher expected inflation would move the Phillips curve upward. But who does the expecting? And when do people form expectations relevant for this year's Phillips curve? Figuring out the expected inflation term in the Phillips curve must be is perhaps the hardest part of any Phillips curve analysis. Expected inflation depends in some way on what inflation is going to be. There is a potential feedback loop: causes having consequences, and then the consequences pursuing the causes back through time to affect them in turn. People's expectations of the future are key. Their images of the future shape their actions now. Thus the current economy depends on what people think the future will be. This makes economics genuinely hard. 12.5.1 Kinds of Expectations Chapter 12 32 Final Candidate Economists work with three basic scenarios for how managers, workers, and investors go about forecasting the future and forming their expectations: Static expectations. Static expectations of inflation prevail when people ignore the fact that inflation can change. Adaptive expectations. Adaptive expectations prevail when people assume the future will be like the recent past. Rational expectations. Rational expectations prevail when people use all the information they have as best they can. The Phillips curve behaves differently under each of these three scenarios. 12.5.2 The Phillips curve Under Static Expectations If inflation expectations are static, expected inflation never changes. People just don’t think about inflation. As long as the natural rate of unemployment remains unchanged (an important qualification) and as long as there are no substantial supply shocks (another important qualification) the Phillips curve is static as well. There will be some years in which unemployment is relatively low; in those years inflation will be relatively high. There will be other years in which unemployment is higher, and then inflation will be Chapter 12 33 Final Candidate lower. But as long as expectations of inflation remain static, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment will not change from year to year. Figure 12.9: Static Expectations of Inflation Inflation Rate Static expected inflation Natural rate of unemployment Unemployment Rate Low unemployment goes with high--but not rising-inflation High unemployment goes with low--but not falling-inflation Legend: If inflation expectations are static, the economy moves up and to the left and down and to the right along a Phillips curve that does not change its position. If inflation has been low and stable, businesses will probably hold static inflation expectations. Why? Because the art of managing a business is complex enough as it is. Managers have a lot of things to worry about: what their customers are doing, what their competitors are doing, whether their technology is adequate, and how applicable Chapter 12 34 Final Candidate technology is changing. When inflation has been low or stable, everyone has better things to focus their attention on than the rate of inflation. Box 12.6--Example: Static Expectations of Inflation in the 1960s The standard example of static expectations is expectations of inflation in the 1960s. No matter whether inflation in any year was lower or higher, rising or falling, economy-wide expectations of what inflation would be in the future were unchanged. For example, in the 1960s the American economy moved along a static short-run Phillips curve. When unemployment was above 5.5%, inflation was below 1.5%. When unemployment was below 4%, inflation was above 4%. Static inflation expectations meant that this Phillips curve did not shift up or down during that decade. Instead, the economy moved up and to the left and down and to the right along what appeared to be a stable Phillips curve of constant slope. Chapter 12 35 Final Candidate Figure: Static Expectations and the Phillips Curve in the 1960s This led economists, politicians, and central bankers to ask, Why not use expansionary monetary and fiscal policy to keep the economy at the upper left corner of the Phillips curve, with permanently low unemployment? In the midand late-1960s economic policy successfully moved the economy to the lower right end of the (then-static) Phillips curve. And economists, politicians, and the rest of us then learned the answer to this question. Chapter 12 36 Final Candidate Inflation expectations remained static--and the Phillips curve unchanged--only when inflation was low and steady: When inflation rose and became more variable, firms and workers began changing their expectations to adaptive ones, and the Phillips curve shifted upward. 12.5.3 The Phillips Curve Under Adaptive Expectations Suppose that the inflation rate varies too much for workers and businesses to ignore it completely. Everyone agrees that if you rely on static expectations you are going to make big mistakes in the prices you charge or the prices you pay. What then? As long as inflation last year is a good guide to what inflation will be this year, workers and managers are likely to hold adaptive expectations. They form their forecasts of this year's expected inflation by setting them equal to what last year's actual inflation happened to be. Such adaptive expectations are a good rule-of-thumb for two reasons. First, adaptive forecasts are good forecasts: as long as inflation changes only slowly, you don’t make big errors by assuming that this year is likely to be very similar to last year. Second, adaptive expectations are simple: you don’t waste a lot of time and energy forming your inflation expectations. Chapter 12 37 Final Candidate Figure 12.10: The Phillips Curve Under Adaptive Expectations Inflation Rate Expected inflation = last-year's inflation Natural rate of unemployment Unemployment Rate Low unemployment goes with higher than expected inflation High unemployment goes with lower than expected inflation Legend: If inflation expectations are adaptive, then changes in inflation shift the position of the Phillips curve: last year's actual rate of inflation becomes this year's expected inflation. Thus a low rate of unemployment not only leads to relatively high inflation this year, it shifts next year’s Phillips curve upward as well. Under such adaptive inflation expectations we need to add time subscripts so that we know what year we are talking about. And the equation for the Phillips curve becomes: t t 1 (ut ut *) t s where πt-1 stands for the fact that expected inflation is just equal to inflation last year. Chapter 12 38 Final Candidate Under such a set of adaptive expectations, the Phillips curve will shift up or down depending on whether last year's inflation was higher or lower than the previous year's. A value of unemployment lower than the natural rate will raise inflation. Higher inflation will then raise expected inflation in the subsequent year, and in the year after that, and so on. Under adaptive expectations, inflation accelerates when unemployment is less than the natural unemployment rate. It decelerates when unemployment is more than the natural rate. Hence this Phillips curve is sometimes called the accelerationist Phillips curve. Box 12.7--Example: A High-Pressure Economy Under Adaptive Expectations For example, if the government tries to keep unemployment below the natural rate for long in an economy with adaptive expectations, then year after year inflation is likely to be higher than that year’s value of expected inflation--and so year after year expected inflation will rise. The government will then find the short-run Phillips curve steadily drifting upwards, and the price level will accelerate, with each year’s proportional increase in prices greater than the last. In algebra we can easily work out the consequences--which hold only as long as expectations remain adaptive. Suppose that the government pushes the economy's unemployment rate down two percentage points below the natural rate, that the parameter in the Phillips curve is 1/2, that there are no current supply shocks, and that last year's inflation rate was 4%. Chapter 12 39 Then this year's inflation rate will be: Final Candidate 4 + 1/2 x 2 = 5 Next year's inflation rate will be: 5 + 1/2 x 2 = 6 The following year's inflation rate will be: 6 + 1/2 x 2 = 7 The year after that's inflation rate will be: 7 + 1/2 x 2 = 8 Figure: Accelerating Inflation Inflation Rate The following year's inflation = the year after that's expected inflation Next year's inflation = the following year's expected inflation This year's inflation = next year's expected inflation The year after that's Phillips curve Expected inflation = last year's inflation The following year's Phillips curve Next year's Phillips curve This year's Phillips curve Natural rate of unemployment Unemployment Rate The government holds unemployment below the natural rate And so on and so forth. As long as expectations of inflation remain adaptive, inflation will increase by one percent per year for every year that passes. But expectations of inflation will not remain adaptive forever if the inflation rate keeps rising and rising. Instead, the situation is likely to decay into hyperinflation Chapter 12 40 Final Candidate unless the government abandons its attempt to keep unemployment lower than its natural rate. 12.5.3.1 The Sacrifice Ratio In an economy with adaptive expectations the government can shift the Phillips curve downward--and thus create for the future a more favorable tradeoff between inflation and unemployment--by generating a recession and pushing the unemployment rate up now. Just as an adaptive expectations economy with unemployment below the natural rate sees expectations of inflation rising year after year, so an adaptive expectations economy with unemployment above the natural rate will see expectations of inflation falling year after year. Suppose that the current inflation rate last year was at a value π-1, and that the government wanted, over the next two years, to reduce inflation to a value of zero. What policies would it have to follow to achieve this goal? Let's reintroduce time subscripts to keep track of what happens when, calling the current year year zero. The government wants π2 to be equal to zero. What needs to be done to bring this about? In this framework the current inflation rate is: 0 1 (u0 u*) ' (u0 u*) Next year's inflation rate will be: 1 0 (u1 u*) But if we substitute the expression for this year's inflation rate: Chapter 12 41 Final Candidate 1 1 (u0 u*) (u1 u*) Then inflation in year two will be: 2 1 (u0 u*) (u1 u*) (u2 u*) If inflation in year two is to equal its target level of zero, it must be the case that: 1 0 (u0 u*) (u1 u*) (u2 u*) This equation tells us that if inflation is to be reduced to zero, unemployment must-sometime in the three years--be above its natural rate by an amount equal to (π-1)/. Lowering inflation requires a period of high unemployment and reduced output. A cost of 1/ worth of higher unemployment for one year is required to permanently reduce inflation by one percentage point. This is called the sacrifice ratio. A typical estimate of the sacrifice ratio is--given the estimated value of --that it is equal to 2: an extra two percentage points of unemployment must be incurred for one year (or an extra one percentage point for two years) over and above the natural rate in order to reduce inflation by one percentage point. Box 12.8—Economic Policy: The Volcker Disinflation Between 1979 and the mid-1980s, the Federal Reserve reduced inflation in the United States from 9 percent per year to about 3 percent. At the end of the 1970s the high level of expected inflation gave the United States an unfavorable shortrun Phillips curve tradeoff. By the middle of the 1980s the fall in inflation had also generated a fall in expected inflation: expectations of inflation were adaptive. And the fall in expected inflation had shifted down the short-run Phillips curve, Chapter 12 42 Final Candidate giving the United States a much more favorable short-run inflationunemployment tradeoff. Figure: The Phillips Curve Before and After the Volcker Disinflation To accomplish this goal, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply, discouraging investment, reducing aggregate demand, and pushing the economy to the right along the Phillips curve. Unemployment rose, and inflation fell. Reducing annual inflation by 6 percentage points required "sacrifice": during the disinflation unemployment averaged some 1 1/2 percentage points above the natural rate for the seven years between 1980 and 1986. Ten percentage point- Chapter 12 43 Final Candidate years of excess unemployment above the natural rate--that was the cost of reducing inflation from near ten to below five percent. [Figure: Change in the Phillips curve generated by the Volcker disinflation] Box 12.9--Example: Accelerating Inflation At the end of the 1960s, U.S. unemployment fell and stayed below the "natural" rate for eight straight years, from 1966 through 1973. During those years, inflation accelerated from 1.9% per year in 1965 to 5.6% per year in 1973. Year Chapter 12 44 Final Candidate after year, unemployment was lower and aggregate demand higher than the natural rate of unemployment, so inflation was higher than expected as well. At some point early in this process, people shifted the process, people raised their expectations of inflation, and the Phillips curve shifted upward. By 1973 a given value of the unemployment rate was associated with 4% per year higher inflation than it had been in the mid-1960s. Figure: Accelerating Inflation at the End of the 1960s Chapter 12 45 Final Candidate 12.5.4 The Phillips Curve Under Rational Expectations What happens government policy and the economic environment are changing rapidly enough that adaptive expectations lead to significant errors, and are no longer good enough for managers or workers? Then the economy will shift to “rational” expectations. Under rational expectations, people form their forecasts of future inflation not by looking backward at what inflation was, but by looking forward. They look at what current and expected future government policies tell us about what inflation will be. Business managers and workers then take into account what they learn about future policy. For example, they would raise their expectations of future inflation should they learn that the government is--as it did in the early 1970s—trying to pressure the Federal Reserve into boosting demand to try to lower unemployment. 12.5.4.1 Economic Policy Under Rational Expectations Under rational expectations the Phillips curve shifts as rapidly as, or faster than, changes in economic policy that affect the level of aggregate demand. This has an interesting consequence: anticipated changes in economic policy turn out to have no effect on the level of production or employment. Consider an economy that begins in equilibrium, with the aggregate demand relation intersecting the Phillips curve--aggregate supply--at the point where inflation is equal to expected inflation and unemployment is equal to its natural rate. Suppose that workers, managers, savers, and investors have rational expectations. And suppose that the government takes steps to stimulate the economy: it cuts taxes, increases government Chapter 12 46 Final Candidate spending, or instructs the central bank to lower the real interest rate in order to reduce unemployment below the natural rate. What is likely to happen? Figure 12.11: The Government Attempts to Stimulate the Economy Legend: A government pursuing an expansionary economic policy shifts the aggregate demand curve. Remember that on the Phillips curve diagram an increase in production is associated with a reduction in unemployment, so an expansionary shift is a shift to the left in Phillips-curve diagram aggregate-demand! If the government's policy comes as a surprise--if the expectations of inflation that matter for this year's Phillips curve have already been set, in the sense that the contracts have been written, the orders have been made, and the standard operating procedures identified--then the economy moves up and to the left along the Phillips curve in response to the shift in aggregate demand produced by the change in government policy. Chapter 12 47 Final Candidate Figure 12.12: If the Shift in Policy Comes as a Surprise… Legend: A surprise expansionary policy shifts the economy up and to the left along the Phillips curve, raising inflation and lowering unemployment (and raising production) in the short run. But if the government's policy is anticipated--if the expectations of inflation that matter for this year's Phillips curve are formed after the decision to stimulate the economy is made and becomes public--then workers, managers, savers, and investors take the stimulative policy into account when they form their expectations of inflation. Thus the level of expected inflation after the shift in policy will be the actual level of inflation after the policy shift. That means that the inward shift in aggregate demand will be accompanied, under rational expectations, by an upward shift in the Phillips curve as the Chapter 12 48 Final Candidate shift in aggregate demand leads to an increase in expected inflation. How large an increase? An increase in expected inflation sufficient to make expected inflation after the demand shift equal to actual inflation. Figure 12.13: If the Shift in Policy Is Anticipated… Legend: If the expansionary policy is anticipated, than workers, consumers, and managers will build what the policy will do into their expectations: the Phillips curve will shift up as the aggregate demand curve shifts in, and so the expansionary policy will raise inflation without having any impact on unemployment (or production). Chapter 12 49 Final Candidate Thus an anticipated increase in aggregate demand has, under rational expectations, no effect on the unemployment rate or on real GDP. Unemployment does not change: it remains at the natural rate of unemployment because the shift in the Phillips curve has neutralized in advance any impact of changing inflation on unemployment. It will, however, have a large effect on the rate of inflation. Economists will sometimes say that under rational expectations "anticipated policy is irrelevant." But this is not the best way to express it. Policy is very relevant indeed for the inflation rate. It is only the effects of policy on real GDP and the unemployment rate--effects that are associated with a divergence between expected inflation and actual inflation--that are neutralized. Box 12.10—Economic Policy: President Mitterand and France in 1981 In 1981 the French socialist Francois Mitterand won the presidential election by promising to end the high-unemployment stagflation that had gripped the French economy since 1973. Mitterand promised that his policies would lower unemployment and inflation and restore rapid productivity growth. They claimed to know how to reattain full employment through Keynesian economic stimulus that would expand aggregate demand. Massive increases in government spending, large budget deficits, and a redistribution of purchasing power from the (low marginal propensity to consume) rich to the (high marginal propensity to consume) poor would “reflate” the French economy. Chapter 12 50 Final Candidate But Mitterand’s policy came two or three decades too late. By 1981 a decade of high and variable inflation had made every French saver and every international exchange rate speculator keenly aware that what the French inflation rate would be depended on what the French government’s policies were. Mitterand had preannounced his policies loudly and publicly: they were, after all, his election platform. If ever there was a case in which there was good reason to believe that expected inflation would be formed through rational expectations, it was France in 1981. So it came as little surprise to cynical outside observers—although it came as a great surprise to the Mitterand administration itself—that the French Phillips curve shifted upwards even as the new socialist government took office. Unemployment in France did not fall. But inflation rose sharply. By the end of 1982 the Mitterand administration had reversed course nearly totally. The idea that full employment could be reattained by expanding aggregate demand was abandoned. 12.5.6 What Kind of Expectations Do We Have? If inflation is low and stable, expectations are probably static: it is not worth anyone's while to even think about what one's expectations should be. If inflation is moderate and fluctuates, but slowly, expectations are probably adaptive: to assume that the future will be like the recent past--which is what adaptive expectations are--is likely to be a good rule of thumb, and is simple to implement. Chapter 12 51 Final Candidate When shifts in inflation are clearly related to changes in monetary policy, swift to occur, and are large enough to seriously affect profitability, then people are likely to have rational expectations. When the stakes are high--when people think, "had I known inflation was going to jump, I would not have taken that contract"--then every economic decision becomes a speculation on the future of monetary policy. Because it matters for their bottom lines and their livelihoods, people will turn all their skill and insight into generating inflation forecasts. Thus the kind of expectations likely to be found in the economy at any moment depend on what has been and is going on. A period during which inflation is low and stable will lead people to stop making, and stop paying attention to, inflation forecasts--and tend to cause expectations of inflation to revert to static expectations. A period during which inflation is high, volatile, and linked to visible shifts in economic policy will see expectations of inflation become more rational. An intermediate period of substantial but slow variability is likely to see many managers and workers adopt the rule-of-thumb of adaptive expectations. 12.5.6.1 Persistent Contracts The way that people make contracts and form and execute plans for their economic activity are likely to make an economy behave as if expectations in it are less "rational" than expectations in fact are. People do not wait until December 31 to factor next year's expected inflation into their decisions and contracts. They make decisions about the Chapter 12 52 Final Candidate future, sign contracts, and undertake projects all the time. Some of those steps govern what the company does for a day. Others govern decisions for years or even for a decade or more. Thus the "expected inflation" that determines the location of the short-run Phillips curve has components that were formed just as the old year ended, but also components that were formed two, three, five, ten, or more years ago. People buying houses form forecasts of what inflation will be over the next thirty years--but once the house is bought, that decision is a piece of economic activity (imputed rent on owner occupied housing) as long as they own the house, no matter what they subsequently learn about future inflation. Such lags in decision making tend to produce "price inertia." They tend to make the economy behave as if inflation expectations were more adaptive than they in fact are. There will always be a large number of projects and commitments already underway that cannot easily adjust to changing prices. It is important to take this "price inertia" into account when thinking about the dynamics of inflation, output, and unemployment. 12.5.7 Supply Shocks and the Inflation Rate Sometimes there can be sudden increases in prices that suddenly push the Phillips curve upward. In an economy with large amounts of imports and exports, a sudden reduction in the value of the currency is such a supply shock. So was the rapid increase in the price of Chapter 12 53 Final Candidate oil in 1973 and again in 1979--the so-called oil shocks. The large decrease in the price of oil in 1986 was another supply shock, but this time in the opposite direction. Figure 12.14: The Supply Shock of 1973 Legend: The sudden shift in the Phillips curve between 1973 and 1975 was the result not of any change in inflation expectations but of a supply shock: the tripling of world oil prices. Chapter 12 54 Final Candidate Such unfavorable supply shocks lead to what is called stagflation. Both inflation and unemployment will rise as the economy moves to a new equilibrium up and to the right on the Phillips curve diagram. If the Federal Reserve tries to accommodate the supply shock by keeping it from reducing real GDP, it risks creating very high inflation. If the Federal Reserve tries to keep the supply shock from raising prices and inflation, it risks a very severe recession, fall in real GDP, and rise in unemployment. 12.6 Understanding Fluctuations in the U.S. How useful is the Phillips curve in understanding economic fluctuations in the U.S. over the past generation or so? If we plot on a graph the points corresponding to inflation and unemployment attained by the U.S. economy since 1960, the economy has been all over the map—or at least all over the diagram. Yet the Phillips curve is useful: that is why macro courses spend time on it. It does provide a framework to understand what happened--and is happening. If we look at the track of unemployment and inflation in the U.S. over the past forty years, we see a tangled picture that crosses and re-crosses itself over the decades. During the first half of the period both unemployment and inflation are more likely than not to drift upward. During the second half of the period both unemployment and inflation trend downward. The position of the economy on the Phillips curve diagram also describes four rough counterclockwise loops--from 1960 to 1972, from 1972 to 1977, from 1977 to 1987, and from 1987 to the present. The first two of these end with higher inflation and Chapter 12 55 Final Candidate unemployment than they had started with. The last two of which end with lower inflation and unemployment than they had started with. In rough outline, the way to understand these loops is that each of them is composed of four parts: A period during which the economy moves up and to the left along a more-orless stable short-run Phillips curve as unemployment falls and inflation rises, during which expansionary economic policies take hold in a context of relatively stable inflation expectations. A period during which the economy moves up and to the right and unemployment and inflation both rise as the Phillips curve shifts out, in part because of a rising natural rate of unemployment and in part because of rising expectations of inflation. A period during which the economy moves down and to the right along a more-or-less stable short-run Phillips curve as unemployment rises and inflation falls, during which contractionary economic policies take hold in a context of relatively stable inflation expectations A period during which the economy moves down and to the left and unemployment and inflation both fall as the Phillips curve shifts in, in part because of a falling natural rate of unemployment and in part because of falling expectations of inflation. During the first two of these loops, a rising natural rate coupled with the fact that inflation expectations rose more as a result of expansionary than they fell as a result of Chapter 12 56 Final Candidate contractionary policies meant that the economy drifted toward higher average inflation and unemployment rates. During the last two of these loops, a falling natural rate coupled with the fact that inflation expectations rose less as a result of expansionary than they fell as a result of contractionary policies meant that the economy drifted toward lower average inflation and unemployment rates. The more-or-less regular decade-after-decade repetition of this pattern has left many observers expecting it to start again any day now-anticipating that a rise in expected inflation will cause both unemployment and inflation to start rising again. Chapter 12 57 Final Candidate Figure 12.15: Inflation and Unemployment Since 1960 Legend: Since 1960, as the short-run Phillips curve has shifted first outward and then inward, and as the economy has moved along the short-run Phillips curve, the U.S. economy has performed four counter-clockwise loops--some large, some small--as expansionary policies that push down unemployment raise inflation, shift expected inflation and so shift the Phillips curve, and then are followed by contractionary policies to raise unemployment lower inflation, reduce expected inflation, and shift the Phillips curve back. Chapter 12 58 Final Candidate But let us look at what actually happened in more detail 12.6.1 The late 1950s and 1960s: William McChesney Martin The late 1950s and 1960s saw little change in real interest rates. By and large the Federal Reserve--chaired by Wiliam McChesney Martin--tried to keep interest rates stable by following an accomodating monetary policy. The period 1961-69 saw a boom, as economic policy makers sought to "close the gap" between the level of total product and potential output through tax cuts and increases in government spending. They overclosed it. The recovery of investment, the 1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, and the Vietnam War together shifted the IS curve out, raised real GDP relative to potential output, and lowered the unemployment rate. By the late 1960s it was clear that real GDP was higher than potential output, and inflation was rising. Stable prices for most of the 1950s had given the American economy static inflation expectations when the 1960s opened. Thus for most of the 1960s—as inflation expectations remained static—the economy moved down and to the right and up and to the left along a stable short-run Phillips curve. Low inflation was associated with relatively high unemployment (on the order of 6 percent, well above that period’s natural rate), and higher inflation (on the order of 4 percent per year) was associated with relatively low unemployment (below 4 percent). Chapter 12 59 Final Candidate Figure 12.16: The U.S. Phillips Curve(s} The U.S. Phillips Curve(s), 1955-1980 Inflation 10% 1980 9% 1974 8% Expec ted Inflation 75-80 7% 1976 6% 1970 Natural Rate, 75-80 5% Phillips Curve, 1975-1980 1972 4% 1955 3% 1967 2% Expec ted Inflation 55-67 1% 1959 1962 Natural Rate, 55-67 Phillips Curve, 1955-1967 1963 0% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% Previous Year's Unemployment 8% 9% Legend: From the mid-1950s to the late 1960s the U.S. economy moved left and right along a stable short-run Phillips curve produced by the largely static expectations of inflation. A prolonged period of low unemployment in the 1960s, however, caused a shift in expectations from static to adaptive. That shift plus the supply shocks of the 1970s caused the Phillips curve to shift upward and outward. By the late 1970s the U.S.'s short-run unemployment-inflation tradeoff was extremely unfavorable. Chapter 12 60 Final Candidate How does inflation accelerate if unemployment stays lower than the “natural” rate for a long time? We can see the answer in the behavior of unemployment and inflation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the end of the 1960s, U.S. unemployment fell and stayed below the “natural” rate for eight straight years, from 1966 through 1973. During those years, inflation accelerated from 1.9% per year in 1965 to 5.6% per year in 1973. Year after year, unemployment was lower and aggregate demand higher than expected, so inflation was higher than expected as well. Thus people raised their expectations of inflation—and the Phillips curve shifted upward. 12.6.2 The 1970s: Arthur Burns During the 1970s monetary policy in the U.S. was overly expansionary. One reason for this was Federal Reserve Chair Arthur Burns’s fear that tighter monetary policy to restrain inflation would generate pressure for Congress to reform or replace the Federal Reserve. A second reason--perhaps: economists and historians still argue--was President Nixon’s strong belief that he had put Arthur Burns at the Fed to reassure Nixon’s election, and that Burns was supposed to do so by generating a loose monetary policy driven boom in late 1972. A third reason was a general failure to recognize how high expectations of inflation were, thus how low real interest rates were and how much of a boost low real interest rates were giving to the economy. 1973 also saw the first of the oil shocks—the first major supply shock. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) tripled world oil prices. In response, Chapter 12 61 Final Candidate investment spending collapsed in 1974-75. The IS curve moved far to the left as uncertainty led businesses to postpone action until the future became clearer. The sudden oil-based supply shock pushed the rate of inflation up substantially. And--because inflation expectations had become adaptive as a result of the variability seen in inflation in the years surrounding the end of the 1960s--high supply-shock caused inflation in 1974 raised expectations of inflation in 1975 and 1976. The natural rate of unemployment also rose in the 1970s. The 1970s saw the--then young and inexperienced--baby-boom generation enter the workforce, which pushed up the natural rate of unemployment. And the mid-1970s saw a productivity slowdown all across the industrial world. Because of this productivity slowdown the rates of real wage increases that everyone had anticipated could not be sustained. And attempts to win what everyone thought of as standard real wage increases almost surely led to a reduction in employment, and to a further rise in the natural rate of unemployment. The effects of these shifts in the natural rate were not well recognized at the time. Monetary policy became too expansionary because policymakers did not recognize how high the natural rate had risen, and in the second half of the 1970s inflation accelerated. By 1979 the Phillips curve had shifted far out and to the right because of the rise in expected inflation and the rise in the natural rate of unemployment. The rate of inflation was approaching ten percent per year. A political consensus developed that some steps-even some painful steps--would have to be taken to reduce inflation. Chapter 12 62 Final Candidate 12.6.3 The 1980s: Paul Volcker President Carter appointed Paul Volcker Federal Reserve Chair in 1979. Facing nearly 10% inflation per year, Volcker decided that inflation had to be permanently reduced— and that he was going to tighten monetary policy and send the economy into recession until it was reduced. When Volcker retired from the Fed in 1987 inflation was only 3% per year. To reduce inflation, Volcker's Federal Reserve raised interest rates sharply. Real interest rates rose to previously unseen levels, real GDP fell, and unemployment rose to a peak near ten percent. Figure 12.17: The Phillips Curve in the 1980s Chapter 12 63 Final Candidate Legend: At the end of the 1970s newly-appointed Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker concluded that reducing inflation and inflation expectations was his principal task. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates to contract aggregate demand. High interest rates pushed unemployment up to 10 percent in the early 1980s. The economy moved first down and to the left along an unchanging shortrun Phillips curve and then--as people responded to the change in Federal Reserve policy by lowering their expectations of inflation--the Phillips curve shifted downward. In 1982 came the deepest recession since the Great Depression. But inflation did slow markedly during the 1980s. First, high unemployment and reduced aggregate demand moved the economy down and to the right along the early-1980s Phillips curve—pushing unemployment up to ten percent and inflation down to four percent. Second, the magnitude of the shift in economic policy under Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker caused investors, managers, and workers to revise their expectations about inflation. During the mid-1980s the Phillips curve shifted inward: stable inflation was combined with falling unemployment as investors, managers, and workers realized that their previous expectations of inflation--geared to the policies of the pre-Volcker 1970s Federal Reserve--were too high. Reducing annual inflation by the roughly 6 percentage points accomplished while Volcker was chairman of the Federal Reserve required substantial "sacrifice": During the first seven years of Volcker's tenure at the Federal Reserve, unemployment averaged Chapter 12 64 Final Candidate some 2 percentage points above the natural rate--and real GDP averaged some 5 percent below sustainable trend. 12.6.4 The 1990s: Alan Greenspan. The principal maker of economic policy since the late 1980s has been Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan--appointed and reappointed by three successive presidents. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan also is somewhat of a paradox: a Federal Reserve Chair whom all trust to be a ferocious inflation fighter, yet one who--in the policies chosen--has frequently seemed willing to risk higher inflation in order to achieve higher economic growth, or to avoid a recession. Greenspan's tenure was marked by a stock market crash in October, 1987. The Alan Greenspan-led FOMC lowered interest rates and expanded the monetary base, hoping that this shift in monetary policy would offset any leftward shift in the IS curve associated with the stock market crash. The stock market crash of 1987 had next to no effect on investment spending or aggregate demand, and by the end of the 1980s the U.S. economy had seen inflation begin to rise toward five percent. In response, the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy occurred at the same time as a sudden leftward shift in the IS curve: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait triggered reduced investment, as companies waited to see whether the world economy was about to experience another long-run upward spike in oil prices. The U.S. economy slid into recession at the end of 1990, and unemployment rose to peak in the middle of 1992. Chapter 12 65 Final Candidate Recovery began in 1993, and Greenspan signalled that if Congress and the President took significant steps to reduce the budget deficit left over from the Reagan and Bush administrations, the Federal Reserve would maintain lower interest rates--a shift in the policy mix that would keep the target level of production and employment unchanged, but that with lower interest rates would promise higher investment and faster productivity growth: an "investment-led recovery." Monetary policy turned out extremely well. In 1994, 1995, and 1996 economists talked of yet another leftward shift in the Phillips curve as investors, managers, and workers had become more confident in the Federal Reserve’s ability to control inflation and hence revised their expectations downward even more. By 1997, however, it seemed clear that something else was going on. 1997 marked the third straight year that unemployment had been below six percent—a sign in the past that inflation was likely to begin to accelerate—yet there had been no acceleration of inflation. Economists began to talk first of special factors. And then, by 1998, economists began to talk of a large reduction in the natural rate of unemployment—from the 6.5 percent or so of the 1980s down to 5 percent, or perhaps even lower. Why has the natural rate of unemployment fallen so far? The aging of the labor force in the 1990s has played a role in reducing the natural rate: older and more experienced workers are much better at searching for jobs and finding good matches than younger ones. The fact that a high-investment recovery began to produce more rapid productivity growth than in the 1970s and 1980s also played a factor. High investment meant relatively rapid growth in potential output. That meant that firms could offer relatively Chapter 12 66 Final Candidate large nominal wage increases without being forced to increase their prices to cover costs. And those large nominal wage increases thus turned into substantial real wage increases, at least for skilled workers with substantial labor market bargaining power. But most of the reduction in the apparent level of the natural rate of unemployment in the late 1990s remains unexplained: a piece of macroeconomic good luck that few had anticipated. Figure 12.18: The U.S. Phillips Curve in the 1990s Chapter 12 67 Final Candidate Legend: The 1990s saw yet another inward shift of the Phillips curve, this one in large part the result of a falling natural rate of unemployment generated by faster productivity growth. 12.7 From the Short Run to the Long Run 12.7.1 Rational Expectations Our picture of the determination of real GDP and unemployment under sticky prices is now complete. We have a comprehensive framework to understand how the aggregate price level and inflation rate move and adjust over time in response to changes in aggregate demand, production relative to potential output, and unemployment relative to its natural rate. There is, however, one loose end. How does one get from the short-run sticky-price patterns of behavior that have been covered in chapters 9 through 12 to the long-run flexible price patterns of behavior that were laid out in chapters 6 and 7? How do you get from the short run to the long run? In the case of an anticipated shift in economic policy under rational expectations, the answer is straightforward: you don't have to get from the short run to the long run; the long run is now. An inward (or outward) shift in the monetary policy reaction function on the Phillips curve diagram caused by an expansionary (or contractionary) change in economic policy or the economic environment sets in motion an offsetting shift in the Phillips curve. In the absence of supply shocks: e (u u*) Chapter 12 68 Final Candidate If expectations are rational and if changes in economic policy are foreseen, then expected inflation will be equal to actual inflation: e Which means that: 0 (u u*) The unemployment rate is equal to the natural rate. The economy is at full employment. Figure 12.19: The Long Run Is Now… Legend: Under rational expectations there simply is no short run, unless changes in policy come as a complete surprise. Chapter 12 69 Final Candidate Because the unemployment rate is equal to the natural rate of unemployment, real GDP is equal to potential output—and stays equal to potential output no matter what changes occur in the economic environment and in economic policy, as long as expectations of inflation are formed rationally and policy changes are anticipated. All the analysis of chapters 6, 7, and 8 holds. Box 12.12—Economic Policy: The Slope of the Monetary Policy Reaction Function and the Effect of Expansionary Policies Under Rational Expectations We can see how large an increase in inflation is created by a government pursuing expansionary policies under rational expectations by adding the rational expectations requirement that actual inflation be equal to expected inflation: e to our Phillips curve and monetary policy reaction function equations: e (u u*) u u0 ( ' ) Expansionary policies are, in this framework, a shift in this last equation. Expansionary government policies reduce the value of u0, the unemployment rate when the real interest rate is equal to its normal value r*. What effect do such policies have? The first equation tells us that under rational expectations with anticipated policies expected inflation will be equal to actual inflation. The first and second equations tell us that under rational expectations with anticipated policies the unemployment rate must be equal to the natural rate: u u* Hence the third equation becomes: Chapter 12 70 Final Candidate u* u0 ( ' ) And we can solve this equation for the inflation rate: u * u0 ' This equation has a very simple and natural interpretation. Take the difference between the natural rate of unemployment and u0, what the unemployment would be if the real interest rate were at its normal level r*. This u0 serves as an index of the extent to which policy is expansionary. Divide this difference by the slope of the monetary policy reaction function . Add the result to the central bank’s target inflation rate π’, and you have calculated the rate of inflation. Under rational expectations, the government’s pursuit of higher production and lower unemployment has not affected either—unemployment remains equal to the natural rate, and real GDP remains equal to potential output. But it has raised inflation. Moreover, the more cautious the central bank is in fighting inflation—the lower the parameter —the higher is the resulting inflation rate. In the limit in which the central bank does not respond to higher inflation by raising real interest rates, there is no way to solve the equation for the inflation rate π. If the government tries overly-expansionary policies, and if the central bank is not averse to inflation, then immediate hyperinflation results. Chapter 12 71 Final Candidate Figure: Rational Expectations Plus an Expansionary Shift in Policy Plus a Vertical Monetary Policy Reaction Function Equals Immediate Hyperinflation Inflation Rate Aggregate Demand shifts in... Inflation explodes Natural rate of unemployment 12.7.2 Adaptive Expectations Unemployment Rate Chapter 12 72 Final Candidate If expectations are and remain adaptive, then the economy approaches the long run equilibrium laid out in chapters 6 and 7, but in the absence of additional shocks it never reaches it--although it does converge to it. An expansionary initial shock that shifts the aggregate demand relation inward on the Phillips curve diagram generates a fall in unemployment, an increase in real GDP, and a rise in inflation. Call this stage 1. Stage 1 takes place before anyone has had any chance to adjust their expectations of inflation. Then comes stage 2. Workers, managers, investors, and others look at what inflation was in stage 1 and raise their expectations of inflation. The Phillips curve shifts up by the difference between actual and expected inflation in stage 1. If the aggregate demand relation does not shift when plotted on the Phillips curve diagram, between stage 1 and stage 2 unemployment rises, real GDP falls, and inflation rises. Then comes stage 3. Workers, managers, investors, and others look at what inflation was in stage 1 and raise their expectations of inflation. The Phillips curve shifts up by the difference between actual and expected inflation in stage 2. If the aggregate demand relation does not shift when plotted on the Phillips curve diagram, between stage 2 and stage 3 unemployment rises, real GDP falls, and inflation rises. After an arbitrarily large number of such stages, the gap between actual and expected inflation becomes arbitrarily small, real GDP become arbitrarily close to potential output, and unemployment becomes arbitrarily close to its natural rate. Chapter 12 73 Final Candidate Figure 12.20: Convergence to the Long Run Under Adaptive Expectations Legend: Under adaptive expectations, shifts in policy have strong initial effects on Chapter 12 74 Final Candidate unemployment and production, but those effects on unemployment and production slowly die off over time. Under adaptive expectations, people's forecasts become closer and closer to being accurate as more and more time passes. Thus the "long run" arrives gradually. Each year the portion of the change in demand that is not implicitly incorporated in people's adaptive forecasts becomes smaller and smaller. Thus a larger and larger proportion of the shift is "long run" and a smaller and smaller proportion is "short run." 12.7.3 Static Expectations Under static expectations, the long run never arrives: the analysis of chapters 6 through 8 never becomes relevant. Under static expectations, the gap between expected inflation and actual inflation can grow arbitrarily large as different shocks affect the economy. And if the gap between expected inflation and actual inflation becomes large, workers, managers, investors, and consumers will not remain so foolish as to retain static expectations. 12.8 Chapter Summary 12.8.1 Main Points Chapter 12 75 Final Candidate The location of the Phillips curve is determined by the expected rate of inflation and the natural rate of unemployment (and possibly by current, active supply shocks). In the absence of current, active supply shocks, the Phillips curve passes through the point at which inflation is its expected value and unemployment is its natural rate. The slope of the Phillips curve is determined by the degree of price stickiness in the economy. The more sticky are prices, the flatter is the Phillips curve. The natural rate of unemployment in the U.S. has exhibited moderate swings in the past two generations: from perhaps 4.5 percent at the end of the 1950s to perhaps 7 percent at the start of the 1980s, and now down to 5 percent or perhaps lower again. Three significant supply shocks have affected the rate of inflation in the U.S. over the past two generations: the (inflationary) oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, and the (deflationary) oil price decrease of 1986. The principal determinant of the expected rate of inflation is the past behavior of inflation. If inflation has been low and steady, expectations are probably static, and the expected inflation rate is very low and unchanging. If inflation has been variable but moderate, expectations are probably adaptive and expected inflation is probably simply equal to last year's inflation. If inflation has been high, or moderate but has varied extremely rapidly, then expectations are probably rational and expected inflation is likely to be households' and businesses' best guesses of where economic policy is taking the economy. Chapter 12 76 Final Candidate The best way to gauge how expectations of inflation are formed is to consider the past history of inflation. Would adaptive expectations have provided a significant edge over static ones? If yes, then inflation expectations are probably adaptive. Would rational expectations have provided a significant edge over adaptive ones? If yes, then inflation expectations are probably rational. The aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework--the IS-LM model and the Phillips curve--is very useful for understanding macroeconomic events in the U.S. over the past two generations. The aggregate demand-aggregate supply framework--the IS-LM model and the Phillips curve--is not as useful for understanding macroeconomic events in western Europe over the past two generations. Too much of the variation in unemployment has been due to changes in the natural rate of unemployment, and not enough to cyclical variation in unemployment around its natural rate. Combining the Phillips curve with the Taylor rule monetary policy reaction function gives us a flexible toolkit to use to analyze inflation and unemployment, and how a real economy makes the transition from the fixed-price model behavior outlined in chapters 9 through 11 to the flexible-price model behavior outlined in chapters 6 through 8. How fast the flexible-price model becomes relevant depends on the type of inflation expectations in the economy. Under static expectations, the flexible-price model never becomes relevant. Under adaptive expectations, the flexible-price model Chapter 12 77 Final Candidate becomes relevant gradually, in the long run. Under rational expectations the long-run is now: the flexible-price model analysis is relevant always and immediately. 12.8.2 Important Concepts Okun’s law Output gap Costs of high unemployment Long and variable lags Sticky prices Phillips curve Natural rate of unemployment Demography Labor market institutions Long-term unemployment Real wage aspirations Normal real rate of interest Normal interest rate level of aggregate demand Expected inflation Central bank inflation target Static expectations Adaptive expectations Rational expectations Natural rate of unemployment Chapter 12 78 Final Candidate Sacrifice ratio Monetary policy reaction function William McChesney Martin Arthur Burns Paul Volcker Alan Greenspan 12.8.3 Analytical Exercises 1. What is the relationship between the three views of aggregate supply? Why do economists tend to focus on the Phillips curve to the exclusion of the other two views? 2. Under what circumstances will a government expansionary fiscal or monetary policy do nothing to raise GDP or lower unemployment? 3. Under the circumstances in which an expansionary government policy fails to raise GDP or lower unemployment, what would the policy manage to do? 4. If expectations of inflation are adaptive, is there any way to reduce inflation without suffering unemployment higher than the natural rate? What would you advise a central bank that sought to reduce inflation without provoking high unemployment to do? Chapter 12 79 Final Candidate 5. What do you think a central bank should do in response to an adverse supply shock? How does your answer depend on the way in which expectations of inflation are being formed in the economy? 6. Suppose that the economy has a Phillips curve: t et (ut ut *) with the parameter = 0.5 and the natural rate of unemployment u* equal to 6%. And suppose that the central bank’s reaction to inflation, the IS curve, and Okun’s law together mean that the unemployment rate is given by: ut u0t t t ' with the central bank’s target level of inflation π’ equal to 2%, with the parameter equal to 0.4, and with the normal real interest rate-level of aggregate demand corresponding to a value of u0 of 6%. Suppose that initially—this year, in the year zero—that expected inflation is equal to actual inflation. a. What is the year-zero level of unemployment? b. Suppose that the government announces that in year one and in every year thereafter its expansionary policies will reduce u0 to 4%, that this announcement is credible, and that the economy has rational expectations of inflation. What will unemployment and inflation be in year one? What will they be thereafter? c. Suppose that the government announces that in year one and in every year thereafter its expansionary policies will reduce u0 to 4%, that this announcement is credible, and that the economy has adaptive expectations of inflation. What will unemployment and inflation be in year one? What will they be thereafter? Chapter 12 80 Final Candidate d. Suppose that the government announces that in year one and in every year thereafter its expansionary policies will reduce u0 to 4%, that this announcement is credible, and that the economy has static expectations of inflation. What will unemployment and inflation be in year one? What will they be thereafter? 7. Suppose that the economy has a Phillips curve: t et (ut ut *) with the parameter = 0.5 and the natural rate of unemployment u* equal to 6%. And suppose that the central bank’s reaction to inflation, the IS curve, and Okun’s law together mean that the unemployment rate is given by: ut u0t t t ' with the central bank’s target level of inflation π’ equal to 2%, with the parameter equal to 0.4, and with the normal real interest rate-level of aggregate demand corresponding to a value of u0 of 6%. Suppose that initially—this year, in the year zero—that expected inflation is equal to actual inflation. a. What is the year-zero level of unemployment? b. Suppose that the central bank raises its target inflation rate for next year—year one—to 4%, and announces this change. Suppose the economy has rational expectations of inflation. What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? c. Suppose that the central bank raises its target inflation rate for next year—year one—to 4%, and announces this change. Suppose the economy has adaptive expectations of inflation. What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? Chapter 12 81 Final Candidate d. Suppose that the central bank raises its target inflation rate for next year—year one—to 4%, and announces this change. Suppose the economy has static expectations of inflation. What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? 8. Suppose that the economy has a Phillips curve: t et (ut ut *) with the parameter = 0.5 and the natural rate of unemployment u* equal to 6%. And suppose that the central bank’s reaction to inflation, the IS curve, and Okun’s law together mean that the unemployment rate is given by: ut u0t t t ' with the central bank’s target level of inflation π’ equal to 2%, with the parameter equal to 0.4, and with the normal real interest rate-level of aggregate demand corresponding to a value of u0 of 6%. Suppose that initially—this year, in the year zero—that expected inflation is equal to actual inflation. a. What is the year-zero level of unemployment? b. Suppose that the natural rate of unemployment u* falls to 4% in year one and remains at that level indefinitely. And suppose that this fall in the natural rate of unemployment does not come as a surprise. Suppose the economy has rational expectations of inflation. What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? c. Suppose that the natural rate of unemployment u* falls to 4% in year one and remains at that level indefinitely. And suppose that this fall in the natural rate of unemployment does not come as a surprise. Suppose the economy has adaptive expectations of inflation. Chapter 12 82 Final Candidate What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? d. Suppose that the natural rate of unemployment u* falls to 4% in year one and remains at that level indefinitely. And suppose that this fall in the natural rate of unemployment does not come as a surprise. Suppose the economy has static expectations of inflation. What will happen to unemployment and inflation in year one? What will happen thereafter? 12.8.4 Policy-Relevant Exercises [to be updated every year…] 1. Why is the natural rate of unemployment so high in Europe today? 2. Why is the natural rate of unemployment so low in the United States today? 3. Consider the unemployment rate and the inflation rate in the U.S. today and back in 1990. Assume that the slope of the Phillips curve is 1/2--that one percent more unemployment leads (holding expected inflation) to 1/2 percent less inflation. How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in the U.S. since 1990 is due to movements along the Phillips curve? How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in the U.S. since 1990 is due to shifts in the Phillips curve? 4. Consider the unemployment rate and the inflation rate in Britain today and back in 1990. Assume that the slope of the Phillips curve is 1/2--that one percent more Chapter 12 83 Final Candidate unemployment leads (holding expected inflation) to 1/2 percent less inflation. How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in the France since 1990 is due to movements along the Phillips curve? How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in the France since 1990 is due to shifts in the Phillips curve? 5. Consider the unemployment rate and the inflation rate in France today and back in 1990. Assume that the slope of the Phillips curve is 1/2--that one percent more unemployment leads (holding expected inflation) to 1/2 percent less inflation. How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in France since 1990 is due to movements along the Phillips curve? How much of the shift in unemployment and inflation in the France since 1990 is due to shifts in the Phillips curve? 6. Do you think that inflation expectations in the U.S. today are static, adaptive, or rational? Why?